未分类的版本
(Classified Material Has been Removed)
Issued by the Department of Energy
October 1997
| Title | Classification |
|---|---|
| A.任务 | 你 |
| B. Stakeholder Input | 你 |
| C. Topics Requiring Greater Protection | SRD (not included) |
| D. Report of the Weapon Design Working Group | SRD (not included) |
| E. Report of the Weapon Science Working Group | SRD (not included) |
| F. Report of the Weaponization and Weapons Production and Military Use Working Group | 你 |
| 你 | |
| 你 | |
| SRD (not included) | |
| CRD (not included) | |
| G. Report of the Nuclear Materials Production Working Group |
你 |
| H. Report of the Military Reactors Working Group | 你 |
| I. Report of the Safeguards and Security Working Group |
你(OUO not included) |
| J. Summary of Proposed Topics for Declassification | SRD (not included) |
| K.组织和参与者 | 你 |
这份报告的第一章描述了让gins of the Review, its place in the DOE Openness Initiative, and the general plan for carrying out the tasks assigned. Stakeholder concerns are discussed, and limitations on the utility of classification for shielding information from potential adversaries are outlined.
In contrast to the current principle of balancing four aims—assuring defense and nonproliferation; promoting peaceful applications of atomic energy; disseminating environmental, safety, and health-related information; and promoting technology transfer—the Review recommends, in Chapter 2, principles for governing the DOE classification system that are centered on the proposition that:
分类必须基于对国家安全的可识别风险的可解释判断，而没有其他原因。
Six recommendations for dealing with overarching issues are given in Chapter 3. Implementation of these recommendations, together with the principles from Chapter 2, will provide the foundation for a major cultural shift toward better protection for information truly important to national security while making available to the public information that no longer warrants protection.
The results of the detailed work to determine which information must continue to be protected and which should be made available to the public are discussed in Part II of this report.
"Much of the strength and efficiency of any government in procuring and securing happiness to the people depends on opinion, on the general opinion of the goodness of that government ..."
Benjamin Franklin to the
Constitutional Convention, 1787
In December 1993, Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary launched a comprehensive initiative to move the Department of Energy (DOE) into a new era of government openness. She outlined a broad package of classification and declassification reforms and disclosed for the first time:
The Openness Initiative is DOE's response to President Clinton's commitment to improve public access to government. The President emphasized the importance of accessibility when he stated, "The more the American people know about their government the better they will be governed." After reviewing DOE's approach, the President called it, "a bold new initiative that will allow an informed group of stakeholders to work with the Department of Energy to solve the problems that face our nation." Key elements of the Openness Initiative include:
The announcement of the Openness Initiative was followed by 28 public meetings aimed at garnering public support and trust. Over 1,000 DOE stakeholders responded. During her June 1994 press conference, Secretary O'Leary stated, "We've been listening and what we've heard loud and clear is that openness in government is very important to our citizens. We've also heard that accessibility is important." The Secretary then outlined broad classification reforms and released information about the nation's nuclear materials production program, its nuclear testing programs, and the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
In addition, the Secretary described new actions aimed at declassification and classification reform and accessibility. These commitments included:
"In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened ..."
George Washington
Farewell Address, 1796
The Under Secretary of Energy, in a February 13, 1995, letter to Dr. Albert Narath (Appendix A), requested that Dr. Narath chair a group to carry out a comprehensive, fundamental review of DOE's classification policy. The stated objective was to determine which information must continue to be protected and which no longer requires protection and should be made available to the public. The review was identified as a major component of Secretary O'Leary's Openness Initiative with an overarching objective of making openness a DOE legacy. Twelve months were allowed for the review so that the views of stakeholders both within and outside the government could be solicited and expertise from the Department of Defense (DoD) and other government agencies brought to bear.
All information within DOE's responsibility was included in the review. Within the Department there are four major categories of protected information. Three are derived from the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended; the fourth is defined by Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995. The charge to the Review Group applied not only to the individual categories, briefly described below, but also to the manner in which they collectively are used to protect information.
Guidance associated with these four categories of information is contained in more than 50 headquarters classification guides and about 800 local classification guides. General policy for classification is given in CG-C-3A, "Classification Policy Guide for Nuclear Programs," dated June 1993. Because the final report to the Secretary was to make clear, concise recommendations for change, along with supporting rationale, review of all policy driving the various guides, and in many cases the details of how that policy is applied, were integral to the study task.
"The mutual confidence on which all else depends can be maintained only by an open mind and a brave reliance on free discussion."
正义学习的手
October 24, 1952
The nature of the task suggested an organization with enough formality to foster completeness and timeliness yet retaining flexibility to deal with prominent issues arising from research and deliberations. The arrangement shown inFigure 1(page 49) was selected to meet these needs. A steering group, comprising the chair, deputy chair and working group and coordinator group chairs, was formed to direct and coordinate the various activities.
适合联合讨论的工作组是与技术和政策相关领域的专家组成的。因为这些群体的主要工作是确定可以发表的信息之间的边界，而这些信息可以发表而没有过高的风险，并且必须继续保护的信息，因此必须进行机密研究和审议。因此，从持有适当许可的人群中选出工作组成员。这些小组被安排为跨越DOE分类信息的全部范围，其中一些故意的主题重叠。
A schedule emphasizing stakeholder input was developed by the steering group (seeFigure 2on page 50). Distinguished speakers from inside and outside the government followed Secretary O'Leary in addressing the initial steering group meeting in Washington, D.C. Written comments were solicited through the Federal Register and by direct mailing to stakeholders known to the DOE Office of Declassification. Another public meeting was held in Oakland, CA, on July 28, 1995, to gain additional stakeholder comment. Again, a distinguished group of public speakers expressed their concerns and suggestions for improvements. Both public sessions were videotaped so that Review participants could carefully consider this important counsel.
初次见面后,指导小组developed a set of interim guiding principles. The 50 or so headquarters classification guides were divided among the working groups. Study areas were in many cases interdependent and in some cases overlapping.
Research for the Review was greatly facilitated by two previous studies. The Classification Policy Study, requested by the Under Secretary and carried out by DOE's Office of Declassification, examined statutes, Executive Orders, DOE Orders, and other records. A number of findings and recommendations, largely dealing with issues requiring modifications to the Atomic Energy Act, were presented.1美国国家科学院应奥利里（O'Leary）的要求召集了美国国能服务能源部环境修复和相关计划的信息委员会。1995年7月的最终报告提出了四个基本原则和许多建议。2
After a May 2, 1995, plenary session involving all working groups and associated support staff, detailed investigation proceeded under the direction of the working group chairs. Periodic steering group meetings monitored progress, considered emerging issues, and coordinated efforts.
Informal cooperation building was pursued throughout the process as a means for widening the spectrum of issues and concerns under consideration and for informing stakeholders in both the government and the private sector of the intent and progress of the Review. The report summarizing the work conducted and recommendations developed during this review was submitted in draft form for public comment on February 6, 1996.
“每个公民欠数ry a vigilant watch and close scrutiny of its public servants and a fair and reasonable estimate of their fidelity and usefulness. Thus is the people's will impressed on the whole framework of our civil policy; and this is the price of our liberty and the inspiration of our faith in the Republic."
Grover Cleveland
第一个就职典礼
March 4, 1885
Stakeholder comments came from a diverse group of private citizens, federal and non-federal government personnel, public and private interest groups, and experts from various disciplines. In addition to public meetings, questionnaires and surveys were used to solicit inputs on specific classification policy issues and to invite comment on topics of individual or organizational interest or concern. As the number of responses expanded, a database was established that grouped information into six major categories: accessibility; openness concerns; declassification proposals; human experimentation; nonproliferation and testing; and environment, safety, and health (ES&H).
Analysis indicated major concerns in the following areas:
众多利益相关者在包括私人公民，环保主义者，历史学家和卫生研究人员中表达了ES＆H的关注。利益相关者认为获得ES＆H数据的访问将是：
Accessibility was a major concern for historians, public interest groups, journalists, and individuals. The majority stated that the review of pertinent documents must be done more promptly and, upon completion of the declassification process, the documents must be released to the public. In addition, the public should be advised of newly released materials. Specific suggestions included:
在审查之前，所有人类实验数据都被解释；但是，利益相关者的利益仍然很高。有兴趣的各方包括退伍军人组织，私人公民，医学研究人员和历史学家。利益相关者称赞该部门始于1993年的努力。该小组表达的主要问题是可访问信息的信息，并且由于响应信息请求而缺乏机构间合作。正在进行的诉讼和有关人口的年龄使这一问题变得非常复杂和情感上的问题。
Researchers, historians, environmentalists, and special interest groups requested that data relative to the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile be declassified. Requests included:
Stakeholders indicated that the release of these data allows independent review of U.S. strategic policy. Weapons storage, stockpile maintenance, and the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program were included in this area of concern.
尽管利益相关者要求改善对DOE设施和信息的访问权，但他们一般同意必须保护关键的核武器设计信息。一些人表示，应该在相对较短的时间表上对科学信息进行解密。但是，他们建议应审查所有设计数据，并以最严格的方式保护继续至关重要的详细技术信息。围绕真正敏感的主题的“高围栏”，但解密和传播大量较少的材料是一个流行的主题。
利益相关者评论的汇编在Appendix B。
"He who is firmly in authority soon learns to think security, and not progress, the highest level of statecraft."
詹姆斯·罗素·洛厄尔（James Russell Lowell）
文学论文,1890
并不是所有的国家安全重要的信息can be protected by classification. In assessing protectability—the ability to shield information from potential adversaries—it is helpful to consider the nature of the information, which from the standpoint of classification can be placed into three categories: subjective, objective, and technical.3
Subjective information is arbitrary and reflective of human decisions and intentions. Consequently, it is unique in that it cannot be generated independently by an adversary. It can, however, be compromised by espionage or unauthorized disclosure. Operational information such as military plans and shipping dates is of this nature. Some subjective information effectively becomes declassified once the activities described are enacted (e.g., launch dates). Thus, establishing a duration of classification at the time this information is generated is frequently practical. Subjective information, when generated and maintained under strict control and secured by proper safeguards, is unconditionally protectable.
Scientific Information—the systematized knowledge of nature and the physical world—falls in the objective category. It is quite different from subjective information in that it cannot be made unconditionally protectable. It is unique but independently discoverable or determinable by skilled investigators. Consideration of the time and resources needed by potential adversaries to unravel a particular fact of nature is quite appropriate when classifying scientific information. Thus, the credibility of the classification process dictates continual awareness of the progress of outside investigators.
虽然试图保护在学习期刊上发表的科学信息几乎没有价值，但如何使用该信息的细节可能是可以保护的。以异常和异国情调的方式获得的科学信息，例如，核爆炸性测试虽然在理论上可以独立发现，但实际上很长一段时间都可以保护。在此示例中，可以最好地通过遵守相互商定的分类规范或标准的核力量来援引可保护性。同样，与沿着既定的询问线稳定进步产生的信息相比，科学的突破可能更具保护性。
技术信息 - 关于与主观类别和客观类别之间的趋势有关的方法，过程，技术或设备，与自然定律相一致，用于创建产品或结果。像科学信息一样，技术信息是永恒的。但是与科学信息不同，它可能不是唯一的。可能有几种方法可以利用自然事实来实现一定的目标。因此，尽管技术信息不是无条件的保护，但通常比科学信息更能保护。时间和资源发现某些技术信息的估计可能是分类决策过程中的重要考虑因素，但它们也可能具有误导性。由于该信息不是唯一的，因此无论花费多少资源，它都可能长期以来逃避方法论研究者。另一方面，一个聪明的对手可能会设计一种完全不同的方法来实现相同目标，而资源支出很少。
To be completely protectable, information must be under strict control. That is, the information holder must be able to restrain access to the information. However, information that has been compromised should not necessarily be declassified. Protectability of some value may still be present, albeit against a smaller set of potential adversaries. Likewise, information revealed by unauthorized disclosure or independent discovery may best remain classified if declassification would remove significant uncertainties on the part of even a subset of potential adversaries. Continued classification, for example, if practiced consistently by all sophisticated nations holding the information, may markedly slow the progress of the less sophisticated.
"Moderation in temper is always a virtue, but moderation in principle is always a vice."
Thomas Paine, 1792
分类政策和实践，例如核武器本身，以支持国家安全政策和目标。反过来，必须根据合理的原则建立分类策略。用于制定，修改和应用分类指南的学说（用于分类和解密信息的主要工具）来自政策和原则。
Figure 3(page 51) illustrates schematically how the classification system works. The products generated by the system are classification and declassification actions—determinations by individual authorized classifiers as to the proper classification category and level for documents and materials within their responsibilities. These actions are supported by a hierarchy of classification guides, which are the basic tools of the authorized classifier.4由DOE运营办公室或承包商发行的本地指南，在解密或运营办公室办公室的批准后，取决于主题 - 在选定的技术领域提供了详细的指示。计划指南是用于涉及两个或多个现场办事处或与另一家政府机构合作的工作的工作。本地和程序指南均应符合《 DOE分类政策指南》，这是政策与个人分类和解密措施之间的关键联系。国家政策的变化通常必须在练习级别修订之前通过该层次结构进行。
该系统具有多种反馈机制，用于适应变化的条件。一个技术评估小组（主要科学咨询小组）遵守提交解密的特定项目，并提出了修改和解释政策的建议。进行正式的评估是为了确定实践是否真正符合DOE政策，并评估分类人员在实施该计划中的有效性。5DOE also conducts various reviews of documents for declassification and downgrading. These mechanisms were devised to keep the system in tune with slowly evolving Cold War policy.
The system is currently keyed to the underlying principle of achieving a balance among four aims:6
Fifteen general policy statements, including criteria for declassification, are provided for authorized users seeking to apply the underlying principle to specific problems.7
The previously discussed DOE Openness Initiative is only one manifestation of policy changes since the end of the Cold War. Defense focus has shifted toward a world where regional powers may attempt to gain local hegemony through aggression or intimidation. These threats cannot, for the most part, be adequately addressed by the United States or any other single nation state.8In general, the changes in national security policy provide a greater opportunity to emphasize our commitment to open government.9However, a critical priority of the U.S. is to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems.10It is largely within this arena of sometimes competing national priorities—international cooperation, openness in government and nonproliferation—that a new DOE classification policy must be formulated.
The Review sought to identify and evaluate fundamental changes that could bring the DOE classification system more closely into line with national policy. A premium was placed on expressing policy and principles so that both practitioners of classification and the public at large can understand which information must be protected and which can be made available to the public. In contrast to the current principle of balancing four aims, the Review recommends 11 general and another 10 area-specific principles aimed primarily at defining what DOE classification must and must not do.
“当我们的创始人大胆地宣布美国对世界的独立……他们知道美国要忍受必须改变；不要为了改变而改变，而要改变以维护美国的理想：生活，自由和追求幸福。”
比尔·克林顿
就职典礼，1993年1月20日
1954年《原子能法》（AEA）规定的分类规定（AEA）适用于一个不确定核研究可能在何处的时代。然而，四十年的密集技术工作提供了简化这些规定所需的理解，而不会损害国家安全。更改AEA对于改变DOE分类政策至关重要。
Restricted Data is defined in the AEA in a very conservative manner. All data meeting the general definition are considered to be "Born Classified." Unlike National Security Information, no decision by an official is needed to render information falling within the AEA definition classified. The very nature of this approach leads to an environment fostering overclassification.
今天，一组广泛的分类指南（简要介绍Chapter 2）为工人提供官方指示，要分类哪种材料。因此，现在是时候将限制数据的规定与整个政府的机密材料更一致的规定。
| 建议1。Amend the AEA definition of Restricted Data by changing the wording of Chapter 2, Section 11 (y) from "all data concerning ..." to "all data designated by the Secretary of Energy concerning ..." |
Another shortcoming in the AEA has arisen through examination of the legality of reclassifying previously declassified material. Implementation of Recommendation 1 will make it less likely that a reclassification action is needed, but the Secretary of Energy should have this authority in order to rectify previous decisions that are inappropriate because of errors or changing national security conditions.
| 建议2。Amend the AEA to provide the Secretary of Energy authority to classify specific topics in previously declassified Restricted Data categories based on technological developments or changing national security conditions. |
从Restri AEA还提供了删除cted Data category information primarily relating to military utilization of nuclear weapons provided that the information is safeguarded adequately as "defense information," and that it is shared with other nations only pursuant to agreements for cooperation as defined in the AEA.
Information in this category is known as Formerly Restricted Data—a term that has caused much confusion and unnecessary work over the years. Little difference exists between National Security Information and Formerly Restricted Data except for the cumbersome requirement for joint DoD-DOE determinations on declassification and the process for sharing the information with other nations—a process largely redundant with other mechanisms for achieving similar objectives.
国防部和能源部可以通过共同审查和分开分类的以前限制的数据将跨性别数据或限制数据的主题受益，以便消除从当前使用中消除以前的限制数据。结果应该是由DOD-DOE指导共同分类的主题减少，从而从国防部更恰当地做出的有关军事利用的分类决定中删除了DOE。13Legislation would, however, be required to apply NSI processes unencumbered by stipulated AEA (Sec. 142.d) restrictions on sharing military utilization information with other nations.
| 建议3。Amend the AEA to allow designation as National Security Information information now categorized as Formerly Restricted Data. |
如果DOE要大大改善分类政策，那么上述三个建议的实施至关重要。需要进行“天生的分类”来处理超分类。重新分类的权力对于解决解密过程中的胆怯至关重要。消除以前的限制数据简化了过程，并阐明了责任分类行。分类政策研究和美国国家科学院评论都推荐了这三者。
As a matter of practice, DOE has generally classified entire documents at the highest level of any material contained therein without further identification of the relative sensitivity of the various parts. By contrast, most government agencies use segregation and portion marking of classified material so that the reader can more precisely identify the sensitivity of the various parts. Segregation and portion marking based on a strong system of classification guides offers a significant measure for reducing overclassification today, for more easily declassifying material in the future, and for more clearly distinguishing between classified and unclassified information.
构成适当的部分可能因文档而异。Figure 4（第52页）说明了可以根据情况应用的决策逻辑。最好的技术人员可以通过授权衍生品分类器进行审查和协助，可以选择适当的隔离或标记。必须谨慎行事，以确保文档中所有部分的整个组合在给定级别上标记，并且类别本身在该级别和整个类别中分类，并且文档上的总体标记反映了最高的分类级别其中包含在其中和最严格的信息类别。
| 建议4。The DOE should institute a graded system (as illustrated inFigure 4在第52页上），用于作者和授权派生分类器对所有新限制数据文档的分离和部分标记。（实施应从修订分类指南开始。） |
有四个主要类别的非机密的反对trolled Nuclear Information (UCNI): security, nuclear materials production, nuclear power production, and nuclear weapons. Implementation of UCNI is confusing; criteria for use are difficult to distinguish from those for classification. For example, the phrase in the AEA, Sec. 148, "... significant adverse effect on health and safety of the public or the common defense and security," is similar to the definition for "Secret" classified information in Executive Order 12958: "... reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to national security."
The most compelling argument for retaining UCNI is to provide some protection for sensitive material that needs to be shared with those not holding security clearances (e.g., law enforcement officials). Release of UCNI to the general public is prohibited. It is thought that this protection lowers the risk of terrorist attacks on sensitive facilities, operations, and associated personnel.
Our analysis indicates that an 80% reduction in UCNI-marked documents can be achieved if application is limited to safeguards and security needs.
| 建议5。The use of UCNI should be limited to nuclear safeguards and physical security information that is clearly unclassified. |
Some stakeholders, while advocating major classification reductions in less sensitive areas, also urged that strict, and perhaps higher, levels of security be maintained around the more sensitive material. The main effort of the Review was focused on the former objective--identifying information that no longer requires protection. However, our investigations led to the conclusion that the latter admonition is valid, and in fact should be treated as an imperative.
As a result of downsizing the DOE nuclear weapons complex, the nuclear stockpile, and the associated operational forces, far fewer people need access to Restricted Data. Implementation of the recommendations of this Review, together with previous actions, will reduce the amount of information that must remain classified. Fewer people accessing less material makes protection enhancement a viable course of action.
Restricted Data not recommended for declassification, in general, warrant protective measures at least as stringent as those used today. Moreover, there exists a body of information within the Sigma 1 and 2 (theory of operation or design of thermonuclear and implosion-type warheads) and Sigma 14 and 15 (nuclear weapons unauthorized use and use control design and vulnerability assessment) categories that warrants special protection, namely:
Appendix C提供了一个判断需要一个主题列表dditional care. (It should be noted that today DoD personnel having clearances based on a National Agency Check can be authorized access to most of this material, and DOE personnel having L clearances can be authorized access to topics denoted SFRD.)
Two main options have been discussed of late for achieving extra protection for this more sensitive material:
Option 1 requires cooperation of other government agencies, particularly DoD, to ensure the CRIT is recognized and honored with the appropriate clearances and need to know measures. While such processes are in place for Option 2 (Top Secret), implementation of the associated procedures would be burdensome, particularly for computer operations.
这两种选择都引起了有关如何正确处理先前生成的材料的严重问题。必须保持高水平的保护，直到审查并可以完成正确的标记。还有一个担心的是，未标记为增加保护的SRD材料应继续以不少于当今使用的水平进行保护。具体而言，Q清理和严格（甚至更严格的）需要知道控制需要继续。
Most importantly, regardless of the method of protection chosen for the most sensitive material, discipline must be maintained across all levels and categories of classified material. Procedures must be clear, and all personnel involved must understand the importance of adhering to those procedures.
| 建议6。More stringent measures should be implemented for protection of the 137 topics identified inAppendix C最敏感。 |
One major advantage gained by collective implementation of the previous recommendations will be a much clearer understanding of which information must remain Restricted Data and within that category which topics are most sensitive. This will allow greater protection because stringent measures can be applied more effectively around sharply defined areas of importance.
在机密级别保护机密材料的规定（披露可能会损害国家安全）要远远远远远远远远远远远远不止用于控制未分类信息的特殊类别的各种措施。未分类的受控核信息（UCNI）和官方仅使用信息，同时根据《信息自由法》的遏制信息请求，并没有防止对确定的对手披露的保护措施。例如，是政府分包商的雇员的非美国公民可以访问UCNI，以招标政府合同。14因此，如果由于国家安全的原因需要删除信息，则应将其归类。解密者不应依赖于当今未分类信息的任何控件下的任何控制下的保护，并且随着全球通信系统的增长，即时披露成为一种实际可能性。如前所述，分类只能延迟对手获得或开发技术信息；当信息未分类时，无法预期的延迟。
第4-8章简要介绍了七个工作组对当前分类指南的详细检查结果。该工作的深入报告在ReportsReports附录D到I。Appendix J。FCPR的成员在Appendix K。
该评论完全注意到没有过时的核武器设计之类的事实，它特别强调保护获得或提高核武器能力所需的信息。对不再需要保护的信息进行排序，以避免较大的当前分类材料所需的知情辩论和判断。在大多数情况下，需要详细的分类讨论，在许多情况下，建议或反对披露的理由只能在本身被分类的论点中适当地构成。因此，对工作组报告中的许多材料进行了分类，并且以下各章中给出的摘要可能看起来简短或不ReportsReports完整。
“然而，正如我们应有的那样，我们还必须对公共政策本身可以成为科学技术精英的占领的平等和相反危险保持警惕。”
艾森豪威尔
告别地址，1961年
这篇综述的一个压倒性结论是，获得或推进核武器能力所需的重要信息应继续受到仔细保护。对美国安全及其盟友的潜在威胁，即使是原始的单阶段武器确实是严重的。
Figure 5(page 53) schematically illustrates how the principles given inChapter 2can be applied to the regime of Restricted Data. In making decisions as to the usefulness of information to potential adversaries, particularly proliferants and terrorists, it is desirable to invoke seasoned professional judgment at each step and to err on the side of protection rather than disclosure.
Current policy is to classify information that would aid a proliferant in developing a nuclear weapon, aid a terrorist in constructing a weapon, aid a nuclear power in improving its nuclear weapons, or reveal vulnerabilities in U.S. weapons. Thus, while general concepts and principles of operation of gun-assembled, implosion-assembled, boosted, and staged (thermonuclear) weapons are unclassified, the details remain classified. The result is that drawings of devices or device parts, details of the high explosive system and its detonation, neutron initiation requirements, pit response to the high explosive, boost requirements (quantity of fuel, pressure, temperature, ratio of deuterium to tritium, fusion yield, etc.) and resulting increase in yield are classified. The yield of the primary and its output, the control (management) of the radiation flow to the secondary, the response of the secondary (motion, temperature, pressure, etc.), the configuration of secondary parts, and the response of materials to radiation from the primary are classified. The mass, shape, and, for some materials, the fact of use in weapons is classified. The current unclassified list of materials in the secondary is hydrogen (any isotope), lithium (any enrichment in lithium-6), and uranium (depleted, natural or highly enriched).
更新武器设计分类指南的详细判决Appendix D。Little change is recommended except in the area of the association of materials with weapons in general or, in some cases, with specific weapons. Declassifying these associations, even if estimates of the mass used in specific weapons can be inferred from plant feed streams or averages, is considered of small risk as long as the details of how the materials are used are protected. (Declassifying the association of a material with a weapon plant or, in some cases, a specific weapon type will allow declassification of many documents that are classified only because they infer or identify the material and its flow into and out of the plant.)
The spontaneous decay of radioactive materials present in nuclear weapons results in the production of neutrons and gamma rays inside the device. Some of this radiation escapes the device and is called intrinsic radiation (INRAD). Personnel who work or sleep in close proximity to the device, usually sailors, are exposed to this radiation. The present classification guidance allows for the specification of a total dose from INRAD at a single radius outside the device measured from the device center. If that single number is an upper bound at that distance, then the maximum health risk is known and can be evaluated. This has been sufficient so far. To characterize the hazard to personnel more completely, it may become desirable to specify the total dose as a function of polar angle or even on the device surface. This information is currently classified because the orientation of the warhead may be deduced from this data. If the warhead orientation becomes unclassified for a given device, then, and only then, we recommend that the total dose as a function of polar angle could be declassified. The polar axis is taken to be the long axis of the warhead with the origin being on the axis somewhere in the center of the reentry body or bomb.
Classification of scientific information underpinning nuclear weapons design activities must be viewed in a somewhat different fashion. Limited resources have become and will likely remain a significant constraint in managing the acquisition of necessary scientific knowledge. However, the past 40 years have seen a large and sustained growth in areas of general science closely related to nuclear weapons technology—astrophysics, condensed matter, high temperature experiments, and computer design and applications. These resources can be leveraged by encouraging scientific exchange between U.S. researchers and the worldwide community.
With no nuclear testing, the safety and reliability assurance of the stockpile will rest on the ability to attract and retain highly skilled scientists and engineers. Their willingness to center their careers in the nuclear weapons field may be enhanced to the extent that their scientific accomplishments can be recognized and rewarded by their peers in the open and unclassified arena.
At the same time, science and technology information relevant to weapon design and unique to the cleared community—for example, data gained from nuclear tests and information on how such data are used to validate models and databases—must be closely guarded. Classification of scientific information becomes an act of informed balance among these imperatives.
In developing definitions of information that must remain classified, nuclear weapon science activities were considered in three topical areas—materials properties, laboratory experiments, and computer codes. The details of this process and the results are presented inAppendix E; a general summary of the findings and recommendations is given in the following paragraphs.
The relations between the thermodynamic variables of a material—density, temperature, pressure, energy, and entropy—are referred to as equations of state. Understanding nuclear weapon performance is dependent on good equation of state information at very high temperatures and pressures.
Because of the importance of uranium and plutonium to weapon design, the equations of state for the actinides (atomic number greater than 89) should remain classified. All currently classified equation of state information used in weapons design calculations should remain classified because it may embody empirical information gained by comparisons with classified experiments. Otherwise, equation of state information for elements whose atomic number is less than or equal to 89 can be treated as unclassified.
Opacity or optical thickness is a measure of the ability of a given path length of material to attenuate radiation of a given wave length. Capabilities for calculating and measuring opacity are becoming widespread and have application in international scientific areas such as Inertial Confinement Fusion. In nuclear weapons design and evaluation, the opacity of the various materials is needed to calculate the passage of X rays and gamma rays from the primary to the secondary.
Current policy is to classify calculated or measured opacities based on the atomic number and temperature of the material. It is recommended that all currently classified opacity information used in weapons design calculations remain classified because it may embody empirical information gained by comparisons with classified experiments. Otherwise, opacity information for elements with an atomic number greater than 89 can be classified for temperatures greater than those achievable in laboratory experiments. Information for elements whose atomic number is less than or equal to 89 can be treated as unclassified. Theoretical methods will be unclassified except for weapon-specific techniques judged to have been normalized or validated by nuclear test data.
In general, for either equation of state or opacity information, any analysis which uses material properties from an unclassified parameter space—in atomic number, temperature, or pressure—to determine material properties in a classified parameter space is classified.
进行实验室实验是为了了解核武器运行背后的基础科学。它们与用于设计核武器的实验不同，因为他们通常会努力将基础科学的各个方面与武器的综合操作隔离开来。在没有核试验的情况下，将需要一类新的实验。
Classification of weapon-related experiments, the analysis of the experiments, and their results, should be based on whether they reveal nuclear weapon design information, classified material property data, or information about specific classification models, algorithms, or computer codes.
Determining whether an experiment reveals weapon design information should be based on how closely an experimental configuration "resembles" a nuclear weapon. Weapon-related experimental configurations will differ from weapon components because they are scaled or modified in one of several ways, such as scaling physical dimensions, changing overall geometry, making material substitutions, or changing the driving energy source. Experiments on configurations that differ significantly in physical scale, geometry, material, or energy source from weapons or weapons components, and whose relative dimensions do not give weapon design information, should be unclassified.
代码是用于求解描述物理系统的方程式的计算机程序。当核武器设计社区在使用大型计算机方面独特并具有开发复杂的模拟的能力时，编写了代码的当前分类策略。如今，许多研究中心都存在可比的功能，与未知的研究人员的合作可以改进和验证用于武器设计有用的代码中采用的方法。但是，仍然存在某些需要保护的方法和特殊技术的组合。
当前分类的代码将保持分类。如果新法规：包含武器设计信息，将其标准化为核测试数据或其他机密实验，包含分类的材料属性，或使用（或展示）特定武器特殊的特殊方法或组合。
武器化是用于描述制造安全武器所需功能的术语，该武器将在预期的环境中有效运行。这些功能包括核装配，弹头电气和增强系统，启动和使用控制组件，用于对策的功能以及支持结构。武器化还包括开发这些功能所需的无核测试和分析。考虑这些主题的分类的结果显示在Appendix F。
The bulk of weaponization topics are classified Formerly Restricted Data. Under建议3（第3章），在国防部控制下，主要与军事利用有关的信息将被转换为国家安全信息。但是，需要一个风险管理过程，以确保充分考虑DOD分类行动对DOE的影响。DOD指令3150.1在DOE接受DOD成型的军事特征中给出的过程可能适合此目的。15Periodic review of DoD classification would be needed to ensure harmony with national security policy.
你nder present classification guidance, it is sometimes necessary to classify the presence and quantities of hazardous materials in nuclear weapons. The Review has concluded that revealing the presence of hazardous materials in specific weapons is of little value to potential adversaries. In most cases, declassifying the quantity of hazardous material used in a weapon type involves little or no risk. In those cases where it is deemed important to protect the exact quantity of hazardous material used in a weapon (e.g., plutonium), a "not to exceed value" can be specified to facilitate estimation of environmental impact under various hypothetical scenarios.
Historically, all nuclear weapon quantitative reliability requirements and assessments have been classified to protect operational capabilities. Nuclear weapons are designed to be highly reliable, thus reliability requirements can be considered for declassification jointly by the DoD and DOE on a case-by-case basis. Significant differences between assessed reliability values and design requirements are usually addressed promptly by remedial action; but to ensure that information identifying weaknesses potentially exploitable by an adversary is not divulged, it is recommended that current assessments of stockpiled weapon reliability remain classified.
By this same token, requirements for hardening nuclear weapons to the effects (X rays, neutrons, blast, etc.) from nearby nuclear detonations have been formulated in a very conservative manner. While it is not possible to survive a close nuclear burst, straightforward measures have been implemented to deny any defense the ability to destroy more than one U.S. warhead with one nuclear-tipped interceptor. Hardness requirements should be considered for declassification on a case-by-case basis, but assessed hardness levels should remain classified.
The fact that special features are incorporated in U.S. nuclear weapons to prevent unauthorized use is unclassified. Most detailed information on these use control features is classified to deny potential adversaries even hints of how the various layers of protection are structured. The current policy is considered appropriate. Moreover, new use control concepts should be afforded protection consistent with actual weaponization.
在核测试领域，应揭示核武器设计的信息应保持分类。如果国防部选择对某些与军事利用有关的特定武器特定信息进行分类，则在某些情况下，核试验事件与武器计划的协会应指定为国家安全信息。
The DOE Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) work will rely heavily on new multipurpose facilities. Concerns have been raised about the possibility that unclassified work at these facilities might be counter to U.S. nonproliferation objectives. It is recommended that DOE develop an SBSS facilities classification guide to serve as a basis for local security plans.
“真正的意见只有在他们所引用的事实已知的事实时才能占上风；如果尚不清楚，错误的想法与真实的想法一样有效，即使不是更有效的话。”
1920年沃尔特·李普曼
Acquisition of fissionable material is a necessary step in the construction of a nuclear weapon. To the extent practical, barriers should be used to increase both the effort and the signature associated with fissionable material acquisition by proliferators and terrorists. Classification of selected DOE information is one of the important barriers that can be applied.
On the other hand, much of the technology associated with the production of fissionable material and light isotopes used in nuclear weapons is now widely available. Classification, as previously noted, can only delay the dissemination of information. In the case of nuclear materials production, only a few items still warrant protection. These matters are addressed in detail inAppendix G和briefly summarized below.
你ranium enrichment core technologies—key features that enable practical or efficient use of a process—should continue to be protected as currently defined. Unclassified definitions of core technologies should be developed and provided to the public so that the rationale for these selective classification actions is understood.
Virtually all information relating to uranium processing has been declassified, but much is currently identified as UCNI. Implementation of建议2in Chapter 3 will allow reclassification of truly sensitive processes as Restricted Data. All other information on processing should be unclassified. The fact that intermediate assay uranium is used in weapons is unclassified; the general location where this material is used in an unspecified weapon should be declassified in order to facilitate weapons dismantlement.
在1950年代，原子能委员会几乎将与从辐照反应堆燃料中提取p的所有信息相关。由于最近对核增殖的担忧增加了，DOE一直在识别出提取p的增量发展为UCNI。在大多数情况下，将这些过程指定为UCNI不提供非扩散目标，但在某些情况下确实可以防止传播有关清理技术的信息。
Technologies employed in separating light isotopes are generally unclassified and many are practiced commercially; however, certain specific technologies relating to practicality and efficiency warrant protection. Production of tritium in Savannah River reactors involves processes that can be declassified with little risk. However, technology related to gas retention in high-temperature targets that could be irradiated in commercial reactors should remain classified. Technology for accelerator production of tritium, including the design details of the integrated plant, should not be classified. Details of target technology that would enable significant special nuclear materials production utilizing an accelerator otherwise engaged in legitimate activities should be protected as Restricted Data.
实际上，对生产地点的所有trium处理系统和与技术相关的信息进行了分类。但是，已经为融合计划开发了特殊的分类指南，该指南本质上是对许多领域加工的许多领域进行解解的。这种重大不一致需要解决。除了提取系统外，建议将所有trium triitium处理信息和相关技术及其应用程序均未分类，除非该信息揭示了核武器中trif的敏感物理细节。如果将triTium提取系统的细节揭示出有助于开发在商业反应堆中产生tri虫的能力的信息，则应保护它们的细节。
The production of nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials involves the use of some highly engineered and often unique nuclear and nonnuclear materials. Classification of the associations of some of these materials with specific sites has greatly complicated waste disposal and reporting activities. Literal compliance with current classification requirements is difficult. A systematic examination concluded that current policy should be revised to specify that the simple association of a material with the nuclear weapons program or with specific sites should not be classified.
当前分类nucle政策ar materials disposition is based on concerns related to revealing details of weapon design. This has led to protection of a large volume of information that might be used to estimate parameters such as average mass of components, material composition, and fabrication technologies. The exact or even approximate configuration and design specifications for specific nuclear weapon special nuclear material parts should remain classified, as should disposition data from which this information could be derived. However, estimates inferred from plant averages are not generally of concern. Declassification of disposition processes should be accomplished on a case-by-case basis.
"Two basic requirements necessarily guide U.S. planning for strategic nuclear forces: the need to provide an effective deterrent while remaining within START I/II limits, and the need to allow for additional forces to be reconstituted in the event of a reversal of current positive trends."
William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense
Annual Report to the President
和国会，1995年
从历史上看，美国的核武器库存，特殊的核物质（p和富集的铀）和tri属的秘密水平或更高层已分类。在原子能委员会的早期，库存数量是如此敏感，以至于他们只致力于最高机密文件。武器和裂变材料的稀缺被认为是一个非常严重的国防问题。16This sensitivity abated greatly as the stockpile grew to tens of thousands, but the actual numbers continued to be protected.
The intense measures to protect quantities of weapons and special nuclear materials resulted in classification of most information concerning production, and later, dismantlement, from which estimates of the stockpile might be made. Production levels and inventories of weapon-grade plutonium, deuterium, tritium, enriched uranium, and lithium were classified as Secret Restricted Data. Financial information (e.g., unit cost of weapons, nuclear components, and most nuclear materials), production plans and capabilities, reactor power levels and discharge histories, and feed stream quantities from which production rates might be derived were also classified. The net result was a vast body of information that could not be disclosed to the public. This restrained public discussion of environment, safety, and health issues and public debate on U.S. nuclear weapon policy in general and on specific matters, such as new production capabilities, in particular.
主要原因分类名单的武器tion rates and stockpile quantities is to conceal military operational strength and capabilities that are determined, in part, by the size and makeup of the stockpile. "Recent international upheavals have not changed the calculation that nuclear weapons remain an essential part of American military power ... Thus, the United States will continue to threaten retaliation, including nuclear retaliation, and to deter aggression against the United States, U.S. forces, and U.S. allies. The notion, however, that nations are motivated by U.S. nuclear forces in making decisions about acquiring nuclear weapons themselves is not valid. Potential proliferators are more likely to be driven by concerns about neighbors' capabilities or the desire for regional hegemony, than by decisions America makes about its nuclear arsenal."17
Consistency between classification policy and U.S. defense policy, as described above, is best achieved by the Department of Defense setting the classification level for stockpiled weapons. Implementation of建议3在第3章中，将允许将机密的库存数字指定为国家安全信息（NSI），从而避免了以前限制数据的繁琐的DOD-DOE流程。生产历史记录，当前活动以及运输以及DOD和DOE之间的信息将被归类为保护指定为NSI的各种数量。
A weapon type, once retirement is authorized and dismantlement completed, is not a factor in military capabilities, and all information concerning production and dismantlement rates and schedules for this weapon type can be declassified.
The U.S. surplus of special nuclear material is so large that classification of these values is no longer warranted. As previously noted in章4和5, estimates made of special nuclear material in specific weapons based on plant averages and feed streams are of little consequence.
Production quantities, cumulative quantities at Savannah River, and the total DOE inventory of tritium have traditionally been (and are still) classified as Secret Restricted Data. Many aspects of tritium production, handling, and use have also been classified. Originally, these very stringent measures were put into place to protect the concept of boosting—the enhancement of a fission reaction by thermonuclear neutrons derived from the fusion of tritium and deuterium.
Classification continued at the same level after the concept of boosting was declassified because of concerns that the quantity of tritium in specific weapons could be deduced from production rates and inventory. The average tritium mass per weapon, it was thought, might help a proliferant nation reduce the number of tests needed to develop a boosted nuclear weapon.
像特殊核材料一样，在美国的库存中存在远远超过当今需求的库存。但是，与特殊的核材料不同，trium衰变相当迅速 - 一半的库存将在大约12年内消失。自1988年以来，美国就一直没有生产tri，除非开始新的生产，否则最终将不足以满足库存需求。DOE目前正在为新的Tritium生产设施寻求两种不同的技术。如果努力重新开始tri吨生产失败，尽管较慢，但美国核威慑姿势的脆弱性可能会发展出缓慢。鉴于目前的关注和不确定性，转向组不愿意在此时推荐对tri库清单的解密。
“宣传是一个伟大的净化器，因为它将公众舆论的力量置于行动，而在这个国家，舆论控制着国家的进程。”
Justice Charles Evans Hughes, 1908
美国构建51军事计划tors in addition to those built for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. Used primarily for testing and research, all but four nonnaval military reactors have been retired. Many military reactor technologies were declassified prior to this Review. However, certain aspects of a limited number of military reactor programs have remained classified to date because of their relationship to military operations and missions.
Classification is considered appropriate only to the extent that disclosure would enable or assist foreign military capabilities; it should not infringe on the use of nuclear reactor technology for civilian applications unless there is a clear national security concern. Information that would aid in identifying or exploiting vulnerabilities in planned or existing U.S. military space systems must remain classified. Nuclear reactor technology that would assist foreign powers in developing or improving advanced military systems must also remain classified. Information that would reveal aspects of classified activities (e.g., nuclear weapons design, military operations, mission requirements) must be classified. When unclassified technology is used for a classified military application, the application itself, not the power source, should carry the classification.
将这些分类原则应用于陆军核电计划以及与太空相关的反应堆系统产生的以下段落大纲结论。详细信息在Appendix H.
The Army Nuclear Power Program was developed to field mobile and stationary small-to-medium electrical generating plants for use in remote areas. There are no Army nuclear electrical generating plants in use or under development. Most Army Nuclear Power Program information has already been declassified. Some information was classified because declassification might reveal details of related classified programs such as naval nuclear propulsion. The remaining classified information concerned military missions and operations. It was concluded that declassification of Army Nuclear Power Program information is not likely to reveal significant information about naval nuclear propulsion or current military missions or operations. It is recommended that all information associated with the Army program be declassified.
在定向核能系统（DNE），同位素热源，热电转换，太空反应堆电源系统及相关计划中进行分类是基于保护难以开发的困难或昂贵的技术，其他国家可以使用这些技术来推进其军事计划显著地。分类还保护了美国军事空间的应用和任务。这些领域的分类指南是共同拥有的，DOE必须适当地与DOD和NASA协调最终分类决策。
The basic physics of controlled (non-explosive) nuclear reactions to generate a laser beam is unclassified. DNES research using power levels and configurations unsuitable for military application or development is unclassified. Information that will not substantially assist others in DNES development, contribute to feasibility assessment of DNES development, or reveal the direction of DNES research is unclassified, as is work not directed toward, nor suitable for, military development.
Detailed design information on the controlled fission portion of a system used to pump a laser, nuclear design information revealing or describing a significant technological advance, and isotopic fuel composition should remain protected as Restricted Data. Design of the laser portion of a system, including quantitative beam characteristics and research directed toward military applications, should remain classified as National Security Information. A stronger differentiation is needed between unclassified research and items having significant military potential. Research in configurations and power levels unsuitable for military applications should be unclassified unless classified information would be disclosed.
1973年8月之前的太空反应堆电源技术未经分类，就像1973年8月至1987年2月之间公开发布的信息一样。有关反应堆电源，特别是多米鹰或颗粒床反应堆设计的信息，被归类为受限数据；有关军事应用程序的一些信息被归类为国家安全信息。大多数理论和基本反应堆系统的信息已被解密；一些应用技术虽然未分类，但仍受到出口控制。
军事任务的潜在有用性证明了对太空反应堆电源系统某些方面的持续分类保护。基本的分类策略是合理的，但是随着计划的进步，应修订指导以提供对关键信息的更具体确定（这些受保护的方面，特征或属性对获得军事优势的重要性）的确定。有关制造和测试氮化铀燃料和颗粒床反应器的详细信息应保持分类。有关将热电材料与核反应堆燃料整合的信息应与空间反应堆电源系统一起检查，并考虑进行持续分类，并取决于程序的进步。
如果需要，可以将空间反应堆影响点分类，以保护核材料或敏感组件，直到恢复为止。对轨道参数进行分类的决定应由办公室承担主要责任。
Thermoelectric conversion and isotopic heat source technologies are unclassified. Some applications of these technologies are still useful for military applications and operations, but the technologies are already unclassified and in use for commercial purposes.
Declassification of existing information could be more reasonably considered if options for classifying new developments are preserved. Implementation of Recommendations 1 and 2(Chapter 3)将极大地促进这项活动。
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program is a joint DOE-Department of Navy organization tasked with the responsibility to design, build, operate, maintain, and manage the nuclear-powered warships and facilities supporting the U.S. nuclear-powered fleet. Classification within the program is governed by a single guide, CG-RN-1, Rev. 2, DOE-DoDClassification Guide for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, which contains about 600 topics.
At the time the Fundamental Classification Review began, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program was already engaged in a detailed review of their classification policy. Therefore, the Military Reactors Working Group did not review CG-RN-1. However, the working group did establish a dialogue with Naval Reactors personnel and exchanged draft reports with them.
The Knolls and Bettis Atomic Power Laboratories conducted the first portion of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Review. This work consisted of an examination of each topic contained in the classification guide. Working groups at the two laboratories compared their separately formulated assessments against current guidance and results were exchanged and reevaluated in a series of conferences until consensus was reached. A similar review was independently conducted at Naval Nuclear Propulsion Headquarters. Proposed changes were then compared with those from the laboratories and the merits debated by the division directors until a consensus was reached on each item. The final determination was made by the director.
建议使用21个项目进行解密或降级，包括有关船舶设计，材料和冶金，化学，发电厂设计和反应堆维修的信息。已重新强调指南，将有关公共卫生，安全和环境的信息从受保护的信息分开，以促进向公众发布。
军事反应堆工作组审查了海军核推进计划分类草案审查报告，并评判了结果与DOE基本分类政策审查一致。
"But a democracy can with only great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience and they are precisely the quantities by which a nation, like an individual, attains a dominant position."
Alexis de Tocqueville
Democracy in America, 1835
"Safeguards" refers to physical protection and material control measures to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to sabotage and unauthorized possession or use of nuclear materials. Security refers to policies, activities, programs, and systems for the protection of classified or sensitive information and material and DOE facilities, property, and equipment. A large portion of the classified information associated with safeguards and security falls under Executive Order 12958, National Security Information (NSI). Where Restricted Data (RD) is mixed with NSI, documents are generally marked RD without further elaboration. Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) is also used widely.
Classification guidance was found to be compliance-based with little or no flexibility to accommodate the wide variation that exists throughout the DOE complex due to different missions and activities. A performance-based approach allowing site-specific guidance based on risk assessment would provide more balanced protection. Current DOE policy allows for a range of classification (e.g., Unclassified-Secret) in certain areas and requires stringent compliance in others. Site-specific classification levels could be developed locally using risk assessment to achieve balanced protection in accordance with revised DOE implementing instructions.18
In the area of safeguards and security, a myriad of measures—classification being only one—can be applied to reduce the risk to national security. Tradeoffs exist between physical security elements and security information protection. A fragile element may require a higher level of classification, whereas a more robust feature may require no classification at all. Risk assessment can be used to make performance-based cost effectiveness determinations on site-specific classification decisions—an approach superior to uniform, complex-wide, compliance-based guidance.
A logic chart similar in nature to the one given inFigure 5on page 53 can be used in the risk assessment process. (A Safeguards and Security version of the logic chart is presented inAppendix I，以及工作组的详细发现和建议。）商业软件（例如Expert Choice™）可广泛使用，以帮助制定风险评估需求的决策。建议将分类决策逻辑图放置在保障措施和安全分类指南中，以用作特定于网站的分类确定过程的第一步。
A graded portion marking methodology can also be applied to achieve the flexibility DOE needs with National Security Information. It is recommended that an agreement be negotiated with the Information Security Oversight Office19to allow a graded approach to be applied to NSI, using the same methodology recommended for Restricted Data（建议4, Chapter 3).
From a Safeguards and Security perspective, UCNI provides valuable protection in certain areas but implementation is complex, confusing, and needs restructuring. UCNI is beneficial to the Nuclear Emergency Search Team in protecting participants, procedures, and equipment. It also helps the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division20in a similar manner. Major UCNI simplification can be achieved by eliminating categories not directly related to Safeguards and Security, eliminating the topic reference system, restructuring topical guidelines into performance-based topics, and having local site Internal Guidelines.
1“分类政策研究”，美国能源部，1992年7月4日。
2"A Review of Department of Energy Classification Policy and Practice," National Academy Press, July 16, 1995.
3该结构基于Arvin Quist的工作：“信息的安全分类，第2卷，信息分类原理”，橡树岭气体扩散厂，K/CG-1007/V2，A。S. Quist，1993年4月。
4DOE Order 5650.2B, "Identification of Classified Information," December 31, 1991.
5DOE Classification Appraisal Procedure Guide, February 1988.
6CG-C-3A, "Classification Policy Guide for Nuclear Programs," DOE Office of [De]Classification, June 1993.
7Ibid.
8"Annual Report to the President and the Congress," W. J. Perry, February 1995.
9行政命令12958，“分类国家安全信息”，1995年4月17日。
10The White House,国家参与和扩大的国家安全策略, July 1994.
11这个第一个原则承认我们对披露重要性的理解。公众对政府信息的权利在法规中定义（例如，信息自由法）。根据这些法规，将许多类型的信息（包括机密信息）排除在披露之外。因此，尽管公众没有分类信息的权利，但我们认识到分类仅适用于需要保护的信息。第二个原理收紧了概念。
12It follows that an identified benefit or need is not required to justify declassification and release to the public. Rather, the federal government must establish the reason for classification. If information does not meet classification criteria, it should be released to the public unless otherwise restricted by law.
13A process for ensuring that the impact of DoD classification decisions on DOE is fully considered is discussed in Chapter 4. If建议3is not accepted, a principle on military utilization and system capabilities must be added.
14"Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information at Sandia National Laboratories," July 1995.
15DoD Directive 3150.1, "Joint Nuclear Weapons Development Studies and Engineering Projects," December 27, 1983.
16“ 1947年4月3日，原子能委员会的第一任主席戴维·利恩哈尔（David Lilienthal）告知杜鲁门总统，没有可立即使用的核武器……对早期库存数字的保密性很强，甚至是神秘的……”Danger and Survival, McGeorge Bundy, Vintage Books, Inc., 1990.
17"Annual Report to the President and the Congress," William J. Perry, February 15, 1995.
18联合安全委员会最近观察到，安全决策经常与基于一个全知的，高能力的敌人的假设联系起来。他们也得出结论，使用风险管理可以实现一个更合理和持久的安全决策框架。1994年2月28日，联合安全委员会向国防部长兼中央情报部门主任的报告“重新定义安全”。
19在国家档案和记录管理局中，信息安全监督办公室主任负责执行行政命令12958的指令，并审查和批准代理机构实施法规。
20美国能源部运输ation Safeguards Division is responsible for shipment of nuclear weapons and certain weapon components and materials.
Source:Department of Energy OpenNet
