

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
)
 v.) No. 1:10cr485 (LMB)
)
JEFFREY ALEXANDER STERLING)

NOTICE

The United States, by and through its attorneys, hereby provides notice of the concurrent public filing of the government exhibits that were admitted at trial on January 15, 2015.

Respectfully submitted,

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Chief

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United States Attorney

Eric G. Olshan
Deputy Chief
Public Integrity Section
U.S. Department of Justice

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Senior Litigation Counsel

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Assistant United States Attorney
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By /s/_____
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S E T 14] SEP 99 STAFF

CITE]

TO: Langley

FOR:

REF: NONE

TEXT:


1. THE FOLLOWING IS PAR FOR SAMUEL CRAWFORD, AIN]

A. GENERAL INFORMATION:

- 1) GRADE: 12/1
- 2) OCCUPATIONAL TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER
- 3) REPORTING PERIOD: 10 JAN 99 - 31 JULY 99
- 4) TYPE OF REPORT: ANNUAL
- 5) DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 30 AUG 99

B. OVERALL PERFORMANCE RATING:.....()

SECRET



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SECRET

C. KEY JOB ELEMENTS AND RATING:

D. NARRATIVE COMMENTS:

CHIEF: 1) BY SUPERVISOR Mr. H. [] AIN []
] BRANCH.

NARRATIVE:

I CERTIFY SUBJECT HAS NOT YET MASTERED THE SKILLS OF A FULL PERFORMANCE OPERATIONS OFFICER.

SUBJECT IS A GS-12 OPERATIONS OFFICER SERVING IN AN OPERATIONS OFFICER POSITION IN [] office ONE OF THE DIRECTORATE'S [] offices AND IS ONE OF [] GS-12 C/OS IN A [] C/O BRANCH.

IMPACT:

AS office 'S [] MANAGER, SUBJECT QUICKLY DEMONSTRATED HIS EXPERTISE ON THIS HIGH PRIORITY TARGET THROUGH HIS SECURE AND PRODUCTIVE HANDLING OF AN [] ASSET. SUBJECT HAS INCREASED THIS ASSET'S INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION AND OBTAINED TIMELY REPORTING FROM THE ASSET IN RESPONSE FO A HIGH PRIORITY POLICYMAKER REQUIREMENT ON RECENT []. SUBJECT HANDLES THIS ASSET I [] HIS EXTENSIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE [] TARGET AND SOUND OPERATIONAL JUDGMENT HAVE ENABLED HIM TO MANAGE HIS OWN OPERATIONS WHILE PROVIDING INSIGHTFUL GUIDANCE TO OTHER office OFFICERS WORKING THE [] IN ADDITION TO THE VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE DESCRIBED ABOVE, SUBJECT PRODUCED [] (INCLUDING ONE [] REPORT) INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ON [] DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD.

COMPETENCIES:

: SUBJECT HAS NOT YET MET EXPECTATIONS IN HIS COMPETENCY.

SUBJECT ARRIVED AT office IN DECEMBER 1998 (MID WAY THROUGH THE GS-12 PAR PERIOD) AND HAS MANAGED TO [] AND BEGIN [] AND OF TWO [] SUBJECT HAS NURTURED A PRODUCTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USG Agency [] WITH WHOM office HAS HAD MIXED RESULTS IN THE PAST. AS A RESULT OF THIS COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP SUBJECT HAS identified TWO POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGETS AMONG THE [] AND IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH [] TO DEVELOP APPROACHES TO THESE TARGETS. BASED ON SUBJECT'S SOUND OPERATIONAL JUDGMENT AND EXTENSIVE AREA EXPERTISE, office IS CONFIDENT THAT SUBJECT WILL SUCCEED IN ADVANCING SOME OF HIS CURRENT [] THROUGH THE [] CYCLE AND INITIATE OTHER PROMISING RELATIONSHIPS DURING THE NEXT RATING PERIOD.

: SUBJECT FULLY AND COMPLETELY MET EXPECTATIONS. SUBJECT DEMONSTRATED GOOD TRADECRAFT IN THE HANDLING OF HIS ASSIGNED CASES AND DEMONSTRATED STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE

IN PREPARING TO MOVE AN [] FROM [] SUBJECT HAS INTRODUCED GREATER LEVELS OF [] INTO THE [] AND MEETINGS ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS OPERATION. WHILE [] TWO FOREIGN OFFICIALS WHILE IN [] GUISE, SUBJECT HAS DEMONSTRATED HIS ABILITY TO OPERATE SECURELY IN

ADDITIONALLY, SUBJECT HAS DEMONSTRATED HIGH STANDARDS OF

SECRET

ST ET

TRADECRAFT IN HIS EXEMPLARY HANDLING OF A SENSITIVE CASE.

: SUBJECT FULLY AND COMPLETELY MET EXPECTATIONS.

SUBJECT MAINTAINED A STRONG CI/SECURITY POSTURE IN ALL THAT HE DID DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD, PARTICULARLY A HIGH INTEREST SENSITIVE CASE. SUBJECT MAINTAINED A STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE AND IS CONSTANTLY SEEKING TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF HIS CASES. SUBJECT CONTINUED TO vet HIS ASSETS THROUGH WELL PLANNED evaluations WITH AND OBTAINED FROM INFO AND CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE AND

SUBJECT'S CONTACT REPORTS ARE THOROUGH, CONCISE AND TIMELY. SUBJECT'S ARE CREATIVE AND WELL PLANNED.

: SUBJECT SIGNIFICANTLY EXCEEDED EXPECTATIONS. IN ADDITION TO SERVING AS A SUBSTANTIVE EXPERT ON FOR THE office, SUBJECT PRODUCED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS (INCLUDING AN REPORT) DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. MANY OF THE REPORTS SUBJECT PRODUCED WERE THE RESULT OF LONG HOURS OF TEDIOUS, TECHNICAL TRANSLATION WORK PERFORMED BY SUBJECT.

IN ADDITION TO REPORTING ON ISSUES, SUBJECT HAS REPORTED ON PREPAREDNESS FOR AND ISSUES.

SUBJECT HAS ALSO PRODUCED VALUABLE REPORTING ON THE LOCAL PRESENCE.

INITIATIVE/LEADERSHIP: SUBJECT FULLY AND COMPLETELY MET EXPECTATIONS.

AS office 'S ISSUE COORDINATOR, SUBJECT HAS ENCOURAGED HIS COLLEAGUES TO ENGAGE THIS HARD TARGET. IN DOING SO, SUBJECT PROVIDED DETAILED, AND NUANCED GUIDANCE THAT MAXIMIZED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATIONAL EFFORTS.

SUBJECT HAS WORKED HARD TO FURTHER DEVELOP A TEAM CONCEPT WITH THE LOCAL WHICH HAS LED TO IMPROVED COORDINATION AND NEW OPERATIONAL INITIATIVES.

SUBJECT HAS ALSO DEVELOPED EFFECTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER OFFICES IN office 'S.

LEARNING: SUBJECT FULLY AND COMPLETELY MET EXPECTATIONS. DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THIS PAR, HE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED THE COURSE AS WELL AS LANGUAGE IMMERSION WITH OTHER NE OFFICERS. SUBJECT HAS EXPLOITED THE KNOWLEDGE HE ACQUIRED DURING THE COURSE IN HIS DAY TO DAY OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES AT office.

2) BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL Mr. S. 2, AIN,

I FULLY CONCUR WITH THE RATING OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF SUBJECT'S PERFORMANCE. DURING THIS PAR PERIOD, SUBJECT HAS DEMONSTRATED SOUND JUDGMENT, SOLID TRADecraft AND EFFECTIVE WRITING SKILLS. IN SUMMARY, SUBJECT HAS HANDLED ALL THE ACTIVITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES GIVEN TO HIM UPON ARRIVAL WITH SKILL AND CONFIDENCE AND HAS DEMONSTRATED THE POTENTIAL TO FULFILL ALL THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PROMOTION TO THE FULL PERFORMANCE LEVEL DURING HIS TOUR IN. IN ADDITION TO THE PROFESSIONAL SKILLS AND POTENTIAL DEMONSTRATED BY SUBJECT, SUBJECT HAS EXHIBITED A COLLEGIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO HIS WORK THAT IS LAUDABLE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT SUBJECT WILL BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT THE SOUND OPERATIONAL BASE HE ESTABLISHED DURING HIS FIRST SEVEN MONTHS IN office TO BRING SOME OF HIS PROMISING TO CLOSURE AND FULFILL THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE COMPETENCY FOR PROMOTION TO GS-13.

ST ET

Samuel L. Crawford
SSN
GS-123.00
DO/NE (DO/NR)

00-1440564

FRP:
STAFF

PAGE 001

TOR: 23 AUG 00

S T 23 AUG 00 STAFF

CITE

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: NO DISSEM C/NR/ INFO C/NE/ C/NR/

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - PAR FOR Samuel L. Crawford

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PAR FOR Samuel L. Crawford.

A. GENERAL INFORMATION:

- 1) GRADE: GS-12
- 2) OCCUPATIONAL TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER
- 3) REPORTING PERIOD: 1 AUGUST 1999 - 31 JULY 2000
- 4) TYPE OF REPORT: ANNUAL
- 5) DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 31 AUGUST 2000

B. OVERALL PERFORMANCE RATING:..... ()



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ATT. 2

C. KEY JOB ELEMENTS AND RATING:

D. NARRATIVE COMMENTS:

1) BY SUPERVISOR (Mr. L) EMPLOYEE NO. []
CHIEF/ [] BRANCH)

I CERTIFY THAT SUBJECT HAS FAILED TO MASTER ALL THE COMPETENCIES REQUIRED OF AN OPERATIONS OFFICER TO ADVANCE TO GS-13.

SUBJECT IS A GS-12 OPERATIONS OFFICER ASSIGNED AS AN OPERATIONS OFFICER IN THE [] WHICH IS COMPRISED OF [] SUBJECT'S PRIMARY JOB RESPONSIBILITY WAS TO interface with FOREIGN TARGETS, HANDLE ONGOING CASES AND SERVE AS office 'S' TARGETING REFERENT. ON 18 JULY 2000, I REQUESTED THAT SUBJECT PROVIDE INFORMATION FOR THIS PAR, I.E. PAR NOTES, BY COB 04 AUGUST. I MADE A SECOND REQUEST ON 07 AUGUST AND EXTENDED THE DEADLINE TO COB 09 AUGUST BUT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY PAR NOTES FROM SUBJECT.

HIGHLIGHTS:

SUBJECT EFFECTIVELY HANDLED A FOREIGN SOURCE UNDER WHO PRODUCED [] REPORTS ON THE [] TARGET. ONE REPORT PROVIDED THE FIRST DETAILS OF A NEW [] [] SUBJECT CONVINCED THE SOURCE TO ACCEPT WHICH REPRESENTED A KEY OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PROGRESS OF THIS CASE.

SUBJECT HANDLED A SENSITIVE ASSET WHO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED THE FIRST STAGE OF A COMPLEX [] [] TARGET WHICH WON PRAISE FROM DCI.

SUBJECT'S SECURE AND PRODUCTIVE HANDLING OF ANOTHER [] RESULTED IN WELL-RECEIVED REPORTING ON []

: SUBJECT DID NOT FULLY MEET EXPECTATIONS DUE TO A LACK OF [] WORK. SUBJECT HAD NO SUSTAINED OPERATIONS DURING THIS REVIEWING PERIOD WHICH PRECLUDED HIM FROM HAVING ANY REAL OPPORTUNITY TO WORK TOWARD THE RECRUITMENT OF NEW SOURCES. SUBJECT WAS COUNSELED ON HIS PERFORMANCE IN THIS AREA BUT WITH NO APPRECIABLE IMPROVEMENT. SUBJECT MET WITH AN [] OFFICIAL BUT AFTER A COUPLE OF MEETINGS SUBJECT DROPPED THE CONTACT DUE TO TARGET'S LACK OF ACCESS. TO HIS CREDIT, SUBJECT USED HIS EFFECTIVELY TO MEET A HIGH PRIORITY [] SUBJECT ATTEMPTED SEVERAL TIMES TO GET A SECOND MEETING WITH THE [] BUT THE TARGET BACKED OUT OF ONE INVITATION AND PROVED DIFFICULT TO RECONTACT. SUBJECT ATTENDED A FEW FUNCTIONS FOR PURPOSES BUT DID NOT MEET ANY VALID [] LEADS.

: SUBJECT FULLY MET EXPECTATIONS. SUBJECT DEMONSTRATED HIS AMPLE TRADECRAFT SKILLS IN HIS HANDLING OF ONGOING CASES. SUBJECT SECURELY AND PRODUCTIVELY HANDLED A SENSITIVE ASSET WHO WAS A KNOWN HANDLING PROBLEM DUE TO HIS DEMANDING AND

E-1

OVERBEARING NATURE. SUBJECT PERSEVERED WITH THIS ASSET AND APPLIED HIS TRADECRAFT SKILLS TO WORK AROUND THESE PROBLEMS AND GUIDE THE ASSET THROUGH THE SUCCESSFUL FIRST STAGE OF A HIGH PRIORITY **classified** OPERATION. SUBJECT EFFECTIVELY USED [] IN HIS HANDLING [] AND SUBJECT'S ABILITY TO MOVE THIS CASE INTO FULL [] MODE WAS HIGHLY COMMENDABLE.

[] : SUBJECT FULLY MET EXPECTATIONS. SUBJECT EXHIBITED GOOD [] AND [] SECURITY AWARENESS IN HIS HANDLING CASES. []

[] THE ASSET CONDUCTED THE OPERATION SUCCESSFULLY THANKS IN LARGE PART TO SUBJECT'S GUIDANCE.

[] : SUBJECT FULLY MET EXPECTATIONS. SUBJECT PRODUCED [] INTELLIGENCE REPORTS DURING THIS PERIOD. IN ADDITION TO THE WELL-RECEIVED [] REPORTING MENTIONED IN THE HIGHLIGHTS, SUBJECT WAS EFFECTIVE IN DIRECTING AN [] AGENT TO REPORT ON [] MATTERS WHICH RESULTED IN WELL-RECEIVED REPORTING ON [] [] THE 1999 []

SUBJECT ALSO PRODUCED A TIMELY SERIES OF USEFUL REPORTS FROM [] ASSETS ON THE [] STATUS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

INITIATIVE AND LEADERSHIP: SUBJECT DID NOT FULLY MEET EXPECTATIONS DUE PRIMARILY TO A LACK OF INITIATIVE IN GENERATING NEW OPERATIONS. IN HIS ROLE AS office 'S [] COORDINATOR

SUBJECT SUPPORTED office OFFICERS IN [] OFFICIALS IN [] SUBJECT MADE SOLID PROGRESS ON office 'S BEHALF IN DEVELOPING A PRODUCTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH COUNTERPARTS AT THE [] OFFICE RESPONSIBLE [] WHICH HAS BEEN STRAINED IN THE PAST.

LEARNING: SUBJECT FULLY MET EXPECTATIONS. SUBJECT CONTINUED TO EXPAND HIS [] EXPERTISE THROUGH HIS ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN TWO [] RELATED OPS CONFERENCES. SUBJECT ALSO WORKED ON IMPROVING HIS [] LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES BY USING [] TRANSLATING [] LANGUAGE DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM

(AIN: [] 2) BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL ([])

THERE IS NO APPROPRIATE REVIEWING OFFICIAL. PLEASE SEE SEPARATE CABLE TRAFFIC FROM [] REGARDING SUBJECT'S REFUSAL TO READ, SIGN, OR ACKNOWLEDGE THIS PAR. AS PART OF THE STANDARD PREPROGRAMMED PAR CABLE FORMAT, PARAGRAPH SEVEN BELOW CANNOT BE DELETED OR MODIFIED BY office . THEREFORE, IN PARAGRAPH SEVEN BELOW, THE LINE "AND HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE EMPLOYEE" IS NOT ACCURATE AND SHOULD BE DELETED.

- 3) TOTAL MONTHS IN POSITION: (18)
- 4) TOTAL MONTHS UNDER SUPERVISION: (12)
- 5) INTERIM DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD: 14 OCTOBER 1999; 05 JANUARY 2000; 06 APRIL 2000

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E-1
Att. 2

6) EMPLOYEE COMMENTS:

7) CERTIFICATION: I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL WAS PREPARED BY Mr. L [] EMPLOYEE NO. []
[] BRANCH, REVIEWED BY
(AIN: [] , AND HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE
EMPLOYEE.


Head of the office

DATE: 8/23/00

2. FILE: NONE. CL BY: [] [] CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON:
X1, DRV FROM:

CABLETYPE: CICO FPAR 2.6.
END OF MESSAGE

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ATT. 2



The New York Times

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November 4, 2001

A NATION CHALLENGED: THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

A NATION CHALLENGED: THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; Secret C.I.A. Site in New York Was Destroyed on Sept. 11

By JAMES RISEN

WASHINGTON, Nov. 3— The Central Intelligence Agency's clandestine New York station was destroyed in the Sept. 11 attack on the World Trade Center, seriously disrupting United States intelligence operations while bringing the war on terrorism dangerously close to home for America's spy agency, government officials say.

The C.I.A.'s undercover New York station was in the 47-story building at 7 World Trade Center, one of the smaller office towers destroyed in the aftermath of the collapse of the twin towers that morning. All of the agency's employees at the site were safely evacuated soon after the hijacked planes hit the twin towers, the officials said.

The intelligence agency's employees were able to watch from their office windows while the twin towers burned just before they evacuated their own building.

Immediately after the attack, the C.I.A. dispatched a special team to scour the rubble in search of secret documents and intelligence reports that had been stored in the New York station, either on paper or in computers, officials said. It could not be learned whether the agency was successful in retrieving its classified records from the wreckage.

A C.I.A. spokesman declined to comment.

The agency's New York station was behind the false front of another federal organization, which intelligence officials requested that The Times not identify. The station was, among other things, a base of operations to spy on and recruit foreign diplomats stationed at the United Nations, while debriefing selected American business executives and others willing to talk to the C.I.A. after returning from overseas.

The agency's officers in New York often work undercover, posing as diplomats and business executives, among other things, depending on the nature of their intelligence operations.

The recovery of secret documents and other records from the New York station should follow well-rehearsed procedures laid out by the agency after the Iranian takeover of the United States

Embassy in Tehran in 1979. The revolutionaries took over the embassy so rapidly that the C.I.A. station was not able to effectively destroy all of its documents, and the Iranians were later able to piece together shredded agency reports. Since that disaster, the agency has emphasized rigorous training and drills among its employees on how to quickly and effectively destroy and dispose of important documents in emergencies.

As a result, a C.I.A. station today should be able to protect most of its secrets even in the middle of a catastrophic disaster like the Sept. 11 attacks, said one former agency official. "If it was well run, there shouldn't be too much paper around," the former official said.

The agency's New York officers have been deeply involved in counterterrorism efforts in the New York area, working jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies. Many of the most important counterterrorism cases of the last few years, including the bureau's criminal investigations of the August 1998 bombings of two United States Embassies in East Africa and the October 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen have been handled out of New York.

The United States has accused Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda terrorist network of conducting both of those attacks.

But United States intelligence officials emphasize that there is no evidence that the hijackers knew that the undercover station was in the World Trade Center complex.

With their undercover station in ruins, C.I.A. officers in New York have been forced to share space at the United States Mission to the United Nations, as well as borrow other federal government offices in the city, officials said. The C.I.A.'s plans for finding a new permanent station in New York could not be determined.

The agency is prohibited from conducting domestic espionage operations against Americans, but the agency maintains stations in a number of major United States cities, where C.I.A. case officers try to meet and recruit students and other foreigners to return to their countries and spy for the United States. The New York station, which has been led by its first female station chief for the last year, is believed to have been the largest and most important C.I.A. domestic station outside the Washington area.

The station has for years played an important role in espionage operations against Russian intelligence officers, many of whom work undercover as diplomats at the United Nations. Agency officers in New York often work with the F.B.I. to recruit and then help manage foreign agents spying for the United States. The bureau's New York office, at 26 Federal Plaza, was unaffected by the terrorist attack.

The destruction of the C.I.A.'s New York station has added to the intense emotions shared by many of its employees about the agency's role in the battle against terrorism. For some, the

station's destruction served to underscore the failure of United States intelligence to predict the attacks.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, morale suffered badly within the C.I.A., some officials said, as the agency began to confront what critics have called an intelligence failure on the scale of Pearl Harbor.

But the terrorist attacks have also brought an urgent new sense of mission to the agency, which has been flooded with job applications as well as inquiries from former officers eager to return to work. Congress is pouring money into the agency's counterterrorism operations, and the C.I.A. seems poised to begin focusing its resources on terrorism in much the same way it once focused on the Soviet Union in the cold war.

The attacks were not the first in which the C.I.A. was directly touched by terrorists. In 1983, seven agency officers died in the suicide car bombing of the United States Embassy in Beirut. Among the others killed was the agency's station chief in Lebanon, William Buckley, who died in captivity after being kidnapped by terrorists in 1984, and Richard Welch, the agency's Athens station chief, who was shot to death by Greek terrorists in 1975.

Fired by C.I.A., He Says Agency Practiced Bias

First Discrimination Suit by a Black Officer

By JAMES RISEN

WASHINGTON, March 1 — As a young case officer at the Central Intelligence Agency, Jeffrey Sterling says, he was eager to begin his first overseas posting, in Bonn, and he fulfilled his secret assignment to recruit Iranians as spies.

After long hours spent on the Iranian desk at C.I.A. headquarters and nearly a year in language school learning Farsi, he felt that he was ready to put his training to use.

But after waiting two months for orders that never arrived, he said, he returned to the agency headquarters in Virginia in the fall of 1997 to ask his bosses why he had not been given any new cases.

The answer stunned him, he said. According to Mr. Sterling, a supervisor on the Iran Task Force of the agency blurted out why he had not been given new assignments. As a "big black man speaking Farsi," Mr. Sterling "stuck out" and would draw too much attention to the agency's secret Iranian agents. The supervisor, who is white, suggested that a black man, especially a tall athletically built black man like Mr. Sterling, could not meet secretly with Iranians without putting the agency's most sensitive Iranian cases at risk, Mr. Sterling said.

"He said, 'You kind of stick out as a big black guy,'" Mr. Sterling recalled. "I said, 'When did you realize I was black?'"

Mr. Sterling said he was a victim of racial discrimination throughout his career at the agency. He has been fired and has sued the agency, which vigorously denies the accusations.

Agency officials said they were prevented from responding to Mr. Sterling's specific statements by his refusal to waive his privacy rights. They said his dismissal stemmed from his refusal to accept a new assignment.

Mr. Sterling, 34 and unemployed, said that he was embittered by his experiences and that he believed he had never been given a fair chance to prove himself inside the agency's clubby atmosphere.

Agency officials and outside lawyers who handle cases against the agency said Mr. Sterling was the first black case officer to file a racial discrimination suit against the agency. Mr. Sterling said other black case officers shared his feelings but were afraid to speak up.

"I think they bring minorities in the door to maintain appearances, and so they can say they are diverse," he said of the agency. "But that's just a facade."

Although the agency has ex-

pressed a determination to become more diverse, white men have long dominated its top management. Since the agency started in 1947, every director, deputy director and chief of espionage operations has been a white man.

In the mid-1990's, the white male control over espionage faced its first major legal challenge from a class-action suit by a group of women who were case officers and who charged sexual discrimination. The women won a \$990,000 settlement in federal court in 1995.

Mr. Sterling also said he believed that his experience showed how difficult it had been for the agency to adapt to a changing world.

The failure to develop more case officers from diverse backgrounds, he said, helped explain why the agency was unable to penetrate Al Qaeda's terrorist network before Sept. 11, while an American teenager, John Walker Lindh, was able to join the group.

"If a skinny white kid from the Bay Area can go up and knock on the door of the Taliban and Al Qaeda and be welcomed in, imagine what a non-traditional C.I.A. officer would have been able to do," Mr. Sterling said.

John Brennan, the deputy executive director of the agency who met Mr. Sterling several times about his case, said there was no evidence that racial discrimination had caused his problems.

"It was an unfortunate situation," Mr. Brennan said, "because Jeffrey was a talented officer and had a lot of the skills we are looking for, and we wanted him to succeed.

"We were quite pleased with Jeffrey's performance in a number of areas. Unfortunately, there were some areas of his work and development that needed some improvement."

In his suit, filed in August in Federal District Court in Manhattan, Mr. Sterling contends that he faced a pattern of discrimination throughout his career.

The challenge of Mr. Sterling's fitting in was complicated by the secretive nature of the agency, where even mundane personnel matters are classified.

Mr. Sterling contends that the managers retaliated against him after he had filed a complaint in 2000 with the antidiscrimination office at the agency over his treatment on his last field assignment, in the New York station. The agency, he said, ordered him to undergo a complete security reinvestigation two years ahead of schedule.

In August 2000, Mr. Sterling was

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Jeffrey Sterling says other black cas-

forced to leave the New York station. In March 2001, he was placed on administrative leave. He said he was subsequently discharged for refusing an assignment to return to the Iran Task Force, although agency officials said he refused other possible assignments, as well. He was let go in October.

Mr. Sterling and others familiar with his case said they believed that

An ex-employee says he asked the Iran unit, 'When did you realize I was black?'

he and other young black case officers lacked mentors to help them navigate the byzantine world of espionage early in their careers.

Agency officials said they were working to improve recruiting and developing employees from minorities. About 12 percent of the professional staff members of the Directorate of Operations, the espionage arm where Mr. Sterling worked, are members of minorities, agency officials said.

"The agency has been very serious about diversity, and we have a very intense recruitment effort," said



Susana Raab for The New York Times

officers at the Central Intelligence Agency shared his feelings about discrimination, but were afraid to speak up.

Don Cryer, a special assistant to the director of the agency, George J. Tenet, for diversity plans and programs. "Our numbers are rising in all the key areas."

Mr. Cryer said he had also met Mr. Sterling before his dismissal.

"The agency really did try to find a way to help Jeffrey be successful," Mr. Cryer said, "because we truly did see him as an employee with potential."

In fact, Mr. Sterling was just the sort of person whom the agency has said it wants to recruit.

Raised in Cape Girardeau, Mo., the youngest of six children, Mr. Sterling was the sole member of his family to go to college. After graduating from Millikin University in Decatur, Ill., he earned a law degree from Washington University in St. Louis. After that, he responded to a newspaper advertisement from the Central Intelligence Agency and was hired in 1993.

In December 1994, he completed training to become a case officer and joined the Iran Task Force in January 1995. He was the sole black officer there out of 20 to 30 professional staff members, he said. In that unit, Mr. Sterling traveled to Africa and Europe to work with Iranian agents.

After his training in Farsi, followed by another period at headquarters while he went through a divorce, Mr. Sterling was sent to Bonn in September 1997, assigned to recruiting Iranians as agents.

But, he said, his efforts to meet

Iranian diplomats were hampered because his "cover," the position he had to pretend to hold while operating for the C.I.A., was as an Army logistics officer. He said his superiors denied his request to switch him to a State Department cover, so he could pose as an American diplomat and move more freely among foreign officials.

While he handled one or two existing cases in Germany, he said, he was not given new cases to develop.

After meeting his supervisors in November 1997, when Mr. Sterling said he was told that he had not been given new cases because his appearance was a hindrance, he demanded that he be allowed to leave Germany, and he returned to headquarters.

After nearly a year in the counterproliferation division, Mr. Sterling transferred to New York in January 1999, where, he said, he was the lone black case officer.

Again, he was assigned to try to recruit Iranians as spies, and soon received a positive evaluation. Mr. Sterling "demonstrated good tradecraft in the handling of his assigned cases," according to an evaluation in September 1999 by a supervisor and provided by Mr. Sterling.

But soon after that, managers in New York began to tell Mr. Sterling that they were disappointed by his failure to recruit Iranian spies. Mr. Sterling again complained that he had been given a cover as an Army officer and he again requested a State Department cover. Again, he

said, that request was denied.

In April 2000, Mr. Sterling met his New York supervisors and was told that he had two months to start recruiting three new spies, and hold three meetings with each, or he would be forced to leave the station.

Mr. Sterling said he saw that as an unrealistic and unfair deadline and rejected the terms. He now says white case officers were routinely given more time to meet less demanding standards. He filed a complaint with the equal employment opportunity office at the agency and said he was soon notified that he would be subjected to a security investigation.

Robert Baer, a former case officer and the writer of a new book on his career at the agency, agreed that the demands put on Mr. Sterling for developing new agents were unreasonable.

"It's incomprehensible to me why any manager would give anyone a two-month limit," Mr. Baer said. "That's an outrageous requirement. It often occurs that people go a whole tour of two or three years who don't recruit a single agent."

Mr. Sterling said that perhaps the most depressing part of his experience occurred on Sept. 11, when the terrorist attacks occurred just as the agency was dismissing him.

"I was trained by the organization to counter enemies like that," he said. "I had the language and area familiarization, but I was still not considered good enough."

DATE
1-3-03

INCOMING CALLS

NAME
Bill Hartow

TIME	NAME	MESSAGE	CALL COMPLETED
7 38		CBS	800
8 39		CBS	LM 890
9 49		CBS	949
10 12		CNN	1012
10 28		WJF	1028
10 31		CBS	1031
11 03		WJF	1103
11 08		Fox News	1112
11 08		Reuters	1130
11 53		WJF	1153
12 35		Reuters	141
13 25		NBC	1325
13 41		NBC	LM 141
14 02		WSJ	230
14 03		Boston Globe	Dom
14 26		CBS	235
14 34		Hallas Morning News	234
14 31		LATimes	315
2 50		Peoples Mag	250
2 57		CBS	300
15 27		WP	1527
3 37		WP	307
3 39		NBC	355
4 33	Jim Plzen	NYT	403
4 18		WP	1740
4 04		NBC News	408
5 15		WP	DBE
5 13		WSJ	1805
5 19		NBC	519
5 19		WJF	519
5 23		AT&T	530
5 22		CNN	530
5 20		Fox	1730
5 25		CBS	525
5 20		NYT	1845
5 31		Fox News	1745
5 36		WJF	1736

GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT
105
1:10CR485

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ // X1

DECLASSIFIED

CL BY:
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 1-82

William R. Harlow

Office: OPA



04/03/03 06:43 PM

To: John E. McLaughlin@DCI, James L. Pavitt@DO, John H. Moseman@DCI, Stanley M. Moskowitz@DCI, a CIA officer

cc:

Subject: NYT Question - Iran

Jim Risen of the NY Times called around 1600 today saying that he was working on a story...not for tomorrow... about what he described as a CIA **classified** program against the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Risen said the program is or was known as "Merlin." He says there was a Russian scientist who defected to the U.S. who we arranged to give or sell some nuclear weapons designs to the Iranians. The plans, according to Risen, had been modified by the National Labs so that they would either not work or would inject some error in their planning. He says the Russian gave the Iranians the plans at an IAEA mission in Europe.

He went on to say that the plans involved the "fire set" which controls the implosion in the nuclear detonation. He said that he was unsure whether this program is still in operation...but that it started in CY 2000.

I told Risen I would see what *if anything* we had to say to him...and added that any real **classified** program is something that a respectable paper should avoid writing about.

My counterpart got a similar call from Risen. Risen said that he knew that President Clinton had approved the plan...but wanted to know if it had been reapproved by President Bush. They had no immediate comment.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ // X1

GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
106
1:10CR485

DATE
4/4/03

INCOMING CALLS

NAME
Bill Harlow

TIME	NAME	MESSAGE	CALL COMPLETED
7 24		CBS	724
9 45		NBC	945
10 12		NBC	1012
10 35		CNN	1035
10 37		NBC	1037
10 43		NBC	1043
10 48		WNY	1048
10 43	Jim Rosen	NYT	1100
10 41		Newsweek	
11 05		NBC News	1105
11 24		ABC	1140
11 25		WP	1140
11 31		WP	1200
11 31		NY	1150
11 32		CBS	msg 1200
11 41		NY Times	msg 1200
12 01		CBS	1215
12 26		NBC	1226
13 00		NY Times	1400
1 07		FOX News	1335
13 20		LATimes	1420
13 30		Reuters	msg 1430
14 26		Newsweek	230
2 31		NBC	231
14 44		Newsweek	1444
14 50		CNN	1450
15 40		NY Post	345
3 53		WSS	415
3 53		WP	353
3 40		WP	340
4 14		Newsday	EM 600
4 33	Jim Rosen	NYT	603
5 26		NBC	550
5 27		Reuters	540
5 45		WSS	603
5 46		WP	600
6 00		WNY	600

GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 107 1:10CR485

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ // X1

CL BY:
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 1-82

William R. Harlow

Office: OPA



04/04/03 12:38 PM

To: John E. McLaughlin@DCI, James L. Pavitt@DO, John H. Moseman@DCI, Stanley M. Moskowitz@DCI, a CIA officer

cc:

Subject: NYT Question - Iran UPDATE

Jim Risen called this morning to ask how I was coming with a response to the story he is working on regarding Iran

I told him I had no official reaction yet...but that I had spent some thinking about why any responsible journalist would want to write such a story. Told him that assuming any of the facts he had were correct...which I was not confirming...seemed to me that such a story would jeopardize U.S. security in a highly sensitive arena. I added that it is hard to believe that any news organization, this side of Al Jazeera, would publish such an item.

Risen said -- amazingly enough -- that he hadn't really thought about the security implications.

I reminded him of a recent occasion when he came to us with a story he planned to write....and we had Condi Rice call his publisher. The story did not run...although Risen and Howell Raines, his editor, were apparently unhappy that senior officials went around them to get it killed.

I asked how he thought we (the USG) ought to proceed and suggested that I suspect senior officials would be quite willing to let his leadership know of the unwisdom in printing such a story.

Risen said he wanted to think about how he might cast the story...and would call me back this afternoon. My recommendation is that if he comes back to us with plans to publish any story....we ask Dr. Rice to place another call to the Publisher of the Times.

---- Forwarded by William R. Harlow on 04/04/03 12:14 PM ----

CL BY:
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 1-82

William R. Harlow

Office: OPA



04/03/03 06:43 PM

To: John E. McLaughlin@DCI, James L. Pavitt@DO, John H. Moseman@DCI, Stanley M. Moskowitz@DCI, a CIA officer @DO

cc:

Subject: NYT Question - Iran

Jim Risen of the NY Times called around 1600 today saying that he was working on a story...not for tomorrow... about what he described as a CIA classified program against the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

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Risen said the program is or was known as "Merlin." He says there was a Russian scientist who defected to the U.S. who we arranged to give or sell some nuclear weapons designs to the Iranians. The plans, according to Risen, had been modified by the National Labs so that they would either not work or would inject some error in their planning. He says the Russian gave the Iranians the plans at an IAEA mission in Europe.

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My counterpart got a similar call from Risen. Risen said that he knew that President Clinton had approved the plan...but wanted to know if it had been reapproved by President Bush. They had no immediate comment.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ // X1

DATE
4/25/03

INCOMING CALLS

NAME
Bill Hauler

TIME	NAME	MESSAGE	CALL COMPLETED
6 46	[REDACTED]	NBC	746
7 19	[REDACTED]	CBS	719
7 39	[REDACTED]	NBC	739
7 51	[REDACTED]	NBC	751
8 15	[REDACTED]	AP	815
8 56	[REDACTED]	NBC CBS	856
9 16	[REDACTED]	WP	0930
9 44	[REDACTED]	CNN	1000
10 21	[REDACTED]	CNN	1030
10 24	[REDACTED]	Fox	1035
10 30	[REDACTED]	US News	1030
10 50	[REDACTED]	Newsweek	1050
10 51	[REDACTED]	ABC	1055
10 58	[REDACTED]	AP	1145
11 25	[REDACTED]	WP	Lm 1150
11 35	Jim Rosen	NYT	1155
11 46	[REDACTED]	Time	1200
11 46	[REDACTED]	Newsday	1158
12 00	[REDACTED]	WP	1230
12 29	[REDACTED]	WP	1237
13 12	[REDACTED]		1312
13 09	[REDACTED]	LA Times	1340
14 40	[REDACTED]	Knight + Rodder	1500
14 43	[REDACTED]	Boston Globe	- RM 330
14 40	[REDACTED]	ABC	msg 1500
15 07	[REDACTED]	ABC	1512
15 17	[REDACTED]	CBS	1519
15 17	Jim Rosen	NYT	330
3 35	[REDACTED]	NPR	430
3 36	[REDACTED]	CBS	430
3 48	[REDACTED]	Newsweek	440
3 52	[REDACTED]	AP	Dom 513
3 55	[REDACTED]	NBC	430
4 38	[REDACTED]	Time	
5 37	[REDACTED]	WP	555
5 58	[REDACTED]	Newsweek	558
6 16	[REDACTED]	Newsweek	

GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT
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CL BY:
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 5-82

William R. Harlow
Office: OPA



04/25/03 04:16 PM

To: John H. Moseman@DCI
cc: two CIA officers
John A. Rizzo@DCI, two CIA officers
a CIA officer, Scott W. Muller@DCI, Stanley M. Moskowitz@DCI, a CIA officer
James L. Pavitt@DO, two CIA officers
Robert J. Eatinger@DCI, two CIA officers
Subject: Risen Leak: Second Wave

Just when you thought it was safe:

Jim Risen called at 1530 today and said he wanted to discuss some more the Iran Nuke story.

He said he had considered my earlier cautions that, without confirming or denying what he had, it would be bad for national security to print such a story....but he was still working on it.

Risen proceeded to summarize the draft lead of his story. It went something like this:

The United States has had an ongoing **classified** program to derail the Iranian nuclear weapons program by selling them intentionally flawed nuclear weapons designs.

He then mumbled something about..."according to government documents" and knowledgeable people.

I asked him....if he was telling me that he has documents with some of this stuff...and he said "yes."

Risen went on to say that the story would say that the program was code named "Merlin" and that it involved getting a Russian defector to pretend to be a Russian scientist willing to sell nuclear firing sets to Iran. He says that the deal was eventually made and that this was part of a "larger program" to inject flawed designs into the Iranian program.

I asked him (again without confirming or denying anything) if he had given thought to the wisdom of writing such a story. He said he had.

It was at that point that he said that he had talked to some people who believe that the operation was "not handled properly". He added that he had been told that the Iranians had already been told that the designs there were given were flawed...so his story would not set back our efforts. He said that there were hints that the Iranians might be able to fix the flaws.


I asked him if he had discussed this story with others at his paper...he said yes, with his editors. He told them that we might wish to weigh in before a story appeared. I confirmed that VERY high officials from the USG would undoubtedly want to make strong representations about the lack of wisdom of doing this story.

I urged him to restrict the number of people he talked to about this....and to handle very securely any documents he had...and any documents he created.

Seems to me we need to move quickly with his management before all of Washington and New York are talking about this story.

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Subject: NYT Meeting

The purpose of this LOTUS note is to memorialize a meeting held yesterday, April 30th, at the White House regarding the New York Times leak.

The meeting was convened by the National Security Advisor, Dr. Rice in her office. Also attending were the DCI, ADDO, Anna Perez of the NSC staff, Jill Abramson, the Washington Bureau Chief of the New York Times, reporter Jim Risen and myself. The meeting was held at 1130 and lasted about 15 minutes.

Dr. Rice followed the attached talking points very closely.

*When Dr. Rice completed her remarks, Jill Abramson asked for more information on the assertion that printing this story could result in people dying. The DCI spoke, again stressing that this was completely off-the-record, saying that the Russian involved in the program introduced himself to the Iranians
If the Iranians learn that they were misled, this could lead them to retaliate against him.*

Risen asked about the issue of whether the Iranians were witting of the program. He implied that he had seen a letter to the Iranians from the Russian which told them that their program was flawed. The DCI said that the individual was suggesting to the Iranians that they needed his services...not telling them that the designs they got from him were flawed.

Abramson said that the Times had "a fully realized draft" of the story...but that they had "not yet" taken the step of asking the Iranians for comment. The implication was that it had been their intention to seek such a comment before publishing. Although the story was in draft, she said that they were not on the verge of publishing it.

Both Abramson and Risen seemed to be impressed by the seriousness of the issue. Neither had many questions or comments.

Anna Perez asked Abramson what she planned to do now.

Abramson said that a decision to not publish would have to be made by her bosses in New York. She said she had a previously scheduled trip to meet with Executive Editor Howell Raines in New York on Monday and would now plan to discuss the issue with him face-to-face then. Similarly, she said that a decision to remove documentation from the Times' computer systems and destroy any documents that were in their possession would have to wait for the meeting with Raines. She said that the number of people aware of the story at the Times was limited. She said it included herself, Raines, Risen and one other reporter (unnamed) in the Washington bureau. She did not address how many people outside of the NYT (Hill staffers, lawyers, former intelligence officers, weapons experts, etc) who have already been questioned by Risen regarding this story.

Abramson said that after her meeting with Raines in New York they would let us know of their decision.

Risen called me twice on other matters later on the same afternoon -- making absolutely no reference to the meeting earlier in the day. I took this to be a hopeful sign of increased awareness of the need for discretion.



RisenTPs.do

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- This meeting is completely OFF-THE-RECORD.
- We've never called a meeting like this before in this Administration-the fact that we have done so may tell you how seriously we view this matter.
- We've asked you to come in for a meeting because this is something which should not be discussed over open telephone lines.
- Jim, someone has inappropriately and incorrectly given you information about one of the most sensitive and important programs this country has.
- I say "inappropriately" because this information in the wrong hands could easily lead to the death of a U.S. citizen...and conceivably contribute to the deaths of millions of innocent victims of a foreign nuclear weapons program.
- I say "incorrectly," because someone has apparently told you that the program was mismanaged and already revealed to the Iranian government. To the best of knowledge of all of us here...that is totally false.
- Preventing working nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of rogue states is one of the most important missions that this, or any other, Administration can have.
- I won't ask you your source, because I know you will not tell me.
- There is no partial answer here. We see no way to write part of this story. If you write it...you endanger lives and national security.
- Asking journalists not to write a story is asking a lot. Now, I am going to ask you more. I am going to ask...in the strongest possible terms...that you not discuss this matter with colleagues and that you not conduct further inquiries around town about it. Each conversation, each call, increases the likelihood that the story will get out...even if you decide to do the right thing and not publish it.
- If you feel the need to discuss this with your seniors in New York. I request that you do so face-to-face. It is much too sensitive for telephone lines.

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Additionally, I ask that the details of the prospective story be immediately purged from your computer systems.

- Jim, I understand that you may have some government documents that impinge upon this story. If that is true, I won't ask that you turn them over to us...but I will ask that you shred every copy-now.
- Let me anticipate a question. You may be wondering, will there be a time when it would be safe for you to write the story. I cannot foresee such a time. Even if Iran turns into a democracy and renounces weapons of mass destruction, the techniques used to hinder their nuclear program could still be useful in preventing other rogue states from endangering us all.
- You have our promise that if we learn of any other news organization plans to publish this story...we will let you know immediately. If any other organization gets this information...we will work as hard to convince them not to publish as we are with you.
- What do you get if you agree not to publish? The comfort of knowing that you haven't contributed to making the world a more dangerous place.

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F.R. 1. 2003 2:45PM

NO. B13 P. 1

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Original Text of William R. Hartow
Original Text of William R. Hartow

CL BY:
CL REASON: Section 1.6 D
DECL ON: X1
ORV FRM: COV 1-32

6 May 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: John H. Moseman@DCI

FROM: William R. Hartow @ DCI

OFFICE: OPA

SUBJECT: Risen Leak - Update

REFERENCE:

Anna Perez of the NSC staff called to say that she had just received a voice mail from Jill Abramson, Washington Bureau Chief of the New York Times, saying: "No further discussions were needed" regarding the leak issue and that we had "nothing to worry about."

We take from this message that the Times has decided to do the right thing...not publish any story.

Anna is going to try to reach Abramson to ask what the Times has decided to do about Condi Rice's request that they shred all documents and purge all computer files relating to this matter.

CC: Two CIA officers
John A. Rizzo@DCI

Five CIA officers

Robert J. Eatfinger@DCI
A CIA officer
Scott W. Muller@DCI

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PAGE 001

IN 9366503

TOR: 062322Z JAN 06 CIA OFFICE #25108

~~SECRET~~ 062316Z JAN 06

CITE CIA OFFICE #2 5108

TO: PRIORITY LANGLEY

FOR:

CLASSIFIED PROGRAM NO. 1 (CP 1)

SUBJECT: MERLIN (M) - MEETING REGARDING COMPROMISE OF CP 1
OPERATION; U.S. TRAVEL OF RUSSIAN OFFICIAL #2

REF: A. LANGLEY 102125
B. LANGLEY 102118

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST HQS ACTION FOR MERLIN ASSETS;

2. EVENING 04 JANUARY 2006, C/O MR. M. AND CP IC MR. S. MET WITH M AND MRS. M AT A HOTEL IN NJ TO DISCUSS THE COMPROMISE OF THE CP 1 OPERATION. C/OS EXPLAINED THE DETAILS OF THE COMPROMISE AND ALERTED THEM TO THE LIKELIHOOD THAT RUSSIA AND IRAN WOULD HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO IDENTIFY M. BOTH M AND MRS. M. ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COMPROMISE, BUT THEY TOOK THE NEWS SURPRISINGLY WELL. C/OS ASSURED THEM CIA WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THEM ON THE TARGETING PROJECT AND OTHER OPERATIONS THAT MINIMIZED M'S POTENTIAL EXPOSURE. C/OS ALSO ASSURED THEM THEIR SALARY WOULD CONTINUE, WHICH WAS CLEARLY AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION FOR THE PAIR.

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3. C/OS COVERED THE DETAILS OF THE COMPROMISE AND NOTED THE MULTIPLE DISTORTIONS IN THE TEXT, INCLUDING UNFLATTERING COMMENTS ABOUT M. THEY ACCEPTED THE NEWS IN STRIDE AND UNDERSTOOD THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES. THEY WILL BE ESPECIALLY VIGILANT TO NOTE ANY UNUSUAL ACTIVITIES OR CONTACTS BY RUSSIANS OR OTHERS. THEY WERE WARNED AGAINST TRAVEL ABROAD, ESPECIALLY TO RUSSIA OR COUNTRY A. BOTH COMMENTED, "DON'T WORRY, WE KNOW THEM BETTER THAN YOU DO, AND WE WILL NEVER TAKE SUCH A RISK." IN THE END, THE COUPLE WAS HAPPY TO HEAR THE NEWS FROM MR. S. A FAMILIAR FACE OVER THE YEARS. THEY WERE PLEASED THEY COULD CONTINUE THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO CIA AND THEIR FINAL COMMENT WAS THAT C/OS "BROUGHT COLOR INTO THEIR GREY LIVES."

4. ONCE THE PAIR HAD DISCUSSED THE COMPROMISE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, C/O MR. M. SHIFTED THE CONVERSATION TO FOCUS ON MRS. M.'S MOST RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH CONTACTS. MRS. M HAS BEEN IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH RUSSIAN OFFICIAL #2'S WIFE. MRS M. DISCOVERED THAT OFFICIAL #2 WILL BE IN THE U.S. HE WILL STOP IN FOR A TRADE SHOW FOLLOWED BY BUSINESS MEETINGS

THE VISIT WILL AFFORD THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A COMMERCIAL APPROACH TO OFFICIAL #2. GIVEN RECENT COMPROMISES OF M'S ACTIVITIES, C/O WILL MAKE THIS APPROACH COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT FROM HIS ASSOCIATION WITH M. MRS. M. SAID SHE THOUGHT OFFICIAL #2 WOULD TRAVEL TO THE U.S. MORE FREQUENTLY IF HE HAD A LEGITIMATE BUSINESS PURPOSE FOR THE TRAVEL AND CORPORATE FUNDING FROM A U.S. SOURCE.

5. AS STATED, C/O WILL FORMULATE AND SUBMIT FOR HQS AND REVIEW AN OPERATIONAL PLAN TO APPROACH OFFICIAL #2 TO DISTANCE THE CONTACT FROM THE MERLINS.

C/O WILL LIMIT THEIR ROLE AND FUTURE INTERACTION. MRS. M. DESCRIBED HIM AS AN EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS AND DELIBERATE MAN. MRS M. ASSESSED HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN AGGRESSIVE APPROACH NOR WOULD HE BE VULNERABLE TO A SOFT USG APPROACH. THE COMPROMISE DICTATES DISTANCING ANY APPROACH TO OFFICIAL #2 FROM THE MERLINS. BELIEVE CIA HAS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO ESTABLISH CONTACT INDEPENDENTLY.

6. IN LIGHT OF THE COMPROMISE OF M, REQUEST HQS ACTION ON BOTH M AND MRS. M.

7. FILE: CP 1 ; M CL BY: ID # , CL
REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON: X1 DRV FROM:

CABLETYPE:

END OF MESSAGE

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WITH NR AND CE.

11. FILE:

CL BY:

CL REASON: SECTION

1.5 (C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM:
CP 1

>

ORIG: CP/

MR. S.

); AUTH: CP 1

(CIA OFFICER ;

COORD: CP 1 (

MR. S.),

CP 1

, CP 1 (

; REL: CP 1 (

CIA OFFICER 16

END OF MESSAGE

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 TOR: 231858Z JAN 06 CIA OFFICE #2 5152

~~SECRET~~ 231858Z JAN 06

CITE CIA OFFICE #2 5152

TO: LANGLEY

FOR:

CLASSIFIED PROGRAM NO. 1 (CP 1)

SUBJECT: MERLIN (M) : HEIGHTENED CONCERN OVER COMPROMISE OF
CP 1 OPERATION

REF: A. CIA OFFICE #2 5151
 B. CIA OFFICE #2 [REDACTED]
 C. LANGLEY 102125
 D. LANGLEY 102118

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLS NOTE M COMMENTS RE A CIA ASSESSMENT OF CP 1 COMPROMISE AND POOL OF POTENTIAL ARZAMAS-16 SCIENTIST SOURCES (PARAS TWO/THREE). PENDING HQS' INPUT, C/O COULD ADDRESS THESE ISSUES IN A VERBAL UPDATE TO M AT A FUTURE MEETING.

2. EVENING 20 JANUARY, C/O MR. M. CONDUCTED A NON-SCHEDULED MEETING WITH M THAT M HAD TRIGGERED TO DISCUSS HIS CONCERNS OVER THE CP 1 OPERATION. M EXPLAINED THAT HE AND MRS. M. NOW WERE VERY STRESSED AFTER READING THE RISEN BOOK. THEY WERE SHOCKED AT THE LEVEL OF DETAIL AND WHAT THEY CONSIDERED THE LACK OF A USG RESPONSE. AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE, IN THEIR VIEW, WOULD BE THE ARREST OF THE AUTHOR AND THE SOURCE(S) OF

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THE INFORMATION. M WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT MANY OF THE ALLEGED FACTS WERE DISTORTED AND SEVERAL LIES ABOUT HIM ALSO WERE PRESENTED AS FACTS. M REQUESTED A FORMAL CIA ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPROMISE SO THAT HE COULD CALM MRS. M. AND ALLAY HIS OWN FEARS. M TOLD C/O HE PLANNED TO BUY A GUN AND UPDATE HIS HOME SECURITY BECAUSE HE WAS CONVINCED THE RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES WOULD RETALIATE AGAINST HIM.

3. AS AN ENGINEER, M CALCULATED THE PROBABILITY OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IDENTIFYING HIM BY NAME AND FINDING HIS ADDRESS IN THE U.S. M BELIEVES THAT, AT MOST, # SCIENTISTS FITTING THE BOOK'S DESCRIPTION LEFT ARZAMAS-16 SINCE . OF THOSE #, # ARE LIKELY STILL IN RUSSIA, PROBABLY MOSCOW. A FEW MAY HAVE GONE TO ISRAEL AND WESTERN EUROPE, POSSIBLY EVEN COUNTRY A, WHICH LEAVES A LIST OF LESS THAN # CANDIDATES. M ASKED IF CIA KNEW HOW MANY OTHER ARZAMAS-16 SCIENTISTS WERE LIVING IN THE U.S. CURRENTLY AND IF THEY WERE MORE OR LESS LIKELY TO BE IDENTIFIED BY RUSSIAN SERVICES.

4. OVERALL, C/O CALMED M A BIT, BUT BOTH M AND MRS. M. ARE NOW CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY. THEY ALSO ARE CONCERNED THE U.S. MEDIA ULTIMATELY WILL PUBLISH HIS NAME AS THEY DID WITH THE C/O SPOUSE OF A FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR. M OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT WANT TO BE CONTACTED BY REPORTERS FOR COMMENT NOR DOES HE WANT TO SEE HIS LIFE IN THE U.S. UPROOTED AND DISRUPTED. IN ADDITION, M SAID HE WAS VERY CONCERNED FOR HIS FAMILY . HE DOES NOT WANT THEM TO FIND OUT ABOUT HIS WORK FOR CIA OR TO SUFFER ANY RETALIATION BY RUSSIA.

5. STATION READS THE CONTINUING CONTACT AND U.S. TRAVEL OF RUSSIAN OFFICIAL #2
AS A POSITIVE INDICATOR THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT YET IDENTIFIED M . IF THEY HAD, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT OFFICIAL #2 WOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE THE RELATIONSHIP AND TRAVEL TO THE U.S. FOR BUSINESS. NEITHER M NOR MRS. M HAS DETECTED ANYTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY THROUGH THEIR PHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH RUSSIAN OFFICIAL #2. C/O ASKED THEM TO BE VIGILANT, HOWEVER, IN NOTING ANYTHING UNUSUAL.

6. AS TIME GOES BY AND NOTHING HAPPENS, THE MERLINS LIKELY WILL BECOME LESS ANXIOUS. IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY ARE VERY UPSET NOW ABOUT THE COMPROMISE AND IT WILL BE SOME TIME BEFORE THEY FEEL COMFORTABLE AGAIN. M WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE STRESS ON HIS WIFE BECAUSE SHE HAS BECOME PARANOID, JUMPING AT EVERY NOISE IN THE HOUSE AT NIGHT. C/O ASSUAGED HIS FEARS TO SOME EXTENT BY EXPLAINING THE DIFFICULTIES THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE IN TRACKING HIM DOWN. AFTER READING THE BOOK, M SAID HE WAS INSULTED BY RISEN'S DESCRIPTION OF HIM, ESPECIALLY AS A DEFECTOR (WHICH HE IS NOT).

7. M HAS STARTED TO MONITOR COVERAGE OF THE RISEN BOOK IN THE RUSSIAN MEDIA, WHERE THE STORY WAS VERY BIG AND THERE WAS MUCH MORE DISCUSSION. C/O POINTED OUT THE FLAWS IN THE BOOK AND THE RESULTING MEDIA COVERAGE POINTING TO THE IMPROBABILITY OF THE OPERATION AS DESCRIBED. M AGREED THAT SOME OF THE MEDIA COVERAGE WAS HIGHLY SCEPTICAL OF THE VERACITY OF RISEN'S REPORTING ON THE OPERATION, WHICH MIGHT AFFORD SOME DEGREE OF PROTECTION IN SAFEGUARDING M 'S IDENTITY. C/O WILL MEET WITH M AGAIN IN LATE JANUARY FOR AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AND THE MERLINS STATE OF MIND.

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