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CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT

ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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-vs-

Case No. 1:05-cr-225

STEVEN J. ROSEN

KEITH WEISSMAN,

Defendants.

HEARING ON MOTIONS

November 8, 2007

Before: T.S. Ellis, III, Judge

## APPEARANCES:

Kevin DiGregory, W. Neil Hammerstrom, Jr., Thomas Reilly and Michael C. Martin, Counsel for the United States

Abbe D. Lowell and Erica E. Paulson, Counsel for Defendant Rosen

John N. Nassikas, III and Baruch Weiss, Counsel for Defendant Weissman

The Defendants, S. Rosen and K. Weissman, in person

NOTE: After the matters relating to CIPA issues are concluded, the public portion of the hearing begins as follows:

THE COURT: So, this discussion I think can be unsealed for purposes of the court reporter and for purposes of the public.

MR. REILLY: With the admonishment to all parties that if we are on the public record, not to disclose classified information.

THE COURT: Absolutely. But I don't see any need to do that.

All right. So, what I intend to do now is to address the classified markings issue. Then I am going to express a view about the disparate disclosure. And I want to hear very briefly, maybe further from the parties, and then I am going to resolve that. And following that, we will go to scheduling. And that should end the day, I think.

All right. At issue with respect to the document markings is whether the classification markings on these documents that are slated to be admitted into the trial record should be removed as inadmissible hearsay.

This is not as straight forward an issue as might appear at first blush, and this is so because the markings I think, carefully examined, have both hearsay and nonhearsay purposes and the markings raise significant 403 issues.

I also asked the Government to tell me why they thought it was illegal to remove the markings, and I will address that as well.

Now, before beginning my analysis of this issue, I think it is important to have in mind the role that these documents may be expected to play in the case and the nature prominence and providence of the markings that are in issue. That is, what do they look like, what are they, where did they come from.

To begin with, this Espionage Act prosecution is not one in which some clandestine agents, foreign or domestic, steal documents or illegally obtain documents or plans which are conspicuously marked as Secret or Top Secret or the like.

All of these documents are documents that were not disclosed in their documentary form to the defendants. The defendants never saw these documents. They never saw these markings.

So, the Government in this case instead accuses the defendants not of obtaining classified documents, but of obtaining information that the Government contends is national defense information under the Espionage Act. And as I have said in several opinions, this essentially means that it's information that is closely held by the United States government and that if disclosed would be damaging to the national interest. Those are the requirements for something

to be national defense information.

Actually, the Government really accuses the defendants of conspiring to obtain NDI. And the Government claims that they don't even have to prove that the information was NDI, they just have to prove that the information they conspired to obtain is NDI.

Well, putting that to one side because as a practical matter, the Government is going to attempt to prove that the information passed is NDI. And indeed, I don't think they could persuade a jury that there was a criminal state of mind if they didn't do that. It is clearly part of the Government's case to show that the information orally provided to the defendants is NDI.

Now, to do so, the Government plans to show that the defendants received certain oral information from government officials, government official 1 and 2, for example, and then passed— And then the Government intends to put on expert testimony to show that this information was at the time NDI.

And to aid in this effort, what the Government plans to do is to have its experts apparently rely on documents containing this information, documents which are classified or at least marked with one or another classification category.

Now, these markings are placed on documents by government officials in accordance with an Executive Order definition of classified terms. And they put it on there

after training and review of the documents. This Executive
Order analysis includes assessment of whether the document
would damage national security if the material was disclosed.

So, if introduced with the markings, these markings would clearly constitute hearsay evidence as to what these unnamed and not present persons, government officials, their opinion as to whether disclosure of this material would be damaging to the national interest. That's clearly hearsay.

There is I think clearly a nonhearsay purpose that the documents might serve. And that is the markings on the documents show that the Government intended that this be closely held information.

Now, we have a situation then in which there is both hearsay and nonhearsay purposes. Obviously there are two ways to deal with that. One way is to let the markings in and give a limiting instruction that says they can only consider it for the closely held issue but not for the other issue.

Alternatively, the Court could exclude the markings and have a stipulation by the parties as to how the documents were marked at the times relevant to this case, but not have the markings on there. And indicate that the stipulation as to the markings may only be considered for the purpose of deciding whether the closely held element of NDI is satisfied by the Government. Those are two choices that the Government or that the Court could pursue.

Now, the Government makes some other arguments that I want to deal with. The Government argues at some point that these document markings are admitted under 803(8), which allows for the admission of public records.

I think that argument is not well taken. 803(8) limits the admissibility of public records to certain kinds of public records. And this is a criminal matter, so 803(8)(C) does not apply. It is 803(8)(A) which applies to reports of an agency's regularly conducted activities. And (B), matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report; excluding, however, in criminal matters, criminal cases matters observed by police officers.

I don't think either of those apply because this is an expert's view. It is an evaluation made by an expert of damage to the national security. It is not, not something that a police officer observed.

Subsection (C), as I said, I don't think applies at all because it only establishes the admissibility of these kinds of evaluations in civil cases or against the Government in a criminal case. That's not what is being done here.

So, I will probably write further on this, but I looked at the <u>Farah</u> case that the Government cited, and I am not persuaded that that is to the contrary. And I will explain that in further detail. I think that matter is distinguishable, that case is.

So, I don't believe 803(8) applies.

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Now, then the Government says, well, what about 803(6), a business record exception. Well, quite apart from my sense that Wigmore and McCormick and folks who thought hard about the business records exception decades ago, I think they would flip in their graves if they thought we were going to extend it to this kind of thing. I don't think it does.

In addition, I am moved to some extent by the view expressed in the Eleventh Circuit case that if you can't get it in through (8), then you shouldn't use (6) as a way to get around the restrictions on 803(8). I don't believe these are business records; that is, the markings are not business records in terms of their hearsay evaluation testimony as to whether there is damage to the public or the national security if the material is disclosed.

So, I think there is clearly a hearsay purpose, as I have indicated. There is a nonhearsay purpose. There are two choices, and the Court has to consider which choice is the more sensible one.

Now, I do want to pause a moment and deal with the Government's contention that was initially made that the Executive Order prohibited classification document markings to be removed. It does say— The Executive Order, of course, does govern how to evaluate the document, but the Government says it does more than that. The Government says that it

doesn't permit them to be removed from evidence introduced at trial.

I have looked and I have found no authority that supports that view, no authority to the contrary. There is just simply no authority.

I don't think an Executive Order precludes the Court from making determinations about the evidence that is admitted in a trial. Indeed, we have gone through a lengthy CIPA process, and the result of that lengthy CIPA process has been to preserve Government secrets to the maximum extent possible consistent with allowing the defendants to make substantially the same defense they would make if they were allowed to have all the documents.

And so, what we have is a mass of documents, although it is not a document case, but we have a mass of documents which are no longer classified. The Government wants to do this prosecution, so it has agreed to declassify these documents to the extent that they are now disclosed at trial.

So, even if there were something in the Executive Order that persuaded me that I ought to be cautious about removing the markings, it is gone, they are no longer classified, period. They are going to be in the public record.

Yes.

MR. REILLY: Your Honor, Section 8 of CIPA deals with this issue and states that Court rulings do not affect the classification status. Classification is an Executive Branch function. The documents have not been declassified. They are going to be authorized for disclosure at the trial.

THE COURT: And where are they going to be?

MR. REILLY: Pardon?

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THE COURT: Where are they going to be? They are going to be in the public record.

MR. REILLY: Yes.

THE COURT: How in the world could they ever constitute NDI after that?

MR. REILLY: It is not a question of NDI. question of classification.

THE COURT: You are right. Well, they are no longer NDI in any event, once they are in the public record.

So, I take your point that they are still classified. And the way I am going to handle it is this. am going to require that there be a stipulation for each document as to how it was marked at the time of the events here in issue, whether it was Top Secret, Secret or whatever.

However, after 20-years plus of watching juries, I am persuaded that if the mass of documents in this case, all of them stamped prominently with large legend Secret, Top Secret, NOFORN, this or that, you eventually overcome any

instruction the Court can give.

The fact that the markings, the likelihood that the jury will review all of these documents during deliberations, see document after document after document, say that it is Secret, I don't believe that the jurors can be expected to be blind to the improper hearsay purposes of the statement regardless of whatever instruction I give them.

I am going to give them an instruction as to how they have to consider the fact that it was classified, and the parties stipulate that it was classified, and they may consider that for the limited purpose of considering whether the Government has met its burden of showing that the material was closely held.

In fact, as I have indicated, all it shows is that the Government intended or attempted to closely hold it. It is still open to the defense to show that they didn't succeed in that respect.

But I find that looking at this mass of documents, as I have, with all of these prominent inch-and-a-half, two-inch stamps, maybe not two inches, but certainly inch and half-inch stamps of Secret, Secret, creates I think unfair prejudice, likelihood of confusion with the jury notwithstanding the instruction.

I am very aware of authority in the Supreme Court and elsewhere and indeed follow it that juries can be expected

to pay attention to instructions. But as any thinking person knows, particularly persons with long experience in 2 3 litigation, maybe even including some who were on the

5 recognize that it doesn't always work. There are limits to

Supreme -- Maybe not. But in any event, everyone would

the efficacy of Court instructions. 6

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And in my view, this is a case where allowing the documents to proceed with the markings, given the number of documents, the prominence of these markings, that it creates unfair prejudice through confusion and the likelihood that they will not be able to remain faithful to the Court's instructions to consider it for a limited purpose. It just has an impact.

I think the matter is better dealt with, because the Government is entitled to show that they were classified--And indeed, I don't have any problem and neither should the defendants with showing that they remain classified, that's all right too, you shouldn't care. They remain classified.

In fact, an undercurrent of the defense's case, even though they don't have the luxury of showing, is that the material is overclassified or silly.

But in any event, there has to be a stipulation as to each document admitted, what its classification was at the Now, some classification markings appear in small letters in parentheses. Those remain on the document. Those

don't create the 403 problem. Indeed, many of them go the other way. Many of them are important as exculpatory for the defendants.

Now, some of those create a problem in that although they were marked unclassified, I believe it's the Government's contention that they are nonetheless classified in the scope or in the context of this document.

Is that right, Mr. Reilly?

MR. REILLY: That's correct.

THE COURT: So, a stipulation should say that as well. And the reason that's appropriate, it's even more appropriate that the markings, the top bold markings be removed from those documents because they have the U there, but it's important for the Government to have included in the stipulation that the entire document was marked in some classified way. Because they are entitled to show that that was the intent or the intention to hold it closely. And that's true.

Now, whether the Government succeeds in persuading the jury that the paragraphs marked U should be treated as NDI, that's up to you all. I don't know how that's going to come out.

So, in the end, that's the Court's ruling on classified documents. To summarize it, the bold, large classified markings for any documents that are admitted will

be removed.

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There will be a stipulation indicating that the documents were classified, either are or were, doesn't matter much to me, nor should it to the parties, I think. And the fact that they are classified is stipulated, but may be considered by the jury solely for the limited purpose in their consideration as to whether the Government has proved that it is NDI as to whether it was closely held or not. But they are not to consider it for any other purpose.

Now, that means that when an expert testifies for the Government that certain material given to the defendants was NDI, that expert is going to have to have an independent basis for saying that it was damaging to the national security other than the fact that the document is marked.

Now, the expert may rely on the document markings that have been removed but that are now in the stipulation as aiding in his opinion that the material was closely held or attempted to be closely held.

The small designations for individual paragraphs will all remain on the document. They don't raise the same 403 problems as the big bold markings on the tops and sides and other things of document after document after document in this nondocument/oral transmission case.

That's the Court's ruling. And I am going to go on to another subject now.

MR. WEISS: One thing you did not address, if I may inquire of the Court. On the small markings that you said remain, one issue that we addressed is those paragraphs where there has been material redacted where in our view the only reason that the small S would have been there is because of the original paragraph as a whole, our view has always been that the paragraphs that have been redacted are an entirely different case.

We wouldn't want the jury to think, because we dispute it, that the S clearly applies to the material that remains when we are arguing all along that the S was there because of the material that was redacted.

THE COURT: Oh, you will have to deal with that because it does apply to the material that remains.

MR. WEISS: The person who put the S there put it when he or she saw the entire paragraph. They never had--

THE COURT: It's only going to be, the S is only going to be considered for closely held.

Now, you may consider a U as an admission because that's not hearsay, but the S on there, the Government gets the benefit of for closely held. They don't get the benefit of it for damaging to the national security.

MR. WEISS: The point is that when the person affixed the S and wanted to closely hold the paragraph, it may well have been the intention--

1 THE COURT: We don't care, that's not going to be in this case. What's going to be in this case is the expert for 2 the Government that says what's left, in my opinion, is NDI 3 because of A and B. And it won't have to do, except for B, 4 5 the closely held can rely on the markings, but not for the 6 other. 7 MR. WEISS: But my point, if I may just finish, is on the closely held point, the person who affixed the S to the 8 entire unredacted paragraph may have done so with the purpose 9 and intent and the conclusion that only the first sentence 10 11 needs--12 THE COURT: It's an imperfect world. It stays on 13 the document. 14 MR. MARTIN: Your Honor, may I ask a few points of 15 clarification as to your ruling? 16 THE COURT: Yes. 17 MR. MARTIN: With respect to documents that are offered by the defense and not by the Government, does your 18 19 ruling apply equally? 20 THE COURT: Why wouldn't it? MR. MARTIN: Because the defendants are offering the 21 document and, therefore, any prejudice would be of their own 22 23 making. 24 THE COURT: Well, I will tell you what.

words of a famous American, I will cross that bridge when I

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1 come to it. 2 Next. What's your next question? 3 MR. MARTIN: I just have two more quick ones. THE COURT: I doubt I will ever come to that bridge, 5 but we will see. 6 MR. MARTIN: Also--7 THE COURT: Because there may be circumstances where they want it on there, the document they offer and they would 8 9 love to have you repeat what you say here. So, I don't know. We will cross that bridge when we 10 11 come to it. 12 What else do you have? 13 MR. MARTIN: Yes, on documents that Larry Franklin 14 saw, does your ruling apply to those as well? 15 THE COURT: Documents that Larry Franklin saw? 16 MR. MARTIN: Yes, Your Honor. Because there would be a secondary nonhearsay purpose for the documents, namely 17 18 Larry Franklin's criminal intent. 19 MR. LOWELL: That might be true if he was standing 20 trial with us, but the fact is he is never accused of giving 21 us the document. 22 THE COURT: I think it does apply to those, but you have the benefit, assuming that's right, you have the benefit 23 24 of the stipulation that the requires the defendants to

stipulate that the document was classified.

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You also, then you may have a problem if you don't present Franklin and you want to say that he knew it was classified. Well, I might reconsider at some point to have the stipulation say that it was not only classified, but that's how, marked as classified, but that's how it was.

My whole purpose is -- I have been in these cases.

I have also talked to jurors over many years. To see this onslaught of documents marked Secret, Top Secret, NOFORN, it creates an atmosphere.

MR. MARTIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That is just unfair, and I am trying to ameliorate it.

But in your case, the question you have just asked, if it becomes necessary, if Franklin isn't here, which would surprise me, but if it becomes necessary to show that the document had a marking on it when it was in his possession, because that's all you can show if he is not here unless you produce a witness that says, I saw Larry Franklin look at that document, then presumably that witness could also say, and it had these markings on it. But assuming you don't have that and all you have is a search warrant that digs it up out of his house or somewhere and you need to show that it had the markings on it, the stipulation will show that they were marked. And if you need to show something else, I will consider it at the time.

MR. MARTIN: Thank you. And one last question. Are you planning to issue a written order, or is this your final order from the bench?

THE COURT: Well, I am sure I will issue an order. Whether it will go through the detail that I have just gone through depends upon the vast amounts of spare time that I have with all the 800 other cases I have.

MR. MARTIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: But in due course I may, I may. I just don't know because I haven't discussed the various cases in detail. But, you know, I don't have the luxury of weeks and weeks and I don't have a dozen law clerks.

MR. MARTIN: Yes, I just was referring to a written order on the record or--

THE COURT: Yes, there will be a written order in due course. But even that, I just finished a four-week capital trial, it won't surprise you that I have a mass of documentation about that, and I start another trial here fairly soon. So, I probably will issue an order, and I may or may not do a discursive one or a memorandum opinion, I just don't know.

Frankly, this I don't think is a CIPA matter. And so, I don't see the need to produce something in a hurry that a Court of Appeals needs to look at. It is really a 403 ultimate determination by me.

But I, frankly, haven't decided whether to produce anything more extensive than what I have said. I would like to, but I can't predict. I am sitting on about five cases of public corruption in North Carolina. And I have got a number of other things to do. So, I just don't know whether I will get to it. That's why I wanted to give you a fairly broad view of why I reached the result that I reached.

Now, do you have anything further?

MR. MARTIN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Now I want to go on to the disparate disclosure. And here I think I need some additional help. Let me tell you where I stand and what I think is the proper resolution of this dispute, and then have all of you address that and tell me why you think I am wrong or right.

I think the issue may be succinctly put as follows. There are many documents that will be introduced with redactions of material, redactions that have been arrived at through the CIPA process. In the course of this process, the defendants have several times raised the specter that they want to argue that, look, this stuff that our clients were told was not the real basis for the classification of the document, it was something else.

The Government has listened to that and is apprehensive about that contention. And so, it says, as a safeguard, we are going to show our expert the whole amount,

but we can't show it to the defendant, the defendants' experts because we want to argue, we want to be able for our expert to say when the defense asks the expert, well, isn't it true that you don't know whether the reason for the classification of this document was the part that's redacted or not because you haven't seen the redacted parts? That's the Government's genuine concern, and it's a reasonable concern. Well, it's a reasonable concern only if, only if the experts are not all limited.

It seems to me that if a Government expert can say, I have not seen the redacted portions, but I don't need to see the redacted portions to offer you my opinion that this material is national defense information because it is closely held— Now, that I may need to go to the markings to rely to some extent on that. And because in my opinion, based on all the things that I have told you about how great I am, disclosure of this information would be damaging to the national security. And I don't need to know what's in the rest of the document because just looking at this in isolation, which is what is at issue in the case, or probably more than what's at issue in the case, is NDI.

Now, if that's what the testimony is and is expected to be, then I don't see what the specter is and I don't see any need to have disparate disclosures to the experts. That may reflect a view about the defense's attack in that regard,

the fact that I think it may not be as successful as they might otherwise hope.

I am somewhat offended by disparate disclosures. I want to avoid it if I can. It smacks of unfairness. But my whole view is predicated on the notion that it is the information that is disclosed that the experts will be testifying about and not the stuff that's redacted. And that that's what the defense experts will be testifying to, namely what was disclosed and not what's been redacted from these documents. So that we don't need to get into what's redacted. These people don't need to see it.

As I view it, and I am going to start with you, Mr.

Reilly, as I see it, this scheme that I have outlined really

strengthens the Government's position on whether this is NDI

because I suppose that the expert would say, I don't even know

what's in the document other than what is revealed here

because what is revealed here, this is NDI, that is NDI and

it's NDI for these reasons.

So, I think it really strengthens your position and removes from the case the speculation about, ah-huh, what else is in this document may do it.

Now, that undercuts the defense significantly, but it seems to me that that's what the case is about. Now, if your expert can't look you in the eye and tell you under oath that's NDI, well then, let's pack our books and go home.

Although you still have the claim that all they had to do was 1 to conspire to do it, but you are not going to get anybody to 2 agree that they had a guilty mind unless you have something to 3 go with that. But anyway, we know about that. 4 5 All right, Mr. Reilly, what is your view about the Court's proposed view of this? 6 7 MR. MARTIN: I will take this one. 8 MR. REILLY: Mr. Martin will. THE COURT: Yes, sir, what's your view? 9 10 MR. MARTIN: If the Government's expert were to 11 testify as you just outlined, are you then saying that the defense would be precluded from asking the kind of questions 12 13 that we are concerned about? 14 THE COURT: Like what? 15 MR. MARTIN: Like, well, isn't it true, Mr. Expert, 16 that the real reason this information you alleged is NDI--17 THE COURT: I would preclude the defendants from 18 But what is your expert's answer? 19 MR. MARTIN: He would then say because he hasn't 20 seen the redacted material, he would say, I haven't seen the 21 redacted material. 22 THE COURT: Have you been listening to what I said? 23 The answer is, I don't need to see the redacted material. 24 This stuff by itself is NDI.

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MR. MARTIN: Correct. But then they would press on

that. They are not going to just--

THE COURT: All right. What would they press? Give me a sense.

MR. MARTIN: They would say, well, you can't possibly be sure that you don't need to rely on it because you don't even know what is in it. And imagine if the following, they give a hypothetical. What if what was in it was a sentence that said, this material was disclosed publicly last week, would that affect your expert opinion on whether it was NDI?

THE COURT: Well, in the first place, they wouldn't put such a hypothetical because it would be contrary to CIPA.

That would be exculpatory and that I would have disclosed.

So, that wouldn't be really an appropriate question.

But to answer your question directly, I don't see precluding a question. I do think what you are doing now is productive, which is to say, let's imagine how they might pursue the point anyway and see what is infirm or inappropriate about the view that I have taken.

The first thing is, isn't it true you can't tell that the document was classified for reasons other than this information? And the answer is, yes, I can. The information that's right here, the stuff that is disclosed, is NDI because it would be damaging and so forth. And moreover, the entire document was classified, so it was closely held.

1 We need to get this issue resolved. I cannot tell you that it doesn't help either side for there to be disparate 2 3 disclosures. Now, let me tell you one thing else. If you show your people that information, then you do open the 705 can of 5 6 worms. MR. MARTIN: Your Honor, can I just make one point 7 of clarification? We are not advocating that our expert can 8 see the redacted material and theirs can't, with the 9 exception, with one area of exception, that being the material 10 11 that was redacted in discovery. 12 What we are saying is--13 THE COURT: In what? 14 MR. MARTIN: With the one exception being the material that was redacted under Section 4 of CIPA --15 16 THE COURT: All right. 17 MR. MARTIN: -- during discovery. 18 THE COURT: Well, presumably neither your experts 19 nor theirs would see that. 20 MR. MARTIN: Well, again, our concern is the same 21 even with respect to that material. 22 THE COURT: Well, then there is disparate 23 disclosure. 24 MR. MARTIN: Right, but that's a fairly narrow 25 avenue of material.

1 THE COURT: It is still disparate disclosure. 2 MR. MARTIN: I agree in that scenario it is disparate, but that is a fairly narrow category of material. 3 The broader category of material is the stuff that we have redacted from the CIPA section--5 6 THE COURT: How do you think it will look if the 7 defense asks these experts, well, you have seen that information, are you aware that the defense experts haven't 8 seen it? And to ask their experts, now, you weren't permitted 9 to see some of this material, were you? No. Do you think 10 11 that is significant? 12 I don't know. I think that--13 MR. MARTIN: My only point being is that by dividing 14 the two groups, it helps inform the Government as to what the Government can show its experts. 15 16 THE COURT: Oh, I agree, that's why I am addressing 17 the issue now. 18 MR. MARTIN: Correct. 19 THE COURT: Because once you show them everything, 20 Rule 705 operates. What do you think I am saying when I say 21 705 operates? 22 MR. MARTIN: That they have a right to challenge the 23 expert's basis of his opinion. 24 THE COURT: Right. 25 MR. MARTIN: My only point is that when the

Government goes to select and prepare its expert witnesses, it 1 2 will be helpful if it could--3 THE COURT: Yes. MR. MARTIN: If there would be a distinction between 5 the two groups. And what I am saying is--THE COURT: Distinction between the two groups. 6 Between the Section 4(a) exclusions and the CIPA redactions? 7 8 MR. MARTIN: Correct, correct. 9 THE COURT: All right. Well, help me a little further now. 10 I think what you are really saying is, look, we 11 have a universe of people we are picking experts from, and some of them have already seen this stuff. 12 13 MR. MARTIN: That may be a possibility, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: That's exactly what I am thinking too. 15 MR. MARTIN: And we are not saying, that at least as far as the Section 6(c) material, that their expert is 16 precluded from looking at the redacted material. But we are-17 18 THE COURT: All right, that's a huge step forward. 19 MR. MARTIN: What we are saying though is both 20 experts if they are going to refer to the redacted material in 21 their testimony should be bound by the substitutions that we 22 have worked on for these past several months, weeks. Namely, for each redaction there is the boilerplate and for many 23 redactions there is more, there is the boilerplate plus 24

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additional details.

1 THE COURT: You know, I made the suggestion I made 2 because I thought you all would like it. I thought the Government would like it because it would serve to neutralize 3 4 to a large extent this attack on--5 MR. MARTIN: I do like it, except I am just worried that it is not really going to neutralize the attack. 6 7 THE COURT: Mr. Lowell. 8 MR. LOWELL: I just want to separate the three 9 things then. 10 THE COURT: All right. 11 MR. LOWELL: I am agreeing with Your Honor that if 12 their expert can't take the stand and say, the material that I heard Mr. Rosen or Mr. Weissman say with reference to the 13 14 information that is in the document in the unredacted form is 15 NDI, then we should all pack up and go home because that's the 16 starting point. 17 THE COURT: Well, I did have a caveat on that. I 18 did say they don't have to show any NDI in this case. 19 just have to show a conspiracy and a guilty mind to obtain it. 20 That's your position, isn't it, Mr. Reilly? 21 That's correct. MR. REILLY: 22 MR. LOWELL: I stand pretty well with your long 23 recitation in your ruling last week as to what elements the Government has to prove--24

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THE COURT:

It is pretty hard to do that without

showing that there is NDI being talked about.

MR. LOWELL: So, what I start with, Your Honor, is simply to say that we started this whole process of what the experts were going to see with the proposition that in a nondocument case, it is what the defendants disclosed or intended to disclose. Since they were never shown a document, the only inference should come from what they were told or what they told others.

And I am with you as a matter of trial tactics, forget the law for a second, but as a matter of trial tactics if their witness takes the stand and says in response to a question of ours, isn't it a fact, Mr. Government Expert, that the reason this was, A, classified to begin with, B, marked in whatever fashion it was and, C, has any ability to impact the national security, is what is in the black part, not there?

And if you are right, that the Government witness will say, no, the stuff that's right there in black and white that I am talking about that the jury is seeing is NDI because.

I don't have a very good question to ask after that except, oh, do you really mean it? I mean, I don't think that's a very persuasive line of cross-examination.

We started this process because of what you said at the end, which is, wait--

THE COURT: Well, if you say, well, look, you don't

know, it could be something really significant in there? And the answer is, well, that just makes it more NDI than it already is.

MR. LOWELL: I guess that's their answer.

THE COURT: And if it is a statement as suggested here that it was disclosed to the public, well, that wouldn't be blacked out. That would be Brady.

MR. LOWELL: Right, but we started in the flip side. We started with what you called disparate disclosure. And that is what started us down the path. Which is, okay, you get to pick the expert you want to pick. Now, if you want to pick somebody who was the author, all right, that's one thing, at least we will now know and we will have the person to examine, the person who classified it classified it as whatever, decided it.

But if you are picking somebody who has seen whatever the redactions are, either originally in its 4 form, which we have never seen, or later, well then, how-- We have briefed the issue of rely versus review. It is not that they get to self-describe an expert who comes on the stand, oh, no, I didn't rely on what was redacted, I didn't rely on what was taken out. I mean, that's up to us to be able to probe and decide.

So that is where we started, which is what you are calling disparate disclosure. And I think that's where we end

up, which is the key to this decision belongs to the Government. If they are going to show their experts anything, and it has got to be that we get to cross-examine them because it is possible that their experts will have used it, seen it, thought about it, and the law doesn't say "rely," it says--

THE COURT: I have seen it before. Once they show an expert something, there is at least the beginning 705 wedge.

Now, how far you get to go into that will depend upon the answers and on the objections. For example, if somebody has reviewed everything and said, yes, I reviewed it, but it doesn't play any role in my decision, there may come a time very soon after that that I stop questioning.

MR. LOWELL: Right, but it can't be right--

THE COURT: It may not be right there, but you would then have to cross-examine to begin to suggest to me that you are making headway in showing that he is not being straightforward in saying, I didn't rely on this other stuff at all.

MR. LOWELL: The redacted paragraph is the identification of a source and method. The nonredacted paragraph is a policy discussion that relies thereafter. And there is a classification and he said this information is, or she says NDI.

It seems to me that if they want to expose their

expert to what is in that first paragraph, certainly the next question allowed is, are you saying that this paragraph, which includes a specific source or a specific method or the identity of a specific source or a specific method or something that is of that nature, is not the reason? Is that what you want these people to believe, that the general policy pablum in paragraph 4 is NDI and it wasn't because of that?

And if they are going to show them that, that's where I am saying that question goes. Now, if he says, yep, that's what I am saying-- I mean, I don't think it goes on forever, but I think you are right, it has to be probed to a point.

THE COURT: But in the colloquy or in the questioning that you have just described, you don't need to identify the source or the method.

MR. LOWELL: No, I think we can decide that we can, we will have to find the means when we have talked about sources and methods--

THE COURT: Right. But what I am suggesting is that the whole thing can be avoided if both sides have the same access to the document.

Now, I don't know what you do with folks who have already seen it, with authors or anything else, I can't decide that issue right now.

What I wanted to do was to address this issue raised

by the defendants because it seemed to me that the Government by going ahead and saying, we are going to show our experts, assuming they are not authors and original classifiers, we are going to show our experts the whole thing but we are not going to show your experts the whole thing, that is in redacted portions, that that may be not the best way to go about this. You open up the 705 door. You make this whole thing about is the document classified because of this or this much more significant than you would want.

What you want are experts who would say, I don't know what's in the document other than this. I don't know what else is there and I don't care. I focused only on what's here because that's what I was told to focus on and here are my reasons.

MR. REILLY: I am terribly sorry to interrupt. I am not seeking a tactical advantage, I am seeking a comfort break.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. REILLY: Sorry.

THE COURT: All right. Well, talk about this during this break and see-- My sense is that I don't need to decide anything right now. What I have done is to explain to you what the ramifications are of how you are proceeding. You all can get together and resolve this. And we are not dealing with authorize or classifiers, we are dealing with experts.

1 And I can't repair what someone has already seen. 2 So, think about that and talk about scheduling, 3 that's the last thing we have to do. MR. WEISS: I would like after the break to have an 4 5 opportunity to address the issue on behalf of Mr. Weismann. THE COURT: You are going to get a chance after we 6 take a brief issue. It is after 4 o'clock. 7 MR. WEISS: I understand it is. 8 THE COURT: And I promised the court reporter that 9 10 he wouldn't be here all day, and I don't want to incur his 11 wrath. I will tell you, he is really in charge here. You 12 know, he could get up and walk away and that would be the end. 13 MR. WEISS: I just don't want to have the smallest 14 opportunity simply because I was last, Your Honor. 15 think I should suffer the least because I was the last. 16 THE COURT: All right. Court stands in recess for 15 minutes. 17 NOTE: At this point a recess is taken; at the 18 conclusion of which the case continues as follows: 19 20 THE COURT: All right, we are back on the record, 21 but not the CIPA record. 22 With respect to disparate disclosures, you wanted to 23 say something. 24 MR. WEISS: Yes, Your Honor. I believe the 25 Government here has a choice. The Government can put on the

expert showing them the redacted material or not. I believe their choice is if they show them the redacted material, anything they show them, they have opened the door. And under the <u>A&S Council</u> Fourth Circuit case that we have addressed—

THE COURT: I understand, that's why I kept

THE COURT: I understand, that's why I kept indicating.

MR. WEISS: Our view is even if, here is one thing I would like to stress, even if that expert says, I looked at it and discounted it, that case makes clear they have opened the door.

THE COURT: Oh, I quite agree, that's why I have told you all, I think we can avoid this whole 705 mess, which is what I was referring to, by limiting experts to what's not been redacted.

MR. WEISS: I think though, I think though that if they make the choice of showing them only the material that is in the exhibit and they don't show them the unredacted material, then when we ask questions are limited to either what's unredacted or the summaries or stipulations that are part of the document there.

I can ask the expert, for example, you never looked at the rest of the stuff? He will say, of course not, I didn't need to.

I can say, maybe the classifier wanted to closely hold this because of the redacted Top Secret source, sources

and methods that the substitution talks about--

THE COURT: And the right answer there is, who knows what the classifier thought, I know what my opinion is.

MR. WEISS: Exactly. All I am saying is, they can give those answers, I can ask those questions, no door has been opened.

On the other hand--

THE COURT: You are just making the point of 705 again. And it's after 4.

MR. WEISS: And the last point I want to make, Your Honor, is I think the choice is available to both sides. If they show it, they open the door. And if we show it to our experts, we open the door. If we don't show it to the experts, they can't ask. If we show it to the experts, they can't ask.

THE COURT: I think you are correct, except that it is more the Government's choice than yours. I think it is more the Government's choice than yours because I think the redactions are not supposed to be shown to your experts.

But anyway, I don't think we need to get there.

Have you all discussed it further?

MR. MARTIN: Yes, Your Honor. I just wanted to offer two additional things that might help advance the analysis a little bit.

And that is, with respect to the Section 4

redactions, we met and talked, and we are not going to show our experts any of those Section 4 redactions.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MARTIN: So, in other words, there is now, we can represent to the Court, that there is no disparate treatment. The defendants' experts can look at the redacted material just ours can, but both parties are bound by the substitutions when they testify to it at trial.

MR. WEISS: That's where we disagree with them, Your Honor. If they show it to them, they have opened the door, we are no longer bound by the substitutions. And that's what--

MR. MARTIN: But then, Your Honor, my response to that would be that if there is something in the redacted material that they believe that they need to cross-examine our expert, then CIPA provides a vehicle through which that can be accomplished.

THE COURT: But then I would have to have CIPA all over again after you showed your experts the stuff.

MR. MARTIN: That's right.

THE COURT: And I am suggesting to you that you can strengthen your case and avoid all of this if all both sides show to their experts is what is unredacted. Nobody seems to hear that. It makes your case stronger, it undercuts a little bit of yours, but it gives you at least even on what the expert sees.

1 But, you know, I am not going to resolve this now. 2 You can show your experts what you wish. I don't think you 3 have that choice right now. 4 MR. WEISS: Your Honor, they have told us that we do. 5 6 THE COURT: Well then, if they don't have an 7 objection, you do it. But I don't know what's going to happen at trial. I don't think you all have thought enough about 8 9 this, frankly. You need to go think about it some more. You 10 may be opening doors you don't want to open. 11 Have you read that case, A&S. 12 MR. MARTIN: Of course I have, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Well, what do you think it holds? 14 MR. MARTIN: A&S Council was a completely different situation. The expert in that case relied to form his opinion 15 16 on what would be the equivalent in our case of the redacted 17 material and then opined at trial on the redacted material. 18 Our expert is not going to do that. 19 THE COURT: Suppose he is asked a question about whether the redacted material would have been the reason for 20 21 the classification. 22 MR. MARTIN: That's exactly the issue that we are 23 trying to address. In that case--

THE COURT: But you don't even get there if you don't show it to him because it doesn't matter. His opinion

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about NDI is independent of the redacted material.

MR. MARTIN: Correct, Your Honor. But the concern is that the defendants aren't going to stop there. They are going to argue to the jury that the expert couldn't possibly be 100 percent sure whether it was the redacted material that caused the classification. And then they will argue to the jury--

THE COURT: He isn't going to be sure of that even if he sees it. He doesn't know what the classifier thought or did. He just doesn't know.

MR. MARTIN: He won't be testifying to the classifier's thought. He will be testifying to his own opinion.

THE COURT: All right. And then all he needs to see is what is disclosed, not what is redacted.

MR. MARTIN: But furthermore, the defendants will then argue to the jury that the expert didn't conduct a thorough review, the jury shouldn't credit his opinion, he didn't even bother to look at the whole document, the Government is offering this person as an expert to you--

THE COURT: All right, I am not going to tell you how to try your case. I will decide the issue when it comes up. You will have to make your own judgment about it. And you can have your expert look at it, I will decide in the course of the trial what has to be done.

1 But it seems to me that it opens up a complete can 2 of worms. And I am pretty sure neither side is going to be 3 happy with the result. You are both spitting into the wind. You can do it if you want to, but I guarantee you won't like 5 the results. 6 All right. Now, let's move on to another subject. There is no issue before the Court to decide. 7 8 MR. LOWELL: On the scheduling, which I think that 9 segs into. 10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 MR. LOWELL: A couple things to say about it, one of 12 which may be effective. When and if the Government makes 13 their expert disclosure to us, as we would do in our 14 reciprocal expert disclosure, we will have to tell each other 15 whether in fact we did or they decided to open that door so 16 705 could be argued. We will know that later, I think. 17 As to scheduling, Your Honor, here is what is next. 18 Next week we have two deadlines--19 THE COURT: Well, you certainly don't want to be in 20 the position of disclosing to your experts what's in the 21 redaction if they decide not to do it. 22 MR. LOWELL: Probably not. I just can't answer it. 23 But what will be the first most important trigger there is

THE COURT: Well, I can tell you right now that it

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their expert disclosure--

doesn't matter what I think. It matters what you all decide.
I can virtually guarantee you that these folks are going to
show it to them and you will too, and I will have to deal with
the fallout.

MR. LOWELL: I too have read the Fourth Circuit opinion and this distinction of "discounting stops cross-examination" is just not what the Fourth Circuit said. Indeed, that's exactly what the expert there said. And the Fourth Circuit said it was reversible error not to allow the defense to pursue that line.

THE COURT: That's right, it did say that.

MR. LOWELL: So--

THE COURT: And in fact, I have recently come from the Fourth Circuit where an issue not dissimilar was argued. You know, you all do what you decide to do, and I will deal with the fallout.

Now, what about scheduling?

MR. LOWELL: Next week we have two items. On the 14th both sides were supposed to file whatever left they have to say on the remaining unsealed, I am sorry, the remaining sealed material, and that's fine. On the 16th--

THE COURT: Wait a minute. What is the 16th?

MR. LOWELL: The 14th, the 14th is where we provide the Court with the answer to, if there is anything left to be addressed, as to what should be unsealed.

THE COURT: Yes, that's for the unsealing.

2 MR. LOWELL: Correct.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LOWELL: The 14th. And now we have seen each other's positions and we will confer and see if there is agreement as to anything that is left.

On the 16th, you have invited us to file our good faith basis as to one of the subpoenaed <u>Touhy</u> witnesses. And we will take advantage of your invitation to do so. That is on the 16th.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LOWELL: I want to tell the Court as well that on or before the 16th we will be seeking the Court's review of one of the witnesses I think that you have said you didn't see the relevance under the applicable standards that you have ruled it is in the motion on the reconsideration. And it will be on one of the witnesses, but we will use the 16th date, I just didn't want not to say it so that people thought, oh, my gosh, they are moving for reconsideration, they didn't tell us. Well, there is one.

As to scheduling, Your Honor, here is what is my best articulation of our problem is. I think you, being the hard working optimist you are, believes that we are going to have a 6(c) order, first of all, fairly soon. By that I mean a week or two weeks.

We have not even seen the first draft of the first 1 2 Government part, and they have been working on it for a long 3 They were supposed to start providing that to us in the 4 very--THE COURT: Well, Mr. Reilly says it is nearly done, 5 right, Mr. Reilly? You just had to--6 MR. REILLY: Except for Tabs 17 to 30--7 THE COURT: When do you think you can finish a draft 8 9 so that they can begin? 10 MR. REILLY: We are going to try and get them, we are going to get them tomorrow what we have now. And we are 11 going to wait until next, we have ordered the transcripts from 12 13 yesterday so that we can start work on Tabs 17 to 30 and the 14 silent witness rule on the other document. THE COURT: All right. By the way, I think there 15 were some findings I think I made adequately on the record 16 17 there. MR. REILLY: Correct. 18 I didn't go into detail, but I think 19 THE COURT: I think I 20 they were in general since it was ex parte. adequately covered the Press Enterprise aspects. 21 Okay. So, that means that by the 13th or 14th, Mr. 22 Lowell and Mr. Weiss, Mr. Nassikas, you will have everything. 23 MR. LOWELL: We will have what the Government 24

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provides us.

1 THE COURT: I don't mean to exclude you.

MR. LOWELL: And so will Ms. Paulson, and I can guarantee that it will be Ms. Paulson who is doing the heavy lifting on this.

THE COURT: I suspect Ms. Paulson is the author of a lot of this material I am reading.

MR. LOWELL: You would be correct. This is a collaborative effort, all parts of which are very active.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. REILLY: Sir, we won't have a transcript from yesterday until later. I think Wednesday next week is the earliest we would get it.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let's shoot for Wednesday or Thursday. Then why couldn't the review and conference be done by, at the very latest by the Tuesday after Thanksgiving, the 27th?

MR. LOWELL: What I am asking you, Your Honor, is assuming the Government gives us this, I assume that in that week of what you have now identified as the 27th is a very realistic date by which we, the defense, will have reviewed and looked at the transcripts and said, oh, Mr. Reilly, you got 90 percent correct, you got 10 percent wrong, I hope. As opposed to saying, you got 10 percent correct and 90 percent wrong.

And, therefore, that's a week by which I suspect--

1 THE COURT: Well, if I had to do it over again, I would require you to do it piecemeal so that it would already 2 3 be done as to the earlier stuff. But in any event, when do you think you could be 5 done with your review if you get it next Wednesday? Thursday, let's say you get it by the 15th of November. 6 7 MR. LOWELL: If they give it to us on the 15th, 8 there is two days the following week--9 THE COURT: Just a moment. 10 MR. DiGREGORY: Excuse me, Your Honor. I am sorry. 11 We don't anticipate that we will have the transcript until 12 Wednesday of next week, which would be the 14th. 13 THE COURT: I see. Then do it by Friday. 14 MR. DiGREGORY: So, getting it by Thursday may be a 15 little unrealistic. 16 MR. REILLY: Your Honor, with respect to Tabs 17 17 through 30 and the reason a lot of this takes so long is we 18 have to go through every single redaction. So, we have to 19 detail every single redaction and ruling on the redaction. 20 And we started it. We have to finish that. So, it does take 21 a considerable amount of time--2.2 THE COURT: All right. When do you think you can 23 finish? MR. REILLY: On that part of it? 24 25 THE COURT: On the whole thing, when do you think it

will be done? You are going to give them part of it, but when 1 do you think you will finally be done with everything? Even 2 though they will have 80 to 90 percent of it before then, they 3 4 won't have this until when? MR. REILLY: Assuming we get the transcript on the 5 14th, the 14th or 15th, the 19th or 20th. 6 THE COURT: All right, let's say the 20th. Now, any 7 8 reason why by the 27th--9 MR. LOWELL: Your Honor, we are going to need ten 10 business days to review. Now, that can start--11 THE COURT: Oh, it will start long before the 26th 12 because you will get stuff beforehand. 13 MR. LOWELL: Right. And as soon as they start giving us any material, I think it's fair to say that at every 14 15 trigger we would want ten business days--16 THE COURT: Well, you are not going to get ten 17 business days from the last dribs and drabs. 18 MR. LOWELL: The last dribs and drabs comes on the 19 week of Thanksgiving, I suspect. 20 THE COURT: It comes on the -- What did we say, the 21 20th or the 21st? 22 MR. DiGREGORY: You said the 20th. 23 THE COURT: The 20th or the 21st. 24 MR. LOWELL: And the last of that week is Thanksgiving. 25

1 THE COURT: Thanksgiving, right. So, if you have 2 until the 30th, you would have enough time. 3 MR. LOWELL: That's correct. I think on the last 4 drib, yes, I think that's right. 5 So, we are going to assume that the Government will 6 give us a great deal of material by Friday, the 16th. By tomorrow, I am sorry, that's right. 7 THE COURT: You will get a bunch of material on the 8 9th of November. 9 10 MR. LOWELL: Yes. And that we will start giving it 11 back. 12 THE COURT: And then you will get on the 20th of 13 November the material that we have been working on for the 14 last two days. 15 MR. LOWELL: And in the same manner, as soon as we get material, review it against our notes and transcript, we 16 will tell Mr. Reilly and his colleagues, you got it right, you 17 18 got it wrong. 19 THE COURT: And then you have got to negotiate with 20 them. 21 MR. LOWELL: Exactly. We will end up with whatever 22 we can do. And sometimes we do better. 23 THE COURT: All right. Now, we need to schedule a 24 hearing so that I can sign this order and deal with any

lingering problems. There shouldn't be any lingering

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1 problems. 2 MR. LOWELL: I hope not, but remember what happened 3 in the 6(a) period, it wasn't that it was that easy without 4 you. 5 THE COURT: Well, I should make a greater effort to 6 make everything very unpleasant with me. 7 I have a trial beginning December 4. And I don't know whether I will then be available any time before 8 Christmas. And the problem is that for a good part of that 9 time I will be in North Carolina. So, even in the evenings I 10 11 am not available. 12 So, let's look at the-- Let's tentatively set, 13 let's tentatively set the 29th of November at 2 o'clock for a 14 hearing for the entry of the 6(c) order. 15 MR. LOWELL: We will not even have received -- We 16 have until the next day to finish our job. 17 THE COURT: You are right. 18 MR. LOWELL: And I understand the holiday issues are 19 very profound, but we won't have gotten our materials--20 THE COURT: What holiday issues? MR. LOWELL: Well, Thanksgiving, and then the end of 21 22 December is going to be a problem for some of the people. 23 THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. WEISS: Your Honor, if you want to meet on the

29th, we can do it with respect to the first part of the

1 We will work in tandem, we will be prepared to come order. 2 before you on the 29th with respect to the first part of the order that we are getting tomorrow. And I don't think 2 o'clock until the rest of the day is going to be enough time 4 for the whole order anyway. 5

In the 6(a) round--

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THE COURT: What have I been doing for all these days?

MR. WEISS: Your Honor, I am just going by past experience. In 6(a) it took us, after we had all the 6(a) hearings, it took us three or four days, full days of hearings to get--

THE COURT: But I have already made the rulings.

MR. WEISS: Your Honor, that was true in the 6(a) process also.

THE COURT: Do you anticipate the same problem? MR. REILLY: There will be disagreements. transcripts in certain places, it is difficult to discern exactly what the reasoning is and what the ruling is in some places.

I don't anticipate that we will need as much time. If the Court, if we give the Court a written submission of the disagreements, the Court can have that and resolve what it can resolve without a hearing and then come to us and say, here are the ones I just want to hear very quickly on.

1 THE COURT: Let's have a hearing then at 2 o'clock on the 29th on whatever has been reviewed by then. 2 o'clock 2 3 on the 29th. 4 MR. LOWELL: And then you should probably--THE COURT: Now, I would hope that there would not 5 If there is a lot, then I want a submission on the 6 be much. 28th that gives me some sense of what's afoot so that I can 7 think about it. It could be a joint submission or it could be 8 9 separate. But by 5 o'clock on the 28th, give me something 10 that I can look at. 11 MR. LOWELL: 4 o'clock on the 28th. I think because 12 of the problems in handling the classified information, you 13 have said--14 THE COURT: Oh, yes, you are quite right. You are 15 quite right. This would be classified. Thank you. Thank 16 you. MR. LOWELL: So, we will do that at 4. 17 THE COURT: Ms. Gunning thanks you. 18 MR. LOWELL: Remind her. Then if you have a date 19 that we could put on the calendar, and I don't know that you 20 21 do, but if you do for the remainder--22 THE COURT: Well, one of the cases that I have on December 4 may be resolved in large part. Let's set 23 24 December 8, or 6th rather at 2 o'clock as the next date. 25 MR. DiGREGORY: Your Honor, if I may. Mr.

Hammerstrom and I are supposed to be in Williamsburg for an all office conference that the United States Attorney's Office has that lasts the 4th, 5th and 6th.

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Well, I guess if the 6th is the last day of the conference, it is conceivable that we could get in the car and get back here by 2 o'clock on the 6th for the hearing.

THE COURT: Well, that's fairly-- I really do want to accommodate you. I mean, I think that's a useful and important thing that you do and I don't want to impose any hardship on you.

I also -- And I don't know whether I will have to, I know I am going to have to be in North Carolina some part of December 4 and maybe 5th and maybe 6th. I might have to cancel. But I am thinking that I might be able to resolve it.

Of course, I may not. If the jury doesn't come back, I may have to sit there.

So-- And then the next date I have, I know I am going to have problems on December 10, that's a bigger trial, more defendants, harder to pick a jury. I don't even know if I will finish that one before Christmas.

MR. DiGREGORY: Your Honor, depending upon where you are in North Carolina, it may be easier for Mr. Hammerstrom and I to get to you rather than to Virginia.

THE COURT: I am in Asheville, North Carolina.

MR. DiGREGORY: Oh, not so easy.

THE COURT: You think it is not easy for you, think about for me. It is very hard to get to Asheville. But worthwhile when you get there.

Well, let's do this because I do think your meeting on the 8th is important.

MR. DiGREGORY: 6th.

THE COURT: The 6th, it is important. I will cancel that, I may have to cancel it for my own reasons, but I will cancel that if it turns out you all need to be here. It is a good three hours from here to Williamsburg. And I don't think you can reasonably have to be in a meeting and come back up here.

So, we can set it tentatively-- I don't think I can do it on the 7th in the afternoon. I have seven sentencings on the morning of the 7th.

So, I don't think I can-- That's not even counting my civil docket. I know I have a patent infringement Markman hearing that day too. Which is a pleasure you all are denied.

MR. LOWELL: So, tentative, we keep it on for the 6th and see how it goes?

THE COURT: Yes, let's see how it goes. But I am going to cancel to accommodate you if I need to. And I may have to cancel for my own reasons. But let's put it there. And if it can be used, we will use it. If I have to cancel for my own purposes or to accommodate you all, in a heartbeat

I will do it.

2 MR. LOWELL: Sorry, go ahead.

MR. DiGREGORY: Thank you. The time you are setting it was 2 o'clock, Your Honor?

THE COURT: 2 o'clock. Even that could be changed.

I would be amenable to meeting at 5 if all I had to do was

listen to one argument and sign an order.

MR. DiGREGORY: Not in this case, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I didn't think so.

MR. LOWELL: And then, Your Honor, perhaps again for whatever is left that may be teed up for December 6, let's put upon us the obligation to get you whatever the dispute is in a written form the day before that as well.

THE COURT: That's right, on the 5th at 4 o'clock.

MR. LOWELL: Okay. So, that's a process that would get us the 6(c) order. As I said to you yesterday, we did provide the Government with what will now be a good deal of, 90 percent of the appendix idea, which will show how a document was produced in discovery, what it's 6(a) treatment was, what it's 6(c) treatment was. And so, that's fairly substantially along the way.

The second triggering event, therefore, is as of today with you making your last rulings on CIPA, two things were supposed to occur. One is, is that now the Government has X days, I think they said 21 days, I don't know if it is

1 20 or 21, I always forget, to trigger their expert disclosure because they didn't need the actual order, they just needed to 2 3 have the final rulings. So, we should date, we should trigger that date, I 4 Their Rule 16 expert disclosures. 5 think. 6 THE COURT: Yes, I know. I am looking at Mr. 7 Reilly. MR. REILLY: We propose November 30, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. MR. REILLY: That's 23 days. 10 THE COURT: That's all right. That's fine. 11 MR. LOWELL: There is one other thing that gets 12 triggered by your having made your final CIPA rulings and 13 14 deciding the expert disclosure. And then I wanted to raise the last and what might 15 be the most important thing. We can submit to you, now that 16 we have that date, that triggers other dates, like our 17 reciprocal expert disclosures--18 That's right. I would like you to give 19 THE COURT: me an order that sets these dates and I will enter the order. 20 MR. LOWELL: Motions in limine, Daubert motions. 21 Exactly. And put on this order that it 22 THE COURT: vacates previous scheduling orders. This supersedes rather, 23 24 supersedes.

MR. LOWELL: We have done that already except for

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the trial date. But now this one will indicate that it supersedes even that date.

THE COURT: Right. Now, what is your view, your view and Mr. Reilly's view and Mr. Nassiskas', everyone views's on a trial date, Mr. Weiss?

MR. LOWELL: Here is what I would like to contribute on the subject. The \$64,000 question that is not only preventing this, but it is having ramifications on your calendar, and, Your Honor, I don't have anywhere near as many cases, but I have two trials that have been trailing behind this case with the great patience of my co-counsel and federal judges in other places in the United States, and they have run out of patience with me. Now, they haven't run out of patience with the process, they understand.

But I have told them last time around, which was last fall, okay, April-ish, May-ish trial date for a Los Angeles co-defendant, seven co-defendant case looks good because we have a January date here and four to six weeks sounds like the right amount, so, yeah, give or take.

The problem now is we have moved January, clearly.

It has moved to at best under this schedule, just doing the math in my mind, probably March, maybe end of March, maybe even the beginning of April. It has moved.

THE COURT: Really?

MR. LOWELL: At best.

THE COURT: You too, Mr. Reilly, you think that's about--

MR. REILLY: I think if we keep the same ideas of spacing dates. So, March is actually pretty accurate.

THE COURT: I want you to put this in the order too.

MR. LOWELL: Absolutely. In fact, we go backwards from that for <u>Giglio</u> and Jencks and some other things. So, we can go backwards from that date. And as I said with Mr. Reilly and Mr. DiGregory, we did it once before, I am sure that I could find with them and us a date. And I can assume that date is mid-March or late March or even early April. Whatever it is, it is. And then I can go to the other people in the world and say, okay, look, I have got a date.

THE COURT: Okay, do that.

MR. LOWELL: But here is my problem.

THE COURT: I will try another case that is pretty big between then and there. I want to you stick in this order, by the way, about ten days before the trial date, I want you to meet and confer and submit to the Court either an agreed upon or separate juror questionnaires.

MR. LOWELL: Okay.

THE COURT: I do want to use a jury questionnaire in this case. There are very significant problems with selecting a jury in this case owing to the nature of the case and owing to the publicity that this case has been accorded.

And I do not like questionnaires, but I know when they have to be used. And this is a case where it has to be used.

And there is another point that I suppose we should make explicit. I view it as no different from cases in which I have the specter of race in it where there is some concern that there may be an animus if prospective jurors that should not be operating. And of course, I am referring to anti-Semitism. You had don't ask people, are you an anti-Semite and expect to get a straightforward answer.

But I leave to you how that can be reasonably explored.

There are also problems, and let me surface them now. We are all, of course, familiar with the constitutional proscription, prohibition against striking any juror purely for reasons of race or gender. We are all very familiar with that principle. And <u>Batson</u> is well established. But, you know, <u>Batson</u> has been extended by a couple of circuits.

I would want to know, because I don't want to deal with it on the day of the trial or during the jury selection—
I will ask all the voir dire questions, the lawyers will not conduct the voir dire, I will, but I will be interested in what you submit for me to ask. And I am sure that Mr.
Nassikas, who has tried cases here, can tell you how I proceed. But, in essence, you participate in voir dire in

three ways. I ask all the questions, but you can submit questions in advance and I will consider those.

Secondly, when I ask jurors questions individually either at the bench or when they are in here individually, you may come to me out of the presence of the juror and ask me to follow up in a way if you think I have not adequately followed up.

And if I agree with you that it is a question narrowly tailored to ferret out an impermissible bias and not unduly intrusive, I will ask that.

And then at the end I will ask you whether there is any further voir dire given what you have requested and what you have heard and you think should be asked. So, you do to get an opportunity to participate, but you don't ask questions.

Now, the <u>Batson</u> issue comes up because there will be the potential for someone to be in the venire who is, either has an obvious Jewish name or an obvious Arab name or something like that. I had it the last time we picked jurors.

I will want to have a date for the submission of briefs at the time that you do the, on whether there is a <a href="Batson">Batson</a> charge for religion. That's an important point. In other words, can the Government strike someone just because his name ends in Stein or whatever, or can the defense strike somebody because his name is Mohammed.

There is an Eighth Circuit case on point, but there 1 is no Fourth Circuit case. And every time I see this issue, I 2 am reminded of the wisdom of Justice Thomas when he said, we 3 shouldn't have these things at all, we shouldn't have these peremptory challenges at all, they will only come back to 5 6 haunt us. 7 Okay. So, give me an order that has all that in it. MR. LOWELL: We will do that, Your Honor. And here 8 is the last point on scheduling that--9 10 MR. WEISS: I am sorry, what was the date that you 11 want the Batson? 12 THE COURT: The same time you submit the, the 10 or 13 14 days before trial, the--14 MR. LOWELL: The written questionnaire, the joint 15 submission. 16 THE COURT: Right. And also fix a time, if we start the trial on a Tuesday, that would be my preference, a 17 Tuesday, start the trial on Tuesday, then on that Friday in 18 19 the afternoon schedule a final pretrial where we will deal 20 with things. 21 MR. LOWELL: We will do that. The last point that is going to trump all the points is we can now do this and I 22 23 will now, and you will, and we all will adjust the rest of our 24 schedules. But the great \$64,000 question--

THE COURT: Are they going to appeal.

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1 MR. LOWELL: Exactly.

yet.

THE COURT: But they don't know yet.

MR. LOWELL: Well, okay, let's say they don't know

THE COURT: Let's indulge that fiction. They will have to decide fairly quickly.

MR. LOWELL: Ii was going to only ask, maybe it is so obvious that it doesn't need to be asked, but please let me ask it because I am going to go to two other federal judges and explain the schedule. Look, they know what your rulings have been in 6(c). They don't need a written order to do that. They now know them. They know what your rulings have been on the silent witness rule as we now know. They know what your rulings have been on marking, they know what your rulings have been on any--

THE COURT: Markings aren't CIPA.

MR. LOWELL: They know what your rulings have been on anything that would tell them or inform them. And it does strike me, and even yesterday you were very kind to say, look, on Tab 69, I am not going to sign the order yesterday because I don't want there to be a piecemeal appeal. And now we are saying, we may not get an order signed by you for CIPA--

THE COURT: If the only thing that went to the Fourth Circuit was Tab 69, I would be hard pressed not to keep in place the schedule that you are going to give me. I would

keep it in. And I would tell the Fourth Circuit, I would issue an order telling the Fourth Circuit, look, this trial is scheduled then. If at all possible, I hope you will expedite it.

There is a new rule that I participated in dealing with, I think it's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, I have forgotten what it is, but it enables Circuit and District Courts to communicate about things of one sort or another.

And I don't have any problem with filing an order that says, I want to go ahead and try this case then. Is it going to be expedited?

MR. LOWELL: My question is then, under the schedule we have just adopted, there won't be a final written order in CIPA at best, if we take up your December 9, and let's say we have even this many disagreements, and let's assume--

THE COURT: How many?

MR. LOWELL: This many was more like seven.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LOWELL: Let's say we have those. And then let's say we can implore you not withstanding your schedule to issue the order not withstanding North Carolina, the Circuit, and the holidays and you do that. They are not going to be put to the test, it seems to me, of deciding that formally, in other words actually filing their notice of appeal, now until the beginning of 2008.

And if they do, I will have already, as you will 1 have, told a number of participants I am going to trial, and I 2 won't be. And now I have really messed things up--3 THE COURT: Well, your problem is more difficult 4 than mine because you are looking farther ahead. I have one 5 other major trial to do and I am going to do it. I was going 6 to do this one first. I will now do that one first. 7

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And you have got all these other things that go out farther into the future. I don't even know if I will be extant farther into the future, but I sympathize with your problem. And I think it would be very nice of Mr. Reilly and Mr. DiGregory and Mr. Hammerstrom to tell you now, and Mr. Martin, who I am sure will play a role in this, to tell you now whether they intend to appeal. That would be very nice of them, but they don't have to.

MR. LOWELL: Well, Your Honor, that just puts us to the test of my, it's not just for me, but--

THE COURT: Let me ask this. Have you made any decision yet?

MR. DiGREGORY: No. And it is not a decision we can make, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh, yes, there is.

MR. DiGREGORY: Well, if I may. It's not our decision. Regardless of whether or not we want to take an appeal, the process we have to go through involves the

Appellate Section of the Criminal Division, it involves the Assistant Attorney General of the National Security Division, Mr. Rosenberg, and then ultimately the Solicitor General who must make the call. We can't speak for any of those people.

MR. LOWELL: But that is exactly the point. It would be extremely helpful, sealed, not binding, not prejudicial to them changing their mind, to tell us that it is the opinion of the trial team, and I don't mean today, I don't even mean tomorrow, but I mean before January 10 before I have to walk into another court and try to create a schedule, that their recommendation—

THE COURT: I think it would be nice if they would give you some information, but let's not cross that bridge now. This is November. Let's get to December, let's get it done.

And then I can see, Mr. DiGregory, that there might come a time mid, late December, early January when you may not have the final word from the Solicitor General, but you know pretty well what is being recommended and what's being considered. And he has to go out and tell a federal judge that he is not going to, he can't tell whether he is going to be able to try this or not because of this.

There is nothing anybody can do about it except I could issue an order, but I don't want to do that. I think you are going to do the best you can to get it decided. All I

am saying is that as soon as you possibly, conceivably can,

tell them whether it's more likely than not likely, a

preponderance of the evidence that there is going to be an

appeal of numerous matters, then that enables him to get rid

of the March date.

MR. LOWELL: Here is what I could do. I mean, it is not what I want to do, but I don't have many choices. As soon as they have their opinion, I think it would be at least good for all the parties to know.

Having said that, I am keeping this case the priority. When Mr. Reilly and his team and our team create the March 14, April 1 whatever it is, April 10 date, that's the date, that's the day I plan to be here and no other trial will interfere.

THE COURT: I think it is fair to say --

MR. LOWELL: If they seek to appeal--

THE COURT: -- that we will not continue the case ever again.

MR. LOWELL: But if they appeal, Your Honor, what I just, maybe it is self-evident, and I am sorry because it is late and I will finish it this way, I will have then told some two other judges that I may begin their case on July or August. And if they appeal, that's kicking this cases off. I can't keep putting that other case off.

THE COURT: I agree.

MR. LOWELL: If they appeal, then we are talking about this case being in the fall.

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THE COURT: The bottom line is I sympathize with your problem, but it is your problem. And that doesn't mean that I don't have real sympathy, I do, but fortunately it is not my problem, but I assure you I have enough of my own.

But I will do this. We are going to move this along. I want you to submit that order. I will enter the order, and we will move literally heaven and earth to get it done by then.

I am going to look at whatever is appealed. And if I think it's manageable, I am going to do something by way of writing an order that advises the Court of Appeals that this matter has been filed since 2005, it has had several trial dates, this has been an enormously complex process, and it is just not reasonable or fair to delay it beyond what it could, and that I request that they give it expedited treatment.

Now, I am not going to ask the Fourth Circuit to do that if the mass of material for them to review, because they are not even going to begin to get a flavor if they only give you 20 or 30 minutes for oral argument, that doesn't even begin to convey the flavor of this case.

MR. DiGREGORY: I know that there is expedited and there is expedited, but CIPA requires that the Fourth Circuit treat this case, if we appeal, handle it in an expedited

matter.

THE COURT: That's a good reminder. But as you point out, there is expedited and there is expedited. If I tell them there is a trial date, that tells them how much expedition.

MR. LOWELL: Two lasts point. I understand it is my problem and I will deal with it as best I can, and we will work out a schedule.

There is two more issues. One, you did say you wanted to tell us something about <a href="mailto:Brady">Brady</a>, I don't know if there is enough time to do it today.

And the second thing was your order of last Friday, the part that's under seal as to why the witnesses were allowed and not allowed, reflects, if you remember, our having raised these as designated items in part, which was informed by our conversations with our clients. So, we knew to raise these.

Under the normal rules, that order because it is that order would not be shared with our client. We are seeking leave that the underlying reasons for each witness be allowed to be shared with our clients such that we can continue the strategy involved.

THE COURT: Can you answer that?

MR. REILLY: We will review it.

THE COURT: All right. I think that's a

reasonable-- And remember, this whole notion about not showing things to the defendants ought to be obnoxious to any good lawyer. These people are on trial for their liberty.

And it is kind of obnoxious that they can't see things that really matter to them.

MR. LOWELL: That is one issue.

THE COURT: I think that it would be important. But if you can't, then I will consider it otherwise. I think the first place to start is Mr. Reilly takes a look at it, sees if there is anything really classified in there that already is not being disclosed to them, then maybe we can redact that or something.

I think your request is an understandable and sensible one, and I am sure Mr. Reilly will deal with it first and then I will deal with it ultimately if necessary.

MR. LOWELL: Do you need anything from us on the Brady issues?

THE COURT: No. I have what I need on the <u>Brady</u> issues. There is a problem about frankly narrowing it. And I am going to think about that. And if I have a problem, I will communicate with you all through some sort of an order.

It is clumsy to have the hearings because the defendants have the right to be present at all hearings. And of course, for <a href="Brady">Brady</a> we don't need a cleared court reporter. But let me see if I can deal with it without your assistance.

1 Anything else today? MR. LOWELL: No. No, sir, not from us. 2 3 MR. DiGREGORY: No, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: All right. I thank counsel again for 5 your cooperation. 6 MR. LOWELL: And may I ask to return the documents 7 that I tendered to the Court for you to read, the uncolored 8 ones. 9 THE COURT: Oh, yes. There is only one that I see 10 up--11 MR. LOWELL: There should be two pieces of paper. THE COURT: Well, I have the one here from the 12 13 Secretary. Let me see what else is here. 14 MR. LOWELL: I think there was one other one without 15 coloring. 16 THE COURT: There is nothing further here. 17 MR. LOWELL: I will find another substitute. was the two bullets on the bottom, the one that said capital E 18 and the one that we have now redacted out. 19 THE COURT: Let's do this also with respect to 20 Brady. I have already indicated what I thought was Brady. 21 And I don't want any more argument on whether that's Brady or 2.2 not. I am clear about that. 23 24 What I am going to do is issue an order. However, Mr. Reilly, looking ahead, I give you leave to tell me after I 25

issue the order why you think it ought to be narrow. Not why the material is not <u>Brady</u>, all right, but why I framed the order in a way that is excessively broad or wrong. All right. But not reargue whether, for example, a particular item is exculpatory or not. That has been crossed.

But when I went through on the transcript and made the ruling, I was not precise in what the Government was going to be required to look for. I am now going to do that on my own, recognizing that I have not had the benefit of your views and your views on it.

I suspect that when I do, it won't transgress what you all think, but may what the Government thinks in terms of the breadth.

So, you may file a pleading telling me why you think it's wrong. You may file a pleading telling me why you think it is partly right and partly wrong. And then I will resolve finally, if it is necessary. Maybe the order I do is going to be all I need, I may then file an order, the reconsideration motions are denied. That's it.

So, we will handle the <a href="Brady">Brady</a> thing that way.

All right. And there are no more documents that I see up here.

Once again, I am mindful that this is awfully hard work for everybody. And I appreciate the efforts you are making to minimize the time of the Court, but I urge you to

1	keep doing it.
2	Court stands in recess until 9 o'clock tomorrow
3	morning.
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5	HEARING CONCLUDED
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19	I certify that the foregoing is a true and
20	accurate transcription of my stenographic notes.
21	COPY
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23	Norman B. Linnell, RPR, CM, VCE
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