FAS注意：在政府解释了正在争夺的文件后，这是本简介 - 美国诉Weatherhead的主题。毕竟，案件的优点不会在最高法院提出。但请参阅政府的Motion to Vacate决定declassificat上诉法院的决定ion and disclosure
IN THE
美国最高法院
OCTOBER TERM, 1999
___________
美国;美国司法部；和美国国务院，
请愿人，
v。
莱斯利·R·韦瑟黑德（Weatherhead），
Respondent.
_____________
在美国证书的令状上
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
_____________
国家中心摘要
安全研究，国家安全
ARCHIVE, THE FEDERATION OF AMERICAN
科学家和美国公民自由
联盟为Amici CuriaeSUPPORTING RESPONDENT
_____________
马克·H·林奇 |
|
Kate Martin 1999年11月19日 |
Jay T. Smith Counsel for Amici Curiae Additional Counsel |
Louis M. Bograd
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
基础
1875Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009
（202）234-1817
史蒂文·R·夏皮罗（Steven R. Shapiro）
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
基础
125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004
（212）549-2500
目录
当局表
INTEREST OF THE AMICI
论点摘要
ARGUMENT
I.法院应拒绝政府邀请解决未明确提出的宪法问题。乐动冠军
ii。政府提出的“最大尊重”标准与Foia的语言和立法历史相矛盾
III. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT MANDATE "UTMOST DEFERENCE" TO AN AGENCY�S INVOCATION OF EXEMPTION 1
A. Congress Has The Constitutional Authority To Subject Agency Determinations Under FOIA Exemption 1 ToDe Novo审查
1.国会和总统分担外交责任
2.国会一再行使其在管理和披露国家安全信息方面的宪法权限
B. The Constitution Does Not Mandate That The Judiciary Afford "Utmost Deference" To Executive Branch Classification Decisions
IV. MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW DOES NOT THREATEN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND IS ESSENTIAL TO PROTECT OTHER VALUES
结论
当局表
Cases
A. Michael的Piano，Inc。诉FTC, 18 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1994)
美国外国服务协会诉Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989)
贝克v。Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959)
Buckley v. Valeo，424 U.S. 1（1976）
Central Intelligence Agency v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
芝加哥和南方航空公司诉沃特曼S.S. Corp，333 U.S. 103（1948）。
克林顿诉琼斯，520 U.S. 681（1997）
Conroy诉Aniskoff，507 U.S. 511（1993）
Department of Navy v. Egan，484 U.S. 518（1988）
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973)
Goldwater诉Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)
Haig诉Agee，453 U.S. 280（1981）
Halpern诉FBI，181 F.3d 279（2dCir。1999）
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha，462 U.S. 919（1983）
日本捕鲸协会诉美国鲸类学会，478 U.S. 221（1986）
小诉, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227 (3d Cir. 1993)
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927)
莫里森诉奥尔森，487 U.S. 654（1988）
New York Times v. United States，403 U.S. 713（1971）
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977)
射线v。Turner, 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. 1978)
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.，299 U.S. 304（1936）
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
United States v. Reynolds，345 U.S. 1（1993）
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
Weinberger诉天主教行动, 454 U.S. 139 (1981)
Youngstown Sheet＆Tube Co.诉Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
法规和宪法规定
立法材料和行政材料和规则
Miscellaneous
INTEREST OF THE AMICI
The Center for National Security Studies is a nongovernmental, nonprofit civil liberties organization that works to ensure that government actions undertaken in genuine pursuit of national security interests do not have the effect of violating the rights of individuals or undermining constitutional government. Since 1975, the Center has worked to secure the public�s right to know about foreign policy and national defense matters.1
国家安全档案馆是位于乔治华盛顿大学的独立研究所和图书馆。该档案收集并发布了通过有关美国外交政策和国家安全事务的《信息自由法》获得的解密文件。通过诉讼和公众倡导，它还致力于捍卫和扩大公众对政府信息的访问。
美国科学家联合会（FAS）由曼哈顿项目科学家于1945年成立，目的是促进核武器控制，是一家由2,000名科学家和工程师组成的国家组织，其中包括57名诺贝尔奖获得者。FAS今天就一系列国家安全政策问题进行了政策研究和倡导。乐动冠军在活动的过程中，FAS取决于对政府信息的可靠访问，并经常利用《信息自由法》。
美国公民自由联盟（ACLU）是一个全国性的，非营利性的，无党派的组织，近300,000名成员致力于《人权法案》所体现的原则。自1920年成立以来，美国公民自由联盟（ACLU）一直在政府对国家安全的主张与知道政府在做什么的权利之间的冲突。有时，这场冲突采取了直接政府对言论的限制的形式。在其他情况下，它集中在政府限制限制公开信息的信息的努力上。ACLU曾多次出现在该法院，以帮助解决这一冲突。
论点摘要
作为demonstrated in Respondent�s brief, the showing made by the government to justify its withholding of information under Exemption 1 to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. � 552, was in contravention of the plain terms of a controlling Executive Order. Because this ground is sufficient for affirmance of the court of appeals� decision, there is no reason for the Court to address either the proper standard of review in Exemption 1 cases or the government�s sweeping claims concerning separation of powers in the realm of foreign affairs.
但是，如果法院选择解决这些问题，则应拒绝乐动冠军the government�s claim that Congress intended to adopt an "utmost deference" standard of reviewunder Exemption 1 of FOIA. The language of FOIA expressly requires "从头开始" review and the legislative history of FOIA makes clear that Congress intended this review to be searching and independent.
Foia的规定从头开始评论不会产生权力问题的分离。国会同时对国家安全和外交事务信息的权力已得到充分确立，并与政府的宣传声称相矛盾，即行政人员在这一领域拥有全体和独家控制。在影响国家外交关系的案件中，宪法也不对司法机构施加一般的残疾。相反，在这种情况下，法院保留其权力和责任，以独立审查行政人员的“外交事务”和“国家安全”主张。
Finally, the Court should not overlook the fact that Congress in enacting FOIA and the President in issuing the current Executive Order set a standard of openness for the United States government. This standard exemplifies this Nation�s most basic values and traditions and allows the United States to be a model of openness for the rest of the world. The position taken by the government in this case threatens both.
ARGUMENT
- THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE THE GOVERNMENT�S INVITATION TO ADDRESS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES NOT CLEARLY PRESENTED.
尽管政府投入的大部分s brief to constitutional argument over the separation of powers, the court of appeals� decision simply does not pose a constitutional problem. As Respondent demonstrates in his brief, the showing made by the agency in this case was inadequate under the plain terms of the Executive Order issued by President Clinton, Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1996), Pet. App. 66a-111a ("Clinton Order"). Accordingly, there is no occasion for the Court to consider whether government affidavits are entitled to "utmost deference" under FOIA or to explore the constitutional implications of从头开始审查。政府试图将宪法用作扭曲FOIA含义的工具，这与该法院的政策直接背道而驰。这样做。”美国外国服务屁股v。Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153, 161 (1989).
确实，如下III.A部分所述，在这种情况下，任何决定外交事务领域的国会与总统之间的权力分离，可能会影响各种各样的国会颁布，目前在政治分支机构之间取得平衡在国家安全信息的管理中。法院不要不必要地进入这个灌木丛，而应拒绝解决政府的宪法主张。
- 政府提出的“最大尊重”标准与Foia的语言和立法历史相矛盾．
The government argues that when Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act in 1974, it adopted President Ford�s position that courts should uphold a classification decision if there is any "reasonable basis to support it." Pet. Br. 46. This argument, unsupported by the text and legislative background to the amendments, is nothing less than an attempt to rewrite history.
The plain language of FOIA states that when reviewing an agency�s non-disclosure determination, "the court shall determine the matter de novo" and "the burden is on the agency to sustain its action." 5 U.S.C. � 552(a)(4)(B). InEPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), this Court interpreted Exemption 1 (as originally enacted) narrowly, ruling that FOIA did not permitin camerainspection of documents containing national security information and thus did not authorize the review of classified documents to separate non-secret material for disclosure. Congress reacted promptly, specifically amending FOIA to override the貂decision. In addition to providing forin camera检查，国会还修改了该法规，以指定只有在“实际上是根据[]行政命令对材料正确分类的”时，才可以扣留材料。5 U.S.C.552（b）（1）（b）。
福特总统在否决1974年的FOIA修正案时写道，如果法官认为政府和原告的立场是合理的，那么政府就不会承担其负担。他的否决信息提出，国会规定，如果有“合理的依据来支持”，代理机构的决定将被维持。总统否决权H.R. 12,471，H.R。Doc。第93-383号，第93堂，第2卷，第（iii）（1974年）。国会通过超级贡献投票否决了总统的否决权。由于国会接受总统提议的标准，因此无法将这种立法替代的特征化。2
作为the government has noted, the House and Senate conferees on the 1974 FOIA amendments stated their expectation that courts would in practice accord "substantial weight" to an agency affidavit explaining why disclosure of a document might damage national security. On this snippet of legislative history rests the government�s argument that Congress required that judges accord "utmost deference" to the government in Exemption 1 cases.3
The conferees� expectation, however, was not a requirement, and no change was made to the standard of从头开始审查。这种立法历史不能覆盖法规的简单语言是基本的。4The conferees were simply stating their belief that courts would give substantial weight, not deference, to detailed government affidavits in the same way that any finder of fact may give substantial weight to evidence that it finds persuasive from knowledgeable or expert witnesses. The proponents of从头开始review in Congress stressed "the need for an objective, independent judicial determination, and insisted that judges could be trusted to approach the national security determinations with common sense, and without jeopardy to national security."射线v。Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1194 nn.18-19 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (citing statements by Senators Muskie, Ervin, and Chiles).5The conference committee, by stating its expectation regarding substantial weight, "countered th[e] image [of judges making reckless disclosures] by registering its anticipation that rational judges conducting de novo reviews would naturally be impressed by any special knowledge, experience, and reasoning demonstrated by agencies with expertise and responsibility in matters of defense and foreign policy."Id．at 1213 (Wright, C.J., concurring). Congress therefore "soundly rejected" the contention that judges were unqualified to review classifications and "refused to create a presumption in favor of agency classifications or to retreat from full从头开始审查。”ID。1210（赖特（Wright），C.J。，同意）。
上诉法院一再注意到从头开始standard in properly applying the FOIA exemptions, including Exemption 1. "De novo review was deemed essential to prevent courts reviewing agency action from issuing a meaningless judicial imprimatur . . . ."A. Michael的Piano，Inc。诉FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 1994); sEE还Halpern诉FBI，181 F.3d 279，288（2dCir。1999）（拒绝，在豁免1上下文中，更有尊贵的标准并申请从头开始review as more consistent with FOIA). The judicial role in reviewing the government�s classification decision is crucial in Exemption 1 cases, in which the adversary process is necessarily diminished because the plaintiff lacks access to the classified materials at issue and often lacks the information necessary to challenge the government�s decision.看ID。at 290;McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993). Given the inherent limitations on advocacy in Exemption 1 cases, adopting the "utmost deference" standard would reduce judicial proceedings to little more than a formality, and thus contravene the clear intent of Congress.
- 宪法不要求“最大的尊重”征用豁免1。
- 国会拥有根据FOIA豁免1的对代理机构裁决的宪法权力。De Novo审查。
在豁免1和FOIA中，国会寻求“平衡公众获得官方信息的需求与政府对机密性的需求。”Weinberger诉天主教行动，454 U.S. 139，144（1981）。在达到这种平衡时，国会仅对执行人员的国家安全信息管理施加了适度的限制。FOIA豁免1允许总统根据行政命令确定哪些标准是哪种标准控制此类信息的分类和发布，并且只要求执行机构遵守该命令。然而，政府也试图通过争辩说，总统对外交事务的宪法权威的规定甚至需要“最大的尊重”标准，这实际上将阻止法院命令释放行政人员的信息，这将撤销这些有限的措施。应扣除豁免1。6Although the government warns of the constitutional implications of enforcing Exemption 1 as written, a holding that the executive branch is not bound by even the slight restrictions contained in Exemption 1 would present far graver constitutional difficulties.
- Congress And The President Share Responsibility For Foreign Affairs.
政府以“全体和独家”对外交事务的“全体和独家”的理论为由United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp。，299 U.S. 304（1936）。尽管柯蒂斯·赖特（Curtiss-Wright）彻底言论，该案并没有认为国会被外交政策领域驱逐出境。正如杰克逊大法官所观察到的那样Curtiss-Wright“暗示总统可以在没有国会权力的情况下在外交事务中行事，但并不是说他可能会违反国会行为。”Youngstown Sheet＆Tube Co.诉Sawyer，343 U.S. 579，636 N.2（1952）（Jackson，J。Consurring）（”Steel Seizure Case"). Indeed, that case focused not on the President�s foreign affairs powers, but on an unsuccessful challenge to the delegation by Congress of some ofitsforeign affairs powers to the executive. "Much of [Justice Sutherland�s opinion] is格言．"Id．
It is well settled that the President does not possess exclusive authority over matters touching on the Nation�s foreign relations. Rather, this power is shared with Congress. As Justice Jackson�s much-quoted concurrence in theSteel Seizure Caseinstructs, the President�s foreign affairs powers "are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress."ID。at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). In a famous passage, Justice Jackson described the interplay of executive and legislative power in this field:
当总统采取与国会明确或暗示的意志不相容的措施时，他的权力处于最低的潮流，因为那时他只能依靠自己的宪法权力来减去国会对此事的任何宪法权力。在这种情况下，法院只能通过禁用国会对该主题的行事来维持独家总统控制。总统对一项权力的主张必须谨慎审查，因此必须仔细审查，因为我们的宪法制度建立了均衡。
ID。at 637-38 (footnote omitted) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson concluded that President Truman�s attempt to seize the steel mills was, in fact, incompatible with the congressional will and that neither the constitutional clause vesting the executive power in the President nor the clause making him Commander-in-Chief conferred on the President the authority to defeat this expression of congressional policy.Id．at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring).
政府的断言，法院必须遵守总统的归类决定“最大的尊重”，尽管Foia明确指出了相反的敦促行动无疑是“与国会明确或暗示的意志不相容的行动”。Id．在637年。因此政府�年代位置在校园里ot be sustained unless (1) Congress is constitutionally disabled from acting in this important field, or (2) Exemption 1 "�impermissibly undermine[s]� the powers of the Executive Branch, . . . or �disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches [by] prevent[ing] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.�"莫里森诉奥尔森，487 U.S. 654，695（1988）（引用省略；更改Morrison).7Neither proposition is true.
Although the Constitution does not expressly allocate control over information pertaining to foreign affairs or national security to either the executive or legislative branch, it is clear that Congress possesses significant authority in this area. First, the Senate plays a key foreign policy role in advising on and consenting to treaties and in confirming the appointment of ambassadors. U.S. Const. art. II, � 2, cl. 2. Second, the Framers enumerated multiple powers that Congress enjoys in the realm of foreign relations, including broad authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign nations" (cl. 3) and the power "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces" (cl. 14), a grant broad enough to include authority to regulate the government�s sensitive national security information. U.S. Const. art. I, � 8.8第三，国会是所有联邦政府立法权的存储库，包括“制定所有“必要和适当”的法律的权力，不仅要执行国会权力，还可以执行美国政府的权力。9
Finally, the Court in貂expressly recognized that Congress shares power over foreign affairs information when it stated that "Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive Branch adopt new procedures or it could have established its own procedures [governing the disclosure of national security information under FOIA Exemption 1] � subject only to whatever limitations the Executive privilege may be held to impose upon such congressional ordering." 410 U.S. at 83;see also Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) ("[T]he regulation and mandatory disclosure of documents in the possession of the Executive Branch. . . . has never been considered invalid as an invasion of [executive] authority.").10
该法院从未认为高管对与外交事务有关的信息具有全体权力。在政府依赖的每种案件中，有关行政诉讼都是根据或没有国会立法采取的。11The decisions neither hold nor intimate that the President can refuse to disclose foreign affairs information in the face of a contrary expression of congressional will. Typical in this regard isDepartment of Navy v. Egan, 484年美国518(1988),认为价值的年代ystems Protection Board, in reviewing the termination of a Navy employee, did not have the statutory authority to review an agency�s revocation of a security clearance. Thus, not only was the conflict in埃根within the executive branch (between the Navy and the Board), the question was one ofstatutory interpretation而不是执行特权。
The government relies on dicta in埃根for the "utmost deference" standard it now urges on the Court.看宠物。br。16.但是，在政府摘要中未引用的语言中，法院明确承认，当国会“明确提供另外”时，司法尊重就会让位。埃根, 484 U.S. at 530. That is precisely what Congress did in Exemption 1.
This Court has never struck down on separation of powers grounds an Act of Congress that did not violate a specific provision of the Constitution.12The constitutional test in the absence of such an explicit textual commitment of authority to the executive is whether Congress has impermissibly intruded on the President�s authority or prevented him from accomplishing his constitutionally assigned duties. The government cannot reasonably claim that Exemption 1 does either. Although Congress has broad authority to legislate requirements concerning national security information, the limitations it has placed on executive discretion in FOIA Exemption 1 are quite modest. Congress requires only that the President adhere to his own Executive Order. Put simply, Exemption 1�s从头开始standard of review falls well within the constitutional powers of Congress.13
- 国会在管理和披露国家安全信息方面反复行使其宪法权力。
政府进一步辩称，国会在总统对国家安全信息的全体控制中“默认”。宠物。br。20-21。与政府有缺陷的历史记载相反，并且随着宪法学者的详细说明，国会积极抵制总统自从国家建立以来与外交事务有关的信息。14政府的主张最清楚地遭到了1974年对Foia本身的修正案的驳斥，Foia本身是由福特总统的否决权的超级欢乐所通过的。
Far from being unique, Exemption 1 is but one of many instances in which Congress has required the executive branch to disclose national security information to either the legislature or the public. Congress has, for example, created an elaborate statutory structure for the oversight of intelligence agencies, a central element of which is the requirement that the President and the Director of Central Intelligence keep Congress, through its Intelligence Committees, fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities.看Intelligence Oversight Act, 50 U.S.C. � 413 (1991). Congress, moreover, has adopted rules whereby each House may, even over the President�s objection, declassify and publicly release classified information originating in the executive branch. S. Res. 400, 94th Cong.; House Rule XLVIII, 106th Cong. Congress has passed several statutes limiting the restraints the executive branch may impose on employees granted access to national security information.15国会还对某些类别的信息狭窄的明确解密标准制定了，该标准比执行命令中指定的信息狭窄。16
简而言之，国会远没有默认国家安全信息的总统控制权，而是在这一领域宣称其在该领域的宪法权威以无数的场合和多种方式宣称。接受政府对独家行政当局的看法将对众多国会成立，并严重破坏政治分支机构之间的均衡。
- The Constitution Does Not Mandate That The Judiciary Afford "Utmost Deference" To Executive Branch Classification Decisions.
由于宪法缺乏“最大尊重”标准的任何文本依据，政府求助于有关机构能力的论点。宠物。br。21-27。由于法官不是外交事务中的“专家”，而且由于该领域很复杂，因此政府认为，在“外交”案件中，法院和宪法管辖权被行政权力击败。尽管政府承认，司法机构并不是不称职，以至于完全被排除在听证豁免案件中，但id．12，46，它仍然提倡一种标准，实际上，它将裁定司法程序只不过是橡皮图章。如下所述，宪法允许``确实要求''法院扮演更有意义的角色。
In日本捕鲸协会诉美国鲸类学会，478 U.S. 221（1986），请愿人敦促商务部长的某些决定应得到最大的尊重 - 实际上，“不适合司法审查” - 简单地“简单地“因为它们涉及[D]外交关系”。Id．在229.法院驳回这一论点的法院详细引用：
作为贝克[v。Carr]明确地举行。．．法院有权解释条约和行政协议，不用说，解释国会立法是联邦法院的反复和公认的任务。．．。We are cognizant of the interplay between these Amendments and the conduct of this Nation�s foreign relations, and we recognize the premier role which both Congress and the Executive play in this field. But under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary�s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones．
Id．at 230 (emphasis added).日本捕鲸清楚地表明，在外交情境中出现案件的事实不会改变法院的基本琐事或削弱其基本能力。
Courts routinely entertain cases that have far-reaching implications for the Nation�s foreign relations without "transgress[ing] . . . the proper boundaries of judicial review," Pet. Br. 29.17Indeed, the Constitution explicitly commits to the federal courts several categories of cases that inevitably have foreign affairs ramifications: "Cases . . . arising under . . . Treaties"; "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls"; "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction"; and "Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. Const. art. III, � 2, cl. 1.18作为the Court has emphasized, despite "sweeping statements" in the case law about the courts� competence to address "questions touching foreign relations," "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."贝克v。Carr，369 U.S. 186，211（1962）;协议金水v．卡特，444 U.S. 996，999-1000（1979）（Powell，J。，同意）。
在与此相反的争论时，政府主要依靠Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp．，333 U.S. 103（1948）。看宠物。br。21-22。该案件没有测试司法在外交事务中作用的宪法界限。相当Watermanturned on the proper construction of the Civil Aeronautics Act. In that statute, Congress explicitly excepted from judicial review "any order in respect of anyforeignair carrier subject to the approval of the President as provided in section 801 of this Act."Waterman，333 U.S.，106（添加了重点）。该法规还要求总统批准与国内的航空公司从事“海外或外国航空运输”，ID。, but said nothing specific about judicial review of such orders. The Court found that Congress nevertheless intended to preclude judicial review for both types of orders primarily because the administrative process under the statute included no mechanism for the President to explain the reasons for his actions regarding either category of order.Id．在110-11。正是在这种情况下，法院遵守了practical，不一定是宪法的，限制了国会decision to preclude review.
FOIA could not present a more distinct case. First, there is absolutely no ambiguity in FOIA�s judicial review provisions. Second, theWaterman法院担心司法机构将被要求按照“没有相关信息”的总统批准的命令采取行动，IE。，没有总统理由的任何表达。Id．在111. Foia允许``确实需要``考虑豁免1索赔的行政人员与法院之间的全面沟通。第三，根据所涉及的法规Watermancourts could not "sitin camera为了受到执行信心。”Id．The 1974 Amendments to FOIA make such proceedings possible. Thus, the broad dicta inWatermandoes not suggest that any problem of constitutional dimensions is present in this case.
The Court�s approach to an analogous situation involving "foreign affairs" and "national security" claims is instructive. In considering executive claims of an evidentiary privilege for "national security" or "diplomatic" materials, the Court has refused to give the executive全权委托．相反，法院确认了司法机构审查威胁性国家安全危害的主张的能力和责任。在如此持有的情况下，法院强调，这项审查应该是独立的司法职能。在有关国家机密特权的主要案件中，该法院强调说“[地区]法院本身must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege," "[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers" even when that evidence relates to foreign affairs.United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1993) (emphasis added).
Nor has the Court accepted the government�s contention that courts are somehow constitutionally or inherently incapable of grasping the executive�s "foreign affairs" and "national security" positions.看宠物。br。24-25, 27. InUnited States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972), the Court confronted the issue of whether the government was required to obtain a warrant to perform so-called "national security" surveillance. In urging that a warrant was not required, the government, as in this case, "insist[ed] that courts �as a practical matter would have neither the knowledge nor the techniques necessary . . . to protect national security.� These security problems, the Government contend[ed], involve �a large number of complex and subtle factors� beyond the competence of courts to evaluate."Id．在319（引用美国的回复摘要）。但是，法院明确地拒绝了“政府的内部安全事务的论点太微妙和复杂，无法进行司法评估。”Id．at 320. As Justice Powell explained, "Courts regularly deal with the most difficult issues of our society. There is no reason to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in [these] cases."Id．In fact, the Court has recognized that review of the executive�s claims by "a �neutral and detached magistrate�" is particularly important in contexts implicating national security.Id．at 316 (citation omitted).
国会显然分享了鲍威尔大法官对法院在FOIA下评估“外交事务”和“国家安全”证据的能力的信心，以及他承认对这些领域执行决定的中性司法审查的重要性。1974年《 FOIA修正案》的支持者“强调了对客观，独立的司法决定的必要性，并坚持认为可以信任法官以常识来对国家安全的决定，而没有危害国家安全”。射线，587 F.2d，1194年。参议员智利同意，不仅强调了法院的能力，而且强调了他们的独立性：
我们说，四星级将军或海军上将是合理的，但联邦地方法院法官将是不合理的。我无法购买该论点，尤其是当我看到将军或海军上将掩盖了一个错误时，联邦法官坐在那里而没有以一种或另一种方式偏见的情况。我希望他能够在没有盲人或必须朝一个方向前进的情况下做出决定。
120 Cong。rec。17028（1974）(Sen. Chiles), cited in射线，587 F.2d，1194。
这些当局说明，法院并没有挑战宪法的分离，而是坚持司法权力决定案件，即使他们涉及外交事务或国家安全也反映了该制度的关键方面。行政部门统治的法院。看10Works of Thomas Jefferson404，n。（P. Ford ed。，1905年）（1807年6月20日的信，从托马斯·杰斐逊总统到美国检察官乔治·海伊）（我们宪法的主要原则是立法机关，执行和司法机构的独立性，彼此之间的独立性没有比司法机构更嫉妒这一点。”）克林顿诉琼斯, 520年美国681,716(1997)。阅读《信息自由法》和Constitution to require the courts to afford "utmost deference" to whatever "foreign affairs" justification the executive branch offers constitutes an assault on that independence in its most basic form, one that the court below properly resisted by seeking more from the executive than a "one-size-fits-all" justification for its action in this case. In requiring the State Department to identify and describe damage to the national security as defined in the Clinton Order, the court of appeals was properly cognizant of the executive branch�s foreign policy assessments. But the court could not, consistent with its own constitutional responsibilities, allow the government to turn FOIA�s judicial review process into "a meaningless judicial imprimatur" for the government�s foreign affairs decisions.A. Michael�s Piano, Inc。，18 f.3d，第141页。
- 有意义的司法审查不会威胁到美国的外交政策，对于保护其他价值观至关重要。
政府辩称，司法机构不能信任审查机构分类从头开始因为外国政府认为，美国政府保密是Ironclad，仅仅法院披露行政人员认为秘密的信息的可能性将严重破坏外交政策。该论点在两个层面上构成信誉。我们的社会对政府的开放率提高了溢价，因此与美国沟通的外国政府无法合理地期望完全保密。此外，有意义的司法审查促进了政府的开放性，这既是支票执行权力滥用权力，又促进了在家中有知情的公民，并且本身就是美国的重要外交政策目标。
The notion that foreign governments realistically expect the executive branch to provide absolute secrecy for all inter-governmental communications is untenable. Since Congress amended FOIA in 1974, foreign governments have been on notice that United States courts might order the release of such information. Moreover, the Clinton Order makes clear that no presumption of secrecy attaches to foreign government communications, even when confidentiality is expected. Compare克林顿订单，1.2（a）（4），1.5（b），withexec。订单12,356，3 C.F.R.�1.3（a）（3）（1983）。
外国政府还肯定会意识到行政部门官员对外交事务信息的经常泄漏。看Secrecy, Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, S. Rep. No. 103-105-2 at A-3. (1977) ("Classified documents are routinely passed out to support an administration; weaken an administration; advance a policy; undermine a policy."). Recent newspaper articles, for example, discuss in detail communications between President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair concerning the targeting of specific sites and military campaigns in Kosovo.19When national newspapers already have access to such high-level communications regarding military secrets, it is entirely unrealistic to suggest that foreign governments have any expectation of confidentiality that will be seriously undermined by the mere possibility of judicially-ordered disclosures of government-to-government communications.
为了支持其声称将由法院命令的披露造成的可怕后果，政府主要依靠当时的国务秘书威廉·罗杰斯（William RogersNew York Times v. United States,403 U.S. 713 (1971). The example of the Pentagon Papers, however, demonstrates how unrealistic are the government�s claims. Secretary Rogers� concerns were not borne out. The Solicitor General who argued that very case, with the benefit of nearly twenty years� hindsight, concluded those concerns were unjustified: "I have never seen any trace of a threat to the national security from the publication. I have never even seen it suggested that there was such an actual threat." Erwin N. Griswold,秘密不值得保留，Wash。Post，1989年2月15日，A25。
The government�s brief pays scant attention to the values furthered by promoting freedom of information.20确实，政府的建议是，根据克林顿命令，政府到政府通信的披露通常应仅限于“常规安排信息或某些政府的祝贺/慰问信息”，PET。br。34，与政府在实施基本人权的其他受众面前的认可形成鲜明对比。在1994年向联合国关于国际公民和政治权利国际盟约所要求的有关该国人权和自由的报告中，美国国务院报告说，“言论自由[]涵盖了某些寻求和接受的权利信息……这项宪法权利已得到许多促进政府访问权的法律，例如《信息自由法》。”21
The United States has long recognized the value of openness in government. As James Madison famously pronounced, "A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. . . . And a people who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."詹姆斯·麦迪逊的著作103 (G. Hunt ed., 1910). Although accommodations to the concerns of foreign countries are no doubt appropriate in many instances � and the executive will have the opportunity to explain the reasons for such accommodation in any future FOIA case � there is no legal justification for presuming that United States information policy must automatically fall to the level of any country with which it deals.
结论
上诉法院的判决应得到确认。
马克·H·林奇
Counsel of RecordKate Martin
国民安全研究中心
National Security Archive
N.W. H Street 2130，套房701
华盛顿特区20037年
(202) 944-7060Louis M. Bograd
美国公民自由联盟基金会
1875Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009
（202）234-1817Jay T. Smith
伊丽莎白·A·斯诺德格拉斯
格雷戈里·威廉姆斯（Gregory M. Williams）
杰拉尔德·罗素（Gerald J. Russello）
卡温顿和伯灵
1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
P.O. Box 7566
华盛顿特区20044-7566
（202）662-5544史蒂文·R·夏皮罗（Steven R. Shapiro）
美国公民自由联盟基金会
125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004
（212）549-2500Counsel for Amici Curiae
1999年11月19日
笔记
1。同意提交此摘要的信已根据规则37.3提交法院书记员。根据规则37.6，Amici的律师指出，除Amici，他们的成员或其律师以外，没有其他人全部或部分撰写此摘要的律师，对本摘要的准备或提交做出了货币贡献。2。The government's out-of-context quotation from Representative Moorhead does not support their claim. Pet. Br. 45. It is clear from the full quote that Representative Moorhead was responding to the President's statement that "the courts would consider all attendant evidence" in assessing the classification, and was not addressing the substantive standard the President proposed. House Action and Vote on Presidential Veto, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),转载Senate Committee on the Judiciary and House Committee on Government Operations,1974年的信息自由法和修正案（P.L. 93-502）：来源书405(1975) ("Source Book") ("[I]n the procedural handling of [FOIA] cases . . . this is exactly the way the courts would conduct their proceedings.") (Rep. Moorhead).
3。With regard to Exemption 1 in particular, the Conference Report expressly stated that the 1974 Amendments were intended to override貂by allowingin camera法院对文件的检查“作为他们从头决定的一部分”。S.Rep。1200，第12页。然后说：
他认识到，负责国防和外交政策事务的行政部门对由于公开披露特定的分类记录而可能发生的不利影响有独特的见解。因此，同盟国期望联邦法院在第552（b）（1）条根据信息自由法案件中做出从头裁决时，将对机构关于有争议记录的分类状态的详细信息的宣誓书大大加强．
Id．
4。参见，例如，Conroy诉Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.").
5。的确，穆斯基参议员在成功反对总统的“合理性标准”时说，“通过给予机密材料作为与任何其他声称的政府秘密不同的地位，我们促进了只有那些拥有军事和外交自信的人才能养成野外神话有专业知识来决定与谁以及何时分享他们的知识。”来源书305。同样，在众议院辩论中，原始1966年Foia的主要作者代表莫斯认为，评估机密文件是否满足行政命令的要求所需的质量是“智能，敏感性，常识性和常识性和对人民知道政府在做什么以及为什么的权利的赞赏。”Id．257。他完全有信心司法机构具有这些素质，可以进行这些评估。Id．
6。看．宠物。br。37(asserting the "inappropriateness of courts superintending Executive Branch judgments about the need to preserve the confidentiality of communications bearing on national security");id．在38岁时（遵守“总统维持保密的奇异权限”）（重点添加了）。
7。The government devotes several pages to the potential disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, but Congress has categorically exempted such information from disclosure under Exemption 3.参见中央情报机构诉SIMS, 471 U.S. 159, 181 (1985).
8。Article I, section 8 of the Constitution also vests Congress with authority to "provide for the common Defence" (cl. 1), "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations" (cl. 10), "declare War" (cl. 11), "raise and support Armies" (cl. 12), and "provide and maintain a Navy" (cl. 13). Congress' appropriations power,id．艺术。I, � 9, cl. 7, also gives it substantial authority in the area of foreign policy.
9。This Court has long recognized that an indispensable adjunct to Congress' power to legislate is its power to investigate.参见Barenblatt诉美国，360 U.S. 109，111（1959）;McGrain v. Daugherty，273 U.S. 135，175（1927）。政府关于行政人员对国家安全信息的全体控制权的论点，如果接受，将在宪法上认识到的重要立法关注的领域中，会在国会的调查权中进行调查。
10.行政特权仅扩展到总统和“密切顾问”之间的“高级社区”。United States v. Nixon，418 U.S. 683，703，706（1974）。
11。看Sims, 471 U.S. at 168-70 ("Congress intended to give the Director of Central Intelligence broad power to protect the secrecy and integrity of the intelligence process.");Haig诉Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 289, 306 (1981) ("The principal question before us is whether [the Passport Act] authorizes" the Secretary of State to revoke a citizen's passport on national security grounds; concluding Congress had approved the Secretary's authority to do so);芝加哥和南方航空公司诉沃特曼S.S. Corp，333 U.S. 103（1948）（国会不打算对民航委员会的命令进行司法审查，否认公民承运人申请从事海外和外国航空运输的申请）。
12。看, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-59 (1983) (violating bicameralism and presentment);Buckley v. Valeo，424 U.S. 1，143（1976）（任命条款）。
13。看Morrison，487 U.S. 654（维护独立律师法规，因为这是对行政当局的适度限制）；Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443;小诉, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (Marshall, J.) (holding executive action subject to congressional regulation even during undeclared war).
14。一般参见拉乌尔·伯杰（Raoul Berger），执行特权：宪法神话163-208 (1974); Stephen W. Stathis,Executive Cooperation: Presidential Recognition of the Investigative Authority of Congress and the Courts, 3 J. L. & Pol. 183 (1986).
15。看Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year 1988, � 630, 101 Stat. 1329-432 (1987) (prohibiting the expenditure of funds for executive employee secrecy agreements that forbid employees from revealing "classifiable" information) (considered inGarfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989)); Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act 1997, � 625, 110 Stat. 3009-59 (1996) (requiring that secrecy agreements signed by employees with access to classified information state on their face that the agreements do not supersede or alter the right of employees to furnish information to Congress).
16。总统约翰·肯尼迪（John F. Kennedy）刺杀记录收集法案1992年，第106条。3443(1992) ("[L]egislation is necessary because the Freedom of Information Act, as implemented by the executive branch, has prevented the timely public disclosure of records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy"); see also Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, 112 Stat. 1859 (1998) (requiring release of Nazi war criminal records subject to statutorily prescribed exceptions); Foreign Relations of the United States Historical Series Act, 22 U.S.C. � 4351 (Supp. 1999) (requiring that "all records needed to provide a comprehensive documentation of the major foreign policy decisions and actions of United States Government" be declassified for inclusion in the State Department's public "Foreign Relations" series subject to statutorily prescribed exceptions).
17。即使是常规案件也可能暗示外交关系。“我们在贸易，金融和交流方面的'一个世界'；在一个可能在其他地方知道每一次发生的时代 - 美国任何法院的任何案件都可能会成为跨国工厂的兴趣，并成为有益的美国外交关系。”路易·亨金（Louis Henkin），Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution133(2d ed. 1996).
18。确实，制定者将这些案件委托给联邦法院的管辖权因为这些案件有可能影响美国的外部关系。看联邦主义者80号，第476页（亚历山大·汉密尔顿）（克林顿·罗斯特（Clinton Rossiter Ed。随之而来的是，联邦司法机构应该认识到其他国家公民的所有原因。”）。
19。看, e. g.，达娜·普里斯特（Dana Priest），委员会的轰炸：法国遭到北约目标, Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1999 at A1 (detailing the contents of a target selection document from the air campaign in Kosovo circulated to President Clinton, Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, and President Jacques Chirac of France; the article also reports the contents of long conversations between the three leaders over target selection); Dana Priest,总部内部的战斗：紧张局势随着策略而分裂, Wash. Post, Sept. 21, 1999 at A1 (analyzing the conversations conducted over top-secret video-conference by the military leaders in the Kosovo war, including General Wesley Clark, chief of NATO forces).
20.参议院关于1974年修正案的报告说：“自《第一修正案》不仅保护公民发表和发表的权利，而且还保护了收到的信息，信息自由立法也可以看作是肯定的国会努力，以赋予宪法有意义的内容。表达自由。”来源书154。
21。美国的民事和政治权利，美国的初步报告，根据国际公民和政治权利国际盟约，1994年7月，第157页。