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Secrecy and Accountability in U.S. Intelligence FAS Note: The following paper was prepared for a seminar on intelligence reform sponsored by the国际政策中心.

Secrecy and Accountability in U.S. Intelligence


by
Steven Aftergood
政府保密项目主任
Federation of American Scientists
October 9, 1996

Questions of secrecy and accountability have figured prominently in the most important intelligence controversies of the last several years. While U.S. intelligence agencies have done an astonishingly poor job of protecting the nation's secrets from foreign adversaries, they have been more successful in blocking access by American citizens to the most basic categories of intelligence information.

Classification practices adopted decades ago to thwart a seemingly omnipotent Soviet threat remain in effect, despite epochal changes in the global security environment. Congressional oversight has often limited itself to expressions of indignation after the scandaldu jour, while reinforcing obsolete security practices that would help make the next scandal more likely. Unexamined secrecy policies have even inhibited communication of intelligence within the government itself. Meanwhile, public tolerance for government secrecy is diminishing, and inherited classification practices are being challenged by an erosion in security discipline and by increasingly capable information technologies in the public domain.

There has always been a degree of secrecy in U.S. government, particularly in intelligence matters, and it has always presented a conflict with American ideals that remains unresolved.

But today, the level of secrecy in U.S. intelligence is a symptom of increasing obsolescence as well as an obstacle to reform. This paper provides an overview of the structure of government secrecy, examines current intelligence secrecy policies, critiques congressional oversight of intelligence, and proposes some corrective steps for the future.

Three Categories of Secrecy

Among the many types of information that are classified by the government in the name of national security, it is possible to distinguish three general categories: genuine national security secrecy, political secrecy, and bureaucratic secrecy.

Genuine national security secrecy pertains to that body of information which, if disclosed, could actually damage national security in some identifiable way. Of course, this begs the crucial questions of what "national security" is, what constitutes "damage" and how the meaning of these terms may change over time. Without attempting to conclusively define national security-- a worthy subject for a separate examination-- common sense suggests that this category would include things like design details for weapons of mass destruction and other advanced military technologies, as well as those types of information that must remain secret in order for authorized diplomatic and intelligence functions to be performed. The sensitivity of this kind of information is the reason we have a secrecy system in the first place, and when it is working properly this system positively serves the public interest.

第二类是政治保密，它是指对政治优势的故意和有意识地滥用分类权的权威，无论对国家安全的威胁如何。这是这三个类别中最小的，但对国家的政治健康也是最危险的。从历史上看，情报中政治保密的最极端的例子也许是在Mkultra计划中对CIA行为修改实验的分类。为了确保这项活动的永久保密性，尽管中央情报局继续对许多此类记录进行分类，但大多数Mkultra记录在1970年代初被销毁。2But this category also includes more petty abuses like the classification of the intelligence budget, which serves to limit official public discussion of intelligence priorities and performance, but does nothing to enhance the security of Americans.

The third category is what may be called bureaucratic secrecy. This has to do with the tendency of all organizations to limit the information that they release to outsiders so as to control perceptions of the organization, as classically described by Max Weber. Bureaucratic secrecy appears to be the predominant factor in current classification practice, accounting for the majority of the billions of pages of classified records throughout the government.

例如，去年，中央情报机构特别否认了美国科学家联合会对情报预算信息的请求的要求，可以追溯到1947年。无论“国家安全损害”一词可能意味着什么，没有任何理智的人会争辩五十岁的预算数字今天可能会损害国家安全。3Nor is there any political advantage to be gained by insisting on the classification of old intelligence budgets, particularly since they have already been declassified in large part by other agencies without the CIA's knowledge or consent.

There is inevitably a subjective factor in the assignment of a particular unit of information into one of the three categories of secrecy. The borders of the three categories may sometimes be blurred in practice. Furthermore, information that falls in one category at one moment will often belong in another category at some later date. Responsible classification management-- i.e., the elimination of all but genuine national security secrecy-- therefore depends to a large degree on the good judgment and the good will of the managers. Failing that, it depends on the steadfast advocacy of congressional overseers. And when that fails, responsibility reverts to the public.

The mixture of legitimate secrecy, self-serving abuse of classification authority, and bureaucratic insularity has been with us in more or less its present form for nearly 50 years. But it appears to be reaching a crisis point whose outcome will help determine the security policies of the early 21st century.

Where Are We Today?

美国情报中的保密是一种无意识的反射。手术原则不仅是“如有疑问，分类”，还只是“分类”。除非一些高级官员主动将其解密，否则几乎所有有关情报的一切都会被归类。通过诸如《信息自由法》之类的官方机制从美国情报机构中提取信息通常是对公众成员的毫无结果的练习。5

The CIA has seized upon the statutory requirement to protect "sources and methods" to classify anything and everything it chooses. Thus, as noted, CIA still claims that declassification of its 1947 budget would compromise "sources and methods," vacating this term of any meaningful content.6

情报界在1950年的国家安全委员会指令中最直率地描述了情报界对保密性的指导，该指令建议“关于情报的任何宣传，事实或虚构的任何宣传可能对情报活动和国家安全的有效性有害”。7The directive instructed all relevant departments and agencies to prevent the disclosure of any information about intelligence, except when specifically authorized.

Today, of course, publicity about intelligence, factual and fictional, is rampant. Many hundreds of official intelligence publications, some extremely valuable, are available for sale to the public. All U.S. intelligence agencies have world wide web sites on the Internet, with gradually increasing content. Various discretely targeted declassification efforts have led to the release of hundreds of national intelligence estimates on the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands of CORONA satellite images from the 1960s, the VENONA decrypts of intercepted Soviet cable traffic, and more.8And the CIA has pledged to "declassify up to 60 million pages [of classified records] by April 2000" in compliance with President Clinton's executive order 12958.9

But as desirable as it may be to finally have greater access to the record of Soviet atomic espionage against the U.S. fifty years ago, say, or the official CIA map of Uganda, the American public is still denied official knowledge of the most basic dimensions of U.S. intelligence, notably the size and composition of the intelligence budget. In other respects, intelligence-related secrecy is actuallyincreasing.10As for CIA pledges of "openness," their credibility has steadily diminished as almost every DCI since the tenure of William Colby has advocated greater openness and increased declassification, with results that invariably fall short of what is promised.11

One way to characterize the failure of intelligence disclosure policy would be to say that it has failed to come to terms with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The original rationale for the indiscriminate secrecy of U.S. intelligence was the challenge of a superpower adversary in a high state of military readiness with an aggressive, large and capable intelligence service aiming at international subversion and global domination. In this context, disclosure of the smallest tidbit of information was perceived to be a potential liability and perhaps an incremental threat.

与elimination of the Soviet challenge, it is still necessary to point out, there is now no remotely comparable threat to U.S. security.12And from an information disclosure point of view, the threat from international terrorists, drug traffickers, Iran, Iraq, Libya or North Korea is in contrast all but negligible. For one thing, most of these adversaries (unlike the Soviet Union) lack the industrial infrastructure to take advantage of our most sensitive technological secrets.

在没有超级大国威胁的情况下，其他类型的以前敏感信息也是良性的。因此，不久前，即将到来的军事行动将被视为最敏感的机密活动，没有任何东西。但是，在与过去的练习中脱颖而出，据报道，最近针对伊拉克的巡航导弹罢工的细节in advanceof the operation itself.13This was not a security violation, but rather a reflection of altered national security circumstances. It simply didn't make a difference whether or not Iraq knew that a U.S. attack was coming.

But the current realities of national security, and their implications for disclosure policy, have still not penetrated the mindset of U.S. intelligence (which is not a favorable commentary on an intelligence agency).

The disparity between the real requirements of national security (by any definition of that term) and the indiscriminate secrecy of the intelligence agencies has created a new degree of tension, sometimes verging on outright hostility, with respect to U.S. intelligence among the alert public.

因此，国防部的一项调查发现，大多数美国公众认为，“鉴于世界局势”，政府对文件进行了太多的分类，并保留了太多的秘密。14这是一个非常重要的发现，因为它表明开放不是公共利益繁忙企业所推动的某种“特殊兴趣”问题，而是人民的意愿。

在一个开放的社会中，没有某些后果就无法长期阻碍人民的意志。

Leaks Are Busting Out All Over

情报披露政策未能跟上当前现实和公众期望的后果之一是对安全纪律的重大侵蚀，导致几乎没有授权的机密信息披露或“泄漏”的披露流行。

Of course, leaks are nothing new. They are the yin to secrecy's yang. It is only fitting that "the history of the CIA itself began with a leak," as one writer put it.16

关于泄漏的抱怨同样古老。最近，国防部长威廉·佩里（William Perry）对持续的一系列“基于高度分类情报报告的报纸文章”表示“深切关注”，并要求联邦调查局开始进行调查，试图定位和起诉泄漏者。ReportsReports17

There are no reliable public statistics on the frequency of leaks or the number of leakers. But even setting aside the large number of "leaks" that are really authorized disclosures on a not-for-attribution basis, there appears to be a dramatically escalating number of genuinely unauthorized disclosures, judging from the almost daily quotations from currently classified documents that appear in the national press.

In fact, leaks have become such a pervasive fact of political life that Clinton Administration officials reportedly decided not to initiate a covert action to ship arms to Bosnian Muslims in 1994 because they believed it would inevitably become public knowledge, and Iranian arms shipments were allowed to proceed instead.18Thus, an otherwise legal policy option was foreclosed by the growing dysfunction of the national security secrecy system.

Nor is it necessary to be a star reporter in a national news organization to be on the receiving end of such unauthorized disclosures. From my own perch on Capitol Hill, I have obtained documents from almost every classification category, up to and including unacknowledged special access program records. With few exceptions, the classified records I have seen could not plausibly be said to pose any threat to national security.

None of the "leakers" I have encountered are anarchists or individuals who are indifferent or hostile to national security. They simply do not regard the classification level of a document as an accurate indication of its national security sensitivity. The problem is, they are right.

But as a practical matter, the government has found it easier to tolerate the growing number of leaks than to prune the secrecy system down to the size dictated by genuine national security considerations. Consequently, leaks have become an essential component of the checks and balances that Americans depend on.

The Intelligence Budget: Classified, But Not Secret

赞成和反对的理由分类的e intelligence budget were thoroughly laid out in 1976 by the Church Committee, which concluded that the budget total should be published annually and that publication of more detailed figures should be considered.20The arguments have not changed (or improved) with age, though they are ritually recited at regular intervals.

反对解密的连贯论点的最接近的事情是，它将导致进一步不受控制的披露的滑坡。但这是没有其他机密支出的经验所支持的。因此，在未分类的国防预算框架内隐藏了大量的分类（非智能）国防支出，这表明，“持有”不受控制的披露是完全可行的。21

Today, even the modest Church Committee suggestion-- that disclosures beyond the total should be considered-- has little official support, even among Congressional advocates of aggregate budget disclosure.22

And yet, thanks to numerous deliberate and accidental disclosures, much of the U.S. intelligence budget now falls into the growing category of information that is "classified, but not secret."

Thus, the House Appropriations Committee inadvertently disclosed the size of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) program, and the CIA budget.23A classified memorandum setting out detailed five year budget projections for the NSA, DIA and other agencies was leaked toDefense Week, which published the memorandum.24美国情报界的角色和能力委员会的最新报告无意中提供了有关中央情报局，DIA，NSA和NRO的预算和人员详细信息。25可以通过对未分类的政府记录进行仔细检查，很容易地推论出更多细节。26

One could argue that if all of this information is already available, then what difference does it make whether the budget is declassified or not? There are at least two answers.

首先，将预算分类的急剧减少到一个可以在真正的国家安全方面进行合理辩护的水平，将使情报界能够在最需要的地方集中其安全资源。国家不必再容忍情报支出作为国家安全秘密的情况，而美国对手则以几千美元购买间谍卫星操作手册，并经常检测，转向或执行美国情报来源。不加选择的保密的人对这些安全失败的负担负担不大，而保密最重要。

其次，预算的发布将有助于揭开“情报崇拜”的神秘面纱，并大大简化国会监督负担，否则这些负担是无法控制的。

The Limits of Congressional Oversight

通过延续不加区分的保密政策，国会不必要地削弱了情报监督过程，使监督的质量几乎完全取决于情报界的善意和诚意。

intellig国会监督的缺陷ence may be summarized with the observation that intelligence demands greater oversight than practically any other government activity, and yet it receives less.

情报要求监督超出数万美元的年度支出的监督，因为它通常在美国法律规范之外运作。因此，众议院情报委员会最近观察到，在秘密服务中

But even the "mere supervision" of routine budget matters often seems to be beyond the reach of congressional oversight. For example, billions of dollars of so-called "base" spending escapes meaningful oversight every year, simply because budget documents provide no detailed accounting for it and, at least until recently, it never occurred to Congress to demand an accounting.29

公共记录不允许对情报监督的质量和有效性进行完整的评估。公平地说，应承认，监督可能比普遍赞赏的要好得多。可以说，监督系统的存在具有一些有益的影响。因此，前DCI罗伯特·盖茨指出：

Fundamentally, however, the current system of Congressional oversight is structurally defective, and does not even provide the scrutiny that is devoted to other less important and dangerous government activities.

This is because of the fact that a large fraction of the "oversight" function in every policy area from agriculture to health care is performed by the media, including numerous specialized trade publications. At the Pentagon alone, well over a thousand journalists hold building passes and are free to roam its halls at will, sniffing around for dirt or, at least, news. Their investigative efforts are supplemented and informed by countless advocacy groups.

But the opportunity for media and advocacy group oversight of intelligence is extremely limited in an environment in which even the budget for pens and pencils is a national security secret. Partly for this reason, the number of journalists who do original investigative reporting on intelligence matters is in the low double-digits, and the number of private advocacy groups doing their own research is in the single digits.

参议院情报委员会工作人员玛丽·K·斯特特万特（Mary K.根据情报预算的要求，因为很少有选民能够合法地访问情报计划，他们希望向委员会提出信息。”31

No matter how competent the Committee staffers may be, they cannot possibly make up for the deficit in independent information and analysis that results from the comprehensive secrecy surrounding intelligence.32

"Although we occasionally hear the charge of 'micromanagement'," says Ms. Sturtevant, "we always shake our heads in wonder that this could be so. In toto, we are perhaps one dozen or so full-time budget staff supporting the Intelligence Authorization and Appropriations Committees of both the House and the Senate reviewing activities conducted by tens of thousands of civilian and military personnel and programs valued in the multiple billions of dollars."

"We normally can review a program only once a year, [if that,] so we make up ours minds quickly [on the basis of limited information].... The great majority of continuing, or 'base,' programs go unscrutinized."33

Thus, the oversight process remains inadequate even when, as in the current environment, the intelligence community is relatively forthcoming to the oversight committees. (Since May 1995, CIA has provided over 300 notifications of intelligence activities to the Committees.34)

A drastic reduction in the scope of intelligence-related secrecy would enable Congress to concentrate its very limited resources on the most sensitive aspects of intelligence policy (which are properly kept secret), while allowing the press and the interested public to take up the slack on the rest.

Instead, the intrinsic limitations of Congressional oversight have been further aggravated by the idiosyncrasies of the 104th Congress. The House Intelligence Committee in particular has been possessed by alien notions that the Committee should be an advocate for the agencies it oversees35; that declassification should be discouraged and executive branch secrecy should be increased36; and that covert action can somehow be an instrument of a Congressional foreign policy.37

The reputation of Congressional oversight has now been degraded to the point that few Americans look to the intelligence committees to represent and defend their interests. The recent firestorm of criticism over alleged CIA links to cocaine traffickers reflects, among other things, a loss of public confidence in current oversight procedures.

In any event, with the erosion of discipline in the secrecy system, the press and the public are able to assert an ever greater role in overseeing U.S. intelligence.

Overcoming Intelligence Secrecy

When government institutions fail in an open society, citizens are not powerless to respond. And when the intelligence community fails to deliver on its promises of "openness" and Congress blocks more fundamental reforms, that is by no means the end of the story.

Despite the obstacles to media oversight of intelligence, there are at least a handful of outstanding reporters-- we all know who they are-- who regularly report to the public (and to the Congress) more information than the intelligence community would wish to have disclosed, and newspaper editors gladly highlight their work on the front pages. The erosion of security discipline noted above, while regrettable in the abstract, makes media oversight increasingly feasible by transferring disclosure authority to the news room.

For example, we now know more about the failed covert operation in Iraq over the last six months than we know about the majority of the thousands of covert actions that took place over the last fifty years.39

甚至相对简单分类预算的决定s, like a recent proposal for a new gymnasium at the CIA, can be determined by media attention. Plans to pursue the $10 million athletic facility at the CIA were canceled only after the Washington Post (not Congress) began to ask questions about it.40

If the effect of indiscriminate secrecy is to discourage (or shape) public awareness of intelligence, then any public discussion-- even the most demented posting on an internet news group-- is an appropriate act of resistance and may help to legitimize a public voice on intelligence policy.

Perversely, public discourse on intelligence appears to be most politically effective when it is least accurate. Thus, Oliver Stone's hallucinatory movie RJFKS succeeded-- where pusillanimous appeals to the public interest failed-- in dislodging hundreds of thousands of pages about the assassination of President Kennedy from CIA files. By any rational assessment of the requirements of national security, most of these records should have been declassified long ago, but it took Oliver Stone to make it happen. Similarly, propagation of the Roswell myth-- i.e. the asserted crash of an extraterrestrial spacecraft in New Mexico in 1947 and the subsequent coverup-- proved remarkably effective in promoting declassification of records from that era.41But in these cases and others, the public attitudes that eventually precipitated declassification became so deeply rooted that they have not been discernably affected by the release of the old documents. In this way, current classification policy promotes public stupidity.42

但这是旧消息。在不久的将来，新兴的新技术将大大减少公众对情报界和国会披露信息意愿的依赖。一个杰出的例子是商业高分辨率卫星成像功能，该功能将于1998年向公众和媒体提供，并且超过了30年前美国情报界本身可用的质量。因此，更好的是，因此，秘密的秘密将少得多。

In effect, the public will soon have an alternative intelligence capability that is not bound by the rather skewed priorities of the official intelligence community, which has come to emphasize "support to military operations" at the expense of preventive diplomacy and other national interests.

即使允许夸张的期望和几个程度的炒作，高分辨率卫星图像的出现以及全球媒体爆炸，扩大互联网公用事业和类似的发展 - 代表了各个公民之间“权力平衡”的根本转变和政府。43

In this scenario, historians are the losers, since the intelligence community may never fully disgorge its Cold War secrets, just as the Congress may never allow the contents of the intelligence budget to be officially discussed in public. But for everyone else, official secrecy will come to matter less and less.

Steps to the Future

The above considerations lead to several specific proposals that would substantially reduce the indiscriminate secrecy surrounding intelligence, and make it more responsive to the demands of the day.

1. Declassify the intelligence budget down to the program level.

All intelligence agency budgets should be declassified at least down to the program level, following the well-established example of the Department of Defense.

The defense budget specifies many dozens of classified programs, identified only by their program nickname, whose purpose remains obscure, i.e. protected. The same practice should be adopted in the intelligence budget.

与流行的观点相反,我的的数量ey spent on intelligence is not intrinsically sensitive, although it may be politically controversial. As the defense budget has proven for decades, revealing the amount of money spent on a program does not jeopardize the sensitive contents of that program. It is simply fallacious to assert that disclosing the amount of money the CIA or DIA spends on analysis-- or the cost of a particular satellite program, not to mention general construction and administrative costs-- would compromise sensitive sources and methods. Even the amount of spending for clandestine collection or covert action could reveal nothing about the distribution or the targeting of such activities, and should be declassified. As it is, these numbers are hardly secret.45

It has been argued that even if individual numbers do not compromise sensitive information, year-to-year comparisons of incremental spending changes would reveal sensitive new initiatives. But this is a Cold War argument predicated on a global Soviet threat. Today, even the DCI feels no hesitation in publicly announcing that funding for human intelligence has been maintained "at a constant level" or that "The gain of new sources in the past 18 months far exceeds previous achievements."46Publishing the budget for clandestine collection would not even revealthat很多。

预算披露是正弦Qua non将美国情报重新融入美国战争后的美国民主。如果无法完成，那么任何其他“改革”都可能是徒劳的。

2. Formally recognize the public as a legitimate consumer of intelligence.

One of the basic definitional questions concerning intelligence is, Whom does it serve? Traditionally the answer to this question has been the President and his circle of advisers.

But intelligence is information that is used to inform policy, particularly on crucial issues of defense and foreign affairs. And if citizens are to be more than passive spectators of events and mute consumers of "news," then they need access to intelligence too.

According to conventional wisdom, secrecy is intrinsic to intelligence and the notion of "public intelligence" is a contradiction in terms.48To demand public access to intelligence is to reject this view.

但是，在披露损害或降低敏感的智能源或方法的范围内，智能披露变得自我抗辩。

Obviously, then, the optimum solution would be to enforce a distinction between the products of intelligence, which should in general be disclosed, and those sources and methods which must be protected if they are to remain productive.

Currently, section 103 of the National Security Act specifies that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for providing national intelligence to (a) the President; (b) executive branch agency heads; (c) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders; and (d) "where appropriate, to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof."49

This section should now be amended to recognize the American public as an authorized consumer of intelligence, consistent with legitimate security requirements.

The precise implications of such an amendment would remain to be worked out (and fought over). But the statutory recognition of the public as an intelligence consumer would signal the beginning of a long overdue revolution in intelligence. The very idea of public intelligence challenges the foundations of Cold War intelligence policy in a way that the pieties of the official reform commissions and task forces failed to do.50

3.将“来源和方法”的保密性限制在那些披露可能会损坏来源或方法的情况下。

It is clear that the DCI has abused his authority to protect intelligence sources and methods by extending such protection to all manner of information that does not warrant it. The continued classification today of the 1947 intelligence budget on "sources and methods" grounds, as cited above, is sufficient proof of that.

Consequently, it is necessary to limit that authority. Just as the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act specified that information is not necessarily exempt from disclosure just because it is classified-- rather, it must be "properly classified"-- so the "sources and methods" exemption can no longer be left to the DCI's subjective discretion or whim.

Therefore, the National Security Act [section 103(c)(5)] should be amended to state that the DCI shall "protect intelligences sources and methods from unauthorized disclosureif that disclosure would demonstrably lead to loss of life or significant loss of intelligence capability“或这种效果的语言。必不可少的是必须设定预扣信息的可辩护标准，并且必须接受独立的司法审查。

4.通过取消最低分类级别来减少分类信息的量。

There is too much classified information in the U.S. intelligence community. Indiscriminate classification does a disservice to the nation first of all by withholding information that does not need protection. But it also devalues the effectiveness of the classification system itself by diverting security resources from where they are needed most, and by promoting contempt for classification inside and outside of the government.

Last year's executive order 12958 on "Classified National Security Information" set out a fairly ambitious program for declassification of 25 year old records, but did little or nothing to limit contemporary classification activity. Indeed, anything that could have been classified the day before the order took effect could also have been classified the day after. Consequently, post-Cold War reductions in the scope of classification remain to be achieved.

Just as the magnitude and intensity of the threat to U.S. national security have diminished significantly with the demise of the Soviet Union, the scope and volume of government secrecy should be reduced accordingly.

One way to proceed would be to categoricallyinvalidatethe two lowest levels of classification, Confidential and Secret. With a reasonable allowance for exceptions, most of this material should not be reviewed in any depth, but should simply be declassified by fiat.

如果分类的目的是来保护ect the nation's most sensitive secrets-- a task at which it has failed so badly in recent years-- then the wholesale cancellation and release of the least sensitive secrets would materially assist in achieving that purpose, while marking the end of Cold War classification policy.

Conclusion

The kinds of measures described above would constitute important steps towards a more productive, responsive, and acountable intelligence system.

当然，当今的政治条件与诸如此类的建议或实际上完全是故意的变化，因为去年的情报改革努力的崩溃令人尴尬地证明。

The good news, however, is that preserving the status quo is not a realistic option. The classification system can be fixed, or it can be allowed to deteriorate in the face of public and media resistance. Oversight can serve to uphold broad public interests, or it can devolve into a mere appendage of the intelligence agencies. The intelligence community itself can be transformed to enlighten and inform the nation as a whole, or it can continue to fight some iteration of the Cold War.

在每种情况下，阻力最小的道路就是什么都不做，让当前的趋势能够按照自己的意愿发挥作用。但是遵循这一道路，美国情报界将被一个不断发展的公众嘲笑，然后被其官方消费者拒绝，因为它的胜于日益敏捷的竞争对手，它表现出色并表现出色。

Notes

1. 中央情报局文件, edited by Robert L. Borosage and John Marks, Grossman Publishers, New York, 1976, page 182.

2.1995年，总统人类辐射实验咨询委员会呼吁迅速解密来自Mkultra的所有幸存的机密记录，以及从1940年代末至1970年代初期的六个相关的中央情报局人类实验计划。迄今为止，中央情报局尚未遵守此建议。人类辐射实验咨询委员会的最终报告，1995年10月，推荐18，第837-839页。

3.Yet that is exactly what the CIA argues. In denying the request (CIA FOIA number 95-0825), CIA cited FOIA exemptions (b)(1) on national security and (b)(3) on protection of sources and methods. An appeal of the denial is still pending. In a startling reflection of how much the Cold War distorted American political standards, the budget of the Office of Strategic Services, the World War II predecessor of the CIA, was unclassified even during the War itself!

4.“ IC21：21世纪的情报界”，在众议院永久性情报委员会举行的听证会，1995年7月27日，第205页。

5.An exception: For some reason, the Department of Justice Office of Intelligence Policy and Review is extraordinarily forthcoming with documents requested under the FOIA, and routinely fulfills requestswithin the statutory ten day time limit!If prizes were awarded for complying with the law, this Office would be a winner.

6.The DCI has essentially unlimited authority under the sources and methods provision to withhold information, no matter how remote it may actually be from revealing a sensitive intelligence source or method. The information need not be "properly classified" under the executive order on national security information. National Security Act of 1947, section 103(c)(4), 50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3).

7.1950年1月6日Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, U.S. GPO, 1996, pp. 1118-1119.

8.Welcome as these disclosures are, they have hardly begun to appease most historians of national security. See, for example, "CIA Less Than Helpful to Historians Seeking to Analyze Covert Operations," by Jim Mann,Los Angeles Times, August 5, 1996.

9。As noted by Brian Latell, Director, CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence,7月24日在国家档案馆讲话. But according to the executive order, 15% of the inventory of 25 year old classified records were to be declassified by mid-October 1996 and CIA has not come close to declassifying 9 million pages this year (i.e. 15% of its 60 million declared pages).

10。An amendment to the 1997 Defense Authorization Act will exempt from disclosure under the FOIA all information about "the organization or any function of" the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the new National Imagery and Mapping Agency. This exempts information above and beyond what is properly classified (which is already exempt from the FOIA). SeeInside the Pentagon，1996年8月8日，第17页。

11.令人耳目一新的是，DCI威廉·凯西（DCI William Casey）并没有声称支持情报上的更大开放性。

12.这并不是要驳斥恐怖分子，扩散物以及其他人对全球或地区稳定的威胁。相反，关键是世界上所有恐怖分子都没有加起来苏联。对美国国家安全的基线威胁已按数量级下降，而分类政策仍然基于无处不在的高科技超级大国对手。

13."U.S. Sets Baghdad Missile Strike," by Bill Gertz,Washington Times, 9/3/96, p. 1; "U.S. is Preparing Bigger Air Strikes on Targets in Iraq," by Philip Shenon,New York Times, 9/12/96, p. A1.

14."Overall support for security and counter-espionage measures is quite strong. Only in terms of the classification of secrets does the majority favor the anti-security [sic] position." See "Public Attitudes Towards Security and Counter-Espionage Matters in the Post Cold-War Period," November 1994, commissioned by the Personnel Security Research Center of the U.S. Department of Defense.

15.政府官员总是说“泄漏比以往任何时候都要糟糕。”但是施莱辛格（Schlesinger）在1975年提倡起诉西摩·赫什（Seymour Hersh）New York Times为了发布分类信息，有一定的地位来进行比较。“ IC21：21世纪情报界”，众议院情报委员会的听证会，1995年5月22日，第1页。73。

16.Walter Laqueur,秘密世界：智力的用途和限制, Basic Books, New York, 1985, page 391, note 31. The reference is to a secret memo that surfaced in early 1945 concerning plans to create an "all powerful super spy system."

17.A copy of Secretary Perry's July 31 memorandum on leaks, which itself was obtained through unofficial channels, is available at//www.tuuruguay.com/sgp/clinton/perry.html.

18.Walter Pincus, "Iranian Arms and the 'Instruction of No Instructions',"华盛顿邮报，1996年4月28日，第A20页。

19。"Nomination of Vice Admiral William O. Studeman to be Deputy Director of Central Intelligence," hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 10, 1992, p. 49.

20。参议院委员会来研究政府打开ations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book I, 1976, pp. 367-384.

21.的确，一个高度分类的（实际上，未被认可）的国防部计划在几年前未经授权的美国公民渗透，但随后的调查确定，它首先不应该在该高度的A级别上分类。参见1992年12月16日，DOD Inspector General Report Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Report Report Report，请参见“ Timber Wind Special Access计划”。

22。Senator Arlen Specter, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has stated that aggregate budget declassification should be the beginning, not the end, of budget disclosure.

23.Tim Weiner, "$28 Billion Spying Budget is Made Public by Mistake," New York Times, November 4, 1994.

24.托尼·卡帕奇奥（Tony Capaccio）和埃里克·罗森伯格（Eric Rosenberg），“迪奇（Deutch）批准了270亿美元的五角大间谍预算”，《国防周》，1994年8月29日。

25.R. Jeffrey Smith, "Making Connections With Dots to Decipher U.S. Spy Spending,"华盛顿邮报，1996年3月12日，第1页。A11。

26.See the budget analysis prepared by John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists athttp://www.乐动登陆www.tuuruguay.com/irp/agency/index.html.

27.Congressional Record, December 21, 1995, page H15496.

28."IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century," Staff Study, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 1996, p. 205. This study is the most important congressional publication on intelligence since the Church Committee report.

29.Nearly 20 years after the House Intelligence Committee was established, it was still necessary for the IC21 Staff Study to argue that "Costs should be delineated as thoroughly for 'baseline' collection and other programs as for non-baseline programs. The NFIP practice of maintaining an undelineated intelligence 'base' should be banished." (p. 117). More than one-third of the national reconnaissance program budget-- or more than $2 billion-- falls into the undelineated 'base' category.

30。From the Shadows, Simon & Schuster, 1996, page 559.

31.Mary K. Sturtevant, "Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: One Perspective,"美国情报杂志，1992年夏季，第17-20页。一些“少数选民”是情报承包商，他们不受限制地进入大厅的利润丰厚的计划，而潜在的批评家甚至不应该知道。参见罗伯特·德雷福斯（Robert Dreyfuss），“影响力的轨道：间谍金融与黑人预算”，《美国前景》，1996年3月至4月，第30-36页。

32。The integrity of the oversight process is further compromised by the longstanding "revolving door" between the intelligence community and the oversight committee staff, as in the recent appointment of a former House Intelligence Committee staffmember to become General Counsel of the CIA. When conflicts arise between the agency interest and the public interest, a staffer who harbors ambitions of a career in intelligence will naturally be tempted to defer to the agency.

33.Sturtevant, op.cit., bracketed words in original.

34。Inside the Pentagon, September 12, 1996, pp. 5-6. The oversight committees have also been blessed with access to Intelink, the classified intelligence computer network.

35.See the IC21 Staff Study, chapter 15. The Committee seems to misapprehend the extraordinary nature of intelligence oversight. It will be impossible to "normalize" intelligence oversight, as the Committee proposes, as long as the most basic features of intelligence policy remain classified.

36.In addition to cuts on spending for declassification and new exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act, the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee opposed declassification of the intelligence budget total even after the DCI determined it could be safely disclosed.

37.The clumsy insistence of the House Intelligence Committee on expanding covert action against Iran late last year significantly embarrassed the United States in the world press. On August 12, 1996, the Government of Iran submitted a formal complaint to a tribunal in The Hague, arguing plausibly that the U.S. action violated the 1980 Algiers Accord between the U.S. and Iran.

38.“ IC21：21世纪的情报界”，在众议院永久性情报委员会举行的听证会，1995年11月16日，第1页。317。

39.参见，例如，蒂姆·韦纳（Tim Weiner），“伊拉克进攻库尔德地区的进攻将美国的阴谋颠覆到驱逐侯赛因”，”New York Times，1996年9月7日；R.Jeffrey Smith，“中央情报局的行动与伊拉克市摔倒”，华盛顿邮报, September 8, 1996; R. Jeffrey Smith and David B. Ottaway, "Anti-Saddam Operation Cost CIA $100 Million,"华盛顿邮报, September 15, 1996, p. A1; and Kevin Fedarko, "Saddam's CIA Coup,"Time, September 23, 1996, pp. 42-44.

40.沃尔特•平卡斯,”德国货架中情局5 1000万美元ld House,"华盛顿邮报, July 31, 1996, page A25.

41.See, e.g.,The Roswell Report: Fact versus Fiction in the New Mexico Desert, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, U.S. Government Printing Office stock no. 008-070-00697-9,1995, approx. 1000 pages.

42。由于促进解密化的战略，杂乱无章的人可能已经达到了顶峰，因为令人发指的门槛变得不可思议，公众话语变得越来越不一致。今天，“当他们可以观看20集'X Files''时，没有人愿意阅读20本CIA的书籍，并且做更多的乐趣。”Public Information Research. The result is a problem that Mr. Brandt terms "Why Johnny Can't Dissent."

43.For information on the use of high resolution imagery for public interest applications, see the FAS "Public Eye" website at//www.tuuruguay.com/eye/. See also Gary Stix, "Public Eye,"科学美国人，1996年8月，第18-19页；查尔斯·莱恩（Charles Lane），“卫星革命”，新共和国, August 12, 1996, pp. 22-24.

44。Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA，Simon＆Schuster，1978年，第459页。

45.可以从公共记录中推断出对秘密行动支出的合理估计。参见约翰·派克（John Pike），“无果的匕首：中央情报局用于秘密行动的支出”，Covert Action Quarterly, Winter 1994-95, pp. 48-55.

46。R. Jeffrey Smith, "Critics 'Wrong,' CIA Chief Says,"华盛顿邮报，1996年9月6日，第1页。A21; Tim Weiner, "The CIA Seeks Out Informers on Terrorism, and Finds Them,"New York Times，1996年9月6日，第1页。A2。

47.Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA, Simon & Schuster, 1978, pp. 459-60.

48.因此，“智力与保密之间的联系对于将智力与其他智力活动区分开来是大多数区别的核心。”艾布拉姆·舒尔斯基（Abram Shulsky），Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, first edition, Brassey's, 1991, p. 174. For a starkly contrasting conception, see Robert David Steele, "E3I: Ethics, Ecology, Evolution, and Intelligence,"整个地球评论，1992年秋季，第74-79页。

49.有趣的是，众议院情报永久选择委员会最近试图通过删除“适当的地方”一词，从而将其地位升级到全国情报的全面消费者，从而要求DCI向参议院和众议院提供情报，并将其提供给参议院和众议院。适当的委员会。”请参阅《众议院报告104-620》，第1部分，有关“情报界法案”的第1部分。102（b）（3）。这项拟议的立法从未到达房屋地板。

50.In a intriguing development, the new Strategic Plan of the CIA Directorate of Intelligence (DI) states that "public outreach will be one of the Directorate's highest priorities [!], embracing all levels of the organization." Further, "The DI will be well suited to discuss with the general public how the IC serves the American people-- not just an administration or Congress." But the Plan does not consider the possibility that American citizens have a legitimate interest in direct access to most DI products. See "Directorate of Intelligence in the 21st Century: Strategic Plan," Central Intelligence Agency, August 1996.

51。This remark might seem to be just a cheap rhetorical jibe if the author were not employed at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence at the Pentagon. See volume 2 of the Proceedings of the 1995 Open Source Symposium, Open Source Solutions, Oakton, VA, pp. 428-436.

52。Nightmover, Harper Collins, New York, 1995, page 155.

53.Secrecy and Democracy, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985, page 285.