Independent Bomber Force Review

I. INTRODUCTION

美国是否应该保留足够的现代重型轰炸机来支持美国国家安全战略是一种战略选择。我们坚信，应根据最能为国防的国防而基础决定美国远程轰炸机的未来。不幸的是，鉴于短期资金和力量结构偏好，国防部（国防部）实际上是在事实上做出了这种战略选择。如果允许该决定站立，最终结果将是几乎完全依赖短距离空气动力的力结构。

Pentagon preferences for short-range instead of long-range air power raises a puzzling contradiction. The long-range bomber fleet is an element of the force structure that appears ideally suited to the demands of the new security environment and national military strategy. We also have a weapon system--the B-2--which is now in production and if produced in substantial quantities, could revitalize and sustain that force. Yet the DoD has consistently opposed continued B-2 production.

Our analysis addresses this contradiction to help the Congress make a vital decision over the future of the bomber force. We first examine the planned future of the bomber force, its role in supporting U.S. national security, and the revolutionary potential offered by the B-2. We then examine the sources of Pentagon opposition and how this opposition has manifested itself in the recent series of studies the DoD has put forth to the Congress. We then offer a set of recommendations regarding legislation.

II. THE FUTURE OF THE BOMBER FORCE

To put the matter simply, under current plans the bomber has no future. A de facto strategic choice has been made to rest the future of American air power on short-range fighters. Unless immediate corrective action is taken, the long-range heavy bomber will gradually disappear as a meaningful element of America's armed forces.

The clearest evidence of the bomber fleet's condition is its size and age. Since the late 1950s, the general trend has been for U.S. force structure to shrink, with capability sustained or improved with advancing technology. But in recent years, bombers have been reduced more than any other major force element (such as army divisions, aircraft carriers, and USAF fighters). There were 360 active bombers in 1980. The force dropped to about 300 in 1990. Under current plans, the operational bomber force in the year 2001 will consist of 130 aircraft: 44 B-52s, 70 B-1Bs, and 16 B-2s.

与战斗部队不同，轰炸机的收缩并没有被新飞机和新型号的大量部署所抵消。因此，随着战斗力的改善，轰炸机力量能力将在长期内不可避免地下降。平均轰炸机已经大约是平均战斗机的年龄的两倍，当前的美国空军计划将维持其余的B-52，直到至少60岁
old, and possibly as old as 100. We may soon be in the extraordinary circumstance where America's bombers will be older than America's oldest aircraft carriers.

The bomber's loss has been the fighter's gain. Although in Congressional testimony the distribution of Air Force procurement is frequently portrayed as a cycling among transports, bombers, and fighters, in reality fighters have consistently maintained a plurality of the budget, and will overwhelmingly dominate the budget over the next two decades.

TABLE 1: APPROXIMATE SHARE OF USAF PROCUREMENT BUDGET

[In percentages]

--------------------------------------

Airlifters Bombers Fighters

--------------------------------------

1970's <5 5 95

1980's 10 40 50

1990年代30 35 35

2000-2020 <5 <5 95

--------------------------------------

战斗机优势的相应指标是战斗机与USAF运营库存中轰炸机的稳步增长比例。该比率从1950年代的4-1增加到1970年代的6-1，到1990年代的10-1，在不久的将来趋向于14-1趋势。

除了极少数例外，空军对现有轰炸机计划的行动表明了对轰炸机未来的极大关注。1986年进入服务的B-1B轰炸机由于常规的任务缺陷而没有在海湾战争中使用。此外，它的升级计划已被延长，以至于部署和传统升级之间存在20年的差距（直到计划退休之前，只剩下10年的预期系统寿命）。B-2舰队计划在1990年延伸到1990年，该机队在1992年被盖在20架飞机上，空军几乎没有异议。更引人注目的是，空军积极抗拒国会授权生产其他B-2的努力。美国空军的领导人甚至已经将轰炸机排除在每年提供给国会的所需但算不定程序的物品的“愿望清单”之外。例如，在1996年，空军包括重新设计RC-135和AWAC的请求，并在同一愿望清单上生产了其他F-16战斗机，该愿望清单省略了更多的B-2。

The DoD has no plan to keep the bomber force viable in the long run. Every other major weapon system--fighter, submarine, destroyer, carrier, tank, etc: has either a system in continuing production or a planned, programmed replacement. JSF will replace F-16. The New Attack Submarine will replace the Los Angeles (688) class attack submarine. But no new bomber model is planned in the numbers required to replace the B-52 or B-1B. The current, uncontested DoD plan will inexorably vitiate the bomber force through age, attrition, and obsolescence.

此外，空军参谋长罗纳德·福尔曼（Ronald Fogleman）的最近国会证词透露，空军没有计划取代随着轰炸机瓦解随着轰炸机瓦解而丧失的任务能力。当被问及轰炸机替代将军福格曼时说：“从现在到2020年，我们有很多事情要看。”但是将军同意在空军计划中实际上没有替代人 - 在五年防御计划（FYDP）或十年计划中都没有资金。没有计划的资金，就不会再使用B-2，几乎可以肯定没有B-3。

In sum, all evidence indicates that bombers have no future:

轰炸机结构已被过分切割。

Budgetary investment in bombers has shrunk almost beyond visibility.

所有轰炸机生产计划均已封顶和终止。

所有国会努力启动新的轰炸机production programs have been actively opposed.

空军有意识地将FYDP和十年计划中的任何新的未来轰炸机类型排除在外。

There is no plan of any kind to replace the bomber capabilities being lost by any other means.

The bomber force is aging, shrinking from attrition, and glaringly absent from future R&D and procurement plans. With no funding, no modernization plan, and no evident concern for their absence, the bomber force faces inevitable extinction. Whether by active choice or default, this evidence means that the DoD has indeed made the fundamental strategic choice to rely in the future almost exclusively on short-range fighter aviation. Unfortunately, emerging trends in the security environment identified by the Pentagon would seem to call for a renewed emphasis on long-range air power.

III. THE BOMBER FORCE IN THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

冷战期间,远程重型轰炸机箴言ed to be vitally important assets to U.S. national security. Not only did these aircraft support nuclear deterrence as part of the `triad' of nuclear forces, but their flexibility also allowed them to also conduct conventional bombing missions in three separate conflicts (Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm). We believe that modern long-range bombers will be of increasing value in the coming decades. Many of the reasons are spelled out in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which provides a useful overview of the future security environment and national military strategy.

Through 2015, the QDR postulates that the United States will face a variety of regional dangers and `foremost amongst these is the threat of coercion and largescale, cross border aggression against U.S. allies and friends in key regions by hostile states with significant military power.' Beyond 2015, a `near-peer' global competitor could also emerge.

报告指出,三个元素—shaping, responding, and preparing--define U.S. defense strategy. But boiled down to essentials, the QDR observed that the `primary purpose of U.S. forces is to deter and defeat the threat of organized violence against the United States and its interests.' If deterrence fails, `the high end of the crisis continuum is fighting and winning major theater wars. This mission is the most stressing requirement for the U.S. military.'

The QDR offered a strong rationale for the need to deal with two near simultaneous regional conflicts. And in fighting such wars, the QDR strategy stated that two aspects deserved special attention--(1) stopping the enemy advance as quickly as possible; and (2) dealing with the `likely conditions' that future wars will involve `the threat or use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) * * * including in the early stages of war to disrupt U.S. operations and logistics.' 1

Forces best able to halt aggressors armed with weapons of mass destruction, then, should logically enjoy highest priority.

Footnotes at end.

We would add that forces capable of executing this operation independent of theater bases and under conditions of surprise would be of even greater value. A range of powerful foreign and economic pressures will inevitably cause a further contraction in the U.S. overseas basing infrastructure and forward-based force levels. Indeed, planners should also assume that we will be taken by surprise in future conflicts; this was highlighted in the 1993 Bottom Up Review and is the recommendation of all analysts who have studied surprise attack in any detail. The wisdom of such a policy can be seen in the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the two recent crises with Iraq (October 1994 and September 1996), all of which took us by surprise. The lessons from the two more recent crises are particularly relevant.

1994年,伊拉克迅速调动部队附近的frontier with Kuwait. Despite intensive intelligence focus on Iraq since the Gulf War, we not only failed to recognize this buildup early on, but also were unable to deploy sufficient forces until well after Iraq was in a strong position to attack. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States and its allies faced at least a 2-3 day `window of vulnerability' through which Iraq could have invaded Kuwait and possibly threatened the Saudi oil fields.

In September of 1996, Iraq mobilized forces in its northern areas and pressed an attack into the Kurdish `safe haven.' Once again we were taken by surprise. Worse yet, for various reasons all members of the Gulf War Coalition denied immediate access to their bases for combat operations against Iraq, leaving our land-based fighters on the scene without suitable bases from which to strike the invading force. Carrier-based fighters located in the Gulf apparently did not possess the range to reach the scene of combat and the lack of stealthy carrier-based assets raised survivability concerns. In the end, we were reduced to largely symbolic strikes against Iraqi air defenses in the south using ill-suited cruise missiles launched from ships and B-52 bombers. Iraq was free to do as it wished in the north.

The lessons of these two crises in combination with the evolving security context reveal that bombers are ideally suited for the new era. They are the only force element capable of stopping surprise enemy aggression while operating outside the range of theater weapons of mass destruction. They do not require bases in the immediate combat theater (which also has the benefit of minimizing the number of Americans placed at risk). Finally, as explained below, bombers, though expensive when viewed on a per-unit basis, are extremely cost-effective compared to other force elements.

Bombers like the B-52, B-1B, and B-2 typically feature unrefueled ranges and payloads 5-10 times greater than fighters. Long range is a vital attribute for the new security era. Long range allows bombers to respond more rapidly than any other force element--from the CONUS if necessary--in the case of surprise aggression. Long range provides strategic agility; bombers can shift firepower from one theater to another. Long range also allows bombers to fight from beyond the range of adversary weapons, which will be of increasing importance as weapons of mass destruction proliferate. In the Gulf War, for example, Iraqi missiles in development or service outranged all of our land-based and sea-based fighter aircraft (whose operating locations were thus at risk). And just as long range provides a sanctuary to the bomber force, it denies any sanctuary to the enemy, who cannot base assets outside the reach of bombers. Finally, long range also greatly expands the number of basing options available to the force should we wish to deploy the bomber force forward to signal resolve (and increase sortie rates). The longer the range, the greater the number of potential bases that are available, and the greater the number of countries available for negotiating access to bases.

The large payload of bombers allows a small number of aircraft to assume a disproportionate amount of the warfighting burden. In Vietnam, for example, the bomber force comprised on average only 7 percent of the force and delivered 44% of the bomb tonnage. In the Gulf War, the B-52 force only represented 4% of the force, but delivered 32% of the bomb tonnage (more than twice as much as the entire carrier force combined).

以前，这些巨大的轰炸机有效载荷的主要优点是它们对敌军的心理影响崩溃了。例如，在海湾战争中，施瓦茨科普夫将军借鉴了他对B-52罢工的越南经历，要求伊拉克部队暴露于相同种类的重型轰炸中，这些轰炸事实证明对北越部队如此毁灭性轰炸。在将来的战争中，精密武器的出现将使轰炸机能够准确地对单一分类袭击许多不同的目标，这大大提高了轰炸机的价值对战斗指挥官。海湾战争说明了精确的革命，这与无指导的武器相比，空气力量的杀伤力增加了几个数量级。

In an era of declining budgets, the nation must procure the most cost-effective weapons possible. The ability to deliver large payloads of precision weapons makes each bomber sortie extremely effective; the low life-cycle cost of bombers (compared to other force elements) makes them extremely cost-effective. Bombers are very expensive weapon systems; producing a new B-2 costs about $1 billion, roughly the cost of a DDG-51 destroyer. But like warships, bombers enjoy long useful service lives and can operate effectively for three decades or more; the initial investment in the force is thus spread over many more years than most other systems. In addition, bombers are not people-intensive to operate. Personnel costs are typically a driving force in determining life-cycle costs for military forces. The annual personnel costs of a B-2 wing are about half that of a fighter wing and substantially less than that of an aircraft carrier or division. Overall, a B-2 wing's 35 year life-cycle cost (that is, total personnel, operations, and procurement cost) is
about the same as a fighter wing; about 1/3 that of an aircraft carrier battle group; and about 1/4 that of a heavy division. 2

人员问题与伤亡方面的乐动冠军考虑有关，这通常在危机决策中起关键作用（因此，在确定国家应投入的力量方面也应同样重要）。从这个角度来看，轰炸机也是非常有吸引力的资产，因为它们仅以伤害方式将少数人放置。例如，将战斗人员部署到剧院基地可能会使2500人或更多人处于危险之中；一个最多10,000人的运营商集团；一个15,000或以上的部门。这些单位中的每个成员都有受敌方武器攻击的风险。弹道导弹对剧院空军基地或部署的部门发出的化学弹头有可能杀死数千人。海洋飞行员导弹对航空母舰的袭击也会罢工。相比之下，与轰炸机翼相关的1300名人员通常会从远远超出对手的罢工范围内的基地运作，因此仅暴露了机组人员的生命。

In this same light we should also recognize the nuclear capability of the bomber force. If American theater forces were to be attacked by weapons of mass destruction--and particularly if they were attacked by nuclear weapons--there are compelling reasons why the United States might have to reply in kind. Bombers are the weapon of choice for nuclear response because the weapons remain under strict human control up to the very moment of launch near the target, and because the variable payload of the bomber gives it the widest possible variety of weapon delivery options. Moreover, since strategic arms control with the former Soviet Union and with Russia strictly limits the size of our nuclear arsenal, bombers could be used in counter-strikes without depleting our far more limited, single-use ICBM and SLBM assets. Inasmuch as our plans must hedge against the eventual emergence of a `near-peer' competitor, preservation of our remaining nuclear forces is a relevant consideration. Looking to the longer term, and understanding that no other nuclear-capable delivery systems are in production or planned, the bomber's dual capability (both conventional and nuclear) would allow a strengthened bomber force to sustain the nation's nuclear capability as other nuclear force elements inevitably age and retire. 3

Overall, bombers appear uniquely well-suited to satisfy America's strategic requirements in the future security environment.

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iv。B-2的具体优势

In looking at the bomber force, we need to discuss one additional, but revolutionary characteristic that the B-2 brings to the bomber force: stealth. Stealth shrinks the effective detection distance of a variety of sensors, particularly radar, and the basic physics involved in this set of technologies argues against the development of effective affordable counters. The B-2 thus combines four key characteristics--range, payload, stealth, and precision--in one platform. Range, payload, and precision allow a single B-2 sortie to strike with the effectiveness of multiple fighter sorties; stealth opens the door to a military revolution.

The traditional operational style that we have developed for the employment of air power relies upon large force packages to suppress enemy air defenses and shoot down enemy fighters. Stealth reduces the need for such support packages, which has a number of important effects. First, it greatly increases the cost-effectiveness of stealth platforms. Analysis conducted for the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) showed that the 42 F-117 sorties (which combined both stealth and precision capabilities) flown on the opening night of the Gulf War were almost equivalent in terms of target coverage to the rest of the land-based air-strike forces combined. 4 Another way to look at this is that each F-117 sortie was worth 16 non-stealth sorties. 5 The Air Force illustrated this same point after the Gulf War by showing that one or two B-2s can do the job of 60 fighters and 15 tankers. 6 This greatly reduces the costs of executing the mission; according to CORM analysis of the Air Force data, a B-2 would be seven times more cost-effective than the 75-aircraft force package. 7

隐身使适当配置的B-2可以自主操作，这将该飞机置于与B-52和B-1B完全不同的类别中。这些较旧的轰炸机必须得到基于剧院的战斗机的支持，直到消除敌人的防空措施或配备了昂贵的巡航导弹，这些导弹可以从敌方防空范围内发射。对陆基战斗机的依赖使非侵害的轰炸机依赖于美国及时获得基本访问权，并提高了一系列政治和运营的限制。巡航导弹虽然很有价值，但却遭受了各种操作限制（针对灵活性，应对可重新定位目标，弹头尺寸等），而且依靠持续的冲突太贵了（传统的空中巡航导弹携带例如，B-52部队比B-2交付的联合直接攻击弹药要贵100次以上。

This autonomous capability puts the B-2 in an entirely new class as of weapon system. It is truly the nation's only `modern' bomber and the nation's only global precision strike asset. Indeed, we believe that the B-2 has the potential to revolutionize this nation's very approach to strategy making and force structuring. As General Michael Loh, then the commander of Air Combat Command, stated in late 1994: `I see the B-2 as the centerpiece of an emerging national security strategy that places increasing importance on projecting immediate, responsive power from the U.S. to a regional crisis anywhere in the world. The B-2's qualities of range, payload, stealth, and sense of immediacy are uniquely applicable to be the centerpiece of this strategy.'

B-2的巨大力量将使美国能够针对地球上任何地方的任何对手投射压倒性和决定性的力量。从角度看，再增加一个B-2中队（8架操作飞机）将
给b - 2力足够的穿孔罢工same number of aimpoints as those targeted by over 1,200 combat aircraft over the first 24 hours of the Gulf War. Clearly, procuring even greater numbers would open up new strategic avenues. As former Air Force Secretary Dr. Donald Rice has written, such a force would `allow the nation to seize this rarest of opportunities: a revolutionary leap in military capability, and with it, long term global military pre-eminence--American style.' 8 No nation could confidently launch an armored assault on its neighbors. No dictator could think that his most prized strategic assets were immune to attack. No target would be more than a few hours away from attack. No defense could be counted on to protect key targets. In response to heightened tensions, the mere possession of a substantial force of B-2s could provide a new way to manage crises. Instead of going through the complex and risky steps of gaining base access, deploying forces, and escalating tensions, the President could simply order B-2s in the United States to be placed on higher alert. Even under the prevailing conditions of surprise and base access denial, a substantial force of B-2s could have made an enormous difference in the Iraq crisis of 1994 and 1996.

The first job of the American military is to provide our political leadership with tools for deterrence and coercion so the nation does not need for fight wars. Preventing wars is far superior to fighting wars. A substantial force of B-2s would have a unique conventional deterrent capability. As two noted scholars of deterrence have written:

`If U.S. national military strategy is designed with regional deterrence in mind, forward presence and/or rapid crisis response become key elements in this strategy. . . . Optimally, this . . . means stationing all the forces necessary between the adversary and his objective, but even the United States lacks the resources to meet such a requirement in more than a few cases simultaneously. Therefore, strong incentive exists for the United States to explore capabilities that . . . are so rapidly deployable into an area as to be `virtually' stationed there. 9

This is the potential capability offered by the B-2. And that is the potential vision that the Pentagon is turning its back on my making the fundamental strategic choice to rely on short-range fighter aviation.

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V.五角大楼为什么反对其他B-2？

If additional B-2 bombers could make a revolutionary contribution, why does the Pentagon oppose them? Basic principles of bureaucratic politics go far in explaining the Pentagon's position. We believe there is such strong opposition to the B-2 precisely because it is so revolutionary--because supporting the B-2 would imply far reaching changes in core organizational interests, such as manpower, budget roles, missions, and autonomy. It is helpful to begin with the perspective of the service that develops the B-2.

The B-2 is an Air Force system and one might imagine that the Air Force would be predisposed to support is continued production and improvement. The oppose is true. In any large bureaucracy, interests and programs tend to be identified with a particular organizational entity or bureaucracy. Historically, Strategic Air Command (SAC) was the heart and strength of bomber advocacy in the Air Force. Through the 1960s and into the 1970s, SAC influence in the Air Force R&D and procurement budgets. Accordingly, `bomber generals' often held top service positions.

When SAC and Tactical Air Command (TAC) were nominally `merged' into Air Combat Command in 1992, it was in reality much more akin to a hostile corporate takeover: TAC absorbed SAC. With the dissolution of SAC, the institutional foundation for bombers disintegrated. Consequently, bomber advocacy within the Air Force has virtually collapsed, and no funds have been budgeted to support any major new bomber program. Furthermore, as in the corporate world, management personnel from the leasing entity discovered that they had little power. In the words of retired Air Force General Chuck Horner, bomber-oriented officers have been `funneled out of the Air Force. 10 Today the top service positions are typically held by `fighter generals,' with hardly a bomber general to be found.

The roots of `fighter' opposition to the bomber force are complex. First, many officers with predominantly fighter backgrounds simply do not believe that the B-2 can perform as advertised. Having served all their lives in an Air Force where bombers were basically old, vulnerable and obsolete, they find it difficult to accept that the B-2 is different--that it can truly penetrate safety through defenses, or that it can strike targets at least as accurately as fighters. Their skepticism is reinforced by intense personal attachment to fighters and fighter operations. At a time when the Air Force budget has been in decline for more than a decade and so many fighters are on the verge of retirement, accepting the B-2 revolution might in their minds mean cutting fighter procurement programs. It might also mean accepting an entirely new approach to warfare in which the fighter sometimes might not even be relevant, let alone the dominant air instrument. Thus the number of fighter aircraft, fighter squadrons and wings--ultimately fighter pilots could be substantially reduced.

It is crucial to understand the USAF `fighter opposition' to the B-2 is well meaning. Everyone, Air Force officers included, have a powerful human tendency to trust in what they know, in what they have invested their careers, and in what has worked in the past. For the current Air Force leadership, this means a strong predisposition to trust in fighters.

The failure of the bomber revolution to succeed in the Air Force precluded any possibility of wider acceptance in the Pentagon. The inevitable consequence of an expanded role for bombers is an expanded bomber budget, and the new funds could come only by diversion from other existing military accounts. More bluntly, for bombers to receive increased funding, the non-bomber Air Force, the Army, the Navy, and Marines believes they may have to accept less. If the Air Force has not yet accepted changes in air power strategy implicit in the B-2, how much more would the Navy and Army refuse the even greater changes which a revolutionary bomber force would mean for broader national military strategy, and hence for their budgets?

The Army continues to maintain its traditional view that the decisive battles of any war are fought on the ground. Victory is achieved through mass troop deployments and close-in engagements, with the Air Force providing `support.' If the Air Force doesn't believe in long-range strike, arguing instead for the importance of air superiority and the primacy of air-to-air platforms, one certainly can not expect the Army to believe that air power has become the decisive combat arm (with the army providing `support' in consolidating the victory). An Air Force dedicated to air superiority and strikes near the forward edge of battle will remain dedicated to supporting the army.

同样，海军继续相信，在不可还原的海军任务中“存在”，并且通常将载体首先出现在现场，并首先在任何剧院冲突中进行战斗。海军没有理由放弃这种观点，只要空军坚持使用需要数周到几个月才能部署的战斗机进行战争，只要轰炸机太小而微弱，以至于没有任何有意义的替代方案“运营商任务。”海军是对的。除非空军建造更多的轰炸机并改变其战略，否则海军必须继续承担全部责任，以履行其所有传统任务。

从这个角度看实际上是inter-service consensus on which to resist the B-2 revolution. An Air Force that believes in applying air power using short-range fighters must have forward access, forward basing, and extensive logistical support. This in turn requires a massive ground presence, and inherently perpetuates a ground-warfare strategy. It also requires a massive sea-borne logistical tail, inherently perpetuating traditional navy views on sea control and sea power.

总体而言，轰炸机部队尤其是B-2遇到了两个主要问题。首先，由于战略空中司令部的灭亡，它失去了任何机构，官僚主义的拥护者。对B-2的支持意味着其他事情必须遭受损失 - 并且没有机构冠军或领导人领导这一斗争。其次，对B-2的支持本质意味着要认识到革命性的新形式的战争形式，该战争威胁了所有其他服务和非轰炸机群体。确认B-2最终意味着战略，服务预算份额，服务规模和人力的重大变化，并以强烈的个人信念。因此，五角大楼对B-2的反对是完全可以理解的。

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VI. THE PENTAGON STUDIES

了解五角大楼内对B-2的制度抗性有助于阐明DOD在B-2上最近进行的三项研究的建议。这些研究并非乐意进行。触发事件是1994年的国会立法，要求五角大楼准备对国家轰炸机的充分性进行评估。这项行动导致了下面评估的三项DOD研究：（1）DOD的1995年重型轰炸机研究；（2）1995年重型轰炸机工业能力研究；（3）1997年四年级防御评论对B-2问题的研究。此外，我们研究了由角色和任务委员会（CORM）的工作人员进行的另一项研究，该研究名为“未来轰炸机”。

In examining the DoD studies, we would like to emphasize two points. First, the studies studiously ignored the fundamental strategic choice at hand: should we maintain a bomber force or go to a force structure based primarily on short-range air power? Second, in formulating scenario and modeling assumptions (which inherently drive study outcomes) the analysts had to go to extreme lengths to ensure that study results supported the status quo and recommend against additional B-2s.

我们对国防部研究的总体评估是五角大楼政治优先于分析客观性和国家安全问题。五角大楼研究的基本问题是，他们面对常识。以下内容似乎是当前情况的适当类比。我们必须计划面对一个武装的对手，武装着锯齿弹枪（一种大规模杀伤性武器的隐喻）。鉴于短距离手枪和远程步枪之间的选择，五角大楼的研究试图认为手枪是可取的，即使这种选择要求我们在shot弹枪范围内移动以拍摄对手。我们认为，在许多情况下，从远处迅速准确地击中敌人是更好的选择，尤其是因为长期看来长期选择更便宜。

The 1995 Heavy Bomber Force Study and its industrial base counterpart were carefully constructed to come up with the desired answer (no additional B-2s required). The CORM bomber study came up with the wrong answer (additional B-2s are very attractive) and was quietly shuffled aside. The 1997 study initially came up with the wrong answer (additional B-2s was the most cost-effective option available), and was reshaped to provide the desired answer (no more B-2s required).

THE 1995 HEAVY BOMBER STUDY

The 1995 Heavy Bomber Study was conducted by the OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Institute for Defense Analyses. 11 Following its chilly reception in Congress, the Department has so far proven reluctant to publish a final scripted report of the study. As noted by Dr. Glenn Buchan, a distinguished and experienced bomber analyst at the RAND Corporation,

`The fundamental problem with the heavy bomber study is . . . whoever framed the study cooked the books. They allowed a set of assumptions that led to a preordained outcome by essentially ruling out all the things that would have led them to other results.' 12

Buchan also noted that once the assumptions were laid out,

`one could have concluded in somewhere between 30 seconds and, perhaps if one were very careful and thoughtful, two or three minutes, how this was going to come
出来，不一定必须经过所有计算机运行和所有分析。”13

The Heavy Bomber Study assumed the following scenario as its base case. The United States would receive approximately two weeks of strategic warning. Acting immediately on this warning, the United States would have these two weeks to deploy large numbers of fighters and aircraft carriers to the theater (without encountering any base access or logistical support problems). The enemy, having watched and waited as the U.S. deployed overwhelming force into the theater (at unprecedented rates) would then attack anyway. American fighters would then fly at sortie rates far beyond those achieved during the Gulf War to defeat these enemy forces.

在战斗中成千上万的战斗机中，分析师随后在计划中的轰炸机部队中增加了20个B-2（总计40 B-2s）。然后，分析师使用陆战模拟，评估了额外的B-2（以较低的B-52在海湾战争中的B-52速度飞行的率）对整个运动的影响。换句话说，将20 B-2s的能力（在未来二十年中进行了约250亿美元的投资）与同期损失约5万亿美元的力量结构的能力进行了比较。正如研究负责人保罗·卡明斯基（Paul Kaminski）博士在简报中观察到的那样：。。我们的战术飞机是轰炸机的十倍。。。。 After everything has arrived, the bomber results get lost in the overall aggregate.' 14

The conclusion of the study was that the planned bomber force could meet all demands `for anticipated scenarios and reasonable excursions.' But testimony revealed that the excursions were carefully scripted. For example, one scenario was supposed to look at the effects of a no tactical air power case--that is, if we encountered difficulties in deploying fighters or were concerned that an adversary might strike our bases or carriers with weapons of mass destruction. But it was revealed in testimony that through some unexplained development, a wing of fighters were always assumed present to support B-52 and B-1B bombers. What would happen if those fighters weren't there? This case, dismissed as `unreasonable', was never considered.

Moreover, results that showed the B-2 in a favorable light were never considered in the decision-making process. For example, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn asked Dr. Kaminski about the likely results if the U.S. was taken by surprise and theater access was a problem. Kaminski replied: `Then I am going to need a lot more bombers than I have in the current force.' But this conclusion was never incorporated into the study recommendations.

该研究的第二个重大结论是，投资其他弹药，而不是其他B-2，因为额外的武器提高了整体力量的效率，这将是更具成本效益的。这是一个奇怪的论点。通过同样的逻辑，人们可能会争辩说，投资于喷气燃料库存而不是战斗机会更有意义，因为需要足够的喷气燃料来提高部队的有效性。

这项研究应该研究的是与其他计划的力量元素的购买相比，B-2的额外购买方式。但这是五角大楼抵制的东西。简单地讨论折衷方案最终引起了五角大楼的这种内部摩擦，即该主题已从研究中删除。与其他计划（和首选）的力量要素相比，公正的分析将迅速说明B-2的卓越成本效益 - 因此，将部门的兴趣平衡置于混乱中。

THE 1995 BOMBER INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES STUDY

The Bomber Industrial Capabilities Study was directed by Congress, chartered by the DOD, and conducted by The Analytic Sciences Corporation (TASC). The study concluded that additional B-2 production was not necessary to maintain the bomber industrial base because, with enough time and money, we could eventually recreate the capability to build B-2s in the future.

Eliminating time and money from consideration avoids the dominant real world issues. Obviously, with enough time and money, we can recreate anything. The real question is: how much time and money compared to the option under consideration by Congress--continued production. On that question, the industrial base study was entirely silent.

Although used to validate the decision against more B-2s, the TASC industrial study provides critical strategic data. The dominant Pentagon argument against the B-2 is affordability. Yet their own industrial study estimates that building a new bomber type, a B-3, could easily cost in excess of $35 billion for research and development alone (with unit flyaway costs about the same as a B-2) and raised questions about the affordability of such a program. If building more B-2s--with research and design already complete--is too expensive, then certainly the cost of a B-3 is prohibitive. Deciding against B-2 production is therefore a de facto decision against any future bomber production. It is a strategic decision to abandon the bomber force.

THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW AND THE 1997 B-2 STUDY

国会显然对五角大楼的分析几乎没有信心，1995年拨款用于恢复B-2的生产。1996年2月，克林顿总统下令将这些资金用于将原始测试B-2（空中车辆1）进行运营配置。此外，在国会的要求下，他命令五角大楼再次重新检查B-2问题。这次，五角大楼将B-2的成本效益与其他深层攻击系统的成本效益进行比较。批评家普遍认为缺乏这种成本效益比较是1995年重型轰炸机研究的重大失败之一。

The Pentagon, though receiving this direction in February 1996, conducted no specific B-2 analysis until March 1997. Over the space of several weeks, analysts from the Joint Staff, OSD, and the Institute for Defense Analyses--the same group that conducted the 1995 bomber force study--ran their computer models and
developed a summary briefing. The analytic results of this study obviously caused alarm bells among the Pentagon hierarchy. Simply put, the results showed that B-2s were more cost-effective than any other force element.

Before proceeding further, let us examine the analysis. Four scenarios were developed: a two conflict scenario with warning (allowing time for deployment), a similar scenario with short warning, a similar scenario with short warning and base-access problems; and a two conflict scenario with warning where one of the conflicts featured a `near peer' competitor.

The Pentagon then assumed the immediate retirement of the following forces: 2 fighter wings (plus 10 percent of Marine air); 4 fighter wings (plus 20 percent respectively of Marine air); 2 carriers and their air wings (though not the entire battle group); 3 carriers and their air wings; and all the B-1Bs.

With the funds freed up by these individual retirements over the next 20 years, the study then looked at how many B-2s could be purchased. In general, retiring a carrier would allow the purchase of 12-14 B-2s; a fighter wing about 8-12 B-2s.

然后，分析师使用复杂的计算机模拟，研究了需要多少个B-2，以替换四种情况中每种情况下的各种退休力元素。在几乎每种情况下，在冲突方案中替代退休系统的军事能力所需的储蓄比替代退休系统的军事能力所需的储蓄更多。换句话说，B-2比计划的部队更具成本效益。

这些不是所需的答案。一般的分析表明，很少数量的B-2可以替代大量计划（因此是首选）（例如整个B-1B机队）。这些B-2的成本大大低于所取代的力量。在错误的手中，这些结果可以用来争辩说，基于B-2的部队结构可以在较低的预算水平上为美国国家安全提供支持 - 在重型轰炸机研究崩溃之后，国会的B-2支持者预测了B-2支持者的预测。。因此，提出了反对这些结果的论点。

One tactic was to break up the warfighting results into two phases: (1) the halt phase; and (2) the counter-offensive. The halt phase--the period during which U.S. forces would stop an enemy offensive--was highlighted by the QDR strategy as being extremely crucial and the results once again showed the B-2s cost-effectiveness; very few B-2s were needed to replace carriers, fighters, or B-1Bs. For the counter-offensive (that is, the period when our ground forces had built up and had launched an offensive after months of aerial bombardment), the analysts calculated the number of weapons each force element could deliver compared to a cost-equivalent number of B-2s. These results showed that the other forces would be able to deliver more weapons in a given period of time (unlike the fighter forces, however, the B-2s were not allowed to deploy forward to increase their sortie rates).

但是反犯罪的结果确实表明了必须仔细安排指标以达到预期的结果。在我们停止敌人前进，摧毁了他的军队，撕裂他的战略基础设施，砍掉他的交流，攻击他的领导层，摧毁了他的领导层，摧毁了他的空军和防空措施后，武器交付的潜力几乎没有问题。获胜或输的问题不再是疑问。假设反攻击中的表现与《停止阶段》一样重要，这与QDR策略相矛盾，QDR策略表明，停止阶段对于实现国家安全目标至关重要。此外，如果分析使用吨米作为度量而不是仅仅是吨，则B-2将被证明优越。通过将数量交付的武器运送到飞行的时机，可以计算出吨位，这是一个有用的措施，因为它包含了重要的范围指标。

However, the most revealing illustration of the Pentagon's orchestration of the results was found in the `capability gap' charts, which emerged as the centerpiece of the arguments used against the B-2 since the quantitative results had proven so problematic. Here, the Pentagon claimed that retiring a single aircraft carrier, for example, would greatly reduce the nation's capability to do drug interdiction, peace enforcement, anti-ship warfare, the sea control, among others. Similar claims were made for the retirement of fighter wings. This line of argument raises more questions than it answers. First, the `capabilities' were completely undefined and the B-2s unjustifiably excluded as potential contributors. Why couldn't the B-2s contribute to some of these missions? For example, B-2s could destroy drug manufacturing facilities with precision bombs, provide sea surveillance, or fire anti-shipping missiles to assist in sea control. Second, it is unclear that a small reduction in the total force would have any effect on these missions. Indeed, but a small fraction of the force would be required to fly a few `drug interdiction' missions. Third, and most important, the missions selected are hardly core missions. What is more important, conducting drug interdiction or preventing the seizure of the Persian Gulf oil fields? What the Pentagon was trying to obfuscate was the fact that the B-2 was more cost-effective than the planned forces in fighting major theater wars. And that was an unacceptable answer.

The clearest illustration of the bias inherent in the 1997 study can be found in a closer examination of the `capability gap' issue. Specifically, not a single chart was dedicated to highlighting the capabilities currently missing from the current and planned force that would be generated by expanding the B-2 fleet. For example, we currently cannot halt a large-scale armored assault without tactical air forces in-theater prior to the outbreak of hostilities. How do we plan to do so in the case of a surprise attack? How do we plan on conducting a large-scale pre-emptive strike against an adversary's facilities for producing weapons of mass destruction? How do we plan on deploying forces in the face of chemical and biological attack--something the QDR says should be assumed? How do we plan on conducting a large-scale pre-emptive strike against an adversary's facilities for producing weapons of mass destruction? How do we plan on striking facilities that lie outside fighter range, such as terrorist camps in northwestern Iran? Nowhere in the briefing are the advantages of an expanded B-2 fleet articulated, much less highlighted. How could the Pentagon advertise this as an unbiased analysis if no consideration was ever given to the formidable advantages offered by the B-2? The lack of such consideration is the clearest evidence that the Pentagon planners preferred to stay rooted in the concepts and force structures of the past--and not consider the future.

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THE 1995 CORM BOMBER STUDY

1994年立法,国会也任命了一个Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM). As one of their tasks, the CORM was asked to provide an opinion on the size of the B-2 force. The CORM sidestepped this issue in their final report--only stating that if one believed the assumptions of the Heavy Bomber Force Study study, one could believe its conclusions. But what the CORM staff did conduct was a most interesting study--primarily, it seems, because it was performed outside of the DOD's influence. Future Bomber Force, however, was filed away until published by the Air Force Association in 1996.

Future Bomber Force offered a fresh view of the B-2 issue. It was the only government study to provide empirical insights into the value of stealth technology. Like the QDR's quantitative results, it showed that B-2s were the most cost-effective weapon system available when compared to other preferred forces. However, it did so using simple `spreadsheet' calculations instead of complex computer simulations. Most significantly, Future Bomber Force was the only bomber study to show a grasp of the revolutionary potential offered by the B-2. Listed below is its `Summary of Findings':

`The synergy of advanced munitions with the range and payload of long-range bombers may be more important to the Department of Defense in the years ahead than at any time during the Cold War. Combined with the stealth of the B-2, precision munitions with long-range bombers have the potential to provide key capabilities not available from any other forces to meet critical future national security requirements. Specifically, these capabilities include:

`有可能在远距离的几天之内停止装甲部队；能够从敌方武器的超越武器（尤其是装有大规模杀伤性武器的导弹）对抗敌人的能力；保证响应能力 - 独立于前向基础或载体介词；迅速实现战略或运营惊喜的能力，对侵略者进行广泛的攻击和瘫痪，并以最少的友好人员接触；能够从一个MRC迅速到另一个MRC挥动和有效力的能力；罢工的心理影响恕不另行通知；在美国在其他地方进行军事参与时，在潜在侵略者中引起足够的不确定性来阻止敌对活动的能力。并大大减少了支持资产，人员和基础要求，以实现非保健和/或较小有效载荷（较短范围飞机）的等效效果。

vii。结论和建议

我们对轰炸机问题的审查得出的结论是，远程空中动力部队的当前计划严重缺陷。我们认为，将来，美国的远程空中力量能力将比过去更重要。确实，安全环境的形状变化使得在未来几十年中非常适合保护美国安全利益的远程空中力量。此外，我们认为，对B-2的适当剥削可以从根本上改变我们的思考和雇用军事力量的方式，最终导致更实惠，更有效的军事姿势。

The only option for maintaining the viability of the bomber force over the long term is to continue production of the B-2 stealth bomber. Our review of the DoD's studies indicates that the B-2 issue has become so captive to Pentagon bureaucratic politics that the Department has made the wrong strategic choice. By following the DoD's recommendations, the bomber force itself becomes a wasted asset. The nation will be abandoning a weapon system that is becoming very cost-effective as precision weapons are introduced. This capability will become increasingly vital to supporting U.S. national security in this very challenging new era. This is not the way to conduct rational national security decision-making. By allowing organizational politics and short-term affordability concerns to dominate the B-2 debate, we will turn our backs on the future. Moreover, we will risk U.S. national security interests and the lives of thousands of young Americans.

We believe Pentagon opposition will eventually ameliorate once military planners gain greater appreciation of the advantages offered by the B-2. But until that time, the future of the bomber force and this revolutionary weapon system lies with Congress. The situation is similar to that of the F-117 in the 1980s. The Air Force insisted that a single squadron of these revolutionary aircraft was all that was needed; Congress directed a doubling of the buy, an action that saved many American and allied lives in the Gulf War. Today, once again, only Congress can set in motion the steps needed to maintain production of the B-2.

在计划的预算中，其他B-2负担得起。五角大楼计划到2001年增加采购支出约50％，这些资金应用于最具成本效益的系统，例如其他B-2。我们提出以下建议：

至少额外一个B-2中队（9架飞机）资助，但要敞开大门增加生产率和计划的力量尺寸；

Direct the Department of Defense to develop and provide to the Congress a five-year procurement plan that contains a full funding plan for one additional squadron of B-2s; and

Hold a hearing to assess whether to re-establish an operational command in the Air Force dedicated to long-range strike, headed by a four star general, who can ensure that bomber issues are given appropriate consideration in national security decision-making.

The fundamental strategic choice is up to you in Congress. An enhanced bomber force centered on a larger B-2 fleet could make revolutionary contributions to our national security. We urge you to take the steps necessary to make sure that the opportunity afforded by the B-2--a better, more effective, and more affordable military--becomes reality.

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FOOTNOTES

1 William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, p. 13.

2 See Charles Perry, et. al,Long-Range Bombers and the Role of Airpower in the New Century,Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1995, p. 57.

3扩大版的“核的理由bombers' can be found in Stephen Cambone and Colin S. Gray, `The Role of Nuclear Forces in U.S. National Security Strategy: Implications of the B-2 Bomber,'Comparative Strategy,15:207-231, 1996.

4Future Bomber Force,角色与任务委员会，1995年，第1页。3.

5 Ibid.

6“隐形价值”，总部，美国空军，1991年。

7 SeeFuture Bomber Force,角色与任务委员会，1995年，第1页。11。

8唐纳德·B·赖斯（Donald B. Rice），“到B-2或不是B-2，这是问题，”The Washington Times,November 5, 1995.

9 Ken Watman and Dean Wilkening,Regional Deterrence Strategies,兰德，1995年。

10 Charles Horner, `Unmatched Survivability,'The Washington Times,1995年6月13日。

11 For a detailed assessment, see Kurt Guthe,A Precisely Guided Analytic Bomb: The Defense Department's Heavy Bomber Study,National Institute for Public Policy, September 1996.

12 Testimony to Military Procurement Subcommittee, House National Security Committee, September 12, 1996.

13Cited in Kurt Guthe,A Precisely Guided Analytic Bomb: The Defense Department's Heavy Bomber Study,National Institute for Public Policy, September 1996, p. 41.

14 DOD特别简报，1995年5月。

15 (Donald b .大米,”b - 2 b - 2,这是Question`The Washington Times,November 5, 1995.