莱文先生。总统先生，我将修正案发送给办公桌，并要求立即考虑。
主持人。The clerk will report the amendment.
助理立法书记官的理解如下：
The Senator from Michigan [Mr.Levin]提出了编号为1056的修正案。
莱文先生。Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
主持人。没有异议，它是如此有序。
The amendment is as follows:
On page 23, line 11, strike out `and' and all that follows through line 14, and insert in lieu thereof the following:
（6）B-2测试计划已经充分证明了飞行测试的以下关键性能特征，以对任务成就提供高度的信心：检测和生存能力，空中车辆性能，结构的强度和耐用性，进攻性和防御性航空电子学，以及目前已计划（截至1991年8月1日）将在1992财政年度进行的武器分离测试，前提-2轰炸机飞机；和
（7）在1992财政年度，此类资金将用于启动不超过四架新生产B-2炸弹飞机的采购。
莱文先生。总统先生，这项修正案将有助于对购买新的B-2炸弹飞机的资金义务建立必要的限制，要求国防部长向国会保证轰炸机将在授权B-2的任何资金之前按要求运作在本法案中有义务。
我担心现有的认证过程没有跟上不断变化的B-2计划。该修正案将建立一个围栏，该栅栏将提供保证和证书，即B-2能够根据需要工作，因为我们没有人想要重复B-1。
我的修正案将确保在本法案中的B-2资金有义务之前，测试计划已在所需的认证时表明，B-2的任务具有很高的信心可以完成。必须证明要获得认证的关键绩效特征对于确保任务成就至关重要，并且在我的修正案中指定了这些关键的绩效特征。
总统先生，B-2轰炸机是一种非常复杂且昂贵的武器系统。我深切关注B-2面临的并发问题，并且由于我们被要求在初始运营测试和评估计划开始之前，并且在我们知道之前，我们被要求为B-2的生产率提高。自信地轰炸机是否会按照设计和必需的方式执行。一些飞行测试已经完成，但是最初的操作测试和评估程序尚未开始。
The B-2 bomber testing schedule has slipped 3 years and the trend is for continued slippage. This means that we will not know as much about the bomber's performance as early in the program as the Air Force had previously planned. This means greater concurrence and greater risk that more planes than desirable will be bought and produced without first knowing if it will work as required.
B-2生产计划还遇到了重大问题。到目前为止，运送的所有三架试验飞机均已交付迟到和不完整。在一种情况下，飞机在交付后需要超过100,000小时的意外额外工作。这些延迟导致了飞行测试计划的延迟。制造问题导致B-2发动机后面的船尾甲板裂缝。其他意外问题需要分析和测试，以防止测试飞机按计划飞行。接下来的三架试验飞机将迟到且不完整。这一点很重要，因为直到交付5和6的空气车并准备飞行后，才能进行某些关键测试。
有人认为，每年我们都会延迟决定进行B-2更高生产率的决定，将花费数亿美元，而这种估计的成本提高证明是有理由在我们的一旦转变为全率生产决定的合理性相信B-2没有终端问题，这意味着问题是如此严重以至于需要取消程序。不论解决B-2问题所需的所有费用如何，直到1990年代中期或更晚才发现的所有费用。
但是，这样的估计假设制造商将能够实现高效且稳定的生产率，远远超出了迄今为止所证明的。假设这种生产效率可能需要数年的可能性，这是合理的。尚不清楚飞机可以在现在计划的任何时间表附近以很高的速度生产。
总统先生，我在B-2上看到了足够的警告信号，我无法接受这样的想法，即我们可以确定在不久的将来，轰炸机将根据需要工作。因此，有必要添加额外的围栏，以确保我们不会购买另一个无法根据需要工作的轰炸机。我们似乎同意概念“如果没有打破，请不要修复它”。对于B-2，我们需要以不同的概念进行操作：“如果它不起作用，请不要购买。”
绝大多数飞行测试没有电动汽车en begun. More than 90 percent lies ahead of us. If the Defense Department wants to obligate these funds for these bombers, my amendment would require the Secretary of Defense to certify first that the bombers will work as required, not just that the limited flight test program has not yet produced any catastrophes. The certification of demonstrated success from testing is the key to the high degree of confidence the amendment requires.
总统先生,鉴于沉重的财政约束this Nation faces we must spend every Federal dollar wisely. We literally cannot afford to waste money. We cannot afford to buy a bomber that doesn't work as required. Many would argue that we can't afford the B-2 even if it does work, and I am sympathetic to their concerns. We need to review the affordability issue each year.
But surely the least we can do is require that DOD assures us that we are going to get what we pay for before we spend any more money. This amendment will help accomplish that.
The B-2 bomber program represents a large investment in a radical new aircraft design and technology. There are many critical elements of the program that are being tested that will demonstrate whether or not the aircraft will be able to perform the missions that were required at the outset of the B-2 program. Some of these critical elements include the terrain following/terrain avoidance radar system, the integrated offensive and defensive avionics systems, including critical defensive avionics systems, the low observable signature features, including radar cross section, infra red, electromagetic, optical, and sonic signature reduction features, flight characteristics throughout the flight speed and altitude envelope, including maximum airspeed flights at low altitude with representative operational gross weight loads, and weapon release characteristics for all weapons in the B-2 baseline program.
Some of these tests already have been conducted, while scheduled to be conducted by the end of calendar 1992.
If the Defense Department certifies as provided in section 118, (C)(6), then would the chairman be willing to hold, as soon as practicable during the 45-day period, a hearing, with a closed session if necessary, to consider the status of the B-2 test program and production schedule?
Mr. EXON. I appreciate the efforts of the distinguished Senator from Michigan to strengthen the committee's oversight of the B-2 program. I believe the Senator's amendment to section 118 is in the spirit of the recommendations contained in the recent Rand briefings and Rand's followup letter of July 31, 1991, to SenatorsNunn, Warner, Levin和myself. That letter recommended that the Secretary be asked to certify that:
First, sufficient testing has been completed on critical aspects of the systems design so as to enable officials to project, with high confidence, system capability to satisfy the operational needs of the using command, and
Second, any aspects of system performance, or elements of the system design, that are deemed critical to successfully achieving the above operational goals and that have not been successfully tested at the time that funds are to be expended should be identified, and the expected test schedule for those elements should be provided.
Accordingly, I want to assure the distinguished Sentor that when the certification under section 118(c) is received, I will immediately consult with the Senator and other members of the subcommittee to establish appropriate hearing dates and witnesses.
I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the Rand briefing and followup letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in theRecord， 如下：
The Rand Corp.
Santa Monica, CA, July 31, 1991.
荣誉。卡尔·莱文（Carl Levin），
美国参议院，罗素参议院办公大楼，华盛顿特区，美国参议院委员会。
[页：S12070]
Dear Senator Levin:这封信是com回应你的要求ments on the phrasing of certain restrictions on use of funds appropriated for the B-2 bomber program. I specifically refer to Section 118, paragraph (C) in S-1507.
I agree with your objective of ensuring that reasonable progress is being made in the development and test program and that no evidence of potentially serious problems has been uncovered. Unfortunately, the process raises complex and troublesome issues. I shall discuss those issues briefly in order to lay a foundation for my recommendations.
一个问题是，测试结果，尤其是在开发测试期间获得的临时结果，很少是结论性的。他们需要了解有关整体系统设计和测试环境的人的解释。即使是完全知情的专家，有时也会在是否需要设计更改以及这些更改的困难方面对测试结果的可能后果表示不同意。因此，我赞扬国会目前的政策，要求国防部高级官员证明测试和其他开发活动的一般状况和结果，并允许这些官员在确定“主要”问题是如何或如何“成功”某些事物的情况已被证明。
在选择特定的设计元素或性能功能的选择中出现了另一个问题，该功能将在任何里程碑中认证。在S-1507中，指定了B-2的四个方面。这些是最关键的吗？我自己的JDUGEMENT是结构疲劳测试的状态至少与当前列表中的某些元素一样重要，仅仅是因为主要疲劳失败的后果可能非常严重。但是其他专家会创建不同的列表。
My belief is that any attempt to list specific features for certification raises more problems than it solves. My recommendation is that when `fencing' the expenditure of authorized funds the Congress should ask the Secretary of Defense or other appropriate official to certify that:
(a) Sufficient testing has been completed on critical aspects of the system design so as to enable officials to project, with high confidence, system capability to satisfy the operational needs of the using command.
(b) Any aspects of system performance, or elements of the system design, that are deemed critical to successfully achieving the above operational goals and that have not been successfully tested at the time that funds are to be expended should be identified, and the expected test schedule for those elements should be provided.
An approach such as this clearly provides more flexibility to the DoD officials in terms of deciding exactly what is critical, and how much testing is needed to judge the performance to have been adequately demonstrated. However, my intention is to also place on those DoD officials the responsibility of identifying the full list of such critical elements, and of defending the contents of that list in a continuing dialog with the Congress. Of course, such a list of critical issues should be defined at the beginning of a program, and the System Maturity Matrix is a first step toward such an objective, but at this time in the B-2 program that process has not been refined to an adequate degree.
我希望对您的问题的最初回答证明有用。当然，这些意见是我自己的，不一定代表了兰德或兰德赞助研究的任何国防部的观点。
Cordially yours,
Giles K. Smith.
我将在这里描述的研究具有很长的血统。三十年来，兰德研究了许多与主要系统的开发和采购相关的主题，包括武器系统和大规模的民用项目。
In 1987, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition requested that RAND conduct a study of the acquisition strategy of what was then known as the Advanced Technology Bomber. Our initial results, which I briefed to Secretary Weinberger, Secretary Aldridge, and several congressional audiences in the fall of 1987, gave high marks to the risk-reduction measures taken in the early phases of the program. However, we expressed considerable concern about the planned pace of the flight test program, which had not yet begun, and especially about the scheduled timing of key production go-aheads. We made several specific recommendations about both the test program and its relationship to the production program. The subsequent evolution of those programs reflected our recommendations.
在我们学习后不久，国会指示OSD为B-2建立“成本，绩效和管理计划”。关于该计划，OSD要求Rand继续对该计划的收购策略进行分析。我们解决的问题之一是如何将生产承诺与测试计划中的进步联系起来，这是我们在1987年研究中提出的建议之一。这是我今天将要描述的研究的一部分。1
1这部分研究由吉尔斯·史密斯（Giles K. Smith）在约翰·伯克勒（John Birkler）的指导下进行。
This research was performed for OSD and conducted within the National Defense Research Institute, the federally funded research and development center sponsored at RAND by OSD and the Joint Staff. The views expressed, however, are those of the research team and do not necesarily represent those of RAND or any of its research sponsors.
Over the past decade a series of initiatives from government commissions and from the Congress have urged the Department of Defense to devote more attention to testing activities during the weapons acquisition process. One special thrust has been to encourage the Services to not only do more, and better, operational testing, but also to defer high-rate production of a new system until its operational suitability and effectiveness have been demonstrated.
Given the mandate to demonstrate operational suitability and effectiveness of a new weapon system before authorizing high-rate production, the obvious question is, how much testing and demonstration are enough? The complete flight test program of a modern aircraft system typically extends four to five years after first flight. The industrial lead time from funding authorization to delivery of such a system is at least three years. Thus, to wait until the end of all testing before funding the first high-rate production lot would mean delivery of the first inventory aircraft at least seven years after first flight. Such a delay would be expensive and would diminish the combat advantage provided by the technology advances incorporated in the design.
我们知道，在飞行测试计划期间，新飞机的系统成熟（缺乏缺陷和性能短缺）通常会有所改善。因此，我们需要一些系统的基础来选择飞行测试计划中的一个点可能无法完全完成，但这将为基本设计提供足够的信心以证明生产资金合理。这项研究的目的是开发必要的分析模型，并将其应用于B-2轰炸机开发和飞行测试计划。
Decision environment
授权资金用于高速生产新武器系统的决定显然取决于许多因素。本分析假设将采购额外数量的B-2轰炸机，并且在某个时间点，我们将通过生产率来寻求经济体，远高于每年约两个单位的低率初始生产（LRIP）这是最近拨款的特征。本研究解决了某些技术和经济问题，这些问题影响了决定转向更高生产率的决定的时机。乐动冠军
研究方法
这项研究基于以下假设：早期生产授权的财政和运营益处必须接受一些尚未确定和纠正所有问题的风险。该研究的目的是识别和量化可以通过飞行测试减少的风险要素，并提供模型，以便这些风险可以系统地和定量投影，然后与延迟生产的成本进行平衡。
图1中的草图可以说明这种基本方法。在飞行测试程序的开始时，设计包含重要缺陷的概率很高。随着我们通过飞行测试计划的进展，我们发现了这些缺陷，因此，在合并的开发测试和初始操作测试计划结束时，我们希望已经发现了所有或几乎全部重要的问题。因此，可以将飞行测试程序视为降低设计中未发现缺陷的风险的过程。为了帮助收购主管在完成飞行测试计划之前正在考虑授权高利率生产的授权，我们需要了解一些降低风险率的信息。图1中描述了两个替代概念模型（图1在Record.）曲线A反映了以下观点：重要缺陷往往很早地揭示出来，而曲线B则表明直到飞行测试结束时，我们才开始迅速积累信心，以至于已经揭示了重要的缺陷。一位相信曲线A的收购主管将倾向于在仅完成一项适度的飞行测试后授权高级生产。相反，对曲线B的信念将导致以后的生产开始。
One of the major steps in the present study was to assemble data from the flight test phase of previous combat aircraft development programs in order to get some idea of which of the alternative models is most accurate (Fig. 2). The following programs were examined in some detail: 2
2 Results were compared in a cursory manner with those from two other major combat aircraft developed in recent times, the F-15 and F-16, and no inconsistencies were found.
Figure 2: Research approach
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回顾最近飞机飞行测试计划的历史：
B-1A, B-1B, F-117, F/A-18, C-5A.
关键事件的时间分布。
Apply historical patterns to estimate future progress of B-2 flight test program.
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The B-1A/B-1B bomber, the most recent bomber program and possibly the one most directly analogous to the B-2;
The F-117, our only operational stealth airplane;
The F/A-18 fighter, another recent major combat aircraft; and
C-5货运飞机是在过去几十年中完成开发和测试的另一架大型飞机。
对于每个程序，详细审查了飞行测试阶段的历史记录，以确定发现了哪些问题，发现这些问题的时间以及进行必要的设计更改所需的时间，并将更改纳入生产线。
When we examined the past programs it became apparent that we needed to distinguish between some different kinds of `positions' (Fig. 3):
[Page: S12071]
1. Those that seriously diminish the mission capability of the system, and that are so difficult or expensive to fix that they threaten the very life of the program;
图3：有些问题比其他问题更糟
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Type 1: Potential program killers:
Seriously diminish mission capability.
纠正非常困难或昂贵。
类型2：麻烦但易于管理：
Seriously diminish mission capability.
Can be corrected, but require time or funding beyond original program scope.
类型3：可以在原始程序的范围内纠正例程。
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2. Other important problems that also affect mission capability but are capable of being corrected to an acceptable degree, although that corrective action causes important delays or increases in program cost.
3. Routine problems that can be corrected within the original program budget and schedule.
There are, of course, many problems discovered during flight test. Most are Type 3 (corrected within the scope of the original program) and therefore have little or no effect on mjaor program decisions. By focusing on the two knds of major problems that migh be uncovered during flight test, we concluded that we needed a two-step decision process when addressing the high-rate production decision.
First, it seems appropriate to demonstrate enough of the critical system capabilities so as to achieve high confidence that there are no flaws in the system concept so serious as to justify program cancellation. We refer to this as `proof of concept.'
鉴于概念证明，可以将第二个与成本有关的标准应用于高速生产。在测试计划中，有一定的意义，即纠正尚未发现的缺陷的预期成本受到高利率生产延迟的预期成本的阻碍。当时开始高利率生产应最大程度地减少预期的总生产成本，包括纠正缺陷的成本和改造已经产生的单位。
By applying this analysis approach to the B-2 program we reached two conclusions (Fig 4.):
Fig. 4: Conclusions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- -- -- -
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- -- -- -
High confidence in system concept by middle of CY 1992:
Verification of detection/survivability.
飞行车辆很好地证明了。
首先查看武器释放和任务设备。
Delay beyond FY92 authorization for starting high-rate production likely to increase total production cost.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- -- -- -
1.到1992年中期，我们应该完成足够的飞行测试，以使人们对没有如此严重的设计或性能问题充满信心，以至于他们可以证明该计划的终止是合理的。
2.纠正尚未发现缺陷的成本可能小于延迟效率更高，更高生产的发作的成本。授权更高生产的任何进一步延迟几乎可以肯定会增加B-2车队的总生产成本。
本文的其余部分将描述支持这两个结论的推理和分析。
Military weapon systems are typically designed against very demanding performance goals, and rarely does a new system fully achieve all such goals early in its operational life. But each new system is typically configured around a few critical design concepts and performance goals, such that failure to meet those goals jeopardizes the entire program. Those goals should be demonstrated to a rather high level of confidence. The question is, how much testing is needed in order to have high confidence that there are no remaining `show stopper' problems in the design?
我们接近这个问题在两个方面。首先,我们ught guidance from past experience. We reviewed a wide range of earlier aircraft weapon system programs, together with other systems that are technologically complex and challenging, to see when in the test programs project-threatening (Type 1) problems were revealed, and how often that occurred. Surprisingly, we found very few instances where major weapon system programs were cancelled because of problems revealed or confirmed during fullscale tests.
在过去的几十年中，我们认为这反映了现代技术和现代管理实践，我们发现只有两个计划在全面测试开始后被取消，并且在大量的连环生产开始之前：陆军的Divad Gun（The Sergeant York）和默认的彩虹导弹。根据在整个规模测试中揭示的主要设计或性能问题，没有取消飞机计划。
在整个规模开发和测试阶段，其他程序已被取消。B-1A和T-46A是最近的例子。尽管两者都遇到了一些绩效问题，但很明显，预算和广泛的政治问题占据了这些项目的命运，而不是在完整测试中揭示的基本设计问题的存在。乐动冠军
系统特定标准
一件事明显从我们回顾过去的计划s was that the few Type 1 problems actually encountered in full scale system tests had usually been identified as critical issues during the engineering development phase. That gave us confidence that we should be able to create, a priori, a list of such critical issues for the B-2 and then see when in the flight test program we are likely to have accumulated some verification of performance in those areas.
我们准备了B-2设计的这些方面列表，其中至少在任务成就方面的性能是绝对必要的，并且最初的性能短缺可能非常困难或很昂贵。我们认为四个领域满足这些标准（见图5）：
图5：B-2设计的关键方面
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -------
当演示时
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Detection/Survivability End 1991.
Vehicle Performance Mid-1991.
Flying qualities throughout critical portion of envelope.
Propulsion system performance.
范围付费功能。
Airfield performance.
结构充足性1991年结束。
空气负载在选定的演习中。
Limit load demo.
一种疲劳寿命。
武器分离1992年中。
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -------
[Page: S12072]
1.检测/生存能力：在完全配置的车辆的全尺度飞行测试中，应验证降低敌人检测并增强生存能力所必需的基本系统性能特征。这包括所有相关签名减少技术的演示，并在整个预期的运营任务中实现签名目标所需的范围。这些绩效特征应在今年年底之前充分证明。
2.Vehicle Performance: The novel vehicle configuration makes verification of basic flight vehicle performance especially important. This includes demonstration of acceptable flying qualities and performance levels throughout the critical portions of the speed-altitude envelope, demonstration of propulsion system performance, and demonstration of acceptable handling qualities and performance during take-off, landing, and ground operation. Adequate cruise efficiency should be demonstrated at gross weights representative of useful loads for typical missions. These characteristics have been adequately demonstrated through tests completed to date.
3. Structure Strength and Durability: The unusual configuration and the extensive use of composite materials suggest that validation of structure adequacy should be the next criterion for proof of concept. That should include verification of predicted air loads in critical maneuvers, together with the common practice of taking the static test specimen to at least 80 percent of ultimate load and the fatigue specimen to at least the equivalent of one operational lifetime. These performance characteristics should be adequately demonstrated by the end of this year.
4. Weapon Release: The unusual vehicle configuration suggests that weapon carriage and clean separation should be demonstrated. The necessary tests are expected to be performed during the first half of 1992.
一些读者可能会因为缺少与电子系统性能的列表中的条目感到震惊。尽管期望进攻性和防御性的电子套件没有麻烦是不合理的，但是对飞行测试床上已经完成的系统的测试似乎足以确保可以在可接受的水平上执行。3
3This conclusion is based on results of a still-classified antecedent RAND study performed in 1987, and is specific to the B-2 program at this point late in the overall development process. It should not be interpreted as a general conclusion; in fact, at the beginning of any modern combat aircraft program the electronic system must be considered among the elements deserving special attention during both development and test.
Provided the present test schedule is met, by some time during the first half of calendar year 1992 there should be considerable confidence that the basic system concept of the B-2 is sound.
假设已经证明了概念证明，在授权高速生产之前是否需要进行更多的测试？该问题的答案是基于观察到测试过程中发现的大多数设计缺陷的观察，但是偶尔（2型缺陷）修复程序很昂贵。如果生产得到较早授权，则可能会与缺陷组件生产几个单元，在发现和纠正缺陷后需要昂贵的改造。这说明在生产前进行广泛的测试。但是，延迟生产本身是昂贵的。这导致了第二个决策标准：
To minimize total procurement cost, the expected cost of correcting flaws not yet discovered should not exceed the savings achieved through prompt start of high-rate production.
该概念可以通过图6中的简单图来说明（图6在Record。。但是，额外的测试应减少未知问题的风险，从而减少这些问题的成本后果。我们在这里定义为总生产成本的这两个成本要素的总和应在某个时间点具有最低值。在这里，我们描述并应用了一种估计该最低成本点位置的方法。
Direct cost of production delays
We start the process of estimating the cost consequences of delaying high-rate production by establishing a series of optional production rate profiles that, while not identical to any actual B-2 program schedules, are close enough for our purposes. We assume a Low Rate Initial production (LRIP) rate of two units per year, which is characteristic of actual appropriations in recent years. Following a decision to produce at higher rates, a build-up sequence of four and six units would occur in successive years, leading to a sustained maximum rate of 12 per year. We examined several such profiles, with each successive one containing an additional year of low-rate production.
我们使用标准参数成本估算程序估算了每个替代生产概况的总苍蝇成本。4
Each year of delay in moving to rates beyond LRIP costs at least $400 million dollars. 5
4Note that these are generalized estimates based on our somewhat arbitary authorization profiles. Therefore, the cost values do not correspond to specific budget authorizations or requests for future authorizations, but the magnitudes and trends are consistent with official values.
5 This estimate is based on broad military aircraft industry averages for overhead rates and fixed costs. We recognize that the B-2 program is likely to experience higher levels of such fixed costs, which would strengthen our conclusions regarding the cost benefits of early production go-ahead.
风险的成本后果
Given the estimated cost of delaying production in order to gain more test information, the next step in estimating the total expected production cost is to determine the likely cost consequences of the risk remaining at each point in time during the test program. The `risk cost' is defined (Fig. 7) as the probability of some remaining undetected flaws, times the expected cost of correcting those flaws and retrofitting any previously-completed production items. Each of those elements can be estimated on the basis of previous experience.
剩余缺陷的概率：在我们检查的以前五个飞机开发计划中，我们试图确定满足“ 2型”标准的问题：
1. The design discrepancy had to be identified during the flight test phase. This eliminated any problems that had been identified during design or component test prior to flight test.
图7：风险的成本后果
Total Cost equals Production Cost Plus Risk Cost.Risk Cost Equals Risk: Probability that additional tests or operational service will reveal new flaws that require corrective action times Corrective costs: Cost of correcting deficiencies in units already funded when flaws were revealed.
2. The discrepancey had a significant effect on the basic mission capability of the system, and therefore had to be fixed.
3. The discrepancy had to be either expensive or time consuming to fix, so that it required changing the schedule or the budget of the project to a significant degree.
在研究的每个程序中，我们只发现了一些此类问题。
The data are plotted in Fig. 8. Figure 8 not reproducible in theRecord.It is apparent that the shape of the risk reduction trend in this data set more closely compares with Curve A in Fig. 1 than Curve B. By roughly mid-way in the test program there is a very low probability that an important flaw remains undetected. Even without further quantitative analysis, we believe this provides justification for rejecting the argument that production decisions should be delayed until `all testing has been completed.'
这些数据与完成的测试计划的百分比绘制。通过将数据映射到B-2飞行测试计划中，我们可以创建一个预期风险配置文件与日历日期的图。产生了图9所示的“参考案例”程序风险概况。（图9在Record.）
That process was repeated, using the arbitrary assumption that the B-2 program might take twice as much testing as historical evidence would indicate is needed to reveal major problems. The resulting `Pessimistic Case' risk profile is also shown in Fig. 9.
纠正缺陷的成本：图7所示的“风险成本”模型的第二部分要求我们估算纠正将来可能确定的缺陷的成本。对文献和可用成本数据库的搜索仅显示了很少的实例，甚至可以大致推断出这种成本。我们发现最糟糕的情况是代替C-5A上的整个机翼的成本，该机翼的成本约占原始飞机总飞行费用成本（使用恒定年满美元）。其他数据点全部占原始生产成本的百分之几。我们选择在计算中使用非常保守和悲观的价值，占原始成本的20％。
We would expect the cost of correcting flaws to vary with the time required to perform corrective engineering and to introduce the new design into the production line. That averages about three years, with a range of one to five years encompassing almost all data points. We used a reference value of three years, and a pessimistic upper limit of five years.
添加直接生产成本和风险的成本后果，可以估算每个生产概况的总生产成本。结果显示在图10中，其中我们绘制了假定的70-Airplane购买的预计生产成本与授权LRIP的生产的第一年。（图10在Record.) The lower curve is the estimate of direct production cost, whereas the upper curve includes the cost consequences of risk that we estimate are associated with each of the different years in which higher-rate production is first authorized.
We included in our calculations a series of cases in which we assumed that authorization for high-rate production had occurred in prior years. We did that to show a more complete picture of cost trends. In this chart only the last two points on the right, for FY92 and FY93, represent real opportunities at this time. We estimate that the minimum-cost point actually occurred several years ago. This is because the `risk cost' component of the total production cost is small compared to the direct production cost, so the trend of total expected cost is dominated by the cost of delaying production. Thus, any delay (at least since FY90) in authorizing production beyond LRIP appears to cause an increase in the expected total production cost.
我们使用对程序风险概况的任意，非常悲观的估计重复了计算。这得出了图11中显示的成本估计。（图11在Record。
All of the results shown above used constant FY91 dollars. To test the sensitivity of the conclusions of the escalation treatment, we repeated the analysis using then-year dollars, together with the most pessimistic combination of assumptions for the other variables (five-year lead time to correct problems, and the pessimistic risk profile). Results are similar to those for constant dollars, but with steeper slopes (i.e., larger cost penalties for each year of delay in authorizing high-rate production).
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该分析支持两个结论（图12），均基于以下假设：本测试程序将大约按计划进行：
1.在1992年中期之前，应该已经完成了足够的测试，以对B-2的基本设计概念的有效性产生高度信心。将对车辆的一般检测和生存特性进行关键测量。应该提供有关飞行特性，结构完整性和基本飞行车辆任务绩效的大量信息。至少应在进攻系统上的关键要素上获得初始数据。该信息应具有很大的信心，即不会发现随后的危险性质问题。
High confidence in system concept by middle of CY 1992: Verification of detection/survivability, flight vehicle well demonstrated, first looks at weapon release and mission equipment.
Delay beyond FY92 authorization for starting high-rate production likely to increase total production cost.
上面的假设：维持测试时间表，及时有效地纠正问题。
2. Under even the most pessimistic combinations of assumptions regarding the effect of problems not yet discovered, any delay beyond FY92 in authorizing high-rate production will likely cause an increase in total procurement cost of the system. This conclusion is valid even if the total production quantity is less than the current projection of 70 units.
有趣的是，在这种情况下，表现出对系统概念的信心的目的似乎是起搏项目，因为我们几乎可以肯定已经过去了我们可以实现最低估计生产成本的时间。
Every program is different, and there is no promise that the conclusions drawn regarding the B-2 program will apply to the next program. However, it does seem that a policy of delaying production until the design is highly refined and demonstrated through exhaustive flight testing is not necessarily the best course in every program.
莱文先生。我感谢法案的经理在此过程中与我合作。
主持人。还有其他辩论吗？
华纳先生。总统先生，该修正案在这方面已清除。
Mr. President, I would like to add, the Senator from Michigan is a tireless worker on the Armed Services Committee. We came to the Senate together, and I have tried to keep up the pace, but I have not equaled the pace in terms of his ability to perform homework.
When this subject of the B-2 bomber was under consideration by the Senate, he gave it his closest attention, and I am pleased to say I support the program.
因此，我认为这是我们委员会工作的建设性补充，我们支持采用修正案。
莱文先生。Mr. President, first let me thank my dear friend from Virginia. The hour is late, so I will not be too rhapsodic for too long.
We are indeed good friends. We came to this body together and have a very lot of very close and good working relationships over the years. I thank him for his comments.
我确实深入研究了B-2所谓的并发问题。我对该计划和并发问题有一些真正的担忧，这是在我们增加该轰炸机的产量之前是否进行了足够的飞行测试问题。
这项修正案解决了这一问题，我们将继续非常谨慎地关注整个程序。
Again, I thank my friend from Virginia.
主持人。Is there further debate?
华纳先生。总统先生，我感谢我的同事，并敦促采用修正案。
主持人。问题是同意修正案。
The amendment (No. 1056) was agreed to.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
华纳先生。I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.