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第四章

THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO

"I reaffirmed that NATO enlargement at the Madrid Summit will proceed, and President Yeltsin made it clear he thinks it's a mistake." President Clinton, March 1997 Helsinki Summit

上下文

在1996年12月的北大西洋委员会（NAC）会议上，外交部长于1997年7月8日至9日在马德里举行了一次峰会会议，以“为联盟迈向21世纪的联盟，巩固了欧洲 - 大西洋的欧洲峰会。安全。^（61）应该一开始就明确表明，1996年12月的北约公告是扩大过程中的第一阶段，预计将需要两年的时间才能完成。^（62）新成员直到1999年4月，即《华盛顿条约》签名50周年。

在峰会上，北约领导人将宣布中欧国家的名称，并邀请与联盟开始加入谈判。最有可能成为会员的候选人是波兰，捷克共和国和匈牙利。（请参阅附件B）。由于成本较低和美国参议院批准的较低成本的原因，美国在第一次扩大浪潮中有利于少量摄入量。另一方面，加拿大支持广泛的扩大，包括这三个国家以及斯洛文尼亚，罗马尼亚和斯洛伐克，以期建立一个广泛的跨大西洋社区。法国以及西班牙，意大利，葡萄牙，希腊和土耳其正在促进“南方大扩大”，以平衡“东方大扩大”，也通过加入罗马尼亚和斯洛文尼亚。法国领导的小组认为，北约应该担心地中海和巴尔干地区以及中欧。在马德里峰会上，第一波规模的大小（即使没有令人满意）的问题可能成为分裂问题。

THE DEBATE

The Alliance has now reached the eleventh-hour in the enlargement process. The decision to hold a summit in July firmly commits the Alliance to enlargement. To reverse that decision would be disastrous. For those who believe in NATO, whether or not we believe in the enlargement of the Alliance, managing the enlargement process in the coming months must be our priority. The reasoning on both sides of the enlargement issue is, on the whole, familiar and it is not our intention to "reopen" the debate at this late stage in the process.

Nevertheless, some of these arguments are likely to surface during the ratification process. It is, therefore, important to review the respective positions of the proponents and opponents of NATO enlargement.⁽⁶³⁾

Those who favour early NATO membership for the Visegrad Three countries make the following arguments:

History demonstrates that CEE has been traditionally unstable. The area is described by some as a "security vacuum" and by Henry Kissinger as a "no-mans land." Without secure membership in NATO, this region may grow unstable and become a source of contention between Russia and Germany;

Yalta treated these countries unfairly, they suffered for more than forty-five years under Soviet domination, these nations now wish to rejoin the West, and the West, therefore, has a moral obligation to these nations. Enlargement is a noble democratizing mission that NATO is well-equipped to undertake, and the Western public will understand and support such a mission;

北约需要扩大它才能生存。秘书长贾维尔·索拉纳（Javier Solana）认为，“不放大是没有做的选择，什么也没能实现的选择，”这是联盟很久以前被拒绝的选择。⁽⁶⁴⁾

欧洲联盟（EU）的扩张，充分整合这些国家的时间至少要花十年，这被认为太长了。

对美国、欧洲安全组织放大ment must begin with NATO, where the United States is the leading member, the "EU/WEU first," option would not promote United States interests in Europe;

北约早期的扩大将巩固美国对欧洲的安全承诺，几十年来；

扩大将是对新俄罗斯威胁的可能性的对冲。和

NATO enlargement should be done with Moscow's cooperation if possible and in the face of Moscow's opposition if necessary; if Moscow strongly opposes this NATO initiative, enlarging quickly is better for the Alliance, both to show Russia that this matter is settled and to do so before Russia becomes stronger and able to endanger the outcome.

On the other hand, opponents assert that:

这三个最有可能的候选人是年轻的稳定的自由民主国家，市场经济的表现相对良好。关于其未来的历史类比是误导性的。他们的情况与1930年代或1945年完全不同。现在，美国是最强大的“欧洲力量”，在欧洲提供了整体稳定，俄罗斯的边界现在是三百年前的地方。俄罗斯不是对CEE的威胁，因此，北约不应急忙匆匆扩大。

The centrality of the United States domination of NATO creates a problem for Russia, so expanding the EU would be better. EU expansion would be perceived as less threatening by Russia and, it would force Europeans to address what is seen by some as a European problem. NATO expanding before the EU lets the "latter off-the-hook";⁽⁶⁵⁾

北约的扩大将使俄罗斯疏远，并将在欧洲划定新的界限，可能会复制欧洲冷战部门；它将邀请莫斯科统治该界点的国家，尤其是危害乌克兰和波罗的海国家的主权，敌对的俄罗斯将使欧洲变得更少，更加和平与稳定。和

虽然目前不合适，但如果出现了威胁性的俄罗斯，那么接任新成员将适合北约。

These wide-ranging arguments for and against enlargement have led, in recent years, opponents and proponents to a wide spectrum of proposed paths ranging from the dissolution of NATO, to a broad-enlargement approach, including Russia. For instance, former US Ambassador Goodby, at the April 97 Symposium on "NATO Enlargement," organized by the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security (CCIPS), posited that Russia would join NATO in the foreseeable future. In response to Ambassador Goodby's suggestion, Dr. Dmitri Trenin, from the Carnegie Moscow Centre, commented that he did not foresee Russia joining NATO.

来自兰德公司的Asmus，Kugler和Larrabee，⁽⁶⁶⁾确定受到最大关注的三种广泛方法：进化扩展路径，促进稳定路径（北约采用的选项）和战略反应路径。每条路径都会导致北约扩大，但是每个路径的基本原理，假设，时间表和标准都不同。以下段落强调了每条路径的一些关键要素，以鼓励和促进批准过程中的知情辩论。

The Evolutionary Expansion path assumes that the main problems facing CEE are economic and political. It also assumes that CEE states do not face any immediate military threats and that their own reforms are essentially on track. Therefore, the top priority for CEE should be its integration into the European Union (EU) as the best means to address these problems. The EU has recently indicated that new membership discussions should commence in 1998, with the year 2002 as a target date for new members joining. According to this school of thought, membership in NATO, although important, is secondary to membership in the EU. While the ultimate goal is congruent membership in both institutions, the EU is seen as the key driving organization in this process. Proponents of this path see no urgent reason for the Alliance to expand in the immediate future. They emphasize the importance of moving slowly, and using the time to ease concerns in the West and to diminish the risk of new confrontations with Moscow. NATO expansion might take place in some ten years. Some proponents of this option suggest that the stability and security issues, are European issues and, therefore, the EU should take the lead.

第二个路径是促进稳定性，是北约选择的选项。与第一条道路相反，支持者认为，中欧的政治局势是脆弱的。共产主义的崩溃和前苏联的瓦解不仅解放了中央政府，而且在德国和俄罗斯之间产生了新的安全真空。这种安全真空威胁要通过重新燃烧民族主义来削弱CEE中脆弱的新民主国家。这所学校的支持者强调了民主与安全之间的联系，中东欧国家需要一个强大的安全框架才能发展成稳定的民主国家。支持者经常与战后西德进行类比，并注意到北约在稳定德国民主中所起的重要作用。1949年华盛顿条约）。根据这种观点，欧盟的成员资格很重要，但不够。它不能解决这些国家面临的地缘政治困境。此外，正如亨利·基辛格（Henry Kissinger）所描述的那样，将这些国家置于战略性的“无人土地”中，可能会诱使俄罗斯试图重新确定其在该地区的影响力，并为德国带来新的战略困境。 NATO, the argument goes, must, therefore, provide the security framework necessary to anchor these countries in the West and stabilize CEE as a whole. Given the risks as well as the consequences of instability in CEE for the continent as a whole, proponents of this path argue that NATO cannot wait until the European Union is ready to expand.

第三个路径称为战略反应。在这种情况下，除非俄罗斯朝着专制或扩张主义的方向移动，否则北约的扩大将不会发生，除非俄罗斯向中东欧国家构成军事威胁。这条道路的支持者包括一个称为“俄罗斯快要”的小组 - 那些认为西方最高政策优先事项的人应该是稳定俄罗斯和那些认为该联盟作为阻止其成员袭击的集体国防组织的主要角色的人。前者反对早期扩张，因为它将激发莫斯科并促进自我实现的预言 - 一种复兴的俄罗斯威胁。后者担心扩大会削弱联盟的政治和军事凝聚力。关于是否以及何时扩展的决定将纯粹基于俄罗斯的战略标准和事件。北约应该给莫斯科每一个机会，将他们视为真正的伴侣，并避免采取任何措施来促进俄罗斯的情况。如果出现新的俄罗斯威胁，那么联盟将迅速扩大。如果没有这种威胁，那么北约可能永远不必扩大。在这种选择下，和平伙伴关系将被视为扩大欧洲大西洋地区“合作安全”的重要一步，而联盟对俄罗斯采取了等待的态度。

THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES

从这次讨论中，我们可以看到，尽管在很大程度上是学者中，但已经大量反思了北约扩大问题。希望随着批准程序的开始，国家当局，议会和公众也将很快参与辩论。一旦他们参与其中，这对他们来说肯定会变得显而易见，因为对于迄今为止撰写的有关该主题的分析师，对扩大和反对扩大的论点“在很大程度上是没有修订过的总体北约战略框架的情况。⁽⁶⁷⁾Small wonder that the enlargement debate seems unfocused at times and somewhat confused.

1994年1月在布鲁塞尔举行的北约峰会上,艾莉d heads of state and government, inspired by the US administration, took the decision, in principle, to open the Alliance to new members. In endorsing the principle of enlargement, they stressed that the admission of new members to the Alliance was not to be an end in itself, rather, it would contribute to Europe's wider stability and security. This in a nutshell, argues John Barrett, "is the strategic objective of NATO enlargement implicit in the Brussels Declaration.⁽⁶⁸⁾Logically, one would have thought that, before taking that momentous decision, NATO governments would have previously engaged in a full analysis and wide debate, of the "why" and of "whether" enlargement was in the interest of the Alliance. However, Barrett suggests that much of the rationale was only explained later, in the 1995 internal study on NATO Enlargement. Stanley Sloan, in a recent北约评论article, laments the same inconsistencies and argues that the "why" and "how" of NATO's future should have been decided before the allies tackled the "who" and "when" of NATO enlargement.^（69）缺乏总体框架在很大程度上解释了为什么北约没有完全预测联盟扩大的全部后果。

1996年NAC 12月会议的非常详细的公报涉及与北约扩大有关的未来问题。乐动冠军同样，在最近的许多演讲中，秘书长贾维尔·索拉纳（Javier Solana）强调了联盟在峰会之前和之后需要关注的问题。乐动冠军但是，公报并不能代替一个概念。

北约扩大可能是等待峰会的最关键决定，但它不得成为欧洲安全辩论的单一问题。成功解决以下问题将是结论北约扩大是否会增强欧洲大西洋地区安全的关键决定因素：乐动冠军

俄罗斯发展的欧洲-大西洋年代的角色ecurity architecture;

the need to reconcile the aspirations of new members to the new NATO;

the need to reassure the non-invited countries, particularly Ukraine and the Baltic States;

the aspect of Mediterranean security;

the costs of enlargement; and

the unanimous ratification by the parliaments and assemblies of all member states.

Russia

从莫斯科看，北约扩大东方的结果可能会影响俄罗斯与西方之间的未来关系。对于俄罗斯来说，目标是避免与西方隔离。另一方面，北约的主要目标是在整个欧洲大西洋地区“增强稳定性和安全性”。这两个目标是不可调和的。为了实现其目标，北约，尤其是美国必须将俄罗斯视为有价值和受人尊敬的伙伴，以免俄罗斯发展为“凡尔赛综合症”。这将不符合联盟和欧洲大西洋安全的长期利益。热心的扩大支持者Brzezinski主张将俄罗斯纳入欧洲 - 大西洋安全进程的发展。“如果被排除和拒绝，他们将感到怨恨，他们自己的政治自我定义将变得更加反欧洲和反西方。⁽⁷⁰⁾俄罗斯在深厚的经济，政治和军事危机的条件下，在其双重帝国崩溃之后，需要放心。

作为一个受欢迎的问题,北约东扩是很少的mentioned in last year's Russian presidential election campaign. That should not surprise us, as NATO enlargement was barely mentioned in the US presidential election and was not an issue in the recent Canadian federal election. However, as a political elite issue in Russia it is important, as the elites in Russia, whether democrats or nationalists, can make it a popular issue. Alexei Arbatov, a leading democrat, makes the case of the democrats opposed to NATO enlargement. "Had the Communists won the election, people here would have expected NATO expansion, but now that Yeltsin has won, under the banner of democracy, the idea that the West would respond by expanding NATO to isolate Russia would be received here as a sign of some generic mistrust of Russia.^（71）The democrats feel betrayed and disappointed. The Soviet Union, and subsequently Russia, has, in their view, behaved in recent years as a responsible power and strategic partner, with the implementation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the unification of Germany, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union without any bloodshed, the destruction of thousands of Treaty Limited Equipment, (TLE) in accord with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and Russia's constructive position during the Gulf War. The West has rewarded Russia for good behaviour, in the democrats' view, by taking advantage of Russia's current weakness and expanding to Russia's border without Moscow's involvement, at least until recently.

"There is a popular consensus in Russia against NATO expansion, not just because it is a threat, but because nobody likes to be excluded,⁽⁷²⁾美国认为谢尔盖•罗戈夫主任-Canada Institute, in Moscow. "Russia has not been invited to join either NATO, or the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC), or the Euro-Asia Summit. So Russia becomes a country in isolation. This is not natural for any big power.^（73）Ambassador Blackwill, in his report to the Trilateral Commission, highlights the desire of Russia, "to be great, to be seen as great, and to be treated by others as great," this, in his view, "lies deep in the Russian psyche.^（74）

The OSCE is another organization where Russian efforts to gain Western acceptance of its perceived "rightful" position as a major European power have thus far been frustrated. The OSCE, despite its many known deficiencies, represents the most broad-based Euro-Atlantic organization for consensus building, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. The OSCE is also the only Euro-Atlantic organization where both Russia and the United States operate as equal members. It is an institution where the West could, with minimum threat or negative impact to its primary interests, recognize Russia as a great European power. The Russian proposal that NATO and the EU be subordinated to the OSCE is not in the Western interest. However, the proposal that the OSCE create a managing/consultative body is worth pursuing as it would show, in a tangible way, that Russia is fully incorporated in the security relationship with the West.

NATO enlargement, if not handled properly, risks poisoning the relationship between Russia and the West for a long time. Some key negative consequences could be: an inward reorientation of Russia; a rebirth of Russia's sphere of influence among the now independent states of the former Soviet Union, with a particularly negative impact on Ukraine and the Baltic States; a weakening of overall Euro-Atlantic security; an unwelcome nationalistic influence on internal Russian politics; encouragement of a new militarism in Russia; a more assertive military doctrine, with deployment of tactical nuclear missiles aboard ships in the Baltic, in Kaliningrad, and possibly in Belarus; and a threat to the security structure established after the Cold War through various arms control agreements.

None of these issues are trivial. The arms control file, for instance, although not as bleak as the public posturing in Moscow would lead us to believe, requires close attention. During the Cold War, the USSR and the US negotiated and implemented many arms control agreements, as it was felt to be in their mutual interest. Recently, with the polarized atmosphere surrounding the enlargement issue, the Russian Duma has withheld ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, (CWC) and the START-II Treaty. At least sixty-eight nations have already ratified the CWC, including the US and, it entered into force in April 1997. The Duma has indicated that it will not ratify the Convention until the Fall of 1997. Nevertheless even if the Duma ratifies the treaty later this year, the Russian authorities will be hard pressed to destroy their large stocks of chemical weapons due to a lack of money, infrastructure, and environmental concerns.

The美国新闻和世界报告1997年1月6日，报告说，尽管莫斯科的态度认为，鉴于北约决定扩大条约的决定，该条约的前景很沮丧，但实际上，II II条约可能很快就会被杜马批准。根据本文，俄罗斯将军们对议员施加了巨大压力，要求其批准该条约。原因是俄罗斯的战略导弹正在迅速衰老，军方缺乏资金来适当地维持如此大型的阿森纳。因此，条约或没有条约，莫斯科的核武库将比计划早年开始缩小，因为其导弹不适合服役。

At the March 1997 Helsinki Summit, President Yeltsin agreed to press the Duma to ratify the stalled START-II Treaty. The Duma, however, indicated in mid-May it would indefinitely delay favourable consideration of START-II. Ratification will likely be delayed until the Fall of 1997, to decouple the issue from the unpopular NATO enlargement issue. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin also agreed that upon ratification of START-II, talks would begin for deeper cuts to a level of 2,000-2,500 warheads under a START-III agreement. Negotiations to update the treaty governing Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), are underway and a framework agreement may be completed by the July Madrid Summit. The updated agreement with much reduced equipment ceilings, will likely be accompanied by specific confidence building measures (CBMs), and intrusive verification measures. It will seek ensure that there is no destabilizing concentration of military equipment anywhere in Europe, with particular emphasis in Central Europe. By permitting national quotas rather than the original bloc ceilings, which no longer reflect the reality of current European security, the parameters for negotiations go a long way in meeting Russia's security concerns. An adapted CFE regime along these lines would truly be the "cornerstone" of Euro-Atlantic security.

NATO was slow to realize that its enlargement to the east would not be successful without the active participation of Russia in the development of a Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The NATO-Russia strategic relationship, except the successful Russian participation in IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, has, until recently, been an empty box. To meet the July Summit deadline, NATO has, in recent months, embarked in earnest on a "two-track strategy" combining the enlargement of NATO to certain CEE countries with the building of a strong and, hopefully, enduring security partnership with Russia. Dmitri Trenin and Andrew Pierre argue that this security partnership must be "commensurate with Russia's dignity and importance and NATO's aims and ideals. Such a new relationship could then provide the much needed political ballast for enlarging NATO.⁽⁷⁵⁾

Moscow in recent months, also pursued a two-track approach. On the one hand, the Russian government continued to voice opposition to enlargement. At the Helsinki Summit, President Yeltsin called NATO enlargement "a serious mistake." On the other hand, President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Primakov were engaged in difficult negotiations, with the United States, Germany, other key allies and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana. These negotiations sought to balance two seemingly incompatible goals: protecting the rights of the Alliance's prospective new members while preserving the West's cooperative relationship with Russia. An agreement on a NATO-Russia strategic partnership was reached on 14 May.

北约 - 俄罗斯战略合作伙伴关系在5月27日的巴黎峰会上由北约领导人和俄罗斯总统签署的“北约 - 俄罗斯创始法”进行了编纂。该协议为北约 - 俄罗斯常设联合理事会建立了明确的原则和安排，以定期就共同利益问题进行咨询，例如：预防冲突，维持和平的联合行动，核和常规军事教义，核安全，剧院导弹辩护（TMD）乐动冠军，WMD的不扩散。联合委员会将使俄罗斯发出声音，尽管不是否决权，这是与北约而不是北约合作合作的机会。该法案还涵盖了北约 - 俄罗斯关系的军事维度，尤其是在新北约成员领土上的核武器和传统部队部署的棘手问题。外交大臣劳埃德·阿克斯维西（Lloyd Axworthy）以以下话来欢迎该协议：“北约 - 俄罗斯的新关系标志着冷战后欧洲安全结构发展的重要阶段。”

A broader strategy toward Russia - separate from the NATO enlargement issue - reflecting political and economic issues, is also being pursued. At the Helsinki Summit, Yeltsin received a promise of support for Russia's membership in key international economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with an increased role at the G-7 annual meeting, which in the future, will be known as the Summit of the Eight. In this vein, Trenin and Pierre maintain that, "ending the current subordinate status of the NATO-Russian relationship to the enlargement issue is a key prerequisite for turning it into a positive factor in the European security situation.⁽⁷⁶⁾

Substantive progress has been achieved in recent months on a number of issues of common interest to Russia, the US, and NATO. The results, however, are perceived as a tactical damage limitation operation to meet the artificial Madrid Summit deadline. President Yeltsin praised the 14 May agreement on the "Founding Act," but the then Defence Minister Rodionov said that, "despite the agreement reached in Moscow . . . Russia-NATO problems have not disappeared," reported国际新闻社。的确，将需要一项长期战略，包括安全性，俄罗斯和联盟成员的政治和经济问题，与北约扩大问题分开。乐动冠军

New Members

新成员将加入与冷战期间现有的联盟不同的联盟。他们将加入适合二十一世纪的“新北约”。尽管这一新北约保留了其核心的集体防御义务和能力，但它还接受了新的任务，每天从集体辩护和抵抗到武装袭击到武装攻击 - 到非章节诉合作安全任务危机管理与维持和平。正如最近同意的“北约 - 俄罗斯成立法案”所能看出的，北约大西洋安全的“北约较软”方法的一个重要方面涉及加深的北约 - 俄罗斯合作。然而，许多希望加入的国家都从二十世纪的情况下看着北约。他们希望加入北约，以获得《华盛顿条约》第五条中隐含的“坚硬”安全保证。⁽⁷⁷⁾Those security guarantees, in their view, best meet their historical security concerns vis-a-vis their Russian neighbour. The softer security dimension of NATO is already available to them through the PfP programme.

在这种情况下，扩大可能是联盟在未来几个月和几年中面临的最严重挑战之一，因为它可能会削弱其政治和军事凝聚力，北约与一群新成员可能会在北约当前的北约思考中脱离北约关于欧洲大西洋的安全，特别是在联盟与俄罗斯建立更紧密的合作关系的必要性方面。管理一个包括一组困难合作伙伴的联盟（希腊和土耳其，没有冷战的焦点，在塞浦路斯公开吵架）已经足够困难，但是如果3-5个新的CEE成员无法克服对俄罗斯的历史焦虑，在联盟内达成共识的发展 - 传统上可能是不可能的。

Non-Invited Countries

The NATO enlargement debate has primarily focused on the countries to be offered membership and on the type of "strategic relationship" that needs to be developed with Russia to make enlargement more palatable to Moscow. Yet, equally important, is how the Alliance deals with countries left out of the first wave of enlargement. If NATO is to achieve its post-Cold War goal of "stability and security" in the Euro-Atlantic area, it must formulate a clear strategy toward these countries, many of which are unstable democracies with struggling market economies, such as Bulgaria, Albania, Ukraine, and the Baltic States.

尽管北约否认，北约的扩大可能会在欧洲创造新的分裂线。至少，这些将是机构的分界线。在西区，将是北约成员，现任和新成员，根据《华盛顿条约》第V条，他们将获得核和常规安全保证。在该机构线的另一端将是那些不邀请加入联盟的欧洲国家。他们认为的排斥可能会产生一种让人联想到欧洲前部的疏远感。尤其是乌克兰，担心扩大会导致欧洲的新部门。

That being said, those not invited in the first wave will not totally deprived of security guarantees. PfP has provided, and will continue to provide, a cooperative security regime that includes provisions for consultation in times of crisis, similar to those in Article IV of the Washington Treaty. The PfP, however, will need enhancement to meet the increased needs of those countries, such as a broader Planning and Review Process(PARP), and Partner involvement through CJTFs in the planning and training of multinational forces for non - Article V operations. The establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will provide an inclusive forum bringing all political, defence and military areas of cooperation between Partners and the Alliance closer together and will give Partners a stronger voice in their cooperative effort with the Alliance. This new structure could become a vital element of Euro-Atlantic security. Leaving aside the important security role of the PfP programme, non-invited countries will still remind NATO that PfP is not an alternative for full membership in the future.

然而，北约的扩大，即使伴随着俄罗斯关注的积极解决方案，也将为这些无因而造成的问题带来新的问题。最重要的问题可能是乌克兰的地位和安全。这个国家不希望成为俄罗斯与新的西部集团之间被遗忘的灰色区域。这也适用于波罗的海国家。基辅目前尚未表现出对加入北约的兴趣，但反复表示，北约不应该在不考虑乌克兰和波罗的海国家的利益的情况下进行扩大过程。波罗的海三个国家有兴趣加入北约，但不太可能被邀请。这四个国家都对加入欧盟都非常感兴趣。

千年来，俄罗斯历史与现在构成乌克兰领土的地区深深地纠缠了这一地区。俄罗斯和乌克兰国家的起源是在9世纪的基辅鲁斯（Kievan Rus）中发现的。俄罗斯认为，自从1654年哥萨克人接近沙皇以保护杆子以来，这一地区的居民就是他们的神奇和亲戚。这不是乌克兰分享的观点。

乌克兰的未来安全定位将对北约扩大产生关键的影响。波兰，匈牙利和罗马尼亚与乌克兰有边界。乌克兰处于弱点的位置，在西方方面非常依赖经济援助。乌克兰是仅次于以色列和埃及的美国援助的第三大接受者。加拿大在这个国家也有大量的援助计划。加拿大，美国和德国以及国际组织等西方政府的经济援助一直是，并且将继续对乌克兰的未来福祉和稳定至关重要。同样，俄罗斯拥有三个强大的杠杆：俄罗斯和乌克兰工业之间的紧密联系，乌克兰对石油和天然气等俄罗斯资源的依赖，以及约有1200万本地俄罗斯人（超过20％的人口）的存在乌克兰边界。如果俄罗斯认为自己与欧洲大西洋社区孤立，那么它可能会感到有必要加强其历史势力领域。因此，北约与乌克兰之间的安全关系增强了，必须伴随着联盟的扩大。 Otherwise, Ukraine's freedom of manoeuver, as an independent nation could be seriously limited.

除了第一次世界大战之后的二十年独立之外，俄罗斯在过去两个世纪中一直控制着波罗的海国家。波罗的海国家于1940年被苏联占领，并于1944年再次被苏联占领，当地人被鼓励俄罗斯人被迁至西伯利亚，因为鼓励俄罗斯人定居该地区。爱沙尼亚和拉脱维亚仍然有俄罗斯少数民族。波罗的海国家选择不包括在俄罗斯的独立国家（CIS）中，许多俄罗斯人对失去了通往波罗的海的门户感到遗憾。因此，毫不奇怪的是，波罗的海国家对他们保持独立性，主权和西方取向的能力有很高的焦虑。

俄罗斯和白俄罗斯之间最近的“统一”协议虽然象征性，但将进一步增加波罗的海国家对其未来行动自由的关注。波罗的海领导人对他们在第一波中加入北约的前景是现实的。他们担心，如果北约扩大过程在最初的扩大后似乎停止，他们的安全将被削弱。与欧盟的紧密联系对于波罗的海国家也至关重要，因为它将在经济和政治上与欧洲联系起来。美国的某种形式的安全保证将有助于减轻其扩大后的安全限制。

A firm NATO commitment that membership will remain an option for those nations not included in the first wave, particularly for Ukraine and the Baltic States, will be a requirement of the Summit Declaration.

Mediterranean Security

As the Alliance prepares to enlarge into Central Europe, defence planners say the gravest risks of future conflict spring from myriad forces of instability along NATO's southern flank. For that reason the enlargement of NATO for countries like Spain, France, Italy, Turkey, and Greece is not as high on their agenda as it is for Germany, for instance. The first three, Spain, France, Italy, are very concerned by the unstable situation in North Africa that could lead to possible mass migration and an export of terrorism to their countries. In a 3 March interview in the newspaper,勒蒙德，前法国外交大臣赫尔维·德·查特（HervéDeCharette）表示：“Dorénaventles priorités de sécurité de la France seront au Sud。" The instability of Albania also concerns Italy and Greece. It could lead to mass migration and the spreading of conflict to Kosovo. As well, within a decade, if not sooner, it is likely that every capital in Southern Europe will be within range of ballistic missiles based in North Africa and the Middle East. The spread of long-range missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is of vital concern to the Euro-Atlantic community. Admiral Lopez, Commander-in-chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, shared these concerns in a recent interview. "The next war," he said, "could grow out of any number of explosive factors: economic difficulties, water shortages, religious fanaticism, immigration, you name it. There are many different forces of instability, and they all seem to be prevalent in the southern region.⁽⁷⁸⁾NATO Secretary General Javier Solana recently highlighted this priority issue for NATO: "Security in Europe," he maintains, "is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean, and the Mediterranean dimension is one of the various security components of the European security architecture.⁽⁷⁹⁾

Finally, Turkey and Greece, without the Cold War as a stabilizing factor, are again publicly quarreling about Cyprus. Both countries have threatened to veto the admission of new members to NATO, over the conditions under which Cyprus would be admitted to the EU. Turkey has also asked to join the EU, but cannot pry the door open. Klaus Kinkel, the German Foreign Minister, during his March visit to Turkey, made it abundantly clear that: "Turkey will not become a member of the European Union in the foreseeable future." He said that Turkey did not qualify because of its record in "human rights, the Kurdish question, relations with Greece, and, of course, very clear economic reasons.⁽⁸⁰⁾欧洲基督教民主党的领导人在1997年3月的会议上还表示，由于文化和宗教原因，欧盟没有土耳其的地方。⁽⁸¹⁾为了使土耳其当局的问题更加复杂，最有可能加入北约的中东欧国家将在欧盟会员等候名单上领先土耳其。

北约的扩大将在1997年7月的马德里峰会议程中排名最高，但是，联盟领导人必须对这一优先事项进行补充，以更加认识到地中海地区对欧洲大西洋安全的重要性。

费用

扩大北约的费用是多少？简短的答案可能与盟友愿意花费的时间少或多大。对于加拿大，扩大必须负担得起。加拿大的捐款可能会比报告的每年增加5000万加元的增加

The Globe和Mailof 25 February 1997. Canada currently contributes, on a yearly basis, some C$150 million to NATO infrastructure and has been reducing its contribution in recent years.

然而，成本问题是布鲁塞尔北约总部进行激烈讨论的主题，随着联盟为7月峰会做准备，正处于扩大辩论的最前沿。支持者声称费用负担得起。秘书长哈维尔·索拉纳（Javier Solana）在查塔姆豪斯（Chatham House）的3月4日讲话中批评智囊团的成本数字，这些人物“严重夸张，并以任意和不切实际的假设为基础。”美国国务卿玛德琳·奥尔布赖特（Madeleine Albright）经济学家, acknowledged that NATO enlargement "will involve real costs, to the United States, its allies, and its partners." "Nevertheless, the costs are reasonable," she argued, "and many would arise whether NATO expands or not."⁽⁸²⁾

The studies to which the Secretary General of NATO alluded were conducted by Rand researchers, Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee, and by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO).^（83）出于说明目的，两种分析都假定Visegrad四（波兰，匈牙利，捷克共和国和斯洛伐克）将被邀请在第一波中加入北约。名义费用为10 - 15年。RAND扩大研究表明，根据选择的国防姿势，整个联盟的预算成本，新成员和现任成员的预算成本可能低至100亿美元。低端将涉及一些新成员的自卫姿势，并具有一些新的基础设施。高端涉及前锋姿势，推断在这些国家的盟军军事部署。RAND研究推测，扩大的北约可以通过升级CEE防御措施以及在危机时期将电力投射到该地区的电力来满足其要求。这样的姿势可以在耗资约420亿美元的包装内实施。

CBO估计值高于RAND。它们从600亿美元的低点（新成员的成本为420亿美元）到高达1,250亿美元的高额。估计值是基于两种不同的方法。尽管RAND的研究是关于目标和能力的估计，但CBO估计主要是由北约为与俄罗斯战争做准备的策略所驱动的。CBO探索的第一个也是最不昂贵的选择可能会为一个新的成员国提供防御姿势，以防御自身的小规模冲突或有限的区域权力攻击。这通常提出了一个问题，Visegrad国家会在哪里找到这种钱。CBO的另外四个雄心勃勃且昂贵的选择集中在俄罗斯复兴的更大威胁上。这四种说明性的情况令人担忧，因为它们给人的印象是，在美国的扩大辩论可以由“鞭打反俄罗斯歇斯底里的歇斯底里，这可能成为一个自我实现的预言。⁽⁸⁴⁾

More recently, cost estimates were included in the 24 February 1997 Clinton Administration Report to the US Congress on the enlargement of NATO.^（85）The Report estimates that the costs associated with enlargement, from 1997 to 2009, will be about US $27 to US $35 billion, (in the same ballpark as the Rand study). The costs are divided into three categories: new members' costs for military restructuring; NATO's regional reinforcement capabilities, (some US $8-10 billion), and direct enlargement costs. These direct enlargement costs will total approximately US $9-12 billion; (average of $700-$900 million annually). About 35% of these costs would be absorbed by the new members, the United States would absorb some 15%, and the other current NATO members would absorb about 50%.

The US Administration Report acknowledges that the cost estimates for NATO enlargement are speculative and highly dependent on a host of assumptions. The assumptions include: the specific new members admitted, the nature of the projected threat environment; the strategy that NATO adopts to carry out the conventional and security guarantees codified in Article V and its associated force posture; the reform of NATO command structure; the criteria used for allocating costs among the countries involved; and the scope of defence effort those current members would take without enlargement.

NATO has yet to decide most of these issues and speculating on an exact cost estimate is presumptuous at this stage. Suffice to say that establishing the cost of NATO enlargement is not just a financial matter, but also a political and strategic one. Across the Alliance elected officials are starting to probe what enlargement will cost to the taxpayers whether they be Canadian, American, British, Czech, or Polish. Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy on 20 March 1997, in his statement to the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Foreign Affairs and International Trade informed the members that the costs could not be estimated at this time. Canada, however, wishes to keep them at a minimum. He promised to inform Parliament when these costs are known.

在7月的马德里峰会上，一旦联盟领导人决定将邀请哪些国家 /地区，北约将需要认真解决此问题，然后在联盟议会和国民议会中批准过程中。

Ratification

At the July Summit, NATO leaders will invite some countries to begin accession negotiations. The invitation is consequential. NATO's glue remains the commitment of its members to treat any attack on one, as an attack on all. By extending the Article V nuclear and conventional security guarantees, to these newly independent nations, NATO expands its sphere of

影响并承诺包括加拿大在内的成员，以“采取必要的行动，包括使用武装部队来恢复和维持这些新成员的安全性”和完整性。

NAC可能会在1997年12月与新成员的磋商所产生的加入协议签署。在1998年，在某些国家，对这些方案的批准最多可能需要一年。在加拿大等议会制度的国家中，批准程序可能会更容易，在加拿大，批准涉及发出授权外交部长的订单，以签署接受加入协议的手段。

考虑到主题的重要性,加拿大的迷你ster of Foreign Affairs should submit the issue to Parliament for debate as he promised the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The Committee has already held several meetings on the issue in recent months where Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, and, several NGOs such as the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security (CCIPS) have presented briefs. The future involvement of these two Committees, and Parliament are essential components in allowing informed debate in Canada.

将会有越来越多的关注是否unanimous agreement can be reached on the ratification of the protocols of accession to the Alliance of these new members. The unanimous ratification by all sixteen NATO members is not a certainty. The recent threats by Greece and Turkey to veto the accession of new members to NATO over the possible accession of Cyprus to the EU are one indication. In the US, ratification must overcome very serious hurdles. The US needs a two-thirds vote from its traditionally independent Senate in order to ratify the protocols. In the 23 January 1997 edition of theInternational Herald Tribune参议院外交关系委员会的主要民主党参议员拜登（Biden）指出：“这都没有由美国公众和国会进行辩论，直到有人认为国会为此列入国会，大错。”他在三月访问布拉格时重复了警告，他说：“在美国参议院所需的三分之二的投票可能很困难。”

Adding new members to NATO will, in the United States, require ratification of the protocols of accession by the Senate and approval by both Chambers of Congress for resources needed to carry out this initiative. Many pointed questions are likely to be raised by inquisitive US Senators and Representatives during the ratification process. These are likely to include: Why are we still in Europe and what are we getting for it? What will be the cost and who will pay? Will current and new members be ready to pay their share? Have we conceded too much to Russia? Will enlargement really produce greater stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area? And by extension, why should the United States provide nuclear and conventional guarantees, when there is no clear and present Russia military threat to these countries? Such a debate in the US Senate could easily turn into a far-reaching referendum of the entire array of worldwide United States commitments. A positive vote in the Senate will mean that the United States will carry on playing a positive role in the world overall, but especially in the Euro-Atlantic area, into the twenty-first century.

In the end, the key determinant of the fate of NATO enlargement's ratification in the United States is likely to be the White House. The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has already taken the lead in developing public awareness with a major pro-enlargement article in the 15 February 1997 edition of经济学家。Jeremy Rosner argues in a recent edition of北约评论that if, "the Clinton administration's advocacy of NATO enlargement is active and bipartisan, the Senate will produce the two-thirds vote that is required.^（86）

Clearly, a major campaign to sensitize the public, parliaments, and the media as to the why of enlargement must be undertaken as a matter of priority in all Alliance countries (in Canada and in the United States, two influential newspapers, the Globe and Mail and the New York Times, have taken an anti-enlargement editorial position). Unanimous agreement by all sixteen member nations, without which enlargement cannot take place, is not a foregone conclusion.

NOTES

61.^61.最后的公报，北大西洋委员会（NAC）的部长级会议，1996年12月。

62。^62。For the full details on the modalities of the enlargement process, see Chapter 6 of the "NATO Enlargement Study," September 1995.

63。

^63。已经撰写了无数的文章，并反对北约扩大。两卷包含有关该主题的许多出色文章。Will NATO Go East? - The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance,D. Haglund, ed. (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University Centre for International Affairs, 1996), andNATO's Transformation, The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance,Philip Gordon, ed. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1997). For a Canadian perspective on the issue see Albert Legault and Allen Sens, "Canada and NATO Enlargement, Interests and Options,"Canadian Foreign Policy, vol. 4, no. 2, (Fall 1996), pp.88-93.

64.^64.Javier Solana, "Secretary General's speech at the CSIS," Brussels, 21 February 1997.

65.^65.T.Friedman, "NATO Expansion As a Crafty Consolation Prize,"International Herald Tribune,23 January 1996, p. 9.

66。^66。R. Asmus, R. Kugler, F. Larrabee, "NATO Enlargement: A Framework for Analysis,"NATO's Transformation, The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance,Philip Gordon, ed. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996), p. 93.

67.^67.Jeffrey D. McCausland和Robert Dorff，“ forword”“北约会向东走吗？ - 关于扩大大西洋联盟的辩论”，D。Haglund编辑。（安大略省金斯敦：皇后国际事务中心，1996年），第1页。vii。

68。^68。J. Barret，“北约的研究年：结果和政策含义”，第1页。95。

69。^69。S. Sloan, "Negotiating a New Transatlantic Bargain,"北约评论,vol. 44, no. 2, (March 1996), p. 19.

70.^70.Z. Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe,"Foreign Affairs,vol. 73, no. 1, (Jan/Feb 1995), p. 31.

71。^71。T. Friedman, "Sucked Into the Wrong Vacuum,"New York Times,14 July 1996.

72.^72.目前尚不清楚莫斯科是否存在针对北约扩大的普遍共识。最近在俄罗斯进行的民意调查没有明确的答案。报纸的民意调查，Moskovskiye Novosti，发现51％的俄罗斯人将北约扩张视为对俄罗斯的“严重威胁”。只有14％不同意。受人尊敬的俄罗斯公众舆论中心的一项民意调查发现，同样的多数人对联盟的拟议变化“毫无保留地负面”，请参阅克里斯蒂安·卡莱尔（Christian Caryl），“伊万（Ivan o）公众说：不对北约，”美国新闻和世界报告, 24 March 1997, p. 42. On the other hand, an article in the May/June issue of北约评论offers the results of two other polls where only 30% of the respondents felt that NATO enlargement ran counter to Russian interests, see Tatiana Parkhalina, "Of Myths and Illusions: Russian Perceptions of NATO Enlargement,"北约评论,不。3，（1997年5月/6月），第11-15页。

73.^73.T. Friedman, "Sucked Into the Wrong Vacuum,"NewYork Times,14 July 1996.

74。^74。Robert Blackwill, Rodric Braithwaite, Akihikv Tariaka,参与俄罗斯 - 向三边委员会的报告，（纽约，1997年），第4页。

75。^75。J. Andrew Pierre, Dmitri Trenin, "Developing NATO -Russian Relations,"生存，vol. 39, no. 1, (Spring 1997), p. 7.

76.^76.J. Andrew Pierre，Dmitri Trenin，“发展北约 - 俄罗斯关系”，生存，vol. 39, no. 1, (Spring 1997), p. 7.

77.^77.《华盛顿条约》第五条的关键文章呼吁每个成员认为对一个人的攻击是对所有人的攻击，并向“如此受攻击的政党或政党提供帮助。但是，北约成员只有义务采取“他们认为必要的行动”。因此，第五条中编码的“硬”安全性是隐式的。

78。^78。威廉·德罗兹迪克（William Drozdiak）：“北约的南方侧面暴露了吗？”International Herald Tribune,20 May 1997.

79.^79.Javier Solana, "Secretary General's Speech to the Royal Institute of International Relations," Brussels, 14 January 1997.

80.^80.Stephen Kinzer, "Kinkel Tells Turkey It's Not Ready for EU,"International Herald Tribune,27 March 1997, p. 1.

81.^81.土耳其每日新闻，14 March 1997, Internet.

82.

^82.Madeleine Albright, "Enlarging NATO -Why Bigger is Better,"经济学家,1997年2月，第21-23页。

83。^83。R. Asmus，R。Kugler，S。Larabee，“北约的扩大成本将是多少？”生存，第1卷。38，（1996年秋），第5-26页，国会预算办公室（CBO），（CBO），The Costs of Expanding the NATO Alliance，（华盛顿特区，1996年3月）。

84.^84.Z. Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe,"Foreign Affairs,vol. 73, no. 1, (Jan/Feb 1995), p. 26.

85.

^85.报告to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs, and Implications。由欧洲和加拿大事务局发行，美国国务院，1997年2月24日。

86。^86。Jeremy Rosner, "Will Congress Back Admitting New Members?" NATO Review, vol. 45, no. 1,(January 1997), p. 14.