弗兰克·L·“跳过”鲍曼
海军上将，USN

- 舰队切斯特·尼米茨海军上将

最近，在第二次世界大战后的柴油船以及60年代，70年代和80年代的核动力攻击和弹道导弹潜艇中，我们中间的许多“较咸”（阅读了年龄较大的水手）都可以回想起。以自豪感，我们在使冷战成功得出的结论中所扮演的单一角色。最近，这一角色越来越广为人知，因为我们已经看到了60分钟的潜艇故事，诺瓦（Nova），《发现频道》（Discovery Channel），众多书籍和互联网上。

潜艇今天压力和紧张
许多目光短浅,乐观,扶手椅的政治-military observers predicted an era of peace, tranquility, and a "New World Order" with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Incredibly, some still cling to this misty-eyed hope. They were, and are, wrong. Today’s world, as you submariners who are out there in it know, is new – but it’s not very orderly. You see it – and feel it – in the length and tempo of submarine deployments, in the frequent "on-the-fly" retaskings you receive, and in the increased operational demands on you for submarine intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Submarines today are working as hard or harder than they were at any time during the Cold War.1

Fleet requirements for submarines on the front lines have not gone down. In fact, they’ve gone up, and they continue to increase. As our SSN force has been cut nearly in half since 1989, the volume of ISR mission tasking undertaken by submarines has doubled, due to the increased national need for information uniquely obtainable by submarines in many new trouble spots around the globe. With 58 SSNs today, and still falling toward 50, we’re already stretched thin by our efforts to meet all the demands. As I said earlier, you submariners who are doing it, know it. Our national leaders are fighting over you, to get enough submarine mission time to meet their needs, and our Fleet Commanders-in-Chief have repeatedly stated needs for a force level of more than 70 SSNs to carry out their heavy, multi-mission tasking. They know that our stealth, endurance, agility, and firepower make SSNs crucial assets in an unstable world, today and for the future. You respond rapidly to any crisis anywhere in the world, giving our national leadership great flexibility. You do what no other platform can do – while on station and forward deployed continuously for months – you can operate either covertly when required, or overtly if desired.

There are numerous real-world examples of submarines executing crucial missions during the past decade. Most are highly classified, but a few have been selectively made public knowledge, like the important and responsive role of our SSNs in helping face down the crisis in the Taiwan Straits in March 1996, as well as some of the various Tomahawk strikes our SSNs have launched. And the pace is still going up, not down. We continue to be called into action in the Persian Gulf, the Adriatic, the South China Sea, and other regional hot spots, every day of the year – and without question, the SSN represents our own premier ASW capability.

尽管我们目前在ASW中有优势 - 危险地造成了未来的威胁，但我们无法自满并失去优势。另外，正如那些做得很好的人一样，您在练习ASW方面发展的技能经常用于执行您独自完成的许多其他任务可以做得很好。

SSN为我们的国家领导人和军事指挥官带来了强大的优势。但是，随着我们的数字下降，他们开始感到捏伤，并且他们面临着一些SSN任务。1998年的国防科学委员会工作队很难看出我们今天和明天对潜艇的国家安全需求，以及在下一世纪展开时（甚至）潜艇应在需要的力量结构中发挥作用。关于“未来潜艇”的研究得出了结论：

潜艇是当前和未来海军部队的关键和持久的要素 - 美国阿森纳的“皇冠上的珠宝”……我们需要更多，而不是更少的SSN。

我不能说什么比这更好。五十SSN还不足以完成您今天需要的所有事情，而50个SSN明天肯定不足以完成所有工作。我们的潜艇很难受压，并利用其多种效果的灵活性和耐力，并通过尺寸不足的力量伸展到满足国家需求。

潜艇的广泛功能可以使用
“当需要时秘密，或者如果需要的话”

潜艇明天 - 创新的必要
The future, smaller SSN force levels that follow from budget-driven decisions will constrain deployment options and limit the quantity of deployed days, but will demand the highest quality, technologically overwhelming submarines we can field. Admirals Giambastiani, Konetzni, Fages, and I owe it to you to make sure of this outcome. The accelerating pace of technology will increasingly provide our potential adversaries broad access to more sophisticated and capable military systems and weaponry. Regional powers will have greater capabilities to engage in area denial – using satellite surveillance and targeting, missiles, mines, and short-range, limited-capability diesel submarines, for example, to deny U.S. forces and our allies access to project presence and power in regions of importance to international stability (the Persian Gulf, Taiwan Straits, and Korean Peninsula, to name a few). SSNs, with their inherent stealth, are recognized as significantly capable platforms that are less vulnerable to those instruments of area denial. The continued capabilities of our submariners to succeed tomorrow will depend on the vision and ability of the Submarine Force to rapidly incorporate technological innovation, in order to maintain our margin in a fast-paced technological environment and to optimize the warfighting capabilities of the submarine platform.

There are two types of innovation that are the linchpins of Submarine Force success – tactical innovation and technical innovation. O’Kane and Fluckey were standouts in wartime, because they were tactical innovators. Once the lines were over and the ship was underway, they had what they had. So they never stopped looking for a better way to solve the problem or conduct the approach and attack – and they were their own harshest critics. Today as well, our best COs are innovators – the thoughtful risk-takers from whom we should all be learning.

Although it is undeniable that the face of warfare has changed in the 20th century, it is also important to reflect on another aspect of history, which has driven submarines and submariners to evolve, changing in step with advancements in warfare. Three major submarine wars have taken place in this century: two U-boat campaigns in the Atlantic, 1914-1918 and 1939-1945; and our own Pacific Submarine Force’s campaign, 1941-1945. The Cold War can count here too, in many respects. For submarines – as with other weapons – war itself has truly been the engine of innovation. And thus, history records that these conflicts were instrumental in leveraging the inherent characteristics of submarines for innovative roles well beyond those for which they were originally conceived.

这就是为什么创新是这一海底战争问题的中心主题的原因 - 我们今天正在奠定基础，以确保我们能够有效地将技术改进纳入下一世纪的潜艇。

对于潜艇而言，这不是新的决议。回顾过去，反复的意愿和能力拥抱技术创新并充分利用它是潜艇力量的标志。我们的一些进步，例如向核推进的过渡，海底弹道导弹系统的部署以及最新的陆地攻击巡航导弹的增加，导致了海底就业和国防学说的革命性变化。其他变化也更具进化性 - 不那么戏剧性，但对于继续提高我们的海底力量能力至关重要。我们的688级潜艇从洛杉矶号通过夏安号号航空母舰（USS Cheyenne）取得了可观的改进，是逐步融合技术以保持我们优势的好例子。

As I look to the 21st century challenges facing us, I see five key areas of innovation which we’ll need to work on, in order for submarines to continue to evolve and maintain the capabilities needed to carry out the broad and significant roles we are being called upon to perform. In simplest terms, we need to do more to:

• Get connected,
• 获得有效载荷，
• Get modular,
• 发电，同时 -
• 保持负担得起！

连接
Our success here will provide the National Command Authority better opportunities to leverage the Submarine Force for access to the littoral environment. Our attack submarines must incorporate new technologies to monitor, report, and respond in real time to the tactical situation, both in shallow-water areas and on the beach – focusing on those complementary capabilities not well-suited to other (e.g., space-based) assets.

从某种意义上说，这意味着使用新的高保真载体和板外传感器，可以更好地连接从外界接收和处理输入。其中的例子包括高分辨率的声纳系统，桅杆安装的电气，更全面的电子支持措施（ESM）以及新型的微型传感器，例如可以提供有关核，化学或生物学剂的信息的传感器。这也意味着更好地利用我们对新的地球观察卫星以及载人和无人驾驶战术侦察平台的使用，包括无人机和海底车辆（UAVS和UVS）。

Additionally, it means that we must develop information systems capable of assembling all this information on board and converting it into knowledge for use in tactical operations; and then – breaking our historic "radio silence" a little more often – sharing this large volume, "spectacular, multi-sensor take" with battlegroup, theater, and national-level decision-makers, who require it to plan and act on a timely basis. In turn, those external commands and agencies must process and turn around selected portions of their own broader knowledge – of direct and timely importance to our submarines – to better enhance our own tactical picture in real time.

负担得起的威慑。
TRIDENT submarines.

即使得到更好的连接和打破radio silence when it is warranted, maintaining our inherent stealth will remain central to our submarines’ unique value as warfighting platforms as the next century unfolds. Frankly, it’s what gives us a prime seat at the table. Innovative concepts are under development to enhance electromagnetic and acoustical information exchange, while remaining stealthy. These include smaller, more efficient mast-mounted antennas, long-range acoustic modems, and towed communications buoys, to permit higher data rates and broader bandwidths at speed and depth. Today’s funded modernization programs will field many of these new sensors and information exchange systems. Purposeful research and development initiatives are also necessary here, as the pace and complexity of technological innovations continue to accelerate.

While stealth continues to be our inherent virtue, let me suggest that we can do more to help the CNO with his peacetime forward presence requirements than we are. There are times when making our presence known would – and will – make sense: Covert when required, overt if desired. Planting the seeds of doubt in a mischief-maker’s mind ("Where did he go? What’s he up to? How many are there?") has some obvious advantages. This is not technological innovation, but another example of tactical innovation. In fact, we used this technique effectively during the blockade of Haiphong during the Vietnam War. In addition to aerial mining of the harbor, a few of our submarines made their presence known overtly, then "disappeared." Using their speed, they approached all the ships moving toward the port, and word quickly spread about the dozen or so submarines surrounding Haiphong. The merchant traffic abruptly stopped – mission accomplished.

Early in a conflict, forward deployed submarines will likely be operated closer to potential adversaries than our sister forces. For this reason, we are becoming ever more valuable participants in the planning, sensor, and engagement networks upon which future command, control, and coordination of the sea-air-land battle will depend. We’ve got to get better connected – with each other, with the Battlegroup, with the Joint Commander, and with the National Authorities.

Flexible firepower. The flexibility of US submarines allows for rapid
response to contingencies around the globe in a wide variety of roles.
Here, USS Oklahoma City (SSN-723) transits the Suez Canal
带有载体战斗小组。

获得有效载荷
为了控制沿海的沿海水域和影响事件，潜艇都需要更多的战斗有效载荷。我在这里使用“有效载荷”一词，而不仅仅是“繁荣的事情”。有时我们会发现自己在桌子旁，只是面对“那呢？”问题。我们可以做出更多的不同。我包括其他形式的有效载荷，例如板车辆和分布式传感器。增加有效载荷的需求意味着要寻求更多的数量和更有效地利用该量的量，例如板车辆，减少或消除有效载荷推进剂，以及（将来更远），以部署有名的能量武器和对策。

国防科学委员会研究我之前提到的再保险commended overthrowing what has been described as the "tyranny of the 21-inch torpedo tube," by employing systems having a more flexible interface with the undersea environment. By removing the size and configuration restrictions imposed by torpedo tube deployment schemes, we will enable submarines to handle more payload and more different types of payloads. Admiral Fages recently signed an agreement with Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to study new attack submarine design concepts, with emphasis on innovative attack submarine payload options and the structural means to accommodate them. Even for our present submarine designs, we will need to explore how vertical launch system (VLS) tubes can be adapted to handle a variety of land-attack (or anti-air – or even anti-missile) weapons, and how existing torpedo tubes can be best used to deploy UUVs, or eventually, miniaturized and podded UAVs, in addition to their more traditional payloads of missiles, mines, and torpedoes.

传统传感器的微型化以及创建全新类型的新型，例如核，生物和化学探测器，提出了用于全面基于海底的掩护监视和监测沿海战斗空间的新可能性。例如，可以通过卫星或潜水员远程遥测包进行实时监控，并通过子弹药的无人机携带或删除相应的空气/土地传感器，以及相应的空气/土地传感器，以及相应的空气/土地传感器，以及相应的空气/地下传感器。

In the near term, we are also studying potential payload options which could be made available by converting a limited number of excess Trident ballistic missile submarines to SSGNs – large, conventionally-armed attack boats. The available volume of these large submarines with significant remaining service lifetimes could be applied to accommodate a variety of new payload concepts, unhinged from the "tyranny of the torpedo tube." They include – but are not limited to – providing capacity for deploying over 100 offensive precision-strike weapons and offering greatly enhanced capacities and capabilities for the transportation and delivery of Special Operating Forces (SOF).

这种创新的研究将少数变形货物的具有成本效益的替代应用不影响我们对三叉戟SSBN的持续依赖，因为我们可靠，可靠，可生存和最重要的战略威慑力量到了下一个世纪，这是一个时代 - 不幸的是，这是一个时代以进一步的大规模破坏武器扩散。我们的三叉戟潜艇部署了该国战略弹头的54％，仅使用战略预算的34％，而海军人员的1.5％不到1.5％。所有这一切都进入了一个巡逻平台，该平台的下落仍然完全不知道那些想对我们国家的利益释放恐怖的人，这使我们的三角体成为我们国家安全姿势在可预见的未来的不可替代的要素。

Getting Modular
Modular construction is the most cost-effective and operationally supportable means of providing for technology insertion into our new submarines. Significant modularity is already embodied in the design and construction of the new Virginia (SSN-774)-class attack submarine. This design will facilitate planned technology insertion over the life of the class. In designing follow-on submarines, these modular concepts will be carried to their logical conclusion, to yield maximum flexibility in operation, economy in procurement and construction, and improvement in our modernization rate.

With modular construction, we will also be able to deploy significant payload variations in our submarines using a single basic design. The modular architectural approach implements a basic, standardized structural "shell" that contains the nuclear propulsion plant and ship control functions, along with fundamental self-defense capabilities. Variable payloads can then be configured as "plug-and-fight" modules that would mate with the basic hull form, using standardized electrical and mechanical interfaces. This approach is similar to that used in configuring the Space Shuttle, where interchangeable payload modules are swapped in and out to best support the specific mission needs of each flight. These SSNs with optimized special payloads must preserve the submarine’s core advantages of stealth, mobility, and endurance and retain their important multi-mission capability. But the added flexibility to substantially enhance a chosen mission area – or set of mission areas – would offer a significant advantage over what I’ve called our traditional "Noah’s Ark" submarine design concept, in which "small numbers of everything" are carried aboard each submarine all the time, potentially to accomplish any conceivable submarine mission.

A truly modular design would permit unprecedented flexibility for operational commanders to tailor their fleets. They would be able to use their current and projected mission requirements to determine the optimum mix of specialized submarines (with volume-dominating, special-purpose payloads) versus other, more broadly configured multi-mission submarines – without incurring the operational inefficiencies and high costs of building and maintaining a number of less flexible, specialized submarines built from the keel up.

Getting Electric

There is a powerful agent, responsive, quick, and easy to use, pliable enough to meet all our needs on board. It does everything. It supplies light and heat for the ship and is the very soul of our mechanical equipment. That agent is electricity。

这些预言的话是世界上最传奇的潜艇船长之一 - 尼莫船长，在朱尔斯·凡尔纳（Jules Verne）的虚构的20,000个海底联赛中。如今，我们的海军的船只，特别是我们的核动力军舰，其“无限”的储存能源储层处于获得朱尔斯·凡尔纳（Jules Verne）几乎无法想象的杰出能力的门槛。新兴技术可以实现大量的运营进步，但是它们需要利用大量的电力。为了实现这一潜力提高能力，我们必须追求现代全电动船的发展，并结合电动驱动技术。该倡议将产生巨大的增长潜力，以推进战斗技术。

Just how would electric drive and an "all-electric ship" give us new abilities to do all of this? Well, take a walk into your submarine engine room. Today, on the order of 75-80 percent of the useful power of a submarine reactor is solely dedicated to propulsion; it is either used for speed, or it is not used – but in any event, it is not available to apply to other uses. Obviously then, only 20-25 percent of the reactor’s useful power can be used for other purposes. With electric drive, 100 percent of the power generated would be placed on an electrical bus, from which the skipper would be free to allocate energy wherever, whenever, and however he needs to, in order to meet requirements dictated by the tactical situation. Examples of future uses which would be made possible by this type of increased flexibility in distributing the ship’s generated energy include:

• 在使用前，充电高耐用，可重复使用的移动有效载荷，例如许多远程UUV以及无人机充电。
• 为高能海底传感器网络和其他分布式有效载荷提供动力。
• 释放高能量对抗，以抗近距离的高速鱼雷，从中逃避可能不是一个可行的选择。
• Employing regenerative directed energy weapons, which would exploit the stored energy of the reactor (rather than depending on the limited quantity of propellant in the small number of weapons for which stowage volume can be made available).

The Navy’s future fossil-fueled surface ships might benefit from this technology as well, even without a nuclear reactor to provide a large power source, because the same type of flexibility in the allocation of available energy would be realized, along with tremendous naval architectural flexibility and substantial cost savings in fuel efficiency and manning reductions. In short, most of our Navy’s ships might be substantially enhanced by "getting electric."

潜艇将通过使用电动驱动器获得至关重要的额外优势，这是改善声学隐形的下一个重要一步。尽管我们的潜艇已经是安静，我们将需要进一步的进步，以保持迅速前进的声学传感器和处理器技术的泛滥。我们已经实现了使用当前机械驱动技术在物理上可用的大多数声学安静。为了做得更好，我们需要更改提供推进和机上发电的总体方法。

可以在短期内利用成熟的技术（例如高功率半导体，永久磁铁电动机和磁性轴承），以提供我们需要的必要的高扭矩，功率密集，安静的机载机械。新兴技术（包括高温超导性和直接能量转换）为未来的可能性提供了有希望的未来可能性，可以实现非常低的能源运输和存储，以及更简单的推进植物的前景，几乎没有运动零件，没有在发动机室里蒸。

英雄：昨天，今天和明天。我们的第二次世界大战英雄设定了
卓越标准使冷战赢得胜利
and sustains the force today. Riding the technological revolution into the 21st Century,
潜艇将继续在我们国家的战斗部队中发挥核心作用。
Clockwise from top left: USS Barb (SS-220) sailors with WWII battle flag;
USS Columbus (SSN-762) underway; Battlestations aboard the USS Tucson
(ssn - 770);and artist’s rendition of the coming USS Virginia (SSN-774)

Remaining Affordable
那些声称今天没有造成船舶竞争的人错过了另一场冷战后的现实。实际上，我们正在争取有限的资源竞争，与其他对国家利益重要的领域（教育，运输，连续剧和社会证券）争夺一些。为了将潜艇部队与我们需要完成这项工作的SSN数量，这些SSN必须负担得起。即使需要更多的艰难预算决策，也将我们限制在今天，即使需要更多的预算，也充分证明了这一点 - 我决心在这里做得更好。

We have made, and continue to achieve, substantial cost reductions in the Virginia-class submarine – in areas such as a life-of-the-ship reactor core; a simpler plant design that reduces pumps, valves, and piping by over 40 percent; reduced numbers of watch stations; disciplined incorporation of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment; and a fully computerized design-then-build process of construction.

降低现有海底类中升级和维护系统成本的方法也正在进行中。一个例子是声纳系统的声学快速COTS插入（ARCI）“最先进”的声纳系统升级，该升级于1997年首次在Augusta（SSN-710）上进行评估，并计划在2005年到2005年在车队中进行完整安装。

We are committed to continuing this cost-limiting approach into the future. Modularity in both power systems and payloads, for example, will be a key factor in containing the cost of submarine construction and subsequent upgrades, as well as permitting a much shorter cycle time for implementing new design concepts. In a low-build-rate environment, this is the most feasible and cost-effective way to field new capabilities quickly to respond to new threats.

But our partners in industry need to do more. They should, and must, understand what is core, and what is process or culture – then challenge any part of the process and culture where we are not maximizing efficiency. For my part, I need to find industrial partners willing to do this and bid a fond adieu to the others.

结论
自从我们一个世纪前出生以来，海底力量就以我们人民的纯粹胆量以及在技术以及战略和战术领域的纯粹胆量以及持续不断的（而且经常大胆）创新而对我们的国家的能力，有效性和价值增长。近几十年来，随着冷战的推动力，随着核推进，潜艇发射的导弹，数字声学信号处理，拖曳阵列以及其他无数技术成就，创新的创新速度急剧加速了我们。随着我们下一个世纪的临近，海底力量将需要维持这种创造力的势头，以应对我们已经参与的“新世界秩序”的挑战。随着有效载荷功能的扩大，连接性的提高，通过模块化提高了平台的多功能性以及我们的潜艇的全部电气化，我们将继续是一项重要而致命的力量，并且是国家武器库中的重要因素。

I began this article reflecting on our heroes from World War II. I don’t think that’s being nostalgic or wistfully recalling faded glory. I recount the stories of those heroes repeatedly, because they set our standards. They developed the culture of our Submarine Force – they led the way. In the crucible of an extended world war, numerous technologies emerged at a blinding rate, and those new technologies demanded new tactics to employ them. Our World War II submariners took the products of new technologies (the sonars, the radars, the improved torpedo exploders, and more), put them into their boats – with welding rods, baling wire, and white line – and then they figured out how to best employ their gadgets, sharing what they learned with one another and telling their leadership what more they needed to do their job. Using every bit of technology and innovation available – and a whole lot of courage – they regained lost territory, developed a lead, and finally prevailed. Anything less would not have been enough. And our submariners of the 60s, 70s, and 80s continued this legacy. The public is just beginning to understand their enormous contributions during those crucial years of nuclear gridlock with the Soviet Union. Study after study after study has concluded that our country will continue to rely on its submariners far into the 21st century.

那是您正在运营我们的潜艇的地方。我们有很多人在开发和纳入新技术的过程中，以确保面对数量减少的最高质量。It’s up to you to take them to sea, though, and figure out how to use them to our best advantage – and to share them with one another, and tell our Submarine Force leadership what works, what doesn’t work, and what you need most in the very integrated and Joint world today.

第二次世界大战的潜艇，我们的冷战潜艇，今天的潜艇以及我们将在下个世纪运作的潜艇之间存在漫长而不间断的联系。当我们的国家需要海底力量时，其他任何事情都不会：

It was to the Submarine Force that I looked to carry the load.... It is to the everlasting honor and glory of our submarine personnel that they never failed us....

就像当今世界各地一样，我们总是回答铃铛。对于我们的潜艇和潜水员来说，这些忙碌而令人兴奋。我们正在从事我们国家今天需要做的重要且不可替代的工作，我们正在为在下个世纪提供对国家对国家武器库的价值。