F-22:为什么它不应该在1991年被批准用于工程和制造开发。1998年3月26日星期四查克灌木林[个人意见，不代表机构关系]空军现在希望在只有4％的测试完成后将F-22放入生产中。摩洛成本正在增长，技术问题正在安装，并且时间表正在滑倒。现在包围F-22的问题是为什么我们应该追求剧烈的原型和测试过程，以减少风险，以便在我们并发对开发和生产的承诺之前。重要的是要理解F-22的问题，如F / A-18E / F的问题被预见，并且可以避免。我不是周一早上的四分卫。我于1991年7月23日撰写附加的报告。自那一来，本文确定的问题已经成真 - 生产数量已被削减，力结构已减少，库存老化问题变得更糟，F-22具有技术，安排和成本问题，这将使所有这些力量结构更差，最重要的是，继续该计划的政治压力增加。即使空军背离这个程序，这不太可能，因为它已经投入了它的声誉，国会可能没有肠道杀死它。空军和洛克希德马丁现在想通过将这一架飞机投入到2％的测试完成之前，通过将这一飞机提高国会的政治锁定。当试图了解我们的国家如何遇到问题时，就像F-22，F / A-18E / F和持续的星球大战计划一样，为什么在我国继续花钱的时候，我们的国家在武器之后花钱是安装的。冷战的结束，必须开始解决动机问题，特别是在士兵和纳税人的总体福利的牺牲行使派系权力。 In this regard, it is important to understand the effects of personal incentives and rewards and punishments in the Pentagon. It might interest readers to know that, notwithstanding the disclaimer, I received a reprimand (from Herb Puscheck at David Chu's urging) for writing this report and distributing it to members of the OSD & JCS staffs as well as the Air Force.]
独立立场文件：在工程和制造业的发展富兰克林·C·斯平尼1991年7月23日工作人员分析师ASD / PA＆E（战术空运部）免责声明：本文所表达的观点仅代表作者本人的。他们并不代表ASD / PA＆E或国防部长办公室批准的位置。----- [主机] ----我认为至少有三个原因的ATF不应该在这个时候批准的工程与制造发展（EMD）。这些理由，我建议可以概括如下：一，即使批准的计划现在到今年2012财年，也就是EMD进行没有问题之间的完美展现，生产率建立按计划，美国国会拨付足够的预算来购买出整个生产运行（见图1），决定与ATF前进与它深厚的力量结构的后果进行。如果我们打算维持26个TFWS和180所防空拦截的受力结构，我们必须在我们所购买的ATF同期购买约1200额外战斗/攻击机（见图2），我们必须允许的平均年龄力结构，以增加基本上高于它的当前高电平11年（参见图3）。在另一方面，如果我们不买更多的飞机，我们将继续22年后退役飞机的现行政策，力的大小将急剧下降，动力组合将有利于空中优势的战斗机变得如此不平衡的是战术的使命战斗机航空将不得不被重新定义（见图4和5）。有没有批准的计划，以解决长期受力结构问题。 Moreover, current planning documents contain serious contradictions. While the Air Force acknowledged the need to buy a multi-role fighter at the Conventional Systems Committee (CSC), and the draft Defense Program Projection (DPP) contains a production funding wedge between 1999 and 2003, there is no funding for this program in the FY 1992/1993 budget, and the DPP claims the RDT&E program is underfunded by 42% in the four outyears of the FYDP. Also, there are no plans to modernize the force structure by remanufacturing existing airplanes, and there has been no explicit decision to increase the average age the force above its current level. We need to define where we want go and how we are going to get there, before we increase our nation's commitment to the ATF. Accordingly, a decision to proceed with the further development of the ATF should be deferred until the force-structure issues have been analyzed, options have been evaluated, precise force-structure goals have been defined, and a comprehensive modernization strategy is approved and integrated into the FYDP and the DPP. II. The ATF program might not unfold flawlessly. Should this happen, the problem described above will get much worse. There are at least three potential problem areas: Technical Risk: With the possible exception of the F-14, the ATF is the most technologically ambitious leap forward in the history of fighter aviation. Yet the YF-22 is a prototype in only the most limited definition of the term. To date, the airframe, engine, and avionics have been developed along three quasi-independent paths. While the YF-22 demonstrated the aerodynamics and persistence of the supersonic-cruise concept, it does not incorporate stealth features, including the required composite materials, the engine is not yet rated for full power, and although brassboard avionics have flown inside a capacious Boeing 757, they have not yet been designed to be integrated into the YF-22's much smaller airframe. The inevitable tradeoffs needed to bring together these disparate efforts in a single integrated design magnify the risk of unexpected weight growth, cost growth, and performance degradation. Moreover, since the wing is optimized for supersonic flight, the problem of unexpected weight growth is especially dangerous in the case of the ATF. Should weight growth reduce supersonic persistence to the point where the ATF must rely on subsonic maneuvering performance in combat, the result could be an aerodynamically inferior fighter. Bias in Cost Estimates: Procurement costs might also be higher than predicted because of systemic biases in our estimation techniques. At this stage of development, without a comprehensive engineering design, industrial engineers have no way of reliably estimating what the ATF will eventually cost to produce. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the estimates presented to the CSC were too optimistic. Those numbers were based on a "learning curve" that predicted continuous decreases in unit costs as production increases (see Figure 6). Learning curves, however, have a long history of underestimating actual costs. For example, while considerably higher, the ATF's cost predictions are almost identical in form to those made for the F-14, F-15, and F-18 after EMD was completed but before production started up. But in the latter three examples, the advantage of having comprehensive engineering drawings, detailed materials specifications, and estimates for "touch labor" did not prevent their actual costs from significantly exceeding their predicted costs (see Figures 7-9). No such "advantage" exists for the ATF. The greater uncertainty inherent in the ATF's Pre-EMD learning curve suggests that higher costs are probable, if not inevitable. The impact of this uncertainty--in terms of increased budget requirements, reduced production rates, or the need to find compensating offsets in other programs--has not been explored. Circumstantial Management Uncertainty: The ATF is being built under a complicated contractor-teaming concept. To proceed smoothly, a large number of hi-tech engineering tasks, performed at widely separated locations, under conditions of very different corporate cultures, must come together harmoniously in terms of time, form, fit, and function. This prodigious effort clearly requires a savvy, experienced, management team. While I do not question the selection of the team members, their track records raise the possibility of administrative dissonance that may disrupt the precise choreography of these diverse activities. To wit: the integrating contractor, Lockheed, has not designed and mass produced a fighter since the mid-1950s (i.e., the F-104). Lockheed's plant in Georgia has a history of cost overruns and quality control problems when producing comparatively simple, large subsonic transports. Our only experience with contractor teaming in a complex tactical aircraft, the A-12, just collapsed in failure, and while liability has not been determined, the management practices at General Dynamics were clearly part of the A-12's cost/weight debacle. Taken together, these technical, economic, and circumstantial uncertainties are flashing red lights suggesting there is a substantial risk that the ATF's development program will not unfold flawlessly. We can reduce this risk by reducing concurrency--that is, by partitioning the program into a Phase II Advanced Development Program aimed at producing a truly combat-capable prototype with full-powered engines and fully-integrated stealth and avionics capabilities, while deferring manufacturing development until a competitive fly-off against current generation fighters confirms the advantages of proceeding with manufacturing development and production. III. There is reason to believe that the ATF can proceed at the slower, more prudent pace described above without excessive military risk. It is important to remember that the ATF was conceived at the height of the Cold War. Its System Operational Requirement (1 Mar 91) is clearly premised on the belief that the Soviet Union is the threat to be countered and that the intensity of cold-war competition would continue unabated. But that stable world no longer exists, and while the long-term consequences of Communism's collapse can not be known, it is now clear that our primary adversary, the USSR, must focus inward for many years. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS have stated repeatedly (e.g., in Congressional testimony and in the JCS Net Assessment) that our new planning assumptions assume the threat of a conventional war with the Soviet Union is greatly diminished, and the threats of major regional contingencies are now the most appropriate scenarios for sizing and shaping conventional forces over the FYDP's planning horizon. While the ATF's continued development might be justified as a prudent hedge against the revival of the Soviet threat in the long term, the overwhelming superiority that our pilots and aircraft demonstrated in air combat against current generation Soviet fighters during the war with Iraq makes it difficult to imagine what major regional contingency could justify the high-risk, concurrent development program being now contemplated. In summary, the profound but unexamined force structure consequences embodied in a commitment to the ATF, the technical and economic uncertainties of the ATF, and the uncertain but certainly diminished character of the air-to-air threat facing our pilots combine to suggest that the ATF should not be approved for EMD. The Air Force needs to formulate a comprehensive, fiscally-pragmatic plan for modernizing the entire fighter force. If the ATF becomes part of this plan, it should be restructured into a less-concurrent, lower-risk, fly-before-you-buy program. The Air Force should defer manufacturing development until the uncertainties are reduced by a competitive flyoff between a combat-capable prototype and current generation fighters. Finally, when considering the ATF's future, senior management should also ponder its political risk: a decision to approve the concurrent engineering and manufacturing development program will lock in and magnify the powerful constituent forces aiming to commit our country to this course of action for the next 30 to 40 years. Such a decision will greatly diminish our future freedom of action during a period of increasing financial uncertainty. Should the ATF be deemed undesirable at some time in the future, it will not be reversed before billions of dollars of the public treasure have been futilely expended. Our experience with the A-12 is a flashing red warning light in this regard. The lesser commitment of a fly-before-you-buy program would reduce political risk and increase management's ability to adapt to unforeseen changes in future years.