[页：S15093]
No matter that the aircraft proposed is an F/A-18 in name only--the fuselage, wing, tail, engines, and avionics will all be new. No matter that development is now pegged at roughly $5 billion with nowhere to go but up. No matter that the Navy cannot now afford to buy enough of the current generation of aircraft to fill the decks of the carriers we already have. All this has counted for nothing in the minds of those who are proposing this accelerated, almost desperate, ramp-up to meet a first flight deadline of the first quarter of 1995.
F/A-18E/F令人震惊的是它的突然性。去年海军在国防拨款小组委员会之前的证词不包括关于F/A-18E/F的消息。现在，在A-12崩溃之后，我们被要求将某些东西扔到负责A-12的公司的公司中，以开发A-12的间隙填充物。如果不是因为这个笑话是在纳税人上的事实，那将是可笑的。
并谈论繁忙的日程，从现在到1992财政年度结束后，F/A-18E/F计划必须跳下以下障碍：
First, system engineering studies to reduce risk and provide data for configuration definition;
其次，基于工程研究结果的飞机配置定义；
第三，详细的规范生成；
Fourth, engine risk reduction effort or initiation of engine source competition;
第五，发动机源选择 - 如果竞争；
Sixth, detailed specification review and approval;
第七，里程碑二世的决定；
第八，FSD合同奖；
第九，承包商FSD飞机设计，分析和模型测试；
第十，子系统的设计和测试；
Eleventh, software preliminary design; and
第十二，长长的铅采购。
No loitering around the water cooler for these guys.
Most amazing of all, however, is how close this plan came to being accepted. Had it not been for the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, the F/A-18E/F would have sailed through and not even been a conference issue.
总统先生，我要求此时插入1992财年参议院国防拨款报告中有关F/A-18E/F的语言。
摘录如下：
F/A-18 squadrons: The Navy's attempts in the past year to chart an affordable, militarily justified, and cost-effective course for the future of naval aviation have, in the Committee's opinion, not yielded the intended result. In the wake of the demise of the A-12 attack aircraft and F-14D remanufacturing programs, the Navy has proposed two new, major, and costly modernization efforts--the AX aircraft and the F/A-18E/F programs.
The AX program, intended to develop a less costly successor to the A-12 and an ultimate replacement for the aging A-6E, all-weather, medium-attack fleet, is nevertheless expected to cost at least $14,000,000,000. The F/A-18E/F upgrade is projected to cost at least $4,000,000,000. It is intended to provide the Navy with a complement and successor to the Navy's primary air-to-air combat platform, the F-14, as well as to supplement the carrier's offensive ground attack capabilities.
该委员会认为，评估AX飞机的总体负担能力为时过早，因为战斗能力和机身性能参数的特定组合在很大程度上不确定。例如，随着竞争行业设计团队制定其特定建议，以满足海军广泛的暂定操作要求，斧头计划的概念探索阶段将开始并延伸到1992财年。
实际上，斧头可以在接下来的一年中定义了斧头可以进行空对空以及空对面的任务的程度。国防部长表示，预计斧头将具有出色的空对空间和空对面能力，以进攻和防御目的。在十年下降的国防预算和不断变化的威胁中，委员会认为这是一个审慎的结论。在这些条件下，主要是单个MISSION飞机的负担能力和军事效用非常有疑问。
Thus, based on the Defense Secretary's statement, and the designs expected to be proposed by some of the industry teams, the Committee concludes that the AX actually has the potential to fulfill some of the air-to-air mission of the proposed F/A-18 aircraft.
委员会1992财年就F/A-18计划提出的建议在很大程度上受到了斧头多功能能力的潜力，并且需要审查该计划的概念探索阶段的结果，以确定范围这种潜力将实现。
虽然提出了f/a-18e/f变体，以治疗对当前F-18的范围和有效载荷能力的长期不满，但该计划的主要理由是为增长室提供进一步改进的增长空间-18c/d及以后的基本e/f。E/F程序的核心是提供机身的重量，空间和功率，以便在基本的E/F配置进行后不久，允许对E/F进行进一步且昂贵的升级。
The costs of developing and procuring these additional capabilities are not included in the $4,000,000,000 cost so far projected for the F/A-18E/F. The true costs of the F/A-18E/F program are unknown and the ability of future defense budgets to support such upgrades is uncertain. Indeed, these costs are not included even in the later years of the Navy FYDP, which is underfunded just for planned upgrades to the F/A-18C/D's.
The Committee is uncertain what advantage lies in spending $4,000,000,000 during the next 5 years just to field an aircraft we immediately will have to spend further untold millions or billions to improve. Based on the Defense Secretary's projection and the expected contractor designs, the extent to which the F/A-18 needs to be upgraded is very hypothetical. The more the AX is capable of air-to-air combat and supersonic speeds, the more simply producing additional F/A-18C/D's is an acceptable, affordable alternative to an open-ended, costly E/F program.
Furthermore, the high cost and steep increase in F/A-18E/F funding profiles is driven by an arbitrary initial operational capability [IOC] date and large contract termination-liability requirements. The Navy has failed to justify both the IOC urgency and the termination liability financial requirements.
The Committee notes the Navy has inflated the weight projection used to claim that the F/A-18 C/D will lose too much payload in the future--thus necessitating the E/F.
同时,对存在的主要问题survivability improvements claimed for the E/F compared with the C/D. In the Committee's opinion, these claims should be subject to more independent review before they can be accepted with sufficient confidence to help justify a $4,000,000,000 program. Further elaboration on this issue is contained in the classified annex to the Committee's report.
Finally, the Committee observes that in making claims about the affordability of the E/F, the Navy compares the costs of the aircraft with the more expensive F-14. The service does not consider any economies from forgoing the E/F altogether, procuring multimission AX in larger quantities, and purchasing more F/A-18 C/D's in the near term to address hypothetical inventory shortfalls. The Committee thinks these considerations should be assessed and notes the unit cost of an E/F will not be inexpensive, especially when further upgrades are considered.
考虑所有这些因素,Committee believes it is prudent to moderate the proposed pace of the F/A-18E/F program to prevent premature commitment to a costly program which may not be necessary, and which may not deliver as advertised. This moderation also will reduce the financial burden on the Navy budget and permit further assessment of the AX and F/A-18 programs as better, more complete information becomes available. The Committee's course of action permits more time to resolve these issues and preserves Congress' options and the taxpayers' pocketbook without risking national security.
For all these reasons, it is recommended that $319,077,000 be appropriated for all F/A-18 research and development efforts in fiscal year 1992. This amount includes $250,000,000 for the F/A-18E/F, a reduction of $133,000,000 from the budget request and $153,000,000 from the House allowance, but an amount still representing 2,908-percent growth (excluding inflation) from the program's fiscal year 1991 funding. This amount is more than sufficient to maintain program momentum in this difficult budget environment.
委员会减少了这种减少的情况，并认为提供的25万美元提供了全力支持，以维持国会未来努力实现强大而强大的F/A-18E/F开发计划的选择。
To assist the Congress in evaluating the full benefits and costs of the F/A-18E/F program, additional information is needed. Therefore, the Committee directs the Office of the Secretary of Defense to submit the following information, no later than April 15, 1992:
An updated cost estimate for the program, including a full listing of all the upgrades contemplated for the F/A-18E/F, the total cost, and costs between fiscal years 1992 and 1998 to develop, procure, and install each upgrade, the timetable for such acquisition and installation, and whether each upgrade project is fully funded in these years.
An updated projection by the U.S. intelligence community validating in detail, by region, scenario, and potential adversary, the most likely and realistic air-to-air and surface-to-air threats the F/A-18E/F would face in the years 1998-2010, and the specific validated threat capabilities which each particular F/A-18E/F upgrade project is intended to counter.
An independent assessment of the capabilities of each F/A-18E/F upgrade to counter each specific threat.
独立组织的新成本和运营有效性分析与海军绝不相关，以F/A-18C/D的配置来评估E/F的成本和操作有效性，因为它们已被编程为1996财政年度，以及斧头的新兴设计。
An independent assessment by the Air Force's civilian and military experts of the proposed survivability features of the E/F and their likely effectiveness against the expected threats and their resistance to countermeasures.
为了进行独立的生存能力分析，委员会指示，空军军事和平民专家（包括林肯实验室的专家）可以访问和清算，以获取他们认为必要的所有信息。
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D'Amato先生。这是我一年中看到的关于海军航空航空的一些最周到的语言，有望代表海军飞机开发的纳迪尔。让我重复一个关键段落：``委员会在不偏见的情况下减少了这一减少，并认为提供的25万美元提供了对维持国会的选项的全力支持，以实现将来实现强大而强大的F/A-18E/F开发计划。”
That is considerably more generous than I would have been, but it gets to the heart of the matter: Good government. Our job is not simply to rubber stamp every cockamamie scheme that is belched forth from the Navy's bilge. We are charged with oversight, with holding the services to account. This language does that.
我赞扬了我的同事，并寻求国防授权和拨款同事，将这种合理的方法纳入他们的最终会议套餐。
结尾