Nuclear & Radiological Terrorism

定义威胁

Seizing an Intact Nuclear Weapon

专家通常将核和放射恐怖主义分为四个威胁类别。首先，诸如恐怖分子，罪犯或一群恐怖分子或罪犯之类的非国家行为者可以从核武国家的武器库中获取核武器。由于武器是无抵押或礼物，因此可能通过盗窃而发生收购，因为保管人希望非国家演员拥有武器，或该州的一个或多个官员希望将一种或多种武器转移给非国家演员。可以想象，非国家演员可以通过对保管人本身或亲人构成可信的威胁来勒索核保管人。

Making an Improvised Nuclear Device

第二个核威胁是，非国家参与者可以获取足够的裂变材料，例如高度富集的铀（HEU）或p plut，以建造简易的核装置（IND）。印第安纳州的炸弹可能像破坏广岛和长崎城市的核心一样多。核安全专家一致认为，HEU构成了最大的危险，因为使用它来制作“枪支类型” IND，类似于广岛上掉落的炸弹。相比之下，只有在长崎丢弃的“内爆式”炸弹中，phluthium只能用于更具技术挑战性的“内爆式”炸弹。

这两个低probab核恐怖主义威胁ility events in that they are unlikely to occur due to the relatively high security for nuclear weapons and most fissile material, but they are very high consequence because of the massive destruction that would occur if a non-state actor could detonate one or more nuclear weapons or INDs on one or more cities.

Dispersing Radioactive Materials and Attacking Nuclear Facilities

第一个放射学威胁是所谓的肮脏炸弹，在这种炸弹中，放射性物质通过使用常规炸药或其他手段来分散。专家经常使用放射学扩散装置（RDD）一词来指“肮脏的炸弹”。第二次放射学威胁是核设施（例如核电站或核废料储存）的可能攻击或破坏。

The radiological terrorism threats are more likely to occur due to the relatively larger number of commercially used radioactive materials and hundreds of nuclear facilities worldwide, but the consequences are much lower than nuclear terrorism because there would not be nuclear explosions but instead dispersal of radioactive materials that emit ionizing radiation.

Thus, nuclear terrorism would involve weapons of mass destruction while radiological terrorism would involve weapons of mass disruption.

Detecting and Stopping Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

Soon after the founding of FAS in 1945, there were concerns that a non-state actor could acquire nuclear or other radioactive materials to use in a crime or an act of terrorism. It is difficult to protect against these threats because of the relative ease in shielding fissile material useful for making nuclear weapons and the widespread availability of radioactive substances for commercial purposes. In the late 1940s, for instance, J. Robert Oppenheimer, the Scientific Director of the Manhattan Project, testified to a congressional committee that the only way to reliably detect nuclear material or nuclear weapons being smuggled into the country would be to open every container with a screwdriver. This remark became the basis of the famous classified “screwdriver report” commissioned by the Atomic Energy Commission. Because of the thousands of miles of borders and the millions of people and containers annually crossing these borders, the United States cannot rely on detection methods to stop non-state actors or even states from smuggling in nuclear weapons or the fissile material to make these weapons.

Highly radioactive commercial sources have a better chance of being detected because their radiation signature would be harder to shield. But detection alone is not an effective prevention technique.

深入防御核安全和降低风险

FAS和其他组织的核和放射安全专家认为，有效的防御战略依赖于“深入防御”或多层保护和反应。

Each layer of defense is imperfect but as more layers are added, the overall defense system becomes more effective. Complementing defense-in-depth is a risk reduction concept that emphasizes both reduction of the probability and consequences of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Risk is a function of the probability of something happening such as a terrorist group acquiring nuclear material and the consequences if an event occurs such as a terrorist group detonating a nuclear explosive.

减少事件发生的概率

Methods to reduce probability include securing nuclear and other highly radioactive materials, eliminating as much as possible these materials by developing and deploying alternative technologies, leveraging intelligence and law enforcement information to interdict non-state actors before they can use nuclear or radiological weapons, improving security at and around nuclear power plants and other potentially vulnerable nuclear facilities, and deploying radiation detection equipment at ports and border crossings as well as around high profile targets such as New York City. Another method is to reduce the motivations of terrorists to engage in nuclear or radiological acts. This latter method is arguably harder to perform that the others because as terrorism expert Dr. Jerrold Post has said, “We know more of the interior of the atom than we do of the interior of the mind of the terrorist.”

Mitigating the Consequences if the Events Occur

Methods to reduce consequences include equipping and training first responders such as police, fire, and hazardous material response forces, developing and deploying more effective methods to clean up radioactive materials and decontaminate buildings, creating better crisis management strategies for all levels of government (local, state, and federal), developing better means for crisis management leaders to coordinate with first responders, decontamination crews, and medical personnel, and communicating with the public about measures that they need to take in the event of an act of nuclear or radiological terrorism.