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- 1 - General
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FAR EAST COMMAND

31 July 1952³

This publication, "History of the North Korean Army," has been prepared by the Intelligence Division, G2 Section, Headquarters Far East Command, and is furnished to provide an up-to-date, ready reference for commanders and intelligence personnel in the field.


Some of the information contained herein is transitory in character and will be revised periodically through the FEC Daily Intelligence Summary and other FEC intelligence publications.

This publication supercedes:

1. "Order of Battle Information, North Korean Army," dated 15 October 1950.
2. "Order of Battle Information, North Korean Army," dated 20 August 1951, and supplement thereto, "General History of NKA Units," dated 16 September 1951.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL CLARK:

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NORTH KOREAN FLAG

RANKING OFFICERS IN THE
NORTH KOREAN ARMY



KIM Il Sung
Commander-in-Chief



NAM Il
Chief of Staff

NORTH KOREAN INSIGNIA OF RANK SHOULDER BOARDS AND SHOULDER STRAPS



SECTION I

GENERAL

1. Aggression:

The morning of 25 June 1950 was chosen for the beginning of the North Korean armed aggression against the young democratic Republic of Korea. Determined to conquer the entire southern portion of the peninsula, the newly converted Communists puppets loosed their military machine with startling swiftness, finally and openly upsetting the delicate balance through which peace had been maintained for not quite five years.

2. Events Leading to Aggression:

In retrospect, it is obvious that the seed of aggression was conceived and nurtured by the USSR as a result of disagreements arising over implementation of the so-called Moscow Decision of 1945. A by-product of the Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, the Moscow Decision provided for a Joint Commission of the United States and USSR to organize a provisional government and initiate a broad program of democratic reforms for a united Korea. However, conflict developed over the establishment of a four-power trusteeship and Korea remained incontrovertibly bisected at the 38th Parallel, a boundary originally instituted merely as a line of demarkation between Soviet and American forces to facilitate the handling of surrendering Japanese troops. The significance of this disagreement over ostensibly pre-determined decisions is that the United States, possessed of the conviction that measures for a unified Korea would eventually have Soviet concurrence, continued to strive for solution through the United Nations, while the USSR proceeded in North Korea to mold in its own image a government and sociology which brooked no other unification of Korea than that subject to the dictates of the Soviet hierarchy.

3. Post World War II Soviet Control:

Soviet supervision over the setting up and initial administration of the North Korean puppet government was vested in a Soviet Civil Administration Bureau which carried out policies formulated in the Politburo and passed down through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Political Administration Department of the Red Army. Through ministrations of this agency, a veritable flood of Soviet advisors permeated the governmental, economic, social and educational structures of North Korea. Although outwardly maintaining an advisory status, Soviet advisors, in fact, exercised control and supervision over all policy matters. In this manner the USSR created a satellite state which was politically subservient and subject to economic manipulation. To buttress the regimentation of North Korean society, reinforce internal security, and maintain the regime during the period required for eliminating weaknesses in administration and leadership, a force in excess of 30,000 police and a para-military border constabulary were assigned to the control of the North Korean Ministry of Interior. Using a wide variety of media, including persuasive propaganda, thought control, and the conferring of material benefits upon those who measured up to ideological standards, penetration was effected into every element of North Korean society and later embraced portions of the Republic of Korea population as well.

4. Development of the Military State:

To add sustenance to the North Korean drive for dominance, it was mandatory that attention be focused upon the internal economy, which, by

the end of 1946, had been reduced to a state of near chaos through a combination of Japan's wartime abuses of arable lands and industrial plants, Soviet looting and Korean neglect. The influx of Soviet industrial and technological experts in 1947 marked the beginning of the renovation. By 1949, through nationalization of banking, heavy industry and communications, the agrarian redistribution program and the political monopoly of unions, the North Korean economy had superficially at least, regained some semblance of stability. Artificial industrial and agricultural surpluses for the expanding of trade relations with Manchuria, North China, Southeast Asia and the USSR were built up through an austerity program which deprived the populace of all but the necessities of life. Even at this point, however, the imparting of a military complexion to the economy of the North Korean "People's Republic" was singularly noticeable. Whereas a nation bent upon establishing a peaceful livelihood negotiates commercial treaties favorable to long-term economic stability, the puppet government demonstrated a willingness to lower the standard of living of its people by exporting vitally needed foodstuffs and raw materials in order to obtain the instruments of war.

5. Soviet Indoctrination:

To complete the indoctrination of North Korean institutions to Communistic concepts, the USSR wove threads of control throughout the educational and cultural complex of the infant satellite. Soviet advisors kept a watchful eye over the curricula of Pyongyang University and secondary schools. Courses were taught from communistically inspired text books and from the classroom podiums emanated a constant stream of villifying, inflammatory, anti-capitalistic propaganda. A mastery of the teachings of Marx and Engels became the passport to academic proficiency. To further assure the loyalty and support of the North Korean Literati, large groups of promising students were dispatched to the USSR for further study. In addition, a Higher Officers' School was created to provide a personnel pool for highest level positions in the "People's Committee" and the North Korean Labor (Communist) Party. Its staff and faculty enjoined the matriculation of only those whose loyalties and attitudes conformed to the mandates of Communism.

6. North Korean Propaganda Against South Korea:

Concurrently with the communization of North Korea, attempts were made through subversive means to unite the whole of Korea under the Communist banner. Initially, the South Korean plum seemed ripe for the picking, since confusion resulting from the United States-Soviet disagreement over the unification of Korea enhanced the domestic rivalries of the two contending South Korean extremist camps. The Left, being an outspoken advocate of equalitarian distribution of national wealth, gravitated towards the propaganda preached by the North Korean Government, and, in time, was utilized as a political instrument in the struggle to destroy the infant democracy. The Rightist element, incensed over the possibility that an equalitarian distribution of vested Japanese interests would constitute a precedent for the confiscation of concentrated Korean-owned wealth, found itself in violent opposition with the Left. This widening of the political chasm in South Korea was given impetus by a resort to terrorism for the attainment of Leftist ends. The South Korean police force, confronted with the emergency of Leftist terrorism, undertook positive suppression methods which committed it to the support of the Rightist faction. Into this situation the North Korean government injected a vicious propaganda effort which contrasted the alleged proletarian paradise of North Korea with what it termed the political and economic distress of the South, buttressing its arguments with exaggerated stories of extortions and brutalities allegedly committed by the police force and Rightist

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groups. This, then, was the toehold for the attempted subversion of the Republic of Korea and provided masquerade material for the internal machinations of the North Korean "People's Committee."

7. Espionage, Sabotage and Subversion Against South Korea:

To supplement its intensive propaganda attack and at the same time put forth a maximum effort to assimilate the Republic of Korea by subversion, the North Korean government spun an espionage network south of the 38th Parallel which touched intimately upon every facet of South Korean society. These agents, many of whom had received prior training at Chinese Communist and Soviet espionage schools, added hot coals of sabotage, propaganda and outright coercion to the political and economic unrest of the United Nations-sponsored democracy. Later, aided by North Korean guerrilla bands, they played a significant role in paving the way for the military penetration of South Korea by furnishing the invaders with detailed military, political and economic information and by sabotaging installations and communication lines vital to the Republic of Korea defenders.

8. Organizing of Communists and Opportunists in South Korea:

Particularly illustrative of the external political "influence" resulting from North Korean propaganda and subversive activities are such endeavors as the abortive Yosu Rebellion in 1948; outright monetary support to the South Korean Labor Party for a continued generation of political and economic instability in South Korea; the promises of prominent positions with the future Korean "People's Democracy" for influential and wealthy South Korean citizenry who saw fit to align themselves with the puppet government; and the use of the then rapidly expanding North Korean Army for scare purposes.

9. Birth of North Korean Armed Forces:

The creation and building up of a competent fighting machine as an alternate means to accomplish the unification of Korea did not wait upon the failure of subversion. Although the North Korean Army was not officially activated until 8 February 1948, the backbone of the armed forces was forged in 1946 under the mask of Central Peace Preservation Units and Youth Training Organizations. Using battle-hardened Korean veterans of the Chinese Communist Forces as a core, the puppet government built a modern military force whose only glaring weakness was in a lack of air power. The striking comparison in organization, logistics and tactics of the North Korean Army with those of the Soviet ground forces is attributable to the influence of the Soviet occupation army and the multitude of advisors which were left behind upon the Red Army's withdrawal.

10. Regimentation of Manpower:

To avoid the military confusions attendant upon manpower shortages, trained replacement pools were established through the organization of the so-called Border Constabulary Units and the creation of a Civil Defense Corps. In addition, training centers capable of efficiently processing the tremendous influx of personnel required to satisfy the needs of a large standing army appeared in the strategically located cities of Sinuiju, Pyongyang, Yongampo, Nanam and Hoeryong.

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11. Foreign Aid:

Since the absence of heavy industry precluded the manufacture of heavy items of equipment such as tanks and artillery pieces, the problem of satiating the heavy logistical demands of an expanding military program arose. The USSR had satisfied initial needs by leaving behind the bulk of the materiel with which its occupation army had been equipped. The North Korean war larder was further supplemented by stocks of equipment originally confiscated by Soviet troops from the Japanese Kwangtung Army and the armament of the Korean Volunteer Army, many units of which returned from China completely equipped. In 1948, the North Korean government also began the stockpiling of USSR-supplied equipment, including tanks, artillery, large caliber ammunition, vehicles, major items of engineer materiel, petroleum products, medical supplies and uniform material. Small arms ammunition and submachine guns were produced at the Pyongyang Machinery Manufacturing Plant, but even the output resulting from the day and night operation of this installation did not match the incoming quantities of ammunition of Soviet origin.

12. Logistics:

By utilizing nearby Manchurian and Soviet depots for the storage of war supplies accumulated since 1948 and by constructing large underground pillboxes along the 38th Parallel for the housing of weapons and ammunition, the problem of accessibility and procurement was overcome. Through this continuing augmentation of the military logistical complex, the potential ability of North Korea to equip its armed forces and sustain them in combat against the Republic of Korea Army apparently was unlimited.

13. Decision for Aggression:

By late 1949 it became evident that the Republic of Korea was not going to be overcome by propaganda and subversion. With its economy steadily improving as the result of United States aid and the implementation of land reform, the effect of Communist propaganda was rapidly diminishing. Guerrilla and border warfare was being competently neutralized by an efficient Republic of Korea police force and defensive army. On the other hand, the feasibility of uniting Korea by military force appeared bright. The Republic of Korea National Defense Army could not match the more numerous and better-equipped forces of the puppet government. That the United States would actually intervene was deemed improbable. Furthermore, the North Korean regime had already addicted itself politically, economically, sociologically and militarily to the drug of war. Aided and abetted by the USSR and Communist China, it was weaned upon the assurance that the Republic of Korea could be subdued in time for Soviet-type nationwide elections on 15 August 1950, the Fifth Anniversary of the Korean Liberation.

14. North Korean Army Geared for Aggression:

Thus, the training of the North Korean military machine was slipped into high gear in January 1950. By April, thousands of Korean members of the Chinese Communist Forces had been returned to participate in the invasion. Additional manpower to bring existing units up to full wartime strength and allow for the activation of new combat and service organizations was obtained during the period March to June, through the all-out conscription of North Korean youths. Inasmuch as the strategy of the puppet government's military planners was predicated upon the rapid sweeping of the Republic of Korea, training was focused upon producing a land army, with only a passing interest being directed to the Air Force and Navy.

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Being able, therefore, to channel its physical and material resources in one direction, the North Koreans simplified the task of completing the fabrication of an efficient and overwhelming fighting force in a relatively short period of time. Having prepared the potential for the rape of the democratic southern republic, it only remained to unleash the military forces poised along the 38th Parallel.

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SECTION II

EVOLUTION OF THE KOREAN ARMED FORCES IN MANCHURIA

1. General:

Since it is a confirmed fact that considerable numbers of Koreans who served in the Chinese Communist Forces, entered Korea and became the core of the North Korean Army, it is necessary to dwell somewhat on the history of these forces to show how the North Korean Army actually came into being.

2. Korean Volunteer Army:

In 1939, an organization known as the Korean Volunteer Army was formed in Yen-an, China. The two individuals responsible for the Army were KIM Du Bong and KIM Mu Chong. The army at that time was composed of thirty charter members and was commanded by KIM Mu Chong. At the same time, a school was established near Yen-an for training military and political leaders for a future independent Korea. By 1945, the Korean Volunteer Army had grown to around 1,000 men, mostly Korean deserters from the Japanese Army. During this period, the Korean Volunteer Army fought along side of the Chinese Communist Forces from whom it drew arms and ammunition. Following the defeat of the Japanese, the Korean Volunteer Army accompanied the Chinese Communist Forces into Manchuria, intending to gain recruits from the Korean population of Manchuria and then to enter Korea. By incorporating local Korean self-defense groups into the Korean Volunteer Army, it reached a strength of approximately 2,500 men in September 1945. With this group, KIM Mu Chong attempted to enter North Korea through Sinuiju in late September 1945, only to be halted and have his group disarmed by the Soviet Army. Reportedly, KIM Mu Chong was told by Soviet officers that he could not bring armed troops into Korea, but that the arms would be returned if he would take his group back into Manchuria and fight the Nationalists. Accepting the Soviet decision, KIM Mu Chong returned to Manchuria and continued to strengthen his army. By October 1945, the army had grown to around 5,000 men, and a reorganization took place as a result of which the Korean Volunteer Army was divided into three brigades and one battalion, as follows: First or South Manchurian Brigade; Third or North Manchurian Brigade; Fifth or East Manchurian Brigade; and the Independent Battalion.

The Independent Battalion was to be stationed in Chinchon on the Dairen Peninsula but due to the advance of the Chinese National Army in that area, this unit never materialized and the personnel later joined the First or South Manchurian Brigade. In January 1946, the Fifth or East Manchurian Brigade was divided into the East Chilin and the Yenchi Brigades. Through continued efforts of KIM Mu Chong and his followers, the Korean Volunteer Army continued to expand. More local security groups were added and by April 1946 each brigade numbered around 5,400 men. During this period, the Korean Volunteer Army participated on a small scale in actions against the Nationalist Army.

In April 1946, the Chinese Communist Armies in China and Manchuria reportedly underwent a considerable reorganization which resulted in the dropping of the title "Korean Volunteer Army." These units of the Korean Volunteer Army became subordinate to the various area commands of the so-called Northeast "Democratic United Army." For example, the Fifth or East Manchurian Brigade became part of the East Kirin Peace Preservation Army. The Peace Preservation Army was in turn under the control of the Kirin

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Military District. The purely Korean composition of the original army also changed after the reorganization and Chinese and Mongolians were mixed into what were formerly Korean units.

Beginning in late spring of 1946, the cadres for the North Korean Army began moving into North Korea. The highest ranking Korean officers of the Chinese Communist Forces, members of the old Korean Volunteer Army, and Koreans in the Soviet Army were assembled in various training centers in North Korea and under the supervision of Soviet Army advisors, prepared to train the new recruits. Because of the exodus of so many leaders, the efficiency of former Korean Volunteer Army units dropped considerably. By spring of 1947, weakened by further officer transfers to North Korea, the units were relegated to a line of communications role until they too were transferred into North Korea to become part of the North Korean Forces. Despite the fact that the Korean Volunteer Army officially passed out of existence in April 1946, the title and those of the original Korean Volunteer Army units, continued to be used until much later, possibly encouraged by authorities for security or morale purposes.

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SECTION III

EVOLUTION OF THE KOREAN ARMED FORCES IN NORTH KOREA

1. Establishment of a National Police System:

The assumption of police power by Koreans occurred in most cases simultaneously with liberation by Soviet troops. Although Koreans were aware of the surrender on 15 August 1945, the Japanese police maintained order generally until the arrival of the Soviet forces. As the Soviet Army moved southward, it established contact with Korean Communists and from this original contact, a wide variety of local, Communist-dominated police or security detachments evolved. From these units, which functioned independently, two major groups emerged as follows:

a. People's Guards:

This organization came into being in North Mangyong Province and eventually spread to South Hamgyong and Kangwon Provinces. The guiding spirits of the group were Korean Communists who had returned from Kwantung Province, Manchuria, and included such figures as LEE Chu Bong and CHOE Yong Gun.

b. Red Guards:

Although there was strong Nationalist and democratic sentiment in South Pyongan Province, the first seizure of police power came from local Communists. A committee, headed by HYUNG Chung Hyok (assassinated 28 September 1945) and including SONG Chang Hyung, KIM Chang Il, CHANG Shi Hyu, and PAK Pyong Chang, all Korean Communists, met immediately after the announcement of the surrender and planned the formation of the Red Guards. This organization was also set up in North Pyongan and Hwanghae Provinces.

2. Centralization of Police Power:

The existence of the above organizations was terminated by the creation of the Peace Guardians. This group was set up on a provincial level and continued the communization of the police system. This force, while politically acceptable, was loosely organized on a militia basis and proved incapable of adequately dealing with the increasingly difficult problems of state security. By early October 1945, plans were formed for the creation of a more efficient, nationwide security system as follows:

3. Organization of the Department of Public Safety:a. Formation of Provincial Level Police Bureaus:

This first step toward formal police organization consisted primarily of adapting the former Japanese police system to the demands of a new Korea by forming provincial level Police Bureaus. In this period, which lasted until the spring of 1946, there were few departures from normal Japanese organizational and administrative procedure.

b. Establishment of the First Unified Department of Public Safety:

On or about 15 November 1945, CHOE Yong Gun called a series of conferences of police and party officials to outline the steps necessary for the unification of the police force. The major problems confronting the participants were:

(1) Differences in Administration and Procedure:

During the operation of the Provincial Level Police Bureaus, little had been done to develop uniform procedure and methods among the various provinces. Reorganization was intended to correct this. Since the lack of uniformity was most evident in the treatment of political offenders, it was decided by Soviet advisors to place the political investigation sections of the proposed new Police Department directly under the Soviet counter-intelligence operational groups.

(2) Integration of Local Police Detachments:

The most reliable elements among the Peace Guardians and Provincial Level Police Bureaus were to be selected for service in the new Peace Preservation Corps or National Constabulary. All other local groups were declared illegal and were required to turn over all arms to the local, authorized police.

c. Department of Public Safety:

Based on plans formulated for the unification of the police force at the 15 November 1945 conference called by CHOE Yong Gun, a Department of Public Safety evolved and began functioning as such approximately 1 December 1945, with CHOE Yong Gun at its head.

d. Political Control of Police System:

From its inception, the Department of Public Safety, as the North Korean police system, was a basic weapon in the arsenal of the Korean Communist Party and its Yenan and Soviet supporters. At no time did this group allow its grip on the police to weaken. During the first four months of the occupation (August-December 1945) there was a tendency to allow a certain amount of opposition in the formation of the new government. This was not true as regards to the security organs in North Korea. Their loyalty to the Communist aim of creating a Soviet-controlled North Korea was unquestioned and was based on these factors:

(1) Prompt Seizure of Power by Local Korean Communists;

As shown above, Korean Communists were the first persons to realize that the key to control of the whole government depended on control of the police. By immediately contacting advancing Soviet forces and identifying themselves as Communists, they were able to cloak their actions with spurious legality, and with the guns of the Soviets supporting them, they assumed the places of the surrendering Japanese police. The hold which these first groups attained was never relinquished, but instead strengthened by later developments.

(2) Arrival of Soviet-trained "Yashki" Group:

On 25 September 1945, KIM Il Sung and a group of Soviet-trained Koreans were landed at Wonsan. These people, formerly guerrillas against the Japanese along the Manchuria-Korea borders, were assigned to various advisory capacities in the several provincial governments. Although they had received considerable training under the Soviets, their educational level was generally not high and their main mission in Korea was supervision of the police forces of the Provincial Police Bureaus.

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(3) Integration of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Koreans into Police and Security Forces:

The effect of the arrival of the Kazakh Koreans was not felt fully until the spring of 1946. Although the majority of the Kazakh Koreans assumed advisory posts in the civil sections of the People's Committee or acted as assistants and interpreters in the civil administration headquarters of the Soviet Twenty-fifth Army, many were assigned to the police. Prior to the occupation of Korea, these people had been settled on collective farms in the Kazakh. After arriving in Korea, they occupied responsible positions and as the standard bearers of the Soviet brand of Communism, grew daily in importance.

(4) Organization of the Central Party School for Police Officials:

Following the completion of the organization of the Central Committee of the Korean Communist Party, the perfection of the Party organization on provincial levels, and the emergence of the Department of Public Safety as the national police system--the Central Party School for Police Officials was founded at the former Sadong Coal Briquette Company's buildings in East Pyongyang in January 1946.

(a) Aims of the Central Party School:

The task of the school was the political re-education of police officials on the Province and Gun levels and the teaching of rudimentary police organization and procedure. The local Korean Communists who had control of the Gun police headquarters in August and September 1945, were men without the slightest police training and who, in spite of their political enthusiasm, had little conception of the nature of the Soviet model state that was being erected in North Korea. The Central Party School attempted to improve basic police methods and operations and at the same time cultivate the desired political attitudes on the part of police officials.

(b) Operation of the Central Party School:

Police officials who had served in the same post since the liberation were recommended for study at the Central School by the Central Provincial Committee of the Party. A minimum middle school education was a pre-requisite for the course, which lasted four months. The head of the school was directly appointed by the Political Section of the Soviet Twenty-fifth Army and the teaching staff was composed of Kazakh Koreans. In addition to political indoctrination, courses were given in police administration, investigation and interrogation methods.

(c) Results Achieved by the Central Party School:

This school had tremendously tightened the party's control over the police department and had weeded out unfit and incompetent personnel. By training local Korean Communists for positions with the Police Administration and the Police Constabulary in the area where they had lived and worked, the police assured that their officials were intimately acquainted with the political background of the majority of the people in their districts.

4. Preliminary Stages in the Formation of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools and the Forces of the Department of Internal Affairs:a. General:

The term "Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools" was

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the beginning of the mask used in the formation of the North Korean Army. One of the first steps taken in the formation of the North Korean Army along with the establishment of a National Police System was the organization of the Pyongyang Military Academy.

(1) Brief History of the Academy:

The academy was organized in late September or October 1945, with KIM Chaek at its head. The first class graduated in the spring of 1946, and the second class finished in August or September 1946. The first students were furnished from those members of the Red Guards, who had received Japanese military training. The academy continued to expand throughout the Fall of 1945 and received its complete allotment of Kazakh instructors in December 1945 or January 1946. The reasons normally given by the Soviets or their North Korean puppets for the rapidity with which they organized the academy were: First, to train police officials; second, to train young men to take part in the government. However, subsequent practices of the People's Committee in obtaining police and government officials, together with the actual assignments received by graduates of the academy cast serious doubts on the announced aims mentioned above.

(2) Training of Police Officials:

There were never more than a few graduates assigned to the police force. The Police Administration and the Police Constabulary were organized independently from the academy. The Central Party School for Police Officials was the recognized organ for the training of such police officials.

(3) Training of Government Officials:

It is possible that part of those students in the academy who took the Russian course for a full year, finally ended up in work for the government, but it was also proven that some later became political leaders in the Army. At any rate, it is significant to note that the Central Committee of the Communist (now Labor) Party had maintained an Economic and Administrative School in Pyongyang for the training of the Headquarters, Soviet Forces in North Korea, and in their four months course, the students who were selected by the Party were trained in Soviet public administration. This school, and not the academy, was the primary source of People's Committee personnel.

(4) Assignment of Trainees from the Pyongyang Academy:

The completion of an academy training cycle was invariably the signal for the organization of a new security or military force. The first graduating class was funneled directly into the Special and later the Railway Constabulary, while the second went to the newly formed Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools. Finally, as if to emphasize the fact that the academy was basically a military training center, in March 1947, similar officers' training schools were set up in Nanam, Sinuiju and Hamhung. The third graduating class of the Pyongyang Academy furnished the cadres for these new centers. These four officers' training schools operated on equal basis and prepared officer personnel for the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools, the mask for the armed forces of North Korea.

b. Plans for Armed Forces Discussed at Joint Conferences:

Immediately after the 1 March 1946 demonstrations against the interim People's Committee, a series of conferences were called in Pyong-

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yang with the purpose of implementing previously discussed plans for the strengthening of the security forces of the state and the organization of a National Army.

(1) Participants in Such Conferences:

CHOE Yong Gun and KIM Song Ku represented the Interim People's Committee and KIM Mu Chong, KIM Sae U and YU O Il represented the Chinese Communist Forces ("Korean Volunteer Army"). Representatives of the Soviet Army from the staff of the Soviet Forces in Korea were also present.

(2) Agenda of the Conferences:

The main item under discussion was the formation of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools and the steps which necessarily preceded this organization.

(a) Formation of Constabulary Units:

The conference decided to create a special Constabulary which would function in the South Pyongan Province alone and serve as the ground work for the Railway Constabulary. It would incorporate the first graduating class of the Pyongyang Academy and together with the Central Committees of the Communist Party and the New People's Party would begin working out the procedure for recruiting men for the armed forces. Acting upon the decisions of these conferences, in April 1946 a meeting was held of principle government officials and police heads. It was pointed out that the most vital sector of the nations' economy was the railway system. Therefore, to adequately protect the railroads, a Railway Constabulary would be organized in June which would succeed the Special Constabulary. On 1 June 1946, a Railway Guard Unit was organized with MOON Chong Mok as head. On 26 June 1946, the General Headquarters of the Railway Constabulary was formed with YU O Il as Commander-in-Chief and MOON Chong Mok as his assistant and troop commander. The organization was set up on a provincial basis and was completely independent of the Department of Public Safety. An intensive recruiting drive was instituted by the Communist Party and allied organizations. During June and July 1946, officers from the Korean Volunteer Army began to arrive in North Korea and were immediately assigned to Railway Constabulary Training Centers. Enlisted men began arriving in August 1946. Due to the extreme shortage of barracks (the Soviet Army had not yet begun its extensive evacuations) these troops were housed in all available quarters and houses. Although there is some evidence that the troops of this unit performed guard duties along rail lines, at tunnels and bridges, the principle task of the organization was to act as a reception command for officers and men of the Volunteer Army and for the new recruits obtained through the Party's drives. In September 1946, twenty percent of the troops of the Railway Constabulary were absorbed by the formation of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools, while the remainder of the troops were retained by the Railway Constabulary itself. Both the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools and the new Railway Constabulary then became a part of the security forces of the Department of Public Safety, later the Department of Internal Affairs.

(b) Transfer of Korean Volunteer Army Units to North Korea:

It was agreed that Korean officers and men serving in the Korean Volunteer Army in Manchuria be released to serve in the Railway Constabulary and eventually the Peace Preservation Officers' Training

Schools. The arrangement provided that officers would arrive first and begin service in the Railway Constabulary and then in the summer of 1946, enlisted personnel would enlarge the Railway Constabulary preparatory to its incorporation into the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools. In addition to this phase of the agreement on the Korean Volunteer Army, it was also decided to halt the recruitment of North Koreans of the Manchurian border area for Volunteer Army service. This recruitment had been carried on since August 1945.

5. Emergence of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools:

a. Creation of the National Level Headquarters, Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools Bureau:

In September 1946, the headquarters of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools was established under the Department of Public Safety (later the Department of Internal Affairs). With the creation of this headquarters, the Railway Constabulary released approximately twenty percent of its personnel to form the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools, thus the actual beginning of the North Korean Army. The first commander of the new organization was KIM Mu Chong. KIM, while not having actually been commander of the Railway Constabulary, was active in its organization and operation since his arrival in Korea, thus he was easily able to assume the command.

b. Re-Organization of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools:

From September 1946 to December 1946, the many changes and continued shifting and reassignment of staff personnel, plus the fact that many were Soviet Koreans who did not occupy one position for very long periods, made an exact listing of staff personnel difficult. In December 1946, CHOE Yong Gun replaced KIM Mu Chong as Commander-in-Chief. This change began a period of rapid growth for the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools in the organizational structure and the receipt of Soviet arms on a large scale.

In March 1947, when the official organization of the Department of Internal Affairs was recognized, the "Army" continued under the mask of, and was subordinate to, the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools Bureau, which in turn was nominally under control of this department. In reality, however, the general staff was responsible directly to the Presidium and the People's Assembly. Also, in reality, the 1st and 2d Divisions and the Independent Mixed Brigade were activated when the Headquarters or Bureau of Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools was created. The 1st Division with its headquarters at Kaechon had units located at Kanggye, Chongju, Sinuiju, and South Sinuiju, Anju, Uiju and Paekchon. The 2d Division with its headquarters at Nanam, had units located at Nanam, Hoeryong, and Kangdok. The Independent Mixed Brigade, with its headquarters in Pyongyang, had its units located in and around the general Pyongyang area.

c. Arming of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools by the Soviets:

The first arms turned over to the Korean forces by the Soviet Army were received in December 1946. After this, the arming of the Korean forces proceeded with rapidity, and by April 1947 it was apparent that there were few troops training under the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools system that lacked Soviet armaments. The procedure in arming the Korean forces was reported as follows:

(1) Soviet Troops Evacuating North Korea Turn Over Arms to North Koreans:

The original arming which began in December 1946, was accomplished almost completely by means of arms from departing Soviet troop units. In many cases the transfer of arms and equipment was connected with the training of Korean troops in the use of these new weapons by their former Soviet owners.

(2) Shipment of Arms from the USSR:

Reportedly, agreements were made early in 1947, regarding payment for arms shipments by foodstuffs exported from North Korea to the USSR. Those arms turned over to the Korean forces by withdrawing Soviet troops were also charged up as payment for export commodities from Korea to the USSR. The bulk of the small arms held by the Korean forces as of June 1947, came by direct shipment from the USSR as did the majority of Soviet manufactured ammunition stocks.

d. Training of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools by Soviet Army Personnel:

Soviet military personnel may have assisted to some degree in the training of police or the early constabulary groups, however, it was not until after the establishment of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools that such aid became organized and effective. The Soviet training cadres, instructors and advisors for the Korean troops, were formed according to definite plans which were roughly divided into the following phases.

(1) Soviet Troops Preparing for Withdrawal Instructed Koreans in the Use of Soviet Weapons:

Soviet units whose equipment had been earmarked for transfer to Korean units were often utilized to train the Koreans in the use of these pieces before the withdrawal to the USSR was made. This training of North Koreans by Soviet troops preparing to leave was generally supervised by Soviet officers and non-commissioned officers who fell under different categories in the training system.

(2) Assignment of Permanent Soviet Advisors and Instructors:

By December 1946, training units had Soviet officers assigned to them as permanent advisors. The exact proportion of Soviet advisors per Korean unit was not known but it was believed that the majority occupied staff advisory positions in training units and were seldom assigned below battalion level except in special cases with special or separate companies.

(3) Special Training Cadres Furnished by Local Soviet Garrisons:

The most common system used in providing instructors for the Korean forces was to secure details from nearest Soviet garrisons. Inasmuch as the majority of the training units were located near large cities, generally the sites of Soviet garrisons, this plan worked out well. Where there was no such garrison, troops were detached from the nearest tactical unit's garrison and sent to the training area. In these cases, these detached troops were still carried by their parent unit, but were under the

administrative and disciplinary control of the senior Soviet advisor and the troops were normally rationed with the Korean unit.

6. Relationship Between the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools and the Department of Internal Affairs as of June 1947:

a. Official Organization of the Department of Internal Affairs:

This department was officially organized in March 1947, and was patterned after the Soviet People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs circa 1940, before the division of this commissariat into what later became the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Although the foundation upon which the Department was built was the Department of Public Safety or Peace Preservation Department, many innovations were made which transformed the organization into an all powerful guardian of state security. The Department had more Soviet Army advisors and more Soviet Koreans than any other organization in the People's Committee. Native Korean members were all members of the Labor Party and many of the latter were members of the Korean Communist Party before the merger with the New People's Party. The large percentage of Soviet and Communist Party personnel assured that Department's absolute political loyalty and integrity. Through this organization, the People's Committee, the Central Committee of the Labor Party, and the Soviet occupation authorities maintained absolute control over every aspect of public and private life in North Korea. The predominant military and security forces are discussed below.

b. Predominant Military and Security Forces Under the Department of Internal Affairs:

(1) Peace Preservation Section:

This section performed the duties of civil police or guardians of public welfare. These included enforcement of public health and sanitation laws, registration of firearms, ammunition, radios, and arrest of violators of any and all civil ordinances.

(2) Constabulary or Guard Section:

This section controlled the Police Constabulary, the Railway Constabulary, the Coast Guard, and the Fire Brigades:

(a) Police Constabulary:

This constabulary was the group seen most often in North Korea at the time. Detachments of this constabulary were attached to every Peace Preservation station (police box) whether it was in the interior of the country or on the 38th Parallel or Yalu River boundaries. They were often referred to as frontier guards, city police, etc. Operating directly under the police constabulary were small forces or detachments which were used in maintaining order in railway stations and their immediate vicinity.

(b) Railway Constabulary:

Since the Railway Constabulary was reduced in strength in September 1946, following the formation of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools, it carried out normal guard duties on railway lines, tunnels and bridges. Inasmuch as this function was in part fulfilled by the Police Constabulary, it did not appear at the time to be a logical reason for a force that was estimated at approximately 20,000 personnel. However, intelligence sources related the fact that the Railway Constabulary

was basically a reserve for the armed forces and an added bulwark to the security of the state in the event of domestic troubles. As of this time, the Railway Constabulary followed the same set-up for the original Railway troops in the summer of 1946.

(c) Coast Guard:

The Coast Guard was first organized in Chinnampo in March or April 1946. By July 1946 there were Coast Guard Training centers in every province. By September 1946 the organization had expanded until it had detachments in the majority of sea coast towns. At that time it came under the control of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools insofar as assignment of recruits was concerned. As of June 1947, it was under the Department of Internal Affairs.

1. Operations of the Coast Guard:

At major training centers, recruits who generally had some maritime experience, i.e. fishermen, ex-Japanese Navy or Merchant Marine personnel, were given from one to three months training in the following subjects: basic military drill and small arms marksmanship, theoretical seamanship, signalling and radio. Trainees were then assigned to Coast Guard detachments which numbered approximately fifty personnel. These detachments along the coast operated against smugglers and in coastal towns themselves apprehended refugees who attempted to escape from North Korea by sea or espionage agents infiltrating by boat. The detachments utilized Japanese motor launches for patrol work.

2. Soviet Participation in Coast Guard Activities:

Until June 1947, this branch of the armed forces of the People's Committee was notably lacking in Soviet assistance. However, a Soviet Captain of the First Rank was reported as an advisor to the Headquarters at Chinnampo. In May 1947, a Soviet Korean, formerly commissioned in the Soviet Navy, took over command. Intelligence sources related that Soviet Naval personnel who were stationed at Wonsan, Chongjin and Chinnampo were known to assist the Coast Guard personnel in their training. At the time it did not appear that the Soviet advisory system which applied to the other armed forces was actually in effect in the training of the Coast Guard.

(d) Fire Brigades:

The fire departments are worthy of mention herein only because through them there was set up an elaborate air-raid defense system in North Korea. In addition to the air-raid defense duty, activities other than normal fire department functions are not known.

(3) Peace Preservation Security Officers' Training Bureau:

This organization, under which the Peace Preservation Officers Training Schools emerged, was recognized as a section of the Department of Internal Affairs. It was still, as of June 1947, the only official title for the thousands of troops which have passed through its training detachments and who at times called themselves the People's Army. The official organization of the Department of Internal Affairs was considered sufficient to mask the actual status of the organization.

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(a) Actual Status of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools:

The primary aim of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools was the organization, equipping and training of a national army. A secondary aim, related closely to the first in the scheme of Communist expansion in the Far East, was the assignment of trained troops of that embryonic army to the forces of the Chinese Communist Party in Manchuria.

1. The Projected National Army:

There appeared little evidence to dispute the fact that the Soviet Command and its Korean Communist cohorts planned such a force from the first months of occupation. There are no indications that such plans were ever slowed down or dropped at any time, rather, they were consistently accelerated. Closely paired with the development of the armed forces, was the close cooperation between the Chinese Communists in Manchuria, their Korean brethren late of the Volunteer Army and the Korean Independence Alliance, and the Soviet Command.

2. Strengthening and Reinforcement of the Chinese Communist Forces, Manchuria:

Although partially trained troops of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools or former Volunteer Army veterans were believed to have crossed into Manchuria in December 1946 and January 1947, the plans for the large-scale transfers of March and April 1947 were not formed definitely until late January 1947. At this time, conferences were held between North Korean military leaders, Chinese Communist forces and representatives of the Soviet Command. Impending Chinese Communist Force offensives were discussed and Chinese Communist Force spokesmen pointed out the need for additional trained troops. Plans were also discussed for the creation of a combined military policy group which would implement the activities of the three military commands.

a. The Joint Military Council:

This council was composed of representatives of the Soviet Command in North Korea and its military commanders, and the North Korean Labor Party and North Korean military leaders. This council reportedly began operation in late February 1947 and began to function officially in March or April 1947. The duties of this council reportedly included the transfer of troops and movement of supplies. It was this council that supervised the liquidation and transfer to the front in Manchuria of those Chinese Communist Forces rear service units, i.e. repair shops, hospitals, etc., that spent the winter of 1946-1947 in North Korea. Due to the work of this council and to the material assistance given by the various units attached to the Soviet Forces' North Korean Headquarters, such as the 3d Railway Operating Regiment, the number of Soviet-trained Koreans sent to Manchuria continually increased.

b. Transfer of Korean Troops to Manchuria:

March and April 1947 were the months given in which the heaviest movements of Soviet trained and equipped Korean troops took place. Reports also related that the movements continued into May. Intelligence sources reported that the largest movement was during April 1947 when KIM Chaek was reported as being in command of approximately

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30,000 Soviet armed and equipped troops which moved to Manchuria. The movement was reported to have cleared the Peace Preservation troop garrisons in Hamgyong Namdo and Hamgyong Pukto Provinces of approximately forty percent of their trained troops. Troops were also taken in unknown numbers from Pyongyang Namdo and Pyongyang Pukto Provinces, concentrated at Kanggye and then moved to Manchuria by train and truck.

(b) Operations of the Early Recruiting System for the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools:

Although there was no evidence of any law or ordinance promulgated by the People's Committee or the Soviet Military Administration which provided for nation-wide military conscription, recruits for the gradually expanding armed force were secured through the following methods:

(1) Recruitment of North Korean Labor Party Members:

In November 1946, a poster campaign was launched in the province of Hamgyong Pukto to attract party members into the armed forces.

(2) Induction of Men with Previous Military Service:

Those persons with military backgrounds generally came from those who served in the Japanese Army or who had been trained by the Japanese for police work and those who were former members of the Korean Volunteer Army or of other Chinese Communists trained forces. Although the bulk of those transferred from the Chinese Communists Forces as units, many had made their way to Korea in small groups or singly.

(3) Transfer of Police Force Volunteers to Military Units:

Beginning in August 1946 and continuing through December 1946, recruits who had volunteered for the police force were later sent to military units for training. The wholesale transfer of entire police units to the new "security troops" was also practiced. In September 1946 about four companies of newly trained police in the Hwangae Province were integrated into the security troops and sent to Hoeryong and other Hamgyong Pukto Province areas for training. This is one shining example of the integration of police units. Similar transfers occurred in other localities.

(4) Operation of a Substitute Conscription:

Lists of persons eligible for military service, which included men with former military service as well as those who were included in the general 18-35 year age group, were forwarded from the town and city committees to county committees. There was no evidence of an exemption procedure or the provisions on which one might be based. These lists were then sent to the provincial and national level committees. After the establishment of the number to be called, the lists were returned by the same channels. The North Korean Labor Party appointed officials at each governmental level responsible for the operation of such system. Except for those who openly volunteered as in the case of party members, or for those who had previous military service, there was little evidence indicating the exact method whereby a man was chosen to report to a military organization. There were but few reports of the use of police to enforce the

induction of men. Many sources attributed this to the fact that considerable officially inspired social stigma was attached to those young men who refused to serve.

c. Future Plans for the Armed Forces of North Korea:

Reportedly in March 1947, in the city of Pyongyang, a series of conferences was held with major People's Committee and armed forces officials present. The Soviet command was also represented. Intelligence sources related that the following was a broad outline of the agenda of such conferences:

(1) Formation of a Department of Military Affairs:

This governmental department was to be officially organized in September 1947. As of June it was functioning under the title of Peace Preservation Officers' Training Bureau. This new department, with CHOE Yong Gun at its head, would embrace all military organizations, including the Coast Guard and Railway Constabulary in North Korea. The Police Constabulary would be retained as a police force under the Department of Internal Affairs.

(2) Formation of the People's Army:

Also in September 1947, the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools would officially drop the mask of a training system and emerge as a full fledged army with KIM Mu Chong as the commander.

(3) Conclusions:

During the period following these conferences and until the reorganization of the Department of Internal Affairs in September 1947 it was apparent that the plans in part were accelerated somewhat in that troops of the armed forces began using the title People's Army and such title was being used in political indoctrination classes of such forces. The formation of a Department of Military Affairs was never actually disclosed as such, however, a headquarters at this level apparently was already functioning but using the mask of Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools Bureau. This bureau, although carried nominally under the Department of Internal Affairs, was actually responsible to the Presidium and People's Assembly. Documents (consisting of tables of organization of infantry regiment, infantry division; an artillery regiment, infantry division; an infantry battalion; and an artillery battalion) captured in July or August 1947, bore the title "People's Army." At the time, due to a lack of evidence, it could not be determined whether the documents were actually in effect or to be put into effect at a later date. Later information, however, disclosed that these were apparently in effect but being masked by the title "Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools." The chart for the organization of the General Headquarters bore the 1st Division, 2d Division and the Independent Infantry Brigade as component to the "People's Army," while at the same time what actually turned out to be that the 1st Division, 2d Division, and the Independent Infantry Brigade were being referred to also as the 1st, 2d, and 3d Peace Preservation Officers' Training Centers, located at Kaechon, Nanam and Pyongyang respectively. In September 1947, when the Department of Internal Affairs was reorganized, reports concerning the reorganization failed to verify the existence of the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Bureau and the forces under it.

Therefore it was accepted that the armed forces or "People's Army" was directly under a Department of Military Affairs or General Headquarters responsible to the Presidium or People's Assembly. It was not until 8 February 1948 that the North Korean Government officially announced the activation of an armed force under the title "People's Army" and the formation of a Ministry of National Defense, although as outlined above, both were actually more or less functioning far prior to this date.

7. Reorganization of the Department of Internal Affairs in September-October 1947:

a. Border Security Bureau:

Commencing in September 1947 and continuing through October 1947, the Department of Internal Affairs underwent a series of modifications which further eliminated remaining vestiges of Japanese Police structure. Such reorganization bore a close resemblance to Soviet security organizations. The result was a definite militarization of the Department of Internal Affairs. As a direct consequence, in the latter part of 1947, elements of a newly-created security force began to be identified along the 38th Parallel. The units were allegedly constabulary guard organizations subordinate to the Border Security Bureau. The constabulary forces under this bureau were allegedly organized into three major elements: the 38th Parallel Guard Forces; Manchuria-Korea Guard Forces; and Railroad Constabulary Forces. Late the following year in September or October of 1948, a number of the constabulary units that had received intensive military training under the Border Security Bureau were transferred from the Department of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of National Defense, in order to form the nucleus for units of the rapidly expanding North Korean Army.

b. Creation of the North Korean Navy:

About a year later the Department of Internal Affairs was subjected to further modification which resulted in the creation of the North Korean Navy. Prior to this reorganization, the Coastal Security Bureau, another office of the Department of Internal Affairs which, with the Border Security Bureau, shared the responsibility for the external security of the North Korean puppet state, is reported to have implemented its security mission through the agency of three Coast Guard Headquarters placed strategically along the shores of North Korea. The 1st and 2d Coast Guard Headquarters, stationed at Wonsan and Chongjin respectively, guarded the long east coast of North Korea, while the 3d Coast Guard Headquarters, based at Chinnampo was charged with the security of the entire west coast. Each headquarters performed its mission by means of three to five detachments dispersed along the shore within its sector of responsibility. Late in 1949 or early 1950, the North Korean Coast Guard was transferred to the Ministry of National Defense to become the North Korean Navy; however, a few small coastal security detachments reportedly remained under the control of the Coastal Security Bureau to perform coast guard functions.

c. Redesignation of the Department of Internal Affairs:

Shortly thereafter, in line with a thorough reorganization of the entire North Korean governmental structure, the Department of Internal Affairs was redesignated Ministry of Internal Affairs and the previously separate Border Security and Coast Security Bureaus were amalgamated into the Security Forces Department, which assumed the functions of

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both. Reports indicate that by April 1950, this reorganization had been completed. Subsequent modifications in the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its subordinate Security Forces can be attributed to the aggressive communist designs against the Republic of Korea and to the conditions and problems created by the ensuing active military operations.

d. Security Forces Department:

Before the North Korean Security Forces experienced the modifications and rapid expansion incident to the outbreak of hostilities, the operational units of the Security Forces Department reportedly consisted of three border constabulary brigades, a railroad security brigade, a number of separate security battalions and several coastal security units.

e. Security Forces Department Reorganized:

In the wake of the invasion which the North Korean aggressor precipitated on 25 June 1950, the Security Forces Department was compelled to undertake another reorganization of its activities in order to cope with its expanded sphere of responsibility and augmented duties. On 2 July 1950, the Security Forces Department was reported as having changed its designation to Security Forces Headquarters. On 7 July, this agency was divided into two echelons known as Security Forces Headquarters Forward and Security Forces Headquarters Rear. The latter allegedly remained in Pyongyang while the forward moved to Seoul. The Forward echelon was charged with the mission of assuming control in occupied areas and of maintaining order and security in the communication zone.

f. Integration of Security Forces Into North Korean Army:

On 9 July 1950, shortly after the move of the Security Forces Headquarters had been accomplished, the 5th Railroad Security Brigade likewise transferred its headquarters from Pyongyang to Seoul and allegedly was renamed the 10th Railroad Security Brigade for reasons unknown. The five battalions which until that time had comprised the entire strength of the Brigade remained in North Korea and an additional seven battalions were activated in Seoul from conscripts and volunteers. These seven newly-organized battalions were stationed along major rail lines south of the 38th Parallel, with the mission of guarding and securing rail communication facilities in occupied areas.

It was during the same period that the North Korean Army was faced with increasingly heavier demands on its manpower potential produced by the mounting intensity of the conflict and imminent prospect of large scale United Nations' aid to the Republic of Korea. As a consequence, a number of security units under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including the 1st, 3d, and 7th Border Constabulary Brigades were integrated into the North Korean Army. The 1st and 3d Brigades had participated in the initial assault on the ROK and were redesignated the 8th and 9th Infantry Divisions respectively. The 7th Brigade was redesignated the 7th Infantry Division in the Haeju area and also followed up the advance of the North Korean Forces. Prior to their integration, these units were brought up to full combat strength by the incorporation of conscripts from North Korea and occupied areas, and reportedly were completely re-equipped with Soviet arms to conform to the standard organization of tactical units.

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g. Occupation by Security Units:

As the North Korean Army, in its rapid drive toward the south, extended its sway over more and more provinces of the Republic of Korea, the Forward Security Forces Headquarters began organizing a series of new security units for occupation missions. From about 2 July 1950 until the middle of September, when the successful United Nations counteroffensive dislodged the enemy from the Seoul communications hub, forty-four security battalions were activated in Seoul. Enemy prisoners revealed that these units were organized into eleven regiments bearing the numerical designations 101 through 111. Cadred by seasoned officers and non-commissioned officers from the former border constabulary brigades and coastal security detachments, these units were brought up to strength by the integration of conscripts and members of the so-called volunteer forces from south of the 38th Parallel. After a brief cycle of very perfunctory training, each regiment was assigned to one of the occupied provinces and charged with the security of rear areas and the preservation of law and order among the civilian population. The four battalions comprising each regiment apparently retained their separate numerical designations and were assigned specific security missions within the regimental area of responsibility. Following the successful United Nations invasion of the Inchon-Seoul sector, the majority of North Korean security forces in occupied areas were either annihilated or forced to withdraw to the north.

8. Official Announcements of the Activation of the North Korean People's Army and Establishment of the Ministry of National Defense:

Extensive celebrations were held in Pyongyang 6-8 February 1948 in commemoration of the second anniversary of the founding of the North Korean People's Committee. It was during this period that the government officially announced the existence of the People's Army as such, thus dropping the mask of "Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools." During a mass meeting, following usual communist lines, held on 7 February and presided over by KIM Chaek, vice-chairman of the People's Committee, the draft of the Korean Constitution was presented to the people. This draft provided for a Ministry of National Defense, among numerous other changes in the governmental structure.

a. Establishment of the Ministry of National Defense:

On 7 February 1948, the draft of the Korean constitution was adopted by the Fourth Session of the People's Assembly, of which article 98 provided for the formation of the Ministry of National Defense. This constitution was not adopted officially until early September 1948, however, for all functioning purposes, the Ministry of National Defense was functioning and had been for some time under its mask of Peace Preservation Officers' Training Bureau. With the official announcement of the activation of the People's Army, it shed further evidence that a department or ministry was also in effect and controlling the armed forces.

b. Activation of the People's Army:

A parade in honor of the activation of the People's Army, with 10-25,000 North Korean troops participating was held 8 February 1948. Units consisted of infantry, artillery, and motorized groups. Arms, of Soviet origin, included machine guns, mortars, antitank guns, antiaircraft

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machine guns, howitzers and field guns. The troops were reviewed by CHOE Yong Gun, Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army.

During the ceremony, KIM Il Sung, Chairman of the People's Committee, made a speech. Salient points of his address were as follows:

"The Korean People have their own army for the first time in their history and the Korean People look upon the People's Army activated today as their own and a source of their own might.

"The purpose of the army is to defend the fruits of democratic reforms in North Korea. It is not for the purpose of staging an internecine civil war, as certain reactionaries have publicized, but on the contrary it will move to check in advance any such attempts on the part of the reactionaries to divide and kill the people. The Army will defend our achievements by armed might. Among these achievements will be the provisional Korean constitution which will consolidate the foundation of the impending democratic People's Republic of Korea. Needless to say, any nation which does not have an army of its own cannot become an independent sovereign nation.

"Because we have formed a superior army we cannot allow ourselves to become complacent. We must strengthen and improve it. We must have a superior Korean People's Army built on the nucleus of this army. The army we formed is but the backbone of the first army to be had by the democratic People's Republic of Korea. Therefore, not only the soldiers but the people must exert their utmost efforts to develop the People's Army. Officers and men must establish iron discipline and must be proficient in the military and in combat techniques."

9. Developments Following the Official Activation of the People's Army:

At the time of the official announcement of the activation of the People's Army, the General Headquarters in Pyongyang controlled a central guard battalion, two rifle divisions, and an independent mixed brigade and reports continued to indicate that the People's Army was expanding and included the possible activation of a third division.

a. Strength:

The overall actual strength for the People's Army at the time was estimated at approximately 30,000. To this figure was added approximately 170,000 trainees, some of whom were currently serving in the Police Constabulary, Fire Brigade and Coast Guard. By the end of 1948, the armed forces had numbered some 60,000, excluding the para-military Border Constabulary and Railroad Guards. They were equipped with the weapons left behind by the withdrawing Soviet occupation troops and those shipped into Korea to supplement the initial turnover and the ever increasing demands to meet the needs of the rapidly expanding armed force.

b. Activation of Regular Units:

In October 1948, the 3d Division was formed from the Independent Mixed Brigade. The 4th Division was formed late in 1949, which also saw the appearance in Korea of elements of the Chinese Communist Forces 164th and 166th Divisions, composed of troops of Korean birth or descent who had been conscripted into the Chinese Communist Forces in Manchuria and later sent home to strengthen the Korean armed forces. The two divisions became the nucleus of the 5th and 6th Divisions which were actually


formed in August 1949 and July 1949 respectively. The 7th in a series of North Korean divisions, later redesignated the 12th, also was formed around a nucleus of officers and enlisted men from the 15th and 156th Chinese Communist Divisions. In addition, a tank battalion was formed as early as September 1948 and expanded into a regiment by May 1949. This unit evolved into the 105th Tank Division which was in the forefront of the invasion of South Korea. As evidenced above, the buildup for war, which began gradually during 1949, was intensified greatly in the six months preceding the June invasion. During 1949, the military force was doubled in strength with the addition of 40,000 conscripts, 20-22,000 Koreans formerly in the Chinese Communist Army, and several thousand men returning from three years of training in the USSR to serve as cadres for the air and tank corps. All units, including the small naval force, were given additional Soviet equipment and their training program was intensified. Finally, preparations for the conscription that took place in 1950 included a physical examination of all males in the younger age groups, conducted in mid-summer 1949. In the early months of 1950, when the final preparations for the attack were made, the tempo of military expansion increased sharply. The army was expanded to 150-180,000 men with the addition of new conscripts and 10,000 more returnees from the Chinese Communist Army. All civilians received basic military training, preparing the way for general mobilization. In April and May 1950, large shipments of arms flowed from the USSR and these shipments served to equip both the army and air force in particular, giving them considerable heavy artillery, trucks, tanks, automatic weapons, and some additional aircraft. Supplementing the Soviet deliveries, the North Korean economy provided increased light arms, ammunitions, and food to the army, at the cost of a cut-back in planned construction of schools and light industrial plants.

c. Semi-Military Units:

In addition to the regular units mentioned above, there also existed two semi-military organizations which were drawn upon after the invasion to provide cadres for additional units. These two units were the Railroad Constabulary and more particularly, the Border Constabulary. The Railroad Constabulary became the nucleus for the Line of Communications troops which operated in the enemy-held portions of South Korea during the summer of 1950. The Border Constabulary Brigade which prior to the invasion had, as their name implies, been stationed along the 38th Parallel as frontier guards, were expanded into divisions. In July 1950, the 1st Border Constabulary Brigade became the 8th Division and the 3d Border Constabulary Brigade became the 9th Division.

d. Creation of Units Prior to Aggression:

The creation of additional infantry divisions from readily available manpower sources apparently commenced just prior to the launching of the invasion. In March 1950, the 15th Division was activated ostensibly to serve as an occupation force apparently under the supposition that the Republic of Korea would be overrun in a month or six weeks. Cadred by Chinese Communist Force veterans, it reportedly was filled with recruits from the training centers at Hoeryong and Najin. The organization of the 10th and 13th Divisions in March 1950 and June 1950, respectively, allegedly swallowed up every available in training centers at Yongampo, Sinuiju and Sukchon.



HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND
 Military Intelligence Division
 General Staff

**HISTORY OF THE NKA
 NK BORDER
 CONSTABULARY
 LOCATIONS
 MAY 1950
 MAP NO. 3**

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SECTION IV

OPERATIONS IN KOREA

1. Initial Aggression:

The Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, was first informed of the North Korean aggression by the U.S. Military Attache, Seoul, Korea, and the Chief, United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea, who stated that North Korean armed forces had launched unprovoked attacks across the 38th Parallel, at 0400 on 25 June 1950, in what appeared to be an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea. Enemy action was actually initiated at 0440 when the 38th Parallel was blasted by North Korean artillery fire. At 0500, North Korean infantry commenced crossing the Parallel in the Jongduchon-ni, Mansegyo-ri, Chunchon, and Naepyong-ni areas while an amphibious landing was made south of Kangnung on the east coast. The U.S. Military Attache stated that at 1100 on 25 June 1950, the North Koreans issued a declaration of war against the Republic of Korea.

The answer to aggression was proclaimed to the world by President Truman, in Washington D.C. on 27 June 1950.

"In Korea the government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th Parallel. This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution.

"In these circumstances I have ordered the United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

"The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.

"It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security

On 7 July, in a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, President Truman was asked to name the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Korea. He complied 8 July, naming General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

a. Exploitation:

Employing the initiative of the aggressor and the surprise concomitant thereto, Marshal CHOE Yong Gun's North Korean forces spear-headed by tanks and employing heavy artillery concentrations, with one division and a border constabulary brigade quickly overran the Ongjin Peninsula, captured Kaesong, thereby cutting off the area west of the Imjin River; launched a two-division attack on Chunchon, while one division and a border constabulary brigade moved against Kangnung on the east coast support by amphibious landings of varying sizes.

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The quick capture of the Ongjin Peninsula protected the west flank of the main thrust on Seoul. The attack was spearheaded by more than 50 tanks with 8,000 to 10,000 troops, down the historical Pochon-Uijongbu corridor. An additional effort, tipped by some 40 tanks, was made by a column driving from Kaesong to Seoul. The east flank was covered by a strong attack on Chunchon while Republic of Korea units still farther east were pinned down by a drive southward along the east coast.

North Korean aircraft strafed the Kimpo and Seoul airfields.

By the 26th of June the North Korean Communists were in complete control of the Ongjin Peninsula and on the 28th Seoul was captured.

United States naval units bombarded shore targets and attacked North Korean torpedo boats on the South Korean east coast in the Kangnung-Samchok area. United States and British naval units were also active on the west coast where major carrier-borne air strikes were made. A naval blockade of Korea south of 41° N on the east coast, and south of 39° 30' N on the west coast was ordered by the United States.

Air activity by UNC aircraft, under the control of the Far East Air Force, consisted mainly of bombing airfields at Kimpo, Pyongyang, Yongpo and Wonsan, marshalling yards at Uijongbu, and the Han River bridges. Numerous trucks, some tanks, ammunition dumps and small craft were also taken under attack.

After the capture of Seoul, the North Korean forces regrouped, brought additional units south and continued the attack across the Han River, the south bank of which was held by the forces of the Republic of Korea.

The river line was quickly penetrated, but initially not in force. To the east, Chunchon was taken, and on the east coast the North Korean's grip on the Kangnung-Samchok coastal strip was consolidated. The crossing of the Han River was made in force. Tanks and vehicles were floated across the river on rafts, moved over pontoon bridges, or the Han River railroad bridge.

During this period the ROK's made a major effort to regroup their forces and reconstitute their divisional structure. Their units were far under strength and closer to regimental than divisional effectiveness.

In Japan, understrength units of the Far East Command were being readied for commitment in Korea. Combat elements of the 24th US Division were being flown in as fast as air space was available in order to stem the communist avalanche. Other elements began moving to Korea by water. By the 5th of July all combat elements of the 24th US Division were in Korea.

The North Korean forces developed a strong envelopment movement toward Suwon, with one force moving along secondary trails between the west coast and the main artery running via Seoul-Suwon-Osan, while other North Korean forces utilized all available trails as far east as the Chunchon-Wonju line. This advance captured Suwon.

The enemy made every possible effort to retain the initiative and to envelop and destroy the remaining ROK forces, together with the small United States contingent. To give effect to this intent, the enemy continued to push along the Suwon-Chonan-Taejon axis. At the same

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LEGEND

-  DISPOSITION 1 JUNE 1950
-  DISPOSITION 24 JUNE 1950
-  INITIAL ATTACK ROUTE



HISTORY OF THE NKA
DISPOSITION AND INITIAL
ATTACK ROUTES OF
NORTH KOREAN
DIVISIONAL UNITS
MAP NO. 4

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FORM MAP-100-8 (REV. 5-5-57)

time, enemy troops moving south of Wonju took Chungju and pressed southward towards Taejon. Toward the end of July the main enemy columns, each of approximately division strength, reinforced by tanks, had been contacted and identified at the following points: 4th Division northwest of Taejon, 2d Division southwest of Chungju, 5th Division north of Yongdok, 15th Division 15 miles southeast of Chungju. The enemy's 1st, 3d, 6th, 8th, 12th and 13th Divisions, also identified, were either in reserve, regrouping or en route to other battle areas. The battle front was not a continuous line, but rather consisted of a series of columns of battalion to regimental strength probing main roads and mountain trails in an effort to penetrate UNC positions. The greatest concentration was massed in the drive for Taejon, with decreasing strength toward the east. The enemy forces on the east coast were separated from the western part of the battle position by rugged mountains; but within the mountain area, from Yongyang south to Yongchon, were an estimated 1500 guerrillas. The impact of guerrillas, often intermingled with refugees, became one of the major problems of the campaign.

The main United States forces were athwart the main line of enemy approach in the Chochiwon area, where the steady pressure of their armor supported divisions had forced them. Despite enemy numerical superiority, one United States battalion, after being encircled and cut off for 24 hours, broke out and rejoined the main body. In addition to numerical inferiority, United States forces were faced with a serious enemy preponderance in artillery and armor.

To further bolster UNC strength in Korea the 25th US Division completed its movement from Japan by the middle of July and on the 18th of July the 1st Cavalry Division commenced landing at Pohang-dong.

In the Taejon sector the enemy employed two to three divisions with tank support. The delaying force in this area was the 24th US Division and elements of the 25th US Division. This delaying force executed a planned withdrawal to Yongdong on the 21st of July. The position at Yongdong was held for four days, showing increased UNC strength, but the enemy was able to muster superior forces and penetrated the flanks so withdrawal was conducted to Hwanggan on the 26th of July and to Kumchon on 30 July.

b. Envelopment in the West:

South of Taejon the 6th Division drove virtually unopposed to the western and southern parts of Korea. Against weak ROK militarized police forces this drive moved very rapidly and by the 25th of July enemy forces held Mokpo, Kwangju, Namwon and Chinan.

The enemy then shifted direction to the east toward the vital ports of Masan and Pusan. Yosu and Hadong were taken by 26 July and by the 29th, enemy forces had reached Kochang and had extended the line to the north at Muju. This major envelopment was possible to an enemy who employed at least eleven divisions against a United Nations force of three US Divisions and four ROK Divisions, all understrength.

East of Taejon enemy progress was less rapid. The 15th Division, in its drive down the Chungju-Hamchang axis was reinforced by the 1st Division. The outskirts of Hamchang were reached and local advances were made in the area between the 15th Division and the enemy forces on the Taejon-Kumchon axis. ROK forces operated in this area.

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The reorganization of the ROK forces into two corps and their resupply with US equipment progressed admirably. These forces demonstrated by limited attacks and determined defensive operations that they were prepared to do their utmost for the defense of their country. Their withdrawals were more directed to preserve continuity of the battle front than because of enemy pressure.

East of the Chungju-Hamchang area, enemy forces from the 8th and 12th Divisions finally occupied Yongju by the 24th of July but had made no appreciable progress thereafter. On the east coast the action fluctuated between withdrawals and advances around Yongdok.

Friendly forces continued to dominate the sea and air. Naval forces which were strengthened by three Canadian destroyers, continued blockade patrol, escort, and rescue duty. On the east coast, enemy installations and road movements were subjected to frequent naval bombardment. Considerable damage was done to oil storage tanks at Wonsan.

In the air, friendly operations continued to meet only sporadic enemy resistance, and activity was concentrated on interdiction and close support. Primary targets continued to be armor, trucks, troops, trains, and highway and railroad bridges.

The first United Nations Command was born on 24 July 1950, the day General Douglas MacArthur assumed command in response to the resolution passed on 7 July 1950 by the Security Council of the United Nations.

By the end of July the Republic of Korea and the United States had already committed Army, Navy and Air Force units. Australia and the United Kingdom were participating in the conflict with elements of their Navy and Air Force, and New Zealand, France and Canada had entered the action at sea.

On 29 July, 11 enemy divisions had been identified on the line of contact. The enemy dispositions formed a disconnected line from Chinju through Kochang, Hwanggan, and Yongju to Yongdok with the greatest concentration of divisions in the central part of the line. The enemy action of major significance was the wide envelopment in the south and southwest.

The first week in August saw additional strength added to the growing UN forces with the commitment of the 2d US Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to the Korean battlefield.

c. Pusan Perimeter:

The enemy rapidly followed up UN withdrawals during August and tightened the squeeze on the lodgment area in southeastern Korea. Two penetrations of the UNC positions were effected and maintained, and increased enemy pressure resulted due to progressive enemy concentrations.

Along the south coast, enemy forces drove through Chinju and continued a two-pronged attack in the direction of Masan, with two major units, the 4th and 6th Divisions. The deepest penetration in this sector was reached on 6 August when enemy forces were stopped eight miles west of Masan. In this sector the 6th Division came under the lashing attack of Task Force Kean. The resulting withdrawal of elements of this hostile division became a full retreat.

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To the north of this sector UN units were spread on extended fronts of from 15 to 30 miles. Penetration and infiltration could not be prevented and a strategic withdrawal became necessary. The enemy advanced east from Kochang to close on the Naktong River line by 31 July 1950. The enemy chose the vicinity of Pugong-ni as a crossing site and by 14 August had pushed the bulk of his divisions into the bridgehead at a great cost in casualties.

In the central part of the sector, generally astride the Kumchon-Taegu axis, the enemy drove hard against Kumchon from three directions with the veteran 1st, 2d and 3d Divisions. By 4 August, the enemy closed on the Naktong River line opposite Waegwan and began probing for a crossing site. Toward the end of the month when the enemy deployment terminated, an estimated five divisions were employed in this sector and there were indications of a general concentration of his forces across the river from Waegwan in preparation for a heavy assault.

Against the northern part of the line the enemy drove down the Chinju-Taegu axis and the Yongju-Andong axis with a total of three divisions, the 8th, 13th and 15th Divisions. Under this attack, in order to preserve a continuity of the line UN Forces were forced to withdraw to better defensive positions.

On the east coast, the town of Yongdok changed hands twice. Inland from the Yongdok-Pohang-dong axis an enemy force identified as elements of the 15th Division filtered through the rugged mountain trails over a period of a day and on 9 August reached the general vicinity of Kigye and by the 12th had entered Pohang-dong and had driven within mortar range of the UN airfield in that vicinity.

At the middle of the month the hard pressed 4th Division retained its bridgehead across the Naktong River west of Yongsan. On the east flank the enemy continued to draw off UNC forces in the east by his deep penetration to Pohang-dong, and slowly concentrated his forces northwest of Taegu, poised for a final drive to Taegu and Pusan. Enemy committed forces still consisted of 12 fully identified divisions, but with a possibility of two additional ones.

The free world during August consolidated its resistance to aggression. The United Nations announced acceptance of troop offers from Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, France and the Philippines. The 27th British Commonwealth Brigade from Hong Kong on the 29th was the first to join the hard pressed ROK and US forces.

d. The Squeeze:

Now operating with 14 divisions, the enemy concentrated on preparations for renewed offensive activity, despite heavy blows and serious local losses inflicted by UNC forces. The enemy gradually reinforced units opposite the extreme flanks and center of the UNC perimeter and achieved moderate local gains in the face of determined UNC resistance.

On the evening of 31 August, the North Korean High Command, employing 13 infantry divisions, two new tank brigades, and elements of a previously identified tank division, launched their strongest offensive to date against the UNC positions. This comprehensive attack, which constituted one of the enemy's major efforts, initially struck hard at the UNC positions south of Tuksong and within two days extended over the entire front.

The enemy's initial effort, in the south, was unsuccessful. At the southern end of the front his 6th and 7th Divisions had been forced back 3,000 yards through determined counterattacks of the 25th US Division supported by other US Forces. Thereafter, despite constant attacks, North Korean forces made no advances in this sector.

Farther north, in the Naktong River area between Hyonpung and the Nam River, the enemy 2d, 4th, 9th and 10th Divisions, plus armored elements, began a general offensive eastward over the Naktong which scored initial advances of 6,000 to 8,000 yards against the bitter resistance of UNC Forces. By the middle of the month the enemy retained only a 2-mile strip east of the Naktong River.

The enemy 1st, 3d and 13th Divisions achieved gains of a similar magnitude along the Taegu salient in some of the heaviest fighting of the war. By the middle of the month the UNC forces had absorbed the drive on Taegu, and began to register slow progress against strong resistance. In the Sinnyong area, UNC forces in a series of heavy, and indecisive engagements, blocked further advances attempted by the enemy 8th Division.

Near the eastern flank of the UNC perimeter the 12th and 15th Divisions posed a most serious threat. Initiating heavy attacks near Kigye, enemy forces penetrated to within four miles of Kyongju, but the threat to the town was vitiated by UNC counterattacks. At his greatest point of advance the enemy had seized an area almost 10 miles deep and 15 miles wide, seriously threatening UNC communications. However, ROK and US Army units conducted vigorous counterattacks and advanced up to six miles on the west flanks of the pocket, relieved pressure on Yongchon and Kyongju, and threatened the enemy in turn with encirclement.

On the east coast the 5th Division, after yielding some ground to UNC attacks, resumed the offensive. This offensive, co-ordinated with the 12th and 15th Divisions' penetration of the west of Pohang-dong, necessitated a withdrawal of the ROK Army units holding the town. Following their withdrawal the same ROK units counterattacked and established a firm line two miles south of Pohang-dong.

e. The Envelopment:

At dawn on 15 September, the X US Corps made an amphibious assault on the Inchon area. The first phase in this wide envelopment was the seizure of Wolmi-do, a small island which dominated Inchon harbor. The 3d Battalion of the 5th US Marine Regiment surprised the North Korean defenders with a perfectly co-ordinated attack that secured the island in two hours' fighting.

The second phase of the operation involved the securing of Inchon peninsula. The 1st US Marine Division and four ROK Marine Battalions accomplished this feat with lightning-like blows that kept the enemy 18th Division and garrison units off-balance and unable to collect their forces for co-ordinated action. Kimpo airfield, the largest in Korea, was cleared on 17 September and opened for UNC operations on 18 September. Elements of the 7th US Infantry Division augmented by ROK Army forces were next brought into Inchon and rapidly took the southern flank, advancing speedily 20 miles to the south and securing Suwon.

The liberation of Seoul and the denying to the North Koreans of road and rail lines in this communication hub comprised the third phase of the Inchon operation. On 19 September, the 1st US Marine Division and two ROK Marine Battalions crossed the Han River, and started

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**HISTORY OF THE NKA
SITUATION
25 JUN - 15 SEP 1950
MAP NO. 5**

KOREA
BAY

JAPAN
SEA

AGGRESSION

EXPLOITATION



YELLOW
SEA


KOREA

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the attack on Seoul from the north. The remainder of the 1st US Marine Division and the 7th US Division enveloped Seoul from the south and west. The 17th ROK Regiment attacked through the center. By this time the enemy had secured reinforcements from the 9th NK Division that was opposing Eighth Army and from scattered garrison and training units. The enemy defense of Seoul was coordinated and stubborn, requiring the X US Corps Commander to order city fighting with its hardships on civilian life and property. The liberation of the city was conducted to cause the least possible damage to civil installations. The third phase was completed on 28 September with only mop-up fighting continuing in the area.

The President of Korea moved the government of the Republic of Korea into Seoul on 29 September.

The obstacles to the wide envelopment were not only enemy opposition but also Inchon's natural obstacles of poor beaches fronted by miles of mud flats, a narrow channel, and an extraordinary tidal range of over 29 feet. The success of the operation demonstrated a complete mastery of the technique of amphibious warfare and clockwork, coordination between the units and services participating. Enemy opposition was not noteworthy, but could have been. The potential was there. The North Koreans were rushing construction of coastal fortifications including dug-in tanks and guns of all calibers, beach defenses, and mining operations. Had the operation been delayed for as much as a month the enemy would have been ready and the landing if possible, would have been many times more costly to UNC assault forces.

f. The Breakthrough and Envelopment:

In co-ordination with the landing of X US Corps at Inchon on 15 September, the Eighth Army launched an attack on 16 September. Cheered by reports of the successful landings at Inchon, ROK, British, and US Army troops attacked along the entire perimeter against strong enemy resistance. Some of the more severe fighting of the war up to this time resulted. The enemy ring around the Eighth Army, though strong, was lacking in depth. The first few days of Eighth Army's attack were marked by attacks and counter-attacks often meeting head on.

By 18 September, the enemy grudgingly began to give ground and by the 20th, UNC forces were punching holes in the enemy ring. The port of Pohang-dong on the east coast was retaken by the 3d ROK Division on 20 September.

The IX US Corps in the south, with the 2d and 25th US Infantry Divisions, and attached ROK units, got its attack rolling rapidly. In the Masan area, on the south coast, the hostile 6th and 7th Divisions began to yield ground by 19 September. Within four days friendly forces had driven westward almost to Chinju, and during the next week, enemy forces had been displaced just short of Hadong, a distance of 35 miles.

The I US Corps to the north with the 1st US Cavalry Division, 24th US Infantry Division, the 1st ROK Division, and the 27th British Brigade crossed the Naktong River on 19 September, built up a firm bridgehead on 20 September, and launched a furious attack up the main Kumchon-Taejon axis, driving the enemy 1st, 3d and 13th Divisions approximately 35 miles northwest of their 15 September line.

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On the northern and western fronts, the enemy 8th, 15th, 12th and 5th Divisions resisted fiercely until 20 September, when they began a series of precipitous withdrawals that carried them more than 70 miles northward within six days.

The I and II ROK Corps brought about the hostile collapse and kept the enemy in full retreat with leap-frogging regiments, alternately pressing the attack and resting. Enemy losses in personnel and equipment in this area were particularly heavy.

In the co-ordinated Eighth Army - X US Corps offensives, the enemy relinquished effective tactical control of nearly all Republic of Korea territory south of the 37th Parallel, while UNC forces assumed control of a territory four times greater than they held at the commencement of the Inchon landings. In his general retreat, the enemy suffered thousands of casualties and abandoned large quantities of arms, ammunition, and equipment. The loss of this materiel which included field guns, tanks, trucks, and aircraft, materially reduced the North Korean fighting potential.

g. The Pursuit:

Outstanding during the period was the advance of the I ROK Corps with the 3d and Capital ROK Divisions. From 30 September to 10 October this force, spearheaded by the 3d ROK Division, moved up the east coast of Korea from below the 38th Parallel to capture the North Korean port city of Wonsan. This movement was continually resisted by the enemy 5th, 12th and 15th Divisions and some enemy garrison units, nevertheless, the ROK forces drove ahead about 15 miles a day with such rapidity and relentless attacks that the enemy was unable to organize co-ordinated resistance, and was forced to commit units piecemeal. The ROKs, superbly supported by the UNC Air Force and Navy, rapidly chewed up each hostile unit encountered.

Meanwhile the II ROK Corps, with the 6th, 7th and 8th ROK Divisions, attacked north through the central part of Korea with equal drive and determination, however, their advance was somewhat slower owing to difficult terrain.

Eighth Army with British, Australian, Philippine, and US units moved up the west coast and central sectors, relieved X US Corps of the Seoul-Inchon area on 7 October and continued the attack to the north. On the vital Seoul-Pyongyang axis, resistance was stronger and better organized than elsewhere along the 38th Parallel. Having cleared the Uijongbu area north of Seoul, Eighth Army, led by the 1st Cavalry Division, drove across the Parallel on 9 October. By 12 October, friendly forces had penetrated more than 15 miles into northern Korea toward the enemy capital of Pyongyang and had taken Paekchon 5 miles west of the Yesong River. Though the Communist defenses athwart the Seoul-Pyongyang axis retained a semblance of organization, UNC forces continued to break through, and to by-pass enemy units.

In the south, isolated remnants of six enemy divisions vainly sought to break out of the UNC cordon which progressively compressed them to more and more restricted areas and proceeded toward their ultimate elimination.

By the end of October, the northern boundary of the occupied area of North Korea was generally marked by a line running south and west from Wonsan to Hyon-ni, thence to Ichon, Pyongsan and Paekchon.

At this time the most challenging problem was to maximize exploitation of strategic opportunities resulting from the spectacular collapse of the Communist invasion force in the Republic of Korea. More than half the enemy's combat forces were entrapped south of the 37th Parallel, and were no longer available to him. Thousands more were lost in their desperate flight north to the 38th Parallel. Subsequent to 1 October, thousands of prisoners and large stocks of enemy equipment were captured. All former Republic of Korea territory except for the small Ongjin and Yonan Peninsula areas, was restored to that Government.

Military developments moved at an extremely rapid rate, and North Korean forces no longer held any well-defined line south of the 38th Parallel. The North Korean high command structure, in fact, appeared to have broken down completely south of the 38th Parallel. Hostile units lost their cohesion as divisional organizations, and only in a few cases were enemy forces fighting as units.

Resistance to the advance of UNC forces was sporadic and weak, but by the end of October began to stiffen. However, despite the advantage of extremely rugged and mountainous terrain, the Communist defensive effort failed to prevent continued UNC advances. Defending briefly at most points of contact, generally with battalion-size units, the enemy forces yielded 150 miles in depth across the front. The retreat was extremely expensive to the enemy, both in men and in materiel. Prisoners of war reached an approximate figure of 135,000; captured materiel was in proportion. The North Korean Army was defeated.

At no time after the September collapse of the North Korean line around Pusan had the enemy been able to organize a solid co-ordinated front. However, with our approach to the Yalu River, the enemy became somewhat more aggressive, resisting in a much stronger manner some 50 miles south of the border. In the west coast sector elements of the enemy 17th Mechanized and 32d Infantry Divisions built up a semblance of a front extending 50 miles from Chongju to Onjong, which temporarily retarded the UNC advance. At Onjong, on the eastern leg of this sector, an estimated two regiments vigorously counterattacked forcing a local friendly unit to make a slight withdrawal. UNC forces also met increasing resistance in their advances in the east coast sector.

On the 20th of October elements of X US Corps commenced landing in the Wonsan area. On the 29th of October the 7th US Division with ROK Army units landed on the beaches at Iwon, 178 miles north of Wonsan.

2. Invasion by Chinese Communists:

The most significant development in the Korean conflict after the defeat of the North Korean Army was the capture of Chinese Communist soldiers in late October 1950. Initial Chinese PWs were captured in two general areas: In the vicinity of Unsan; and in the Sudong area about 40 miles north of Hamhung.

Toward the end of October, the dwindling North Korean forces began making a last desperate stand in the Unsan area. Elsewhere, they steadily gave ground to advancing UNC forces. However, in late October, elements of the 124th CCF Division were identified on the front near Kotori, a few miles south of Chosin Reservoir. Within 10 days, through interrogation of prisoners from all Chinese units involved, elements of

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eleven more CCF divisions were identified in the forward areas. Of these elements, nine had taken up positions between Pakchon and Tokchon in the western sector, and CCF strength in the Koto-ri area had expanded to identified elements of three divisions. At the same time, UNC aerial reconnaissance disclosed heavy troop movements near the Korean border, in Manchuria, and into Korea.

Advance UNC elements began movements to organize a continuous front on the western and central sectors, preparatory to a co-ordinated large-scale offensive action. During this period of the UNC Forces' re-deployment, the Communist forces were moderately aggressive and mounted numerous small-scale attacks at various points in the western and central parts of the front. As UNC forces resumed the offensive, the enemy displayed flexibility and resisted stubbornly at Pakchon, Wonni, and particularly at Tokchon.

In the widely extended east coast sector, no definite front lines existed. Of the three main axes of advance, the Communists interposed a strong defending force only on the approaches to the Chosin and Fusen Reservoirs. On the Pungsan-Kapsan axis, a North Korean brigade had retreated to Kapsan under steady UNC pressure. Another brigade, carrying out limited delaying action, had been forced to displace 25 miles northward from Kilchu along the main east coast highway.

a. Entry CCF Forces into Korea:

The entry of sizeable CCF units into the Korean War commenced in mid-October, and by late October the following CCF units had completed their crossing of the Yalu River into Korea: (1) 38th Army, consisting of army troops, 112th, 113th, 114th Divisions, with an aggregate strength of 28,000 crossed at Manpojin 23-25 October. (2) 39th Army, consisting of army troops, 115th, 116th, 117th Divisions with a similar strength, crossed the Yalu at Antung on 22-23 October 1950. (3) 40th Army, consisting of army troops, 118th, 119th and 120th Divisions of similar strength, crossed the Yalu in the Antung area 20-24 October 1950. (4) 42d CCF Army, consisting of army troops, 124th, 125th and 126th Divisions of similar strength, crossed the Yalu at Manpojin 14-25 October. (5) 50th CCF Army, consisting of army troops, 148th, 149th and 150th Divisions of similar strength, crossed the Yalu in the Antung area 10-12 October. (6) 66th CCF Army, consisting of army troops, 196th, 197th and 198th Divisions of similar strength, crossed the Yalu at Antung 27 October.

All of these units were apparently preceded by small protective groups of CCF troops that crossed the Yalu in early October.

The remainder of the units, the 20th, 26th and 27th CCF Armies, normally with three divisions each, crossed the Yalu at subsequent dates. Elements of the 24th, 30th, 32d and 37th CCF Armies were also identified in a replacement reinforcement role.

The total estimated strength of these units was more than 250,000 and the potential of further reinforcement was obvious.


b. The CCF Offensive:

The enemy forces opposing United Nations operations in Korea demonstrated considerable strategic and tactical skill. These forces, predominantly Chinese Communists, surrendered very extensive

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HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND
 History of the NKA
 Situation
 SEP - NOV 1950
 MAP NO. 6



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KOREA

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HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND
 Military Intelligence Service
 (Source: Staff)

**HISTORY OF THE NKA
 CCF INVASION
 OCT - DEC 1950
 MAP NO. 7**

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areas in the east coastal sector in the zone of operations of the X US Corps. UNC forces were virtually unchallenged within the great quadrangle marked by Chongjin, Hyesanjin, Chosin Reservoir, and Hungnam, except for strong pressure on UNC units south and west of the reservoir. The 7th US Infantry Division met only moderate opposition in its rapid advance to the Manchurian border at Hyesanjin, and ROK forces advancing beyond Chongjin on the east coast encountered only light resistance. However, in the west sector Communist forces launched a strong counter-offensive in response to the UNC general offensive on 24 November.

In this sector on a line arching northward between Kasan and Tokchon the enemy displayed little interest in combat up to the 25th of November. In many instances, UNC units advanced several miles without contact, and patrols ranging northward 5 to 8 miles met only occasional resistance in the eastern part of the sector. On the night of 25-26 November, the enemy counterattacked all along the line, devoting his major effort to the Eighth Army's central sector along the Chongchon River. These strong, sustained attacks, characterized by the usual Communist infiltration and flanking tactics, forced advanced UNC units to displace 10 to 12 miles to a main line of resistance on a line between Pakchon and Won-ni. Powerful Communist thrusts north of Tokchon forced UNC units back about 25 miles to the vicinity of Taepyong on the Taedong River. During the intense fighting in these actions, the enemy suffered heavy personnel losses as a result of maximum UNC air and ground efforts.

Here in the vicinity of Kunu-ri near Won-ni, the 2d US Division, the 27th British Brigade and the Turkish Brigade fought their way out of a communist trap.

Falling back along the Chongchon River line under constant day and night attacks from the north and east, all elements felt the brunt of the Chinese Communist descent into the valley below Won-ni. There the Turkish Brigade was surrounded near Wason. After fierce bayonet fighting, elements of the brigade broke through the surrounding enemy and took up positions near Kaechon with the enemy following closely.

The 2d US Division and the 27th British Brigade disengaged but were forced to "beat" their way through strong enemy road blocks. Friendly air units were very active and particularly successful in damage inflicted on the enemy which permitted friendly ground forces to escape from the area.

The opposition in the central sector of Eighth Army was accepted as a major CCF thrust, which commenced approximately 25 November, in opposition to UNC operations, and which involved elements of approximately eight CCF divisions, while holding operations on the remainder of the Eighth Army front involved approximately six additional CCF divisions. As part of the general CCF offensive, savage attacks were directed against friendly X US Corps forces in the general vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir with an estimated six to eight hostile divisions in the attacking force.

The Eighth Army right flank positions held by the II ROK Corps were penetrated resulting in an untenable tactical disposition for other units of the Eighth Army. Withdrawal was forced upon the UNC forces by the overwhelming superiority of enemy numbers moving in a position to strike in the rear in the direction of Pyongyang. A deliberate planned withdrawal with unbroken cohesion was conducted.

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c. Evacuation of X Corps:

The X US Corps operated out of the east coast ports of Wonsan and Hamhung in an attack to the border. Its units were deployed on four lines of attack: The I ROK Corps along the northeastern coast had passed Chongjin; the northern advance of the 7th US Infantry Division had reached Hyesanjin; the northwesterly advance of the 1st Marine Division had passed Yudan-ni on the western side of Chosin Reservoir; the 3d US Division attacked to the west from Wonsan.

The massive weight of the Chinese Communist attack forced the withdrawal of the X US Corps. From three of its four lines of advance this was effected without serious interference by the enemy. On the fourth, however, a major enemy drive impinged against the troops in the Chosin Reservoir area.

While the 1st Marine Regiment, with two battalions near the town of Koto-ri and one with the 1st Marine Division Headquarters at Hagaru-ri at the south end of the Chosin Reservoir, kept the supply road and route of withdrawal open, the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments withdrew under heavy and continuous pressure from their advanced positions at Yudan-ni to the division base of Hagaru-ri, 11 miles to the south. Meanwhile, a task force consisting of two battalions of the 7th US Division operating on the eastern side of the reservoir was attacked by an overwhelming number of Chinese and withdrew across the frozen reservoir to join the Marines at Hagaru-ri.

All elements to the northward having closed at Hagaru-ri on 4 December, the Marine Division and attached elements of the 7th US Division resumed the movement to the south. The enemy attempted to block the withdrawal route and pressed the friendly column from the rear and both flanks. The column on 7 December, reached the US Marine battalion holding the MSR at Koto-ri. Meanwhile, a special task force from the 3d US Division had moved north to Sudong-ni where it relieved the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, which, in turn, attacked north to reopen the road to Koto-ri. On 9 December the head of the withdrawing column effected a juncture with this battalion. The following day the leading elements of the column debouched from the mountains onto the coastal plain and entered the Corps' defensive position. By nightfall 11 December, all elements had withdrawn to that position and the concentration of the corps was complete.

Enemy attempts to disrupt the embarkation of X US Corps units at Hungnam were foiled by friendly artillery fire and air and naval support. However, completion of the evacuation of the X US Corps from Hungnam on the afternoon of 24 December once again gave the enemy control of all of Korea north of a line generally along the 38th Parallel.

On 27 December, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway assumed command of the Eighth United States Army in Korea.

d. Resumption of the Communist Offensive:

In late December, Communist activity along the battle front consisted mostly of light probing attacks against the friendly forces deployed along the 38th Parallel. These attacks increased in intensity and on 31 December, the enemy initiated a general offensive, directing his main effort toward Seoul and Kapyong in the west and Wonju in the center. Employing his main force of eighteen CCF divisions, the enemy delivered heavy attacks against friendly forces to the north and northeast of Seoul, and achieved deep penetrations of 10-12 miles, which, in conjunction with

similar successes by the enveloping force in the Chunchon area, forced a general UNC withdrawal. By 4 January the enemy reoccupied Seoul, and UNC forces were forced to displace south of the Han River to protect their flanks. However, continued enemy success in the Wonju salient made this position untenable, and on 7 January new UNC defensive positions were established along a line extending from Pyongtaek northeast to Wonju. Thereafter, the enemy maintained only light patrol contact and began deploying his assault forces along a parallel line about 10 miles to the north through Osan and Yoju.

An enemy force of eleven North Korean divisions and elements of a Chinese Communist Army undertook the secondary effort down the center of the peninsula, driving along and to the east of the Chunchon-Wonju-Chechon axis, which constitutes the principal north-south line of communications in this area. Taking advantage of superior numbers, strong guerrilla forces, and difficult terrain, the enemy drove a deep, 20 to 30 mile penetration through the thinly held UNC lines east of the Chunchon-Chechon axis. This penetration enabled the enemy forces to strike repeatedly against the right flank of the main body of UNC forces deployed to meet the large CCF concentration to the west, and impede the withdrawal of UNC units to Wonju by assuming blocking positions in their immediate rear. The enemy made strong efforts to drive the friendly forces out of the Wonju area, but stubborn UNC resistance, coupled with counterattack, blunted this attempt and cost the enemy extremely high casualties.

It was here that the 2d US Division, with the attached Netherlands' and French battalions, made another historic stand. The enemy, employing "human wave" tactics, attacked repeatedly with overwhelming numbers which at times overran elements of the division. Heavy infiltration forced the division to withdraw and consolidate, bitterly fighting its way through strong road blocks established by night infiltrators. Momentarily taking the offensive, elements of the 2d Division surprised a hostile force preparing positions just southeast of Wonju and after killing more than 200 withdrew to defensive positions. The enemy attempt at a double envelopment of the division's positions came under heavy air and artillery attacks, which, in conjunction with strong ground action, repulsed their efforts.

e. The Attack:

By the middle of January the momentum of the Communist attack had reduced considerably and the UNC forces turned to aggressive patrolling, meeting only light to moderate resistance as far north as Suwon and Kumsyong. At the same time air sightings and other reports indicated numerous small-scale displacements of enemy forces northward in the area south of Han River. In consonance with the decision of the Commanding General, Eighth Army, announced on 21 January to employ armored counterattacks supported by infantry, artillery, and air, in order to inflict maximum enemy casualties and material losses, the UNC forces passed to the offensive and by the end of the month had advanced to a general line 3 to 5 miles north of Suwon, Kumsyong, and Ichon in the west.

North Korean forces defended stubbornly in the Wonju area, however, by the end of the month UNC patrols advanced 10 miles northward in Hoengsong and the enemy withdrew to positions 3 miles north of the town. North Korean forces in the east coast sector offered only moderate resistance as UNC forces advanced 8 to 10 miles in the Yongwol and Samchok areas.

From 24 November, when the UNC attack exposed the CCF build-up south of the Yalu River, to the first part of the year 1951, was the period the Chinese Communist forces, following the deep and rapid withdrawal of the UNC forces, extended his lines of communications and exposed his area of operations to both air observation and attack.

In the deep re-entrant of the Yongwol-Andong-Uisong axis, the North Korean troops withdrew from positions to which they had earlier infiltrated, leaving about one division in the mountainous area east of Tanyang, and another astride the road between Andong and Yongju. These divisions augmented a force of about 5,000 guerrillas who were operating in the area east of Uisong. These two enemy regular units and the guerrilla forces were relatively active throughout the period. The guerrilla elements south and east of Uisong, on one occasion, extended their activities to the Yongdok area on the east coast, while some elements displaced southward to about 20 miles northwest of Pohangdong.

During United Nations' advances in late January and the early part of February, I Corps, fighting along with the Chinese Communist Forces on the west front, fought rather stubbornly to protect the main approach to Seoul in the Anyang area. However, on 7 February, United Nations' forces took Anyang and the enemy was later driven north across the Han River.

Fighting a delaying action during most of February, the North Korean Army with I Corps on the west front and the II, III and V Corps on the east front, suffered increasingly heavy casualties, and elements of the North Korean Corps were forced to retreat 10-17 miles by the end of February. During most of March and April, the North Korean Forces continued fighting a delaying action punctuated by sharp counterattacks mostly in the mountainous section on the east front.

During this period, the VI, VII and VIII North Korean Corps which had been organized and trained in Manchuria, entered Korea and were deployed in the rear coastal areas; the VI Corps in Hwanghae Province, the VII Corps in the Wonsan area, and the VIII Corps in the Hamhung area. The VIII Corps, consisting of the 42d, 45th and 46th Divisions, was soon disbanded with the 42d Division used as a replacement pool, while the 45th and 46th Divisions were transferred to the III and VII Corps, respectively.


Enemy forces offered only sporadic resistance until 8 April when all regular Chinese Communist and North Korean forces to the east of the Imjin River had been driven out of South Korea. Thereafter, enemy forces on their main line of resistance bitterly contested UNC advances. The most intense fighting took place on the central front along the Hantanchon River east of its confluence with the Imjin, along the southern approaches to the Hwachon Reservoir and Dam, and along the Soyang River a few miles to the east. Fighting was also intense in the Changam area. In his defensive efforts, the enemy demonstrated increased strength in artillery and mortars.

Marked increase in activity in the hostile rear had been noted with a continued deployment of combat forces into forward areas. Daily vehicle sightings in late March and early April repeatedly passed the 2,000 mark, and the traffic pattern indicated that the enemy had expanded his central front build-up westward into the Kumchon area, opposite the west flank of Eighth Army.

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1 JAN 51
OFFENSIVE
RESUMED

ATTACK

9 JAN 51

HISTORY OF THE NKA
OPERATIONS
JANUARY 1951
MAP NO. 8

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
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HISTORY OF THE NVA
FIFTH CAMPAIGN
2nd PHASE
(16-22 MAY 51)

FRONT LINE
15 JUNE

FRONT LINE
16 MAY

FRONT LINE
22 MAY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~f. "Fifth Campaign, 1st Phase," 22 April 1951:

On 22 April, elements of the III and V Corps on the east front participated in the Communist "Fifth Campaign, 1st Phase" south in the Yanggu-Inje-Nodong area. The I Corps on the west front also took part and occupied the extreme west flank with Chinese Communist forces on its left. Although they obtained some initial success, by 29 April the attack abated somewhat and in spite of the quiescent attitude which the enemy had during the first part of May, there were a number of significant indications that the "Fifth Campaign" had actually been designed to extend over a prolonged period.

g. "Fifth Campaign, 2d Phase," 16 May 1951:

As early as 13 May, actions of hostile covering forces showed evidence that they had ceased to content themselves with merely parrying United Nations' patrols and had embarked on a series of probing ventures of their own, and on 16 May the enemy unleashed a fresh general offensive to expel United Nations Forces from Korea. The I Corps again on the west flank with its three divisions, and elements of the II, III and V Corps with six divisions forward on the east front, launched attacks in conjunction with those attacks of the Chinese Communist Forces with the main effort developing on the central front. Although gains of 10 to 15 miles were registered along most of the front, with gains up to 30 miles on the extreme eastern front, the hostile effort was completely spent by 21 May. The North Korean Forces, along with the Chinese Communist Forces, were then thrown into a precipitous withdrawal. By 28 May, after suffering very heavy casualties, and the loss of painfully mustered supplies, the enemy was forced well north of his line of departure and back to about the same line he had held on 1 January.

3. Military Situation from June 1951:

During June, the III Corps was recommitted on the left flank of the North Korean line in the east sector. Then in August, the VI Corps redeployed from the west coast to the east coast and assumed responsibility for the eastern portion of the former III Corps' zone. There was now the VI, III, II and V Corps deployed from east to west along the eastern front from the coast to the Pukhan River. In other areas, the I Corps still occupied most of Hwanghae Province in the west; the IV Corps was deployed in the coastal areas west of Pyongyang from Chinnampo north to the Chongju area, while the VII Corps secured the Wonsan area from the vicinity of Kojo, north to Hamhung. The remainder of North Korea was occupied by Chinese Communist Forces.

During late September and early October, the Communist forces were realigned in the east sector during which process the V Corps was squeezed out of the line by the commitment of the newly arrived 68th Chinese Communist Army and a slight westward shift of II Corps. The V Corps subsequently drew back to the Kowon-Yonghung area where they regrouped and retrained, while relieving the VII Corps of its defensive responsibility for the area north of Wonsan.

Beginning in late November 1951, further changes occurred in the dispositions and organization of the North Korean Forces. Initially, the I Corps redeployed from the west to the east sector, replacing the VI Corps. Subsequently, the 18th and 19th Infantry Divisions of the VI Corps were inactivated and used as replacement pools, while the 9th Infantry Division was transferred in place from the VI Corps to the newly arrived I Corps. The 17th Mechanized Infantry Division, which had been subordinate to the I Corps, did not accompany the move, and was subsequently inactivated. The 23d Brigade, which had a coastal defense mission

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
under the I Corps in the west, remained in place and was reassigned to the IV Corps, which now had responsibility for the defense of the west coast from the Haeju area, north to the Chongju area. The North Korean Army now had six active corps, with the I, III and II Corps deployed along the front lines from the coastal areas in the vicinity of Kosong, west to the vicinity of Tupo-ri, where they tied in with the east flank of the Chinese Communist Forces; the IV Corps remained in the west coastal areas and the V and VII Corps in the northeast coastal area. The remainder of the front lines west of Tupo-ri and the rear areas were under the control of the Chinese Communist Forces.

Since June 1951, the North Korean front line forces have maintained a defensive attitude. They continued to offer considerable resistance to limited attacks of the United Nations Forces, and such resistance has been punctuated by sharp counterattacks. During this period also, extensive efforts have been put forth toward the construction of bunker type emplacements on key terrain features, which further assists their defensive efforts.

In July 1952, the II Corps was relieved by a westward extension of the area of responsibility of the III Corps; thus leaving only the I and III Corps committed in the eastern sector.

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HISTORY OF THE NKA
 FIFTH CAMPAIGN
 1st PHASE
 (22-30 APR 51)
 MAP NO. 9



POSITION AT START OF IMPULSE (OFFENSIVE)

POSITION AT END OF IMPULSE (OFFENSIVE)


FRONT LINE 22 APR

FRONT LINE 30 APR

CHANGDAN

NODONG

HISTORY OF THE NKA SITUATION
16 MAY - 15 JUNE 1951
MAP NO. 10



SECTION V

HISTORIES OF NORTH KOREAN ARMY UNITS

I CORPS

Commander: Lt Gen LEE Kwon Mu

I Corps was activated at Pyongyang on or about 10 June 1950. During the initial attack on the ROK, the Corps advanced down the Uijongbu-Seoul-Suwon-Taejon axis under command of Lieutenant General KIM Ung, with the assigned responsibility for the western sector of operations. By the end of July 1950 the Corps had closed into the western sector of the Pusan Perimeter. In the most optimistic order of the Korean War, the capture by I Corps of Taegu and Pusan by 6 August 1950 was ordered in Operation Order No. 121, dated 3 August 1950.

During the fighting along the Naktong River, its divisions, the 2d, 4th, 6th, 9th, 10th and 105th, suffered very heavy casualties while attempting to break through the UNC perimeter. The last attempt to smash the UNC line was made by the Corps on 31 August 1950. As a result of the UNC counteroffensive launched on 16 September 1950, the Corps ordered a general withdrawal on 25 September 1950. Adding to the confusion during the period was the fact that the Corps Commander, Lieutenant General KIM Ung, had been reassigned and replaced by Lieutenant General LEE Kwon Mu, formerly commander of the 4th Division, on 8 September. However, the staff and new commander managed to escape to North Korea.

There followed a reorganization period during which time the Corps was composed of the 17th and 46th Divisions and the 105th Tank Division. The Corps was located immediately north of Sukchon at the time of the UNC airborne operation in that area in late October 1950.

After participating in the First Campaign, 25 October - 25 December 1950, during which it attacked toward Anju on the west flank of the 39th Chinese Communist Army, the Corps withdrew to Chosan (YF 3020). Here it was reorganized with the 8th, 17th and 47th Divisions under its control. These units were trained and replacements integrated before the Corps once again advanced southward, entering Pyongyang on 4 December 1950.

By 27 December 1950 the I Corps, led by the 47th Division, was at the Imjin River near Korangpo-ri. On 4 January 1951 it entered Seoul, and subsequently set up defenses in the Suwon and Inchon area on the west flank of the 50th CCF Army.

Again in late January 1951 the Corps suffered a serious reversal, attempting to halt the UNC counteroffensive launched on 25 January 1951, and as it withdrew toward Seoul in mid-February 1951, it lost almost the entire 81st Regiment, 8th Division in an attempted counterattack against UNC elements near Kwangju.

Mid-March 1951 saw the Corps pushed back from Seoul across the Imjin River. At this time the 19th Division, VI Corps, moved south of the Imjin River and was attached to cover the Corps retreat. The 19th Division took the brunt of a UNC airborne attack on 23 March and was driven

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north of the Imjin. The Corps continued its withdrawal, moving across the Yesong River to the Paekchon-Kumchon area where it received replacements and was re-equipped for the "Fifth Campaign."

On 22 April 1951 when the "Fifth Campaign, 1st Phase" started, the 8th and 47th Divisions attacked across the Imjin River near Munsan-ni registering some gains but suffering heavy casualties. When UNC forces withdrew in the face of heavier Chinese pressure farther east, I Corps advanced to the Karhyon area where it again sustained heavy casualties. The 19th Division once again appeared under I Corps in place of the 17th Division. As soon as the enemy drive lost its impetus, I US Corps retaliated with a short-lived offensive specifically aimed at the enemy I Corps which was forced to withdraw in some disorder across the Imjin River.

On 16 May 1951 when the "Fifth Campaign, 2d Phase" started, the I Corps advanced against UNC outposts but did not press an attack on the MLR. In late May it withdrew for the third time across the Imjin River again under pressure and with considerable personnel and materiel losses. The Corps continued its withdrawal to the west bank of the Yesong River in the general vicinity of Myorak-san (BT 5542) for a much needed rest and reorganization.

I Corps remained out of contact until the first part of July 1951, when patrol contact was established east of the Yesong River in the general vicinity of Tosong-ni (BT 7504). On or about 18 July the 8th Division was located in this area; the 19th Division apparently remained in the general Paekchon (BT 6409) area.

During mid-August 1951 significant changes began to take place in the composition of the Corps. The 19th Division reverted to VI Corps control and was replaced by the 17th Mechanized Infantry Division, formerly the 17th Division. Reports indicating a possible displacement of the 17th Mechanized Infantry Division were never confirmed and the division continued to be carried in the general Anak area. The 81st and 83d Regiments of the 8th Division, which displaced from Kaesong to Sinchon during August, returned to the general Kaesong area in late September 1951. Meanwhile the 47th Division remained in the general vicinity of Yonan with elements employed in a coastal defense mission while also engaged in training and combating friendly partisan activities in the area. The 23d Brigade, IV Corps, which was charged with a coastal defense mission in the Haeju-Ongjin-Changyon-Ullyul area, was placed under I Corps control.

The Corps remained in these areas until about mid-November 1951, when it was replaced in the Hwanghae Province by the 40th Chinese Communist Army and began displacing towards the Eastern Front. Reports indicated that the 8th and 47th Divisions assembled in the general Haeju area for their northeastward displacement to the Hwachon-ni area. These units arrived in the Hwachon area by the latter part of November. The 47th Division continued displacing southeast from the Hwachon-ni area and, by early December 1951, had established contact in the general Yongonsu (DT 2771) area after having relieved the 19th Division, VI Corps. In late November the 8th Division, minus the 82d Regiment which remained in the Kaesong area, relieved the 18th Division, VI Corps, in the Tongchon area and assumed a coastal defense mission in the Corps rear area. The 9th Division, which had been subordinate to the VI Corps, remained in the line but was transferred to the I Corps in order to replace the 17th Mechanized Infantry Division which had not accompanied the Corps movement

to the east sector. The 23d Brigade remained in place along the coastal areas of Hwanghae Province in the west sector and was subsequently assigned to the IV Corps.

By the end of 1951 the redeployment had been completed and the Corps was responsible for the area from Komisong northeast to Kosong, thence northwestward to the vicinity of Kojo. The 47th Division and elements of the 9th Division were on the line, while the remainder of the 8th and 9th Divisions defended the coastal areas north of Kosong.

During the first seven months of 1952, the dispositions of the Corps remained substantially the same. However, one change occurred in late June, when the 82d Regiment, 8th Division, displaced from the Kaesong area to the east coast in order to rejoin its parent organization.

As of July 1952 the I Corps was maintaining defensive positions on the eastern front and also the eastern coast.

II CORPS

Commander: Lieutenant General CHOE Hyon

II Corps was formed on or about 12 June 1950 at Pyongyang and, sometime prior to 25 June 1950, moved to Hwachon near the 38th Parallel. The Corps was then commanded by Lieutenant General KIM Kwang Hyop, but by 10 July 1950, KIM was relieved for inefficiency, since the Corps was 7 to 10 days behind schedule, and he was replaced by Lieutenant General KIM Mu Chong. By the time the Corps closed into the northern portion of the Pusan Perimeter in late July 1950, with the 1st, 2d, 5th, 8th, 12th, 13th and 15th Divisions, the invasion schedule was totally disrupted. The last attempt to crack the UNC line was made at 021800 September 1950.

With the UNC counterattack launched on 16 September 1950, which resulted in the "disappearance" of Lieutenant General KIM Mu Chong and the appearance of Lieutenant General CHOE Hyon, former commander of the 2d Division, as Corps commander, elements of the Corps along with remnants and stragglers of many units began to withdraw on 20 September 1950 to the Hwachon-Kumhwa-Yangdok area of central Korea. Here, the Corps, now consisting of the 2d, 10th and 31st Divisions, reorganized and conducted guerrilla warfare in the Singye, Chorwon, Pyonggang, Inje, Yanggu and Chunchon areas until the UNC withdrawal from North Korea. The 4th, 7th and 27th Divisions also remained behind UNC lines to conduct guerrilla warfare. The entire guerrilla operations were reportedly directed by KIM Chaek, the Commander of Front Headquarters.

Beginning in mid-December 1950 and prior to the Communist New Year's Offensive, the Corps, consisting of 2d, 9th, 10th and 31st Divisions, infiltrated the UNC lines in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel south of Inje. Elements of the Corps were briefly engaged at Hongchon, Hoengsong and Wonju before they side-slipped to the east in an effort to bypass UNC forces and infiltrate farther south. Because of aggressive action on the part of UNC forces, only the 10th Division was able to reach the Andong area. The remainder of II Corps bypassed Chechon and became heavily engaged in the Yongwol-Tanyang area. The 2d Division in particular suffered heavy casualties as a result of these engagements and was considered non-effective for a time.

Shortly after mid-January 1951, the 27th Division was relieved of its assignment to V Corps and moved to the area north of Chechon to reinforce II Corps. In spite of this reinforcement, II Corps, now consisting of the 2d, 9th, 10th, 27th and 31st Divisions, withdrew north of Pyongchang to rest and regroup.

During February 1951 the Corps conducted a delaying action in the face of the UNC advance until 12 February, when an enemy counteroffensive was launched in the Hongchon-Hoengsong area. At this time the 31st Division was inactivated and the personnel distributed to the remaining divisions, the 2d, 9th, 10th and 27th.

The II Corps advanced in the Pyongchang area until the latter part of March 1951, when the Corps withdrew to the Inje area. Meanwhile, the 10th Division, completely cut off from the II Corps, reached the Andong-Uisong area in late January 1951, and split into small guerrilla type forces. It suffered heavy casualties as a result of aggressive UNC ground and air action, disease, and the severe weather. As a result, the 10th Division was unsuccessful in its attempt to harass UNC lines of communication. In late February 1951 the division started to withdraw north through the zone of the I ROK Corps. During this withdrawal, it was under constant attack and although a few members of this division succeeded in reaching the enemy lines in the latter part of March 1951, the unit suffered heavy losses including most of its principal commanders and staff officers. Because of these losses, the 10th Division was considered an ineffective unit.

By the end of March 1951 the Corps had withdrawn to the Hoeyang area where it was reorganized. The 13th Division was assigned from VII Corps and the 9th Division was transferred to VI Corps. In addition, other replacements, some from the inactivated 42d Division, considerably strengthened the 2d and 27th Divisions.

In mid-May 1951 the Corps again appeared on the Eastern Front, now consisting of the 2d, 13th and 27th Divisions. According to PWs, the mission of II Corps in the Communist "Fifth Campaign, 2d Phase" which began on 16 May 1951, was to infiltrate UNC units. Before being halted, elements of the Corps penetrated to the vicinity of Hajinbu-ri and contributed to the disorganization of ROK forces in the east. In late May, the Corps began to withdraw slowly but offered somewhat stiff resistance to UNC units by launching local counterattacks until it reached the general Pia-ri-Changjong area. Upon arrival in this area, the Corps dug-in and continued to offer determined resistance to local counterattacks of UNC units until the latter part of August 1951, when elements of the III Corps began to effect a relief of II Corps units.

By 2 September 1951 the 2d and 13th Divisions were relieved by the 1st and 15th Divisions, III Corps, leaving the 27th Division holding a narrow sector for the Corps. On or about 9 September the 13th Division relieved the 27th Division, apparently as a stop gap measure which enabled the 2d Division to complete training and re-equipping and to absorb replacements prior to its recommitment. By 16 September the 2d Division completed a relief of the 13th Division. During this period, the V and III Corps were on line on the west and east flanks of the Corps, respectively. On or about 21 September the 13th Division was recommitment on the west flank of the 2d Division in the general vicinity of (DP 1641) causing a westward displacement of the 6th Division, V Corps. In the meantime, the 2d Division, remaining in contact with friendly elements of the X US Corps along the ridgelines northeast of Pia-ri, offered stubborn resistance to advancing UNC elements. Shortly thereafter, V Corps, then on

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the II Corps west flank, was relieved by the 68th Chinese Communist Army. Thus the Corps was flanked on the west by Chinese Communist Forces, and on the east by elements of the III Corps.

In early November 1951 the 27th Division was recommitted on the Corps east flank in the zone of the 2d Division. By 10 November the relief of the 2d Division was completed, and the division displaced to the Soksa-dong-ni area.

The Corps maintained its defensive positions in the Satae-ri-Soksa-dong-ni axis since the winter of 1951 with the 13th Division on the west and the 27th Division on the east flank. The 2d Division maintained its reserve positions from the immediate rear of the frontlines north to the Soksadong-ni area. Persistent reports pointing to the relief of the corps materialized in July 1952 when the committed III Corps extended westward to assume the frontage of the II Corps. II Corps is currently carried in the Naegumgang (DT 2276) area.

III CORPS

Commander: Lieutenant General YU Kyong Su

III Corps under the command of Lieutenant General KIM Kwang Hyop, former commander of II Corps, then Chief of Staff, II Corps, and later commander of the 1st Division, was first identified in central Korea along the 38th Parallel in October 1950, during the withdrawal of the North Korean forces. No firm identification of the Corps was made again until elements of the then subordinate 1st and 3d Divisions were committed on the Hungnam Perimeter during December 1950.

Corps activities during the interim period are unknown, although it is reasonable to assume from the location of its reappearance and statements of PWs, that elements of the Corps had managed to withdraw into the relative sanctuary of Chakang Province, North Korea, and Manchuria, where they had been reorganized sufficiently to be recommitted.

In early January 1951 the Corps, now joined by the reorganized 15th Division from Kanggye and the 45th Division from the VIII NK Corps, proceeded southward to the vicinity of Inje. The 3d Division moved southward with the III Corps to the vicinity of the 38th Parallel but returned to the general vicinity of Wonsan where it was later identified under VII Corps. Also during January 1951, elements of the 15th Division were engaged briefly at Kangnung.

The Corps was not engaged again until late February 1951, when the 1st and 15th Divisions were committed in order to reinforce the already committed and battered II and V Corps in the Pyongchang area.

Shortly after mid-March 1951 the Corps, now commanded by Lt Gen YU Kyong Su, former commander of the 105th Tank Division and then commander of IV Corps, again disengaged and withdrew to the Yanggu-Inje area, where it prepared defensive positions from which to cover the withdrawal of the II and V Corps. During this same period, the 69th Brigade, later deactivated, was also under operational control of the III Corps.

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In late March 1951 with the commitment of the 45th Division in the east sector under III Corps and the complete withdrawal of the II and V Corps, the III Corps was left in control of the entire eastern front from the Hwachon Reservoir to the east coast. The 1st, 15th and 45th Divisions and the 69th Brigade were deployed from west to east in that area, until the beginning of the enemy's "Fifth Campaign, 1st Phase" on 22 April 1951, at which time the V Corps was recommitted.

During this Communist campaign beginning on 22 April 1951, the Corps attacked in the Yanggu sector but made no appreciable gains. When the April phase was stopped, the Corps again fought a delaying and screening action for the V Corps. The Corps suffered heavily during this phase of the campaign.

The Corps remained in the Yanggu area and continued to screen until the "Fifth Campaign, 2d Phase," beginning 16 May 1951, when Communist and North Korean elements passed through elements of the Corps and attacked south. The Corps remained in contact only a short time, then withdrew to the Hwachon-ni-Sinpung-ni area for rest and reorganization. The Corps also had the mission of defending the east coastal area south of Wonsan against a possible UNC amphibious landing.

Upon the arrival of ROK forces in the area south of Kosong, the 15th Division was assigned the mission of defending that area. The division remained in defensive positions in this area until the latter part of July 1951, when it was relieved by the 45th Division; it then withdrew to the Sinpung-ni area for rest and reorganization.

The III Corps relieved the II Corps on 2 September 1951. By 2 September 1951 the 15th Division had relieved the 13th Division, II Corps. The 1st Division, which had been out of contact since shortly after the beginning of the "Fifth Campaign, 2d Phase" in May 1951, displaced south during the latter part of August 1951 and, by 2 September 1951, had relieved the 2d Division, II Corps.

As a result of the arrival of the 19th Division, VI Corps, on the III Corps east flank in late August 1951, the 45th Division was squeezed out of the line and reverted to Corps reserve. The Corps was now disposed in the Ipo-ri-Norumegi area, flanked by the VI Corps on the east and the II Corps on the west, with the 15th Division in the east sector and the 1st Division in the west sector of the Corps zone. The dispositions of the Corps remained substantially the same throughout the fall and winter, although the VI Corps on the east flank of the Corps was relieved by I Corps during early December 1951.

During the latter part of January 1952 the 45th Division was again committed in relief of the 15th Division. In July 1952 the Corps extended westward to assume the frontage of II Corps which displaced from the frontlines to the Naegungang (DT 2276) area.

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IV CORPS

Commander: Lieutenant General PAK Chong Dok

IV Corps was originally organized for the defense of the Seoul-Pyongyang area during September and October 1950, under the command of Vice-Admiral HAN Il Mu, Chief of the NK Navy. Although not confirmed, it is probable that the then newly formed 18th and 19th Divisions and elements of the 9th Division were subordinated to the Corps at that time. Miscellaneous units found in the Seoul area at the time of the Ichon landing were probably also organic to the IV Corps.

With the rapid advance of the UNC forces north from the Seoul area, remnants of the Corps withdrew toward Pyongyang during October 1950, thence across the peninsula into the Wonsan-Hamhung area. After having absorbed remnants of the 24th Brigade and the 41st Division which had been newly formed in the Chongjin area, the Corps then withdrew before the advancing northeastern elements of the X US Corps, of which I ROK Corps was then a part.

During early December 1950 the Corps followed the withdrawal of UNC elements from northeastern Korea into the eastern arc of the Hungnam Perimeter. At that time the Corps dropped the remnants of the 41st Division and the 24th Brigade and proceeded with only the Corps headquarters to the Pyongyang area, where it was located by the end of December. Here, the Corps was turned over to Lieutenant General YU Kyong Su, former commander of the 105th Tank Division. During this move the Corps received the 5th Division which had been reconstituted in the Kanggye area. The Corps then began establishing defensive positions in the coastal area west of Pyongyang with the 5th Division and subsequently the 4th Division which was recalled from the Seoul area during January 1951. The 26th Brigade, which was then operating in the Chinnampo area, also came under the command of the Corps. In March 1951 the Corps Commander YU was replaced by Lieutenant General PAK Chong Dok, former commander of the 4th Division.

During June 1951 the 10th Division, formerly subordinate to II Corps, which had managed to extricate a few troops from behind the UNC lines, was added to the IV Corps as the third division. It was sent to the Chongju area to be reconstituted as a mechanized infantry division and to assume responsibility for the defense of the northern reaches of the Corps zone. The 105th Tank Division -- a GHQ unit -- which had remained in the Sukchon area following the I Corps southward, was also attached to the Corps.

Remaining in the Chinnampo-Pyongyang-Chonju area, the Corps conducted extensive training activities and prepared defensive positions along the coast to provide defenses for the general Pyongyang area. With the eastward shift of I Corps during November 1951, the Corps assumed an additional area of responsibility extending into the coastal areas of Hwanghae Province as far south as Haeju. Since this area had been previously secured by the 23d Brigade under I Corps, the brigade became part of IV Corps.

In March 1952 a reorganization of the 23d and 26th Brigades into mechanized artillery brigades was accepted. Reports indicated that the mechanization occurred during October 1951. In early July 1952 the 21st Brigade, formed in early June 1952 from elements of the reorganized 23d Mechanized Artillery Brigade, was accepted. Based on the accepted organic units of the brigade after reorganization, the previously accepted designation of the 23d Mechanized Artillery Brigade was changed to 23d Brigade.

Presently the Corps is deployed on the west coast with a coastal defense mission.

V CORPS

Commander: Lieutenant General PANG Ho San

V Corps was activated in either September or October 1950, under the command of Lieutenant General PANG Ho San, former commander of the 6th Division. Its components were formed around the remnants of the 6th, 7th, 12th, 38th and 43d Divisions, which were being reorganized in Korea in Chakang Province and the northeastern portion of South Pyongan Province during October and November 1950.

During the latter half of November 1950 the Corps proceeded south through Yongwon, Yangdok, Koksan, Ichon, Kumhwa and Hwachon. Advance elements arrived in the Yanggu-Inje area in early December 1950. During December the Corps was joined by the 27th Division in the Hwachon area. This division had been previously operating under II Corps in the 38th Parallel area in the east central sector.

The 12th Division, accompanied by the 2d Division, II Corps, led the V Corps across the 38th Parallel in the vicinity of Hyon-ni in late December 1950. From there the 12th Division moved to Hongchon, Hoengsong, and Wonju, arriving northwest of the latter city on 5 January 1951. The remaining divisions of the Corps soon joined the 12th Division and a series of attacks were launched on Wonju. For the first time the Corps encountered stubborn UNC troops who did not withdraw from their advance. In an all-out attempt in mid-January to take Wonju, the Corps suffered heavy casualties and was forced to withdraw north of Hoengsong to reorganize. To accomplish this reorganization, the 28th and 43d Divisions were inactivated and the remaining personnel assigned to the 6th, 7th and 12th Divisions. The 27th Division reverted to control of the II Corps.

After being relieved north of Hoengsong by the 66th Chinese Communist Army in early February 1951, the Corps displaced eastward. On 12 February 1951 it bypassed Wonju to the east and attacked south toward Chechon. This attack was repulsed and the Corps again assumed a defensive role. For the remainder of February and until mid-March 1951, it conducted an outstanding delaying action. For one week, beginning 27 February 1951, V Corps stubbornly defended the Chunchon River corridor in the vicinity of Haanhung-ni. Tenacious defense of key terrain, coupled with well coordinated and aggressive counterattacks, exemplified this action.

In mid-March 1951 the Corps started to withdraw along the Hongchon-Inje axis and by the end of March had withdrawn to the Komisong area where

a substantial reorganization took place. The 7th Division was exchanged for the 32d Division, VII Corps; the 41st Division, VIII Corps, was inactivated and its personnel absorbed as replacements.

The Corps re-entered combat on the eastern front in the latter half of April 1951 with the mission of infiltrating ROK positions. It achieved only limited success.

In the "Fifth Campaign," beginning 16 May 1951, the V Corps was more successful; 1200 PWs and a substantial amount of material were captured when several ROK units were encircled in the Hyong-ni area. In late May the Corps began a slow withdrawal, punctuated by sharp counterattacks. Upon arrival in the general Naegungang area, it set up strong defenses and constructed bunker-type fortifications which greatly assisted its defense of that area. With the aid of such fortifications the Corps was able to offer strong resistance to UNC limited objective attacks and patrolling activities during the period mid-August to mid-September 1951. However, the Corps suffered heavy casualties which necessitated the complete relief of its units during mid-October 1951. The 68th Chinese Communist Army effected this relief. The V Corps displaced northward to the general Kowon-Yong-hung-Hamhung area, where it is currently located.

Upon arrival in this northeast coastal area, the Corps began training and reorganizing its forces, while at the same time defending the coast against possible UNC amphibious attacks.

The 46th Division which was located in the Hamhung area, and the 25th Mechanized Artillery Brigade which was responsible for the defense of the coast from Hodo Peninsula north to the vicinity of Yonpo, were subordinated to the Corps in keeping with the coastal defense mission of the Corps. Simultaneously, the 32d Division was inactivated and its personnel were employed to form a replacement pool for the rest of the Corps.

Presently, the disposition of the Corps remains static with the 6th Division in the Yonghung area, the 12th Division in the Kowon area, the 46th Division in the Hamhung area, and the 25th Mechanized Artillery Brigade in defensive positions along the coast.

VI CORPS

Commander: Lieutenant General CHOE Yong Jin

VI Corps was activated during early October 1950, in Northwest Korea, under the command of Lieutenant General CHOE Yong Jin, formerly commandant of the 1st Military Academy and commander of the 13th Division. The Corps, comprised of the 18th, 19th and 36th Divisions, was then moved to Kuantien, Manchuria in early November 1950, where it was reconstituted and trained for use in Korea. Advance elements of the Corps, consisting primarily of elements of the 19th Division, departed Manchuria during January 1951 and entered Korea through Chongsongjin followed by the remainder of the Corps. The Corps proceeded southward through the Yongbyon, Songchon and Sunchon areas, arriving in the Namchonjom-Yonan areas by mid-February 1951.

Having arrived in Hwanghae Province in February 1951, the Corps assumed command of the 23d Brigade, which was already performing a coastal defense mission in the area.

In mid-March 1951, the 19th Division was exchanged for the 17th Division, I Corps, which had preceded VI Corps into the area.

During May 1951, the 36th Division was inactivated and its troops used as replacements for the 23d Brigade and for the 9th Division which had been transferred to the VI Corps from the II Corps. During this period, the Corps was responsible for the defense of the western approaches of Hwanghae Province, in rear of and to the west of the I Corps.

In August 1951, the 17th Division was again exchanged for the 19th Division, and the Corps, with the 19th Division leading, began to redeploy to the Eastern Front. By the end of August, the 19th Division had moved into position to relieve the 45th Division, III Corps, on the extreme east flank of the North Korean line and by early September 1951, had completed that relief. The VI Corps now consisted of the 9th, 18th and 19th Divisions. The 23d Brigade had been left in Hwanghae Province to continue with its coastal defense mission under the I Corps. The 9th and 18th Divisions continued their eastward movement and by 1 September, the III Corps had been completely relieved of its coastal defense mission and was moved into line, relieving elements of the II Corps. The 18th Division moved into the general Tongchon area and linked up with the VII Corps. The 9th Division moved to the rear of the 19th Division and established defensive positions in the Kosong area. Elements of the 9th Division were first contacted by UNC elements in this area about 7 October 1951.

The 18th Division on two occasions dispatched elements to the front lines to participate in local limited attacks, first on 26 September 1951, when elements of its 22d Regiment participated in an attack to recapture Hill 1024 (DT 0835), and again during the night of 12-13 November 1951, when elements of the 22d Regiment and the division reconnaissance battalion were committed against the ROK Capitol Division. Both attacks were repulsed and elements of the division withdrew to the division area in the vicinity of Tongchon. The Corps remained in these same general areas until early December 1951, when the 47th Division of I Corps, having moved from the western sector, began a relief of the 19th Division which was completed by 5 December. At approximately the same time the 8th Division, less its 82d Regiment which was in Kaesong, relieved the 18th Division in the Tongchon area.

With the relief of VI Corps by I Corps, significant changes began to occur. The 9th Division was transferred to I Corps to replace the 17th Mechanized Infantry Division which remained behind during the eastward move of I Corps. The 18th and 19th Divisions were then inactivated and the troops of these divisions used as replacements for II and III Corps. Reports received during the period of disbandment indicated that the Corps Headquarters had remained intact and had moved back to the rear areas in order to form a new corps.

VII CORPS

Commander: Lieutenant General LEE Yong Ho

The early history of the VII Corps is similar to that of VI and VIII Corps. The Corps was activated under the command of Lieutenant General LEE Yong Ho, former commander of the 3d Division, during either September or October 1950. Beginning in October 1950, remnants, stragglers and conscripts, from both Manchuria and Korea, were utilized to reconstitute the 13th, 32d and 37th Divisions in order to form the Corps.

The Corps continued to organize and train in Chilin Province, Manchuria, during the winter of 1950 and until January 1951, when it began a movement into Korea through the Sinuiju area. The bulk of the Corps, moving by individual units, had arrived in the Yangdok-Wonsan area by the end of February 1951. Upon arrival in the Wonsan coastal area, the Corps assumed control of the 3d Division which left the III Corps at the 38th Parallel and displaced northward to the Wonsan area and of the 24th Division which had taken up coastal defense positions following the evacuation of UNC troops from the area. The 24th Division subsequently reorganized into a brigade and finally into a mechanized artillery brigade.

During the period the VII Corps was entering Korea from its Manchurian bases, the VI and VIII Corps, which had also been organized and trained in Manchuria, were also in the process of moving into their assigned zones. These movements, coupled with the reverses suffered by the North Koreans on the front, necessitated a series of changes within North Korean Corps organizations. Thus, during March 1951 the 13th Division was transferred to II Corps to replace its 9th Division which had been transferred to VI Corps in the west sector; the 32d Division was exchanged for the 7th Division, V Corps; and the 46th Division and the 25th (formerly 63d) Brigade which were located in the Hamhung area, were acquired from the VIII Corps which was then being stripped of its units.

Following reorganization in March 1951, the VII Corps began preparing defensive positions centering on Wonsan and extending from the vicinity of Kojo in the south to Hamhung in the north. The Corps remained in this location throughout 1951, training its troops, and occasionally providing replacements for the units committed on the east front. When the V Corps was relieved of its frontline duties and reverted to the mission of defending the coastal areas north of Wonsan in October 1951, the 46th Division and the 25th Brigade, which was then reorganized into a mechanized artillery brigade, were transferred to that Corps. This move left the VII Corps with a smaller area of responsibility, from Kojo north to Hodo Peninsula, and a basic organization of three infantry divisions, the 3d, 7th and 37th, and the 24th Mechanized Artillery Brigade which evolved from a reorganization of the 24th Division that had been transferred to the Corps from IV Corps in February 1951.

The Corps continues to be accepted in the general Wonsan area with a dual mission of training and providing coastal defense.

VIII CORPS

(Possibly Inactivated)

Commander: Lieutenant General KIM Chang Dok

VIII Corps was activated under the command of Lieutenant General KIM Chang Dok, former commander of the 5th Division, in October 1950 at about the same time as the VI and VII Corps. As with the other two corps, the VIII Corps trained and reconstituted three remnant divisions, the 42d, 45th and 46th, in Kirin Province, Manchuria, from October to January 1951. In late January and early February 1951, the Corps began entering Korea from the Manpojin area.

Although there are indications that the Corps originally intended to

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defend the Hamhung - Hungnam area, it is probable that the reverses suffered by the North Korean forces at the front necessitated a change in plans. The 45th Division proceeded directly to the Inje area to be assigned to the III Corps. The 42d and 46th Divisions proceeded to the Hamhung area, where the 41st Division and 25th (formerly 63d) Brigade were incorporated into the Corps for a period. However, during March 1951, the 41st Division, which was considerably understrength and of low combat effectiveness, and the 42d Division were inactivated and the troops of these two divisions were used as replacement troops for other North Korean Corps. Also, the 46th Division and the 25th (formerly 63d) Brigade were reassigned to VII Corps. Thereafter, the Corps ceased to exist as a unit. Reports from various sources have indicated that the VIII Corps may have returned to Manchuria in order to train additional personnel for the North Korean Army.

1ST DIVISION

(2d, 3d and 14th Regiments)

Although not publicly announced as an army unit until February 1948, the 1st Division was originally created in September 1946 at Kaecheon under the guise of the 1st Peace Preservation Officers' Training School. The original regiments of the division were the 1st, 2d and 3d. In March 1950 in order to provide the 1st Division with combat experienced Koreans, the 1st Regiment was exchanged for the 14th Regiment, 6th Division--an organization which as the 166th Division, 56th Chinese Communist Army, had fought with the Chinese Communists in Manchuria and China.

Following intensive training, the division assembled at Namchonjom before 15 June 1950. On 15 June 1950 the division moved to Songhyon-ni, approximately six miles above the 38th Parallel, where it remained until 25 June 1950. By 250930 June 1950, the division was deployed along the line of departure near the 38th Parallel.

At 251130 June 1950 the entire division, under control of I Corps, crossed the 38th Parallel and struck elements of the 1st ROK Division, southeast of Songhyon-ni. Spearheaded by the 203d Tank Regiment, 105th Tank Brigade, which had been attached for the drive, the division advanced

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southward, by-passed Kaesong, and between 26-28 June 1950 fought its first battle with ROK forces in the Changdan-Munsan area. ROK forces withdrew to new defensive positions. On 29 June 1950 advance units of the 1st Division moved into Seoul, encountering little resistance in the occupation of the city.

On 5 July 1950 the 3d and 14th Regiments moved southeastward with Chungju as their objective; the 2d Regiment also marched southeast with the capture of Umsong as its mission. All elements of the division passed through Ichon and Changhowon-ni, encountering only light resistance from defending forces. The 3d and 14th Regiments met stiff resistance near Chungju on 8 July, and in the ensuing battle suffered heavily in both personnel and materiel. The 2d Regiment, reaching a point just north of Umsong by 8 July 1950, became engaged in fierce action with ROK forces. Failing to take its objective, the regiment veered to the east following the 3d and 14th Regiments. The entire division occupied Chungju on 11 July 1950; it was then transferred from I to II Corps.

The division was next ordered to occupy Hamchang via Mungyong. The first large-scale battle of the campaign occurred in the division's assault on Mungyong. After a severe and bloody battle which lasted 14 days and cost the division a fantastically high number of casualties and the loss of considerable equipment, the division captured Mungyong on 27 July 1950. Following a brief reorganization, the division entered Hamchang between 30 July and 3 August 1950--sustaining additional casualties en route. After receiving replacements and taking a short rest at Hamchang, the division departed on 8 August 1950. It captured Pian on 10 August 1950 and Kunwi on 17 August 1950. Between 22-24 August 1950 the division captured and occupied Kasan.

On 25 August 1950, the entire II Corps began a general offensive. The objective of the 1st Division, transferred from I Corps, was to sever the Taegu-Yongchon highway between Hayang and Taegu by the afternoon of 26 August 1950. This attack bogged down and another assault was ordered for 021800 September 1950. By 4 September 1950, however, the objective had not yet been taken and the division was regrouping at Kasan. Despite a shortage of personnel and materiel, the 1st Division pushed to an area north of Taegu by 12 September 1950. On or about 17 September 1950, the division was attacked by UNC forces and forced to retreat to the north. Remnants of the division made a hasty withdrawal through the Sobak and Taebaek Mountain Ranges into Chakang Province.

During November 1950 the division, having reorganized under III Corps during November, was committed in mid-December 1950 against UNC elements that were preparing to evacuate the Hungnam Perimeter. Following the evacuation of Hungnam the division, in company with the 15th Division, moved southward through Wonsan and arrived in the Kumhwa area in early February 1951.

The division continued its advance, and in late February 1951 was committed in the Pyongchang area where it enjoyed limited success initially. It was subsequently forced to withdraw under UNC pressure. During its withdrawal from the Pyongchang area the division suffered heavy casualties, and by 6 March 1951 it had completely broken contact.

In late March 1951 the division was recommitted in the Yanggu area, as the III Corps covered the withdrawal of the II and V Corps. The division remained in contact until the beginning of the "Fifth Campaign, 1st Phase" on 22 April 1951, when it disengaged and began reorganizing in the

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Hwachon-ni-Sinpung-ni area. While in the area the 1st Division was also charged with the mission of defending the coastal area. The division's artillery regiment, which had been training and receiving additional equipment in the Hoeyang area, joined the division at this time. The division remained in this area until the 19th Division, VI Corps arrived and effected its relief in August 1951. The division then displaced southwestward and relieved the 2d Division, II Corps on the line immediately west of the Soyang River by 2 September 1951.

The 1st Division remained in contact until early July 1952, when it was relieved by the 90th Regiment, 45th Division, III Corps. The division is currently carried in the Ipo-ri area in III Corps reserve.

2D DIVISION

(4th, 6th and 17th Regiments)

The 2d Division was established as early as 1946 under the guise of the 2d Peace Preservation Officers' Training School at Nanam.

On 8 February 1948 the 2d Unit of the school officially became the 2d Division; and the 4th, 5th and 6th sub-units became the 4th, 5th, and 6th Regiments respectively. On or about 20 November 1948 the 6th Regiment moved to Wonsan, where it was redesignated the 8th Regiment of the 3d Division. The 2d Division immediately organized new recruits into a new 6th Regiment at Nanam. On or about 27 July 1949 the 5th Regiment was assigned to the 4th Division at Pyongyang. Sometime in December 1949 a civilian training unit stationed at Sondokchong-ni and composed of 2,500 men was redesignated as the 17th Regiment and integrated into the 2d Division.

Beginning in January 1950 military training was intensified, and all elements of the division were thoroughly drilled in infantry assault tactics.

On 17 June 1950 the division arrived at Hwachon from Hamhung, where it had been training since 25 July 1949. On 21 June 1950 the division was alerted for action by Warning Order No. 1, dated 210400 June 1950. This was followed by Operation Order No. 001, dated June 1950, which stated that the division would seize Chunchon in one day and continue toward Kapyong with the 3d Division on its west flank. All preparations were to be completed by 221800 June 1950. At 242030 June 1950 the division began movement to the line of departure and by 242310 June 1950 it was ready to jump off.

At 250500 June 1950 the division, operating under II Corps, crossed the 38th Parallel and the 4th and 6th Regiments became engaged in the division's first major battle at Chunchon against elements of the 6th ROK Division. With support from the 17th Regiment, which had been in reserve, Chunchon was captured on 27 June 1950 almost 48 hours behind schedule. The 2d Division then moved down the Chunchon-Seoul highway and, encountering only slight ROK rear guard opposition, seized Kapyong on 28 June 1950. Rolling on in the direction of Seoul, the division captured Kungong-ni on or about 30 June 1950.

On or about 1 July 1950 the division crossed the Han River. Executing a pincer movement, the 4th Regiment overcame stiff resistance and captured Yongjin on 5 July 1950 while the 6th Regiment occupied Ichon on the same day after a brief skirmish. In danger of being surrounded by

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ROK troops, the 6th Regiment fought its way back to Yongjin and rejoined the division on 6 July 1950. The division captured Ansong with comparative ease on 7 July 1950, and then advanced to Chinchon where a major battle took place between 8-11 July 1950. The 2d Division prevailed over the ROKs and on or about 15 July 1950 moved into Chongju, capturing that town with comparative ease and forcing the ROK forces to retreat southward. Following this success, the division engaged in a violent two-day battle with ROK forces which culminated in the capture of Hwanggan on 29 July 1950. ROK forces retreated southeastward and the division moved on, arriving at Kumchon without incident on 5 August 1950.

The division remained in Kumchon, receiving replacements and reorganizing, until 25 August when it departed for Hyopchon. The division closed there on 20 August 1950 and subsequently received additional replacements and ammunition.

The division crossed the Naktong River by 312200 August 1950, its objective being the occupation of Changnyong. After a bitter see-saw battle between 3-14 September 1950, in which the division suffered huge casualties, the town of Changnyong was captured. Counter-attacked by UNC forces on 16 September 1950, the division began a disorganized retreat to Hyopchon. On 25 September 1950 I Corps ordered a general withdrawal. Remnants escaped to the Taebaek Mountain Range, where the division was reformed during October and November 1950 under the II Corps. The division conducted guerrilla warfare in the Singye, Chorwon, Pyonggang, Inje, Yanggu and Chunchon areas.

The reconstituted 2d Division then led the southward drive of II Corps in December 1950; and was engaged briefly near Hongchon, Hoensong, and Wonju in early January 1951. The division then by-passed UNC forward elements and moved into the mountains between Chechon and Tangyang in mid-January. Here, under UNC attack, its strength fell to 2,000 troops before it retreated northward. Strengthened by a replacement regiment from the inactivated 31st Division, the division fought a delaying action until it withdrew from contact in mid-March 1951 and reorganized in the Hoeyang area.

It was recommitted near the east coast in mid-April 1951. In the Communist "Fifth Campaign, 2d Phase" beginning 16 May 1951 the 2d Division attacked elements of the ROK Capitol Division, but met with no success. However, on the ordered withdrawal of the ROK Capitol Division, the division advanced as far south as Hajinbu-ri. In the face of the prompt UNC counter-offensive the division was again forced to retreat northward, fighting a delaying action. Initially it offered only light resistance until its arrival in the general Inje area, from where it fought stubbornly from well-prepared positions and effected only limited withdrawals from June until late August 1951. During this period the receipt of the division's organic artillery greatly assisted in the conduct of defense by the division.

During late August 1951 the division was relieved in the Norumegi area by the 1st Division, III Corps, and remained out of contact in the II Corps immediate rear until mid-September 1951 when it relieved the 13th Division in the Satae-ri area. The division then remained in contact, giving up some ground during the period, until relieved by the 27th Division during early November 1951 in the area south of Sohui-ri. The division subsequently remained out of contact in the II Corps immediate rear areas until it withdrew with II Corps in early July 1952 to the Naegungang area.

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(7th, 8th and 9th Regiments)

The 3d Division was activated at Pyongyang over a period of months and was not finally constituted until sometime in October 1948. The bulk of the division's strength was drawn from three main sources: the 3d Independent Brigade; the 2d Division from which an entire regiment was transferred; and from personnel in training centers. All of the personnel from the brigade transferred to the division, with the majority of the troops going to the 9th Regiment at Hamhung; the 7th Regiment stationed in Chorwon received an influx of volunteers from training camps in the Songjin area; and in November 1948, the entire 6th Regiment, 2d Division, was transferred from Nanam to Wonsan where it was incorporated into the 3d Division as the 8th Regiment.

Sometime during the early part of 1949, division headquarters moved to Hamhung, where the 9th Regiment was undergoing training. In June 1949 division headquarters moved to Wonsan where the 8th Regiment was already stationed, while the 9th Regiment moved farther south to the Kumsong area, placing it close to the 7th Regiment located at Chorwon. Shortly after this move was accomplished, the division began advanced training with units spending most of their time in the field. On 14 June 1950 the 8th and 9th Regiments and division headquarters moved to Chorwon.

On 240800 June 1950 the division began moving into assembly areas along its assigned route of attack, the Kumhwa-Seoul highway, in accordance with carefully prepared Communist designs to extend their hegemony over all of Korea.

By 250330 June 1950 the 3d Division, under I Corps, was deployed along the line of departure running generally astride the route Kumhwa-Seoul. Artillery preparation commenced at 250440 June 1950. Spearheaded by tanks attached from the 109th Tank Regiment, 105th Tank Brigade, leading elements of the 7th and 9th Regiments crossed the line of departure at 0503 and hit elements of the 7th ROK Division. Early the next morning the division entered Pochon without incident, since the ROK defenders effected a withdrawal during the night. Continuing the advance the 7th Regiment entered Uijongbu simultaneously with leading elements of the 4th Division which was driving south along the Yonchon-Seoul road. Continuing the drive on Seoul the division entered the city at 281340 June 1950. For this action the division, along with the 4th Division and 105th Tank brigade, was awarded the honorary title "Seoul" in Order No. 7, dated 100800 July 1950, by KIM Il Sung.

On the morning of 3 July 1950 the division crossed the Han River without incident, thus bringing to a successful conclusion the first phase of the invasion. On its way to Suwon the division was engaged several times by ROK units which succeeded in slowing its progress. Upon entering Suwon at 051500 July 1950, it was discovered that the battered town had already been occupied by elements of the 4th Division which were preparing to continue the advance toward Taejon. After a short rest the division marched southward, still in the wake of the 4th Division. Approximately 4 miles south of Osan, the 9th Regiment swung southeast toward Ansong while the rest of the division followed the 4th Division toward Pyongtaek. The 9th Regiment arrived at Ansong at 072400 July 1950 to learn that it was already occupied by units of the 2d Division. Meanwhile the rest of the division continued south following the 4th Division. After passing through Pyongtaek and Songhwan without engaging UNC forces, the entire division again joined forces and entered Chonan at 090550 July and found the

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4th Division heavily engaged. Early in the evening a concerted attack with the 4th Division, coupled with infiltration tactics, succeeded in piercing UNC defenses by 2400. On the morning of 11 July 1950 the division occupied Chonui after a four-hour battle. On 12 July 1950 the division captured Chochiwon and pursued retreating UNC forces to the Kum River. After three unsuccessful attempts during 14 and 15 July 1950, the division finally crossed the river early in the morning of 16 July 1950. Fighting all the way the division and the 4th Division entered Taejon on 21 July 1950 after almost three days of heavy fighting. On 29 July 1950 the division captured Yongdong after a fierce two-day battle.

On 7 August 1950, after a four-day battle, Kumchon was occupied. For these actions the division was awarded the honorary title "Guards." On 122200 August 1950 the division, with a mission to seize Taegu, made a disastrous unsuccessful attempt to cross the Naktong River, together with the 10th Division. This action which ended three days later, against elements of the 1st US Cavalry Division, was the first major North Korean setback in the Korean War.

At 021800 September 1950 the division joined in the general all-out assault on Taegu and was constantly engaged with UNC forces until 20 September 1950. At this time, after being exposed to renewed pressure all along the front, the division was ordered to withdraw to Sangju, where all heavy weapons were abandoned, and then continued to Pyongyang. In the face of the impending capture of Pyongyang, the division was ordered on 15 October 1950 to resume its withdrawal to a reassembly and reorganization area in Chakang Province, North Korea.

On the Hungnam Perimeter the division operated under III Corps. It moved southward to the 38th Parallel following the UNC evacuation, but moved back into the Wonsan area, where it became subordinate to the VII Corps upon the Corps' arrival in the area. Subsequently, the division moved to the Anbyon area where it is currently located. In this area the division has prepared coastal defense positions and conducted intensive training. During the summer of 1951 the division provided some replacement troops to frontline units.

4TH KIM CHAEK-GUARDS-SEOUL DIVISION

(5th, 18th and 29th Regiments)

The 4th Brigade, which had been training in and around Chinnampo as early as February 1948, was deactivated and reconstituted as the 4th Division in October 1948. At the time of its activation, the division was composed of the 16th, 17th, and 18th Regiments, in addition to the artillery regiment. The 17th Regiment--which had moved to Pyongyang after activation of the division--was replaced on or about 27 July 1949 by the fully-equipped and well-trained 5th Regiment, 2d Division which had just arrived from Hamhung. Although the 17th Regiment went out of existence as a unit of the 4th Division, its designation was revived with the activation of a new 17th Regiment in the 2d Division in December 1948. Sometime in 1951 the 16th Regiment was redesignated the 29th Regiment, which was formerly the designation of the third regiment of the 10th Division.

Basic training was initiated almost immediately after activation and emphasis shifted entirely to mountain warfare tactics between October 1948 and June 1950.

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The division departed the Pyongyang area on 16 June 1950, and by 18 June 1950 it had arrived in the vicinity of Yonchon. Alerted for invasion of 22 June 1950 by Operations Order No. 1--issued by Headquarters, 4th Division at Okkye-ri, near Yonchon--the division deployed along the line of departure in the evening of 24 June 1950.

At 250430 June 1950 the division, with tanks from the 107th Tank Regiment, 105th Tank Brigade, under I Corps, struck across the 38th Parallel against elements of the 7th ROK Division deployed along the Yonchon-Uijongbu highway in the direction of Tongduchon-ni. The 3d Division was advancing on the eastern flank of the 4th Division and the 1st Division on its western flank. On the same day the 16th Regiment captured Tongduchon-ni. By 260900 June the 16th and 18th Regiments, assisted by elements of the 3d Division, occupied Uijongbu after encountering only slight resistance. At 281130 June 1950 the 18th Regiment, the leading element of the 4th Division, arrived in Seoul. Both divisions secured the city. This phase of the operations cost the 4th Division 219 KIAs, 761 WIAs, and 132 MIAs for a total loss of 1112 troops. For the capture of Seoul the 4th Division, along with the 3d Division and the 105th Tank Brigade, received the honorary designation of "Seoul Division" in Order No. 7 dated 100800 July 1950 and signed by KIM Il Sung. The same order elevated the 105th Tank Brigade to a division.

By 301000 June 1950 all units were in position north of the Han River, and at 010400 July 1950 the division began crossing the river in force into Yongdungpo. By 030830 July 1950 Yongdungpo was secured. The division, however, again paid for its advance--losses for this operation were 227 KIAs, 1822 WIAs, and 107 MIAs for a total of 2,156 troops. The division departed 040600 July 1950. Suwon was easily captured by the 5th Regiment by 042400 July 1950; and here, on 5 July 1950, initial contact was made with US Forces (Task Force Smith 24th US Division). At 061810 July 1950 the division continued its way south, and arrived near Sojong-ni at 070100 July 1950; Pyongtaek at 071400 July 1950; and Songhwan at 080600 July 1950. Assisted by elements of the 3d Division on the left flank, Chonan fell on 9 July 1950 after a fierce battle. Chonui was captured on 11 July 1950 in a co-ordinated attack with the 3d Division. Following this success, Naecheon-ni fell to the division without incident late in the afternoon of 12 July 1950. The division began crossing the Kum River at 142000 July 1950, and the town of Kongju was captured by the 5th Regiment by 142300 July 1950 after a brief siege. Nonsan was captured with comparative ease by the 16th and 18th Regiments on 18 July 1950. In the meantime at 161900 July 1950, the 5th Regiment--supported by one tank company--proceeded down the Kongju-Taejon highway, taking Maogu on the same day and Kongam-ni at 180400 July 1950 with little difficulty. At 191900 July 1950 the 5th Regiment attacked and shortly thereafter captured Yusong, and crossing the Kum River, rolled on to Taejon where it joined the 3d Division in a bitter struggle for the city. The 16th and 18th Regiments arrived on 20 July 1950. The battle for Taejon, in co-ordination with the 3d Division, was a costly and hard-fought battle against the 24th US Division. Taejon airstrip was taken by elements of the 5th Regiment at 200400 July 1950, and by 21 July 1950 the city had fallen. For this victory, the division was awarded an additional honorary title--"Guards." After the fall of Taejon, divisional units fought their way southward, finally capturing Anui after a brief engagement on 27 July 1950. The town of Kochang was assaulted at 290500 July 1950 and captured after a minor engagement with withdrawing UNC troops. The 5th and 18th Regiments took Kwonbin-ni at 302000 July and continued along the main road to Hyopchon.

Hyopchon was captured on 1 August 1950 after a major battle and the division pressed southeastward in the direction of the Naktong River area opposite and south of Pugong-ni, arriving on the river bank on 5 August

1950 where it was joined by the 16th Regiment. The division crossed the Naktong River on 2 and 12 August 1950, but was repulsed each time by defending UNC forces. Finally, at 312200 August 1950, an all-out effort was ordered by I Corps. The mission of the division was to seize Miryang in co-ordination with the 9th Division forward which was to take Samnangjin. Bitter engagements and staggering casualties in the vicinity of Yongsan forced the division into retreat to the west side of the river on 20 September 1950. I Corps had ordered the division to regroup at Hyopchon; but by the time the division reached the vicinity of the town and delay would have meant the complete annihilation of the remaining units by the rapidly advancing UNC forces. Thus the division continued its retreat, this time in the direction of Kochang.

From 25 September through the end of October 1950 the scattered elements of the division made their way up through central Korea, crossing the 38th Parallel to the Yonchon-Chorwon area. By 3 November 1950, the division reached the Hupyong-ni area and bivouacked in the hills surrounding the town. On 8 November 1950 remnants of the division moved stealthily southward to the Chorwon area, with the 5th Regiment deploying in the Taegwang-ni area. On 9 November 1950 the 18th Regiment attacked Chorwon capturing some hand grenades and anti-tank ammunition. The division remained behind UNC lines in the Yonchon-Chorwon area as a guerrilla formation. For this, the division was awarded the title "KIM Chaek."

Elements of the division were engaged by the 8th ROK Division in early December 1950 in the vicinity of Yonchon. The last contact was on 4 January 1951 near Seoul. The division then moved to the general Pyongyang area, under the control of IV Corps, where it was reorganized.

Although the division furnished some replacement troops for frontline units, it has not been engaged since January 1951. As of July 1952 the division remained in the general vicinity of Kangso, with the mission of defending against UNC landings in the Chinnampo area.

5TH DIVISION

(10th, 11th and 12th Regiments)

The 5th Division was activated at Nanam during the early part of August 1949, from Korean veterans of the 164th Division, 55th Chinese Communist Army, which had been stationed in the old Manchurian capital city of Changchun until 1949. All non-Korean troops of the 164th Chinese Communist division were transferred to other Chinese Communist organizations in July 1949 and in their place the division began to receive Korean soldiers from various other units of the Chinese Communist Forces. Some of the Koreans assigned to the division had seen action against the Japanese Army during World War II; but the majority were veterans of the Chinese civil war who had been inducted into the Communist armies of China at a later date, while a comparatively small percentage of these troops stemmed from an even more recent conscription drive conducted in the various provinces in Manchuria.

During the latter part of July 1949, the 164th Division, with a strength of approximately 7,500 troops, was transferred from Changchun, Manchuria, to Nanam, where it was integrated into the expanding North Korean Army and redesignated the 5th Division. At the same time the division underwent a reorganization to make it conform to the organizational structure of the standard North Korean infantry division, composed of the 10th 11th and 12th Regiments.

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From the time of its activation until December 1949, the division was engaged principally in road repairs and construction work of a military nature. Beginning in January 1950 the entire division was subjected to a new basic training cycle in order to accustom these Chinese Communist-trained troops to the military terminology and tactics peculiar to the North Korean Army. Early in February 1950 the division began a new phase of advanced field training on a platoon and company level with emphasis on mountain warfare and camouflage. By April 1950 the division was up to strength in personnel. In May 1950 the division was brought up to its full allowance of weapons and equipment with huge quantities of Soviet materiel and all units were required to turn in any remaining American or Japanese weapons which had been brought from Manchuria. By 25 June 1950, the entire division had moved from Nanam and had deployed along the 38th Parallel south of Yangyang.

At approximately 250500 June 1950 the division, under control of II Corps, lunged across the 38th Parallel in an offensive down the main road that parallels Korea's rugged east coast, defended by the 8th ROK Division. The division's drive was supported by the 766th Independent Unit, an organization with a strength of 1,500 men. This unit, under direct control of GHQ, left Yangyang by boats on 24 June 1950, with the mission of establishing beachheads along the east coast in the rear of the ROK army in order to disrupt rear area communications and defenses. When its mission had been accomplished and after contact had been established with the main body of the division, this amphibious guerrilla unit was scheduled to infiltrate through the mountains in the direction of Pusan as an ordinary partisan force.

The 766th Unit and the division entered Chumujin without incident shortly before noon on 25 June 1950. After continuing the drive south, the 766th Unit and the 10th Regiment entered Kangnung on 26 June 1950, after an all-night battle. From Kangnung the 11th Regiment headed southwest toward Hajinbu-ri, while the rest of the division continued south along the coastal highway. Continuing in its drive along the Kangnung-Pyongchang corridor, the 11th Regiment was generally engaged in mopping up small pockets of resistance and finally reached Pyongyang on or about 2 July 1950. After spending two days at Pyongyang, the 11th Regiment captured Chunyang on 10 July 1950, after an all-day battle with a large ROK force which was withdrawing from the coast.

After separating from the 11th Regiment at Kangnung, the 10th and 12th Regiments continued south along the coastal highway, with the 766th Unit still leading the attack until the division reached the approaches to Samchok. Here the 766th Unit joined other elements of its parent organization which a few days earlier had made an amphibious landing near the town. This unit then proceeded into the hills, from where the troops, after changing into civilian clothes, infiltrated into Samchok, in order to gather intelligence. The 10th Regiment, after some small skirmishes with ROK troops, entered Samchok on or about 5 July 1950. The division, less the 11th Regiment but including the 766th Unit, occupied Utchin on 9 July 1950, after a large-scale engagement which reportedly involved only the 766th Unit. The 11th Regiment which was fighting at Chunyang at that time apparently became engaged with UNC forces retreating from Utchin. After taking Chunyang the 11th Regiment rejoined the division at Utchin on 11 July 1950.

The 766th Unit, after undergoing a reorganization at Utchin, proceeded westward into the mountains with the mission of infiltrating in small units to Pusan. Leaving this unit behind the division continued its drive south and, on 13 July 1950, the 10th Regiment swung west at Pyonghae-ri headed for Chinbo. On the morning of 16 July 1950 the 11th

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and 12th Regiments captured Yonghae after two previous unsuccessful attempts.

In two weeks of heavy battles under almost continuous naval gunfire, the entire division forged its way ahead and captured Yongdok on 3 August 1950, after sustaining prohibitive casualties. After a brief rest and reorganization at Yongdok, the division assaulted and captured Changsa-dong on 8 August 1950, fighting against stubborn resistance. Continuing south, the division battled its way through Chongha and Hungae under constant harassment by UNC naval fire and air attacks and arrived on the outskirts of Pohang-dong on 18 August 1950. After a two-day artillery barrage, the entire division captured the town on 20 August 1950, following a fierce engagement. On or about 20 August 1950, UNC forces launched a counterattack, which forced the division to withdraw about 5 miles to the north. From 23 August to 3 September 1950 the division remained in defensive positions just north of Pohang-dong. On 6 September the division re-entered the town with elements penetrating southwest to the Chongjin area in coordination with the 12th Division but an immediate UNC counterattack forced the division to withdraw.

. ROK amphibious force of about company strength effected a landing on or about 14 September in the vicinity of Chonha. One battalion of the 12th Regiment, which was dispatched to dislodge this force, reached the landing site late that same evening and promptly engaged the raiders who had taken up positions in the coastal hills. In the meantime, the rest of the division was ordered to withdraw from their heavily-shelled positions and to regroup in the vicinity of Chongha. When the last elements had withdrawn to the assembly area on 16 September 1950, the division was deployed along the Tosong-dong-Chonga road in well dug-in positions designed primarily to afford protection against the dreaded air attacks which only the day before had blown up the entire ammunition dump of the division artillery.

On 21 September 1950 the division was hit by the full weight of the all-out UNC offensive launched in coordination with the successful amphibious operation at Inchon. As a result, on 22 September 1950, elements of the routed division withdrew in utter disorder to Yongdok and thence to Anbyon, arriving there on 3 November 1950. Continuing its retreat, the division arrived in Chongpyong on 8 November 1950 and proceeded through Hamhung, where it swung inland, finally proceeding north along a road that parallels the Taedong River. The division proceeded to the Kanggye area to be reorganized, retrained and re-equipped. On 7 November 1950 elements of the division were contacted in the Kowon area, which indicates that remnants of the division had been by-passed in this general area and were still capable of conducting guerrilla type operations.

The reconstituted division was in the Yangdok area during early December 1950 and remained there until placed under control of IV Corps when it passed through the area en route to the Pyongyang area. The division moved into the Pyongyang area in early January 1951, and is currently accepted in the Yonggang-gun area with a mission of defending the western approaches to Pyongyang.

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6TH GUARDS DIVISION

(1st, 13th and 15th Regiments)

The 6th Division had an origin similar to that of the 5th Division in that the 166th Division, 56th Chinese Communist Army, was transferred to Sinuiju on 25 July 1949 and redesignated as the 6th Division. Soon after the arrival of the division in Korea, a thorough retraining program was instituted to acquaint the troops with the tactical formations, military terminology and customs peculiar to the North Korean Army. From September to December 1949 the troops were busy firing weapons and participating in squad, platoon and company tactical problems. During January and February 1950 extensive field exercises were conducted on a unit level with particular emphasis placed on mountain warfare tactics and night combat. In the early part of March 1950 the 15th Regiment transferred to Chaeryong; the 14th Regiment to Sibyon-ni, where the regiment was exchanged for the 1st Regiment, 1st Division, in order to provide the 1st Division with a hard core of seasoned soldiers with previous combat experience; and the 13th Regiment to Sariwon. Following this the division embarked on an extended schedule of field training which lasted until 16 June 1950. It received warning order on 23 June 1950.

At approximately 250100 June 1950 the 1st Regiment, plus attached supporting units, departed Haeju and had cleared the Ongjin Peninsula by 26 June 1950. The regiment then backtracked to follow the division, which in the meantime had commenced artillery preparations on Kaesong at 250440 June 1950; crossed the line of departure at 250525; and entered Kaesong at 250700 June 1950.

The division, less the 1st Regiment, operating under I Corps continued along the Kaesong-Seoul highway defended by elements of the 1st ROK Division and crossed the Imjin River by 28 June 1950, encountering very little opposition. The division continued its advance, still minus the 1st Regiment, following the east bank of the Han River. The Han River was crossed without incident and after a minor engagement with small ROK rear guard units, the town of Kimpo was captured on 29 June 1950. The 13th Regiment continued to Inchon, securing that port city by 30 June 1950. The entire division consolidated at Yongdung-po by 4 July 1950. For this phase of the operation, the division was awarded the honorary title "Guards."

Starting 5 July 1950 the division moved south and mopped up ROK troops until it reached Chonan on 10 July 1950. The 13th Regiment thrust southwest from Chonan on 11 July 1950 to begin the much publicized "End Run" which shortly saw the fall of Southwest Korea. The regiment occupied Yesan by 12 July 1950 and continued southward via the coastal route Hong-song, Kwangchon-ni, Ungchon and Piin. On 16 July 1950 the regiment forced the Kum River, assaulted Kunsan and easily captured the city which had been erroneously estimated as being held by one US regiment. The 1st and 15th Regiments continued from Chonan behind elements of the 4th Division through Kongju and took over on 18 July 1950 at Nonsan. The 13th which had captured Kunsan, raced on to secure Mokpo by 25 July 1950, via the inland route through Naju. The 1st Regiment moved south from Nonsan to secure Iri, Chonju, Namwon, against light opposition and captured Kwangju by 25 July 1950, and by 26 July 1950 had occupied Yosu and Hadong. The entire division assembled at Suncheon on 28 July 1950 and began preparations for an attack on Chinju.

The division, by then reinforced by the 83d Motorcycle Regiment, 105th Tank Division, pushed forward and fighting for every inch of ground battled

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its way into Chinju on or about 1 August 1950. The 13th Regiment remained in Chinju while the other two regiments, opposed only by small scale delaying actions, passed through Sachon, from which they took a route through the mountains and entered Kosong on 2 August 1950, after a two hour battle. Swinging north, they captured Chindong-ni the next day after a fierce battle. By 6 August 1950, the division had advanced to a point eight miles west of Masan where it came under the lashing of Task Force Kean, which included the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. Bearing the brunt of this attack was the attached 83d Motorcycle Regiment; the Marines were said to have returned to the Perimeter on motorcycles.

On 20 August the division commander received "Operational Order No. 81," which directed the 2d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th and 10th Divisions and the 105th Tank Division to an all-out offensive in their respective sectors, at 312200 August 1950. The 6th Division, holding the right flank, was supposed to advance through Hanan, Masan, Chinhae and capture Kumhae by 3 September 1950. Immediately upon receipt of the directive, the division embarked on extensive preparations for the coming offensive. But throughout this preparatory phase, UNC forces exerted continuous pressure from their tightly-held perimeter and inflicted mounting casualties through unremitting artillery and air attacks.

At 312200 August 1950, the division launched its attack with all three regiments against strongly-held UNC defenses along the general axis of the Chinju-Masan highway and effected a breakthrough just before noon on 1 September 1950. Fighting for every inch of ground and suffering tremendous casualties, the division reached the outskirts of Hanam on about 3 September 1950. After several attempts to capture the city, the attack bogged down and the division was stopped cold. A determined UNC counterattack succeeded by 11 September 1950 in pushing the division back with additional losses to a line running generally from Chungam-ni to Chindong-ni. Following this, the division was in no condition to withstand the UNC breakthrough launched on 16 September 1950, and, sustaining continuous heavy casualties, was pushed back to Chinju by 27 September 1950.

In accordance with orders to retreat north which were issued as a result of the successful UNC amphibious landing at Inchon, the division retreated northward via Muju, closing into the Poun area on 5 October 1950 together with the 7th Division. The division then continued through the Taebaek and Sobaek mountain ranges to the Kanggye area. The division reassembled and reorganized in this area from 25 October to 25 November 1950. On 25 November 1950, the division departed the Kanggye area and, without meeting any opposition, passed through Huichon, Tokchon, Yangdok, Ichon, Pyonggang and Kumhwa, arriving at Hwachon on 24 December 1950. Upon arrival, the division was assigned to V Corps. This corps had the mission of capturing Wonju, after which it was to swing west and link up with Chinese Communist units advancing on the western front in the hope of encircling and annihilating UNC troops caught in this pincer movement. The 6th Division left the Hwachon area and, after passing through Chichon-ni, crossed the 38th Parallel once again on 28 December 1950. The division marched through the mountains by-passing Chunchon, Sabangu, Hongchon, Hoengsong, and on 6 January 1951, reached a point 2- $\frac{1}{2}$ miles north of Wonju. The division entered the city on 7 January 1951 without opposition.

The division continued fighting in the Wonju-Hoengsong area until 12 January 1951, when it was ordered to withdraw to Hongchon to reorganize. By 26 January 1951 the division was regrouped approximately 4 miles north of Hoengsong.

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On 12 February 1951 the division side-slipped to the southeast in order to make a deep penetration with the 12th Division. By 21 February the 6th Division had reached Chunchon-ni but was effectively held there. A general withdrawal followed soon thereafter in which the division delayed stubbornly until relieved in late March 1951. Battle casualties and typhus took a high toll during the withdrawal. The division rested in the Komisong area for approximately one month, and while there received a substantial number of replacements from the inactivated 41st Division.

The division was recommitted on the eastern front on 22 April 1951, and also took part in the Communist "Fifth Campaign, 2d Phase," beginning 16 May 1951. During this latter offensive, it met with some initial success against ROK forces and succeeded in advancing as far south as Odae-san on 21 May 1951.

On 22 June 1951 the division attempted to sweep wide to the east in an attempt to encircle withdrawing UNC forces, but was stopped and forced to withdraw to Odae-san. It continued to withdraw, fighting a delaying action, in the face of the UNC counter-offensive. The division suffered heavily during these actions.

The division continued to offer determined resistance to UNC units in the Mundung-ni area until approximately 23 July 1951 when it was relieved in line by the 12th Division. The division retired to the immediate rear areas as Corps reserve. Here, it received replacements and underwent training. During the latter part of August 1951, elements of the division were recommitted on the frontlines and occupied a narrow front in the general Mundung-ni area, relieving the 27th Division, II Corps. The division remained in this general area, on a gradually shrinking front, until relief of V Corps by the 68th Chinese Communist Army was completed on or about 14 October.

Upon its relief, the division moved northward with the V Corps to the Yonghung area where it began reorganizing and training, while also preparing defenses against any possible UN invasion north of Wonsan. As of July 1952, the division continued maintaining its positions in the Yonghung area.

7TH DIVISION

(51st, 53d and 54th Regiments)

The 7th Division was activated at Haeju on 3 July 1950 from the 7th Border Constabulary Brigade and local conscripts. With the activation and reorganization phase completed, the division intensified its basic training program. Training continued until 28 July 1950, at which time it departed for Seoul via Tosong-ni, Kaesong and Uijongbu. The division arrived at Seoul on 31 July 1950 and crossed the Han River on 1 August 1950. The entire route of the division passed through territory that had already been secured by other North Korean units. The entire division continued southward along the Seoul-Taejon highway. The 51st and 54th Regiments passed through Chonju, Namwon and Chinju and arrived at Tongyong on 17 August 1950. Meanwhile the 53d Regiment, which had separated from the division, arrived at Kwangju and continued by way of Suncheon in its journey to Yosu. The regiment arrived at Yosu on 15 August 1950 and was immediately assigned the mission of securing the city and the nearby coastline against allied amphibious landings which the North Korean High Command considered imminent.

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Immediately upon their arrival on the Tongyong Peninsula on 17 August, the 51st and 54th Regiments were attacked by UNC troops and fought a pitched battle which lasted for three days. On 18 August 1950 ROK marines made an amphibious attack at a point immediately north of Tongyong with the intention of isolating these two regiments and cutting their only escape route to Chinju; after a desperate fight the two regiments broke through the ROK lines and limped back to Chinju. The 51st Regiment joined the division at Chinju from Yosu on 1 September 1950.

In accordance with orders issued on 20 August, the 7th Division, under I Corps, was to join the 6th and 9th Divisions in the southern portion of the perimeter in an all-out offensive against the Pusan Perimeter beginning 31 August 1950. According to the attack plan, the 7th Division was to advance parallel and to the north of the Chinju-Masan highway, with the 6th Division operating on the right flank, for a drive on Kumhae.

The division's advance was obstructed by fierce UNC artillery and aerial attacks. The 53d Regiment and the Artillery Regiment, confronted by almost impenetrable artillery fire east of Uiryong sideslipped south-east on 6 September.

In the meantime, the 51st and 54th Regiments approached the Haman area also from the Uiryong area on or about 5 September 1950 and were met by a withering barrage from UNC artillery. The battle which followed was the fiercest action encountered by the division since the start of the campaign. For nearly five days the divisional units together with the 6th Division fought for Haman, without success. This was the farthest point of the division's advance, from where the division fled northward.

By 17 September 1950 the division had retreated to Chunggyo-ri. On 25 September 1950 the I Corps ordered a general withdrawal. Continuing northward, the division passed through Muji on 2 October 1950 and arrived at Chongsan on 5 October 1950. After reorganization at Chongsan, the division made its way northward through Poun and then, veering eastward, traveled through the eastern mountain range and crossed the 38th Parallel and proceeded in a northwesterly direction through Kumsong, Hupyong-ni and Karyoju-ri, and finally reached Koksan on 12 November 1950. After a short rest, the division engaged in guerrilla warfare in the Kangdong-Songchon-Koksan area until arrival of the V Corps in December 1950.

The division recrossed the 38th Parallel south of Yanggu under V Corps at the end of December 1950. The division was next committed in the Hoengsong area about 17 January 1951, but was withdrawn about 22 January 1951. On 12 February 1951, when V Corps launched a new attack, the division attacked northeast of Wonju where it fought a fierce two-day action against the 3d ROK Division. The division then continued south to the Chechon area where V Corps was stopped with heavy casualties. In the ensuing withdrawal, the division was reduced to regimental size.

The division was withdrawn from combat with V Corps in late March 1951, and was subsequently transferred to VII Corps. The division then moved north to the Majon-ni area in the general vicinity of Wonsan where it has been training and preparing defensive positions.

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8TH DIVISION

(81st, 82d and 83d Regiments)

The 1st Border Constabulary Brigade, after reinforcing the 5th Division on 25 June 1950, was deactivated at Kangnung on 1 July 1950 and reconstituted as the cadre of the 8th Division; trained reserves were added to make up the full complement of troops.

The entire division left Kangnung on 14 July 1950 and arrived at Chechon on 16 July 1950 via Samchon. Chechon was policed by the division until 18 July 1950. From here the division moved to Tanyang on 18 July 1950, where it came under control of II Corps and was immediately dispatched with orders to recapture Yechon which the 31st Regiment, 12th Division, had failed to hold because of heavy pressure from ROK troops. In its first major battle of the campaign between 19-23 July 1950, the division occupied Yechon on 23 July 1950.

On or about 4 August 1950 the division departed Yechon and proceeded towards Pungsan, arriving there the same day without encountering any opposition. Its mission at this time was the capture of Yongchon.

Following this the division fought its second major battle on 9 August 1950 in the Sindong-tong area; suffered tremendous casualties but repelled ROK troops. For approximately three days after the costly battle, the division remained in its new position reassembling its meager forces. On 13 August 1950 the division limped into Uisong, the first objective in its mission to take Yongchon. Remnants of the division remained in Uisong from 14 August to 17 August.

On 25 August 1950 the division received orders to sever the Hayang-Yongchon highway by the afternoon of 26 August 1950, in the general offensive planned by II Corps. Although the division had received a large number of replacements, it was not ready to embark on any large-scale offensive, especially one which involved a march of more than 20 miles (the approximate distance from its encampment to the highway objective) in one day. At any rate, on or about 26 August 1950 the entire division departed the encampment area and despite heavy opposition from ROK forces captured Uihong on or about 28 August 1950. Without resting or regrouping its forces, the division continued its southward march, all the while harassed by steadily increasing ROK artillery and mortar fire. By the time the regiments had reached the approaches to the village of Hwasan-dong on 1 September 1950, they were engaged in continuous battle. See-saw interchange of positions between the 8th Division and the ROK defending forces continued until about 12 September 1950, when the division finally repelled ROK troops and established its position at Hwasan-dong. The division was counterattacked by ROK forces on 18 September 1950 and fought a violent battle lasting five days; the division was stopped and it began retreating northward.

Less than 2,000 men made their way to Songchon where a partial reorganization was effected in late September 1950. The division then continued its retreat to the Chosan area near the Yalu River in early October 1950. Here the division recruited additional personnel and continued its training until sometime in December 1950. In late December 1950 elements started south with the I Corps via Pyongyang and arrived in Seoul by 4 January 1951, following the CCF assault. Replacements received here brought the division to near operational strength. In the ensuing UNC

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offensive the division suffered heavily and lost almost the entire 81st Regiment in an ill-fated counterattack near Kwangju in mid-February 1951.

The division along with other elements of the I Corps then withdrew from Seoul in mid-March 1951 and after delaying for a time on the Imjin River continued to the Pyongsan area where it arrived about 26 March 1951. After a month's rest, the division again crossed the Imjin River near Munsan-ni on 22 April 1951 in the Communist drive on Seoul. In subsequent fighting near Munsan-ni, the division again lost heavily from UNC artillery and air action. With the next Communist offensive on 16 May 1951, the division advanced against UNC outposts, but soon withdrew north of the Imjin River before the prompt UNC counter-offensive.

During the early part of June 1951 the division was replaced by CCF elements west of the Imjin River, and the division withdrew to the west of the Yesong River for rest and reorganization. While in this area, they received replacements and trained until about 5 July 1951 when elements of the division began to displace southeastward to the east side of the Yesong River. In mid-July 1951, the division was located in the area south and west of Kaesong where it maintained patrol contact with UNC forces until the latter part of August 1951 when the division, minus the 82d Regiment, began to displace northwest via Kumchon to the general Sinchon area, arriving there about 12 September 1951 and engaged in training. The 82d Regiment remained deployed in the vicinity of Kaesong with the mission of guarding the Kaesong area during the armistice negotiations. During late September the 81st and 83d Regiments returned southward and as of 10 October 1951, the entire division was again located in the Kaesong area. In November 1951 the division, less the 82d Regiment, began displacing to the east coast with the 47th Division. The 82d Regiment remained in the Kaesong area. By late November 1951 the division reached the Tongchon area and relieved the 18th Division, VI Corps. The 82d Regiment joined the division in the Tongchon area in late June 1952. The division has subsequently remained in the area as I Corps reserve, while also defending the east coast in rear of the Corps as far north as Kojo.

9TH DIVISION

(85th, 86th and 87th Regiments)

The 3d Border Constabulary Brigade assembled at Haeju on 23 June 1950. On 25 June 1950, the brigade attacked Ongjin in conjunction with the 1st Regiment of the 6th Division. After a seven-hour battle, the brigade and the 1st Regiment, 6th Division, occupied the city. The 1st Regiment moved out immediately, leaving the 3d Brigade responsible for the security of the city. On 1 July 1950 the brigade moved to Kaesong and was reconstituted as the 9th Division between 5-9 July 1950.

The division was assigned the mission of guarding the former ROK capital between 11 July - 12 August 1950. On 30 July 1950 the 85th Regiment was assigned to garrison duty at Inchon until 12 August when it was replaced by the 87th Regiment. On 12 August the division less the 87th Regiment, departed Seoul for the Taegu front.

On 25 August 1950 the two regiments arrived at Sinban-ni via Suwon, Pyongtaek, Chonan, Chochiwon, Taejon, Kumsan, Muju, Kochang and Hyopchon.

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The division rested at Singan-ni for approximately six days, during which time the troops were making active preparations for an attack across the Naktong River under I Corps.

The actual assault began at 312200 August 1950, at a point directly east of Sinban-ni and southwest of Pugong-ni. The division finally crossed the river and by 4 September 1950, the division, supported by the 16th Tank Brigade and followed by the 4th Division, had arrived in the outskirts of Yongsan, the first objective in its drive to Samnangjin. Yongsang was the scene of a fierce battle with UNC forces between 4 - 15 August 1950. The division was so decimated by UNC attacks that it was forced to retreat westward on 15 September 1950.

The division retreated to a point approximately 2½ miles northeast of Hyopchon by 19 September 1950. Here it received its first replacements since the start of the campaign. The division, however, was ordered to retreat northward on 25 September 1950.

On 20 September 1950 the 87th Regiment engaged in a 24-hour battle in the Yongdung-po sector with invading UNC forces who had landed at Inchon on 15 September 1950.

Back on the southeastern front after by-passing Taejon to avoid UNC troops, the 9th Division, less the 87th Regiment, arrived at Kwang-ri on 1 October 1950 by way of Kunchon and Yongdong. From this point the division arrived at Hupyong-ni on 5 November 1950 and was completely reorganized under II Corps. It was charged with the responsibility of patrolling the area between Hupyong-ni and the 38th Parallel. In this general area, the 85th Regiment prepared to attack Pyonggang but was intercepted on 13 November 1950 and forced to retreat. The division remained in this general area between 13 November and 13 December 1950.

On 15 December 1950 the division attacked US forces at Yonchon and after a brief skirmish, retreated to Kumhwa. Upon its return to the Kumhwa area, the division remained in reserve until 20 December 1950, when the entire II Corps began moving southward. The mission of II Corps was to infiltrate through the eastern sector of the UNC lines and to sever supply and communication lines in the area east of Taejon.

On 1 January 1951 the division crossed the 38th Parallel for the second time at a point south of Yanggu. The division moved in a general southeastward direction and reached Yongwol on 13 January 1951, the entire journey completed without incident. Upon arrival in the Yongwol area, the unit was immediately engaged in combat by ROK forces, which were forced to retreat eastward. Moving south, the division attacked Oktong-ni on 15 January 1951, forcing ROK forces to retreat eastward. After a month and a half of engaging UNC forces in brief skirmishes in the Pyongchang area, the division was withdrawn in mid-March 1951. The division had failed in its mission to sever roads behind UNC lines at Chechon, Tanyang and Yongu.

Although the II NK Corps was recommitted on 16 May 1951, the 9th Division remained behind and moved to the western front in the general Yonan area, where it became subordinate to the VI Corps. Here the division received replacements from the 36th Division which was inactivated. The division remained on a defensive mission in the Yonan area until mid-August 1951, when it again began displacing to the eastern front with VI Corps. Late in September 1951 the division was located in the Sinpung-ni

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area. On 7 October 1951 elements of the ROK Capital Division contacted the 86th Regiment in defensive positions south of Kosong, marking the first time the 9th Division had appeared in contact since March 1951.

The division subsequently placed one regiment in defensive positions in the Kosong area, while the remainder of the division is disposed inland northward along the coast to the vicinity of Tongchon. Although the 18th and 19th Divisions, VI Corps, were inactivated in December 1951 when the Corps was relieved by the I Corps, the 9th Division remained in its positions and became subordinate to the I Corps. As of July 1952 the division remained in the same general area carrying out its defensive mission.

10TH GUARDS MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION

(25th and 27th Regiments; 107th Tank Regiment)

The division was formed at Sukchon in March 1950 from the 4th, 5th and 6th Training Classes of the 2d Democratic Young Men's Training Center.

Sukchon was the basic training site of the division from March to the middle of June 1950. Pyongyang, Sadong and Chaeryong were the sites for advance training of divisional units from 16 June to 25 July 1950. The division passed through Seoul on or about 27 July 1950 and assembled in Waegwan from 8 to 10 August.

The division under I Corps crossed the Naktong River near Tuksongdong in its first combat engagement at 122200 August 1950, in coordination with the 3d Division to the north, with mission of cutting the MSR south of Taegu. The division was forced to withdraw to the west bank of the river on 16 August. By 31 August 1950 the division had successfully crossed the Naktong River, only to remain--as a result of poor intelligence--totally inactive in the Hyonpung area. The UNC counteroffensive on 16 September 1950, forced the division to withdraw to Songju on 10 September 1950, where it remained until 25 September 1950, on which date it was ordered to retreat north. Shortly thereafter, the division commander was killed in action north of Kumchon.

By the middle of November 1950 the division was actively engaged in guerrilla warfare in the Singye, Chorwon, Pyonggang, Inje, Yanggu, and Chunchon areas. For these exploits, the division was awarded the honorary title "Guards." It later consolidated in the vicinity of Hwachon, on or about 8 December 1950. The division participated in a limited attack against ROK forces in the Chunchon area and succeeded in advancing to the vicinity of Chongsyong-ni where it was dispersed and again forced to withdraw, but remained in contact in the Chunchon area. During the latter part of December 1950, the division shifted east with the II Corps to the Yanggu area. In the meantime the division had built up its strength to approximately 4,000 troops. From this vicinity, the division moved south between the break in UNC lines along the Inje-Wonju axis beginning in mid-December 1950. By 11 January 1951 it had moved south to the Chechon area, where it was engaged by elements of the 7th US Division. It continued to move southward, avoiding contact where possible by skirting around major UNC troops concentrations and, by 25 January 1951, was located in the area about 30 miles northeast of Taegu, deep behind friendly lines. In the meantime, UNC forces began to attack and close the gap in efforts to cut off II Corps. During this offensive all elements of II Corps, except the 10th Division, succeeded in escaping the trap. The 10th Division was sealed off and it reverted to organized guerrilla tactics.

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In mid-March 1951 the division began to withdraw to the north in an apparent attempt to rejoin the II Corps. Meanwhile, it was constantly engaged by UNC forces and its strength was reduced considerably. By the end of March 1951 the division was reduced to less than 1,000 troops who succeeded in getting north of the UNC lines. Subsequently, the division proceeded to the Chongju area on the west coast where it began reorganizing under the IV Corps as a mechanized infantry division. Although the division did not receive any armor initially, a battalion of tanks was received from the 105th Tank Division during the summer of 1951, and another battalion of tanks from the 17th Mechanized Infantry Division in late February 1952.

The division continued with its reorganization and training throughout 1951, while at the same time defending the coast in the IV Corps northern area. Currently, the division is carried in the Taepyong area southwest of Pyongyang.

12TH ANDONG DIVISION

(30th, 31st and 32d Regiments)

In February 1950, ordered by MAO Tse Tung, all Korean units serving with the Chinese Communist Forces in Manchuria began a journey to the city of Chengchou in Honan Province, China. Throughout the months of February and March 1950, an estimated 12,000 Koreans streamed into Chengchou from Manchuria and various other parts of China. These Korean troops were drawn largely from the 139th, 140th, 141st and 156th Chinese Communist Divisions. On or about 6 April 1950, the entire Korean group was assembled and formed the 15th Independent Division.

On or about 7 April 1950 the division left Chengchou and arrived at Wonsan on 18 April 1950. On 25 April the 15th Division was deactivated as such and reconstituted as the 7th Division. Prior to 18 June 1950 the division had been redesignated as the 12th Division, composed of the 30th, 31st and 32d Regiments. Despite this change in designation, veterans of the division continued to refer to their unit as the 7th Division, perhaps by force of habit or by intention in order to confuse UNC intelligence since a new 7th Division was activated on the west coast of North Korea almost simultaneously.

On or about 22 June 1950 the division had assembled at Inje. The division had received orders from II Corps to advance across the border and occupy Hongchon via Chaun-ni and Songsan-ni by 27 June. Prior to the offensive, 30 T-34 tanks were attached to the division.

At approximately 250500 June 1950, after a 20 minute artillery preparation, the division attacked across the 38th Parallel in the vicinity of Naepyong-ni and struck elements of the 6th ROK Division. The division then diverted from the original plan by attacking westward along the Inje-Chunchon highway. In coordination with the 2d Division, Chunchon was captured on 27 June 1950. After capturing Hongchon on 29 June 1950, the Hongchon River was crossed by 30 June 1950. About noon the same day, the division less the 31st Regiment, recommenced its drive with Wonju as the next objective. After a heated battle, Wonju was captured on 3 July 1950 and the division proceeded toward Chechon on 4 July 1950. In the meantime, the 31st Regiment, under orders from II Corps, attacked in the direction

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of Chungju. On 10 July 1950, the division occupied Chechon after only a brief skirmish within the city proper. On the same day, Chungju fell to the 31st Regiment, which continued on to Yechon. On 14 July the division captured Tanyang with comparative ease. Meanwhile, the 31st Regiment, moving directly eastward after its capture of Chungju, passed through Tanyang on 14 July 1950 and arrived in the Yechon area on 16 July 1950. The regiment captured this town with ease on 16 July 1950; but ROK troops counterattacked the next day and forced the regiment to withdraw to Tanyang. At this time II Corps returned this regiment to the control of its parent unit and dispatched the 8th Division to retake the town.

After a four-day rest at Tanyang, the entire division captured Punggi on 18 July 1950, without a struggle. After a brief engagement, Yongju was captured on 20 July 1950. After a bloody battle between 25-30 July 1950, Andong finally fell to the division. For this action, the division was awarded the title "Andong."

On 4 August 1950, the division resumed its offensive along the Andong-Chonsong highway and by 5 August 1950, had captured Chongsong with relative ease. Kigye was secured on 12 August 1950, and the division arrived in the Pohang-dong area on 13 August 1950, in time for the 31st Regiment to join in a coordinated attack on the port city with the 5th Division. This area was the scene of a fierce battle with defending UNC forces between 14-17 August 1950. The combination of UNC artillery and naval fire forced the division to withdraw to Chiga-dong on 18 August 1950 after reorganizing at Pihak-san, the division occupied Angang-ni on 4 September 1950, after a violent battle.

The main objective of the division was to capture Pohang-dong in order to deny its use to UNC forces as a port, and then to attack Kyongju, a vitally important rail and highway hub. However, due to determined UNC resistance, the outskirts of Kyongju was the farthest point of the division's advance; and the division started its retreat. By 30 September 1950 remnants of the division arrived at Inje via Kigye, Topyong-dong, Chongsong and Andong. From Inje, the division made its way northwestward, passing through Koksan and reaching Pyongyang on 30 October 1950. From here, the division moved through Sunchon and Anju and arrived at Kanggye on 10 November 1950. What remained of the original 12th Division was absorbed in the heterogeneous assembly of decimated and defeated combat units at Kanggye and the division as such ceased to exist.

A new 12th Division was activated under V Corps on 18 November 1950 and included former members of the 7th, 9th and 12th Divisions. On 25 November 1950, the division departed the Kanggye area and began its southward advance. Following only mountain trails, the division passed through Mupyong-ni, Huichon, Maengsan, Tangdok and Pyonggang, and arrived at Inje on 15 December 1950 without serious incident.

The division continued south with V Corps in late December 1950. After having been ordered to infiltrate UN lines, very heavy casualties were sustained by the division near Wonju and Hoengsong in early January 1951. The division then took part in the CCF-NKA counteroffensive of 11 February 1951 near Hoengsong and three days later began another infiltration attack, this time directed at Chechon. The effort, though determined, was stopped on 19 February 1951 five miles short of the town. The division then conducted a slow withdrawal characterized by stiff counterattacks. When finally relieved at the end of March 1951, it had been reduced to regimental strength. After reorganizing for one month in the

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Komisong area, and receiving replacements from the inactivated 41st Division, the 12th Division was recommitted with the V Corps during the "Fifth Campaign, 1st Phase," on 22 April 1951, in the Inje sector. PWs indicate that the 12th Division was to have infiltrated friendly positions and to conduct guerrilla warfare in the Chechon area. This objective, however, was not accomplished. On 25 April 1951, the division, and especially the 32d Regiment, suffered heavy casualties from UNC artillery and mortar fire. On 2 May 1951 the division broke contact and withdrew. In the "Fifth Campaign, 2d Phase," on 16 June 1951, the division was again committed and it launched an attack against ROK III Corps elements in the Inje-Hyon-ni area and assisted in inflicting heavy losses in personnel and equipment on the ROK forces. The division pursued the withdrawal of UNC elements and on or about 26 May 1951, arrived in the vicinity of Hajinbu-ri. However, by 28 May 1951, the division was forced to withdraw north in face of the UNC counter-offensive. Initially it offered only light resistance, but upon arriving in the Inje area it began to fight tenaciously. Here the division was reinforced by approximately two artillery battalions which arrived after having trained in the Chinnampo area.

During the latter part of June 1951, the division withdrew from contact to reorganize and train. It remained out of contact until the latter part of July 1951, when it displaced and relieved the 6th Division in the area north of the Hwachon Reservoir. The 31st and 32d Regiments, defending the western sector of this front, were forced to give up several commanding terrain features to UNC elements and suffered heavy casualties in very persistent counterattacks. By 26 August 1951 western elements of the division had been relieved by elements of the 32d Division, and were mainly occupied with the defense of the high ground in the vicinity of Pia-ri. The entire V Corps sector shrank eastward during the period, and by the end of September 1951, the 12th Division front had shifted to the vicinity of Songhyon-ni. Early in October 1951 the relief of V Corps by the 68th Chinese Communist Army began and by 10 October 1951 the 12th Division had been completely relieved, except for straggler elements. The division began displacing northward to Yonghung. Arriving in the Yonghung area by the end of October 1951, the division began training and reorganizing, while also carrying out its mission of defending the area against a possible friendly amphibious invasion. As of July 1952 the division remained in the Chinhung-ni area.

13TH DIVISION

(19th, 21st and 23d Regiments)

The 13th Division was activated during early June 1950 from personnel of the 1st, 2d and 3d Democratic Youth Training Centers. The 1st Training Center, located at Sinuiju, was redesignated the 19th Regiment; the 2d Training Center, situated at South Sinuiju, became the 23d Regiment; while the 21st Regiment was organized from the 3d Training Center at Yongampo.

Yongchon was the assembly area of the division from 24 to 26 June 1950. The division crossed the 38th Parallel on or about 27 June 1950. In the wake of the 3d and 4th Divisions, the division passed through Uijongbu and arrived in Seoul on 30 June 1950, without becoming engaged in battle. On or about 2 July 1950, the divisional artillery and 23d Regiment were dispatched to Inchon with the mission of securing that city. They remained there from 2 to 30 July 1950 with a security mission. The rest of the division moved on to Chungju where it was subordinated to II Corps.

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After remaining in Chungju for a few days the division was ordered to join the 1st Division at Mungyong by 23 July 1950 and support that unit in its drive south. Upon arrival there on 24 July 1950, one day late, it was learned that the 1st Division had moved out. The division continued south on a forced march in an attempt to overtake the 1st Division. Enroute the division was engaged in its first combat action on 25 July 1950 at Chigong-ni. It displayed poor fighting qualities and was almost completely disorganized. After regrouping, the division pushed on to Sangju by 1 August 1950 and began preparations to cross the Naktong River. Spearheaded by the 21st Regiment, the division crossed the river in the Naktong-ni area during the period 4 to 7 August 1950. The 23d Regiment and division artillery, which had been diverted to Inchon, made the crossing on the night of 6-7 August 1950.

Fighting against stubborn UNC resistance the division finally reached Hajang-dong on or about 11 August 1950. Pushing on, the division fought a fierce all-day battle just north of Tabu-dong on 12 August 1950. The division sustained tremendous casualties and was forced to withdraw in disorder. The division reorganized at Yuhak-san from 14 to 24 August 1950 and fought some small-scale engagements in the area.

All units of II Corps were notified on or about 20 August that an all-out offensive would be launched commencing on 25 August 1950. The mission assigned to the 13th Division was to attack south and occupy Taeju by the afternoon of the 26 August 1950. This was the beginning of the end. The division jumped off at 252000 August 1950 and arrived at a point just south of Tabu-dong on 27 August 1950. Here a powerful UNC counterattack separated the division headquarters from the main body and threw the division back in disorder. On 30 August 1950, the last all-out effort was ordered by II Corps for 021800 September 1950. The 13th Division was to push through and 15-20 kilometers beyond Taegu, with the 1st Division on the east and the 3d Division on the west. The division, however, was still in the area of Mount Palgong on 12 September 1950. This was the division's farthest point of advance.

The division withdrew to Kasan where it conducted a costly defensive stand from 12 to 20 September 1950. On 21 September 1950, UNC forces effected a deep penetration in the division and caused its complete disintegration.

The division earned one dubious distinction. Never before or since has an enemy division in Korea been so completely defeated. On 22 August 1950, the commander of the division artillery regiment surrendered. On 21 September 1950, the division Chief of Staff, LEE Hak-ku, later to become a ringleader in the Koje Island PW riots, awakened two US soldiers who were fast asleep and surrendered. On 24 September 1950 the commander of the division self-propelled gun battalion, who had nothing left to command surrendered. On 27 September 1950 the division surgeon surrendered. On 1 October 1950 the commander of the 23d Regiment who attempted in vain to assemble scattered remnants of his regiment numbering about 600 troops for a formal surrender, gave up. The commander of the 19th Regiment had better luck. He marched up to a ROK Police Station and formally surrendered his command which by then had been reduced to 168 men.

Remnants and stragglers of the unit moved northward into South Hamgyong and Chakang Provinces during early October 1950, thence into Kirin Province, Manchuria, where the division was re-constituted under the newly activated VII Corps. The division entered Korea with the Corps and by mid-March 1951, was located in the general Chongju area. At the end

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of March, it joined the II Corps at Hoeyang to replace the 9th Division. From Hoeyang it marched south arriving in the vicinity of Won-ni on or about 22 May 1951. The division remained in reserve behind the 27th Division until approximately 26 May 1951, when it was engaged by ROK forces and forced to withdraw.

The division took only a minor part in the Communist May 1951 offensive since it was committed during the UNC counteroffensive and was subsequently forced to fight a delaying action. The division continued its delaying action to the Norumagi area, and sustained heavy casualties until 2 September 1951, when it was relieved by the 15th Division, III Corps, which had displaced south in a relief role. The division then withdrew to the immediate rear area for reorganization; it remained out of contact until about 9 September 1951 when it began relief of the 27th Division in the area west of Pia-ri. This was more in the nature of a support role rather than a relief, and the 13th Division's period on the line was brief since it was completely relieved by the 2d Division during 12-15 September 1951. On 22 September 1951, the 13th Division again appeared in contact, the 19th Regiment relieving elements of the 6th Division in the vicinity of Satae-ri, where it held against small scale attacks and probing action by UNC elements. Subsequently, the division maintained its defensive attitude in the Satae-ri-Chongson-ni axis until relieved in July 1952 by the 48th Regiment, 15th Division, III Corps. Currently it is carried in the Naegumgang area under II Corps.

15TH DIVISION

(45th, 48th and 50th Regiments)

Units of the 15th Division received their training at the 3d People's Training Center in Hoeryong and at the Youth Training Center in Najin. Training began about the middle of March when both camps began to receive trainees. Assembling in the Hwachon area about 24 June 1950, the troops heard for the first time they were part of the newly-organized 15th Division. The 7th, 8th and 9th Training Regiments were redesignated the 45th, 48th and 50th Regiments respectively.

The division was not committed on 25 June 1950, but followed up the attack in the central sector under II Corps. The division departed Hwachon on 28 June 1950, for Chunchon. Operations Order No. 003, dated 280800 June 1950, issued at Hwachon, ordered the move of the division to Chunchon by 281400 June 1950. The division left Chunchon on 28 June 1950 and, continuing southward through Honchon, met slight ROK rear guard action at Pyongjang-ni and Wonju. Swinging west and crossing the Han River at Yoju on or about 1 July 1950, the division cut southward for Changhowon-ni. The 45th Regiment separated from the division after crossing the Han River, continued west to the outskirts of Changhowon-ni about 3 July 1950.

The division fought its first large-scale engagement at Changhowon-ni on 4 July 1950. Changhowon-ni was occupied on the same day and the division fought on to capture Umsong on 8 July 1950; and Koesan on 10 July 1950. On 14 July 1950, the 45th and 48th Regiments were ordered to continue south. Meanwhile, on 14 July 1950, the 50th Regiment was ordered to occupy Chongan by 15 July 1950, and then continue to Chongjin to take up

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blocking positions. On 16 July 1950 the 45th and 48th Regiments were ordered to assault Chongchon-ni beginning at 170400 July 1950. Following the fall of Chongchon-ni, the entire division consolidated and at 181900 July 1950, departed for Sangju. By 21 July 1950 all preparations were completed to attack Sangju. Sangju fell on 22 July 1950 and the division immediately crossed the Naktong River and was engaged at Yuhak-san on or about 12 August 1950. At this point the mission of the division was to attack through the strongly held defense line north of Taegu. The division advanced, after heavy fighting, to Kunwi, arriving on 16 August 1950. After being subjected to a three-day pounding against a virtually impregnable stonewall, the tactical plan was changed and the division pulled out of the lines and moved to Uisong, joining the troops in that sector who were trying to seize the important highway junction of Yongchon. The division assembled in the Kumhak-tong area on 27 August 1950 for the attack on Yongchon.

II Corps ordered the division to attack at 021800 September 1950 and take the town at all costs. The division suffered tremendous casualties and loss of materiel in the unsuccessful process. Ordered to withdraw on 6 September 1950, it was under constant attack during the retreat. Some organized elements of the unit were able to withdraw to the Chunchon area where they assembled and moved to Kanggye.

After reorganization, the division marched south in December 1950 under III Corps. The 48th Regiment was committed at Kangnung on 28 January 1951, but the division as a unit did not see action until committed near Pyongchang in late February 1951. The division fought with determination as the III Corps covered the withdrawal of the II and V Corps. The division played a minor but effective role in the Communist April 1951 offensive and apparently took no part in the May 1951 offensive. In April 1951, several hundred replacements were received by the division from the inactivated 69th Brigade. After the beginning of the May 1951 offensive, it remained in contact briefly, then withdrew north with other elements of the III Corps to the general Hwachon-ni area. However, when ROK forces threatened the east flank, the division was recommitted south of Kosong during the middle of June 1951. During June-July 1951, the division received a considerable number of replacements from IV Corps. The 45th Division, III Corps, then relieved the division in the Pohyon-ni area on or about 30 July 1951, and the division withdrew to the general vicinity of Sinpung. In this area the division received replacements and trained until the first part of September 1951 when it again displaced south and relieved the 13th Division, II Corps, in the Changjon-Sintan-ni area, with the 50th Regiment on line until about 10 September 1951 when it was relieved by the 48th Regiment. The 45th Regiment also appeared on line about this time and the division offered strong, well-supported resistance to UNC elements. During the fighting in mid-September 1951, elements of the division reportedly suffered rather heavy casualties in the face of UNC limited attacks which were effectively supported by air and artillery. During October 1951 the division continued to offer considerable resistance in defending their positions against limited attacks by friendly elements in the Sintan-ni area. The division remained on the line in the same general area until mid-January 1952, at which time it was relieved by the 45th Division, III Corps. The division then withdrew to the vicinity of Ipo-ri but, in July 1952, relieved the entire II Corps.

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27TH DIVISION

(7th, 14th and 32d Regiments)

The 27th Division is believed to be the former 27th Brigade which was organized at Kumchon in August 1950. In mid-October 1950 when UNC forces advanced on Kumchon, the brigade retreated to the north in complete disorder. However, remnants and stragglers assembled in the Koksan area and formed the 27th Division, prior to 3 December 1950, and conducted guerrilla operations under the II Corps. The division then moved to the vicinity of Hwachon where it became attached to V Corps at the end of December 1950.

The division then crossed the 38th Parallel from the vicinity of Yanggu during the Communist New Year's Offensive and proceeded towards Wonju through Hongchon and Hoengsong. Entering Wonju on 7 January 1951, elements of the division were met by UNC forces and turned back. The division then moved southeastward, but was again stopped in mid-January 1951 at Yongwol. Here the division reverted to II Corps control and moved to the north of Chechon where it assisted the Corps in its defense against advancing UNC forces. In mid-February 1951 the division again participated in an enemy offensive and advanced southward to the vicinity of Pyongchang. However, the division was again stopped, along with the remainder of the Corps, and forced to fight a stiff delaying action until the division and the Corps broke contact and withdrew in late March 1951. The division having suffered heavy losses during the winter action, withdrew to the Hoeyang area with the remainder of the Corps and began to reorganize.

The division remained out of contact until the beginning of the Communist May 1951 offensive, at which time it again appeared in the east sector under II Corps. The division managed to reach the vicinity of Hajinburi, but was turned back by the UNC counteroffensive. The division then began fighting a delaying action back through Inje. The division received substantial replacements and additional artillery during this action but still sustained heavy casualties as it fought tenaciously against advancing UNC forces. The division remained in contact until about mid-September 1951 until it was finally relieved by the 13th Division, II Corps, along the ridgelines northeast of Pia-ri. It then moved to the Corps rear area where it recuperated for a period. Meanwhile the 13th Division, II Corps, was relieved by the 2d Division, II Corps, in the former area of the 27th Division. In early November 1951, the 27th Division relieved the 2d Division, II Corps, in the area north of Sohui-ri. The division remained in the same area during the winter, while preparing defensive positions and offering determined resistance to limited UNC probes. In July 1952 the division was relieved by the 50th Regiment, 1st Division, III NK Corps, and withdrew to the Naegumgang area where it is currently carried.

37TH DIVISION

(74th, 75th and 76th Regiments)

The origin of the 37th Division is obscure, although the existence of the division was reported as early as September 1950. Information regarding the division is more firm subsequent to October 1950. The division

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is known to have trained and reorganized under the VII Corps in Chilin Province, Manchuria, beginning in late October 1950. The division then entered Korea with the Corps in late January 1951, and proceeded to the Wonsan area. Although the division has provided some replacements to other units, the division itself has not been contacted as a unit. As of July 1952 the division remained in the general vicinity of Samdae-ri with its mission of defending against any UNC landing in the Wonsan area.

45TH DIVISION

(89th, 90th and 91st Regiments)

Available reports indicate that the division was formed in mid-August 1950 in the Chinnampo area, where it trained and had a coastal defense mission. In October 1950, before the unit was fully organized and equipped it was routed by advancing UNC forces and it withdrew northward into Manchuria. The division was then reconstituted under the VIII Corps and reentered Korea with the Corps in January 1951. However, the division was immediately detached from the VIII Corps and was assigned to the III Corps which was then located in the east sector. The division then proceeded directly to the Inje area, where it made contact with UNC forces in mid-March 1951. The division remained in contact with attacking UNC elements until the beginning of the Communist April 1951 offensive. The division participated in the initial attack and suffered heavy losses in personnel and equipment. The division withdrew from contact in late May 1951 during the second phase of the enemy's spring offensive and withdrew to the Kumgang Mountain area where it regrouped and re-trained its personnel.

The division remained out of contact until late July 1951, at which time the division was recommitted in relief of the 15th Division, III Corps, in the east sector. It remained in contact until it was again relieved by elements of the 15th Division and the 19th Division, VI Corps, at the end of August 1951. Upon its relief, the division withdrew to the III Corps immediate rear area and prepared defensive positions and continued with its training. Once during this period, on 15 and 16 September 1951, the 91st Regiment of the division was committed in support of an assault by a regiment of the 1st Division, III Corps, against UNC positions north of Shuigu. Having failed in its mission, the regiment returned to the division rear area.

The division remained out of contact until late January 1952, when it was again committed in relief of the 15th Division in the vicinity of Sintan-ni. As of July 1952 the division remained in contact in the general Yuusil area.

46TH DIVISION

(93d, 94th and 95th Regiments)

The 46th Division was activated in August 1950 in the Chinnampo area. However, because of the rapid UNC advance following the landing at Inchon, and the replacement levies made upon the unit, the division was not fully organized prior to its initial commitment.

In the face of the UNC advance during October 1950, the division withdrew northward to the vicinity of Sukchon, where elements of the 19th Division were incorporated into the division. Following the UNC airdrop in the Sukchon area in mid-October 1950, the division again withdrew northward. The division remained in contact as it continued its northward withdrawal during the latter part of October 1950. The division, now under I Corps, then advanced again against UNC elements during the enemy's first counteroffensive. Then, after the first week of November 1950, the division again withdrew northward with the Corps into Manchuria. At Yenchi, Manchuria, the division was reconstituted under the VIII Corps from remnants and recent conscripts.

The division reappeared under the VIII Corps in the Hamhung area during late February and early March 1951, where it took up defensive positions. When the VIII Corps was inactivated soon thereafter, the division was transferred in place to the VII Corps and remained in the Hamhung area throughout 1951, continuing with its coastal defense mission. In November of 1951 the division was transferred to the V Corps which had been withdrawn from the front to defend the coastal areas north of Wonsan in the Hamhung area. As of July 1952 the 46th Division still remained in the Hamhung area with no change in its mission.

47TH DIVISION

(2d, 3d and 4th Regiments)

The 47th Division was organized in late August 1950 at Sinuiju. During October 1950 the division was completely reorganized and equipped with the addition of recent conscripts, newly trained officers, and new weapons. In late October 1950 the division departed Sinuiju under I Corps and proceeded to Kusong, where it remained only a few days, then withdrew to Sakchu in the face of the UNC advance. At Sakchu elements of the division continued training for approximately a month, while the rest of the division, in conjunction with elements of the 50th Chinese Communist Army, continued to engage and harass UNC elements in the Chosan area. In early December 1950 the entire division headed south toward Pyongyang, where it awaited orders.

Again proceeding south in late December 1950, the division arrived in Seoul in early January 1951 and followed up the withdrawal of the UNC forces south of Seoul. With the resumption of the UNC offensive in late January 1951, the division covered the withdrawal of the enemy forces from the Suwon area to south of the Han River. The 47th Division continued to defend the Seoul area during the month of February 1951, and in mid-March 1951 the division withdrew from Seoul with I Corps to the west of the Yesong River to rest and reorganize in preparation for the next Communist offensive. On the night of 23-24 April 1951 elements of the division attacked across the Imjin. The 4th Regiment received a surprise counterattack and heavy artillery fire which caused a retreat with heavy casualties. Other elements got closer to Seoul but soon they too were forced to retreat before the UNC counterattack. In late May 1951 the division again withdrew to the west of the Yesong River in the general vicinity of Onjong-ni. Here the division received replacements and trained. By 17 July 1951 the division had displaced southward to the general Yonan area. The division remained in the general vicinity of Yonan during the summer, combating UNC guerrilla activities, while also maintaining coastal defense

positions along the south coast of Hwanghae Province.

In early November 1951, the division assembled in the Haeju area to the west of Yonan, then displaced to the east sector with I Corps. In early December, the division relieved the 19th Division, VI Corps, in the Komisong-Oemyon area. Since then the division has remained in this position defending from the high ground against UNC probes and patrol action.

105TH SEOUL TANK DIVISION

(1st, 2d and 3d Tank Regiments; 208th Armored Training Regiment)

The 15th Tank Training Regiment, the first tank unit in the North Korean Army, was the nucleus around which the 105th Tank Brigade was activated at Sedong. Initially, the brigade consisted of the 1st, 2d and 3d Tank Regiments, also known as the 107th, 109th and 203d Regiments, respectively; the 65th (206th) Motorized Infantry Regiment; the 83d (603d) Motorcycle Regiment; the 208th Tank Training Regiment; and the 303d Motorcycle Training Battalion.

During the first week in June 1950 the units of the 105th Brigade were making last-minute preparation for what the bulk of the troops believed were forthcoming maneuvers. During the period, the 83d (603d) Motorcycle Regiment was made an independent unit and divorced from the brigade. No reason for this change has been reported. One source stated that the original plans for the regiment called for joint combat operations with the 12th Division, but this plan was changed later because of the impassable mountain roads on the east coast, and the 83d (603d) was then ordered to proceed along the west coast. Also during the period, the 303d Motorcycle Training Battalion was redesignated the 303d Reconnaissance Battalion.

On 25 June 1950 the 109th Regiment spearheaded the 3d Division's attack across the parallel in the Sachang-ni area and moved southwest. Meanwhile, the 107th Regiment, supporting the 4th Division, moved along the Yonchon-Seoul road. The 203d Regiment, in support of the division, attacked along the Kaesong-Seoul highway. Continuing the attack, the brigade was reunited at Seoul on 28 June. For this action which culminated in the capture of Seoul, the brigade was awarded the honorary title of "Seoul" and elevated to a tank division in Order No. 7, dated 100800 July 1950, by KIM Il Sung.

After crossing the Han River, the 109th Regiment proceeded westward, passed through Yongdungpo and entered Inchon about 3 July 1950. One battalion stayed in Inchon while the other two returned to Yongdungpo. After a few days the 109th Regiment reassembled in the vicinity of Suwon, where all three battalions closed on 9 July 1950.

Very little information is available on the movements of the other tank regiments of the division during this period. Most likely they remained in the Seoul area for several reports from other units mentioned a large tank force in capital at that time. At any rate, the division assembled in the vicinity of Pyongtaek on or about 12 July 1950.

On 16 July 1950 units of the division were again separated. The largest force, which included the 107th and 203d Regiments in addition to the 2d Battalion, 109th Regiment, attacked toward Taejon. The 1st and 3d Battalions, 109th Regiment, headed eastward toward Songhwan and Chinchon, arriving in the Koesan area about 17 July 1950. Joining in the attack on Kunchon, the two tank battalions encountered large mine fields which slowed

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their progress, however, Hamchang was taken on 28 July 1950. Passing through Sangju, they crossed the Naktong River at Naktong-ni after two unsuccessful attempts. Reaching Hajang-dong about 12 August 1950, they joined in the assault on Taegu.

In the meantime, the other two tank regiments plus the 2d Battalion, 109th Regiment, and other divisional units were supporting the 3d and 4th Divisions' drive on Taejon. Shortly after separating from the two battalions of the 109th Regiment, they were subjected to a severe air attack at Chonui. This force was continually fighting along the axis, Taejon, Yongdong, Kumchon, Waegwan, Taegu and Yongchon. Supporting various units, the tankers participated in battles for each of these cities and were apparently committed in battalion strength. On 15 August 1950 approximately 200 men and 21 new tanks of an independent tank battalion, which had recently arrived from the tank training center at Pyongyang, were incorporated in the division. This was the only instance of any large-scale tank replacements, although tanks were continually supplied a few at a time. While crossing the Naktong River in the vicinity of Waegwan, the division suffered tremendous casualties. Reports indicate that in the battle of Taegu, the division was reduced to about 20 per cent of its initial strength.

On or about 10 September 1950 units of the division were ordered to assemble in the vicinity of Kumchon to regroup and receive replacements. While the division was regrouping, the 849th Independent Anti-tank Regiment, composed of recent inductees, was assigned to the division.

A few days after the Inchon landing, the division was ordered to Suwon to repel UNC forces. Before it had a chance to make an orderly withdrawal, the division was heavily engaged on 19 September with UNC forces who were driving from the south. The intensity of the UNC action virtually annihilated the 849th Independent Anti-tank Regiment.

Remnants of the division that managed to reach North Korea reorganized in the Sakchu area during October 1950, while rear service elements of the division withdrew into Manchuria. At 062000 November 1950 the division was recommitted under I Corps for an attack with the Chinese Communists, but was forced to withdraw again.

Following the enemy's advance against UNC forces after the commitment of the Chinese Communist Forces, the division proceeded to the Sukchon area where it began reorganizing and was subsequently placed under IV Corps. Although reports during mid-1951 indicated that the division had moved southward into the vicinity of Sariwon, later information revealed that the bulk of the division remained in the Sukchon-Anju area where it continued training and reorganization. Also during 1951, the division provided cadre personnel and equipment to form the armored elements of the 23d, 24th, 25th and 26th Mechanized Artillery Brigades and the 10th Mechanized Infantry Division. As of July 1952 the division remained in the general vicinity of Sukchon.

21ST BRIGADE

A reorganization of the 23d Mechanized Artillery Brigade into an ordinary brigade in June 1952, resulted in the activation of the 21st Brigade. This brigade, currently on a defense mission in the Hwanghae Province, is composed of three infantry battalions, two mechanized battalions, one artillery battalion and one transportation battalion.

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23D BRIGADE

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The 23d Brigade was originally formed in July 1949 as the 956th Independent Marine Regiment under the Naval Headquarters at Chinnampo. In August 1950, the regiment was redesignated the 23d (239th) Marine Brigade at Chinnampo. At this time, battalions of the brigade were sent to the Ongjin, Haeju, Kunsan, and Kwangju areas. Following the UNC advance in September 1950, remnants of the brigade withdrew to North Korea and began reorganizing and training in the Yongwon area northeast of Tokchon.

In mid-December 1950 the brigade, still understrength and poorly equipped, started moving south through Maengsan, Yangdok, Koksan, Singye, Sariwon and arrived in the Haeju area in mid-January 1951. Battalion elements of the brigade then took up positions in the southwestern coastal areas of Hwanghae Province from Chongdan south through Ongjin and east through Haeju to the vicinity of Changyon. Here the brigade began preparing beach defenses, while also training and adding personnel and equipment. In February 1951 the brigade was placed under the command of the VI Corps, which had then arrived in the area.

In April 1951 the brigade extended its zone of responsibility further to the north to the vicinity of Ulliyul. In late May 1951 the 36th Division, VI Corps, which was located in the Haeju area, was inactivated and the 63d Regiment of the division was integrated into the brigade. At this time, the brigade was apparently redesignated a division, at least for a short period.

When VI Corps displaced to the east sector in August 1951, the brigade remained behind and became attached to I Corps which had assumed responsibility for the area. Then in late November 1951 when I Corps also moved to the east sector, the brigade again remained in the area and became subordinate to IV Corps, which, although located north of the Taedong River, was now apparently also responsible for the southwest coast of Hwanghae Province.

Although the brigade may have been redesignated a division during May of 1951, it was again redesignated as a brigade and underwent some reorganization during the summer of 1951. The brigade was changed to a mechanized artillery brigade in October 1951. The brigade is actually a coastal defense brigade and has been extremely active since 16 November 1951 in the enemy island hopping campaign.

In June 1952 it was redesignated once again as the 23d Brigade after supplying organic elements to the newly-formed 21st Brigade.

24TH MECHANIZED ARTILLERY BRIGADE

The 24th (249th) Brigade was organized at Wonsan in August 1950 simultaneously with the organization of the 23d Brigade at Chinnampo. Elements of the units subordinate to the Naval Headquarters (599th Unit) at Wonsan, including the 945th Regiment which had participated in the enemy amphibious landings on the east coast, were integrated into this newly constituted unit.

The mission of the brigade was to defend the Wonsan area, however, the brigade was quickly dispersed upon the arrival of elements of I ROK Corps

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in the area in early October 1950. The brigade then withdrew northward, with elements scattered in two directions. Elements withdrew due north from Hamhung towards Kanggye, while the remainder withdrew to the northeast up the coast towards Nanam and also to Hyesanjin. However, following the evacuation of UNC elements from northeastern Korea, the brigade was able to consolidate its forces with other stragglers and remnants and proceeded as the 24th Division under the IV Corps towards the Hungnam Perimeter. Following the evacuation of the Hungnam area by UNC elements, the division proceeded to the Wonsan area where it again took up coastal defense positions. In February 1951 the division was placed under VII Corps, which had then arrived in the area.

During 1951 the 24th Division remained in the Wonsan area from the vicinity of Kojo north to Hodo Peninsula and, while receiving additional equipment and personnel, prepared defenses against possible UN amphibious landing. In June 1951 the 24th Division received a tank battalion from the 105th Tank Division to assist in its defensive mission. Then in October 1951, the 24th Division was again reorganized as a brigade and then redesignated as the 24th Mechanized Artillery Brigade. The only mechanized unit of the brigade is the tank battalion. The basic organization of the brigade consists of six motorized artillery battalions, and is designated as a coastal defense unit.

As of July 1952 the brigade continued to defend the coast in the Wonsan area under control of VII Corps.

25TH MECHANIZED ARTILLERY BRIGADE

The origin of the brigade is obscure since there have been no reports emanating directly from the unit. However, a 25th Coastal Defense Brigade was activated at Chinnampo in July 1950 and was subsequently organized in the Chorwon area during August and September 1950. The brigade was initially committed in the Seoul area during September, but was forced to withdraw before the UNC advance. The brigade was last contacted in October 1950 in the northwest sector. The brigade was previously believed to have been inactivated, however, recent reliable reports place the brigade in the area formerly occupied by the 63d (507th) Brigade from Hodo Peninsula on the east coast north to the vicinity of Hungnam. It was reorganized into a mechanized artillery brigade in October 1951, similarly to the 24th and 26th Mechanized Artillery Brigades. The mission of the brigade is to defend the coastal areas against possible UN amphibious invasion attempts.

26TH MECHANIZED ARTILLERY BRIGADE

The 26th Brigade was organized during August 1950 at Namchonjom. In September 1950 the brigade moved south but was met by superior UNC forces and was forced to withdraw to the Yalu River border region, where remnants of the brigade and the 571st Regiment were combined with other replacement troops in order to reconstitute the brigade. In early December 1950 the brigade departed from the Manpojin area and proceeded south behind the advancing Chinese Communist Forces. By the end of December 1950 the brigade had reached the Pyongyang area and began to take up coastal defense positions west and southwest of Pyongyang. By mid-January 1951 the headquarters

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of the brigade had been set up in the Pyongyang area.

While en route to Pyongyang, the brigade became subordinate to IV Corps, whose area of responsibility included that of the 26th Brigade. In October 1951 the brigade, originally an infantry brigade, was reorganized as a mechanized artillery brigade together with the 24th and 25th Mechanized Artillery Brigades. The brigade currently maintains coastal defense positions from the Chinnampo area north to the vicinity of Hanchon. Although the brigade has been designated a mechanized artillery brigade, it is actually a coastal defense brigade as it was intended to be when it was activated under the Naval Headquarters at Chinnampo.

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SECTION VI

ORGANIZATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN ARMY

1. Ministry of National Defense: (Chart No. 1) In February 1948, the draft of the Korean constitution was adopted by the Fourth Session of the People's Assembly of which Article 98 provided for the formation of the Ministry of National Defense. This constitution was not adopted officially until early September 1948; however, for all practical purposes, the Ministry of National Defense was functioning and had been for some time under its mask of Peace Preservation Officers' Training Bureau. With the official announcement of the activation of the "People's Army" on 8 February 1948, it shed further evidence that a ministry was also in effect and controlling the armed forces.

2. General Headquarters, North Korean Army: The GHQ, NKA, planned and directed the fighting from Pyongyang during the early stages of the present conflict but the advance of the North Korean Army into South Korea necessitated the establishment of a Front Headquarters to control the fighting of I and II Corps. As UNC forces advanced into North Korea after the breakthrough from the Pusan Perimeter, GHQ retreated to Manchuria for sanctuary and the reorganization of the North Korean Army. During the early part of December 1950, GHQ returned to Korea and was re-established in its present location in the Pyongyang area.

Presently, this headquarters, constitutes the principal echelon of command for the North Korean Armed Forces. Under direct control of GHQ, NKA, are the following: (Chart No. 1a) Front Headquarters; Corps in reserve; and various non-organic service and tactical support organizations. However, this headquarters is subordinate to the Headquarters CCF in Korea. Although another echelon referred to as the "Combined Headquarters," reportedly commanded by a North Korean and exerting control over the CCF and NKA, has been identified; it is considered probable that it is merely a liaison center for the purpose of closer coordination between the two forces.

3. North Korean Army Front Headquarters: (Chart No. 2) This headquarters was first reported as being in Seoul during July 1950. It directed the fighting of the I and II Corps, and upon the advance of the North Korean Army to the general areas around the Pusan Perimeter, a command echelon of this headquarters displaced to Kumchon leaving the rear headquarters in Seoul. Although its movement during late 1950 is obscure, reports indicate that the commander and staff did not retreat in September 1950 but stayed in the Yangdok-Kumhwa area with remnants of the II Corps and directed the guerrilla activities on UNC lines of communication. This headquarters was not firmly identified again until mid-June 1951. The Front Headquarters was then controlling the II, III, V and VII Corps in the east.

Presently, the highest tactical echelon of command, within the North Korean Army is this Front Headquarters. Normally consisting of three to four Corps of three divisions each, this organization is of Soviet origin and corresponds to an army group in military forces of other nations. This headquarters is essentially a wartime organization and is normally disbanded as soon as its strategic or operational mission is completed.

The subordinate Corps may be transferred for operational control from the Front Headquarters to GHQ, NKA, and vice versa, dependent upon exigencies of the situation.


Next in the chain of command is the division, considered to be the basic tactical formation with three infantry regiments and one artillery regiment. It is noteworthy that a division may be transferred to another Corps, unlike the CCF.

Presently, the I, II and III Corps, all in the eastern sector are under operational control of the Front Headquarters, while the IV, V and VII are under direct control of General Headquarters.

4. North Korean Army Tactical Organization: (Charts 3 through 9)


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NORTH KOREAN ARMY



(1) ATTACHED **IV CORPS**
 (2) COMPOSITION UNKNOWN, POSSIBLY INACTIVATED


ARMY FRONT HEADQUARTERS



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CORPS HEADQUARTERS

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
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C/S STAFF SECTION


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CORPS ARTY CMDR ARTILLERY SECTION


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
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
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
CORPS POLITICAL SECTION



CORPS ARTILLERY SECTION



CORPS STAFF SECTION



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CORPS REAR SERVICES SECTION


REAR SERVICES

STAFF SECTIONS


SERVICE UNITS

- ORGANIZATION & PLANNING
- ADMINISTRATION
- PROVISIONS
- CLOTHING
- ORDNANCE
- FOOD SERVICE

- TRANSPORTATION
- INTENDANCE & FINANCE
- VEHICLE MAINTENANCE
- ROAD MAINTENANCE
- MEDICAL
- FUEL



FIELD HOSPITAL




EVAC


Security Information

CHART No 3b


INFANTRY DIVISION




INFANTRY DIVISION HEADQUARTERS




DIVISION AA BATTALION




DIVISION AT BATTALION




DIVISION ENGR BN





DIVISION RCN BN





DIVISION REAR SVC SEC





Security Information


INFANTRY REGIMENT
STATISTICAL TABLE STRENGTH AND WEAPONS

NO.	ORGANIC UNITS	STRENGTH		PISTOL	RIFLE	SUB-MACHINE GUN	LMG 7.62 MM	H M.G 7.62 MM	ANTI-TANK RIFLE 14.5MM	ANTI-TANK GUN 45MM	MORTAR 82 MM	MORTAR 120 MM	AA MACHINE GUN 12.7 MM	76 MM HOW
		OFF	EM											
1	REGTL HQ	36	152	36	122									
2	INFANTRY BN	43	579	69	445	81	27	15	9	2	9			
3	INFANTRY BN	43	579	69	445	81	27	15	9	2	9			
4	INFANTRY BN	43	579	69	445	81	27	15	9	2	9			
5	ARTILLERY CO	5	73	5	66	7								4
6	120 MM MORTAR CO	5	63	11	48	9					6			
7	AT GUN CO	5	54	11	40	8				6				
8	SMG CO	5	83	5		83								
9	ENGINEER CO	4	71	4	62	9								
10	SIGNAL CO	5	69	5	63	6								
11	AAMG PLAT	1	43	1	43								6	
12	GUARD PLAT	1	23	1		23								
13	RECONNAISSANCE PLAT	1	25			26								
14														
	TOTAL	197	2393	286	1779	414	81	45	27	12	27	6	6	4


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CHART 5d

INFANTRY REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS




REGIMENTAL ARTILLERY CO




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REGIMENTAL MORTAR CO




REGIMENTAL ANTITANK CO




~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGIMENTAL ENGR CO




REGIMENTAL SMG CO




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REGIMENTAL AAMG PLAT


REGIMENTAL SIGNAL CO




REGIMENTAL GUARD PLAT




REGIMENTAL RCN PLAT



REGIMENTAL MEDICAL SECTION




INFANTRY BATTALION




INFANTRY BATTALION

STATISTICAL TABLE STRENGTH AND WEAPONS


NO	ORGANIC UNITS	STRENGTH		PISTOL	RIFLE	SUB-MACHINE GUN	L M G 7.62 MM	H M G 7.62 MM	ANTI-TANK RIFLE 14.5 MM	ANTI-TANK GUN 45 MM	MORTAR 82 MM	GUN 76 MM	GUN 122 MM
		OFF	EM										
1	INFANTRY CO	6	119	8	85	23	9	2					
2	INFANTRY CO	6	119	8	85	23	9	2					
3	INFANTRY CO	6	119	8	85	23	9	2					
4	HMG CO	5	62	14	44	9		9					
5	MORTAR CO	5	76	14	67						9		
6	AT PLATOON	1	15	3	13					2			
7	ATR PLATOON	1	22	1	22				9				
8	MEDICAL PLATOON	1	18	1	18								
9	SUPPLY PLATOON	1	10	1	9	1							
10	SIGNAL PLATOON	1	15	1	13	2							
11	BATTALION HEADQUARTERS	10	4	10	4								
12													
13													
14													
	TOTALS	43	579	69	445	81	27	15	9	2	9		




BATTALION MEDICAL PLATOON




BATTALION SIGNAL PLATOON




AT GUN PLATOON




AT RIFLE PLATOON



BATTALION MORTAR CO.



DIVISION ARTILLERY REGIMENT




ARTILLERY REGIMENT
STATISTICAL TABLE, STRENGTH AND WEAPONS


NO.	ORGANIC UNITS	STRENGTH		PISTOL	RIFLE	PPSH SUB-MACHINE GUN	LIGHT MACHINE GUN 7.62 MM	HEAVY MACHINE GUN 7.62 MM	GUN 76 MM	GUN 122 MM
		OFF	EM							
1	REGT'L HQ	28	77	28	69	8				
2	76 MM BN	29	263	44	218	24	6		12	
3	76 MM BN	29	263	44	218	24	6		12	
4	122 MM BN	29	263	44	218	24	6			12
5										
6										
7										
8										
9										
10										
11										
12										
13										
14										
TOTALS		1115	8666	160	723	80	18		24	12

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ARTILLERY REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS




ARTILLERY BN (76mm / 122mm)




~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ARTILLERY REGIMENTAL COMMAND CO. ARTILLERY FIRING BATTERY (76 mm / 122 mm)



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TYPICAL MECZ INF DIVISION




ACTUAL STRENGTH

10th MECZ INF DIV:

45mm GUN	36
76mm GUN/HOW	32
122 mm HOW	12
T-34/85 TANK	34
82 mm MORT	36
120mm MORT	12
7.62 mm HMG	72
12.7 mm AAMG	12
37 mm AAG	12

TYPICAL TANK DIVISION




ACTUAL STRENGTH

105th TANK DIV:

T-34/85 TANK	144
SU-76 SP GUN	44
12.7 mm AAMG	12
37 mm AAG	12

TYPICAL MECZ ARTY BRIG



ACTUAL STRENGTH

	45mm AT GUN	76mm GUN	107mm GUN	122mm GUN	155mm HOW	T-34/85 TANK	SU-76mm SP GUN	82mm Mortar	120mm Mortar	7.62mm HMG	12.7mm AAMG
24th MECZ ARTY BRIG	12	48	17	-	4	12	6	.42	12	72	36
25th MECZ ARTY BRIG	12	48	-	24	-	8	10	42	12	72	36
26th MECZ ARTY BRIG	12	51	-	24	-	8	10	42	12	72	36

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SECTION VII

UNIT CODE DESIGNATIONS AND COMMANDERS;
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF KEY PERSONALITIES

1. Unit Code Designations and Commanders:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CODES</u>	<u>COMMANDERS</u>
I CORPS	169	LEE Kwon Mu
8th Division	415	KIM Pong Mun
81st Regt	417	PAEK Hak Nae
82d Regt	418	KIM Hak Man
83d Regt	421	O Yun Sop
Artillery Regt	419	KIM Yong Hyon
9th Division	315	SOK Chung Guk
85th Regt	317	HYONG Chung Yil
86th Regt	319	TAE Kyong Uk
87th Regt	321	KIM Tae Mo
Artillery Regt	323	HO In Taek
47th Division	361	PAIL Nak Chul
2d Regt	367	LEE Sung Jun
3d Regt	393	CHONG Nak Hyon
4th Regt	368	CHONG Hoe Sok
Artillery Regt	369	KU Yun So
II CORPS	179	CHOE Hyon
2d Division	235	LEE Chol Yong
4th Regt	238	KIM Song
6th Regt	244	KIM Chong Mom
17th Regt	247	KIM Pong Chol
Artillery Regt	253	LEE Kum Nam
13th Division	715	CHONG Pyong Kap
19th Regt	717	LEE Chong Hwa
21st Regt	719	HAN Tae Song
23d Regt	721	CHO Ban Kil
Artillery Regt	723	KIM Kwang Jin
27th Division	772	CHO Kwang
7th Regt	172	TANG Tong Hi
14th Regt	173	LEE Ki Wun
32d Regt	174	LEE Won Son
Artillery Regt	407	KIM Ki Ho
III CORPS	259	YU Kyong Su
1st Division	115	CHONG Pom
2d Regt	127	KANG Chong Su
3d Regt	133	KIM Kyong Mo
14th Regt	117	KO Ki Hwan
Artillery Regt	139	

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15th Division	775	CHU Yon
45th Regt	777	CHO Chang Ho
48th Regt	779	HONG Il Yong
50th Regt	781	HAN Chang Dak
Artillery Regt	783	YU Sung Pil
45th Division	696	CHOE Pyong Hak
89th Regt	581	KIM Chol Won
90th Regt	704	CHOE Chu Won
91st Regt	705	KIM Ho
Artillery Regt	706	SONG Chong Yon
IV CORPS	269	PAK Chong Dok
4th Division	485	SONG Tok Man
5th Regt	241	CHOE Pong Chun
18th Regt	661	PAK Yong Son
29th Regt	657	CHOE Man Bok
Artillery Regt	496	CHUNG Do Ho
5th Division	615	KIM Chang Dok
10th Regt	617	KYE U Song
11th Regt	619	PAK Choe In
12th Regt	621	WANG Hwi
Artillery Regt	623	HA Ching Dong
10th Mecz Inf Div	745	LEE Pang Nam
25th Regt	747	KIM Chol Man
27th Regt	749	LO Myong Peng
107th Tank Regt	751	KANG Chin
160th Arty Regt	753	CHANG Ki Yul
105th Tank Division	105	SONG Yong Sil
1st Tk Regt	107	CHOE Yong Chol
2d Tk Regt	109	KIM Yong Han
3d Tk Regt	203	CHOE Ul Sok
208th Armor Trng Regt	208	KIM In Chol
21st Brigade	579	
23d Brigade	239	OH Paek Yong
26th Mecz Arty Brigade	264 (226)	SONG In Sop
V NK CORPS	327	PANG Ho San
6th Division	655	CHAE Bong Chon
1st Regt	659	LEE Chong Sik
13th Regt	657	KWON Sun Ik
15th Regt	661	PAK Pyong Yong
Artillery Regt	663	HONG Se Ung
12th Division	825	CHOE Am Lim
30th Regt	827	LEE Choe Hak
31st Regt	829	KIM Song In
32d Regt	831	PAK Yong
Artillery Regt	405	SONG Hun Sam

46th Division	407	CHOE Won
93d Regt	158	KIM Chang Gwon
94th Regt	159	LEE Bong Lim
95th Regt	160	LI Ung Pyo
Artillery Regt		
25th Mecz Arty Brigade	507 (632)	KIM Yo Man
VII CORPS		
3d Division	324	LEE Yong Ho
7th Regt	362	O Chin U
8th Regt	389	HAN Chang Bong
9th Regt	383	KIM Chin Dong
Artillery Regt	377	KIM Man Sik
	371	AN Pyon Gol
7th Division	625	LEE Ik Son
51st Regt	627	LEE Tong Hyon
53d Regt	629	CHOE Tong Su
54th Regt	631	PAK Ka Yong
Artillery Regt		LEE Kol Chae
37th Division	842	HA Chin Tong
74th Regt	604	KIM Yong Il
75th Regt	605	HAN Sok Ho
76th Regt	606	LEE Myong Il
Artillery Regt	607	CHOE O Chol
24th Mecz Arty Brigade	249	KIM Song Guk

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2. Biographical Sketches of Key Personalities:

a. KIM Il Sung, Premier of North Korea and Commander-in-Chief of the North Korean Armed Forces, is North Korea's top Communist and an imposter. His real name is KIM Sung Chu. The following condensed biography has been prepared from all available sources; however, reliable information about a person who has made a deliberate attempt to conceal his origins and indeed his whole life before 1945 is understandingly difficult to obtain. The situation is further complicated by a long and almost completely fabricated official biography of KIM issued by the Communist Government of North Korea.

The real KIM Il Sung, who is revered by all Koreans, was born in 1885 and, had he lived, he would be 67 years old today. He was the second son of KIM Chun Han, whose home was in South Kyongsan Province, Korea. When quite young he went to Japan, eventually entering the Military Academy. Before graduating, he returned to Korea and became a guerrilla leader. His classmates in the Military Academy, all of whom were colonels or generals at the time of the Japanese Surrender, say that he showed great ability as a tactician. His raids against the Japanese forces in Korea became legendary. Eventually, he was forced to flee to Manchuria, where he continued his successes, being known to the Japanese as "The Tiger of Chang Pek San" (a mountain where he made his headquarters). He died in Manchuria in the spring of 1935.

KIM Sung Chu, now known as KIM Il Sung, was born in April 1910, the eldest son of a farmer named KIM Hung Jin. He had two younger brothers. His father took part in the 1918 uprising against the Japanese in Seoul, was caught and placed in jail, where he eventually died. KIM and his two brothers fled to Manchuria, where he attended a middle school in Kirin, but did not graduate. He left school in 1929 and joined the Communist Party and was local secretary in Kirin of the Communist Young Man's League in East Manchuria. At this time he started his career as a guerrilla leader, and for some time was in the army of WU I-Cheng during the early 1930's. Korean guerrillas were then very active in eastern Manchuria. He was undoubtedly a very able guerrilla, and thus came to the attention of the real KIM Il Sung. The younger KIM was active in arranging an alliance with the North Manchurian forces, and in 1936 an allied anti-Japanese force was established. The Second and Sixth Corps of this guerrilla army appear to have been composed of Koreans. He became commander of the Sixth Corps in 1938 and was very active in guerrilla operations until 1939, when he was driven out by the Japanese and fled to Soviet territory. Definite information about his actions during his stay in the USSR is lacking; there are unconfirmed stories that he attended a Soviet military academy, was commissioned a captain, and actually took part in the defense of Stalingrad, being decorated for his services there.

In August 1945, KIM Sung Chu returned to North Korea with the Russians as a captain in the Russian Army. He cultivated CHO Man Sik, an able Korean Nationalist and the most respected non-Communist leader in North Korea, telling him privately that he, KIM, was a fervent nationalist and did not believe in some of the Communist plans for Korea. Taken in, CHO introduced KIM at a liberation celebration in Pyongyang on 3 October 1945, as KIM Il Sung, describing him as an ardent Korean patriot and nationalist. CHO's reputation assured KIM of an enthusiastic reception from the general public, which did not stop to consider that the real KIM Il Sung must have been a much older man.

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KIM became immediately popular, and later the same month, with full Soviet support, obtained leadership of the party from the local North Korean Communists and from the titular head of the Korean Communist Party, PAK Hon Yong. The latter returned to South Korea. The old Korean revolutionaries and nationalists soon found themselves out in the cold, and they were used and discarded at will. With KIM Il Sung as head of the party and the North Korean state apparatus, Soviet-Koreans and Soviet-trained fellow partisans of KIM infiltrated the Communist Party organization and the national and provincial state administration. Thus, the Soviets maintained control without using many Russian advisers.

When the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea was set up in February 1946, he announced the 20-point political program as its chairman. In July, KIM Il Sung was elected Chairman of the North Korean Democratic and Racial Unity Front. The Provisional People's Committee was reorganized into the People's Committee in 1947, and he retained the chairmanship, later publishing the people's economic program for the fiscal year 1947. When the members of the Korean Committee of the United Nations came to Korea in January 1948, he was chosen as one of the nine political leaders to be consulted, but he did not meet them. With the establishment of the North Korean Government on 8 September 1948, he was elected to the post of Premier of the Cabinet, the head of the executive organ. In February-March 1949, he went to Moscow, and concluded agreements for increased economic and cultural aid. In January 1950, he is said to have married a daughter of HONG Myong Hui, a Vice Premier of the North Korean Regime. On 4 July 1950, he was appointed Commander in Chief, North Korean Armed Forces, by the Presidium of the North Korean Government.

Non-Communists who know KIM personally describe him as a roughneck, poorly-educated, poor at languages, with little administrative ability. He is, however, an able and ruthless guerrilla leader.

b. Marshall CHOE Yong Gun, Minister of National Defense and Deputy Commander in Chief of the North Korean Armed Forces was born in Yongchon, Korea, at the turn of the century. He was educated at the Osan High School at Chongju. Following a series of student strikes of which he was a ring leader, he went to China in 1925 and allegedly attended the Whampoa Military Academy at Nanking and the Yen-an Military School. Upon leaving the Yen-an School, CHOE joined the Chinese Communists.

CHOE served in the 8th Route Army and also as a political instructor at the Yen-an School, and was active in the Korean Independence Alliance subsequent to 1937. In November 1941, he became commander of the Korean Volunteer Army, which was originally formed at Yen-an. During the period 1941 to 1945, he fought with the Korean Volunteer Army against the Japanese in Manchuria.

He returned to North Korea in October 1945 and in 1946 became commander of the Cadre Training Center, North Korean Security Forces. He became the first Commander in Chief of the North Korean Armed Forces upon its activation in February 1948 and was generally regarded as its creator. In August 1948, he was elected to the Supreme People's Council, North Korean Government, and in September 1948 became Minister of National Defense, a post he still holds.

Meanwhile he was also active in politics. In 1946, the Korean Communist Party sent CHOE and KIM Chaek to seize leadership of the North

Korean Democratic Party. The party leader, CHO, Man Sik, was arrested on trumped up charges and CHOE became the new leader. CHOE was generally believed not to have been a member either of the Korean Communist Party or its successor, the North Korean Labor Party. Although a Chinese Communist Party member, he has never been regarded as an all-out Communist and his failure to join the North Korean Labor Party has been a serious handicap to his career.

In his capacity as Commander in Chief of the North Korean Armed Forces, CHOE was opposed to the invasion of South Korea and to the new group of Soviet military advisors who came in December 1949 to prepare the North Korean Armed Forces for war. During this period KANG Kon was Chief of Staff of the North Korean Armed Forces. Although he had maintained excellent relations with his previous Soviet advisor, CHOE was cool toward Lt Gen Vasilev, the new senior advisor to the Ministry of National Defense. CHOE procrastinated with the new combat training and re-equipment program until March 1950 when Vasilev began bypassing him to take direct charge of these programs.

CHOE took little part in these preparations. He became a member of the North Korean Military Council in July 1950 but took no active role in directing operations, contenting himself with handling replacement problems.

Upon retreat of the armed forces into Manchuria in November 1950, a GHQ Advance was organized and left behind in North Korea. CHOE was in command of this forward echelon of GHQ. The advance headquarters conscripted, equipped and trained newly drafted recruits and organized new units with these men and the remnants of the defeated North Korean Armed Forces. CHOE, who had originally created the Armed Forces, did a good job of breathing new life and spirit into his beaten force. LEE Sang Cho was his Chief of Staff during this period.

CHOE is a tough, rock-hard personality who can and sometimes has been ruthless, when necessary. However, he is normally kind and considerate and deeply and constantly concerned about the welfare of his men at all levels. He demands and receives immediate and unquestioning obedience. His manner is always reserved and dignified; he has never been known to unbend. He is a most respected figure in the armed forces, and regarded by some people as its true leader rather than KIM, Il Sung. Able and intelligent, he is rated as a top strategist, commander and administrator.

Although CHOE and KIM, Il Sung got along well before the war, they became cool toward each other by mid-1950.

In spite of his opposition to present North Korean policies, CHOE is still a potent influence in the North Korean high command. In times of crisis - the defense of Seoul and the rebuilding of the armed forces - CHOE was called on to take command. With his prestige and ability, he could not be dispensed with. His prestige extends to the peasantry and even into the ranks of those violently opposed to the regime. He has never been the target of assassination plots; however, he has suffered the penalty of obscurity.

Although no conservative, CHOE is generally regarded as a nationalist rather than a Communist. If he had been selected as the senior North Korean delegate to the ceasefire negotiations, it would have signified a genuine intent of the Communists to reach an early and equitable settlement in Korea.

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c. NAM Il (alias NAM Song Il; NAM Sung Il; PAK Song Il), Chief North Korean delegate to Panmunjom, Vice Premier, and Chief of Staff, North Korean Armed Forces, has spent practically all of his life in exile from his native Korea, and the details of his background are extremely difficult to confirm. However, two facts about him do emerge: (1) he is the most completely Russianized of any of the top North Korean leaders, and (2) he would appear to be KIM Il Sung's closest and oldest friend.

Although there has been indications that NAM Il was not born in Korea but came from some Korean group inside the USSR, the best evidence is that he was born in Hoeryong, North Hamyong Province, Korea, in 1911. With his parents, he fled to Manchuria late in 1918 or early in 1919, and they seem to have settled in Kirin, Manchuria, where he later attended the middle school. Unlike KIM, who left this same middle school without graduating and became an active guerrilla, NAM Il graduated. His parents died, and he joined the Kirin branch of the Communist Young Man's League as a clerk.

When the Japanese Kwantung Army took over Manchuria in 1932, KIM Il Sung continued his guerrilla career. NAM Il, however, desired more education, and entered the USSR, finding his way to Smolensk, an old city on the Dneiper River, some distance west of Moscow. How he managed to find his way all across Siberia and most of Russia is not known. He stayed in Smolensk for 10 years, attending the local gymnasium (college) and later a military academy. It is reported, but not confirmed, that he served as an instructor in this military academy.

When Germany attacked Russia, NAM Il entered the Soviet Army. There is no certain knowledge of his military career, but it is said that he was with KIM Il Sung at the siege of Stalingrad. Whatever his military attainments, he was certainly not lacking in scholastic ability, for he now speaks English, Russian and Chinese in addition to his native Korean.

NAM Il was still in the Russian Army when he returned to Korea, either with or soon after KIM Il Sung, in August, 1945. At that time he was a captain. From 20 March 1946 until 9 May 1946, he was in Seoul attending the USSR-US Joint Commission as an interpreter-translator. It is believed that soon after this conference he went on a reserve status in the Russian Army, and in July 1946, he appeared as president of the North Korean Teacher's League, and shortly afterward he became a member of the General Society of Letters, which had strong Communist political connections. As a Korean Labor Party candidate, he was elected to the Supreme People's Council in August 1948, and the next month, Vice-Minister of Education. In this post, he controlled military education as well.

During this period, NAM Il assiduously cultivated the Russian advisers, with whom he was very popular. He also continued his close association with his old school-mate, KIM Il Sung, who became Premier of North Korea in September 1948. Although he was disliked by the old-line Korean Communists (he has an overbearing, supercilious manner), his political foundations seem to have been secure enough.

When the "People's Army" was formed, he does not seem to have had any military assignment, but toward the end of 1948 he received the rank of colonel, and in 1949 appears to have had some military duties, probably on the staff at Pyongyang. From his background, these duties may well have been connected with military education, founding of military schools, etc. There is also mention of a command assignment in Pyongyang.

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In June 1950, when the North Koreans attacked South Korea, NAM Il was a major-general. He was a lieutenant-general in September 1950, and became Chief of Staff of the North Korean Armed Forces on 14 January 1951. In addition to his post of Chief North Korean Delegate to the Panmunjon Conference, he is Vice-Premier and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

Large for an Oriental, NAM Il makes an impressive appearance, although he has been getting a little too portly lately. He is always meticulously turned out, shining boots, sharply pressed uniform, drives around in a large black Chrysler (probably looted from Seoul) with a uniformed chauffeur. His appearance, mannerisms and demeanor are so thoroughly Russian that some Allied newsmen have claimed that he was one. He is stern, grim-looking, and gives the appearance of knowing a great deal. His detractors claim that this is simply cover for a really monumental ignorance of things military. According to Alan Winnington, Correspondent for the Communist London "Daily Worker," NAM Il gets along well with the Chinese at social affairs, and is an accomplished dancer. None of the Allied newsmen have ever been able to get NAM Il to speak to them in English. He is a vigorous and fluent speaker, and probably his ranting style is considered effective by his Russian masters.

d. Lieutenant General KIM Ung, Commander of the North Korean Front Headquarters, was born in North Kyongsang Province, Korea, circa 1910 and was graduated from Kumchon Commercial School in Korea and then from the Whampo Military Academy in China.

KIM received some military training in Siberia and then served with the 8th Route Army in North China. He became famous for a daring feat accomplished in 1939 or 1940, when he tossed hand grenades into a conference of Japanese Army generals at Peiping causing numerous casualties, and then made his escape. He eventually became an 8th Route Army brigade or division commander.

He came to North Korea in 1946 and in December 1946 became Deputy Commander, Cadre Training Battalion, North Korean Security Forces. In 1947, he was a regimental commander in the security forces and in February 1948 became Chief, Combat Training Bureau, North Korean Armed Forces, and continued as bureau chief when the bureau became part of the Ministry of National Defense. Despite his ability and experience, his rise was relatively slow because of his CCF background. However, as chief of combat training, he began to favor Soviet tactics over those of the CCF and gradually came to be identified with the Soviet faction in the North Korean Armed Forces. As of 24 March 1948, he commanded the 1st Division.

KIM commanded I Corps when it struck across the parallel on 25 June 1950. The capture of Taejon was a bright feather in his cap and his failure to break through to Taegu has not been held against him. On 8 September 1950, he became Chief of Staff, Front Headquarters, having succeeded KANG Kon who was killed. In February 1951, he became Commander, Front Headquarters, following the death of KIM Chaek.

KIM is rated the ablest of the now active field commanders. He is a crack tactician, good on the offensive and a little weak on the defense but rapidly learning. He is energetic and harsh; a driving demanding type, tough on his subordinates and feared rather than respected. He has had trouble with his Corps commanders, as many of them were once his superiors. Some military personnel feel rather grudgingly that KIM needs and deserves another star. It is also expected that he will be the next

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Chief of Staff, North Korean Armed Forces, a position currently held by NAM Il, and that he is likely to restore the power and prestige of that office. KIM is said to be a friend of KIM Il Sung, however, his interests are strictly military.

e. Lieutenant General KIM Kwang Hyop, is Chief of Staff of the North Korean Front Headquarters. He is about forty years old, presents a pleasant manner and is reported fluent in the Russian language; however, little else is known about KIM's personality and background, or for that matter, his rapid rise through the ranks of the North Korean Armed Forces.

Reports indicate that KIM spent some time in China/Manchuria prior to the end of World War II. He allegedly served in the Anti-Japanese Army, and as a lieutenant in the Independent Brigade in the Mutang-chiang District after the war's end. Following KANG Kon's return to Korea in August 1946, he became commander of the East Kirin Peace Preservation Army. KIM returned to Korea in August 1947 and took over command of the 3d Independent Brigade from YU Kyong Su. In September 1948, he was appointed commander of the 3d Division.

At the outbreak of the war in June 1950, KIM was Commander of II Corps. By 10 July 1950, however, he was relieved for inefficiency and reduced to the position of Chief of Staff, II Corps. Then, about a week later, he was reassigned as commander of the 1st Division. In October 1950, he was appointed commander of the III Corps.

In January 1951, KIM was wounded and subsequently replaced by YU Kyong Su. In February 1951, upon the death of KIM Chaek, commander of the North Korean Front Headquarters, KIM Kwang Hyop was appointed Chief of Staff of the Front Headquarters, relieving KIM Ung, who moved up to replace KIM Chaek as commander.

f. Lieutenant General LEE Kwon Mu, Commander of I Corps, was born in Yenchi, Manchuria, in 1910 and remained in Manchuria throughout most of his early life. He fought with the anti-Japanese army. In 1934, LEE went to the Soviet Union to attend a university, but reportedly was sent to Yenchi, China, to serve in the Communist 8th Route Army. Some reports indicate he was a lieutenant in the Soviet Army in World War II. Following World War II, he became Chief of Staff of the Korean Volunteer Army's 5th Detachment.

In May 1946, LEE returned to Korea to head the Peace Preservation Department of Pyongan Namdo. In September 1946, he was appointed commander of the newly organized 1st Regiment, 1st Division, and in April of 1948, he became commander of the 3d Independent Brigade.

LEE reportedly returned to the Soviet Union in June 1948 to attend school. Upon his return he replaced KANG Kon as Chief of Staff of the North Korean Armed Forces while KANG went to the Soviet Union.

Following KANG's return from the USSR, LEE was relieved of all his official duties, allegedly for having displayed discontent over having a political office. He was recalled to duty shortly thereafter, reportedly upon KIM Il Sung's personal order, and at the time of the invasion of South Korea, was in command of the 4th Division. For his action while in command of the 4th Division, LEE was presented the highest honor, the "Hero of the Korean Democratic Peoples' Republic," with a concurrent award, the "Order of the National Flag, 1st Class."

On 8 September 1950, LEE was appointed commander of I Corps in place of KIM Ung who became Chief of Staff of Front Headquarters.

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LEE is considered to be fair-minded, friendly, intelligent, capable, and modest and affable in manner. He is a conscientious and painstaking commander. His troops are well-trained and his operational plans are prepared clearly and well executed. He is a physically active man who dislikes paper work.

LEE is a born soldier, an excellent tactician and natural fighter but possibly not at his best above divisional level. At any rate, his CCF background under present conditions, would seem to bar him from further advancement.

g. Lieutenant General CHOE Hyon, Commander of II Corps, was born in Hamyong Province, North Korea, circa 1905. In the late 1920's, CHOE went from Korea to Manchuria, where he joined a guerrilla - bandit force. About 1938, he went to the USSR, served in the Red Army during World War II and returned to North Korea in 1945 as a company grade officer with the Soviet forces. Joining the North Korean Security Forces in 1946, he became commander of the Border Constabulary on the 38th Parallel in August 1948.

On 30 June 1950, CHOE assumed command of the 2d Division from LEE Chong Song who was relieved of command for inefficiency in the battle of Chunchon. On 8 September 1950, CHOE assumed command of II Corps from MU Chong who had previously relieved KIM Hwang Hyop. KIM had been relieved and demoted to Chief of Staff of II Corps because of his constant failure to meet the schedules set for the advance of II Corps.

CHOE has the reputation of being the most brutal and ruthless man in the North Korean Armed Forces. When entering North Korea at Manpojin with the Soviet forces in 1945, he was said to have killed a Korean sawmill manager for talking back to him. During the North Korean retreat in September 1950, he personally killed a number of officers who had failed to carry out orders. His manner is harsh, overbearing and gangster-like.

Despite his near illiteracy, CHOE is very shrewd and a fast thinker, with a remarkable talent for retaining facts. He has a tremendous capacity for work. He makes up for his deficiencies in military knowledge by being thorough and painstaking, using the whiplash of fear to get the most out of his subordinates. He is partial to guerrilla-type tactics, emphasizing feints, surprises and unorthodox fighting. He has a good reputation and record as a combat commander and is rated as a fine tactician, being considered among the ablest of the Corps commanders.

Aside from his shortcomings in military knowledge, he possesses a serious weakness in that he has a tendency to get rattled under pressure at times. On 20 September 1950, in a telephong conversation between CHOE and KIM Chaek, Commander, Front Headquarters, CHOE was ordered to hold a town against UNC forces. During the conversation, CHOE apparently frantic and losing his head, demanded 500 SMGs, a quantity of weapons which he surely knew was not available.

CHOE is resented by army personnel but respected by former Security Forces' troops who are proud of their old commander for having made good in the army.

CHOE has the complete trust and support of the USSR. He has shown a certain arrogance toward higher ranking North Korean generals and

officials who both fear and hate him. He is not a political figure and as a military man, his obvious lack of knowledge of strategy and higher command problems would seem to bar him from rising any higher. He could come to the fore only in the event of a hopeless last-ditch fight.

h. Lieutenant General YU Kyong Su, Commander of III Corps was born in Yenchi, Manchuria, circa 1905.

YU was graduated from a Red Army tank school about 1938. During World War II, he was a company grade officer in a Soviet tank unit. He came to North Korea in 1946 and in 1947 was commanding officer of the 4th Regiment of the Security Forces. In 1948, he became commander of the 15th Tank Regiment, continuing in command as it became the 105th Tank Brigade and finally the 105th Tank Division. On 10 July 1950, when the 105th Tank Brigade was elevated to a division and awarded the honorary title of "Seoul" Division for its operation in the capture of that city, YU, as division commander, received the North Korean Armed Forces' highest decoration, the "Hero of the Korean Democratic Peoples' Republic," with a concurrent award, the "Order of the National Flag, 1st Class."

In September 1950, major elements of the 105th Tank Division were encircled by UNC forces. Most of the tanks were lost but many of the men managed to escape. Despite this YU was named III Corps commander in January 1951 when its commander KIM Kwang Hyop was wounded and subsequently appointed Chief of Staff of Front Headquarters. As a field commander, his reputation is rather poor and he is rated at or near the bottom among Corps commanders. The possibility exists that he may currently be chief of the Armored Branch. YU is married to KIM Il Sung's sister.

i. Lieutenant General PAK Chong Dok, is Commander of IV Corps. Little is known of his early history. During Chinese Communist operations in Manchuria, he commanded the 490th Regiment of the all-Korean 164th Division, 55th Chinese Communist Army. The division entered Korea in July 1949 and was redesignated as the 5th Division in August 1949. During the invasion of South Korea, PAK commanded the 10th (formerly the Chinese Communist 490th) Regiment, 5th Division. Then, just prior to the UNC breakthrough from the Pusan Perimeter in September 1950, he was placed in command of the 4th Division, which subsequently remained behind UNC lines to conduct guerrilla warfare in the Yonchon and Chorwon areas. For this, he was awarded, "Order of the National Flag, 2d Class."

PAK was assigned to his present position as Commander of the IV Corps on 17 January 1951.

j. Lieutenant General PANG Ho Son, Commander of V Corps was born in Hangyong Namdo, Korea, circa 1910. PANG joined the 8th Route Army in the 1930's. Eventually PANG rose to the position of division political commissar of the all-Korean 166th Division, 56th Chinese Communist Army. When the 166th Division entered North Korea in July 1949 and was redesignated the 6th Division, PANG became the Commanding General. For his actions as commander of the 6th Division in the capture of Kimpo Airfield and the port city of Inchon, PANG was awarded the highest decoration, the "Hero of the Korean Democratic Peoples' Republic," with a concurrent "Order of the National Flag, 1st Class." He also received the "Freedom and Independence Medal, 1st Class," for capturing the greater portion of Southwest Korea. Again for his part in leading the 6th Division back to North Korea from the southernmost tip of South Korea, he was awarded the "Golden Star Medal," in lieu of a second "Hero" decoration. In January 1951, he became commander of the newly activated V Corps.

PANG is rated the best of the corps commanders, being a first class strategist, tactician and commander who gets the most out of his men. He is described as being constantly concerned about their welfare as well as with the state of their training equipment. PANG is partial to Chinese tactics such as infiltration, attacks from the rear and night and surprise attacks. He favors close combat but avoids anything resembling "human sea" tactics.

PANG has not engaged in any political activity; his Chinese background has undoubtedly handicapped his career and he may have reached his ceiling in rank and position.

k. Lieutenant General LEE Yong Ho, Commander of the VII Corps, is a 43 year old native of Yenchi, Manchuria. Background information on LEE is sparse. It is reported that he joined the Anti-Japanese Army and subsequently, the Independent Brigade in Manchuria, as a lieutenant and platoon leader. Other reports indicate that he served as a junior lieutenant in the Soviet Army during World War II, and that he was educated in the Soviet Union.

No information is available concerning LEE's activities from the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945 until October 1947 when he became Chief of Staff of the 1st Regiment, 1st Division. In June 1948, LEE reportedly returned to the Soviet Union for further study. Upon his return in September 1948, he was appointed commander of the 1st Regiment. When the present conflict began in 1950, LEE succeeded KIM Kwang Hyop as commander of the 3d Division. The exact date of LEE's appointment to the command of the VII Corps is not known, but it is believed to have been in late September or October 1950, during the reorganization of the North Korean Armed Forces.

Little or no information is available regarding LEE's present activities, but it may be assumed that he is actively engaged in supervising the defensive activities of his Corps in the Wonsan.

LEE gained an excellent reputation as commander of the 3d Division, during which he won the "Hero of the Korean Democratic Peoples' Republic," with a concurrent award, the "Order of the National Flag, 1st Class". He is apparently well thought of in the Communist hierarchy as is evidenced by his rapid rise.

l. KIM Mu Chong (Alias Mu Jong), is ex-commander of II Corps and ex-Chief of Artillery, Ministry of National Defense.

MU was a CCF veteran and his association with them has been a long and close one. He was with MAO Tse Tung on the "Long March" and was the only one of 30 Koreans who set out on the march and survived. He was commander of the Korean Volunteer Army around 1940. He was also at one time commander of a Chinese Communist Artillery Brigade and was rated the best artilleryman in the Chinese Communist Forces. He is a Korean with Chinese citizenship.

In late August or early September 1945, the Chinese Communists sent MU into North Korea as their choice to assume leadership of the country. Of the Koreans in the Chinese Communist Forces, MU had the highest position and prestige. He made a speaking tour of North Korea, drawing vast audiences and getting a tremendous popular response. In a free election he would have won easily. In his speeches, MU stressed two main principles, a cooperative economy and economic and political independence in place of colonialism. He also strongly implied that a North Korean regime should cooperate with the Chinese Communists. He omitted any references to the USSR or to union with South Korea.

However, neither MU nor the North Korean people could nullify the fact that Soviet occupation meant Soviet hegemony. KIM Il Sung froze MU out of any high post in the new regime, whereupon the Chinese Communists asked MU to return to China, but he refused and remained in North Korea.

Meanwhile, MU had entered the Korean Communist Party in September 1945. He was later one of the organizers of the North Korean Labor Party. In December 1946, he became Deputy Chief for Artillery in the Officers' Training Battalion, North Korean Security Forces. With the establishment of the North Korean Armed Forces in February 1948, he became Chief of Artillery and in September 1948, when the Ministry of National Defense was organized, he became Chief of Artillery, Ministry of National Defense.

He got nowhere in politics. Due to KIM Il Sung's opposition, he could not even run in the August 1948 elections for the North Korean Government Supreme People's Council. In October 1948, he was finally elected to a seat on the Provincial People's Council of Pyongan Namdo, a sad comedown for the man who had expected to be chief of state.

MU'S appointment to military positions had been due in great part to the influence of CHOE, Yong Gun, the Minister of National Defense, his comrade in the Chinese Communist Forces. CHOE was also said to have persuaded MU to stay in Korea.

In July 1950, he was given command of II Corps on the central front, meanwhile retaining his other positions. MU disregarded orders from GHQ and fought as he saw fit. II Corps did badly, handicapped as it was by rugged terrain, inadequate forces and poor communications and supplies. On 8 September 1950, MU was relieved of his command by CHOE Hyon. Since that date, MU, in the best Communist fashion, simply and completely disappeared. Even his other positions as Chief of Artillery, North Korean Army, and as Chief of Artillery, Ministry of National Defense, were taken over by MU's assistant Major General KIM Pong Yul.

MU complained bitterly that KIM Il Sung had picked him for the worst tasks, where failure was likely or inevitable. This belief was shared by most of the pro-Chinese officers in the North Korean Armed Forces. Nevertheless, even CHOE Yong Gun criticized MU for failure to follow orders in speeches to North Korean officers in Manchuria in December 1950.

In a speech to the Seventh General Conference of the North Korean Labor Party in December 1950, KIM Il Sung castigated MU, declaring that his failure to obey orders had resulted in destruction of II Corps and that he had failed to withdraw his remaining forces properly. MU was expelled from the North Korean Labor Party at this meeting. There was no open defense of MU by the Chinese faction, although there was much muttering and grumbling in the aisles and lobbies.

Since January 1951, MU, in mufti, has been in the GHQ area, to which he has been restricted. He is not under arrest nor is it likely he would be arrested or tried.

Despite his lack of formal education, MU is intelligent, able and well-informed. In appearance and manner, he is dignified, reserved, severe and a little remote. His chief weakness is his habit of being too frank and outspoken. His temper is fierce, hot and coarse - he curses freely when angry - and although he bridles it with equal fierceness, it sometimes got the better of him.

Despite this, MU is not only respected but revered by his followers. There is a deep abiding core of humanity in the man which shows itself in his acts and in his consideration and treatment of his men, rather than in his words and manner. He still has powerful support among the ex-CCF Koreans in the North Korean Armed Forces, including division and corps commanders, among artillery troops and among the growing Chinese faction in the North Korean Labor Party. Moreover, he has the friendship or partisanship of high figures in the Chinese Communist Forces and Chinese Communist Group. The pressure from these groups is believed to have prevented MU's complete banishment. By May 1951 there was already talk that MU might be reappointed to some high military post.

Meanwhile, MU's name has disappeared from all public information media. There had been no mention of him since October 1950 and many people believe him to be dead.

m. CHOE Yong Jin, commander of VI Corps, was born in Lungching, Manchuria, circa 1911. He fought in Manchuria in the same guerrilla force with KIM Il Sung. The force was neutralized by the Japanese in 1935 and its remnants, including CHOE, fled into Siberia.

He received some training in a Soviet military school and served in the Red Army during World War II, becoming an infantry lieutenant. He returned to North Korea with the Soviet forces in 1945. In 1947, he was commandant of the First Military Academy in Pongyang from 1948 to May 1950.

CHOE led the ill-fated 13th Division across the 38th Parallel on 27 June 1950. In November 1950, he was named commander of VII Corps. This appointment was viewed by officers as one dictated by the USSR and aroused considerable dissatisfaction.

CHOE's formal education is limited. He reads Korean slowly and does not know many Chinese characters. He speaks Korean with slight accent and speaks Russian and Chinese fluently.

CHOE is a silent morose man with a fearsome temper. He is a physically active figure. Unable to handle complex problems, he is ill-suited for high command. During an inspection tour in December 1950, the Corps was found to be poorly organized, possessed poor discipline, had desultory maintenance of equipment and other signs of a fumbling command as a whole.

CHOE is fairly good in infantry tactics but knows little about artillery and the other support and service arms.

n. KIM Chang Dok, (alias LEE Tok San), commander of the VIII Corps, was formerly Commanding General of the 5th Division. He was born about 1894, in North Hamgyong Province, North Korea, and during early childhood, moved to Manchuria. Little is known of KIM's activities as a youth, however, he subsequently appeared as Deputy Commander of the all-Korean 164th Division, 55th Army, Fourth CCF Field Army in Manchuria. He then became the commander of the division in July 1949, when it entered Korea. At this time, the division was redesignated the 5th. KIM commanded the division during the initial southward drive of the NKA and in October 1950, he was placed in command of the VIII Corps, then in the process of reorganization.

APPENDIX I

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT IN THE HANDS OF THE NORTH KOREAN ARMY

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
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CONFIDENTIAL




7.62mm REVOLVER, M1895 "NAGANT" (SOVIET)

The 7.62mm revolver, M1895 "Nagant", is similar in design to the Belgian Nagant revolver. The revolver is a double action weapon, fed by a revolving cylindrical magazine.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	7.62mm
Muzzle velocity	892 feet per second
Range (effective)	50 yards
Magazine capacity	7 rounds
Weight of revolver (magazine empty)	1.6 pounds
Length overall	9.3 inches
Length of barrel	4.33 inches

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
7.62mm SEMI-AUTOMATIC PISTOL, TT M1933 "TOKAREV" (SOVIET)

The 7.62mm semi-automatic pistol, TT M1933 "Tokarev", is a simplified version of the US Caliber .45 Colt M1911 and is quite similar in appearance.

The "Tokarev" pistol is a .30 caliber, magazine-fed, recoil-operated, semi-automatic weapon. A half cock position of the hammer is the only safety device incorporated.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	7.62mm
Muzzle velocity	1,378 feet per second
Range (effective)	50 yards
Magazine capacity	8 rounds
Weight of pistol (magazine empty)	1.8 pounds
Length overall.	7.7 inches
Length of barrel.	4.6 inches



7.62mm RIFLE, M1891/30 "MOSSIN-NAGANT" (SOVIET)


Several models of the 7.62mm rifle, M1891/30 "Mosin-Nagant", exist but all types are of the same basic design. The rifle is bolt operated, and loaded by a five round clip.

A blade front sight and lifting "V" rear sight are employed. The original sight was graduated in paces (400 to 2,700); however, the sights of recently manufactured rifles are calibrated in meters.

The rifle is in the "Safe" position when the bolt is closed and the cocking piece is pulled to the rear and to the left as far as it will go.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	7.62mm
Muzzle velocity	2,838 feet per second
Range (effective)	440 yards
Length overall	48.5 inches
Weight (magazine empty)	9.92 pounds
Rate of fire	8-10 rounds per minute
Magazine capacity	5 rounds



7.62mm CARBINE, M1938 "MOSSIN-NAGANT" (SOVIET)
 7.62mm CARBINE, M1944 "MOSSIN-NAGANT" (SOVIET)


The 7.62mm "Mossin-Nagant" carbine is identical in all respects, except length, to the Mossin-Nagant rifle M1891/30 and was introduced to provide the infantryman with a shorter length weapon.

The 7.62mm carbine M1944 is identical in appearance to the 7.62mm carbine M1938 with the single exception of the folding bayonet which is permanently attached to the barrel and folds back on the right side of the M1944 carbine.

Both weapons have bolt actions and are clip-loaded. When a cartridge is chambered and the bolt closed, the weapon and bolt are locked and placed on "Safe" by pulling the cocking piece to the rear and turning it to the left as far as it will go.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	7.62 mm
Muzzle velocity	2,650 feet per second
Range (effective)	440 yards
Length overall	40 inches
Weight (magazine empty)	8.32 pounds (M1938) 8.82 pounds (M1944)
Rate of fire	8-10 rounds per minute
Magazine capacity	5 rounds



7.62mm SUBMACHINE GUN, PPSH-41 (SOVIET AND NORTH KOREAN)


The 7.62mm submachine gun, PPSH-41, is a high cyclic rate weapon that can be fired either full or semi-automatic. The change lever for selecting the type of fire is located on the trigger guard; for automatic fire, it is pushed forward and for semi-automatic fire, the lever is in the rear position.

The barrel jacket, which extends beyond the muzzle, acts as a muzzle brake and compensator.

The gun fires from an open bolt and when a magazine is in place, it is loaded and ready to be fired.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	7.62mm
Weight (with empty magazine)	11.7 pounds
Overall length	33 inches
Range (effective)	330 yards
Rate of fire	900 rounds per minute
Muzzle velocity	1,610 feet per second
Magazine capacity	71 rounds
Practical rate of fire	100 rounds per minute




7.62mm SUBMACHINE GUN, PPS-1943 (SOVIET)

The 7.62mm submachine gun, PPS-1943, is of later design and manufacture than the PPSH-1941 submachine gun. The stock is hinged and folds up and forward when the stock release button is pressed, thus facilitating carrying. It is fully automatic in operation by the cyclic rate has been deliberately retarded to permit "touching off" of single rounds. A compensator is welded on the front of the barrel jacket. The gun fires from an open bolt; with the bolt open and a loaded magazine in place, it is ready to fire.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	7.62mm
Weight (with empty magazine)	7.98 pounds
Overall length, stock extended	32 inches
Overall length, stock folded	24 inches
Range (effective)	220 yards
Rate of fire	600 rounds per minute
Muzzle velocity	1,640 feet per second
Magazine capacity	35 rounds
Practical rate of fire	100 rounds per minute



7.62mm LIGHT MACHINE GUN, DP "DEGTYAREV" (SOVIET)


The 7.62mm light machine gun, DP "Degtyarev", is a gas-operated, drum-fed, air-cooled, automatic fire weapon. It is the basic Soviet light machine gun and the other models (DPM, DT, DTM, and M1946) are variations and improvements. The DP is simple in construction. It is used as the base of fire for the Soviet rifle squad and delivers only full automatic fire. However, the gas cylinder has three gas vents of different sizes to permit changing the rate of automatic fire.

The DP and all variants fire from the open bolt position. The bolt and receiver are constructed so that the firing pin cannot strike the primer of the cartridge until the bolt is locked.

Standard Soviet 7.62mm rifle and machine gun ammunition is used. U.S. caliber 30 ammunition CANNOT be used in the Degtyarev light machine guns. It is fired from the shoulder with the barrel supported by a bipod.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	7.62mm
Muzzle velocity	2,770 feet per second
Range (effective)	880 yards
Length overall	50.5 inches
Weight (magazine empty)	18.5 pounds
Practical rate of fire	80 rounds per minute
Magazine capacity	47 rounds




7.62mm TANK MACHINE GUN, DT (SOVIET)

The 7.62mm tank machine gun, DT, is the tank version of the 7.62mm light machine gun, DP. It has a retractable shoulder stock, pistol grip, and a feed drum. It uses a 60 round drum whereas the DP uses a 47 round drum magazine. A bipod, with detachable front sight, is used with this gun when it is utilized as a ground weapon. Its heavy barrel is not of the quick change type. The DT fires from the open bolt position.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	7.62mm
Muzzle velocity	2,770 feet per second
Range (effective)	880 yards
Length overall (stock extended)	46.5 inches
Weight (less magazine or bipod)	21.5 pounds
Practical rate of fire	125 rounds per minute
Magazine capacity	60 rounds



7.62mm TANK MACHINE GUN, DTM (SOVIET)


The 7.62mm tank machine gun, DTM is a modified, more modern DT. The housing for the operating spring of the DTM is located on the back plate of the receiver. Like the DT, this gun is gas-operated and air-cooled. The gas cylinder has three escape vents of different sizes to permit various rates of fire.

The weapon fires from the open bolt position. The barrel is not of the quick change type.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	7.62mm
Muzzle velocity	2,770 feet per second
Range (effective)	880 yards
Length overall (stock extended)	46.5 inches
Weight (less magazine or bipod)	21.5 pounds
Practical rate of fire	125 rounds per minute
Magazine capacity	60 rounds

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
7.62mm HEAVY MACHINE GUN, M1910 "MAXIM" (SOVIET)

The 7.62mm M1910 "Maxim" heavy machine gun is water-cooled and recoil-operated. It is a copy of the German MG08. The ammunition is fed by means of a 250 round canvas belt into the right side of the receiver. The cyclic rate of fire is approximately 500 rounds per minute; however, the practical rate of fire is only 125 rounds per minute.

The gun is normally mounted on the 2 wheeled Sokolov mount. This wheeled mount affords ease of maneuver, and makes unnecessary the constant mounting and dismounting required to rapidly move a heavy machine gun of this type. This is a favorite type of mount with Soviet troops.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	7.62mm
Muzzle velocity	2,854 feet per second
Range (effective, ground)	1,100 yards
Range (effective, AA)	1,500 feet
Length overall	42.4 inches
Weight (with tripod)	145.5 pounds
Weight (gun only)	39.7 pounds
Practical rate of fire	125 rounds per minute




7.62mm HEAVY MACHINE GUN, M1943 "GORYUNOV" (SOVIET)

The 7.62mm heavy machine gun, M1943 "Goryunov" is a gas-operated, air-cooled, weapon designed to take the place of the 1910 Maxim. Five multiples of its 50 round metallic link belt can be joined to give a 250 round capacity belt. In addition, the 250 round canvas belt of the M1910 can also be used. The rear sight leaf is graduated from 0 to 2,300 meters for the 1930 heavy ball ammunition and from 0 to 2,000 meters for the 1908 light ball ammunition. Spade grips and a back plate buffer, similar to that used on the U.S. caliber .30, M2 machine gun, are used on this weapon. Any Soviet 7.62mm rifle ammunition may be used. The charging handle is beneath the grips.

The gun is mounted on an improved version of the 1931 "Universal" tripod, which easily converts into an antiaircraft mount.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	7.62mm
Muzzle velocity	2,620 feet per second
Range (effective, ground)	1,100 yards
Range (effective, AA)	1,650 feet
Length overall	46 inches
Weight (gun and tripod)	89 pounds
Weight (gun only)	30.4 pounds
Practical rate of fire	300-350 rounds per minute




F-1 DEFENSIVE HAND GRENADE (SOVIET AND NORTH KOREAN)

This Soviet grenade closely resembles the U.S. MK II. The body is usually painted olive drab, and is of serrated cast iron construction. This grenade is thrown from cover because of its fragmentation effect.

To use, grasp the safety lever and grenade body firmly with one hand and remove the safety pin and ring with the other hand. When the grenade is thrown, the safety lever and fuze cap fly off, actuating the delay element.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	1.25 pounds
Overall length	4.6 inches
Diameter	2.6 inches
Delay time	4 to 5 seconds




RG-42 OFFENSIVE HAND GRENADE (SOVIET)

The Soviet RG-42 offensive hand grenade is usually painted olive drab and resembles a small tin can. As it has little fragmentation effect, it is used for concussion effect.

To use the grenade, grasp the safety lever and grenade body firmly with one hand and remove the safety pin and ring with the other hand. When the grenade is thrown, the safety lever and fuze cap fly off arming the delay element.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight96 pounds
Overall length	5.1 inches
Diameter	2.2 inches
Delay time	3 to 4 seconds



RGD 33 OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE HAND GRENADE (SOVIET)

The RGD 33 offensive/defensive hand grenade is dual purpose. As an offensive grenade, it has a 10 yard lethal radius. By adding a fragmentation sleeve, it becomes a defensive grenade which has a 15 yard lethal radius. This sheet metal grenade is normally painted olive brown.

To arm, pull the grenade handle and body apart as far as possible, then turn the handle clockwise and release. A red mark can be seen showing that the firing pin is cocked. Push the safety catch to the right to put the grenade on "Safe". Then open the cover on top of the grenade body and insert the detonator. Close the cover. The grenade is now armed.


The grenade is thrown vigorously. A spring in the handle forces the body back quickly and the firing pin strikes the primer actuating the delay element.

Duds are dangerous and should be destroyed in place as the slightest vibration may set them off.

CHARACTERISTICS

	WITH	Fragmentation Sleeve WITHOUT
Weight	1.7 pounds	1.1 pounds
Overall length	7.5 inches	7.5 inches
Diameter	2.1 inches	1.7 inches
Delay time	3 to 4 seconds	3 to 4 seconds

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RPG 43 HAND GRENADE (SOVIET)

The RPG 1943 is primarily an antitank weapon, but it can also be used effectively as an antipersonnel grenade. This hollow charge grenade can penetrate 2.95 inches of armor. It is thrown from cover because of the secondary fragmentation effect.

To use, the handle and safety lever are firmly grasped in one hand, and the safety ring and pin removed with the other. When the grenade is thrown, the safety lever flies off and a spring forces the conical collar, which is positioned on the handle of the grenade, off the handle. The cone remains attached and it, plus canvas streamers, act as stabilizers guiding the grenade to the target at the right angle to insure maximum effectiveness. The grenade detonates on impact.


Duds are dangerous and must be destroyed where they lie. Do not pick them up.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	2.65 pounds
Overall length	11.12 inches
Diameter	3 inches
Delay time	Impact fuze

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RPG-6 HAND GRENADE (SOVIET)

The Soviet RPG-6 shaped charged hand grenade is designed primarily for anti-tank use, although, because of its secondary fragmentation effect, it can also be used as an antipersonnel weapon. For this reason, it should always be thrown from cover. The grenade is effective against armor up to 3.94 inches in thickness.


To use this grenade, the handle and safety lever are firmly grasped in one hand while the safety pin is withdrawn. When the grenade is thrown, the lever flies off and a stabilizing device contained in the handle is exposed. The device consists of a weight and four canvas web streamers that are fastened to the handle. The grenade explodes on impact.

NOTE: Duds must be destroyed in place, as they cannot be safely picked up.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	2.4 pounds
Overall length	13.5 inches
Diameter	3.9 inches
Delay time	Impact fuze

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82mm MORTAR, M1937 (SOVIET AND NORTH KOREAN)

The Soviet 82mm mortar, M1937, closely resembles the U.S. 81mm mortar. Two base plates are used; a circular one for normal operations and a smaller, lighter rectangular plate for mountain warfare. The mortar breaks down into three loads: tube, baseplate, and bipod. It is a smooth bore, muzzle-loaded and fixed firing pin weapon. It is fired by dropping the projectile, tail first, down the tube.


Two other Soviet versions of this 82mm mortar also exist, the M1941 and the M1943. The ammunition is interchangeable and the ballistic characteristics are the same on all three models. The M1941 has a mount that permits quick attachment of wheels for rapid displacement. The M1943 is similar to the M1941 with the exception that the bipod legs do not fold, and the wheels are not removable. The wheels are raised off the ground when the mortar is put into firing position.

The Chinese also manufacture a copy of this mortar.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	82mm
Muzzle velocity	663 feet per second
Range	77 to 3,400 yards
Length of tube	48 inches
Weight (total)	134 pounds
Rate of fire	18 to 20 rounds per minute
Traverse	6°
Elevation limits	+45° to +85°

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ELEVATION	ELEVATION & RANGE					
	45° 0'	57° 22'	65° 09'	71° 19'	78° 41'	80° 0'
1	1509 YD	1312 YD	1084 YD	875 YD	656 YD	503 YD
2	2428 YD	2187 YD	1869 YD	1422 YD	1094 YD	831 YD
3	3488 YD	3171 YD	2824 YD	2078 YD	1750 YD	
4	4518 YD	4921 YD	4046 YD	2843 YD		
5	5448 YD	4821 YD	4046 YD	2718 YD		
6	6564 YD	5784 YD	4811 YD			

120mm MORTAR, M1938 (SOVIET AND NORTH KOREAN)

The Soviet 120mm mortars are employed tactically in roles somewhat comparable to those of the U.S. 105mm howitzers. The light, easily attached transport limber, and the light weight circular stamped base plate, make the 120mm mortar highly mobile despite its size. For pack transport, this weapon breaks down into three loads. For animal or vehicle draft, it is sometimes equipped with a large caisson.


This weapon is either drop or trigger-fired. To use with a fixed firing pin, turn the wing nut on the base cap to the right until the safety bolt protrudes about 0.4 inches. Then turn the lever to the right. The mortar may now be drop-fired in the conventional manner. If the weapon is to be trigger-fired, the above procedure is reversed.

The Russians also have a 1943 model of this weapon which differs only in minor details. The range and ballistic characteristics of the two pieces are identical.

CHARACTERISTICS

- Caliber 120mm
- Muzzle velocity 890 feet per second
- Range 438 to 6,564 yards
- Length of tube 60.5 inches
- Weight (traveling position) 1,081 pounds
- Traverse + or - 3°
- Elevation limits +45° to +80°

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
12.7mm HEAVY MACHINE GUN DShK M1938 (SOVIET)

The 12.7mm DShK M1938 heavy machine gun is a gas-operated, belt-fed, air-cooled weapon. The mount is dual purpose and may be adjusted for use against ground or aerial targets. Detachable wheels are provided for the mount. This gun uses a speed ring antiaircraft sight for fire control.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	12.7mm
Muzzle velocity	2,790 feet per second
Range (effective, vertical)	4,950 feet
Range (effective, horizontal)	2,800 yards
Length overall	62.3 inches
Weight (with tripod and shield)	367.4 pounds
Weight (gun only)	74.8 pounds
Practical rate of fire	125 rounds per minute
Traverse	360°

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


37mm ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN, M1939 (SOVIET)

The 37mm anti-aircraft gun, M1939, is an automatic weapon mounted on a four wheel carriage with a pedestal mount. Firing jacks are provided to lift the wheels off the ground when the gun is in firing position. The weapon is fed with 5 round clips. Tracking is performed manually with a course and speed computing sight.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	37mm
Muzzle velocity (HE projectile)	2,953 feet per second
Maximum vertical range	19,800 feet
Maximum horizontal range	8,887 yards
Length of tube	91.1 inches
Weight	4,630 pounds
Practical rate of fire	25 to 30 rounds per min.
Traverse.	360°
Elevation limits	-5° to +85°




85mm ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN, M1939 (SOVIET)

The 85mm anti-aircraft gun, M1939, uses the same carriage as the 76mm AA gun M1938. A multi-baffle muzzle brake is provided. The piece is manually operated and uses the match pointer system for anti-aircraft tracking. The same AA director, the PUAZO-3, is used for both pieces.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	85mm
Muzzle velocity (HE projectile)	2,625 feet per second
Range (maximum, vertical, HE projectile).	34,461 feet
Length of tube	184.7 inches
Weight	9,601 pounds
Practical rate of fire	12-15 rounds per minute
Traverse	360°
Elevation limits	-2° to +85°

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
14.5mm ANTITANK RIFLE, PTRD-41 (SOVIET)

The 14.5mm antitank rifle, PTRD-41, is a single shot, bipod supported, shoulder-fired weapon. A muzzle brake is provided to reduce the recoil. Its projectiles are rated as being capable of penetrating 1.57 inches of armor at a range of 110 yards and 30° angle of attack. Although obviously of little value against modern armor, it is effective against armored cars, light tanks, and other lightly armored vehicles.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	14.5mm
Muzzle velocity	3,350 feet per second
Range (effective)	880 yards
Overall length	79 inches
Weight (with bipod)	38.1 pounds
Armor penetration capability	1.25 inches at 550 yards

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
14.5mm ANTITANK RIFLE, PTRS-41 (SOVIET)

The 14.5mm antitank rifle, PTRS-41, is an improved version of the PTRD rifle. It is a magazine-fed, gas-operated, air-cooled weapon supported by a bipod and shoulder fired. It has the same ballistic characteristics as the PTRD-41 model and, for this reason, is also considered an outmoded weapon for combating modern armor.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	14.5mm
Muzzle velocity	3,350 feet per second
Range (effective)	880 yards
Overall length	83 inches
Weight with bipod	46.1 pounds
Rate of fire	4 to 5 rounds per minute
Magazine capacity	5 rounds
Armor penetration capability	1.25 inches at 550 yards

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45mm ANTITANK GUN, M1937 (SOVIET)

The 45mm antitank gun, M1937, although rendered obsolete by modern armor, is still of value to the infantry as a close-in support weapon in attacks against pillboxes and minor field fortifications.

An exceptionally light-weight piece, it employs a carriage equipped with tubular steel split trails. The gun carriage may be encountered with solid disk, perforated disk, or wire spoke wheels.


CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	45mm
Muzzle velocity (AP projectile)	2,500 feet per second
Range (maximum)	5,090 yards
Length of tube	81.5 inches
Weight	1,144 pounds
Rate of fire	20 to 30 rounds per min.
Traverse	60°
Elevation limits	-8° to +25°
Maximum armor penetration	2.25 inches at 550 yards

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NOTE ABSENCE OF MUZZLE BRAKE



57mm ANTITANK GUN, M1943 (SOVIET)

The 57mm antitank gun, M1943, is a light-weight but powerful weapon for close-in combat against armor. It is mounted on the modified carriage of the 76mm divisional gun, M1942.


It strongly resembles the 76mm divisional gun, M1942; however, the 76mm M1942 has a double-baffle muzzle brake and a shorter, heavier tube, whereas the 57mm M1943 has a long slender, whip-like tube that is not equipped with a muzzle brake.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	57mm
Muzzle velocity (AP projectile)	3,240 feet per second
Maximum range (AP projectile)	9,200 yards
Length of tube	164 inches
Weight	2,530 pounds
Rate of fire	20 to 30 rounds per minute
Traverse	54°
Elevation limits	-5° to +25°
Maximum armor penetration	5.6 inches at 550 yards

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
76.2mm HOWITZER, M1927 (SOVIET)

This 76.2mm howitzer is sometimes called a regimental gun. Either large disk or wooden-spoked wheels may be fitted, the latter being for horse draft. The range of this howitzer is adequate for its close support role. However, by Soviet standards, the piece is heavy for its purpose.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	76.2mm
Muzzle velocity	1,247 feet per second
Maximum range	9,113 yards
Length of tube	49.5 inches
Weight	1,720 pounds
Rate of fire	15 to 20 rounds per min.
Elevation limits	-6° to +25°

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76.2mm DIVISIONAL GUN, M1902/30 (SOVIET)


The 76.2mm divisional gun, M1902/30, exists in two lengths which are, to all intents and purposes, ballistically identical.

This weapon has a modified box trail.

In spite of the obvious antiquity of this weapon, it is capable of adequate ranges, once employed.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	76.2mm
Muzzle velocity (HE projectile)	2,316 feet per second
Range (maximum)	14,850 yards
Length of tube	84 or 114 inches
Weight	2,976 pounds
Rate of fire	8 rounds per minute
Traverse	2°
Elevation limits	-5° to +37°



76.2mm DIVISIONAL GUN, M1942 (SOVIET)


The 76.2mm divisional gun, M1942, is a dual-purpose weapon used for both field and antitank roles. It is an exceptionally lightweight piece and has been designed to facilitate rapid displacement in tactical situations. The double-baffle muzzle brake provides a quick recognition feature. This weapon and the 57mm antitank gun, M1943, use the same carriage.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	76.2mm
Muzzle velocity (HE projectile)	2,231 feet per second
Maximum range	14,545 yards
Length of tube	117 inches
Weight	2,460 pounds
Rate of fire	25 rounds per minute
Traverse	54°
Elevation limits	-5° to +37°

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122mm HOWITZER, M1938 (SOVIET)


The 122mm howitzer, M1938, is used within the rifle division in the same role as our 155mm howitzer. A light-weight, effective weapon, it is fitted with split trails, and a large sloped shield.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	122mm
Muzzle velocity (HE projectile)	1,690 feet per second
Maximum range	12,904 yards
Length of tube	103 inches
Weight	4,960 pounds
Rate of fire	5 to 6 rounds per minute
Traverse	50°
Elevation limits	-3° to +65°

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122mm CORPS GUN, M1931/37 (SOVIET)

The 122mm corps gun, M1931/37, is a powerful, long range weapon. It is normally employed in roles comparable to those of our corps artillery.


This modern field piece is mounted on the same split trail carriage as the 152mm gun-howitzer, M1937. Its primary recognition feature is its long slender tube. It does not mount a muzzle-brake.

CHARACTERISTICS

Caliber	122mm
Maximum velocity (with HE projectile)	2,625 feet per second
Maximum range	22,747 yards
Length of tube	222 inches
Weight	15,692 pounds
Rate of fire	5 to 6 rounds per minute
Traverse	58°
Elevation limits	-2° to +65°

Handwritten markings or scribbles in the bottom right corner.

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
ARMORED CAR, BA-64 (SOVIET)

The BA-64 armored car is a lightly armored, highly mobile vehicle. It can easily be recognized by its sloping sides and the small turret on the top rear. It is a 4 x 4, liquid-cooled, gasoline engine powered vehicle. Provisions are made in the turret to mount a 7.62mm DT or DTM light machine gun.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	2.6 tons
Length	140 inches
Height	75 inches
Width	70 inches
Armor24 inches
Maximum speed, surface roads	50 miles per hour
Maximum speed, earth roads	28 miles per hour
Cruising radius	272 miles
Maximum fording depth	1.6 feet

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76mm SELF-PROPELLED GUN, SU-76 (SOVIET)

The 76mm self-propelled gun, SU-76, consists of the 76mm divisional gun, M1942, mounted on the modified, lengthened, chassis of the obsolete T-70 tank, as a self-propelled gun. This vehicle is powered by two 6-cylinder gasoline engines mounted in line.

No machine guns are mounted on this vehicle but a submachine gun is normally carried for close in fighting.

The SU-76 is an exceptionally light vehicle, designed for close support of the rifle division. However, its thin armor renders it vulnerable to infantry type weapons.


The characteristics of the primary armament are basically the same as the parent weapon.

VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS

Fighting weight	12 tons
Width	9 feet
Maximum armor protection.	1.4 inches
Maximum road speed.	25 miles per hour
Maximum cross country speed	15 miles per hour
Cruising radius.	200 miles
Trench crossing ability.	6 feet
Fording depth ability	3.1 feet
Vertical step climbing ability	2.1 feet

WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS

Primary armament	76mm M1942 gun
Traverse	32°
Elevation limits	-2.5° to +25°
Range	12,400 yards
Maximum armor penetration at 550 yards.	3.27 inches
Ammunition carried.	60 rounds



MEDIUM TANK, T-34/85 (SOVIET)

The excellent T-34 medium tank, weighing 35 tons combat loaded, was the principal combat vehicle of the USSR throughout World War II. At present, it is the only enemy tank that has been encountered in Korea. From a technical standpoint, it has the following features: low silhouette; clean, heavily sloped armor; good flotation; excellent cross country performance; high maximum speed; and effective fire power.


The main armament consists of an 85mm tank gun and, as secondary armament, one fixed, hull-mounted and one coaxial turret-mounted machine gun.

VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS

Fighting weight	35 tons
Width	10 feet
Maximum armor protection	3 inches
Maximum speed	30 miles per hour
Maximum cross country speed	15 miles per hour
Cruising radius	186 miles
Trench crossing ability	8.2 feet
Fording depth ability	4.3 feet
Vertical step climbing ability	2.3 feet
Maximum gradient	35°

WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS

Primary armament	85mm gun
Traverse	360°
Elevation limits	-5° to +25°
Range	5,796 yards
Maximum armor penetration at 500 yards	4.2 inches
Ammunition carried	55 rounds




TRUCK, 4 x 4, GAZ-67 (SOVIET)

The GAZ-67 truck is commonly referred to as the Russian jeep. It is a light, open, four passenger, 4 x 4 car powered by conventional 4-cylinder liquid-cooled engine. It is easily identified by its high fenders, which angle out from the body of the vehicle.

CHARACTERISTICS

Comparable to the U.S. jeep




TRUCK CARGO, 4 x 4, GAZ-63 (SOVIET)

The truck, cargo GAZ-63, is an open body truck found both in dump and cargo versions. The cargo version uses a wooden body. The engine, based on the U.S. 6 cylinder Ford, has an estimated horsepower of 70 at 2,800 revolutions per minute.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	3.6 tons
Height	86 inches
Width	86 inches
Length	210 inches
Wheel base	131 inches
Pay load	2.2 tons
Speed (maximum)	40 miles per hour
Cruising range	285 miles




TRUCK CARGO, 4 x 2, GAZ-51 (SOVIET)

The cargo truck GAZ-51 is a 4 x 2 open body vehicle with dual rear wheels powered by a 6 cylinder engine. The vehicle is often used as a prime mover for lighter artillery pieces. Its engine rating is 70 horsepower at 2,800 revolutions per minute.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	3 tons
Height	83.8 inches
Width	86 inches
Length	210 inches
Wheel base	131 inches
Pay load	2.2 to 2.7 tons
Speed (maximum)	43 miles per hour
Cruising range	260 miles

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
DUAL WHEELS

TRUCK CARGO, 4 x 2, ZIS-5 (SOVIET)

The cargo truck, ZIS-5, is a 4 x 2 vehicle based on the U.S. Autocar and was first produced by the Soviets in 1933. It is an open body vehicle with a square cab and dual rear wheels. The liquid-cooled engine has 6 cylinders.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	3.4 tons
Height	85 inches
Width	88 inches
Length	238 inches
Wheel base	150 inches
Pay load	3.3 to 4.4 tons
Speed (maximum)	37 miles per hour
Cruising range	110 miles




TRUCK CARGO, 4 x 2, ZIS-150 (SOVIET)

The cargo Truck, ZIS-150, is based on the US Autocar. The chassis reportedly is used for special purpose vehicles such as small repair trucks. It is powered by a 6 cylinder liquid-cooled, gasoline engine.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	4.3 tons
Height	85 inches
Width	93.8 inches
Length	265 inches
Wheel base	154 inches
Pay load	3.3 to 4.4 tons
Speed (maximum)	38 miles per hour
Cruising range	300 miles

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


TRUCK CARGO, 6 x 6, ZIS-151 (SOVIET)

The open body cargo truck, ZIS-151, is powered by a 6-cylinder liquid-cooled, gasoline engine. It has a six wheel drive and is used as a prime mover as well as a cargo and personnel carrier.

CHARACTERISTICS

Height	90 inches
Width	92 inches
Length	270 inches
Wheel base	165 inches
Pay load	4.5 tons




TRACTOR, S-80 (SOVIET)

The S-80 tractor is powered by an 80 horsepower, four-cylinder diesel engine. A model P-46 two-cylinder gasoline auxillary engine is provided as a starting engine. The tractor is primarily used as a prime mover.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	12.5 tons
Speed	6 miles per hour
Maximum tractive effort	9.5 tons

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


TRACTOR, ATZ (SOVIET)

The ATZ tractor is powered by a 54 horsepower, 4-cylinder diesel engine. A 12 horsepower auxiliary gasoline engine is provided as a starting engine for the diesel engine. The tractor is used primarily as a prime mover.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	12 tons
Speed	5 miles per hour
Maximum tractive effort	2.1 tons



BOX MINE, TMD-B (SOVIET)


Because of its simple, cheap construction, this wooden box mine is one of the most extensively used. Its color varies but it is usually either black or unpainted. A force of 300 to 450 pounds applied to the top of the box will break the locking strip which is engaged in a groove in 3 pressure boards, allowing the pressure block to contact the fuze and detonate the mine.

The TMD-B may be used as an anti-personnel mine by disengaging the locking strip from its groove in the pressure boards. When armed in this manner, a pressure of 10 to 15 pounds is sufficient to activate the mine.

To disarm, swing out the locking strip and raise the pressure boards. Lift out the fuze and its attached detonator. These mines may be booby trapped so extreme caution must be taken.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	18 to 20 pounds
Weight of explosive	13 to 15 pounds
Height	5.25 inches
Width	12.5 inches
Breadth	10.25 inches



ANTITANK MINE, TM-41 (SOVIET)


The Soviet TM-41 anti-tank mine is made of blued sheet metal often painted white or olive drab. A pressure of 350 pounds anywhere on the lid crushes the upper section of the mine and activates a pressure fuze located beneath the pressure cap. The mine reportedly remains operative for months when it is waterproofed with rubber washers.

To disarm, unscrew the pressure cap and gently pull out the fuze with its attached detonator.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	12 pounds (approximately)
Weight of explosive	8 pounds (approximately)
Height	5.2 inches
Diameter	10 inches

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LARGE SMOKE POT (SOVIET)

This smoke generator is an OD colored metal drum approximately 19 inches high and 15.5 inches in diameter, weighing about 88 pounds. Stencilled markings are generally found on the side of the drum.


The drum may be enclosed in a slotted wooden crate.

Both manual and electrical firing devices are provided.

The filling is a greenish-brown mixture with a creosote odor.

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


SMOKE HAND GRENADES (SOVIET)

The "S" type smoke hand grenade has a cylindrical, brown-painted, sheet metal body with a metal lid. A belt hook is mounted on the side. The lower one-third of the grenade body is of reduced diameter and serves as the handle. Weight is 1.25 pounds, length 6.3 inches, and the diameter of the main body 2.75 inches. The smoke mixture is dark gray and crumbly in texture.

The RDG-1 is a "stick" type smoke grenade made of moulded cardboard. The main portion is gray and the handle section is green. Two types of RDG-1 grenades exist. One produces black smoke and the other white smoke. The two grenades are identical in appearance and can only be distinguished by the markings on the packing case: ЧЕРНОГО ДЪМА - (black) and БЕЛОГО ДЪМА - (white). The grenade floats and is therefore useful in laying screens over water targets. Weight is 1.2 pounds, length 8.7 inches, and the diameter of the main body, 2.4 inches.

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RBM-1 FIELD RADIO (SOVIET)

The RBM-1 is an amplitude modulated transmitter-receiver for voice or CW operation. The set consists of two metal cases (one for the radio and one for the batteries) and a canvas spare parts bag with web carrying straps.

This set is normally used in division and regimental command nets, but may also be employed for convoy control, special security, or warning purposes.


To place in operation, connect the power cable and turn the volume control clockwise. Set the tuning dials and band switches on the assigned frequency (dial calibration is frequency in kilocycles divided by 25) and put the selector switch on "voice" (ТЛЖ). Depress the handset switch and "calibration" button simultaneously; adjust the coarse and fine antenna tuning for maximum brightness of the antenna tuning indicator. Release the handset switch and turn the selector switch to "zero beat" (ТРЖА), and adjust the receiver tuning knob until the receiver is in zero beat with transmitter. For voice operation, set the selector switch on "voice" (ТЛЖ); for CW operation, set on "CWI" (ТПП) or "CWII" (ТПП).

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight (with battery)	38 pounds
Length	13 inches
Width	8 inches
Height	9 inches
Power source	Battery 2.5; 80 and 180 volts
Range (clear, dry day)	10 miles
Frequency (in two bands)	1.5 to 5 megacycles

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- 1 ANTENNA MOUNT
- 2 MAIN TUNING
- 3 VOLTMETER SWITCH
- 4 VOLTMETER
- 5 SELECTOR SWITCH
- 6 TERMINALS L AND P
- 7 FILAMENT VOLTAGE CONTROL
- 8 HEADPHONES JACK
- 9 KEY JACK
- 10 HANDSET PLUG
- 11 POWER PLUG
- 12 RECEIVER FINE TUNING
- 13 TUNING INDICATOR LAMP
- 14 ANTENNA TUNING
- 15 HANDSET
- 16 MICROPHONE
- 17 HANDSET SWITCH
- 18 RECEIVER
- 19 BATTERY COMPARTMENT
- 20 WIRE ANTENNA AND REEL
- 21 HEADPHONES



A-7-A FIELD RADIO (SOVIET)

The A-7-A is a one man, pack type, frequency modulated, transmitter-receiver for voice operation. The entire unit including the battery is housed in a wooden case with web carrying straps.


The set is normally used in division and regimental command nets. However, it may also be used for convoy control, and special security or warning purposes.

To place in operation: Mount the antenna and then connect the counterpoise to terminal "P" (П); turn selector switch to "radio" (РАДИО) and set main tuning dial on assigned frequency; (dial calibration is frequency in megacycles times 10) the set is turned on by connecting the batteries. The voltmeter normally registers the filament voltage (the heavy mark on the scale). The plate voltage (120 volts) is read by pressing the handset switch and voltmeter button simultaneously. Keep the handset switch depressed, and adjust the antenna tuning until maximum brightness of the indicator lamp is obtained. Then release the handset switch and set the selector switch on "calibrate" (КОПЕК); adjust the receiver tuning until the receiver is in zero beat with the transmitter.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight (with battery)	50 pounds
Length	13 inches
Width	8.8 inches
Height	15.5 inches
Power source	Battery 2.5 volts and 120 volts
Range	5 miles (line of sight)
Frequency	27 to 32 megacycles

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TAI-43 FIELD TELEPHONE (SOVIET)


This field telephone is contained in a wooden or plastic case. It is used for communications within the infantry regiment, but it may also be used for special security, warning, and artillery fire control circuits.

The operation of this set is similar to that of the U.S. EE-8 field telephone, except that no provisions have been made for use with a common battery system.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	12 pounds
Length	11 inches
Width	4.5 inches
Height	8 inches
Power source (voice)	1.5 volt battery
Power source (ringing)	Hand generator
Range	15 miles on field wire; 100 miles on pole line

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MODIFIED U.S. EE-8 FIELD TELEPHONE (SOVIET)


The Soviet modified EE-8 field telephone is contained in a green metal case with web carrying straps. It consists of a U.S. Signal Corps EE-8 field telephone which has been modified to use as its power source either the U.S. BA-30 battery or a Soviet 1.5 volt battery.

The parts are interchangeable with and the operation of this Soviet set is identical to that of the U.S. EE-8 field telephone, with the exception that there is no provision for common battery operation.

This set is used for communications within the infantry regiment. It can also be used for special security, warning, and artillery fire control communications.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	15 pounds
Length	9.5 inches
Width	4.5 inches
Height	8 inches
Power source (voice)	1.5 volt battery
Power source (ringing)	Hand generator
Range	15 miles on field wire; 100 miles on pole line




UNA-I-43 FIELD TELEPHONE (SOVIET)

This Soviet field telephone is used by all echelons of command. Its operation is similar to that of the U.S. Signal Corps EE-8, and it may be used with either common battery or local battery system. It is contained in a wooden case, and has a web carrying strap.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	17 pounds
Length	11 inches
Width	4.5 inches
Height	8.5 inches
Power source (voice)	3 volt battery
Power source (ringing)	Hand generator
Range	15 to 30 miles on field wire; 100 to 350 miles on pole line

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K-10 FIELD SWITCHBOARD (SOVIET)

The K-10 field switchboard is a 10 drop, local battery, monocord switchboard. Two or more boards may be connected in parallel by connecting the "TA" (TA) terminals of the boards together.

This switchboard is used for units within the division, including the fire control centers.


To place in operation, connect a field telephone for the operators use to the "TA" (TA) terminal. The plugs are placed in the standby jacks. The operator's cord is on the extreme right.

To use, place operator's cord in "calling parties" answer jack. Place "calling parties" cord in "called parties" answer jack and ring "called party" with the operator's telephone. When the party answers, remove operator's cord from "calling party's" jack. When party rings off, insert the operator's plug in either answer jack to determine if conversation is concluded.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	10 pounds
Length	11.5 inches
Width	5.5 inches
Height	7 inches
Power source	Operators field telephone
Range	Same as operators field telephone

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PK-30 FIELD SWITCHBOARD (SOVIET)

The PK-30 is a 30 drop, universal magneto switchboard used by division or higher headquarters. Although drops 25 through 27 are sound powered circuits and drops 28 through 30 are common battery circuits, all drops may be used for a local battery operation. The entire unit is housed in a wooden case. In operation, this case serves as a table for the switchboard.

The PK-30 is made up of four main sections: the receiver unit, operators unit, line terminal boards, and the carrying case. The receiver contains the drops, jacks, and line cable receptacles. The operators unit contains the recall drops, the line continuity indicator, the plugs with drop cords, the answer-ring keys, the ringer selector switch (hand ringer or automatic ringer) and hand ringer. The line terminal boards contain the line terminals, test jacks, fuses and line protectors. The side doors of the carrying case hold the batteries and the automatic ringing equipment.

The operation of this board is similar, but not identical to the U.S. Signal Corps TC-4 telephone central.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	176 pounds
Length	24 inches
Width	18 inches
Height	24.5 inches
Power source (voice)	3 volt battery
Power source (ringing)	Hand generator or automatic ringing (110 or 220 volts AC)
Range	15 miles on field wire; 100 miles on pole line

APPENDIX II

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