MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
SUBJECT: Producing Timely Tailored Finished Intelligence: Writing for the Consumer
1.The United States has the most sophisticated and capable intelligence system in history. We have honed this national capability through a turbulent period of fundamental change in the national security environment. It is my firm intent to continue the enhancement of our intelligence capabilities. In addition, it is my intention to improve dramatically the way we do business to ensure the products of the intelligence system reach the full range of the customers we support.
2. To achieve these goals, I am continuing the reviews of our basic security practice that were initiated by my predecessors. In particular, I am focusing on the needs of commanders at all levels in the armed forces. Coalition warfare is the future model for US military conflicts, and I want the Intelligence Community to rededicate itself to the concept of releasable tailored intelligence--intelligence produced at the lowest security level commensurate with the protection of sources and methods or produced in a format that allows for timely disclosure to US customers or authorized foreign governments. From this point forward we must "write for the consumer."
3.这个目标很容易,但是很难聚氨酯t into practice. I do not intend to limit the production of intelligence at high levels of classification that is primarily in support of decisionmakers, nor do I intend to hold back the production of extremely sensitive and restricted intelligence which is based directly upon sensitive intelligence sources. We will continue to provide this kind of intelligence to limited sets of cleared customers at high levels of classification.
4.我们必须认识到,军事指挥官only require timely information at the collateral level but they often must share information with coalition partners who may not normally receive US intelligence. In this equation it is not our military forces that have changed, but rather the nature of conflicts in which our military forces are involved. The world has changed and our provision of intelligence must change with it. We need an updated intelligence product line that is releasable from the inception--a flow of reporting based on all available sources that is written from the outset to be given broad US dissemination and appropriate foreign release. The challenge is to extract meaning from all intelligence sources and package it for our various customers without betraying the very sources that will provide the next critical piece of intelligence.
5. The forthcoming revised DCID 1/7 reflects this change in emphasis. In order to speed progress toward this goal, the Secretary of Defense and I recently agreed that the NOFORN category should be dropped from the lexicon of security terms we currently use to protect sensitive information. We concluded that NOFORN was a redundant marking which had become ineffective through its frequent overuse and misuse. Instead of the majority of actionable intelligence being marked NOFORN, the revised DCID promotes intelligence production at the uncaveated collateral level, or better still in tearline format or at a minimum, portion marked. We recognize, however, that the problem is too complex to be solved completely by any single action. A comprehensive education, training, and implementation program is critical to the success of the "write for the consumer" policy. This education and training program must be across the-board and across the government, to include reports officers, analysts, disclosure officials, and most importantly - intelligence consumers.
6. DCID 1/7 now specifies regular reviews and challenge procedures to ensure that these changes are in fact taking hold in the Intelligence Community and that new abuses are not taking place. I will follow the results of these reviews closely and make further changes as necessary.
约翰·迪奇（John Deutch）
ADCI/MS/TROBERTS：SJK X32522（96年4月4日）
Distribution:
1 - The Honorable John M. Deutch
Director of Central Intelligence
1-光荣的乔治·J·tenet
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
1 -理查德•j•Stakem先生
Acting Director for Intelligence Community Affairs
1 - Ms. Nora Slatkin
Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency
1 - RADM Dennis C. Blair
Associate DCI for Military Support
1 - Mr. Michael J. O'Neil
DCI Chief of Staff
1 - The Honorable John White
Deputy Secretary of Defense
1 - The Honorable R. Rand Beers
Special Assistant to the President and Director for Intelligence Programs
1 - General Joseph Ralston
副主席，参谋长
1 - Dr. Paul Kaminski
在收购和技术的国防部长下
1 - Mr. Emmett Paige
国防助理部长指挥，控制，沟通和情报
1 - Major General Patrick M. Hughes, USA
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - Lieutenant General Kenneth A Minihan
Director, National Security Agency
1 - Dr. Annette Krygiel
Director, Central Imagery Office
1 - Mr. Keith R. Hall
国家侦察办公室副主任
1 - Rear Admiral (Sel) Joseph Krol
Director, Special Program Division (SP/N)
1 - Mr. John C. Harley, Jr.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
1 - Mr. Michael Romey
Department of Treasury
1-琼·罗芬女士
Department of Energy
1 - Ms. Toby Gati
国务院
1 - Dr. Richard N. Cooper
国家情报委员会主席
1 - Mr. Jeffrey Smith
总法律顾问
1-约翰·莫斯曼先生
Director, Office of Congressional Affairs
1 - Mr. Joe Markowitz
社区开源计划办公室主任
1 - ADCI/MS Chrono
1 - Executive Registry
MEMORANDUM FOR: Intelligence Community Executive Committee Principals
主题：中央情报指令总监1/7的修订，“有关情报信息传播的安全控制”
1.我转发给你一个专业revision of Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/7, "Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information" (DCID) that I have recently signed that is designed to increase significantly the amount of releasable, tailored intelligence available to support the policy and US warfighter communities. The DCID establishes a new policy of "writing for the consumer," which means preparing intelligence reports and products at the collateral, uncaveated, level to the greatest extent possible, and using tear line reporting, portion marking, or other means to facilitate the segregation and dissemination of releasable information. I do not intend to limit the production of intelligence at higher levels of classification necessary to support decisionmakers, nor to hold back the production of extremely sensitive and restricted intelligence based on sensitive intelligence sources. We will continue to provide this kind of intelligence. Rather my purpose is to improve the way we conduct business to ensure that the full range of our intelligence products reach our customers in a timely fashion. The DCID will take effect 60 days after signature.
2. The key elements of the DCID are as follows:
4.我还分享了你们许多人的担忧，即控制标记，只能成为另一个Noforn，这是一个被过度使用，多余的，最终完全无效的标记。为了限制其申请，DCID仅允许我们仅在未根据DCID 5/6授权的“情报披露政策”授权外国披露的情况下使用我们。我认为，DCID 5/6的不披露政策目前过于广泛，需要受到限制。它是最后一次修订于1983年，需要进行修订，以使其与我们支持美国战士和我们的联盟合作伙伴的其他政策一致。我曾要求情报社区事务代理执行董事理查德·斯塔克姆（Richard Stakem）和中央情报局副主任VADM Blair寻求情报生产者和消费者社区的广泛参与，以加快速度进行此DCID。我要求他们在1996年5月31日之前与我联系，并进行修订。
约翰·迪奇（John Deutch）
依恋
CMS/PSI/SSagalkin/dre: 44382 (5 Feb 96)
DOC ID：计划/DCID通知Excom
发行：（ CMS/96-00109）
1 - IC ExCom Principals
1 - D/RPP
1 - C/PSI
1 -PSI Chrono
1 - CMS Registry
根据1947年《国家安全法》的规定，经修订的第12333号行政命令，第12958号行政命令，并在本主管中建立了有关情报信息和相关材料的传播和使用智能信息和相关材料的指令，政策，控制和程序中央情报指令（指令或DCID）。
1.0 Policy
1.1正是中央情报（DCI）主管的政策是“为消费者写的”，允许最广泛地传播及时，量身定制的情报。“为消费者写作”的政策必须与“需要知道的”原则以及保护资源和方法的要求一致。本文建立的情报控制标记只能用于识别和限制从敏感来源和方法中得出的特定智能的传播，并表示额外传播或外国释放需要发起人批准。仅当无法通过单独使用其分类标记（即机密，秘密或最高秘密）来保护一项情报信息，才能使用此类控制标记。情报界（SOIC）的高级官员将建立遵守此政策的程序。
1.2这项政策的目标是在最大程度上在抵押品，未浪费的水平上产生情报根据该指令和DCID 5/6，情报披露政策。This does not require that all intelligence reports and products be prepared without reference to sources or methods when necessary to provide the recipient with additional intelligence reflecting on the credibility or usefulness of the information. In such cases, intelligence producers shall make every reasonable effort to limit the amount of information classified at a higher level or marked with a restrictive caveat and to use a "tear-line", portion-marking, or separable annexes to allow broader dissemination or release of information at the lower level of classification.
2.0 Purpose
2.1 This Directive establishes policies, controls, and procedures for the dissemination and use of intelligence information to ensure that, while facilitating its interchange for intelligence purposes, it will be adequately protected. This Directive implements and amplifies applicable portions of the directives of the Information Security Oversight Office issued pursuant to Executive Order 12958 (E.O.) and directives of the Security Policy Board issued pursuant to E.O. 12958 and PDD-29.
2.2 Additionally, this Directive sets forth policies and procedures governing the release of intelligence to contractors and consultants, foreign governments, international organizations or coalition partners consisting of sovereign states, and to foreign nationals and immigrant aliens, including those employed by the US Government.
2.3行政命令12958规定建立特殊访问计划，包括敏感的隔间信息。DCID 3/29提供了与情报活动和限制抵押信息有关的特殊访问计划的制定程序。情报界的组成部分可以建立并维护对根据DCID 3/29（DCID）和实施指导的政策和程序批准的信息的传播控制。
3.0 Definitions
3.1情报信息和相关材料（以下称为“情报”）包括以下信息，无论是书面还是在任何其他媒介中，根据E.O.12958：
3.1.1 Foreign intelligence and counterintelligence defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and in Executive Order 12333;
3.1.2描述美国外国情报和反情报活动，来源，方法，设备或方法的信息，用于获取，处理或开发这种智能；外国军事硬件是通过情报活动获得的剥削和剥削结果获得的；以及美国情报收集工作产生的任何其他数据；和，
3.1.3 Information on Intelligence Community protective security programs (e.g., personnel, physical, technical, and information security).
3.2 "Need-to-know" is the determination by an authorized holder of classified information that access to information in his/her possession is required by another person to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function. Such persons must possess an appropriate security clearance or access approval granted pursuant to Executive Order 12968.
3.3 Intelligence Community (and agencies within the Intelligence Community) means the United States Government agencies and organizations identified in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
3.4情报界（SOIC）的高级官员是情报社区机构或组织的负责人。
3.5“撕裂线”是智能报告（通常由一系列破折号表示）的位置，在该报告中开始了更高度分类和/或受控报告的消毒版本。撕裂线下方的消毒信息应包含撕裂线上上方信息的实质，而不识别敏感的来源和方法。这将允许根据“需要知道”原则和外国披露准则，对催泪线的信息进行更广泛的传播。
3.6“警告”信息与第9节中的授权控制标记之一的信息具有代名词。
4.0 General Applicability
4.1为了支持第1.0节中的政策声明，情报信息的分类器在准备传播信息时应采用风险管理方法。为了将信息最广泛地传播给政策制定者，战士和其他消费者，分类员应仔细考虑是否需要使用任何传播控制标记进行标记材料，并仅在其指令授权的有限实例中使用控制标记。
4.2 In carrying out this policy, intelligence producers shall prepare their reports and products at the lowest classification level commensurate with expected damage that could be caused by unauthorized disclosure. When necessary, the material should be prepared in tear-line form to permit broader dissemination or release of information below the tear-line. All material shall be portion marked to allow ready identification of information that cannot be broadly disseminated or released.
4.3 The controls and procedures established by this Directive shall be applied uniformly in the dissemination and use of intelligence originated by all Intelligence Community components.
4.4该指令的实质应由每个情报社区组成部分颁布，并允许建立迅速的机构咨询的适当程序。
5.0 Use By and Dissemination Among Executive Branch Departments/Agencies of the US Government
5.1行政命令12958提供了机密information originating in one US department or agency shall not be disseminated beyond any recipient agency without the consent of the originating agency. However, to facilitate use and dissemination of intelligence within and among Intelligence Community components and to provide for the timely flow of intelligence to consumers, the following controlled relief to the "third agency rule" is hereby established:
5.1.1每个情报界的组成部分同意在其他情报社区组成的机密情报产品中使用其机密情报，包括第6条的承包商，以及在美国政府的行政部门/机构中传播这些产品，除非由该指令或其他DCID中定义的控件特别限制。
5.1.2如5.1.1所示，没有任何限制性控制标记的机密情报不得在分类渠道中向美国的任何执行分支机构/机构在任何原始分配中都没有给予美国次要的美国传播。删除了对情报来源和方法的所有参考和推断，以及生产代理的身份，或（b）如果产品不那么消毒，则已经获得了发起人的同意。
5.1.3 Any component disseminating intelligence beyond the Intelligence Community assumes responsibility for ensuring that recipient organizations agree to observe the need-to-know principle and the restrictions prescribed by this directive, and to maintain adequate safeguards.
6.0政策和程序，要求向承包商和顾问发布情报
6.1 General Policies and Procedures for Contractors
6.1.1 SOICS或其指定人员可能会发布情报，以适当清理或访问批准的美国承包商和顾问（以下简称“承包商”），其证明是“需要知道”而没有转介到发行机构之前发布之前，但前提是：
6.1.1.1 SOIC或她/他的指定人员书面证明，披露并没有为承包商带来不公平的竞争优势，也不会与承包商保护信息的义务造成利益冲突。如果指定的官员不能或不解决不公平的竞争优势或利益冲突的问题，则需要发起人的同意；
6.1.1.2 Release is made only to contractors certified by the SOIC (or designee) of the sponsoring organization as performing classified services in support of a national security mission;
6.1.1.3如果需要保留情报，承包商具有批准的保护能力；
6.1.1.4 Contractors are not authorized to disclose further or release intelligence to any of their components or employees not directly engaged in providing services under contract or other binding agreement or to another contractor (including subcontractors) without the prior written authorization of the sponsoring agency;
6.1.1.5释放给承包商的情报，其所有复制品以及基于该数据或从中纳入数据的所有其他材料（包括授权复制品）仍然是美国政府的财产。最终处置情报信息应由赞助机构管辖；
6.1.1.6 National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), and Interagency Intelligence Memoranda may be released to appropriately cleared contractors possessing an appropriate level facility clearance and need-to-know, except as regulated by provisions concerning proprietary information as defined in sections 6.1.1.7 and 9.3, below;
6.1.1.7智能具有控制权的控制标记为“涉及“涉及的专有信息”（缩写为“ propin”或“ pr”）的情报，除非已获得发起人和向发起人提供情报的人获得事先许可，否。具有控制标记的情报，即“由发起人控制的信息传播和提取信息”（缩写为“ orcon”）只能向政府设施内的承包商释放，除非获得发起人的事先许可。这些控制标记在下面的第9.2和9.3节中进一步描述；和
6.1.1.8 Authorized release to foreign nationals or foreign contractors is undertaken through established channels in accordance with sections 7 and 8, and DCID 5/6,情报披露政策,和theNational Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations（缩写标题：国家披露政策1或NDP 1）在与DCID和其他DCI指南一致的范围内。
6.2 Policies and Procedures for Contractors Inside Government Owned or Controlled Facilities
在政府拥有或受控设施内履行职责的承包商将遵守该指令第6.1条的赞助情报社区成员的程序和政策。
6.3 Policies and Procedures for Contractors Outside Government Owned or Controlled Facilities
6.3.1 Contractors who perform duties outside of Government owned or controlled facilities will adhere to the following additional policies and procedures:
6.3.1.1 The SOIC of the sponsoring agency, or her/his designee, is responsible for ensuring that releases to contractors of intelligence marked ORCON and/or PROPIN are made only with the consent of the originating agency pursuant to this Directive and through established channels; (See Sections 9.2 and 9.3);
6 3.1.2 The sponsoring agency shall maintain a record of material released;
6.3.1.3 Contractors shall establish procedures to control all intelligence received, produced, and held by them in accordance with the provisions of the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual. This will not impose internal receipt and document accountability requirements for internal traceability and audit purposes;
6.3.1.4 All reproductions and extractions of intelligence shall be classified, marked, and controlled in the same manner as the original(s);
6.3.1.5 Sensitive Compartmented Information released to contractors shall be controlled pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/19,敏感隔室信息的安全策略（SCI）;和，
6.3.1.6 Sponsoring agencies shall delete any reference to the Central Intelligence Agency, the phrase "Directorate of Operations," the place acquired, the field number, the source description, and field dissemination from all CIA Directorate of Operations reports passed to contractors, unless prior approval to do otherwise is obtained from CIA.
7.0 Release to Foreign Governments, International Organizations, and Coalition Partners
7.1 It is the policy of the DCI that intelligence may be shared with foreign governments, and international organizations or coalition partners consisting of sovereign states to the extent such sharing promotes the interests of the United States, does not pose unreasonable risk to U.S. foreign policy or national defense, and is limited to a specific purpose and normally of limited duration. The release of intelligence to such entities is subject to this Directive, DCID 5/6,情报披露政策，以及与DCID和其他DCI指南一致的范围和NDP 1。
7.1.2 In "writing for the consumer," Intelligence Community elements shall prepare their reports and products at the collateral, uncaveated level to the greatest extent possible, without diluting the meaning and value of the intelligence for the consumer. If it is not possible to prepare the entire report at the collateral, uncaveated level, Intelligence Community elements shall organize their intelligence reports and products to identify clearly information not authorized for release to foreign entities. The preferred method of doing this is through the use of tear lines. Intelligence information below the tear lines shall be written so that it may be released to an authorized foreign recipient pursuant to DCID 5/6. Where tear lines cannot be used, information not authorized for release should be limited, to the greatest extent possible to specific, portion-marked paragraphs to facilitate segregation and dissemination of releasable material.
7.1.3 Intelligence Community elements shall restrict the information subject to control markings to the minimum necessary. See Appendix A for illustration.
7.2 Intelligence information that bears no specific control marking may be released to foreign governments, international organizations, or coalition partners provided that:
7.2.1 A positive foreign disclosure decision is made by a designated intelligence disclosure official in accordance with procedures in DCID 5/6;
7.2.2 No reference is made to the originating agency or to the source of the documents on which the released product is based; and,
7.2.3智能的获取（包括分析判断或技术）和/或收集情报的位置（如果与保护来源和方法相关的话）的位置没有揭示，并且无法以任何方式推出。
7.3 RESTRICTED DATA and FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA may only be released to foreign governments pursuant to an agreement for cooperation as required by Sections 123 and 144 of Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
8.0向外国国民或外国承包商传播
8.1 DCI的政策是，除非根据本节的规定，否则将与不由主权国家组成的外国国民，外国承包商或国际组织共享任何机密情报。
8.2 Intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive control markings, will not be released in any form to foreign nationals or immigrant aliens (including those employed by, used by, or integrated into the US Government) without the permission of the originator. In such cases where permission of the originator has been granted, the release must be in accordance with DCID 5/6, and the NDP 1 to the extent consistent with DCIDs and other DCI guidance.
8.3 Release of intelligence to a foreign contractor or company under contract to the US Government must be through the foreign government of the country which the contractor is representing, unless otherwise directed in government-to-government agreements or there is an appropriate US channel for release of the information. Provisions concerning release to foreign governments is contained in Section 7.0, above.
9.0 Authorized Control Markings
9.1 DCI政策是授权的控制标记有关情报信息in this Section shall be individually assigned as prescribed by an original classification authority (OCA) or by officials designated by a SOIC and used in conjunction with security classifications and other markings specified by Executive Order 12958 and its implementing directive(s). Unless originator consent is obtained, these markings shall be carried forward to any new format or medium in which the same information is incorporated.
9.1.1最大限度地可能,信息assigned an authorized control marking shall not be combined with uncaveated information in such a way as to render the uncaveated information subject to the control marking. To fulfill the requirements of paragraph 9.6.1 below, SOICs shall establish procedures in implementing directives to expedite further dissemination of essential intelligence. Whenever possible, caveated intelligence information reports should include the identity and phone number of the organization authorized to approve further dissemination on a case-by-case basis.
9.1.2 Further, to the maximum extent visible, tear line reporting will be used to disseminate releasable intelligence, not subject to the restrictions of the control marking. The caveated intelligence should be above the tear line.
9.2“由发起者控制的信息的传播和提取”（ORCON）
9.2.1 This marking may be used only on classified intelligence that clearly identifies or would reasonably permit ready identification of intelligence sources or methods that are particularly susceptible to countermeasures that would nullify or measurably reduce their effectiveness. It is used to enable the originator to maintain continuing knowledge and supervision of distribution of the intelligence beyond its original dissemination This control marking may not be used when access to the intelligence information will reasonably be protected by use of its classification markings, i.e., CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET, or by use of any other control markings specified herein or in other DCIDs.
9.2.2带有此标记的信息可以在总部内传播[脚注2]并指定了接收者组织的下属要素，包括政府设施中的承包商。只要简报或情报产品仅向原始信息提供给原始收件人，就可以将该信息全部或部分合并到其他简报或产品中。除了原始收件人以外的总部和指定的下属要素或其他机构以外的传播要求发起人提前许可。
9.2.3 Information bearing this marking must not be used in taking investigative action without the advance permission of the originator.
9.2.4 As ORCON is the most restrictive marking herein, agencies that originate intelligence will establish procedures, pursuant to Section 14, to ensure that: 1) it is applied by the originating agency only to intelligence which clearly identifies or would reasonably permit ready identification of intelligence sources or methods that are particularly susceptible to countermeasures that would nullify or measurably reduce their effectiveness; and, 2) timely reviews of requests for further dissemination of intelligence bearing this marking are conducted. This marking shall be abbreviated "ORCON" or "OC."
9.3 "CAUTION-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED" (PROPIN). This marking is used, with or without a security classification, to identify information provided by a commercial firm or private source under an express or implied understanding that the information will be protected as a proprietary trade secret or proprietary data believed to have actual or potential value. [Footnote3]仅当政府专有信息才能为承包商提供不公平的优势时，才能将此标记用于政府专有信息，例如美国政府的预算或财务信息。未经情报发起者和专有信息提供者的明确许可，不得以任何形式在联邦政府之外传播此标记的信息。这种标志性的排除在承包商的地位上，无论其身份如何或在美国政府内部，未经该信息的发起人和信息提供者的授权。该标记应缩写为“ propin”或“ pr”。
9.4 "US ONLY" (UO). This marking is used to identify that limited amount of intelligence which an originator has determined falls under the criteria of Section C, "Intelligence Which May Not Be Disclosed," attachment to DCID 5/6 (attached hereto as Appendix B) and may not be released in any form to foreign governments, international organizations, coalition partners, foreign nationals, or immigrant aliens.
9.5“我们和（指定国家 /地区）”。当可以授权第9.4节中的标记要求有限的例外情况下，将使用此控制标记。仅当创始人与DCI政策和程序批准的外国政府有情报共享安排或关系时，该标记才能授权，该政策和程序允许向外国政府释放特定的情报信息，但没有任何其他形式。
9.6通过授权控制标记进一步传播情报
9.6.1 This Directive does not restrict an authorized recipient of intelligence at any level from directly contacting the originator of the intelligence to ask for relief from a specific control marking(s) in order to further disseminate intelligence material to additional users for which the authorized original recipient believes there is a valid need-to-know. Authorized recipients are encouraged to seek such further dissemination through normal liaison channels for release to US Government agencies or contractors and through foreign disclosure channels for foreign release, on a case-by-case basis, in order to expedite further dissemination of essential intelligence.
9.6.2 Authorized recipients may obtain information regarding points of contact at agencies that originate intelligence from their local dissemination authorities or from instructions issued periodically by these intelligence producers. Intelligence products often also carry a point of contact name/office and telephone number responsible for the product. If no other information is available, authorized recipients are encouraged to contact the producing agency of the document to identify the official or office authorized to provide relief from authorized control marking(s).
9.6.3 If there are any questions about whom to contact for guidance, recipients are also encouraged to contact the Director of Central intelligence (DCI) representative at the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Headquarters, overseas mission, trade delegation, or treaty negotiating team under which they operate.
10.0 Dissemination and Disclosure Under Emergency Conditions
10.1 Certain emergency situations [Footnote4]涉及对生命或任务的迫在眉睫的威胁，要求将情报传播给对这种传播中不常规的组织和个人。当国家指挥部（NCA）指示存在紧急情况时，SOIC将确保为正在进行的行动提供的情报支持符合该指令，DCID 5/6和NDP 1，最大程度地与任务一致。
10.1.2只有在以下情况下，根据以下条款进行情报的传播才能授权：（a）由军事指挥官或平民官员指定的授权确定遵守此DCID的依从性有理由及时排除及时的传播来保护生活或使命；（b）传播的持续时间有限，并且狭义地限于需要在24小时内需要信息以满足即将到来的紧急需求的人员或实体；（c）没有足够的时间通过正常的情报披露渠道获得批准。
10.1.3 The disclosing authority will report the dissemination through normal disclosure channels within 24 hours of the dissemination, or at the earliest opportunity thereafter as the emergency permits. For purposes of this provision, planning for contingency activities or operations not expected to occur within 24 hours does not constitute "imminent" need that warrants exercise of the emergency waiver to bypass the requirements of this DCID.
10.1.4 Military commanders and/or responsible civilian officials will ensure that written guidelines for emergency dissemination contain provisions for safeguarding disseminated intelligence and notifying producers of disclosures of information necessary to meet mission requirements.
10.1.5 The NCA, and/or major commands or responsible civilian officials will immediately advise intelligence producers when the emergency situation ends.
11.0 Procedures Governing Use of Authorized Control Markings
11.1 Any recipient desiring to disseminate intelligence in a manner contrary to the control markings established by this Directive must obtain the advance permission of the agency that originated the intelligence. Such permission applies only to the specific purpose agreed to by the originator and does not automatically apply to all recipients. Producers of intelligence will ensure that prompt consideration is given to recipients' requests with particular attention to reviewing and editing, if necessary, sanitized or paraphrased versions to derive a text suitable for release subject to lesser or no control marking(s).
11.2 The control markings authorized above shall be shown on the title page, front cover, and other applicable pages of documents, incorporated in the text of electrical communications, shown on graphics, and associated (in full or abbreviated form) with data stored or processed in automated information systems. The control markings also shall be indicated by parenthetical use of the masking abbreviations at the beginning or end of the appropriate portions in accordance with E.O. 12958.
12.0 Obsolete Restrictions and Control Markings
12.1 The following control markings are obsolete and will not be used in accordance with the following guidelines:
12.1.1 WNINTEL和NOCONTRACT。控制标记，警告通知 - 涉及的情报来源或方法（WNINTEL），并且对承包商/顾问（缩写的nocntract或nc）不可释放，这过时有效于1995年4月12日。该指令标记为WNINTEL。1995年4月12日之前的文件持有人应采用Nocartract标记，应应用第6.1节中包含的政策和程序，以释放此类文件。
12.1.2 The control markings, REL, REL TO, and Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals (NOFORN) will no longer be authorized for use after the effective date of this Directive.
12.1.3 For automated information systems, a phased-in elimination of the WNINTEL, NOCONTRACT, REL, REL TO, and NOFORN control marking will be accomplished as systems are upgraded or software is modified but not later than three years from the date of this Directive, except that no phase-in period is authorized for electrical message formatting procedures.
12.1.4 Remarking of material bearing the WNINTEL, NOCONTRACT, REL, or REL TO control marking is not required; however, holders of material bearing these markings may line through or otherwise remove the marking(s) from documents or other material.
12.1.5 Information that was marked NOFORN before the effective date of this Directive continues to be nonreleasable to foreigners. If the information is being considered for release to a foreigner, permission must be received from the producer of the intelligence prior to dissemination. Information bearing the NOFORN marking that is being incorporated without originator's approval into material created after the effective date of this Directive must be remarked US ONLY, if such information meets the requirements of Section 9.4, above.
12.1.6 Other obsolete markings include: WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, CONTROLLED DISSEM, NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY, INTEL COMPONENTS ONLY, LIMITED, CONTINUED CONTROL NO DISSEM ABROAD, BACKGROUND USE ONLY, USIB ONLY, NFIB ONLY.
12.2 Questions with respect to current applications of all control markings authorized by earlier Directives on the dissemination and control of intelligence and used on documents issued prior to the effective dare of this Directive should be referred to the agency or department originating the intelligence so marked.
13.0 Reporting Unauthorized Disclosures
13.1 Violations of the foregoing restrictions and control markings that result in unauthorized disclosure by one agency of the intelligence of another shall be reported to the Director of Central Intelligence through appropriate Intelligence Community channels.
14.0 Responsibilities of SOICs
14.1 SOICs职责onsible for the implementation of internal controls and shall conduct training to ensure that the dissemination and release policies contained in this Directive and the limitations on the use of control markings are followed. SOICs shall assure that agency personnel are accountable for the proper marking of classified information under this Directive and Section 5.6 of EO 12958.
14.2 SOICS应建立挑战程序，消费者可以通过该程序注册有关滥用控制标记或缺乏撕裂线报告或部分标记的投诉。有关此类挑战的信息应根据要求或年度审查提供给安全政策委员会工作人员。
14.3的有效日期不晚于这个可怕ctive, SOICs shall develop additional policies and guidelines on the use of the control marking ORCON to limit its use to the absolute minimum necessary to protect the most sensitive sources and methods. SOICs shall provide the Staff Director, Security Policy Board copies of such policies and guidelines prior to their adoption. The Security Policy Board staff shall, in coordination with the Intelligence Community, including the SIGINT Committee and the National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center (NHRTC), develop uniform policies and guidelines (including sanitization and oversight procedures) on the proper and uniform application of ORCON for approval by the DCI as an attachment to this Directive by 1 July 1996.
15.0使用控制标记的年度报告
15.1 The Security Policy Board staff shall report to the DCI and Deputy Secretary of Defense on Intelligence Community compliance with this Directive, including the need for further policies in this area. The report will include an in-depth evaluation of the use of control markings in intelligence reporting/production, including consumer evaluations and producer perspectives on implementation of the Directive. The report shall also include, specifically applied to coalition/crisis military operations, statistics on: (1) the use of control markings - collateral (no caveat), US ONLY, US (designated country(s)) ONLY, and ORCON, and tear line reporting (2) the number of exceptions granted by the originator to permit further dissemination, and (3) the number of times the authority in Section 10 was used and the documents provided. In order to inform the Security Policy Board staff of substantive detail in these areas for purposes of this review, Intelligence Community elements shall respond to requests for information from the Security Policy Board staff. Intelligence Community elements may build this program into their Self-Inspection programs under E.O 12958. The Security Policy Board staff shall also obtain pertinent information on this subject from intelligence consumers as required.
15.2除非DCI另有指示，否则本节要求的报告应每年进行。安全政策委员会参谋长应建立报告的时间表。
16.0解释
16.1 Questions concerning the implementation of this policy and these procedures shall be referred to the Community Management Staff.
约翰·迪奇（John Deutch）
Director of Central Intelligence
16 April 1996
日期
1.该指令取代DCID 1/7，生效1995年4月12日。
2.Recipients will apprise originating agencies as to which components comprise the headquarters element and identify subordinate elements that may be included as direct recipients of intelligence information.
3.This provision is a requirement of the Trade Secrets Act, as amended (18 U.S.C 1905). The consent of the originator is required to permit release of material marked CAUTION - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED, PROPIN or PP to other than federal government employees.
4.For the purposes of implementing this portion of the DCID, "emergency situation" is defined as one of the following:
a) declared Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) alert condition of defense emergency, air defense emergency or DEFCON 3;
b）针对美国或联合美国/友善部队发起的敌对行动；
c) U.S. persons or facilities being immediately threatened by hostile forces;
d）美国或联合美国/友好的部队计划或部署以保护或拯救美国人，或美国/联盟/友好部队；
e) U.S. civilian operations in response to U.S. or international disasters/catastrophes of sufficient severity to warrant Presidential declared disaster assistance/relief.