无人驾驶飞行器：猎人系统不适合海军舰队使用（信报告，12/01/95，GAO / NSIAD-96-2）
GAO审查了海军的联合战术无人机（UAV）项目，重点是开发供海军使用的舰载亨特无人机。高发现：（1）联合战术无人机项目办公室计划继续采购亨特舰载变型，尽管海军舰队指挥官反对将其部署在海军舰艇上；（2） 海军将继续参与猎人无人机项目，直到完成系统性能测试；（3） 海军舰队指挥官反对在船上部署该系统，因为他们认为该系统无法满足无人机性能和空间需求；（4）舰队指挥官预计将在1996年5月前完成无人机舰载需求评估。----------------------------索引术语-------------------REPORTNUM:NSIAD-96-2标题：无人机：Hunter系统不适合海军舰队使用日期：1995年1月12日主题：军用飞机军事采购先进武器系统海战防空系统战备测试系统评估标识符：Hunter无人机无人机联合战术无人机********************************************************************************************此文件包含GAO**报告文本的ASCII表示。保留文本中表示章节标题、**标题和项目符号的描述。正文的主要部分和细分**，如章节、章节和附录，**由双线和单线标识。这些行右端**上的数字表示**文件大纲中每个小节的位置。这些数字与印刷品的**页码不一致。***尽管复制了图**标题，但未尝试显示图形图像。包含表格，但可能与**印刷版中的表格不同。***可通过致电（202）512-6000、将**请求传真至（301）258-4066或致函马里兰州盖瑟斯堡**6015号邮政信箱20884-6015，从GAO文件**分发机构获取本报告的打印副本。我们目前无法接受打印文件的电子订单*****************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************封面======================================================================================================================================================给国防部长的封面报告1995年12月无人机-猎人系统不适合海军舰队使用GAO/NSIAD-96-2无人机（707117）缩写=，1995尊敬的威廉·佩里国防部长尊敬的部长先生：作为我们正在进行的42亿美元联合战术无人机（UAV）项目审查的一部分，我们正在评估海军用舰载亨特无人机的发展。我们发布本临时报告是为了提请您注意海军对亨特无人机舰载变型的要求方面的冲突，我们认为这应该在海军部分的计划开始之前解决。背景------------------------------------------信函：1猎人无人机舰载变型计划部署在海军两栖攻击舰上，以完成侦察、目标捕获和其他军事任务。每个系统将包括8个无人机，带有有效载荷和改进的Hunter支持设备，用于发射和回收无人机、控制飞行中的无人机以及在飞行任务期间处理来自无人机的信息。管理该项目的联合战术无人机项目办公室目前正在确定无人机系统改装以及海军使用Hunter所需的船舶改装。目前的计划是为海军采购9套完整的系统，1998年开始部署到舰队，并为海军12艘两栖攻击舰的整个舰队配备舰载控制站，可用于操作猎手飞行器。--------\1海军正在采购八套完整的系统用于部署在舰艇上，一套完整的地面系统用于训练。简要结果-----------------------------------------------信函：2联合战术无人机项目办公室正在着手购买Hunter舰载变型，尽管所有海军舰队指挥官都表示不希望在海军舰艇上使用该系统。因此，国防部（DOD）面临着投资一个不会使用的系统的风险。1995年4月，大西洋舰队司令通知海军作战司令ions that he, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, and the Commander of Naval Forces in Europe did not support deploying Hunter UAVs on Navy ships. Fleet officials told us that they opposed Hunter because of the adverse impact that it would have on flight operations of other aircraft on the ships. Some fleet representatives also opposed Hunter because its performance capability was insufficient and because the system required too much space on the ships. Fleet officials provided the following details of their opposition to Hunter: First, all aircraft currently operating from amphibious assault ships, typically including some 25 helicopters and 6 AV-8B Harriers, can take off and land vertically from up to 9 designated points on the ship's flight deck. Since Hunter cannot take off or land vertically, a ship's crew would have to clear the back half of the ship's deck to allow Hunter operations, moving the helicopters and Harriers to the front of the ship or below to the hangar deck. For Hunter landings, the crew would also have to erect a protective barrier to shield parked aircraft from a possibly errant, or out-of-control, 1,500 pound Hunter UAV. Moving aircraft and erecting the barrier to allow for each Hunter operational cycle would take about 1 hour. This, coupled with the need for frequent Hunter takeoffs and landings necessitated by Hunter's limited flight endurance, would severely disrupt flight operations by other aircraft. Fleet representatives pointed out that when other aircraft were moved to allow Hunter landings, the area remaining would be too crowded to safely conduct routine flight operations. Hunter's limited performance capability detracts from its potential use by the Navy. Hunter's range capability of about 100 miles is considered to be inadequate in the vast Pacific. In addition, when Hunter is viewing land targets, its limited range means that the ship must move closer to shore, increasing the risk from shore patrol attacks, mines, and other threats. Finally, because of weight limitations, Hunter cannot carry payloads capable of seeing in poor weather conditions. Use of Hunter would compound an already existing space problem on amphibious assault ships. Atlantic Fleet and Naval Forces Europe representatives also told us that because of a lack of available space, storage of Hunter air vehicles and related equipment (estimated to take up 12,000 cubic feet on each ship) would dictate that other combat mission equipment, such as helicopters and artillery pieces, be removed. The number of Marines stationed on the ships for assault missions would also have to be reduced to make room for personnel needed to operate and maintain Hunter. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY PROCEEDING WITH PLANS FOR SHIPBOARD VARIANT ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4 Representatives of the Chief of Naval Operations told us that despite the position of the Fleet Commanders, the Navy's participation in the Hunter program would continue at least until testing shows whether Hunter will meet its performance requirements. The Joint Tactical UAV Projects Office is proceeding with plans to identify and perform the UAV and ship modifications required to install and operate Hunter. The first modified UAV system and ship are to be ready for testing in 1997. The cost of the Navy's portion of the Hunter program is estimated to be about $340 million. We discussed with fleet representatives the Department of the Navy's intention to continue with the Hunter program at least until testing shows whether it will meet its performance requirements. They told us that they consider Hunter inadequate to meet shipboard requirements even if it meets all of the UAV performance requirements. FLEET UAV REQUIREMENTS ARE UNCERTAIN ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5 Fleet commanders plan to complete an assessment of their UAV requirements by May 1996 and will not know what their specific requirements will be until that time. However, the Pacific Fleet Commander believes that a UAV with substantially more capability is needed while the Atlantic Fleet Commander and the Commander of Naval Forces Europe believe that a system requiring less space than Hunter is needed. RECOMMENDATION ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6 We recommend that the Secretary of Defense stop all acquisitions of shipboard variants of the Hunter UAV System until the Navy (1) allows fleet commanders to complete their assessments of shipboard UAV requirements, (2) resolves the issue of whether Hunter will meet those requirements, and (3) determines whether fleet commanders will use Hunter if Navy acquisition officials procure it. AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7 In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it plans no further acquisition of the Hunter shipboard variant until an assessment is completed. However, DOD also indicated that the concerns of the Fleet Commanders about the Hunter system had been resolved and cited a message from the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations as representing a coordinated Navy position on the matter. Our review of the message and follow-up contacts with Fleet Commanders' representatives indicate that the objections to Hunter have not been resolved. In addition, the Defense Acquisition Board will meet shortly to consider a Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation to terminate the Hunter program. This further indicates that the issue remains unresolved. DOD's comments are presented in their entirety in appendix I along with our evaluation of them. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8 Our examination of the shipboard variant requirements controversy was done as part of our ongoing review of the Joint Tactical UAV program. We discussed the fleet commanders' objections to using the Hunter shipboard variant with representatives of the Commanders in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia; U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, London, England. To better understand their objections, we visited a deployed amphibious assault ship, the USS Kearsarge, and another operational ship, the USS Nassau, and discussed with the ships' commanders and crew the potential problems associated with use of the Hunter UAV shipboard variant. We also discussed the issues with representatives of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, D.C., and reviewed the Joint Tactical UAV Project Office's plans for acquiring the shipboard variant. We conducted our work from June 1995 to October 1995 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1 We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available to others on request. Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were Jack Guin, Mark Lambert, John S. Warren, and Charles A. Ward. Sincerely yours, Louis J. Rodrigues Director, Systems Development and Production Issues (See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ============================================================== Letter (See figure in printed edition.) (See figure in printed edition.) (See figure in printed edition.) The following are GAO's comments to the Department of Defense's (DOD) letter dated November 8, 1995. GAO COMMENTS ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9 1. Our review of the N8 message and follow-up contacts with Fleet Commanders' representatives indicate that the objections to Hunter have not been resolved. The message from the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations to the Fleet Commanders summarized Navy plans for acquiring various UAVs. With respect to Hunter, the message stated, in part, that (1) continued Navy participation in the Hunter program was pending results of a user demonstration in October 1995\2 and (2) fleet concerns about Hunter would be resolved in an upgrade process, including consideration of a vertical takeoff and landing air vehicle. The message also requested comments and concurrence with the plans. In their response message dated October 3, 1995, the Fleet Commanders stated that they supported the "focus" of the plans and concurred in the need for an endurance UAV and certain other aspects of the plan. However, they did not mention the Hunter in their response to the N8 message. In an attempt to clarify the Fleet Commanders' position on Hunter, we recontacted their representatives on October 20, 1995, to determine if they had changed their position and supported the Hunter system. None would state that they supported Hunter. The fact that the Defense Acquisition Board will meet shortly to consider a Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation to terminate the Hunter program further indicates that the issue remains unresolved. 2. These comments appear to be aimed at discrediting the Fleet Commanders' opposition to Hunter. We did not attempt to independently determine whether Hunter is suitable for shipboard operations. Rather, we point out the Fleet Commanders are opposed to it and outline the reasons for their opposition. We believe that these issues should be settled by the Navy before DOD allows the Navy portion of the program to proceed. 3. We do not question the Navy's need for a tactical UAV, but show why the Fleet Commanders believe that the Hunter System is not appropriate for Navy Fleet Use. -------------------- \2 This demonstration was not held because the Hunter system has been grounded due to technical problems.
