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Defense Daily Network Special Report, posted 5 May 1998 at .Dissemination of this paper, with full credit to DDN and OSS, is encouraged.

Open Source Intelligence: Private Sector Capabilities to Support DoD Policy, Acquisitions, and Operations

Executive Summary

DoD policy, acquisitions, and operations can be greatly enhanced and advanced through the use of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). Several aspects of post-Cold War politico-military issues lend themselves to an increased use of OSINT to assist DoD policy-makers, acquisition program managers, and operational commanders:

(1)突发事件往往出现在较低的层nations (per PDD-35) where U.S. classified capabilities are least applicable or largely unavailable.

(2)警告这些危机不需要分类的收集。

(3) These issues have required increased reliance on international organizations and non-traditional allies with whom information must be shared, which is difficult if not impossible with classified sources.

(4) The "information explosion" has increased the amount of available information, while also creating a new "intelligence gap" between what needs to be known, and what can be processed and exploited.

OSINT, like all other intelligence sources, is more than information. It represents a careful sifting, selecting, analyzing and presenting of open source material on a timely basis. OSINT should be a valuable contributor to "all source" intelligence, although it continually gets short shrift throughout the intelligence and policy communities.

Properly developed and implemented, the OSINT support process for DoD should include SI/TK buffers and full security assurances, proper attention to copyright compliance, access to all foreign language sources as well as automated translation technologies, very strong emphasis on source validation, and full access to supporting materials by DoD analysts and action officers.

Osint可以通过两种方式帮助DOD:(1)危机支持;(2)支持正在进行的操作,在这两种情况下都带来最佳和最相关的开源来源,以使用OSINT而不是信息来响应已建立的DOD需求。OSINT包括全球地理空间数据和全球物流信息。

Bureaucratic misperceptions notwithstanding, OSINT is not free to current users and is not being supplied by the Intelligence Community to DoD in any significant way. However, a modest investment by DoD elements in OSINT can significantly multiply the effectiveness of current classified intelligence capabilities while simultaneously improving general intelligence support to DoD policy makers, acquisition managers, and warfighters.


Open Source Intelligence: Private Sector Capabilities to Support DoD Policy, Acquisitions, and Operations(1)

By Mr. Robert D. Steele(2)President, OSS Inc. <[email protected]>,和

Dr. Mark M. Lowenthal(3)<[email protected]>, President OSS USA

“``联合国情报的概念承诺将传统的原则转向其脑海。智力将必须基于主要是通过公开手段收集的信息,即通过不威胁目标状态或群体并且不妥协的方法联合国的诚信或公正性。”(4)

"If it is 85% accurate, on time, and I can share it, this is a lot more useful to me than a compendium of Top Secret Codeword materials that are too much, too late, and require a safe and three security officers to move around the battlefield."(5)

Introduction: DoD and Open Source Intelligence. Faced with ever-increasing requirements for intelligence support--particularly in Tier III and Tier IV countries where classified capabilities have not been focused and operational funds have not been pre-programmed--the U.S. military has discovered the unique value of commercial imagery and developed EAGLE VISION and JOINT VISION. Commercial imagery is one small portion of the remarkable range of open sources that can support DoD policy-makers, acquisition program managers, and operational commanders. This paper proposes that DoD develop a concept of operations for providing open source intelligence (OSINT) to all elements of DoD, in both CONUS and OCONUS.

Osint是uniquely suited for support to DoD operations because OSINT relies exclusively on information and expertise obtained through legal and ethical means. This gives OSINT greater utility and flexibility in working with Congress, with foreign coalition partners, and with civilian agencies not routinely cleared for classified information. There are three primary reasons for this:

First, contingencies have tended to arise in lower Tier countries (as defined by PDD-35)--such as Haiti or Somalia--where the United States is paying much less attention overall and where national collection resources are least likely to provide much useful information, especially at the outset of a crisis. These are also areas where analytical expertise has been cut back into order to meet demands within the top Tiers and the Hard Targets. As DCI Tenet himself has observed, the Intelligence Community cannot now cover the hard targets and also provide global coverage.

Second, the lead-ups to these issues have not relied on highly classified intelligence as was often the case during the Cold War. Many of these situations -- physical conditions in Somalia, the existence of a junta in Haiti, Milosevic's early statements of his intentions re Bosnia, refugee flows into Goma, Zaire -- have been evident from unclassified sources.

Third, these issues have emphasized recourse to international organizations and broad diplomatic and military coalitions beyond the bounds of the United States' traditional allies and intelligence partners. These are not instances in which much classified intelligence can be easily used, given the increasing need to share information across a broad spectrum of partners.

第四,The "information explosion" has increased the amount of available information, while also creating a new "intelligence gap" between what needs to be known, and what can be processed and exploited. Both producers and consumers of intelligence are being flooded with information of mixed value, and both lack the expertise and tools to filter, distill, summarize, visualize, and digest the "nuggets".

Osint的优势是提供大量的情报,DOD在危机中断后立即发现有用。独立使用,而无需等待DCI和CIA来解决自己的优先事项和需求;并且在国防部与政治军事合作伙伴或联盟部队共享的情况下更容易使用它。

The Characteristics of OSINT -- Intelligence, Not Information. OSINT, also known as unclassified intelligence or, in the business community, as "decision support" or "business intelligence", must be carefully distinguished from open sourceinformation(OSIF), which is acquired in support of both the OSINT process carried out by the private sector, and the all-source process carried out by the U.S. Intelligence Community. OSIF consists of volumes of multi-media and multi-lingual information gathered for further processing and consideration. OSINT, in sharp contrast, integrates world-class human expertise with an integrated human-technical process to produce only "just enough, just in time" intelligence--information tailored to support a specific decision. The OSINT process includes four key elements:

Discovery."Knowing who knows" and "knowing where to look" are the heart of a global OSINT process, which leverages distributed centers of expertise and archival knowledge.80% of the information needed to create OSINT useful to DoD isnotonline,not用英语和notavailable within the US.

歧视.Careful discrimination between good and bad sources, current and outdated sources, relevant and irrelevant sources, and finally, between cost-effective and cost-prohibitive sources, is part of the unique value of the OSINT process.

蒸馏.The most important value added by the OSINT process is that of distillation, so that the final OSINT report can be as short as a paragraph or a page, and can communicate to the decision maker the essence of the collective wisdom pertinent to the decision under consideration. The OSINT process permits the out-sourcing of first echelon analysis, and allows world-class expertise to placed in the service of the in-house analysts and their DoD customers.

Delivery.最好的智能是,如果不能及时将其交付给客户,以与内部系统兼容,并以适当的安全性和可以轻松理解的形式提供足够的形式,那么世界将毫无用处。

换句话说,如果由知识渊博的专业人员正确地完成,OSINT与决策者可用的任何其他情报源一样严格,及时和专注。

Osint是nota substitute for classified "all-source" analysis. However, if the term "all source" is to have any true value then it must include OSINT where necessary and applicable. OSINT is often the only intelligence available during routine times and as the necessary first body of knowledge when the national intelligence community and policy makers are shifting toward the increased coverage required by crises. OSINT is widely acknowledged as an essential element for:

通风报信.最有经验的情报分析师acknowledge the vital role played by open sources in tip-off regarding intentions, new weapons systems, and emerging crises.

Context.迅速评估情况的专业知识和历史知识,尤其是在III或IV级国家或在美国政府具有有限历史利益的奥秘问题中,可从私营部门专家获得数十年的知识,这些知识已由其他人资助。并且可以在“足够的,及时”上轻描淡写。

Collection Management.A solid OSINT foundation is essential to those responsible for classified collection management, both within the consumer agencies and within the producer elements, because it permits the focus of classified capabilities on "the hard stuff".

Cover.即使有分类的情报,OSINT也可以用于保护资源和方法,同时仍向联盟合作伙伴,新闻界和公众传达基本见解和关键发现。

The Substance of OSINT: A Complex Range of Open Sources, Software, and Services. The greatest obstacle to improved use of open sources is not that of使用权, which is freely or inexpensively available to all, but rather that ofacknowledgement.The two most erroneous perceptions among experienced national security professionals who should know better are that open sources are "merely a collection of newspaper clippings" (in the words of a senior Intelligence Community official) or "the Internet" (in the words of a general officer). On the one hand, neither DoD nor the U.S., Intelligence Community have properly inventoried the full range of private sector offerings, and neither has a credible foundation for identifying, evaluating, and exploiting a complex mix of "just right" open sources, softwares, and services. At the same time, both within the intelligence producer and the intelligence consumer communities, there is a reluctance to accept the fact that the U.S. Intelligence Community is no longer the sole source of critical information, nor the best source for open source information.

来源。代表性来源包括与当前意识相关的来源(例如,个人公司);当前内容(例如ISI CC Online);专家目录(例如大风研究,TELTECH);会议记录(例如大英图书馆,Cisti);商业在线中介机构(例如对话,STN);风险评估报告(例如预测国际,政治ReportsReports风险);地图和图表(例如,来自East View Publications的轮廓线的1:100,000级的俄罗斯军事地图);乐动体育赛事和商业图像(例如,斑点图像,Radarsat,自动)。

Software. Representative software which is commercially available and which an OSINT provider can integrate off-site, not requiring the client to buy new technology, include Internet Tools (e.g. NetOwl, WebCompass); Data Entry Tools (e.g. Vista, BBN); Data Retrieval Tools (e.g. RetrievalWare, Calspan); Automated Abstracting (e.g. NetOwl, DR-LINK); Automated Translation (e.g. SYSTRAN, SRA NTIS-JV); Data Mining & Visualization (e.g i2, MEMEX, TASC Textor); Desktop Publishing & Communications Tools (many options); and Electronic Security Tools (e.g. SSI, IBM Cryptolopes, many emerging offerings).

Services. Representative services from the private sector include Online Search & Retrieval (e.g. NERAC, subject-matter and foreign language experts listed inBurwell Worldwide Directory of Information Brokers); Media Monitoring (e.g. BBC, FBIS via NTIS); Document Retrievel (e.g. ISI Genuine Document); Human Abstracting (e.g. NFAIS members); Telephone Surveys (e.g. Risa Sacks Associates); Private Investigations (e.g. Parvus, Pinkerton, INTELYNX); Market Research (e.g. SIS, Fuld, Kirk Tyson); and Strategic Forecasting (e.g. Oxford Analytica).

This token listing barely scratches the surface, and illustrates the importance to DoD of ensuring that its OSINT provider(s) are able to document their investment in following the rapidly expanding, often changing, and frequently unstable nature of the open source world. Beyond this depiction of the variety ofopensources, software, and services that can be applied to the answering of requirements from consumers and producers of intelligence, is the distinction between those unclassified data resources which are readily available within the U.S. Intelligence Community; within the rest of the government; within the nation (i.e., in the private sector with its universities, information brokers, businesses, media, and other information activities); and within the larger global information community. It is absolutely essential that each intelligence producer and consumer have a "map" of this larger knowledge terrain, and a strategy for assuring their ability to discover, discriminate, distill, and digest critical open-source information and intelligence.

OSINT的机制:安全性,版权和其他问题。乐动冠军OSINT提供商必须带来政府友好的安全和理解的最佳组合,私营部门精通开源版权,外语能力和来源验证问题。乐动冠军

安全。OSINT提供商的主要人员必须持有最高机密的SI/TK许可,并有资格根据需要进行任何隔离间隙。各个消息来源可以拥有SI/TK,最高机密和秘密许可(或根本没有清除),并且该资格可以与语言和主题资格相似。OSINT提供商应为许多客户提供服务,并为DOD客户提供与银行提供最有价值的私人帐户相同的晦涩和酌处权。OSINT提供商应在其建筑物中具有敏感的隔室信息设施(SCIF),并根据需要具有Intel-Link和Stu-III连接性。通过使用完全清除的人员进行需求过程,然后在内部和分包合同人员之间保持平衡,而内部和分包合同人员不符合客户的身份,并且也根据不公开合同进行操作,Osint提供商可以完全保护客户的服务股票。当找到专家(或几位专家)来响应特定要求时,OSINT提供商不应向专家透露要求或与专家合同,直到客户审查了专家资格的简历并批准了专家的授权工作具体要求。

Copyright. The OSINT provider should handle copyright through a combination of full compliance, in which the OSINT provider, without revealing the identity or interest of the client, acts as its agent to pay the copyright clearinghouse or obtain a copy through legal and ethical means; and the more common second means of avoiding copyright violation, by abstracting key ideas and data points with full citation. The OSINT provider should avoid the need to classify documents or otherwise restrict their handling to meet copyright--the client should receive products that are legally and ethically of the highest standard, and also receive indemnification from the OSINT provider with respect to copyright.

外语。除了核心管理团队所说的语言外,OSINT提供商的外语资格方法应与其实质资格的方法相同。正是OSS Inc.的建议。Burwell Worldwide Directory of Information Brokersadded to its publication an index of foreign language and foreign database capabilities. Many other capabilities, such as the Monterey Institute of International Studies, use graduate students with native fluency in Arabic, Russian, Vietnamese, Korean, and many other languages. A few select technology companies offer advanced foreign language browsing and data extraction technologies with applications already developed for Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, French, German, Thai, and Spanish. Others can be readily developed.

Source Validation. The normal concern of military professionals with source validation, report integrity, and the reliability of the process upon which the open source intelligence reporting is based merits special attention.

The OSINT provider should employ the traditional rigor of the intelligence community analysis process, in that every source should be clearly and explicitly evaluated in terms of its authority, currency, and confidence level. In particular, the OSINT provider should be conscious of personal, political, cultural, and other biases associated with Internet, commercial online, offline, and individually-produced source material.

The true OSINT provider is in the business of discovering, distilling, discriminating, and delivering open source intelligence. This is a completely different process with significantly more value than the process of open source information discovery and delivery. The greatest value that the true OSINT provider can offer is that of first echelon technical processing (de-duplication, weighting, clustering, and summarization) and first echelon human analysis by experts who can be relied upon to evaluate and discriminate and also to distill intelligently.实际上,这意味着,超重的全源分析师或决策者可以避免被开源源淹没,因为真正的OSINT提供商提供了一种复杂的过滤机制,主要依赖于主题的专家,并偶然地依赖于技术。

At the same time, the OSINT provider should offer a deliverable which permits the all-source analyst or policymaker to "drill down" to original source documents if they wish. For instance, if a question is asked and the OSINT provider supplies a one paragraph answer, beneath that one paragraph answer, in HTML format or in hard-copy, as desired, should be the expert report, the commercial online documents, the Internet search results, and the memorandum of conversation for a verbal inquiry, if that is what the analyst or policymaker desires to have delivered.

The true OSINT provider should strive to serve as the "trusted agent" for the client, and specialize in "knowing who knows", "knowing where to look", and also in the value-added evaluation of sources and first echelon analysis which pre-processes open source for the all-source analyst. Every source used should be identified and available for scrutiny.

环境全源访问。OSINT提供者是一个支持activity. While it is capable of serving as the open source intelligence stovepipe, at no time should the OSINT provider assume the role of the in-house librarian, all-source analyst, or staff action officer. Initially, as a new client and their personnel become familiar with the quality and range of the OSINT provider's capabilities, there will be a tendency to "drill down" into the underlying sources. Eventually, as the value and the reliability of the process are proven, the supported analysts and policymakers will place greater and greater reliance, and value, on the fact that theOSINT provider will deliverthe briefest possible answer, in the shortest possible time, at the lowest possible cost--and will focus on answering the question of the moment rather than on inundating the analyst with unfiltered source material.

OSINT对DOD的特定支持。OSINT支持DOD操作有两条曲目:

Crisis Support.在危机支持下,激增的努力可以利用各种私营部门的来源和服务,并为政策制定者和指挥官提供有关情况的快速但相对全面的情报,包括人格研究,意图估算和快速响应空气负责人和其他物流评估。

正在进行的操作.通常,政策制定者,收购经理和指挥官可以收到定期的宣传报告,“ QuickSearch Services”,“按需访问专家”以及战略预测支持。ReportsReports可以量身定制此类支持,以涵盖特定的问题领域,特定的命名领域以及特定的技术,系统反测量或供应商。

Crisis Support is illustrated below with a listing of the responses actually developed by OSS Inc. during "the Burundi exercise" requested by the Aspin/Brown Commission on Intelligence. The requirements were posed at 1700 on Thursday, 3 August 1995; private sector capabilities were tasked by 1500 on Friday, 4 August 1995; all requested materials were delivered to the Commission offices by 1000 on Monday, 7 August 1997.(6)

Strategic Orientation.Oxford Analytica provided a series of two-page assessments created over a two-year period for the World Bank and Prime Ministers around the world.

Academic Experts.The Institute of Scientific Information and citation analysis were used to identify the top experts available for immediate debriefing. Such individuals have a global network of life-long contacts, including top government and business officials in-country.

Journalists on the Ground.LEXIS-NEXIS was used to identify journalists of varying nationality who had been on the ground recently and were intimately familiar with personalities and the situation. Such individuals publish less than 10% of what they know, and have current appreciations for personalities, logistics, corruption, and other key factors of high interest to the Country Team.

Conflict Orientation.Jane's Information Group provided a very authoritative and easy to use map of tribal areas of influence, one page orders of battle for each tribe, and one paragraph summaries of all articles about the Burundi situation published by Jane's in the preceding two years.

军事地图.East View Publications provided a listing of all immediately available military maps created by the former Soviet Union, at the 1:100,000 level and with contour lines.This is especially important because 90% of the Tier III and Tier IV countries have not been mapped by the United States below the 1:250,000 level.

商业图像.Belatedly but no less importantly, SPOT Image Corporation confirmed that it had available in its archives 100% of Burundi, cloud-free, and immediately available for the creation of military maps, precision munitions targeting packages, and aviation mission rehearsal systems.

持续的支持可以适应政策制定者,收购经理和指挥官的各种经常性需求。尽管每种要求的深度,优先级和需求的混合都会有所不同,但已经建立了以下四种通用开源情报服务:

Current Awareness.有几种私营部门选项可获取与特定资料相匹配的关键新闻故事的每天一页列表。这些可以与Internet监控服务(例如,观看安哥拉和Zaire的讨论小组)以及对“当前内容”的学术和行业期刊的监视结合使用。然后,消费者可以选择全文访问或文件全文元素以供以后访问 - 所有这些都以HTML格式提供,具有技术嵌入式(de de-DELICARICY,CLUSTICH,CLUSTER,加权)和服从于主题专家的摘要分析和选择性判断。外语和特别高价值的离线资源也可以进行编程以进行覆盖。

QuickSearch Help Desk.通过这种服务,消费者选择of calling, faxing, or sending electronic mail to obtain additional information, while also specifying a not-to-exceed price within an existing basic ordering agreement. This, like all aspects of good OSINT support, can be tasked and delivered via existing SI/TK channels which do not require any further investment in alternative unclassified architectures, or costly A-B multi-level switch augmentation. The Help Desk is able to access the full range of commercial online services (adding the value of both knowing which international services to use, and also the skilled searching knowledge which reduces costs from unproductive search strategies), and is also able to access the full range of international gray literature sources. It is important to emphasize that this concept does not rely on a single information broker or document acquisition source, but is optimized instead to identify and utilize those intermediaries who specialize in particular geographic or functional areas of inquiry and thus have decades of knowledge about both sources and search strategies, which cannot be replicated inside the U.S. government.

专家按需.全方位服务的OSINT提供商必须提供一个高效的过程,以识别和利用任何感兴趣领域的世界一流专家。该过程应结合牛津分析(牛津分析)(政治经济领域中最强)等选定中介机构的使用与独立的引文分析以及对开源情报专家的国际国际网络的开发。最重要的是:可以在一两天内确定一名高级专家,可以依靠他们进行非常明智的分析,从直接进入国内土著来源以及未出版的材料中受益,这些材料回答问题

Strategic Forecasting.正确的战略预测方法结合了自动引文分析,自动化内容分析和选择性剥削专家判断。这种组合允许在标准“环保强盗”方法的十分之一以及在一周到十天的时间内而不是几个月或整整一年的时间内交付非常高价值的产品。(7)

Why Pay for Open Source Intelligence? The nature of OSINT leads many to question why they should have to pay for it. After all, aren't these sources that are publicly available? There are several substantial reasons that justify a relatively modest expenditure for OSINT:

1.“开源”并不意味着“免费”。无论谁承诺收集,筛选和评估开源信息以创建OSINT(一个局外人或内部分析师),在时间上不可避免的成本,访问在线数据库等方面,等等。选择的来源确实可能是“自由的”,并且充满了偏见,不准确,不合时宜或远离决策者的特定需求。筛选,选择,分析和介绍开源智能的过程增加了价值,最好的来源将not是自由的。

2. Osint是一个情报社区的继子。根据目前的实践,很大程度上预计分析师会自己承担奥西特,as time allows: reading newspapers and magazines; checking FBIS; perhaps attending the occasional conference. But none of this is supposed to detract from keeping on top of all classified sources and producing necessary analysis. The ultimate result is that necessary OSINT is given short shrift if not ignored completely. If "all source" is to have any value, then it must include OSINT. But if OSINT is going to make the contribution that it could, then it must be treated as seriously as other collection disciplines (imagery, signals, etc.), with its own dedicated resources. The key difference between OSINT and the other disciplines is that most if not all of these resources are most effective if left within the private sector. In fact, OSINT is not about the "privatization of intelligence", but rather about nurturing an emerging private sector capability to provide OSINT support to each of the classified disciplines (overt HUMINT, commercial imagery, overt broadcast and print monitoring) while also providing first-echelon historical and contextual analysis to the all-source analyst and action officer.

3. IC是NotProviding OSINT.上面指出的问题不是国防部唯一的。他们是情报界的特有。实际上,国防部遭受了双重损失:整体上给Osint的短暂嘲笑,以及先前声称中央情报局和白宫投入了大多数情报资源。私营部门OSINT产品可以帮助IC优化其机密的收集和生产,但是不应期望IC成为情报消费者所需的OSINT的账单付款人。情报委员会在这一点上很清楚:可以通过开放来源“主要”满足的情报要求是消费者的责任,而不是情报界的责任。

4. OSINT Is an Intelligence Multiplier and Cost Saver. If OSINT is undertaken systematically and with proper management and focus, it can be responsive to a very large number of the tasks and questions that DoD, or any of its elements, might pose. This frees up much more expensive classified intelligence resources for those issues for which they are uniquely suitable and ultimately saves costs as these classified means are not tasked to address queries that can be answered more efficiently and more quickly by OSINT. Further, the greater ability to use OSINT more freely saves both time and costs, while significantly expanding DoD policy options, acquisition efficiencies, and operational effectiveness.

5. OSINT Is A Resource Multiplier and Public Value. The range of multi-lingual and multi-media open sources and services is so varied in terms of coverage, reliability, and relatively low cost, that a truly professional OSINT endeavor can save DoD at least as much as it costs in preventing the waste of internal man-hours and funds against less than excellent sources, while also increasing the quality of the information available to policy-makers, acquisition managers, and commanders.

OSS。建议。OSS, inc .)建议t DoD establish a policy, acquisitions, and operations focal point for addressing DoD needs for OSINT as a Department, including oversight and programming authority for both the Services and the theater commands. This focal point can examine DoD intelligence requirements, including those from major commands supported by Joint Intelligence Centers; quickly identify those which can be met through OSINT rather than more expensive and harder to task classified systems; and begin the process of earmarking 1% of DoD's total budget for OSINT.

DoD could develop a complete concept of operations for OSINT support to DoD operations as quickly as possible and possiblyin time to impact on the current legislative cycle for authorizing and appropriating funds for DoD operations.

DoD could systematically identify critical intelligence requirements, including the elements of scope, timeliness, and reliability of sources, for each of the major DoD consumer communities--policy-makers, acquisition managers, and operational commanders; and then translate these requirements into a carefully constructed and justified concept of operations and proposed program for meeting DoD needs for OSINT--this is especially obvious and fruitful in relation to existing commercial imagery capabilities to satisfy DoD's needs for wide area surveillance, 1:50,000 combat charts, precision munition guidance, and aviation mission rehearsal imagery.

当提供两个条件时,开源智能支持最有效:

Analyst and Action Officer Training on Open Source Options. As the Commission on Intelligence noted in its report, the ability of all-source analysts to access open sources is "severely deficient". Analysts know so little about what is available from open sources, that the support process is significantly enhanced if analysts receive training about their open source options prior to being asked to participate in all-source decisions which draw on open sources. This makes the all-source analyst much more effective at specifying their needs and understanding the deliverables. The same holds true for action officers who are either dealing directly with private sector OSINT providers, or developing their all-source requirements for submission via the chain of command.

Maximum Flexibility. Analyst and action officer needs are virtually unpredictable, and it is not helpful to force upon anyone a generic package of services or even a Chinese menu of one profile, ten search units, or whatever. Each analyst and action officer should be able to specify their needs and receive tailored open source intelligence support (under cost guidelines and with management approvals, which ensure that the subject-matter and financial guidelines of the program are satisfied).

Therefore, the DoD concept of operations should provide for the integration of OSINT training into all standard DoD training and education programs, and especially the training of acquisition program managers, commanders, and their respective staffs. A mix of electronically accessible self-paced study, easy to use handbooks, online directories of sources and services, and mobile training teams could be defined to provide surge and on-going training at the entry, middle, and senior levels.

资金资料。对于国防部预算的不到1%(每年约合27亿美元),可以完全满足开源情报的需求(以及使私营部门通信和计算机服务提供商互动的电子安全性)可以完全满足。本文重点介绍开源情报支持问题,并提议每年15亿美元(每年为急需的电子安全性和反情报计划提供12亿美元的预算),以满足国防部对地图,外国地区研究的记录需求,关键的技术未来以及其他相关信息的信息元素可及时私营部门内的解决方案。

Since the Secretary of Defense controls roughly 85% of the total national foreign intelligence program (86% according to the Commission on Intelligence, 80%plusaccording to the HPSCIIntel21Report), the Secretary of Defense has the option of boldly accelerating this entire program by realigning $1.5 billion a year ramping up from an initial realignment of $250 million in 1998. At full operational capability, a $1.5 billion Defense Open Source Intelligence Program (DOSIP) could fully satisfy DoD needs for tactical maps, provide a global architecture for OSINT support to coalition and contingency operations, augment DoD overt collection capabilities in most Embassies and especially in Tier III and IV countries, and provide for a robust program of direct OSINT support to key policy-makers, acquisition managers, and commanders. It merits emphasis that this new capability will not duplicate nor compete with nor relieve DIA of its existing all-source responsibilities. In fact, this program, which DoD may wish to have DIA manage, offers great relief directly to the DoD consumers of intelligence, while allowing DIA to optimize its scarce resources against "the hard stuff".

199719981999200020012002

2.5亿美元$ 5亿美元$ 7.5亿美元$ 1B $ 1.25B $ 1.5B

The Community Open Source Program is on record as stating that the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) spends 1% of its budget on open sources, and that this returns 40% of the all-source product. A DoD initiative to increase the investment in open sources from 1% to 6% (of the NFIP) will have asignificant positive impact on defense intelligence production以及国防政策,获取和战斗。

At a more detailed level of examination, below is a short list of representative OSINT opportunities with rough cost levels per year at final full funding level:

用于映射,定位和任务排练的商业图像 $250M/YR
JOINT VISION ground-stations & follow-on all-source (10 @ $5M) 5000万美元/年
北约/PFP,联合国和临时联盟OSINT支持 $100M/YR
Creation of DoD OSINT Cells (JCS, CINCs, Services, 15 @ $10M) $150M/YR
Creation of DoD-wide OSINT Training Program $25M/YR
Creation of Internet Seeding/Sponsorship Program $25M/YR
OSINT Analysts at Embassies with Funds to Buy (100 @ $500,000) 5000万美元/年
战略预测OSINT支持(10,000 @ $ 25,000) $250M/YR
专家按需(One Day at a Time/25,000 @ $6,000) $150M/YR
QuickSearch调查(300,000查询 @ $ 1000) $300M/YR
Integrated Current Awareness Profiles (50,000 @ $2,500) 1.25亿美元/年
Contingency/Crisis Surge Support (10 @ $2.5M) $25M/YR
全部的 $1.5B/YR

这些数字仅仅是说明性的。有roughly 100,000 SI/TK workstations around the world, and at least that many analysts and action officers who require "just enough, just in time" OSINT support. It bears emphasis, repeatedly, that these modest funds will result in dramatic improvements in general intelligence support to DoD policy-makers, acquisition managers, and commanders, and that this support and the additional funding are required above and beyond the existing budget of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Technical Information Center.

Epilogue. What is important to recognize about the OSINT process is that it significantly reduces most of the overhead costs and the atrophy of capabilities associated with "standing armies" of intelligence collectors and producers (including those maintained by second-tier private sector bureaucracies). It does this by relying on finding the very best experts (with particular citizenship and clearance or foreign language qualification as required), and tapping into their knowledge and sources--knowledge and sources funded over decades by others and thus available to the client for the marginal cost of short-term exploitation. With this OSINT foundation, the very capable, very expensive, and often difficult to exploit classified capabilities can be freed up to attack the most difficult intelligence challenges, and can be exploited in the context of the fuller understanding of the target derived from OSINT.信息费用money; intelligencemakesmoney. How $mart do you want to be?�

Training Opportunity: OSS '98, forthcoming 17-21 May 1998 in Washington, D.C., offers policy, acquisition, and command & staff professionals a number of integrated opportunities to come up to speed on OSINT. A special four-hour Senior's Course, free to those sending five subordinates to OSS '98, covers changes in private sector information sources and technologies, an overview of OSINT, and a presentation on how OSINT can augment and reinforce existing classified all-source collection and production. The main conference, over three and a half days, covers online and offline OSINT, hot topics, pricing, source validation, coalition operations, and science & technology. Three affiliated conferences are free to those attending OSS '98: one on business intelligence sources & methods; another sponsored by the National Military Intelligence Association on asymmetric warfare; and a third sponsored by the Association of Former Intelligence Officers on national intelligence priorities. On the day following OSS '98 there is an international job fair for intelligence professionals, and a half day SI/TK session sponsored by DIA on OSINT contracting. The participation of over 30 DIA professionals OSS '98, and DIA's half-day event, should in no way be construed as endorsement of the larger OSS offering. For more information send email to <[email protected]>,请访问,然后单击事件,传真(703)242-1711,或致电(703)242-1700。This is a pro-government conference, and privacy protection is guaranteed.

Endnotes

1.

1.OSS。, a Virginia stock corporation created in 1992, is the foremost authority in the world with respect to the theory and practice of open source intelligence, and is a leading strategic think tank regarding national and organization information strategies, information operations, and the optimization of all-source intelligence capabilities. Its principals and associates have provided training to over forty countries. Those interested in this issue may wish to visit where there are 5,000 pages of reference material from over 500 international authorities, including the Open Source Intelligence Handbook and the Open Source Intelligence Reader. OSS '98, the Global Intelligence Forum, will take place 17-20 May 1998 in Washington, D.C. in conjunction with a separate Seniors' Course, a one-day job fair, and a half-day SI/TK session sponsored by DIA. For additional information send email to <[email protected]>,请访问,然后单击事件,传真(703)242-1711,或致电(703)242-1700。每年有40多个国家 /地区的600多名情报专业人士(主要是军事)参加此活动。

2。2。Mr. Robert D. Steele, founder of the parent company established in 1992, serves as the Presidentof OSS Global and also the Director of Collection for all OSS Groups. He has been twice named to the小动物100 list of "industry leaders and unsung heroes who�helped create the future", and is featured in the chapter on "The Future of the Spy" in Alvin and Heidi Toffler'sWAR AND ANTI-WAR: Survival at the Dawn of the 21stCentury等出版物。乐动体育赛事twe的课程nty year national and defense intelligence career, Mr. Steele has fulfilled clandestine, covert action, and technical collection duties, been responsible for programming funds for overhead reconnaissance capabilities, managed an offensive counterintelligence program, initiated an advanced information technology project, and been the senior civilian responsible for founding a new national intelligence production facility. Mr. Steele holds graduate degrees in international relations (Lehigh University) as well as public administration (University of Oklahoma), and certificates in intelligence policy (Harvard University) and defense studies (Naval War College). He speaks fluent Spanish and elementary French, and holds a current Top Secret clearance with a current SBI.

3.3.Mark M. Lowenthal博士是OSS USA的总裁,也是所有OSS组的分析和生产总监。他曾担任众议院情报永久选择委员会的参谋长(104th国会,1995年至1997年),他指导了这项研究IC 21:21岁的情报界stCentury.Lowenthal博士是一个副助理国务卿of State for Intelligence (1988-1989) and has also served as the Senior Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (1989-1995). He is the author of seven books, includingU.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy这是许多情报课程中的标准文本,以及80多种文章和有关国家安全问题的报告。ReportsReports乐动冠军Lowenthal博士获得了博士学位哈佛大学历史上的历史。他目前在哥伦比亚大学和乔治华盛顿大学教授有关情报的研究生课程。1988年,洛文塔尔博士担任大冠军危险!,电视测验节目。Lowenthal博士拥有最高机密的SI/TK许可。

4.

4.Hugh Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping" in生存(36/3, Autumn 1994), page 39, as cited by Sir David Ramsbotham, "Analysis and Assessment for Peacekeeping Operations" in情报分析和评估(Frank Cass, 1996).

5.

5.海军翼指挥官的评论释义,领导了1992年技术计划游戏中的巴格达领先航班,第一作者曾担任国家情报牢房的董事长。

6.

6.The exercise is described in vague terms on page 88 of准备21st世纪:对美国情报的评估(关于美国情报界角色和能力委员会的报告,也称为阿斯平/布朗委员会)。情报委员会在开放源方面的两个关键发现是,美国情报界本身在无法获得开放源的访问权限时“非常不足”,这应该是“资金的重中之重”。- - 很大程度上与国防部的行动有关 - 情报消费者不应向美国情报界提及任何问题,这些问题可以由开源来回答。将来,每个情报消费者都将有望发展自己的开源情报功能,并仅参考私营部门无法回答的这些问题。结合委员会在保护和减少政府保密的最初重点,试图定义机密与开源情报的“交易成本”,这显然表明“自由”情报的日子已经结束。我们预计将来会有一个情报消费者的机会,要求预算重新调整,并就机密收集的支出相对价值做出自己的判断,而不是开源智能支出。

7.

7.Mr. Jan Herring, President of the OSS Business operating group, developed this practical and integrated concept for applying proven intelligence processes to unclassified information. Mr. Herring served a distinguished career in the U.S. Intelligence Community, retiring in 1988 after final service as the National Intelligence Officer for Science & Technology. He went on to be the founder of the U.S. business intelligence community, and was responsible for establishing the business intelligence units--all relying only on legally and ethically available information but applying the intelligence collection management and analysis processes to the unclassified information--for Motorola, Ford, Phillips Petroleum, NutraSweet, General Dynamics, Southwestern Bell, and Monsanto. In his decades of work with corporations and the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, he has helped thousands understand that while information may cost money, intelligence makes money--i.e. helps achieve goals.