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标题：USAF TACS战斗管理：为高节奏的未来操作做准备
作者：美国空军官员C.B. Miller少校
论文：战争的不断变化的性质将带来USAF剧院空中控制系统（TACS）的要求，即当前的USAF命令，控制和执行框架以及战斗管理培训系统没有为此做好准备。
背景：在沙漠风暴之前进行战争的概念方法在大多数情况下是非常顺序的。在每个阶段的顺序上对操作进行了非常具体的约束测序，该步骤在该步骤之前，操作沿着相当设定的时间表进行。从本质上讲，这是对武装冲突进行的基础方法。剥离洋葱的类比非常接近描述战争的历史方法。从外层开始，然后依次朝着心脏工作。根据一些学者的说法，沙漠风暴，战争每个人都说如此革命性，其行动与以往一样。这种步进的方法将试图以约翰·沃登上校在他的现代民族国家模型中描述的那些目标集来降低或摧毁那些目标集。沙漠风暴期间的实际空战攻击了五个目标类别中的每个目标。尽管存在于顺序相，但这些相重叠并压缩到明显同时的时间。这种转变，从空中力量对单个目标集的独特顺序应用到在系统性攻击方法中的应用，是许多人认为是武装部队将在未来几年使用的新战争方法的特征。 Enhanced mobility of fighting systems and improved communications systems have dispersed and mobilized the battlefield beyond Clausewitz's wildest dreams. As a result, the US and other friendly nations will be forced to use maneuver, dispersion, speed, mobility, range, and deception to a far greater extent when facing unpredictable enemies who may potentially be armed with weapons of mass destruction. The shifting nature of warfare that we will face in the future, with its whirlwind tempo, fluidity, and reliance on responsive flexible command and control structures, begs the question--is our TACS ready for the future.
尽管在海湾战争期间非常成功，但以分散执行的方式进行集中式命令和控制的教义方法可能证明太麻烦和限制了，无法赢得未来的流动之战。沙漠风暴期间空军规划和执行过程的批评围绕着漫长的空中任务命令（ATO）过程以及对实时需求的响应缓慢。
Additionally, several manpower changes and events which took place during the early 90s degraded the officer air battle management career field and with it the system for training new battle managers. Conversion of 50% of the officer battle manager positions to enlisted billets, consolidation of three other unrelated career fields with the battle management career field, selective early retirement boards, and reduction in forces all had compounding disastrous effects on the USAF battle management manpower pool. During the onset of these disastrous manpower events, training for battle management officers was dismantled, and has only now just begun to be rectified. The problem, however, is the fixes are merely Band-Aids on the wound.
推荐:如果空军想要继续主导ir operations in the battlefield of the future it must take steps now to ensure that it stays ahead of the OODA loop power curve. The Air Force must be able to command, control, and execute air operations faster, and more efficiently than the enemy can. As a first measure the conceptual approach to command, control, and execution of air operations must change. To maintain maximum flexibility, responsiveness, and timeliness in the application of scarce air resources, control and execution must be decentralized to the lowest possible command levels. The keys to effective decentralization are many faceted. First, all forces involved must have a common operational outlook; they must be oriented similarly towards the task at hand. Additionally, the main focus of effort or desired outcome must be clearly identified and communicated continuously to all participants. Further, lower command levels must be given the latitude to use their initiative in order to capitalize on fleeting opportunities when they fall within the framework of the commander's intent.
我们必须立即采取行动设计一个培训系统，该系统将为我们的战斗经理做好准备以进行未来的战争，否则我们必须为接受后果做好准备。The entry level Air Battle Manager course at Tyndall AFB is appropriately focused on giving the new accessions the basics of controlling and Air Force aviation tactics. The shortfall in the training system, however, is in advanced battle management training. Advanced training for actual battle management positions, like senior director (SD), mission crew commander (MCC), and battle commander (BC), must be formalized. These positions bring with them the responsibilities of integrating, supporting, and redirecting the joint/combined air effort in support of the air, land and maritime component commander's schemes of maneuver as well as the joint force commander's intent and desired focus of effort. The battle manager's position, as the fulcrum in the effort to leverage our combat forces, demands that training be conducted in formal courses that are manned, equipped, and funded to do the job right. To do this correctly, the Air Force needs to create two new formal training courses. The Initial Battle Management Training course (IBMT) for SDs would focus primarily on the mid to upper end of the tactical level of warfare while just touching on the lower operational level. Students would attend this course after their control focused apprenticeship period when enroute to their second assignment. The Advanced Battle Management Training course (ABMT) for MCCs, on the other hand, would focus primarily on the upper end of the tactical level through the mid to upper end of the operational level of warfare. Students would attend while enroute between assignments at the appropriate point in their career (possible the eight to ten year point). The importance of training cannot be understated. It is the key to producing and maintaining effective, ready, combat forces, and therefore must be attended to with relish in peacetime. If we are to continue to espouse the old adage of "train how you plan to fight", then we as a service must be ready to put our money where our mouth is. Professional quality, realistic training is not a frivolous waste, it is a necessity for ensuring success in the future.
USAF TACSBattle Management:
Preparing for High Tempo Future Operations
The conflict in South West Asia (Desert Storm), in the minds of many people, was a turning point in the rapidly progressing revolution in military affairs. Never in the history of mankind has the employment of information and weaponry taken place at the blistering pace of that witnessed during the Gulf War. This warfare of hyper tempo created stresses on the supporting USAF Theater Air Control System (TACS) command, control, and execution network that stretched it to its limits. The expected trend is for the tempo of warfare and the levels of information overload to continue their upward spiral. The USAF Theater Air Control Systems (TACS) battle management capabilities are at a fork in the road which will determine their capability to orchestrate and execute the air war in future conflicts. The pace of real-time information updates and the focus on information dominance will demand more and more time-critical/real-time decision making be made by the operators at the lower level command and control platforms orchestrating the show. This decentralization will be crucial to ensuring we can operate at a tempo faster than the enemy can react to. The increased operations tempo and reduced margins for error will put demands on the USAF TACS that the current framework for command and the training process isn't preparing it for. More importantly it calls for a shift in the current conceptual framework of lower-level USAF command, control, and execution.
在本文中，我将提出如何更改USAF TACS战斗管理系统以使其可行和可靠的方法，并具有长期生产能够在未来运营所需的节奏中执行的熟练战斗经理的能力。我将首先描述过去和未来的战争特征。然后，我将评估USAF TACS及其增强空中动力就业灵活性的能力。具体来说，我将回顾当前的指挥，控制和执行的学说方法，以及对当前USAF TACS培训系统的审查。最后，我将概述一些必须在两个领域进行的更改。首先，必须发生教义变化。就我们的命令，控制和执行方式而言。其次，必须在USAF TACS战斗管理培训系统的结构中进行更改。这些变化对于确保USAF TAC可以满足未来战争所需的需求至关重要。
The Shifting Nature of Warfare
Clausewitz, in his masterpiece在战争中，将战争定义为“迫使我们的敌人履行我们的意志的力量”。（1）
In many ways, early approaches to conflict followed the essence of this often quoted description of warfare. Set piece battles, lines of warriors squaring off against one another, plans laid out down to the finest detail all serve as examples throughout history of an extremely linear approach to the conduct of war. The conceptual approach to warfare prior to Desert Storm was, for the most part, very sequential in nature. Operations were time sequenced with very specific constraints on the order of each phase, which steps preceded which, with operations progressing along a fairly set time schedule. In essence it was a building block approach to the conduct of armed conflict. The analogy of peeling an onion is very close to describing the historical approach to warfare. Beginning at the outer layer and working sequentially towards the heart. Even today Army Field Manual 100-5 talks specifically of the sequencing, phasing and synchronization of different parts of an operation.（2）
根据一些学者的说法，沙漠风暴，战争每个人都说如此革命性，其行动与以往一样。正如曼恩上校在他的书中所说的那样Thunder and Lightening: Desert Storm and the Air Power Debates：
In accordance with FM 100-20, the campaign would employ the whole
可用空气动力的重量依次针对选定的目标区域。
气势将是协调的多轴的主要武器
从第一阶段开始的空中，海军和地面攻击，战略空气
活动。（3）
这种依次分阶段的战争方法通常旨在进行决定性的战斗，这将导致敌人击败。这种步进的方法将试图以约翰·沃登上校在他的现代民族国家模型中描述的那些目标集来降低或摧毁那些目标集。军事行动在大多数情况下将依次攻击敌人的野战部队，国家人口，国家基础设施，主要生产要素，最后是国家领导力（从外部剥离洋葱）。在计划最终成为沙漠风暴的空中运动时，Warden上校制定了一个内而外的战争概念，从本质上讲，该概念呼吁针对伊拉克的领导和其他关键目标，同时绕过伊拉克军队直到尽头。(4)
沙漠风暴期间的实际空战攻击了五个目标类别中的每个目标。尽管存在于顺序相，但这些相重叠并压缩到明显同时的时间。这种转变，从空中力量对单个目标集的独特顺序应用到在系统性攻击方法中的应用，是许多人认为是武装部队将在未来几年使用的新战争方法的特征。
现代军事技术对现代战场的形状和特征产生了巨大影响。战斗系统的流动性增强和改进的通信系统，这些系统几乎可以使用到每个战斗平台上，并动员了克劳塞维茨最疯狂的梦想之外的战场。许多专家认为这种趋势持续到未来。结果，美国和其他友好的国家将被迫使用机动，分散，速度，流动性，范围和欺骗，而面对可能有可能拥有大规模杀伤性武器的不可预测的敌人。(5)
Although this will detract from our freedom to mass forces for an attack, modern systems are capable of delivering effective fires while remaining relatively dispersed right up until the moment of attack. Where in the past, even as late as Vietnam, hundreds or thousands of bomber sorties had to attack a single target group at a time (often a single target), the smart weapons and stealth technologies of today enable a single aircraft to attack a single target while providing a high degree of certainty that the target will be destroyed or disabled. This increased efficiency of airpower allows the offensive capability of the air arm to be used in a way that theorists like Douhet and Mitchell dreamed it would be. In 1943 the US Army Air Corps bombers of 8th Air Force were only able to effectively strike 50 strategic targets in the entire year, while the coalition air forces of Desert Storm struck over 150 targets in the first 24 hours of that war.(6)
许多专家认为，这种扩展的能力几乎同时启动天文数量的目标是允许新的战争方法进行的。
平行战争允许在守望者的五个环中的每一个中的关键节点（重力中心）几乎同时击中。并行战争的目的是通过超出其恢复能力来克服敌人来迅速带来战略系统性瘫痪的效果。（7）
遵循并行性原则起诉的空战的最终特征是速度，音量和极大的复杂性的操作，在敌人民族国家的深度和广度上有系统地进攻。在沙漠风暴期间，联盟以这种方式使用了庞大的空军。从1991年1月17日开始，他们针对战略军事力量，领导力，基础设施，预警地点，机场，综合防空节点，通信设施，电力设施，电力设施以及许多其他目标集合。（8）
As Col John Boyd would say, the overarching goal of this warfare of increased operations tempo is to overwhelm one's enemy by being able to observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) faster than he is able to. To do this, however, a force must have three things. It must have access to nearly instantaneous information, the ability to use that information to adapt and focus the effort where and when it is needed, and an effectively trained system to carry out the newly focused effort. Our enemies (e.g. PRC or North Korea) around the world watched the progression and outcome of Desert Storm and surely learned many lessons from it. Enemies in the future will go to great lengths to disguise, disperse, mobilize, camouflage, hide, and harden their critical resources, nodes, and weapons. They will use disinformation and deceit to try to increase the fog and friction on our side of the conflict. The effects of successfully winning this information and communication battle were evident during Desert Storm and are likely to be lessons our enemies surely won't miss capitalizing on in the future.
Knowing this, we must ask ourselves...what will the battle of the future look like? The answer is simply it will be faster, more fluid, more dispersed, more accurate, more lethal, and more difficult to get our arms around than anything we've ever seen before. The following simple table gives a flavor for the shift in OODA loop processing that has taken place throughout the last couple centuries of warfare（9）
。
| 革命者 战争 |
内战 | 第二次世界大战 | 海湾战争 | Tomorrow's War | ||
| 观察 | 望远镜 | 电报 | 无线电/电线 | Near Real Time | 即时的 | |
| 东方 | 几周 | 天 | 小时 | Minutes | 连续的 | |
| 决定 | 月份 | 几周 | 天 | 小时 | Immediate | |
| 行为 | 一个季节 | 一个月 | 一周 | A Day | 小时或更小 |
但是，这些特征中最困难的处理是未来操作的节奏和数量以及战场的流动性。高音调的高音调将需要增强的能力，以便在正在进行的操作过程中快速有效地与和直接沟通和直接沟通。此外，现代战场的流动性将需要能够迅速转移注意力以保持主动性和处理高度移动目标集的能力。然后，问题是我们当前的命令和控制结构，方法，系统和培训是否正在为我们的速度，流体，高度动态的战斗做好准备。
USAF TACS
我们今天在我们今天运营的剧院空气管制系统的结构源于第二次世界大战的早期指挥和控制建筑。组件，函数和命令结构实际上是相同的。尽管技术导致了一些掉落在路边的组件，但通过第二次世界大战，韩国，越南和沙漠风暴，大多数主要作品（除了一些小名称更改）保持不变。
与当今TAC的结构一样，过去的结构本质上都是垂直的，无论是命令还是信息流。始终在最高水平上计划和密切监督空中力量。尽管越南看到了一种全新类型的命令和控制平台的范围，但TAC的空降元素并没有改变基础
fundamental principle of centralized command and control with decentralized execution. Today's command and control structure, like that of Desert Storm, is not all that different from those structures of the distant past. Although ground radar elements of the TACS did not play a significant part in the execution of the Desert Storm air campaign, many of them were present and capable of performing their doctrinally assigned tasks. The end result is that the command, control, and execution concepts for the TACS today is virtually identical to what it has been for over 50 years.
Having thought through the shifting nature of warfare that we will face in the future, with its whirlwind tempo, fluidity, and reliance on responsive flexible command and control structures, the question to be dealt with is--is our TACS ready for the future? Is our TACS structure, methodology, and training optimized to prepare us for the future conflicts we will undoubtedly face?
当前命令，控制和执行概念
对空军满足未来战斗需求的能力的真实测试将取决于其计划，指挥，控制和执行空中力量在追求未来军事目标的任务。与生活中的所有事物一样，成功将被衡量，以衡量的是完全灵活性与对稀缺和宝贵资源的有效利用之间的权衡之间的权衡。
Much has been written in condemnation of the USAF approach to daily planning during Desert Storm. Most of the criticism stems from what, to most casual observers, appears to be the inordinate amount of time and effort it took to put together the daily Air Tasking Order (ATO). The volume of reports and intelligence processed by the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) resulted in the TACC staff swelling to roughly 2000 people, and often stretched the planning cycle out to 48-72 hours. The result was that the ATO often lagged significantly behind the ongoing war.(10)
这种完全集中的规划方法源于空军在空中力量计划和就业方面的教义原则，集中控制和分散执行。
集中控制是联合部队空中组件指挥官（JFACC）实现努力的统一性，将所有可用资源集中在实现联合部队指挥官（JFC）的预期结果上。（11）
问题发生在计划完成to excruciating levels of detail and when control is extended into the execution phase. Decentralized execution is the implementation of the plan established under centralized control. The current air tasking order (ATO) process assigns the instruments of airpower (weapon systems and support assets) exact tasks to accomplish, but does little to communicate the JFACC's vision and intent for the overall operation to those same instruments of airpower. This shortfall in commander's intent is what drives far-reaching centralized control, from the highest levels of the TACS, throughout the execution phase. The deleterious result, however, is that the front line warriors are often relegated to being simple mouthpieces relaying directions from higher command echelons that are overcome with information overload.
我们的系统目前是针对战术和战略性的许多现场传感器的结构，旨在将命令结构提高到用于处理和决策的集中式节点。一旦达成决定，新的命令指南就会在指挥渠道下传播，直到最终到达最终采取行动的操作员。这种线性命令和控制结构对针对数小时或数天所需的决策的反应很好，但鉴于未来战场的爆炸要求，实际上将是无用的。（12）
Like Napoleon at Leipzig and Waterloo, forces that operate under a centralized command system, lacking detailed instructions and a clear understanding of the intent of the commander, are ill-prepared to take independent action which is in concert with the intended focus of effort.（13）
与这种指挥和控制的教义方法相反，沙漠风暴有许多很好的控制的例子，这些例子被分散到较低水平的TAC。机载警告和控制系统（AWACS），机载战地指挥与控制中心（ABCCC）和联合战略目标攻击雷达系统（JSTARS）飞机上的机载指挥部元素（ACE）授予将任务从其主要ATO分配的目标转移到击中机票目标的主要目标目标。（14）
但是，要一直使这一成功的过程制度化，但是，USAF TAC的较低梯队必须具有两件事 - 相当地访问关键情报和信息，以及执行它所需的培训和经验。
我们的信息/智能结构，系统和方法旨在在最终将其发送给实际用户之前为处理信息提供信息和智能渠道。通常可以提供所需的信息或智能，但被挂断地在更高层次上处理或在命令和通信链上上下工作。沙漠风暴期间的Scud狩猎经历证明了需要及时信息/情报的需求，以及一种响应能力，足以利用移动目标的瞬时脆弱性。(15)
在不久的将来，正在开发许多信息和智能融合系统，以供野外进行范围。但是，在最高命令级别集中信息/情报的系统将具有很高的倾向，即降低我们在未来战斗中起诉及时行动的能力。命令的最高梯队将具有极其准确但可腐烂的智能信息。到执行指挥官意图的部队到达部队时，利用短暂机会的窗口将消失。
当前的TACS培训
从1991年开始的tac战斗管理力量s were subject to tremendous changes directed by the highest level of USAF leadership. The conversion of nearly 50% of the entry level company grade officer positions to enlisted billets; consolidation of four dissimilar career fields into one; and Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERB) and Reduction In Forces (RIF), which decapitated the field, all began to cause a degenerative slide from which we are still trying to recover. The company grade to field grade manning imbalance caused by the conversion left a critical segment of the operational air force that was shaped like an upside down pyramid, unable to grow the field grade officers the system would need over time. The consolidation created the potential for officers from drastically different career fields, with absolutely no battlefield command and control (TACS) experience, to cross over into critical battle management leadership positions. The effects of the SERB and RIF devastated the experience base of the battle management community at a time when that experience was most needed. Unfortunately, in the midst of all this turmoil, the element that has always given US armed forces an edge in previous conflicts, was left languishing. The training system for TACS battle managers was dismantled by the conversion, consolidation, SERB and RIF of the early 1990s, and is only now beginning to be repaired. The question is; will the new training system be structured to prepare future USAF TACS battle managers for the demands they will face in future conflicts?
现在，培训系统在不久的将来将被证明是不足以使我们的未来战斗经理做好准备。大多数正式课程本质上是介绍性的，主要是针对控制的，或者仅适用于少数学生。当对训练大量运营商的艰巨任务（具有最低较低战术水平的经验）的艰巨任务时，要进行策划和操纵未来的流体动态空中战，而问题的真实大小就浮出水面。我们作为系统的正式培训课程完全不足以完成这项任务。
Formal entry level training for tomorrow's USAF TACS battle managers begins with the entry level Air Battle Manager school which was reopened for officers at Tyndall AFB in the later part of 1996. The focus of this course is divergent, in that it is trying to do several things at once. It is designed to orient new officers to the concepts of battle management, while at the same time trying to prepare these officers for the duties they will perform when they arrive at their first unit. Their first duty will be as battle management apprentices, where they will conduct anywhere from 18 months to three years of orientation level weapons controller training while they begin transition to their first battle management position (either as a senior director or air surveillance officer). The nine month course is broken into three major blocks which teach air surveillance concepts, basic controlling techniques and weapons system capabilities and tactics, and a cursory exposure to the basics of integrated (weapons and surveillance) battle management. As of this date, this is the last formal school thatall战斗管理人员将参加。(16)
The course lacks the ability to participate in any large scale live flying battle management exercises, and is not equipped to participate with any joint agencies during any large scale simulation exercises. Once the students graduate from this course, they proceed to their first unit where they enter into a program of unit level upgrade training. The focus of unit level upgrade training is on refining controlling skills and enlarging the base of knowledge that the beginning controllers have on their own system. The career field plan is for entry level officers to perform controlling duties in their first unit for a maximum of 18 months to three years. The hope is that this brief orientation period will allow the young officers to garner a base line of experience that will serve as a foundation for their battle management training. There are, however, critical flaws in this plan. Depending on where the officer is stationed during this period, he/she will probably not experience anything larger than an occasional four aircraft versus four aircraft (4v4). In all likelihood the majority of experience the new battle manager will get during this 24 month period will be very narrow exposure to 2v2 and 2v4 air combat training (ACT/DACT) mission profiles with an occasional single receiver--single tanker refueling. Although there are controlling assignments where a new officer will be exposed to large force employment missions, the volume of those they will get, in the brief orientation period, will make proficiency highly doubtful. During this same apprenticeship period they will enter upgrade training for their first battle management position, normally senior director (SD) or air surveillance officer (ASO). This dual direction focus creates a dilemma for the trainee and the unit--what should they focus the scarce training resources on. The high value training opportunities, like large force employment missions, will most likely be given to the enlisted weapons controllers (rightly so) who will be performing those duties for the long run, while the young battle manager apprentice will get the left-overs. Additionally, they won't ever really be qualified as a weapons controller, so the pressure will be to focus on training for the battle management position they are getting qualified in. The short orientation period will provide very limited exposure to actual warfighting tactics, techniques, and procedures from a controlling perspective, and as a result we will be filling the battle management ranks with individuals who lack a solid tactical base. Years down the road, that same battle manager may enter training for mission crew commander (MCC) and eventually battle commander (BC) positions. In most units, training for these positions is conducted entirely through unit level, on-the-job (OJT) training. Historically there have always been advanced training opportunities, although there is a drastic mismatch between the current qualification pre-requisites for these courses, the focus of these advanced courses, and the experience levels the planned career field path will provide prospective selectees. The Counter Air Tactics Awareness Training Course (CATATC), at Tyndall AFB, is designed as an intermediate level controller course focused on enhancing the controlling skills in a two/four fighter, multi-bogey environment. Since this course normally requires three years controlling experience before attending, most young battle management officers will never qualify. Additionally, the CATATC course is only equipped to handle approximately 32 students per year.(17)
高级培训的另一种途径是通过Nellis AFB的USAF武器学校。武器学校虽然最初是围绕重大控制教学大纲而设计的，但自1990年初以来一直将其集中在战斗管理概念上。该学校的生存主要原因是增强军官对威胁策略和技术的知识，联合和大型力量就业策略，并增强了学生的教学能力。目的是让毕业生返回其单位，担任中队武器和战术官员。武器学校可以作为出色的高级战斗管理课程，除了几个主要的弱点。入学仍然要求申请人拥有四到七年的控制经验（或操作）。此外，由于专门针对未来的武器和战术官员的专门关注，武器学校只能每年最多处理12名学生(18)
。武器学校的实用性作为整个社区的高级战斗管理课程的另一个限制是，该学校目前没有大规模联合空战模拟的能力。自从实时，大规模的联合培训演习非常昂贵，而彼此之间很少，因此缺乏模拟能力为扩展的课程公用事业带来了几乎无法克服的障碍（注意：武器学校最初要求战术空气司令部（TAC）在1987年为此能力提供资金。
从很明显的情况下，旨在培训空军未来战斗经理的系统充满了弱点。除入门课程外，没有扎实的正式战斗管理培训all战斗管理军官经历了。无论基本的学术对战管理概念的曝光如何，年轻的第二中尉可能会在基本控制器课程中获得任何遗忘，因为重点是磨练他们在战术战争层面上建立知识基础所需的控制技能。当他们开始一致的OJT升级到他们的第一个战斗管理职位时，他们在Tyndall空军基地（AFB）的入门级课程中收到的学术概述将是遥远的回忆。
当前和计划的培训系统结构的另一个主要问题是依靠OJT方法来培训未来的战斗经理。这使对空军的战斗管理部队的教育和培养落入了那些无法执行这项任务的人的手中 - 单位人员。这并不是说单位讲师无法教书，而是一个超负荷的问题。随着操作节奏，平均TDY率每年超过180天；维持个人资格和培训要求；有限的大规模实时培训活动的机会有限；和模拟培训支持设备不佳；深入，为初级官员提供的高薪战斗管理培训充其量是不足的。(19)
总而言之，空军成功起诉未来冲突的能力显然是有问题的。如果战争的本质在不遥远的未来确实越来越多地转变为提高的流动性，分散，欺骗和致命性，那么我们对空中努力的指挥，控制和执行的方法就必须改变。我们当前的概念框架，即各级细节的详细精确规划，以及决策的过度集中化，将使我们能够赢得Ooda循环战争的能力。我们必须开发一种方法来维持对集中式的健康度量command, while retaining the flexibility inherent in decentralizing thecontrolandexecution越多越好。此外，我们必须创建一个具有的正式培训系统，该系统具有资源，专业知识, and时间培训我们的战斗经理，以应对权力下放的复杂性和责任。换句话说，我们的系统必须保留努力统一的宗旨的好处，同时释放了从下属命令级别的积极主动性中固有的增强的灵活性，及时性和响应能力。如果做得正确，敌人总是可以将敌人落后两个步骤。
结论/建议
命令，控制和执行：
If the Air Force wants to continue to dominate air operations in the battlefield of the future it must take steps now to ensure that it stays ahead of the OODA loop power curve. The Air Force must be able to command, control, and execute air operations faster, and more efficiently than the enemy can. As a first measure the conceptual approach to command, control, and execution of air operations must change. To maintain maximum flexibility, responsiveness, and timeliness in the application of scarce air resources, control and execution must be decentralized to the lowest possible command levels. The keys to effective decentralization are many faceted. First, all forces involved must have a common operational outlook; they must be oriented similarly towards the task at hand. Additionally, the main focus of effort or desired outcome must be clearly identified and communicated continuously to all participants. Further, lower command levels must be given the latitude to use their initiative in order to capitalize on fleeting opportunities when they fall within the framework of the commander's intent. The information/intelligence structure and systems must provide all levels an equally clear, timely understanding of the battlefield without having to flow information/intelligence up and down vertical command channels (fig 5). Finally, effective communications must exist to allow the highest command levels to redirect the main effort when needed.（20）
As a simple example, the trend in planning must move towards a system that combines the best elements (integration, coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction) of the current highly scripted, detailed, lock-step type air tasking orders with a system that clearly delineates and communicates commander's intent, guidelines, and acceptable retargeting limits to ensure maximum flexibility. This system needs to go way beyond simple identification of alternate targets, to a point where lower levels can react to and capitalize on fleeting moments of vulnerability of the enemy. The structure of the system must provide the flexibility for lower command echelons to conduct real-time, immediate alteration and reallocation of mission resources when the combat situation demands. This system of任务式订单, originally conceptualized under the early Prussian General Staff of General Von Moltke, would place a premium on maintaining the room for application of individual judgment by the command elements closest to the action that have the information necessary to make decisions.(21)
This decentralization of on-scene decision making is very similar to the principle of mission-type orders used by the US Marine Corps and US Army, as well as the Navy's command by negation.
Battle Management Training System
如从巴拿马到沙漠风暴，海地，到波斯尼亚的行动中所见；命令和控制力的定位和任务是可以制造或破坏操作的方式。如果没有经过训练且现成的战斗管理系统，沙漠风暴行动的行为将很困难，即使不是不可能进行编排和执行。当您考虑到我们从一开始就决定与伊拉克战斗的术语和节奏的事实时，这个事实更加惊人。因此，必须确保我们的战斗经理获得我们可以给他们的最好的培训。第二次世界大战期间，埃文·隆美尔（Erwin Rommel）说：“部队的最佳福利形式是一流的训练，因为这节省了不必要的伤亡。”(22)
我们必须立即采取行动设计一个培训系统，该系统将为我们的战斗经理做好准备以进行未来的战争，否则我们必须为接受后果做好准备。
Tyndall AFB的入门级空战经理课程虽然离基地不远，但将更加专注于确保新的加入牢固地掌握控制和空军航空策略的基础知识，同时为战斗管理概念和技术提供了合理的方向。但是，培训系统的危险短缺是在高级战斗管理培训中。必须正式化实际战斗管理职位的高级培训，例如高级主任（SD），任务人员指挥官（MCC）和战斗指挥官（BC）。这些职位带来了整合，支持和重新指导联合/组合空中努力的责任，以支持空中，陆地和海上组件的机动指挥官计划，以及联合部队指挥官的意图和期望的努力。战斗经理的立场，作为利用我们的战斗部队的支点，要求在驾驶，装备和资助的正式课程中进行培训，以便完成这项工作。
To do this correctly, two new formal courses need to be created. These courses would provide the initial battle management training for SDs and advanced battle management training for MCCs. The Initial Battle Management Training course (IBMT) for SDs would focus primarily on the mid to upper end of the tactical level of warfare while just touching on the lower operational level. Students would attend this course after their control focused apprenticeship period when enroute to their second assignment. This course would concentrate on the coordination, integration, and management of air assets in the prosecution of offensive, defensive, and support missions. Additionally, it would expand the SDs knowledge base of joint command and control systems integration, offensive air support to ground forces, and control and employment of ground based air defense assets (fig 6). Most importantly it would provide the foundational knowledge and skills required to conduct real-time resource allocation decisions at the tactical level of warfare.
另一方面，针对MCC的高级战斗管理培训课程（ABMT）将主要集中在战术战争层的中部到上端的战术水平的上端。学生将在职业生涯的适当点（可能是八到十年的时间）之间参加任务的同时参加。它将集中于将联合空气动力与地面和海军机动战争概念相结合。该课程将旨在使MCC对运动水平集成概念以及实现这一目标的动手技能有牢固的基础理解。它将在诸如战场塑造，联合火灾协调，特种部队整合和其他领域等概念中扎根MCC。此外，这将使MCC深入了解联合指挥系统集成，对地面部队的进攻空气支撑；以及联合剧院空气和导弹防御系统资产的整合，控制和就业的概念。像IBMT课程一样，它将继续开发MCC的实时资源分配决策，仅在更高的战争层面上才能制定能力。最后，它将开始将MCC暴露于戏剧，服务和国家级情报传感器的剥削和整合的能力，局限性和概念中（图6）。
IBMT和ABMT课程很容易与本科控制者培训课程（UCT）结合在一起，用于入门级别入伍的控制器，用于该课程的那部分，这些部分侧重于开发动手执行级别技能。这些课程可以纳入诸如美国海军司令部联合系统培训练习之类的练习中，作为所有三个课程的顶峰练习。
当战斗管理官员准备好准备诸如战斗指挥官或更高的职位时，重点必须转向上级/较低的战略战争水平。在这一点上，他/她的旅行中，他/她将通过战斗管理培训系统进行广泛的正式，技术，战术和运营培训。此外，他们的经验水平将在所有服务提供的中级或高级专业军事教育（PME）课程中找到适当的进一步教育。这些课程将重点放在运营活动计划以及战略和国家指挥权级别的计划和运作上，将提供正确的教育结合，以使战斗经理提示提示袋（图6）。
空军高级领导必须确保现有的关键高级课程，例如Catatc和武器学校完全为了培养高技能的官员和应征经营者，载人和能力继续像今天一样继续运作。表现出卓越的运营技巧的战斗管理人员应保持控制资格足够长的时间，以便在参加IBMT课程之前有资格并参加CATATC课程，并开始过渡到他们的第一个SD战斗管理职位（图7）。当适合时机时，这些相同的人很可能会成为武器学校的好候选人。保留这一能力供官员参加CATATC，将确保他们获得足够的下端战术技能，以应用武器官员的概念，这些武器官员概念在武器学校通过全部指挥和控制就业范围学习。这种较低战术敏锐度的增强基础将确保它们具有优秀武器官员所必需的知识和技能基础。此外，这将确保武器学校将继续拥有健康的战术经理基地，具有坚实的战术背景，从中选择潜在的武器和战术官员（WTO）。因此，另一个好处是，战斗管理部门，例如AWAC，JSTARS，控制和报告中心（CRC），控制和报告要素（CRE）和ABCCC将继续获得过去12年中证明至关重要的WTO（图7）。此外，由于武器学校在过去几年中将其重点转移到了更高级别的战斗管理上，因此它可以轻松地执行双重责任，提供武器官和以MCC为中心的培训。
这将防止潜在的武器官员除了武器学校之外必须去ABMT（图7）。
The importance of training can not be understated. It is the key to producing and maintaining effective, ready, combat forces, and therefore must be attended to with relish in peacetime.（23）
如果我们要继续拥护“训练您打算打架”的古老格言，那么我们作为一项服务就必须准备好将钱放在嘴里。专业质量，现实的培训不是轻率的废物，这是确保未来成功的必要条件。（24）
秘书秘书的自下而上的审查中，削减了部队，毫无疑问，我们将在不久的将来面对四年一年的评论，要求我们直接面对这个问题。力量水平下降和资金与增加的运营节奏相结合，这意味着一件事 - 战斗经理有效地训练/磨练关键战斗技巧的机会。（25）
认为，通过为战斗管理人员启动入门级课程，我们为社区解决了所有问题，这是一个关键的错误。直到我们分析战争的未来对我们来说是什么以及我们想要处理的方式，战斗管理将成为决定我们成功或失败的复杂事件中的命中率。在目睹了沙漠风暴的成功之后，我们各地的敌人肯定已经了解了否定关键指挥节点的有效操作的重要性。如果我们继续跋涉，我们将徒步迈进不断增加信息，智能，命令和控制的道路。像我们的宝贵战斗力一样，我们必须找到使空中力量的指挥，控制和执行的分散，分散和弄平的方法。我们的目标必须是一个灵活，响应且稳健的系统。我们必须尽可能地采取这一点，同时仍确保我们确定，交流和起诉给定的努力重点的能力，同时保留稀缺资源的努力 - 空气权力。
最确定的方法使得不协调的声音by having the orchestra filled with very talented musicians, using the newest top-of-the-line musical instruments, led by a wino with poor to no musical training. We must ensure that the forces that will orchestrate, direct, adapt, coordinate, and facilitate the air effort are up to the task at hand. USAF battle management concepts and training must be scrubbed from top to bottom.
首字母缩写词表
ABCCC：机载战地司令部，控制和通信系统
ABM：Tyndall AFB的空战管理课程
ABMT：高级战斗管理培训
高手：airborne command element
行为：air combat training
艾达：防空大炮
AEWC：airborne early warning and control
AFB：air force base
AOC：空运中心
ASOC：air support operations center
ato：空气任务订单
awacs：airborne warning and control system
公元前：battle commander
catatc：Counter Air Tactics Awareness Training Course
CRC：控制与报告中心
CRE：控制和报告元素
CRP：control and reporting post
DACT：不同的空中战斗训练
FDP：forward director post
IBMT：最初的战斗管理培训
JFACC：联合空气组件指挥官
JFC：联合部队指挥官
JSTARS：联合战略目标攻击雷达系统
LCC：土地组件指挥官
LFECC：大型雇用控制器课程
MCC：mission crew commander
mewu：microwave early warning unit
OJT： 在职培训
Ooda：观察，东方，决定，行动
rif：reduction in forces
SD：senior director
塞族：selective early retirement board
TACC：战术空气控制中心
TACP：tactical air control party
TACS：剧院空气管制系统
TADC：战术空气方向中心
TCC：战术控制中心
TDY：临时职责
UCT：本科控制者培训
美国空军：United States Air Force
WD：weapons director (used interchangeably with WC: weapons controller)
WS：武器学校
世贸组织：武器和战术官
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Schneider，Barry R.和Lawrence E. Grinter，“概述：未来战场的简介”，未来的战场：21世纪的战争问题，乐动冠军1995年9月
Schneider, Barry R., "New Era Warfare? A Revolution in Military Affairs?" in未来的战场：21世纪的战争问题，乐动冠军1995年9月
Szafranski,理查德上校,美国空军。“平行战争和Hyperwar: Is Every Want a Weakness?", in未来的战场：21世纪的战争问题，乐动冠军1995年9月
麦克伦登（McLendon），詹姆斯（James W.）上校，美国空军。“信息战：影响和关注”，未来的战场：21世纪的战争问题，乐动冠军1995年9月
雷诺，美国空军理查德T.上校。风暴之心：反对伊拉克的空中运动的起源，航空大学出版社，1995年1月
Mann, Col Edward C III, USAF.Thunder and Lightening: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates，航空大学出版社，1995年4月
空军手册（AFM）1-1，美国空军的基本航空航天学说华盛顿特区总部美国空军，1992年3月
现场手册（FM）100-5，操作，弗吉尼亚州门罗堡：美国陆军tradoc，1993年6月
“空军单位为高昂的速度支付高价”，空军新闻服务，95年3月8日，从dtic.dla.mil/airforcelink/pa下载，11/20/96
“空军问题 - 塑造明乐动冠军天的空军”，从Nellis.af.mil/range/99RG下载，11/20/96
“空军问题 - 维持战乐动冠军斗准备”，从Nellis.af.mil/range/99RG下载，11/20/96
"Air Force Issues - Current Operations", downloaded from nellis.af.mil/range/99rg, 11/20/96
"Air Control Squadron Hones Skills", Air Force News Service, 4 May 95, downloaded from dtic.dla.mil/airforcelink/pa, 11/20/96
“打击战争的计算机”，空军新闻服务，95年4月21日，从dtic.dla.mil/airforcelink/pa下载，11/20/96
“ Tradoc Commander强调联合培训”，空军新闻服务，96年2月21日，从dtic.dla.mil/airforcelink/pa下载，9/21/96
罗马，格雷戈里（Gregory A.
Vincent，1LT Gary A.，美国空军。一种新的指挥和控制方法：控制论设计，空中力量杂志，1993年夏
Beyerchen, Alan,克劳斯维茨，非线性和战争的不可预测性, International Security, 17:3
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War，1992年4月国防部向国会国会致国会的最终报告
营长布鲁斯墙壁,中校参谋总部空战Command/DOYG, interview by author, 5 Mar 97
USAF武器学校运营官Maj Mike Kegler，作者采访，97年3月5日
1Clausewitz，Carl von，On War，ed。迈克尔·霍华德（Michael Howard）和彼得·普雷特（Peter Paret），普林斯顿大学出版社，1989年，75,77
2现场手册（FM）100-5，操作，弗吉尼亚州门罗堡：美国陆军tradoc，1993年6月, 6-9
3Mann, Col Edward C III, USAF.Thunder and Lightening: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates，航空大学出版社，1995年4月，61
4Mann, 98
5Schneider，Barry R.和Lawrence E. Grinter，“概述：未来战场的简介”，未来的战场：21世纪的战争问题，乐动冠军1995年9月1日
6Schneider, Barry R., "New Era Warfare? A Revolution in Military Affairs?" in未来的战场：21世纪的战争问题，乐动冠军1995年9月43日
7Szafranski,理查德上校,美国空军。“平行战争和Hyperwar: Is Every Want a Weakness?", in未来的战场：21世纪的战争问题，乐动冠军1995年9月，126
8麦克伦登（McLendon），詹姆斯（James W.）上校，美国空军。“信息战：影响和关注”，未来的战场：21世纪的战争问题，乐动冠军1995年9月1日87
9罗马，格雷戈里·A·ltcol，美国空军，“ C2困境：技术和组织取向相撞时”，8月96日，从空军2025 Home Page au.af.mil/au/au/au/au/20205/volume1/chap04/chap04/v1c4/v1c4-4.htm，95年3月10日，10月10日，10月10日，10月9日
10Fischer，Maj E. Michael，美国空军。联合空中运营中的任务式命令：授权空中领导能力，论文，麦克斯韦空军基地。高级气势研究学院，1995年5月, 38
11Fischer, 55,57
12Vincent，1LT Gary A.，美国空军。一种新的指挥和控制方法：控制论设计，空中力量杂志，1993年夏, 28
13Fischer, 9
14Ibid, 39,43
15Conduct of the Persian Gulf War，1992年4月，国防部华盛顿特区的国防部最终报告，97，167
16营长布鲁斯墙壁,中校参谋总部空战Command/DOYG, interview by author, 5 Mar 97
17营长布鲁斯墙壁,中校参谋总部空战Command/DOYG, interview by author, 5 Mar 97
18USAF武器学校运营官Maj Mike Kegler，作者采访，97年3月5日。Manning shortfalls as a result of the conversion and consolidation of the early 90s has reduced the schools ability to handle students down to a paultry eight to 10 per year. This amount of graduating students is not even close to satisfying the Combat Air Forces requirements for weapons and tactics officers
19在过去的七年中，转换，合并，塞族人，RIF和操作节奏摧毁了战斗管理社区，尤其是在经验丰富的高级公司成绩中，留下了弱者到没有教师干部的线路单位。这个主题本身值得研究。
20菲舍尔，13岁
21霍尔伯恩，哈霍，“普鲁索 - 德国学校：莫尔特克和总参谋部的崛起”Makers of Modern Strategy,ed Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1986, 290,291
22Force Marines Field Manual (FMFM) 1,战斗。华盛顿特区：总部美国海军陆战队, 38
23FMFM 1, 46-49
24“空军问题 - 保持战乐动冠军斗准备”，从Nellis.af.mil/range/99RG下载，11/20/96，3
25“空军问题 - 保持战乐动冠军斗准备”，3