



THE DIRECTOR  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

13 March 2014

The Honorable Carl Levin  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

*Mr. Chairman*  
At my confirmation hearing you requested that I pursue declassification of a 2003 communication related to an alleged meeting between Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer, which was referenced in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's September 2006 report entitled *Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments*.

I understand that your principal concern is that the historical record be as complete as possible regarding this period in our history, and on this point we are in agreement. The American people deserve as full an understanding as possible of these historical events, consistent with the national security interests of the United States. Consequently, having worked with our declassification review experts, I can confirm the following information, which describes the substance of what the communication relayed with respect to the meeting at issue, without compromising national security:

On 13 March 2003, CIA headquarters received a communication from the field responding to a request that the field look into a single-source intelligence report indicating that Muhammed Atta met with former Iraqi intelligence officer al-Ani in Prague in April 2001. In that communication, the field expressed significant concern regarding the possibility of an official public statement by the United States Government indicating that such a meeting took place. The communication


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noted that information received after the single-source report raised serious doubts about that report's accuracy.

In particular, the field noted that while it remained possible that a meeting between Atta and al-Ani took place, investigative records subsequently placed Atta in the United States just before and just after the date on which the single-source report said the meeting was to have occurred, making it unlikely that Atta was in Prague at the time of the alleged meeting. The field also warned that both FBI and CIA had previously told foreign intelligence officials that they were skeptical that Atta was in Prague. Finally, the field observed that "identifications" like the one that was made by the source of the earlier report, during a period of high emotion four months after the September 11 attacks, could be faulty and would require further evidence. The field added that, to its knowledge, "there is not one USG [counterterrorism] or FBI expert that...has said they have evidence or 'know' that [Atta] was indeed [in Prague]. In fact, the analysis has been quite the opposite."

I hope this letter answers any outstanding questions about the correspondence in question and addresses our shared interest in creating an accurate and complete historical record.

Sincerely,



John O. Brennan