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Statement for the Record

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## INTRODUCTION

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, LTG Flynn and I are pleased to appear before you today to discuss the importance of intelligence within the Department of Defense. The unclassified nature of this statement precludes us from discussing in detail many aspects of Defense Intelligence, as well as sharing some of our greatest successes. We welcome the opportunity to meet in closed session to fully discuss Defense Intelligence capabilities and contributions with you.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE IN DOD

Before I discuss the importance of Defense Intelligence in achieving our national security objectives, I would like to review some of our most pressing national security challenges. First and foremost, we seek nothing less than the strategic defeat of al-Qa'ida—dismantling and defeating core al-Qa'ida in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, defeating its affiliates on the Arabian Peninsula, in Iraq and Syria, and in East and North Africa, and preventing the group from reconstituting. Second, we must successfully transition our mission in Afghanistan. Third, as the Arab world undergoes a historic transition, we must posture ourselves for the “new normal” that brings with it increased instability and violence and we must accelerate the transition to a representative government in Syria. Fourth, we must prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems, specifically with regard to Iran and North Korea. Fifth, we must defend against cyber threats. Sixth, we must deter and defeat aggression, ensuring our continued access to the global commons, and to critical regions such as

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East Asia. To be successful in this effort, we must be able to counter rapidly evolving anti-access/area denial threats. Seventh, we must ensure that we continue to provide decisive intelligence and decision advantage to national policy makers and our operators, and that we are postured to prevent strategic surprise. Finally, we must ensure the continued economic leadership of the United States—this is the foundation upon which our long-term national security rests.

At the same time as our intelligence and defense budgets are declining, the challenges we face are increasing and becoming more complex. Intelligence is a major source of U.S. advantage. It informs wise policy and enables precision operations. It is our front line of defense. The continued war against al-Qa'ida and the instability in the Middle East and North Africa requires us to continue to enhance our counter-terrorism capabilities. Our national security strategy in Asia will require significantly different investments over the next 15 years in order to obtain the Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities most appropriate to the unique challenge of ensuring access in the Pacific. Likewise, countering cyber threats and nuclear proliferation requires new resources as well as new ways of operating. We also are improving our human intelligence capabilities by implementing our Defense Clandestine Service. Lastly, critical intelligence capabilities such as our overhead and cryptologic architectures continue to require recapitalization and modernization. Budgetary instability and the prospect of further deep cuts put these investments at risk.

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### HOW DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE IS STRUCTURED

Defense Intelligence is comprised of the DoD organizations, infrastructure, and measures of the intelligence and counter-intelligence components of the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), the military services, the three Combat Support Agencies (CSAs) (Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), the National Reconnaissance Office. Defense Intelligence has just under 60,000 civilians and 123,000 military members supporting our national and military intelligence missions, both here at home and alongside our combat forces worldwide.

Defense Intelligence partners at all levels with our counterparts in the broader Intelligence Community (IC), including the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and numerous other elements.

Defense Intelligence consists of the following intelligence and counter-intelligence elements:

- **Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA):** The DIA mission is to satisfy the military intelligence requirements of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the DNI. DIA provides the military intelligence contribution to national foreign intelligence and CI. The Director, DIA, serves as the Defense Collection Manager, operates the Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate (J-2) in support of the Secretary and CJCS, and is the Functional Manager for Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) as well as Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT), including the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS).

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- **National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS):** NSA is the U.S. government lead for cryptology, and its mission encompasses both Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and information assurance (IA) activities. As the Functional Manager for SIGINT, the Director, NSA, serves as the principal SIGINT and IA advisor to the Secretary, CJCS, COCOMs, Secretaries of the military services, and the DNI. The Director also serves as Chief of the CSS, which is comprised of the military elements conducting SIGINT and other cryptologic operations. Lastly, the Director is dual-hatted as Commander, USCYBERCOM, ensuring DoD's ability to operate effectively in cyberspace.
- **National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA):** NGA provides geospatial intelligence in support of U.S. national security objectives to DoD, the IC, and other federal entities. It also provides GEOINT for both safety of navigation and combat support for U.S. & allied forces. The Director, NGA, serves as the program manager for the National Geospatial Intelligence Program and the Functional Manager for the National System for Geospatial Intelligence.
- **National Reconnaissance Office (NRO):** The NRO is responsible for the research, development, acquisition, launch and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems to collect intelligence and information in support of national and DoD missions. Jointly staffed by the DoD and the CIA, NRO-provided capabilities empower the CSAs to accomplish their missions. The Director, NRO, serves as the principal advisor for overhead reconnaissance.
- **Army Intelligence:** Led by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2), Army military intelligence (MI) soldiers and sensors provide a full-spectrum intelligence capability to support Army efforts ranging from irregular warfare to major combat operations. Organic MI units are embedded in every Army echelon from tactical maneuver elements to theater headquarters. Example components include the Army's Intelligence and Security Command

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(INSCOM), a major command that conducts multi-discipline and all-source intelligence operations, and the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), which produces and disseminates all-source intelligence on foreign nation-state and irregular ground forces.

- **Navy Intelligence:** Led by the Director of Naval Intelligence/Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance (DCNO N2/N6), Navy Intelligence ensures a deep understanding of the maritime domain, including forward presence, maritime security, humanitarian assistance & disaster relief, power projection, sea control, and deterrence, providing decision advantage for Navy and Joint warfighters. Naval Intelligence also includes the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Fleet Intelligence Office, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service.
- **Marine Corps Intelligence:** Led by the Director of Intelligence, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) has service staff responsibility for ISR, GEOINT, advanced geospatial intelligence, SIGINT, HUMINT, MASINT, and CI for Marine Corps units.
- **Air Force Intelligence:** The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for ISR (AF/A2) is responsible for end-to-end functional management of all Air Force ISR capabilities in the air and space domains. Two field operating agencies report to the AF/A2: the Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency (AFIAA), and the Air Force ISR Agency (AFISRA), the latter organization also overseeing the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC).

Additionally, the USD(I) exercises oversight of the security elements of the Department of Defense, including the Defense Security Service:

- **Defense Security Service (DSS):** The DSS administers the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) on behalf of DoD and 23 other federal agencies, as well as overseeing approximately 13,000 contractor facilities cleared for access to classified information. In

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addition to security, DSS provides the U.S. cleared industrial base with counterintelligence support to protect classified information.

### **MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE**

Under Titles 10 and 50 of the United States Code, the Secretary of Defense has broad policy and budgetary responsibility for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted by DoD components and personnel. In addition, under Title 50, the Secretary has several specific statutory responsibilities for elements of the IC that are part of the DoD, including DIA, NGA, NSA, and the NRO. Consistent with the DNI's statutory responsibilities, the Secretary is responsible for the continued operation of those elements as effective organizations for the conduct of their missions in order to satisfy DoD and IC requirements.

Congress established the USD(I) in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, enabling DoD to strengthen its management of Defense Intelligence. As the USD(I), I am the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, CI, and security matters. It is my job to relate and integrate Defense Intelligence, and to that end I exercise the Secretary's authority, direction, and control over the defense agencies and DoD field activities that are defense intelligence, CI, or security components.

I am also dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) in the office of the DNI. The DNI and Secretary of Defense jointly established the DDI in 2007 to enhance integration, collaboration and information sharing between Defense Intelligence and the broader IC. My close relationship with Director Clapper—himself a former USD(I) and the first DDI, and someone intimately familiar with Defense Intelligence—enables DoD and the IC to work

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seamlessly to manage, resource, and apply intelligence capabilities in pursuit of our national security objectives.

Director Clapper and I each manage our respective resource portfolios: the DNI executes the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and the USD(I) executes the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). To characterize the relative scale of our portfolios, in the FY 2013 President's Budget Request, the NIP request totaled \$52.6 billion compared to a \$19.2 billion request to fund the MIP. The DoD MIP includes intelligence, CI, and intelligence-related programs, projects, or activities that provide capabilities to effectively meet warfighter operational and tactical requirements. As the MIP Program Executive, I provide governance and oversight to the MIP through a structured business process, closely integrated with the DoD Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES).

### **SUPPORTING NATIONAL DECISION MAKERS AND THE WARFIGHTER**

Defense Intelligence enables our national decision makers and our warfighters to accomplish their objectives. As I previously mentioned, many of our successes are by necessity classified, and I look forward to discussing them in closed session.

In broad terms, however, Defense Intelligence enables national and tactical collection and analysis in pursuit of our national security objectives. Consumers of Defense Intelligence range from the President, the Secretary, Combatant Commanders, foreign partners and allies, all the way down to our tactical warfighters: the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and civilian intelligence professionals deployed in harm's way. Defense Intelligence helps these men and women understand the nature of emerging threats, establishing our peacetime situational awareness and alerting our leadership to when that peace is threatened in order to avoid strategic surprise. Once engaged in conflict, our air, space, sea, ground and cyber ISR capabilities deliver



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unparalleled intelligence advantage to U.S. forces. Delivering that intelligence advantage requires the dedicated efforts of tens of thousands of highly skilled personnel, supported globally, no matter how austere or remote their operating environment.

### **CONCLUSION**

Returning to my earlier comments, we are living in a dangerous world. Developing and sustaining intelligence advantage is challenging in the best of times; it is sure to be made even more difficult in an era of declining resources. I am committed to working with the Congress to find the best way to continue delivering this intelligence advantage to the nation.

Thank you for the opportunity to address this Subcommittee today, and we look forward to your questions.