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HEARING  
ON  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT  
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013  
AND  
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED  
PROGRAMS  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION

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FULL COMMITTEE HEARING  
ON  
**BUDGET REQUESTS FROM  
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND  
U.S. AFRICA COMMAND**

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HEARING HELD  
FEBRUARY 29, 2012



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**FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 29, 2012.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony from the commanders of the United States European Command and the United States Africa Command. I am pleased to welcome Admiral James Stavridis, Commander of the U.S. European Command and the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and General Carter Ham, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.

Gentlemen, thank you for your long and distinguished careers and your service to our Nation.

The last year has been very busy for both of your commands, from operations in Libya to the current tensions with Israel and Iran and the recent announcements of force posture changes to our U.S. forces deployed in Europe.

Admiral Stavridis, for the last 2 years before this committee you have strongly advocated for the presence of four Army brigade combat teams. But 2 weeks ago the Defense Department announced its decision to withdraw the two heavy BCTs [Brigade Combat Teams] from Europe. You have talked about the ready, proven, mature basing infrastructure in Europe that allows the U.S. military to rapidly respond to crises in the world's most likely hot spots. I am worried about the decisions being made for the sake of efficiencies and budget that change our force posture in Europe and neglect our commitment to regional allies and stability.

I also want to highlight my continuing concerns about President Obama's missile defense strategy. It appears the United States is spending \$4 on regional missile defense, like the European phased adaptive approach, for every \$1 it is spending on homeland defense. What is more, European missile defense will be a national contribution to NATO, meaning the costs will be borne entirely by the U.S. at a time when most of NATO is failing to meet even the

2 percent of GDP [Gross Domestic Product] threshold for NATO membership.

I am also concerned that the new strategy continues to provide sufficient resources to EUCOM [European Command] for the defense of Israel, given the growing threats to Israel and its security. It is important the United States upholds our pledge to defend one of the most reliable and loyal allies from threats to their security and existence.

General Ham, although operations in Libya concluded last October, there remain significant challenges to stability and security on the African continent. While I am glad that the brutal Libyan dictator Qadhafi is gone, the country is still transitioning. A stable peace may not come for some time.

Meanwhile, violent extremist organizations continue to be a significant concern in Africa. The attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria, especially against Christians, are extremely worrisome. Somalia remains a continuing source of instability, still hosting Al Qaeda and its affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist organization. The increasing coordination between Al Qaeda and al-Shabaab is a dangerous development and a reminder of the threat posed by radicalism, terrorism, and ungoverned spaces.

Piracy remains a serious threat in the Gulf of Aden, threatening commercial shipping in a major sea lane. The recent Navy SEAL [Sea Air and Land] operation rescuing two hostages, including the American Jessica Buchanan was good news, but we must find a way to prevent these violent criminal acts of piracy and terrorism from happening in the first place.

Nevertheless, the new defense strategy appears to emphasize presence and engagement in Asia at the expense of other regions, including Africa. We look forward to your testimony shedding additional light on these matters.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

The CHAIRMAN. Ranking Member Smith.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank both Admiral Stavridis and General Ham for being before us today and for their outstanding leadership and service to our country. We have two great leaders in two very important commands. I appreciate your service. Both in Europe and in Africa, there are many challenges going forward.

Certainly our relationship with NATO is critical as we continue to fight in Afghanistan, and it will be critical going forward as we look for ways to partner on the various challenges that we have faced. It has been successful in the past as we have dealt with situations in the Balkans, in Libya; and, Admiral Stavridis, I appreciate your leadership in maintaining those relationships. It is critical to us meeting our national security needs.

And certainly in Africa there are growing challenges. It is a region that I have always been concerned about. Clearly, in the last 10 years, our focus has been on Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan

region, and rightly so, to some extent. That is where we were fighting the fight. But, at the same time, there are growing problems in the African region, in Somalia, but then also in Nigeria and Mali as Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula and also Al Qaeda in the land of the Islamic Maghreb are both rising and extremely problematic.

Stability in Africa is going to be critical because it is clearly a potential breeding ground for Al Qaeda and like-minded ideologies. We are going to need to continue to pay close attention to that area and be mindful of the need to spend some resources there.

Now the overall challenge that you will hear throughout this hearing is you don't have enough resources to do all of what I just described, much less the considerable more than what I just described that you have to do. We are aware of that challenge. The budget is a challenge right now. It is a challenge for the countries in Europe and our NATO allies as they try to figure out how to deal with deficits while at the same time meeting national security needs.

But I do hope the committee will keep in mind that, as Admiral Mullen said, the greatest threat to our national security, he felt, was our weak economy and our budget deficit. So trying to meet that is also a national security need and also something that this committee should be concerned about.

And certainly we have finite resources in meeting the concerns that we have. And I have issued this challenge many times before this committee, that if Members are upset about the amount of money being spent somewhere, then tell us where we can find it. That is a challenge that has not yet been met. Some have mentioned that the stimulus bill was a mistake, and it may or may not have been. I am not going to debate that issue. But that money has been spent. So from an accounting perspective, that doesn't help.

We need to realistically look at our budget. And if this committee realistically looks at the budget and says we don't have enough money, then let's propose where we are going to cut spending and let's propose where we are going to raise taxes in order to make that up.

Because I do believe the Armed Services Committee has responsibilities that go just beyond this committee and just the Department of Defense. We have a responsibility for the national security of this Nation in all its aspects, and we need to figure out how to meet that challenge.

And I have enormous sympathy for the two gentlemen seated before us and all others who have come in previous weeks and will come in the weeks ahead because you are dealing with scarce resources and very difficult challenges. So we understand that, and that has to be part of the equation when you are figuring out how to meet those challenges, to live within the budget that we all have to live within.

With that, I look forward to the testimony from our two witnesses explaining to us how they are going to meet those very difficult challenges in this very difficult budget environment and to their answers to the committee's questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.  
Admiral.

**STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER,  
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, NATO SUPREME ALLIED COM-  
MANDER EUROPE**

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you very much for having us down to talk about the important issues that both the chairman and the ranking member have articulated.

I want to acknowledge it is a pleasure for me to be here with Carter Ham, a good friend. We would say in the Navy, a great shipmate. Carter, thanks for being a part of this hearing.

Sir, I have a full and prepared statement. I ask that it be entered for the record, as you always allow me.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. So for 3 years now I have been appearing here and doing my best to lead U.S. European Command and also work in NATO.

And just to highlight a couple of things since the last time I appeared in front of the committee about a year ago: We have concluded a campaign in Libya. We have continued our hard work in Afghanistan. I speak from a NATO perspective here. We are working hard, both U.S. and NATO, in the Balkans to maintain stability there. I think we have, in fact, been able to strengthen our partnerships in Europe, which are important to us around the world; and we have found time to work on some of the new and emerging areas of security—special operations, cyber, interagency, private/public, countertrafficking. I think we are making progress in all those areas.

And at U.S. European Command, we continue to focus on defending America forward. And if I were to articulate sort of three things that we work very hard to do, the first is to be ready, because the unexpected will occur. A year ago at this time, we saw a very sudden change of events with the Arab Spring. In U.S. European Command, we try to be ready to execute our contingency plans and be ready for the unexpected.

Secondly, we try and conduct operations effectively. We do that both within the confines of U.S. European Command but, also, many U.S. European Command based units forward deploy into Afghanistan and into Iraq. We support that, and we consider that part of our operational responsibility.

And then, thirdly, we work, as I mentioned, very hard on partnerships. Because I do firmly believe, although we see great strategic challenge in the Pacific and in the Middle East, I think we will continue to need these strategic partnerships that we have developed over decades in Europe.

We are also working, as the chairman mentioned, on missile defense, weapons of mass destruction, focusing on the new strategic guidance that we, all of us, combatant commanders, work together with the service chiefs and with the civilian partners in the Office



of the Secretary of Defense. And that has created a change in our European posture. We are going to reduce our current presence there, part of a larger reduction that has really been going on for 20 years. We have reduced from almost 400,000 troops in Europe at the height of the Cold War, troops and civilians, down today to somewhere under 100,000, about a 75 percent reduction.

That will continue, as the chairman mentioned, with the reduction of two heavy brigade combat teams coming out. We are going to add a rotational presentation which I think will ameliorate that a bit, and I am glad to answer questions about that as we go along.

I am very much focused on the question of why do we need to continue to engage in Europe. I think people ask that question, and I would answer it with several different things.

First of all, the economic base, although under stress, as are many economies around the world, the European economy is still about 25 percent of the world's GDP, about the same size as that of the United States.

Secondly, the geography of Europe itself is important. It really is the nexus point between the United States and our operations in Africa and our operations in Central Command region. And of course you will hear from General Mattis next week.

Thirdly, the NATO alliance I think continues to be of great importance to us. As we look at, for example, Afghanistan, we see 40,000 allied troops standing alongside 90,000 U.S. troops. It is a significant contribution.

Fourthly, this is the part of the world that really shares our values: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly. We stand with Europe in many, many ways philosophically.

And then, fifth and finally, the technology, the trained militaries that are available to us to come and partner around the world, as I have described.

So I think for all those reasons Europe will continue to matter. I hope to make the case that we are approaching it in a balanced way, and I believe that as we look at the challenges ahead we will endeavor to meet them.

I want to close by simply saying thank you to the members of the committee. You support our military magnificently, and we appreciate it every day. From the men and women of U.S. European Command, it is an honor to be with you.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement Admiral Stavridis can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral.  
General.

**STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.  
AFRICA COMMAND**

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, and Members of the committee, thanks very much for this opportunity to discuss with you the accomplishments of the men and women of the United States Africa Command.

I really am honored to be here with Admiral Stavridis. He is a respected colleague, an old friend, and, truth be told, an old boss.

Operations in Libya truly have brought U.S. European Command and Africa Command to a higher level of collaboration, and this year we will continue to work closely together as we seek to more effectively address the security challenges in our respective areas of responsibility.

During the last year, significant changes swept across the African continent. The broad wave of democratic movements that began in Tunisia spread faster and more broadly than many forecasted. The Republic of South Sudan became the world's newest nation. In Nigeria, as the chairman mentioned, Boko Haram conducted violent attacks and demonstrated an increased threat to Western interests. And in the Horn of Africa, al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda publicly formalized their longstanding merger.

Security in Africa, indeed, continues to be influenced by external actors, by rapid economic developments, population growth, and the overall size and diversity of the continent itself.

In line with the new defense strategic guidance, we have prioritized our efforts, focusing on the greatest threats to America, Americans, and American interests. Countering the threats posed by Al Qaeda affiliates in east and northwest Africa remains my number one priority. Strengthening the defense capabilities of our partners to responsibly address security challenges remains an integral part of all we do. Strengthening regional capabilities and peacekeeping and maritime security also remain important areas of focus. Our engagements are designed to be innovative, low cost, and have a small footprint. In Africa, truly a small investment can go a long way.

As I travel across Africa I have been encouraged by the optimism of African leaders in confronting the challenges and embracing the opportunities ahead. I believe that, in the long run, it is Africans who are best able to address Africa's security challenges. Because of this and because a safe, secure, and stable Africa is in the U.S. national interest, we at U.S. Africa Command will continue to strive to be the security partner of choice in Africa.

Everything U.S. Africa Command has accomplished has been the result of the professionalism and dedication of the uniformed and civilian women and men of the Command, our strong partnerships in Africa, and our teammates across the U.S. Government. I appreciate the tools that you have given us to execute our missions, including new authorities under sections 1206 and 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act.

Meeting our intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance requirements continues to be a great challenge; and I am working with the Department of Defense to gain additional capabilities to monitor the activities of Al Qaeda and its affiliates in east, north, and West Africa.

ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] is also essential to U.S. Africa Command's ongoing efforts to assist the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, the Central African Republic, and the Republic of South Sudan to defeat the Lord's Resistance Army in central Africa.

Again, I join Admiral Stavridis in thanking the committee for its enduring support, without which the United States Africa Command would be unable to accomplish its missions.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement General Ham can be found in the Appendix on page 141.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Admiral Stavridis, the new strategy talks about reorienting our forces away from Europe to other regions. In light of the recent announcement that two brigade combat teams will come out of Europe and your public support for continued U.S. military presence in Europe, what are the risks and gaps to EUCOM's abilities to respond to emerging regional threats and deter aggressors, including defending Israel from potential attacks from its enemies? With fewer forces, what will EUCOM realistically no longer be able to do?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Chairman, thank you.

First of all, just to sort of set the stage, again, we are in the middle of coming down from a Cold War-high of 400,000 troops in Europe. So I believe that the reduction in the two BCTs that we are talking about, the 170th and the 172nd, these are both heavy brigades, they will come out of Europe in 2013 and 2014.

We are also going to take out one A-10 squadron and one air control squadron as well. So this is going to represent, sir, in the aggregate about a 15-percent reduction in our forces in Europe.

I am content that we have examined this strategically; and while there is, obviously, some additional risk in the reduction of forces, that it is a manageable level of risk and it is appropriate in the larger global context. All of the combatant commanders, all of the service chiefs came together to discuss this. We all had the opportunity to present. Again, I support the strategy, and I support this reduction.

In terms of how it will affect us, we are looking at how we can mitigate for that increased risk. One of the things that we have settled on is to have a dedicated brigade combat team in the United States that will come on a rotational basis to Europe. So we will have the benefit of bringing that in. It won't be static in Germany, as the previous brigades were, but will be available to deploy to Eastern Europe, to the Baltics, to the Balkans. So I think that will help us mitigate this level of risk.

In terms of the aircraft reductions, even though we are taking out some aircraft, we are going to bring some new aircraft in, including the V-22, which is optimized for special operations. We are going to add a few ships that are going to be part of the missile defense system. So I think, Chairman, in the aggregate, I believe, although we are accepting a level of additional risk, I think it is a manageable level of risk when I look at the mitigation that we put together.

In terms of Israel specifically, which you mentioned, I focus on our military-to-military relationships with Israel very closely. Israel is a proud and strong nation. We are very proud of our relationships. They run the spectrum of education, weapons systems, financing, funding, and so forth as well as the missile defense piece. I am also content that these reductions in Europe will not affect our ability to partner effectively with Israel.

The CHAIRMAN. I feel good about the fact that you and the combatant commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the chiefs

have had months to work on this. And I appreciate that you support the final decisions. I understand when you were all in a room, I am sure everybody had differences, but it is important that you do come together in support of it.

If you had not been facing these budget cuts, however, the \$487 billion, the sequestration that is set to hit us in January, would you have recommended making these cuts?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it is fair to say that all of these cuts were in the context of a \$500 billion reduction in defense over a 10-year period and that they must be understood in that context.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General Ham, I have got a multipart question here.

What do you consider the top three threats to regional stability? How does the changing force posture in Europe and evolving plans for building partnership capacity affect your ability to respond to these threats in a timely and effective manner? And how does the Al Qaeda and al-Shabaab merger impact AFRICOM [Africa Command] planning and its building partner capacity programs for counterterrorism?

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, I would categorize broadly the number one threat for us is countering violent extremist organizations that present threats to America, Americans, and American interests that might emanate—those threats which might emanate from the continent of Africa. So, in that context, I would say that very clearly in my mind the top three concerns for me are al-Shabaab in Somalia, Al Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb, which operates in north and western Africa, and the emerging threat of Boko Haram, as you mentioned, based in Nigeria.

And while each of those three is dangerous, what concerns me more is at least the aspirational intent expressed by the leaders of those organizations to more closely collaborate and synchronize their efforts. So while each three is independently dangerous, if they are able to coordinate their efforts, share funding, training, weapons exchange, and what have you, I think that presents a real challenge for us.

Specifically to the al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda public announcement of the 9th of February, this of course has been long suspected, that there was a strong relationship between Al Qaeda and al-Shabaab in Somalia and as well as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula across the Gulf of Aden operating in the country of Yemen.

Some have postulated that the timing of this public announcement may actually be indicative that al-Shabaab is under duress. I believe that they are very much under duress by the African countries, the African Union mission in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya who have joined in the effort to defeat al-Shabaab and to clear areas of Somalia from al-Shabaab control. And I believe the public announcement may be—certainly not quite a last gasp but I would say an effort by al-Shabaab to gain some international support.

To counter the threat posed by these three organizations, we do work by, with, and through the indigenous forces, the host nation forces, to increase their capability. There are some times where it may be appropriate for U.S. forces to act. Libya is an example of that, although not directly related to terrorism. But, more gen-

erally, we are better off when it is Africans leading with a little bit of training and support and equipping from us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.  
Ranking Member Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Following up a little bit, General Ham, on Africa, can you talk a little bit about the instability that is going on in the eastern Congo and, in particular, our recent efforts to try to track down the last remnants of the Lord's Resistance Army? We deployed some special operations forces in cooperation with the Ugandan Government there. How is that operation going? How do you see that as sort of a template along the lines of what you talked about on the by, to, and with approach to trying to bring greater stability to the region and keep extremist groups, like the one you described, from rising up and causing problems?

General HAM. Congressman Smith, thanks for that question.

The Lord's Resistance Army is an organization which creates, through violence, a tremendous amount of instability in a four-country region of east and central Africa. Initially beginning in Uganda but now extending their efforts into South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, they have displaced many thousands of African citizens. They brought terror and fear to families across the region.

It is very encouraging, actually, to see the four nations, the four African nations come together in an increasingly collaborative approach. The U.S. support to that approach is one of training, advising, a little bit of equipping, and intelligence-sharing but more in a facilitating role than in a leading role.

To date, what we have found is that the presence of the U.S., mostly Special Forces advisers that are working with the nations, with the armed forces of those four nations, are having a very positive effect. We are assisting in intelligence fusion, in facilitating long-range communications, logistics operations to sustain forces in the field for long periods of time, and increased intelligence collection.

So I am optimistic, but I am not yet to the point where we see the end in sight.

Mr. SMITH. And if I may, I think that is an important model going forward for the threats we face and how to confront them. I think we all agree the most likely threats are coming from these mostly non-state actors, terrorist groups affiliated with Al Qaeda. And for a relatively small amount of money and a light footprint we can work with local partners to strengthen those local partners to contain that threat.

And going forward that is the most likely threat we are going to face. I think we have all learned the limitations of major full-scale occupations and full-scale ground wars in place like this. If we can fund those smaller, cheaper forces, they can be much more effective as well. So I certainly appreciate that leadership.

I want to follow up on the size of the force in Europe and how it fits in with the strategy. I do think it is important to point out that yet the strategy has budget components to it. We don't have infinite resources. In any given endeavor in life, you are going to

have to look at what your budget is and then match that up against the strategy.

But we did start with a broader strategy. You mentioned at the height of the Cold War there were 400,000 troops in Europe, and the point was they had to be there to stop the Soviet Union from coming from eastern Europe into western Europe. That was a very clear purpose. That is not something—I don't want to assume, but I am pretty sure that is no longer part of our strategy. We don't feel like we have to have a strong enough force to stop that.

So how many troops do we have there now, and what will we have once we implement the strategy that the President has put in place as a starting point?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, we have about 80,000 uniform personnel. We are going to withdraw about 12,500. So we will be down in the 68,000 range. I can break those down by service very quickly. There are about 35,000 Army, 25,000 Air Force, 10,000 Navy and Marine Corps, roughly. And 10,000 dedicated to NATO.

Mr. SMITH. As succinctly stated as possible, what is their purpose? How does that fit into our national security strategy?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. First and foremost, they are there as part of the NATO alliance that bespeaks all of the commitments that NATO undertakes, therefore, Afghanistan, the recent operations in Libya, the operations in the Balkans, the counterpiracy operations at sea, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So there is the alliance piece.

Secondly, there is a large component of building partner capacity, working with these European nations to encourage them to come and stand with us in these battlefields under non-alliance circumstances, similar to what you are describing in Africa. That is the model that allows us to get allies to come and do that.

And then, third, all of these troops are very engaged in training and exercises within Europe itself. So I would say those three things are the three fundamental purposes, which I would argue remain valid today.

Mr. SMITH. Yes. And I think they are very valid.

Are they there for the purpose of being a forward-deployed force to go fight a war somewhere in the region so that they can get there more quickly?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. That is part of their purpose, yes.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. How much more quickly can you get some—what would be a scenario for a place that the European forces could get to? How much more quickly could they get there than coming from the continental United States?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, I would start by simply pointing to my colleague here on the left and say Africa, an immediate shot down, particularly into northern Africa, certainly into the near Middle East, to Levant, into Israel, Syria, in that region, off and into that whole broad area, the Central Command region. Europe is a very geostrategic platform that sits, again, between the United States and any number of places where we might hypothetically be engaged.

Mr. SMITH. And given the size of the Force that this new strategy will have in Europe and given some of those scenarios you just laid out, are you comfortable that you have the size of the Force to be the quick response for those small contingencies that is needed?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I am.

Mr. SMITH. And I mean, that is the thing. The strategy was not pulled out of whole cloth. And I think the impression that is given sometimes by the questions is, you know, that you are all just sort of scrambling around, it is a big fire sale, there is no budget, no money, so we just do the best we can.

We have a very large, very capable force. We have spent nearly as much as the rest of the world combined on our defense budget every year for 15 years. We have doubled the defense budget in the last 7 years and built a highly, highly capable force to respond to precisely these types of strategic needs. So I think, while it is fair to say that every strategy is constrained by whatever the budget constraints might be, even with the doubling of the defense budget in the last 5 or 6 years, we were somewhat constrained by resources. We certainly saw that in Iraq and Afghanistan. That will always be the case. We, nonetheless, have a strategy and a budget that matches that strategy that gives us a large enough force to respond to the contingencies that you have discussed.

And I think you have explained that quite well, and I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Thank you both very much for your service to our country.

General, the Arab Spring is still playing out. We have had government changes in a number of countries and some still in ferment. In many of these countries, they simply exchanged a tyrannical government for a dysfunctional government. I would like to ask you two questions relative to this.

In your view, is the average citizen in these countries now better off under the dysfunctional government than they were under the tyrannical government? And has your concern and responsibility been lessened or heightened by the Arab Spring and the changes that we have seen there?

General HAM. Congressman, I would say that the average citizen in the two countries in the AFRICOM AOR [area of responsibility], which are most affected, which would be Tunisia and Libya, are indeed better off, because they at least now have the opportunity—in Tunisia, where they already have selected a government of their choice, and in Libya, where they will soon have the opportunity to select a government of choice, choices that were denied them previously. That is not to say that there aren't significant challenges in every domain. Whether it is economic governance or security, significant challenges certainly lie ahead.

The challenges for us in partnering with the security forces of those two countries specifically I think actually are heightened now in this post-Arab Spring or Arab awakening timeframe where—in Libya, for example, where we did not have a previous military-to-military engagement, we do now. And we have met several times, to include my visit to Tripoli and hosting the military chiefs of the Libyan armed forces at our headquarters in Germany. We are building a relationship and are helping them craft the way ahead.

Similarly, in Tunisia, where we have had a longstanding good military relationship, the needs perhaps are greater now. In terms

of professionalizing, the Tunisians have asked for some assistance in border security and in a number of areas as well.

So the opportunities are great, but the challenges are also great.

Mr. BARTLETT. When we first became involved in Libya, I asked Mr. Gates if the people we were aiding and abetting in Libya were the same people that we were fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan; and his honest answer was we didn't have the foggiest notion whether that was true or not. Do we now know whether that was true or not?

General HAM. By and large, I would say, sir, that is not true. But there are some small pockets remaining in Libya and in other places in north Africa that were centers of foreign fighters who had left north Africa, transited along various routes, and ended up fighting against us and other coalition forces inside Iraq. There are remnants of that, and there are indications that Al Qaeda's senior leadership is seeking to reestablish those networks, and that is one of the challenges that lays ahead for us.

Mr. BARTLETT. Admiral, Europe has an economy I think a bit bigger than the United States. The amount of money that they spend on defense is a fraction of what we spend on defense.

After the cuts that we have made in our spending, our military budget will grow from \$525 billion this year to \$767 billion 5 years from now. Obviously, we are contributing nothing to reducing the deficit when we spend more next year than we spent this year. And with a deficit that grows \$1 billion every 6 hours, clearly we have to do something, which will mean that Europe ought to step up and spend more on defense so that we can spend less on defense or we are going to go bankrupt, sir. I know some of their countries are going bankrupt now. In your view, do they have either the will or the ability to step up and provide an equitable commitment to their defense?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I think that the Europeans—as you correctly say, the economies are roughly about the same, \$15 trillion economies, the United States and Europe. The Europeans, by and large, the NATO members have set a goal of spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense.

Mr. BARTLETT. We are spending double that; is that correct?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. They are not meeting that goal, and they are failing to meet a goal that they have set for themselves. So I believe that Europe should spend more on defense; and I have spoken publicly on this many, many, many times.

Now the good news is, even at that low level, Europeans spend about \$300 billion a year on defense, which is a significant contribution in the sense of being part of security globally. It is not enough. They should spend more. And if they spent more, it would permit the United States to spend somewhat less.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, welcome and thank you for your service in these very critical areas internationally.



Admiral Stavridis, I think you are uniquely qualified and experienced in this position in several areas. I have always appreciated your perspective both from a military and from a diplomatic perspective, and I would recommend to the Members that any time they get an opportunity and are in Europe to stop by and get your unique perspective. I know that I have appreciated the insight that you bring to that position.

Having said that, in the area of counternarcotics, can you explain to us exactly what is going on with the bridge, particularly from Latin America through Africa and into Europe? And I would be interested to know, since Azerbaijan is a key ally in terms of resupply for Afghanistan, do they have a role in this effort of stopping narcotics going into Europe?

And then for you, General Ham, thank you for your service as well. If you could explain to us the strategic value of Djibouti and the role that it both plays and you think will play as we look at ways to reduce our presence particularly in Europe but as it would affect Djibouti.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Congressman, thank you very much. It is great to see you, as always.

I think Europe has two streams of narcotics that come into it, both of which are dangerous in slightly different ways.

The first, as you allude to, is cocaine which, as you and I both know from our conversations when I was with SOUTHCOM [Southern Command], is a series of flow that comes out of the Andean ridge. It comes up to the United States, but we are increasingly seeing it break and come over to western Africa. And I would invite General Ham to comment here. But then it flows from western Africa north into the Iberian Peninsula.

There are many countries in Europe that have a significant problem with cocaine. The money from that trade tends to go back into Latin America, where it undermines fragile democracies, notably in Central America and the Andean ridge.

The second flow, which you also alluded to in the context of Azerbaijan, is heroin, which comes, of course, from poppy which is grown in Afghanistan, converted into opium, through which it is typically transported, and it then becomes heroin. That is a business that not only creates corruption, has a huge human cost, particularly in Eastern Europe and Russia, which have many, many addicts, but it also flows money and resources back to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

So these two streams coming into Europe are of concern to us from a security perspective. Therefore, at U.S. European Command, one of the things we are doing is using some of our current and existing resources to focus on countertrafficking, how we can help the interagency break apart this supply process.

Azerbaijan, to answer your question, is very important in this. Turkey is very important in this in that the stream of countries between Afghanistan and into eastern Europe is where we are focusing a lot of those efforts.

General Ham might want to comment on the African piece of that as he answers your other question.

General HAM. I would, Congressman Reyes.

As Admiral Stavridis pointed out, counternarcotics is very much a destabilizing influence, particularly in West Africa. The Africans are not the overall consumers of these drugs that are coming from Central and South America, but they are the transit point for the narcotics that go into Europe.

A couple of efforts that we are undertaking, we are supporting a multinational intelligence operations center in Cape Verde; and last year they facilitated the largest seizure, well over \$100 million worth of cocaine, in a good effort. But more importantly than specific seizures, it is the undermining of good governance, the influence of corruption that permeates areas where illegal narcotics are flowing, and that works contrary to our national interests.

In Djibouti, sir, I would mention that, at present, there is a good contingent of Texas Army National Guard folks that are there. I had the opportunity to see them a few weeks ago.

It is a very stable platform afforded to us by a most reliable partner in that part of the world. It allows us at Africa Command as well as those from Central Command, Transportation Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command a place from which we can operate and project into multiple different regions: Africa, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean. It provides a great platform for countering piracy. It is a vital installation for us and one that has served most capably. And, most recently, in the hostage rescue situation it would have been extraordinarily difficult to have executed that mission without the basing in Djibouti.

Mr. REYES. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Ham, I won't repeat the concerns that have been expressed about Africa and the potential dangers there. I would just add that the circumstances are not going to be static. They are going to evolve in some direction or another. And I think we are all going to trust that if it evolves in a more dangerous direction and you don't have the resources you need, of whatever variety, to deal with an increasing danger, that you will raise your hand and say, I have got to have more, regardless of, you know, some overall strategy that emphasizes other parts of the world.

Admiral Stavridis, I wanted to ask you about a couple of news headlines that got my attention, related to NATO. One was an op-ed in today's *Wall Street Journal* about whether the Afghans hate America.

And, you know, a lot of us are getting the question after this most unfortunate Koran-burning incident about whether we are being successful—NATO is being successful in helping to train the Afghans to defend themselves, which, even if it is in our best interest, if they don't want to be trained, if they don't want us there, it causes lots of people to say, can we be successful? So, given what we have seen on the news the past week, what is your perspective about chances of success there?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, sir.

First of all, it has been a very challenging week in Afghanistan, obviously the result of a variety of circumstances that have dominated the news cycle.

If you step back and you look at the larger progression in Afghanistan, I remain cautiously optimistic that we can succeed there. I think the key—and you mentioned it—is can we effectively train the Afghan security forces to take on this important mission of defending their own country, which is how it should be. Why I feel confident that we are moving forward in that is the build-up of the Afghan security forces. We now have over 300,000. They are in everything from marksmanship training to literacy training. But, most importantly, we are seeing them very effectively move into the battlefield.

Two years ago when I testified in front of this committee, we were getting ready to mount an operation into a place called Marja, which is in south Afghanistan. At that time, we had 10 coalition forces for every Afghan who was in the fight. Today, we have two Afghans for every coalition soldier in the fight. That is real progress over a 2-year period.

I think additionally, when I look at the operations we are conducting to date, 90 percent of them are conducted with Afghans; 40 percent of them are conducted with Afghans in the lead.

My own trips to Afghanistan—I have been there many, many, many times. To the question, do Afghans hate Americans? I don't think so. I have seen with my own eyes frequently the standing together of Afghan and coalition troops very, very effectively. We are always going to see an incident or two. But if you stop and think about 300,000 Afghan troops, 140,000 coalition troops effectively operating together every single day, they are standing and taking the field.

I think you will hear from General Allen, who will be back here in a couple of weeks, in detail about all of this. But as the strategic NATO Commander for the operation, again, I remain cautiously optimistic despite a very challenging week that we have been through in Afghanistan.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

And just very briefly let me ask about one other complex topic. There was a news report yesterday about a study that says that NATO is still playing catch-up in the cyber arena. Could you just briefly outline how NATO, as an alliance, is catching up from a military standpoint on cyber?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I agree with the statement that we are in the process of catching up. We have hard work to do on cyber.

Two very quick things that I will mention. One is the Cyber Center of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia. It is a nascent organization that is bringing together policy actors across the military side of the spectrum. Secondly is a computer incident response center that we are building in the operation center of the alliance which will, I believe, begin to create some effectiveness in this area.

We have a lot of work to do, and it is a focus area of mine, as you and I have discussed.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I appreciate that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, gentlemen, for being before us today.

Admiral, in particular, we know the life extension plan for the B-61 nuclear warhead which we forward-deployed in Europe will cost upwards of \$5 billion. What is the cost to EUCOM and the continued value of forward-deploying nuclear weapons in Europe? What is the military utility of these weapons? And if our NATO allies do not invest in continuing to maintain our nuclear delivery vehicles, how does EUCOM expect to fill this gap?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you very much. Excellent question.

First of all, NATO's position on this is in the process of being revisited in anticipation of the Chicago summit in May where the defense and deterrence policy review will present the alliance's path forward in total on nuclear weapons, not just B-61 but strategic as well. So the first answer would be this is very actively under discussion in the alliance. We will see how the nations come out at the summit in May.

In terms of the military utility of the weapons, they have a deterrent value since other actors hold similar levels of weapons.

And in terms of NATO continuing to finance the infrastructure and what are their costs, the costs are relatively significant in protecting these weapons and, thus, we have to, as an alliance, make decisions about whether we want to maintain them or not. Again, I think that will be something that will be decided in the May timeframe. I assure you it is being focused on, and I anticipate a fairly clear NATO policy statement in May.

Ms. SANCHEZ. As our NATO head, where do you see opportunities for further partnership with NATO?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would look, first and foremost, at building on the coalition in Afghanistan. Twenty-eight NATO nations, but we have 22 other nations who are partnering with NATO in Afghanistan. These are many Pacific nations: Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Tonga. So I think that coalition base gives us one set of potential partners looking forward.

Secondly, we have two organizations that reach beyond NATO today, the Mediterranean dialogue. We are in the process of talking, for example, with Libya. Already many of the other nations in General Ham's region are part of this. The nations around the Mediterranean are natural NATO partners.

Thirdly, we have an organization called the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative which are the Gulf states. We partner with all of them in piracy operations at the moment.

And then, fourth, just to push a little further out there, two nations that I think are worth exploring possibilities with are India and Brazil. They both have great capability. They could operate with us, for example, on a piracy mission, should they choose to do so.

So I think that is a spectrum of partners. But, again, this idea of partnership is very important to the alliance.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great.

And to both of you gentlemen, what are your thoughts on our relationship with Russia? Is there strategic stability there? What are our mil-to-mil relationships with them? Have they been helpful in Afghanistan? Is it worth continuing to pursue missile defense cooperation with them?

We had talked to them a while back about the phased approach and coming in with it and helping us, and we haven't really heard much back. So can you sort of give us an idea of how you see our relationship with Russia out there?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I can. Russia is part of the EUCOM region, so I will hit that one, I think.

First of all, we have many areas of cooperation with Russia: counterterrorism, counterpiracy. They are being helpful in Afghanistan, both with logistics, with sales of helicopters, Mi-17 helicopters, donations of ammunition, weapons, cooperation on information- and intelligence-sharing. They are a very effective partner in piracy off the Horn of Africa, which General Ham knows quite well. So there are many zones of cooperation. Our mil-to-mil includes a robust program of exercises and engagement. That is the good news.

We do have areas of disagreement with Russia. We disagree with them about the policy with regard to Georgia. We disagree with them at the moment about missile defense. So, as always in a relationship, there is going to be balance, but I would argue that we need to continue to pursue trying to find cooperation where and when we can with Russia.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral and General, I truly want to thank you for your service to our country.

As you know, this is probably one of the most bipartisan committees in Congress, and I always appreciate when the distinguished ranking member points out that sometimes there are things outside of this room that impact us so much. That is why I can't help but continue to be mindful, as we were when we passed that \$825 billion stimulus package, that if you added that with the \$345 billion of interest we are paying, that almost equals the amount of cuts that we will take both now and with the sequestration.

We talk about the strategic guidance and the new strategic guidance. But, Admiral, can you tell us how much time were you given to analyze this new strategic guidance and offer your input from the time you were first asked to do that until the time you submitted your input?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. General Ham will remember with me, because it was done with all the combatant commanders together. My recollection is it was over about a 6-month period, I believe.

Mr. FORBES. Were you all together in doing that?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. We were. We did it not only using technology, video teleconferences, but then we would periodically physically come together, because it is important to do that I think in a room together.

Mr. FORBES. Were you given a dollar figure that you had to work to before you—

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, sir.

Mr. FORBES. So you did this totally out of context of the \$487 billion of cuts?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. We did it in a context of a need to reduce in general, but we were not given a specific dollar figure—for example, in the case of EUCOM, of being told you have to cut your activities by this dollar figure. We certainly did it in the context of the reductions.

Mr. FORBES. So your strategic guidance would have been the same whether the cuts were \$7 billion or \$487 billion?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, sir, I think we were informed by the size of the cuts. There was, as I say, a contextual sense of the cuts but not a parsing dollar for dollar.

Mr. FORBES. So how were you informed by the size of the cuts? It just looks like to me—maybe I am wrong, but it looks like to me it would make a big difference on your guidance as to whether you thought you were working with \$487 billion of cuts or \$8 billion of cuts.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. We were all certainly aware of the magnitude of the cuts; and so I think that, again, contextually informed us as reasonable actors. But, again, I want to emphasize that this was not a specific dollar for dollar kind of a drill. It was very much, let's get out a clean sheet of paper, we are in the context of reducing the budget because of a national deficit, and how are we going to do that? How are we going to contribute to this?

Mr. FORBES. And I don't want to push this too much. I am just trying to understand. It looks like to me it is just light years of difference.

Because one thing we hear is people saying we had security changes, and that drove this new strategy. The other thing is we hear people always coming in there and say, well, we had to do this because we had \$487 billion of cuts. And I am just scratching my head when the two of you got together with the other combatant commanders, if you had no idea whether this was going to be \$400 billion or something of that magnitude, then what you would be saying is this was all done based on a security change, as opposed to the budget. How did you know this magnitude? I mean, were you guessing at it or—I mean, you had to have some kind of guidance.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, no, we were—obviously, any senior officer in the Department is quite well aware of the macro sense of where the budget is going. So that is sort of a common baseline. And, again, we were brought forward into the process specifically in response to the reductions in the deficit.

Mr. FORBES. You guys just kind of came into the meeting kind of all quietly knowing that there were these cuts that had to be made, but there was never a discussion about the dollar figure that was—

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Again, the macro dollar figure was well understood.

Mr. FORBES. Which was what? What macro dollar figure?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. We had—I think it was around \$500 billion was the number we were looking at.

Mr. FORBES. So you all were told when you started this planning process that you had to have cuts of about \$500 billion.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. We were aware that reduction was going to be appropriate for the Department.

Mr. FORBES. How were you made aware of that?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Through our own processes as well as briefings.

Mr. FORBES. So when you got a briefing, did somebody ever communicate and say, this is \$500 billion of cuts; basically, we have got to find a way to make them work?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The general context was presented to us of the level. When I say we weren't focused on the numbers, I am speaking as the Commander of U.S. European Command.

Mr. FORBES. I understand. I am just trying to get a handle on when all of you came together did you just kind of assume it is going to be \$500 billion? Or at some point in time—

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No.

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Does somebody say, here is \$500 billion, roughly; we have to make a strategic guidance that fits that?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think all of those things came together.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral and General, for your service to our country and for your devotion to our country. I mean my questions not to be rhetorical but clinical.

Admiral, you do an eloquent job, I think, of laying out the historic importance of our relationship with our friends and allies in Europe and you talk about shared values and the critical importance of the European economy and the global economy and the proximity of Europe to hot spots around the world. It is a very compelling presentation. I want to ask you this question: Who are our adversaries or enemies in the European area command today?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would argue that we don't have a specific set of enemies within the confines of the U.S. European Command. I think, as the chairman and the ranking member both alluded to, the threats we face today are transnational in character, generally speaking. So it is difficult to sort of pin an area and say here is an enemy.

Mr. ANDREWS. Understood. And in an era of asymmetric warfare you can't really define the opposition the way you used to be able to.

If you had to characterize the asymmetric threat in your AOC [area of commitment], how kinetic has it been in the last 12 months or 24 months? Kinetic ranging from Afghanistan is incredibly kinetic on an hourly basis to, thank God, a country like the UK [United Kingdom] or France is rather quiet. How kinetic are things in your AOC?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, in terms of terrorism in Europe last year, there were 300 kinetic terrorist incidents, ranging from bombings to assassinations, including two U.S. airmen, for example, who were shot dead at the Frankfurt airport. So there is a terrorism piece to it.

In terms of cyber, there have been, as there are here in the United States, thousands of cyber incidents that are of concern.

In terms of the Balkans, as an area within the EUCOM region, we had major rioting there about 3 months ago, including several

of our NATO peacekeepers being shot, dozens of them being put in the hospital. This is in northern Kosovo.

So I think there is a certain amount of kinetic activity. But, again, I think it is, by and large, the concerns we have from a security dimension are the transnational things that are difficult to categorize geographically.

Mr. ANDREWS. Sure. And I am well aware of the fact that the mission of an organization like yours goes far beyond what is happening today. It is designed to mitigate what might happen in the future and improve what might happen in the future. I am well aware of that.

The question we are all going to have to wrestle with is how to match up our resources and our basing structure with the level of those threats; and, again, I think you have done a very eloquent job describing your views on this.

Here is what a lay person in my district might say about this discussion; and, General, this will go to you as well.

At least on the surface, the level of kinetic activity by Al Qaeda and its allies has been quite acute in the African theater. You have mentioned al-Shabaab, AQIM [Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], Boko Haram as very, very active, not to discount in any way the kineticism we see in Europe. But if I understand this correctly, we have committed 96,000 personnel to Europe, if you count uniform and defense civilian and contractors, and 2,100 people to Africa, which if I understand correctly, 550 of them are under your command but not actually based in Africa. How would we explain that apparent mismatch of resources to a citizen? Either of you?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, I would say that we are in the process of reducing our forces in Europe for exactly these reasons; and this is why we are, within a balanced, strategically calculated way, drawing down in Europe. And I think we will continue to do that.

Again, if you look at the line which goes from the Cold War, when we had almost 400,000 total, down to where we are today, about 96,000, that is a 75 percent reduction in 20 years. I would anticipate over time that will continue to go down.

In terms of Africa, I will let [General] Carter describe it, but I will pick up from a previous life when I was U.S. Southern Commander. Part of the answer is because the nations at least in the Southern Command region don't leap to the opportunity to have U.S. troops stationed there, by and large.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am certainly well aware of that.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. That is part of the answer to—

Mr. ANDREWS. General, I have about 16 seconds.

General HAM. Sir, in Africa, I would say a light footprint is consistent with what we need and consistent with the defense guidance. Lots of the forces who operate in Africa are based in Europe; air, maritime and special operating forces; and it is that proximity to the theater that enables the agility we require.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. I appreciate the discussions about right sizing. I think you have been very helpful. Thanks both of you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



Admiral, General, thank you for being here, and thank you for your testimony.

Admiral, I appreciate your substantive knowledge, your leadership, and your capability. I want to walk you back a bit, though, on your answers that you were giving my ranking member on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Loretta Sanchez, on the issue of the deterrent and the defense review that is undergoing with NATO.

First off, I want to acknowledge, before I toss this to you, in the National Defense Authorization Act just last year Congress, with the President's signature, stated that the presence of the nuclear weapons of the United States in Europe, combined with NATO's unique nuclear sharing arrangements under which nonnuclear members participate in nuclear planning and possess specifically configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons, provides reassurance to NATO allies who feel exposed to regional threats.

That was an affirmation both from the Administration and Congress of the importance of nuclear weapons in Europe. The strategic concept for NATO reaffirmed the nuclear alliance and the issues of basing.

The Senate, in the ratification of the START [Strategic Arms Reduction] treaty, placed upon the Administration the task of looking to Russia's advantage in tactical nuclear weapons, which public sources quantify those as we are in the hundreds and they are in the thousands. It is a 10-to-1 ratio of advantage that Russia has.

No one suggests that we should withdraw our nuclear weapons without concessions, significant concessions from the Russians. You did make a statement that there were similar presence to ours. I believe you mean similar —

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I was speaking of quality, not quantity.

Mr. TURNER. That is exactly what my note was just going to be. I wanted you to confirm that that is of type, not quantity.

So that as we go up to the issue of the value, that disparity—and I appreciate you acknowledging it—has to be a focus of a 10 to 1. And that is obviously the issue in the deterrence, the defense and deterrence review, and also in the acknowledgements from the Senate and I think from our NATO allies of no one is suggesting, certainly on behalf of the Administration, that we should be withdrawing without acknowledging the Senate's focus of reduction in the tactical nuclear weapons on the part of Russia. I appreciate your clarifying that.

With respect to Mr. Bartlett's discussion, you were saying that, you know, of the 28 nations only 4 of them are meeting the 2 percent GDP requirement threshold. This is their own goal. They continue to fall short of it.

As you know, I am active with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Mr. Frank Boland, the director of planning for the defense policy and planning division on the NATO international staff, gave us a chart, which I believe you have in front of you, that shows basically the United States foots overwhelmingly, perhaps as much as 75 percent, of the overall expenses with respect to NATO operations. This was his presentation. He was showing the comparable GDPs, which you mentioned in your discussion, that the GDP of

Europe and the United States are the same, Europe being down here, defense spending for the United States being up here.

Now, the comment you made that I thought was most interesting is you said perhaps if they would spend more we also could spend less. I know that you know that among our NATO allies there is a view that some of this disparity is a result not just of our contributions to NATO but just a global presence. Could you speak a little bit more about what our European allies need to do to bolster their participation in NATO? People talk about smart defense, how they need to also come together in ways in which they spend. I would appreciate your input on that.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you.

Again, just to do the numbers, if our budget is kind of \$600 billion-ish, \$650, theirs is about \$250 to \$300 billion. It is about a two-to-one ratio. They do not meet the 2 percent. You could argue it is somewhere between 4 and 8 of them are perhaps meeting it out of 28. So that is far too low.

Again, I think you hit the nail on the head, sir; and it is smart defense, which is this idea of how they can operate collectively together to get more bang for the buck, which are things like Baltic air policing, alliance ground surveillance, helicopters, NPA [non-precision approaches], ISR. I can provide for the record, since we are running out of time, some detail on that. But I think that is the powerful point the Europeans should focus on as they go toward this NATO summit.

Mr. TURNER. I would appreciate if you would do that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 171.]

Mr. TURNER. One more item, Admiral. I know that you are aware that the NATO PA [Parliamentary Assembly] committee from the House has sent you a letter asking for the consideration of Georgia to participate in the NATO Special Operations facility headquarters with the Special Operations training and coordination activities. I think as a great ally and partner they would be excellent for that, and we would appreciate your thoughts on that.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I agree, and we are investigating that, with an eye toward making it happen.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and certainly to Admiral Stavridis and General Ham, thank you so much for your service and for being here.

I wanted to ask you to focus for a minute on something that we have been calling over the last number of years the whole-of-government approach. And as you know, General Ham, in many ways I think AFRICOM was supposed to be the kind of poster child for this. What can you tell us about any services, purposes, programs, processes that are occurring that you are working with the Department of State and that in any way have reduced the need for defense, the Department of Defense, to be doing something there in the area as well? Is it making any difference in that way? Is it

something that is helpful? What are we actually doing that we have seen a true difference in the way that we do our job?

General HAM. Ma'am, I would start by looking at Somalia, which is an area, again, in the region of Africa which is the highest priority for me. And in our security assistance approach, most of those authorities and most of those resources reside with the Department of State. So we look for a collaborative approach with the Department of State and in partnership with the chiefs of mission in the countries that are neighboring Somalia.

And under the auspices of the African Union mission in Somalia, under State authorities, augmented by Department of Defense trainers and advisors, we have helped particularly Uganda and Burundi, and increasingly Djibouti and now Kenya, to build capable forces to operate inside Somalia in an effort to provide additional security there.

If that is successful, and I believe the trend line is pretty good right now, that means that that is an area where the United States would not have to commit sizable forces to address a security situation. And that is really what we are trying to do. That is the essence of building partner capacity in this collaborative approach with State and Defense.

Mrs. DAVIS. When we think of the number of troops, and I think my colleague was contrasting in the European Command with AFRICOM, you mentioned working with the State Department, are we talking mostly contractors there? Are those State Department personnel that are working there?

General HAM. By and large, ma'am, the training is generally accomplished by contractors and often augmented by U.S. uniformed military personnel.

Mrs. DAVIS. So if you add those numbers, I guess trying to get—maybe that would provide a more complete picture.

But, again, when we look at resources and we look at where we should be, where we want to put our dollars, and with the economic constraints that we will be having, I think trying to get—that would be helpful in getting a better picture of what needs to occur there. Because, in many ways, I think that would probably be an area where people would target and would think that that is an area that we could certainly cut back on.

General HAM. For us in Africa, in most missions, the use of contractors is a good solution; and it is consistent with the Defense guidance of, again, a light U.S. military footprint. So what we seek to do is provide the unique U.S. military capabilities when and where required to augment the basic capabilities that are provided by the contractors.

Mrs. DAVIS. I think we are also aware of the humanitarian assistance we provide, and are you worried that in a number of instances that we would be looking to cut back on those? And what argument would you make that that would not be a good idea?

General HAM. The linkage between security and humanitarian efforts in Africa is very clear to me, and I think we have to look at each situation independently. But I do worry overall that if there is a significant decline in the State Department's security assistance or in USAID's [U.S. Agency for International Develop-

ment] ability to provide developmental or humanitarian assistance those will have security consequences.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my time is just about up. So I yield back. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Admiral, always a great pleasure to see you. I am looking for the opportunity to come visit again sometime. A great time.

General, good to see you.

I am just going to kind of go through some numbers here and see if I got this right.

Admiral, EUCOM has roughly 80,000 troops, going down to about 68,000 troops, about 10,000 in Afghanistan on the EUCOM side, not total NATO, of course. You have got 1,000 or so people in the headquarters, something like that, and about \$35 million.

And, General Ham, you have got it looks like about a couple of thousand people, something like that, according to the document here, and about \$67 million for headquarters support and then a couple hundred million dollars for other activities.

Admiral, you testified that you, in response to somebody here, that you conduct training and exercises with these troops. General, you don't have troops assigned. Do you conduct training and exercises? And, if so, where and how do you get the troops?

General HAM. Sir, we most certainly do conduct training and exercises, a very robust program. We request those forces through an established process—

Mr. KLINE. Which is? What is that process?

General HAM. It is called the global force management process, where there are priorities established. I submit a requirement, typically on an annual basis unless there is an emergent requirement such as the operations in Libya, so that there is some predictability. And we place our requirements, and that goes through a process managed by the Joint Staff. It ultimately leads to a Secretary of Defense decision for force allocation.

We are very heavily reliant on Reserve Components. That is a good thing for us. We have very strong State partnership programs that contribute very significantly to our training and exercise programs as well.

Mr. KLINE. Okay. I am sort of going somewhere with this. I am a little bit concerned that we have built up the number and size of combatant commands over the last few years. AFRICOM being clearly an example didn't really exist as a command until almost about—I guess you had one predecessor—

General HAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLINE. Kip probably was the first, as I recall, and now you are there. And yet we are shrinking. Not only are we going down from 80,000 to 68,000 in Europe, presumably the source of some of the troops that you borrow through this process to train with, but the end strength of the United States Army is going to be plunging. The Marine Corps are going down significantly, from over 200,000 to 182,000 or something. So we have fewer and fewer forces, and yet we have the combatant commands that have to train and draw

on these forces. And even when you draw from the Reserve Component, they have been pretty heavily used, too.

So I am looking at potentially a pretty high OPS TEMPO [operations tempo] as we—as SOUTHCOM and EUCOM and AFRICOM and CENTCOM [Central Command] and PACOM [Pacific Command] and so forth are conducting exercises with fewer and fewer troops, and I am a little bit concerned about the size of these forces and of these combatant commands.

And looking at AFRICOM, I am reading here from—this is a document prepared by us. It wasn't part of your testimony, but I think it is accurate. But it says AFRICOM has no assigned standing forces. It does, however, have service component headquarters. It has got U.S. Army Africa [USARAF]. USARAF is headquartered in Vicenza, Italy. U.S. Naval Forces is headquartered in Naples, Italy. U.S. Air Forces Africa is headquartered in Ramstein Air Base, Germany. U.S. Marine Forces Africa and Special Operations Command Africa are both located in Stuttgart, Germany; and AF-Africa [U.S. Air Forces Africa] and NAVAF [U.S. Naval Forces Africa] are dual-hatted commands, with responsibility to EUCOM and NATO.

You know, I spent my life in uniform, and I know how these things shuffle around a bit, but, boy, that does seem to be stretching just a little bit as we have tried to pull this AFRICOM together. So I am going to run out of time here, and I am not expecting you to actually respond to this, but I think it is important that we as a committee and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the chiefs really take a look at these combatant commands in the light of much reduced resources and money and reduced forces, if that is really the way we ought to be organized.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Stavridis and General Ham, I want to thank you for appearing before the committee today and, of course, thank you for your service to our Nation. I know we have already talked a little bit about cybersecurity here today, and I would like to touch on that a little more.

Admiral Stavridis, in past years several nations in the EUCOM AOR [area of responsibility] have been subject to sophisticated cyber attacks in conjunction with political and military conflicts. To what extent do you communicate with these countries on cyber threats and how has your communication with other countries changed as a result of the inclusion of cyber in the 2010 NATO strategic concept? And are there limitations on your ability to communicate with these and other EUCOM AOR countries on cybersecurity-related matters that need to be addressed?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, thank you for the question. Thank you very much, sir.

You are absolutely correct. For example, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Georgia have all been subject to fairly severe cyber attacks within the last 5 to 8 years. We continue to see daily cyber attacks.

We are—within the alliance, as I mentioned to Representative Thornberry, we have created a center—and I would encourage any

of the Members to come and visit it—in Tallinn, Estonia—appropriate because Estonia was one of the countries that had suffered an attack—where we bring together our policy planners to look very specifically at the cyber challenges we are facing.

We also have an operational component, as I mentioned, that is centered in my operational headquarters in Belgium.

And then, thirdly—I didn't have a chance to mention earlier, and I think it is an important part of this debate—is the private-public connection here, which we of course wrestle with in the United States. The Europeans wrestle with it as well. Cyber crosses this border between purely military and purely civilian-type functionality.

So all of those elements have to be a part of the mix in this conversation. I think we are pursuing all of those in NATO. As you said, the strategic concept drives us in this direction. We will have another statement along these lines at the May summit. It is an area where we continue to put additional resources. As I mentioned to Rep. Thornberry earlier, we have a long way to go.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, do you feel that EUCOM's lines of communication and responsibility are well defined with regards to operational cyber?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I do. I think we have more thinking and talking to do within the U.S. military structure as to the precise authorities and responsibilities of our—what is currently a sub-unified command, CYBERCOM [Cyber Command], and what its relationship is to each of the combatant commands. It is a new area of endeavor. We are talking constantly with General Alexander, who is I think the superb head of U.S. Cyber Command. So this is kind of a work in progress, but it is again an area of security that we are all addressing.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Let me ask you about base energy security as it relates to cyber in particular. I have been very concerned over time about the capabilities of our bases here in the United States to withstand a cyber attack directed against outside supporting infrastructure such as the electric grid. Obviously, much of our critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, which we don't have responsibility per se to protect, and yet our bases are dependent on that critical infrastructure for its power and other needs. Have you examined the ability of overseas bases in your areas of responsibility to operate in the event of such an attack?

And, General Ham, you can answer this question as well.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. We have; and I would be glad to provide some more information on that for the record, since we are quite short on time. The short answer is yes.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 171.]

General HAM. And the same for us. Principally at our base at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, we do frequent cyber vulnerability assessments.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good.

Let me—since my time is running out, I will ask this question to the degree you can answer it but something to think about as well. Do you have a good understanding of the capabilities that

people within your command have with respect to their knowledge and ability to use computers and operate in cyberspace?

And I ask the question because it is not necessarily going to be the admirals, the commanders, captains or colonels that have maybe the most robust capabilities. It is probably going to be your newest enlisted people and officers who have grown up with computer skills and could be very effective in assisting you in your work, especially when the stuff hits the fan, if you know what I mean.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you so much for your long and continued service to our country.

First, Admiral, I believe do we have 28 NATO allies? Is that the number?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir, there are 28. Technically, the United States has 27 allies. There are a total of 28 nations in NATO, yes, sir.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. So out of the 27 allies to the United States within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, how many are spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It depends how you measure it. As few as four and as many as eight.

Mr. COFFMAN. Could it be argued that, now, they have a lot of the same pressures that we have, where, you know, are they going to maintain a welfare state or are they going to cut their defense budget. And it seems to me—and I would like you to reflect on this—that they see perhaps the United States as the guarantor for their security. Maybe there is an overreliance on the United States as a NATO member where they feel like they can make those cuts in defense. Where we are spending about 4.7 percent of GDP on defense in the United States, they are spending less than 2 percent on most NATO countries. Is that an accurate statement?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. That is an accurate statement.

And, again, as I mentioned to one of your colleagues earlier, it is a subject I frequently press on with the Europeans and I encourage our senior diplomatic and military officers to press with their interlocutors. We should continue to pressure the Europeans to spend more on defense.

Mr. COFFMAN. So outside of those facilities we have in Europe to support the NATO operations in Afghanistan, outside of those bases to maintain our expeditionary forces such as I think we have a naval presence in Naples and Rota, Spain—if we still do—so the permanent bases, our support of NATO does not necessarily—I mean, we could articulate our support for NATO by joint military exercises. We don't necessarily—there is no requirement to have permanent military bases in Europe, is there not?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. There is no treaty requirement to have bases in Europe. That is a fair statement.

Mr. COFFMAN. Very good. Let me just say, as a former soldier in the United States Army and later transferred to the Marine Corps, I served in the First Army Division during the height of the Cold War—and it was very cold there—as an infantry guy, mechanized

infantry in the 1st Armored Division, where I felt that there was a need for part of that 400,000 troops that you mentioned in Europe at that time, where there was truly a need for permanent military bases there, because we rotated back and forth to the Fulda Gap to have a presence there, where we were facing the Warsaw Pact forces just on the other side of the Czechoslovakian border where my unit used to rotate to the West German—then west German-Czechoslovakian border. So I think we ought to look at taking all of the BCTs out of there.

General Ham, you mentioned the use of contractors for trainers in Africa. Is that the standard practice for AFRICOM?

General HAM. It is. To be clear, sir, most of that training is under State Department authorities and resources, and it is largely under State contract that those contractors operate.

Mr. COFFMAN. Is a central part of your mission then to train up African military forces that share our strategic interests?

General HAM. It is. Yes, sir.

Mr. COFFMAN. Then why is it necessary for us to go beyond that mission in terms of the Lord's Resistance Army? So instead of—where we are actually going out with them on active operations?

General HAM. Sir, we do not go out with them on active operations. The law and policy place us there in a training and advisory role only.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Now, you are based in Europe. Is it you are not based in Africa for security reasons?

General HAM. Sir, when Africa Command was formed in 2007–2008, it split apart from European Command, which previously had responsibility for Africa; and they are and remain located in Stuttgart. So it made sense that there were facilities and people to remain in Stuttgart.

Mr. COFFMAN. Let me just say I don't think it makes sense today. And I think Central Command is located in Florida. And I believe that your command, since it is not located in Africa, ought to be located in the United States as well.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSON.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, General, thank you for joining us today; and I deeply admire the professionalism and competence with which you all exhibited jointly in the Libyan operation.

The new defense strategy and budget request, including force reductions in Europe, reflect the hard work and forward thinking of President Obama, our DOD civilian leaders, and our military commanders. But I must say that the last few hearings of this committee have caused me some amusement to watch the righteous indignation that is on display by some of the armchair quarterbacks on this committee.

Some of us have never served before, and we are indignant about the 1-percent defense cut that has been offered up by the Obama administration pursuant to the Budget Control Act that was passed last year by this Republican-led House. So to show indignation about a 1-percent cut in growth and then claim that it is going to



result—not claim but infer that it is going to result in a hollowed-out force is truly amusing to me.

But I will ask you, Admiral, how have EUCOM and AFRICOM been able to partner to support each other's missions and find efficiencies?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, sir.

We are, I think, very strong partners. As Carter just mentioned, our headquarters are co-located. AFRICOM and EUCOM have a tradition of working together.

Some of the specifics include the sharing of forces which are based in Europe but then come and do training and exercises in Africa with General Ham.

We have shared nautical component commanders; and, thus, when we operate, for example, in a NATO and a U.S. way in the piracy operation we are constantly partnering there.

We are also exploring ways that we can create efficiencies in intelligence and information sharing, and I believe we essentially share intelligence facilities now, and there may be some ways to do even more of that. This is a good idea because of the close connection between the European partners and the African continent itself.

So there is a very natural partnership I think between the two of us, and I will let General Ham add anything he would like.

General HAM. I would echo that, Congressman.

The Europeans, both through NATO and the European Union, are heavily invested in security matters in Africa; and it is our strong relationship and partnership with U.S. European Command that allows us to have access and meaningful dialogue in the planning and coordination of those activities.

Admiral Stavridis mentioned earlier today the Mediterranean dialogue in which the North African countries participate because they see themselves—they are partly African, they are partly Arab, they are partly Mediterranean; and these hard lines that we draw as boundaries between combatant commands, the nations, of course, don't abide by those.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, General.

Admiral, how will the Administration's newly released defense strategy change the way that you do business at EUCOM?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. In a sense, it will not dramatically change what we do. As I have categorized the new strategy, sir, to our European partners, who often ask about it, I think the strategy reflects a sense of challenge for the United States in the Pacific and in the Middle East. It reflects strategic opportunities in places like Latin America, the Caribbean, and AFRICOM; and I think it reflects enduring strategic partnerships with Europe. So, in that sense, for European Command, I don't think there will be dramatic changes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, and I will yield back.

Mr. COFFMAN. [Presiding.] Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Stavridis, General Ham, thank you so much for joining us today. We appreciate your service to our Nation.

General Ham, I want to follow up a little bit. You talked about those innovative partnerships that are being developed. Obviously,

in Africa, you are looking to build those partnerships with those nations in Africa. I know that is an ongoing effort there.

I know also there are other competing interests in the region looking to develop those partnerships. I wanted to get your perspective on how you believe those partnerships are perceived by those African nations with that partnership-building. How are our partnership efforts being perceived by other countries, such as China? Where do you believe that they will be for us strategically in the next 5 to 10 years? And do you see the role and mission of AFRICOM moving more towards those partnership-building efforts, those efforts versus a more strategic or more kinetic relationship there?

I know we have some Special Operations Forces in the region. But do you see AFRICOM's role there more on the side of partnership building in the region in the next, let's say, next 5 to 10 years?

General HAM. Sir, I do. While we obviously always want to preserve the capability to conduct whatever military operations might be necessary, it is far better if we can focus our efforts on preventive measures by, with, and through our African partners. I think that is what they expect from us, it is what they desire from us, and we try to head in that direction.

One of the challenges that I have encountered—I have been there just about a year now—is how do we cooperate more closely with other nations whose security interests align with our own so that as we deal with a particular African country or with a regional organization of the African Union that we do so in a much more collaborative and synchronized manner? I think that is an area in which we can improve.

Similarly, I think we should look for opportunities with nontraditional partners, such as China, to find those areas where our interests do align and look for ways in which we might increase our cooperation.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, General Ham.

Admiral Stavridis, I wanted to ask you, you talked a little bit about this shifting of strategy there across the globe. And one of those shifts is the movement of four *Arleigh Burke* class destroyers to Rota, Spain, and I wanted to get your perspective strategically what that means. What do you see, as a combatant commander, as the primary use for those, and how do you see that as being indicative of the strategic shift that this Nation is placing in the way it defends this country's interests?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, sir.

Primarily, the destroyers are going forward in order to be the backbone of missile defense. That is the primary functionality.

However, these are marvelous ships. I was lucky enough to command one several years ago. I was a commodore of a squadron of six of them. I know the ships well. They are the ultimate multimission-capable ship, with anti-submarine, anti-air, anti-surface [capabilities], wonderful to partner with other nations. So they will be a very robust addition to our European capability set.

They will also very much be part of General Ham's world. Because, as I mentioned before, the naval commander, the four-star Admiral who will have charge of these ships reports both to me and to General Ham.

So these are ships that you will see off the Gulf of Guinea. They will be operating in counterpiracy off the East Coast of Africa. They will be in the Mediterranean. They will be up north. So I think that their home porting overseas reflects the ongoing engagement not only in Europe but also in the African theater as well, and I think it is a very powerful statement of that.

Mr. WITTMAN. Another question. I know that EUCOM is very involved in joint operations—joint training operations with Israel. And, as we know, with the instability in that particular region of the world, there has been a lot of increased interest, obviously, in Israel and their interests and what they have to deal with in the region. Can you tell me where you see EUCOM's relationship and cooperation with Israel going in the months and years to come?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it will continue to be extremely strong. It is based on exercises, information-sharing, intelligence-sharing, very much on the sale of U.S. defense systems, on technology-sharing. Missile defense is certainly an important component of it.

And, finally, I would say, as always, personal contact trumps everything in the sense that the key leader engagements, the personal relationships up and down will continue to be extremely robust going forward.

Thank you.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. COFFMAN. Mrs. Roby.

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess I could expand on the question that was just asked as it relates to Israel. This is obviously a concern of many right now, not just in this country but all across the world. And I guess I would ask if there are any gaps or areas of concern as we discuss your role in the relationship with Israel.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think, ma'am, that we have a very high level of commitment and a very high level of engagement with Israel. We have ongoing discussions with them constantly about their needs, and I think they would say they are satisfied. I feel like we are providing them what is appropriate as we stand with them in this time. And, as you say, it is a very nervous time for Israel because of the Arab Spring and the strategic circumstances surrounding all of that.

Mrs. ROBY. Do you want to comment, to the extent you can in this setting, about the concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear development and—

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think those are probably questions that would best be done in a closed session.

I can comment in a context of for the record in terms of support to Israel in that context.

Mrs. ROBY. Sure. And I thank you for that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 172.]

Mrs. ROBY. And then, sir, I just would ask you if you would just talk about the AFRICOM's current location, how that really plays into the cost of what you are responsible for and what you have to do and what potential negative impacts there are related to that as we move through our concerned fiscal times.

General HAM. I don't really see, ma'am, any negative consequences to our current stationing. We have good facilities. We are well supported. We are relatively proximate, as proximate as anything can be to the African continent without incurring the costs of building a headquarters on the continent, which I think would not be wise for a host of reasons. At the top of that list would be fiscal issues.

The Congress has required the Department of Defense to conduct a review and report back in April, a study to look at the basing of the Africa Command headquarters. The Department of Defense is conducting that review through the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The review is not complete, but that is ongoing.

Mrs. ROBY. Okay. Well, let me just—I should have said this on the front end as well—thank you for both your tremendous service to our country, and we certainly appreciate you being before this committee today to answer all of our concerns. Thank you very much.

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Roby.

Mr. Gibson of New York.

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I thank the panelists for being here today and also for your service, your long and dedicated, distinguished service. And our thoughts and prayers are with all the troopers and their families from your commands.

And I apologize for being late. I was at a hearing on the Committee on Agriculture. So if this question has been asked before, I do apologize for that.

But I would like to have described for me the timeline, some of the specifics with regard to the movement of two BCTs from Europe back to the United States. And then, Admiral, to hear your perspective, I understand we are going to now have deployments, exercises to help strengthen our relationship with our allies, and hear your vision on that. And, then, finally what the reaction is from our allies with all this.

Thanks.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, sir, and thanks for your service as well.

And I would tell you that we are going to take two heavy BCTs out of Germany. It will be the 170th and the 172nd. They are coming out of Baumholder and Schweinfurt, and they are scheduled to go out in 2013 and 2014 respectively.

We are also going to take out one A-10 squadron, the 81st, out of Spangdahlem, and then the 603rd Air Control Squadron, small unit out of Aviano.

So when you put all that in the aggregate, it will all be done kind of between now and 2014; and it will be about 12,500 people coming out of Europe. That represents about a 15-percent decrement in the number of uniform personnel in Europe.

Thank you for asking about the European reaction, because that is a very pertinent question. I have been pleasantly surprised to find that the Europeans understand this. They find it is sensible. They recognize that we are facing budget cuts here, just like they

are; and so they are accepting of this in a very straightforward way.

In terms of mitigating the reduction of the two BCTs, what we are going to do is the Army has committed to identify a BCT here in the United States that would rotationally come through Europe. So, in other words, instead of being a static BCT essentially parked in Germany, this would be a BCT that could rotate its battalions one time into eastern Europe, one time into the Balkans, one time into the Baltics, as well as other places that U.S. European Command might be tasked to operate.

So that is sort of the outline and the timeline as I see it now, sir.

Mr. GIBSON. Very good.

And in the process of planning was a course of action looked at that took all four BCTs, rotated them back to the States and then looked to use the same model in terms of sustaining relationships and providing capabilities?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Over the time I have been at EUCOM as the European commander we have looked at all the options you can imagine, with BCTs, squadrons. And of course a lot of this is deeply involved with the Services. I am not the sole voice in this at all. As you appreciate fully, sir, the Army has views about all this, the Air Force has views. So it is part of an ongoing conversation. But it is fair to say we have looked at all the options.

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you. Very informative. I look forward to at some point sitting down and learning more about how all that analysis went, and I just want to conclude by once again thanking you for your service and for being here today.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gibson.

Mr. FRANKS of Arizona.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I always want to take the same opportunity to express my own personal gratitude for your service to the country. I have 3-year-old twins, and I know that their futures are going to be greatly enhanced by the commitment of your lives. And I really continue to believe that people like you are the noblest figures in our society.

With that said, you know, it is our responsibility on this committee, more than anything else, to make sure that we try to have insight and see to the future of this country in terms of our national security. And you are the guys that get to try to flesh all that out and make it work, and we try to create the kind of resource equation that will empower you in the best way. So every once in a while I ask questions just a little differently and kind of turn around and ask you to tell me what you think the most important thing this Congress could do to enhance your capability to defend this country and the cause of freedom in the world.

I mean, that is a really broad question. But, in other words, your greatest need, or perhaps that you would consider is an unmet or an unaddressed issue that we need to consider more carefully or something you see coming down the road. What is the thing that you think that we should be focusing on to empower you to do those noble things that you have dedicated your life to doing?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, I would, frankly, start by saying that Congress is already doing it, and that is to fully resource—in fact here on this placard in front of me it says, “The Congress shall have power to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy.” You know these words better than anybody.

Mr. FRANKS. I happen to have the privilege of being the chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee in this Congress, so it means a lot to me, actually.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, I have felt, in my 6 years as a combatant commander, well supported by Congress.

I will pick up one thread, and maybe Carter has a different site picture on how to answer the question. I will say one less traditional thing perhaps.

But I would say when Congress comes to the field to visit our troops, when you come on a congressional trip to meet with high-level leaders, when you engage with your counterparts in other parliaments, that is tremendously beneficial to me in U.S. European Command, when you come to EUCOM. So I know it is always hard for all of you to get out of Washington. But when you can find time to do that, both the “visit the troops” piece but also the high-level engagement with counterparts, that is tremendously helpful. So I would offer that as one thought.

Carter?

General HAM. Sir, I would say, first of all, I think managing 3-year-old twins is probably harder than my job. I don't envy you that.

The foundation upon which everything we do is built is the All-Volunteer Force, and those men and women and their families who make a conscious decision to serve our Nation is what enables us to do the things that we need to do. Now, the Force might be a little bit smaller as we head into the future, but I think it is vitally important that all of us in leadership positions—and certainly I would ask this of Congress—to make sure that we have programs in place that continue to attract and retain the very bright, innovative, imaginative, committed servicemembers that we need to address the Nation's security needs well into the future.

Mr. FRANKS. Tell me, would either of you have any reactions to the challenge that some of us see that the sequester represents to the military? That is probably not the fairest question to ask of you in the world, because I know how you guys are. You are willing to salute and charge off with the proverbial squirt gun. But that is not where some of us are. We want to make sure you are more capable—or more armed, more fully equipped, and trained than that.

But let me ask you, what does the sequester represent, in your mind, to your operation?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, first, I would say that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have spoken very directly on this and used a wide variety of expressions, to include devastating; and I would simply say that I would agree with their assessment in terms of the macro for the Department.

In terms of U.S. European Command if sequestration were to kick in, obviously, we would have less ability to conduct our operations, less ability to do the military construction that we need to do, less ability to do the building of partnership capacity to support

our allies to come to Afghanistan and help us win in that very challenging world. Across the spectrum, it would be an extremely challenging scenario for U.S. European Command.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, my time has gone here, so thank you, gentlemen; and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Franks.

Mr. Forbes from Virginia.

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you again; and I do echo what everyone has said about appreciation for your service to the country.

Admiral, you mentioned the fact that we have resourced to the strategy. But if the strategy is not correct then we are not doing what we need to, to defend the country. And many of us have a number of questions, and I would like to just pursue some of the questions I asked you earlier.

Specifically, you indicated to me that the combatant commanders had about 6 months to come together and work on the new strategic guidance. Is that pretty accurate?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. FORBES. And you worked in a combination of ways, through technology and meetings together, I would assume?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. FORBES. A number of different ways.

On that 6-month period of time do you just happen to recall when that began? It is a pretty big-deal item, so I imagine that would—just the month.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Carter, do you remember when we had our first get-together on all that?

General HAM. Sir, my recollection was March; and that is because I became the Commander of U.S. Africa Command in March. And shortly after that we had the first meeting that I am aware of with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. So it would be fair to say sometime around March or April of 2011?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think that is right.

Mr. FORBES. In that ballpark?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. FORBES. And it lasted for about 6 months?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Probably a little longer, actually, if you think about it, since we ran from March until—basically, I think our last meeting was December where we really put it all to bed. So probably closer to 7 or 8 months.

Mr. FORBES. And at what time again—again, not to narrow it down, but towards the beginning of the process, the middle of the process, the end of the process, were you ever told formally this is the number that we have got to work with? In other words, I know you said you were looking at basically \$500 billion in cuts. But I just want to make sure we are not all walking in as combatant commanders and saying, well, I am relying on what I read in the *Washington Post* or—

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, not at all.

Mr. FORBES. But at some point in time I would take it someone came in to you and formally said we have got to have a strategic guidance that is locked into about \$500 billion or \$487 billion—whatever the figure was—of cuts. Is that fair? Did that happen?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, it did.

And, again, when I responded earlier that we didn't have a number, I thought what you were pressing on was, did U.S. European Command have a specific slice of that or a piece of that? And we did not.

Mr. FORBES. No, no, but, overall, for your meetings and putting together your input for the strategic guidance, were you ever formally given a number in some capacity at all?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would say we were not kind of given a formal number, but I think in each of the meetings there was a general presentation that would give us a sense, broadly, of where the current debate was in terms of the budget cut.

Mr. FORBES. And, again, this is important to us in knowing how much of this is security driven and how much is budget driven. I just can't comprehend how—and the reason I say this is the Secretary of Defense said he wouldn't have picked \$487 billion. He would have picked another number. He thought that was too high. He said that in testimony. He said it privately.

So at some point in time somebody had to walk in and say we have got to reach this goal of \$500 billion of cuts or \$487 [billion]. You don't recall anybody ever coming in with that figure and saying we have got to shoot for this?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think in each of our meetings we would have a presentation that kind of talked about the budget and where the budget situation was. But you know, Congressman, when you do strategy, you are trying to combine ways, means, and ends. You are trying to have goals—

Mr. FORBES. The reason I say that, General Amos, I think, the other day said, if sequestration came down—what I think Mr. Franks was saying—we would have to do a whole different strategy. So if we had \$500 billion more cuts, it would be a hugely different strategy than if we had \$487 billion in cuts.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would say that any strategy that anybody has, including in our personal lives when we try to put a financial strategy together, that if the resources change, then the strategic picture will change.

Mr. FORBES. So wouldn't it be important for us, in developing the strategy, to know what the resources were before we started making it?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think that is fair. I think it is also important that we understand the geopolitical situation.

Mr. FORBES. I fully agree with that.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it is all those things put together.

Mr. FORBES. I absolutely agree. The only point I am saying is I am having a hard time understanding whether you guys ever knew what those resources were to begin with or not. Because you are saying you just had kind of an understanding. They were talking about it. But nobody ever came down and said, this is the world we are living in, this \$487 billion cut?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Congressman, again, at each of our meetings, we would get a very short sort of sense of the budget, but the vast majority of our time was devoted to the geopolitical structure.

Mr. FORBES. In that short sense, did somebody give you a number at all?



Admiral STAVRIDIS. We saw many numbers in the course of that and many numbers of aircraft and ships and dollars and the geopolitics, and all those things need to kind of come together if you are going to create a coherent strategy.

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Forbes.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you for allowing me to get an extra question in, Mr. Chairman.

I will ask this of General Ham. Last week, Secretary Clinton attended the London conference on Somalia. What do you think was the result of the conference and what are the implications for Somalia's future?

General HAM. Congressman, I think the London conference was a very significant and worthwhile step forward. Because it brought together I think about 40 different nations, to include the leadership of the Somalian Transitional Federal Government, to address the near, mid, and longer term needs of Somalia.

There has been I think very much a focus on the security aspects in Somalia and not so much focus on the governance and developmental aspects that would follow the establishment of a sufficiently secure environment; and I think this London conference really started to address, in a very meaningful way, how the international community will seek to pull together to assist the Somali people in forming a government of their choice. So it is too soon to really tell, but I think all the indications are quite positive coming out of the London conference.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. If I could just add on that, because many of the participants were European, and I think the United Kingdom in particular had a real driving role in this.

I, too, am cautiously optimistic that this is the right approach for the international community to begin to focus on this because this area of the world could have potentially negative impacts in terms of transnational threat. And I believe that we are on the right course, but we have got a lot of work to do in that region.

Mr. JOHNSON. The leadership of the African Union, what is their involvement in that process?

General HAM. The African Union has a very significant role in Somalia, especially at present with the African Union mission in Somalia which is primarily focused on the security line of operation, as we would—

But the African Union, with all of its members pulling together, again, to address not only security but governance and developmental needs in Somalia in the whole of East Africa I think is a very significant component of the international community's effort to help Somalia stand up once again as an independent and cohesive nation.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

And, General, one last question. As you are probably aware, undercover journalists with Al Jazeera English recently documented high-level corruption in the office of Sierra Leone's vice president; and it appears on tape that his aides accepted bribes on his behalf in exchange for illegal logging permits. The evidence was so damning that 19 Members of Congress have urged that the U.S. Government push Sierra Leone to hold the perpetrators responsible.

General, Sierra Leone is an important security partner. Would you please relay to your counterparts in Sierra Leone that Members of Congress are still deeply concerned about this matter? And will you please explain to the committee how high-level corruption in partner countries make security partnerships, counternarcotics cooperation, and security assistance more difficult?

General HAM. I will, sir. And your comment is timely, as Sierra Leone has offered to the African Union mission in Somalia a troop contingent, which would be the first out-of-region force to join the African Union mission in Somalia. And certainly the reports and indications of corruption undermine that overall effort.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

And I would like to thank the witness for your testimony today. I really appreciate it.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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**A P P E N D I X**

FEBRUARY 29, 2012

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

FEBRUARY 29, 2012

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**Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon**  
**Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services**  
**Hearing on**  
**Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization**  
**Budget Requests from U.S. European Command**  
**and U.S. Africa Command**  
**February 29, 2012**

The last year has been very busy for both of your commands, from operations in Libya to the current tensions with Israel and Iran, and the recent announcements of force posture changes to our U.S. forces deployed in Europe.

Admiral Stavridis, for the last 2 years before this committee, you’ve strongly advocated for the presence of four Army brigade combat teams. But 2 weeks ago, the Defense Department announced its decision to withdraw the two heavy BCTs from Europe. You’ve talked about the “ready, proven, mature basing infrastructure” in Europe that allows the U.S. military to rapidly respond to crises in the world’s most likely hotspots. I’m worried about the decisions being made for the “sake of efficiencies and budget” that change our force posture in Europe but neglect our commitment to regional allies and stability.

I also want to highlight my continuing concerns about President Obama’s missile defense strategy. It appears the United States is spending \$4 on regional missile defense, like the European Phased Adaptive Approach, for every \$1 it is spending on homeland defense. What’s more, European missile defense will be a “national contribution” to NATO, meaning the cost will be borne entirely by the U.S. at a time when most of NATO is failing to meet even the 2% of GDP threshold for NATO membership.

I’m also concerned that the new strategy continues to provide sufficient resources to EUCOM for the defense of Israel, given the growing threats to Israel and its security. It’s important the United States upholds our pledge to defend one of our most reliable and loyal allies from threats to their security and existence.

General Ham, although operations in Libya concluded last October, there remain significant challenges to stability and security on the African continent. While I am glad that brutal Libyan dictator Qadhafi is gone, the country is still transitioning. A stable peace may not come for some time. Meanwhile, violent extremist organizations continue to be a significant concern in Africa. The attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria, especially against Christians, are extremely worrisome. Somalia remains a continuing source of insta-

bility, still hosting Al Qaeda and its affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist organization. The increasing coordination between Al Qaeda and al-Shabaab is a dangerous development and a reminder of the threat posed by radicalism, terrorism, and ungoverned spaces. Piracy remains a serious threat in the Gulf of Aden, threatening commercial shipping in a major sea lane. The recent Navy SEAL operation rescuing two hostages, including American Jessica Buchanan, was good news. But we must find a way to prevent these violent, criminal acts of piracy and terrorism from happening in the first place. Nevertheless, the new defense strategy appears to emphasize presence and engagement in Asia at the expense of other regions, including Africa. We look forward to your testimony shedding additional light on these matters.



**Statement of Hon. Adam Smith**  
**Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services**  
**Hearing on**  
**Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization**  
**Budget Requests from U.S. European Command**  
**and U.S. Africa Command**  
**February 29, 2012**

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. I would like to join Chairman McKeon in welcoming Admiral Stavridis and General Ham. We appreciate your time and look forward to hearing your thoughts on the budget requests for your respective commands.

Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately places a renewed focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific region, but our regional commands will continue to play a vital role as we work to confront national security threats wherever they arise.

Today, we will take a close look at the posture of two important regional commands: U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command.

First, let me address U.S. European Command. The U.S. European Command remains an essential part of U.S. and international security. Looking beyond the military operations in Afghanistan, the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran and the risk of the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons to terrorists remain grave threats to U.S. and international security. We are particularly concerned about the recent escalating tensions with regard to Iran and the impact for EUCOM.

Now, let me address AFRICOM. Recently, AFRICOM played a key role in our efforts to oust a brutal dictator and support the aspirations of the Libyan people. Moving forward, it is clear that stability in Africa is in the United States' national interest. Supporting justice, human rights, and the secure access of goods and services to the world markets is imperative to encouraging stability, but even more pressing is the variety of violent extremist organizations aligning with Al Qaeda: al-Shabaab in Somalia being the most dangerous, but also Al Qaeda in the Magreb and Boko Haran in Nigeria. Their desire to do serious damage to our Nation, our friends, and our partners is real. Additionally, our efforts assisting our partners in going after the Lord's Resistance Army will bring stability to a resource rich part of the country that has known enormous bloodshed and strife for too many years. AFRICOM will play a central role as we continue to emphasize the importance of building the capacity of our African partners, who are also endangered, to deal with these mutual threats.

In closing, I would like to remind our Committee that overall, the defense budget is fully consistent with the funding levels set by the

Budget Control Act passed by Congress. Although I did not support this act, many members of the House Armed Services Committee did, Congress passed it, and the Department of Defense has submitted a budget that complies with the congressionally mandated funding levels.

I want to thank the witnesses again and I look forward to hearing their testimony.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

TESTIMONY OF

ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, UNITED STATES NAVY  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND  
BEFORE THE 112TH CONGRESS

FEBRUARY 29, 2012



*United States*  
**European Command**  
*"Stronger Together"*



*INTRODUCTION*

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. For nearly three years now, I've had the privilege to command the exceptional men and women of the United States European Command and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Allied Command Operations. As you know, it has been a busy year for these commands, for the NATO Alliance, and for our international and interagency partners who are such a vital part of our mission, our many initiatives, and our team.

Working together, we have accomplished some important objectives since I saw you last: saving tens of thousands of lives from a despotic and unstable regime in Libya; supporting continued progress and transition in Afghanistan; maintaining a safe environment in the Balkans; sustaining vital relationships with our key allies and emerging partners in the region; and developing the necessary capabilities to meet the rising—and, in many cases, different—security challenges of the 21st century.

I am happy to report that we continue to make sound and efficient progress, in concert with our allies and partners, toward ensuring continued security and stability across our theater and, in so doing, are providing for the forward defense of the United States.

But before reporting our progress and achievements over the past year, I want to take a moment to examine a fundamental question on many minds here in Washington and abroad: How does the U.S. military presence in the European theater contribute to the national security of the United States? This is a question especially relevant during times of significant economic challenge; a challenge that represents a formidable threat to our national security as well as our national well-being.

First, economics matter. U.S. engagement and European stability have been intertwined since the first American soldier stepped foot onto the continent in 1917. Since then, American periods of engagement and support have helped underwrite security to prevent the far wider costs of war. Sadly, the converse has also proven true, when episodes of postwar U.S. disengagement, notably in the 1930s and 1990s, led to renewed European instability, conflict, and bloodshed, ultimately requiring significant U.S. military action.

Yet, for the past sixty-three years, the security and stability delivered by this transatlantic alliance have provided conditions for economic vibrancy, sustained investment, and growth; conditions that have substantially benefitted the United States. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that the 28 countries which comprise NATO constitute over 50% of the globe's Gross Domestic Product. This association, rooted in security, continues to enable the largest and most complex economic relationship in the world, with activity supporting 15 million transatlantic jobs and generating trade in goods and services of more than \$2.4 billion daily<sup>1</sup>. This advantage provides the United States and Europe, acting together, tremendous economic influence moving into the future.

Second, the European Theater, located in or adjacent to three continents—Europe, Asia, and Africa—represents critical geostrategic terrain. Existing U.S. posture in Europe provides ready, proven, mature basing infrastructure for rapid response to crises in the world's most likely hot spots including North Africa, as we witnessed first-hand last year, the Levant, and elsewhere in the Middle East. U.S. basing in Europe, though 75% reduced from the height of the Cold War, continues to provide that irreplaceable combination of location and services at the nexus of these

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<sup>1</sup> European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, report on European trade with the United States, [http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-states/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-states/index_en.htm).

three continents essential in responding to contingencies, both foreseeable and unforeseeable, in today's highly dynamic security environment. These bases also support the global reach missions of four U.S. combatant commanders and numerous U.S. government agencies. Currently, that reach includes support to the Northern Distribution Network, which provides a vital logistical lifeline to our forces in Afghanistan and is increasingly important today given the precarious nature of our other lines of supply. Preserving this theater's vital strategic access to meet our enduring national security needs requires relationships with our European partners, relationships based on presence and commitment.

Additionally, European Command's outreach and engagement with nations inside our theater across the Caucasus, Black Sea, and Balkan regions also strive to mitigate the potential for conflict in areas important to U.S. foreign policy, inviting these nations into the community of international cooperation and partnership, and benefitting from their willingness to conduct expeditionary operations, including support to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Third, the NATO Alliance, which the President has called "the most successful alliance in human history," and NATO's continued transformation matter tremendously to the future viability of coalition warfare, and our ability to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. These challenges include missile defense, assurance, deterrence, cyberspace, terrorism, and transnational illicit trafficking, to name just a few. In squarely meeting these challenges, sustained American leadership, commitment, and support will remain an important cornerstone to ensure, in concert with our allies, that history's most successful alliance remains strong and, as the President has also said, "as relevant in this century as it was in the last."

Fourth, the fundamental values we share with our European allies and partners cement our nations' common commitment to the bedrock principles of democratic government, the rule of law, free markets, and enduring human rights. Communicating and reinforcing these shared values throughout our theater-wide engagements and personal interactions—through what we say and, more importantly, what we do—helps to clarify our common goals and identify common threats as we work together to achieve the former and combat the latter, firmly and confidently, in step with the new century's unremitting pace, change, and challenge.

Fifth, through our long-standing presence, leadership, cooperation, and engagement with the Europeans, we have developed our best and most willing pool of partners to stand with the United States in our ongoing commitment to security, stability, and peace. In Afghanistan, roughly 90% of the 40,000 non-US troops serving there come from Europe. In Libya, NATO aggressively stepped up to lead that mission just three weeks after military operations commenced, conducting 75% of all sorties and 100% of the maritime operations. And in the Balkans, Europe provides 90% of all forces for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Operating together, whether on modern battlefields in Afghanistan, Libya, and the Balkans, or in emerging and ironically “new” missions like counter-piracy, Europeans continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with us to face the many complex challenges of the 21st century. And, in the years ahead, even as our nation shifts its strategic focus to the ‘Asia-Pacific,’ the reality remains that our most willing, effective, credible, and enduring strategic military partners reside in Europe.

To summarize, in all of my appearances before you, I have sought to emphasize and illustrate, through tangible progress and concrete examples, the strategy that we have pursued for several years now: a strategy of active security and forward defense focused on preserving our strategic



partnerships in Europe; building interoperability with the NATO Alliance; deterring would-be adversaries; sustaining progress and transition in Afghanistan; when directed, conducting decisive military and counterterrorism operations to fight and win; and thinking creatively, acting efficiently, and working collaboratively to confront the rising security challenges of the modern era—an era that continues to be characterized by the power of unprecedented information connectivity, the tensions and opportunities of global economic interdependence, and accelerating change.

Like any strategy, this strategy has served as a framework to organize the relationship of ends, ways, and means necessary to accomplish our mission. But at the core of this strategy is the fundamental realization and revalidation of the strategic linkage between Europe and the United States. America's European allies remain our nation's most reliable and enduring strategic partners.

As we consider the complexity of the modern security environment, as well as the need to align fiscal realities with enduring security requirements, I believe that our European partnerships and engagements continue to be wise and sound national security investments. As Secretary Panetta said last October in Brussels: "We live in a world of growing danger and uncertainty, where we face threats from violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, rising powers, and cyber attack. We cannot predict where the next crisis will occur. But we know we are stronger when we confront these threats together. The benefits that our countries derive from working together to defend common interests and protect our security and prosperity are obvious and enduring. And it is precisely because of the growing security challenges and growing fiscal constraints that we need to work more closely than ever as partners." As I have said many times throughout the years, and believe now more firmly than ever, we are *stronger together* with our European partners.

### ***MISSION, VISION, OBJECTIVES, PRIORITIES***

***Mission:*** The mission of the U.S. European Command is to conduct military operations, international military engagement, and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the United States forward.

***Vision:*** We serve the nation as an agile security organization executing full-spectrum activities in a whole-of-government framework to deliver solutions that contribute to enduring security and stability across the world.

#### **USEUCOM OBJECTIVES**

- Ensure high readiness to execute European Command's contingency plans;
- Posture European Command forces to support NATO Article V response, while focusing on allied and partner training designed to maintain interoperability;
- Assist the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) transition, through the continued generation and training of ample coalition forces;
- Sustain NATO and capable partner nations' expeditionary capabilities, while reinforcing their ability to maintain regional stability and to provide for their own security;
- Nurture strategic relationships and necessary force posture to enable continued access, thereby ensuring U.S. freedom of action and global reach;
- Prevent violent extremist organizations from obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction;
- Advance NATO European ballistic missile defense through an integrated approach built on balanced contributions;
- Prevent the evolution of local crises into regional conflicts, particularly in the Balkans and Caucasus.

#### **USEUCOM PRIORITIES**


- Ensure readiness to execute European Command's contingency plans
- Enable a successful ISAF transition
- Preserve strategic partnerships
  - Ensure a strong NATO Alliance
  - Sustain ally & partner expeditionary capability beyond ISAF
  - Maintain ally & partner interoperability
  - Promote regional stability & security
- Prepare for transnational threats, focused on Missile Defense, WMD, and cyberspace
- Maintain U.S. strategic access across Europe in support of U.S. global operations
- Engage Israel, Russia, Turkey, and Poland in areas of mutual security

***“Stronger Together”***

Over the past year, U.S. European Command has made significant contributions to coalition combat operations in Afghanistan and Libya, while pursuing an aggressive schedule of major theater exercises and sustained engagement with our allies and partners. We have achieved progress along multiple lines of operation to assure our friends and deter potential adversaries.

*Support to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.* European Command continues to conduct a wide range of activities supporting the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, as well as the President's strategy to transfer the security lead to Afghan National Security Forces by 2014. As mentioned, 90% of forces from non-U.S. troop contributing nations come from the European theater. This translates to a third of the force on the ground, relieving the strain this gap would pose as a U.S. force generation requirement. European nations are, by far, our strongest supporters in Afghanistan.

European Command actively supports our allies and partners in their preparations for deployment to Afghanistan. We help these countries identify pre-deployment training and equipment requirements, and then leverage a number of available programs and authorities to assist in meeting those requirements. Through these programs, our allies and partners have received training in critical combat skills, including: Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) procedures; the operation of mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles and up-armored high mobility




*European Command is providing wide-ranging support to ISAF combat operations.*

multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs); counterinsurgency intelligence analysis, tailored to the complex Afghan environment; and battalion-level full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations. European Command has also provided partner nations with essential equipment for operations in Afghanistan, including night vision devices, communications systems, robots, and other counter-IED systems.

Some quantitative examples illustrate the scope of European Command's efforts to support the fight in Afghanistan. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, European Command conducted three Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) and three Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (POMLT) training rotations at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany, ultimately preparing 50 OMLTs, 25 POMLTs, and almost 2,000 personnel from 15 countries for deployment. Additionally, European Command conducted 21 Expeditionary Intelligence Training Program courses, providing fundamental

counterinsurgency intelligence and operational skill sets for 628 personnel from 25 countries, and trained 2,135 soldiers from 18 countries in life-saving counter-IED skills. Finally, in 2011, European Command trained two Polish Brigades, two Romanian battalions, and two Georgian battalions for deployment to Afghanistan. All of these activities provide crucial linkages, personally and professionally, between the U.S. military and these deploying coalition forces. Without these relationships, contributions, and training conducted



*A Polish Special Operations Forces Command soldier, front, trains alongside U.S. Special Operations Forces at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany.*

to a common standard, the challenges we face deployed side-by-side with these partners would be far more difficult, and the requirements placed on U.S. forces heavier.


European Command also provides critical logistical support to operations in Afghanistan. Our mature basing footprint and theater relationships are a vital part of U.S. Transportation Command's en-route strategy, and have enabled us to develop and expand the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to provide important additional supply routes to Afghanistan. In FY11, European Command's Deployment and Distribution Operations Center moved 21,574 containers and 232,206 tons of equipment through Europe to Afghanistan over the NDN. Additionally, for the first time since 2003, U.S. forces conducted trans-loading operations at the multimodal facilities located at Mihail Kogalniceanu Airbase in Romania. This effort fulfilled U.S. Central Command's requirement to establish alternative lines of communication to mitigate any potential loss of supply routes through Pakistan.

European Command also provides logistical capacity to assist our allies and partners move their forces and equipment to and from Afghanistan. In FY11, European Command coordinated the use of the Department of Defense (DoD) Lift and Sustain Program to transport 16,344 service members and 2,734 tons of cargo from 19 contributing nations, who otherwise would have been unable to make these contributions. In addition, European Command increases efficiency by leveraging our active involvement in two European military transportation consortiums, as well as the U.S. allocation of 1,000 flight hours in the Heavy Airlift Wing (comprised of three cooperatively shared Hungarian-registered C-17 aircraft), to support U.S. and partner logistical movements into and across the theater.

*Support to Operations in Libya.* Last year's operations in Libya validated the critical importance of maintaining strong relationships across Europe for basing, access, and force contributions. These relationships, as well as infrastructure investments already made, particularly along the Mediterranean Sea in France, Italy, Spain, and Greece, allowed us to obtain rapid basing and access for U.S. and coalition military assets participating in Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR.

This support made it possible to develop a holistic basing plan that maximized the air assets of all participating nations, and provided the aircraft support, logistics, ordnance, communications,

and resupply to ensure rapid and sustained actions throughout the operation.



*Canadian F-18 jet fighters deployed from European bases to conduct combat sorties over the skies of Libya in support of NATO's Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR.*

In one example, only days after U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 was passed, Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy, opened its doors, with Italian support and approval, to become a critical multinational coalition launching pad, hosting air assets

from nine countries flying sorties in direct support of NATO mission requirements.

In addition to basing, sustainment, and logistical support, European Command provided significant intelligence, command and control, and communications support to coalition and NATO operations over and around Libya. Without strategic access and forces postured in Europe, it is safe to say that the coalition response to UNSCR 1973 would have been significantly longer in developing, less effective in execution, and less likely to have achieved its objective. This reinforces

the criticality of our strategic partners and position in Europe, highlighting that we truly are stronger together when we act collectively in areas where our national interests overlap.

*Multinational, Joint, and Interagency Exercises.* European Command's rigorous theater exercise schedule formed a vital foundation for the effective execution of the combat operations described above, and remains an essential venue for intensive, steady-state interaction and engagement with our allies and partners. European Command maintained an intensive bilateral and multilateral exercise program last year, executing 22 major exercises involving nearly 50,000 U.S., allied, and partner nation personnel from 42 contributing nations. Exercises in 2011 focused on preparing partner nations for ongoing coalition operations, primarily in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, as described in the previous section, as well enhancing NATO interoperability for present and future coalition operations, and improving our military coordination and interoperability with Israel. Highlights of the latter include:

*AUSTERE CHALLENGE / JUNIPER COBRA.* In its seventh year as European Command's premier joint force headquarters exercise, AUSTERE CHALLENGE 11 ventured back into the arena of full spectrum major combat operations, incorporating a significant focus on cyberspace. AUSTERE CHALLENGE 11 made significant progress addressing the ongoing challenge of coalition communications interoperability, implementing a first-of-its-kind information sharing network over the existing U.S. Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES). This arrangement provided rapid network development and expansion, as well as important lessons for integration into future coalition communication plans.


This year, AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 will continue to provide world-class, large-scale training opportunities for U.S. European Command Headquarters, our Service Component Commands, and the Israel Defense Force General Staff. A five-phased, eight part exercise, AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 will examine two existing U.S. European Command concept plans exercising theater operations organized under two different Joint Task Force Commanders. Exercising real-world air and maritime missions, the first Joint Task Force (JTF) will be commanded by U.S. Air Forces in Europe/Third Air Force, while the second JTF will be led by the Commander of Naval Forces Europe/Africa/SIXTH Fleet. As part of the broader AUSTERE CHALLENGE event, European Command will also conduct the largest of our combined exercises and engagements with Israel, Exercise JUNIPER COBRA. JUNIPER COBRA supports the U.S.-Israeli political-military relationship and exercises important theater capabilities, providing a further demonstration of U.S. commitment to the security of Israel.

*Balkan Exercises.* In the Balkans, Exercise IMMEDIATE RESPONSE brought together forces from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia in an effort to build relationships, strengthen capabilities, and foster multinational cooperation through counter-IED training. Additionally, Macedonia hosted the popular Medical Central Europe (MEDCEUR) Exercise last year, sharing valuable medical skills among 340 medical professionals from the United States, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia.



*Baltic Exercises.* U.S. Naval Forces Europe led the 26th annual Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) exercise, assembling 13 nations in the region's largest multinational maritime training event focused on maritime interdiction, amphibious skills, and interoperability. Shifting landward to Exercise SABER STRIKE, European Command, the Baltic nations, and Poland sharpened the counterinsurgency skills—at the platoon, company and brigade levels—of over 1,600 Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish forces preparing for deployment to Afghanistan.

*Black Sea Exercises.* Focusing on partnerships and interoperability in the Black Sea region, RAPID TRIDENT assembled 1,600 forces from 13 countries to conduct the first-ever multinational airborne drop into Ukraine, developing important land warfare skills and camaraderie among key NATO and non-NATO partners in a critical area of the world. JACKAL STONE 11, Special Operations Command Europe's annual capstone exercise, involved eight nations and over 1,500 partner nation Special Operations Forces (SOF) sharpening theater SOF capabilities in all



*Paratroopers from (left to right) the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Belarus, Poland and Ukraine join together for a photograph to commemorate RAPID TRIDENT 2011, a first-of-its-kind multinational airborne exercise designed to promote regional stability and security, strengthen international military partnering, foster trust, and improve interoperability among participating nations. RAPID TRIDENT 2011 was led by U.S. Army Europe, and conducted at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in Yavoriv, Ukraine.*

mission sets from counterterrorism to high-intensity conflict. Exercise SEA BREEZE joined naval and marine forces from 14 countries in the Black Sea to exercise maritime interdiction, counter-piracy, non-combatant evacuation operations, and actions to counter the flow of illicit transnational trafficking, all rising challenges in the 21st century.

*Israeli Engagement.* European Command's sustained engagement with Israel, in numerous annual theater security cooperation and military-to-military engagement activities, continues to strengthen our relationship with this key regional ally. European Command chairs four bilateral, semiannual conferences with Israel addressing planning, logistics, exercises and interoperability. The United States/Israeli exercise portfolio also includes eight major recurring exercises to strengthen our nations' ties and military cooperation. Through these engagements, European Command leaders and staff maintain uniquely strong, recurring, personal, and direct relationships with their counterparts in the Israeli Defense Forces.


Additionally, our comprehensive engagement strategy with Israel complements other U.S. government security cooperation initiatives, to include the efforts of the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC). The USSC's mission is to help the Palestinian Authority transform and professionalize its security sector, and support U.S. and international whole-of-government engagement with the Israelis and Palestinians through security initiatives designed to build mutual trust and confidence. European Command is working actively and collectively with our Israeli partners to address common security challenges and counter threats to regional stability.

*FLEXIBLE LEADER.* Exercise FLEXIBLE LEADER opens the aperture, expanding awareness and exploring the efficiencies of interagency capacity to meet "whole-of-society" challenges raised by Foreign Consequence Management and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. This year's exercise, set in the Balkans, focuses on the response to a major earthquake and a rail yard collision leading to the accidental spill of nuclear power plant fuel. These exercises provide valuable opportunities to vet European Command's contingency plans, examine internal and interagency command and control protocols, and improve coordination with regional and international response organizations.


*COMBINED ENDEAVOR.* The largest communications and electronics interoperability exercise in the world, European Command's COMBINED ENDEAVOR 11 brought together delegates from 40 nations (25 NATO and 15 Partnership for Peace countries) seeking to strengthen partner communications capabilities, pursue joint training and professional development objectives, develop critical interoperability standards, and prepare C4 (command & control, communications, and computer) forces for deployment. COMBINED ENDEAVOR continues to bridge important partners from across the theater to identify future coalition communication needs in support of regional and global military operations.

*CYBER ENDEAVOR.* European Command's flagship cyber security engagement, CYBER ENDEAVOR continues to reach out to NATO allies, partner nations, industry, and academia to strengthen cyber defense capabilities through multiple exercise events. CYBER ENDEAVOR 11 included representatives from NATO Headquarters, 19 NATO nations, and 13 Partnership for Peace nations. The exercise explored and developed secure information system core competencies, technical defense capabilities, and best-practice network security measures. CYBER ENDEAVOR participation continues to grow each year, another indication of the rising relevance and theater-wide interest in the effects and impact of cyberspace.

*ARCTIC ZEPHYR.* The ARCTIC ZEPHYR series, which started in 2010, seeks to expand understanding and awareness of the legal, security, commercial, and political ramifications of the changing Arctic environment, while strengthening relationships with other Arctic nations. The ARCTIC ZEPHYR exercise series will culminate in 2013, and remains one of the areas where we seek to find common ground and zones of cooperation with Russia.



*National Guard State Partnership Program:* We are very proud of this low-cost, high payoff program. One of European Command's most unique, cost effective, and essential international engagement tools, the State Partnership Program partners U.S. National Guardsmen from 21 participating states with 22 countries across the theater to engage in mutually beneficial training, interactions, and exercise engagements that support key Theater Security Cooperation objectives and preserve and develop these important strategic partnerships. The program capitalizes on the National Guard's unique state and federal military characteristics. The program has achieved mutually beneficial security goals and developed long-term productive relationships that continue to benefit ongoing military activities.



*European Command's access, presence, and engagement continues to preserve our vital strategic partnerships.*

"For more than six decades, Europeans and Americans have stood shoulder to shoulder because our work together advances our interests and protects the freedoms we cherish as democratic societies. As the world has changed, so too has our alliance, and we are stronger, safer, and more prosperous as a result...Put simply, we are each other's closest partners."

-President Obama

*EUCOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDS*

Except when assigned to a joint task force for military operations or participating in joint exercises, European Command forces are managed, trained, and equipped by our Service component headquarters: U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR); U.S. Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR); U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Africa/COMSIXTHFLT (NAVEUR); U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE); and U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). These organizations provide forces for our military-to-military engagements, serve an assurance and deterrence function in the region, deploy units for contingency operations, and, when necessary, provide a full-spectrum Joint Task Force headquarters. Understanding our service component commands is the key to understanding European Command, as they conduct the majority of our steady-state activities.

*U.S. Army Europe  
Heidelberg, Germany*

*Introduction & Overview.* United States Army Europe provides forward-based forces to execute national security objectives, prevail in today's wars, and prepare to defeat future threats. U.S. Army Europe leverages its forward presence to conduct and facilitate essential theater multinational interoperability training. These activities assure our allies and partners, and deter potential aggressors. Today in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) executes complex multinational coalition operations to defeat terrorism and protect the U.S. homeland forward. U.S. Army Europe provides a vital linkage between the U.S. Army and our European allies and partners participating in ISAF through our long-standing relationships, frequent military-to-military engagements, and the interoperability training so instrumental to current and future coalition operations. U.S. Army Europe provided essential logistical support to NATO operations in Libya in 2011, and continues to provide training and intelligence support to Israel as well as critical logistical support in Kosovo. Additionally, United States Army Europe's Forces form the cornerstone of the U.S. Article V commitment to NATO.

*Major Accomplishments.* U.S. Army Europe focused on providing trained and culturally aware units and enabling forces, capable of conducting full-spectrum operations, in support of ISAF and other current and future contingency operations. Until recently, Army Europe's V Corps provided the primary command and control headquarters for ISAF in Afghanistan. Today, V Corps is reorganizing and preparing for future deployments. U.S. Army Europe's leadership and support were also crucial in establishing the first ground-based radar site in Turkey, as European

Command implements the President's European Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense. Additionally, while U.S. Army Europe forces maintained a 30-40% deployment rate to Iraq and Afghanistan last year, increased dwell time has significantly improved the quantity and quality of our multinational training events and engagements. These events are focused on improving our European partners' capabilities, capacity, and interoperability for deployment to ISAF or other future contingency operations.

In 2011, U.S. Army Europe staff officers, intelligence specialists, and logisticians provided direct mission support to U.S. Africa Command and Operation ODYSSEY DAWN, including critical ground targeting capability from the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade. Throughout the continent of Europe, the 21st Theater Support Command provided U.S. Africa Command, and their Special Operations component, with key logistics and sustainment support, enabling the execution of vital missions across this theater of operations. Additionally, U.S. Army Europe played a crucial role in U.S. Transportation Command's proof-of-principle test in Romania to develop alternatives for transiting critical cargo to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other locations.

*Theater Security Cooperation.* In one of European Command's most important Theater



*U.S. Army Europe Soldiers and our Romanian allies engage the enemy during a combat mission rehearsal exercise, conducted at the Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany*

Security Cooperation initiatives, U.S. Army Europe forces prepared two Polish brigades, two Romanian battalions, and, in concert with the Marine Corps, two Georgian battalions for deployment to ISAF. Leveraging the personal relationships and consistent presence of our forward-deployed brigades, we use these brigades to conduct vital training and


mentorship with similar multinational forces. These 'unit partnership' programs have dramatically enhanced the capabilities of our coalition partners, preparing them to conduct operations across the globe and receiving considerable praise from ISAF commanders. Additionally, U.S. Army Europe has provided deploying units with critical life-saving courses in the use of MRAP vehicles, Up-Armored HMMWVs, and counter-IED procedures. Finally, in FY11, U.S. Army Europe trainers prepared 50 Operational Mentor-Liaison Teams (OMLT) and 25 Police Mentor-Liaison Teams (POMLT) for deployment to Afghanistan, supporting ISAF's high priority mission to train Afghan National Security Forces.

The Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) is the linchpin to achieving these vital theater objectives, and meeting our comprehensive security cooperation mission. JMTC is a national strategic asset, providing world-class training and support that enables a broad range of multinational Soldier training events ensuring U.S. and partner nation forces are well-prepared for ISAF operations and future global contingencies.

*Exercises.* Exercises remain critical to the pre-deployment training of U.S. and coalition forces supporting ISAF operations, and they serve to prepare these same forces for future coalition operations across U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Central Command. In 2011, U.S. Army Europe participated in 21 major joint and Army exercises, including three major mission rehearsals, conducted in 13 countries with 44 participating nations. Highlights include:

- SABER STRIKE 11, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-directed brigade level command post exercise conducted in Latvia involving over 1,700 Soldiers from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, and Poland. SABER STRIKE enhanced combat readiness and interoperability in the Baltic region, while assuring NATO partners of the United States' Article V commitment.





*Multi-national paratroopers, participating in U.S. Army Europe exercise DRAGON 11*

- DRAGON 11, a live-fire exercise conducted in Poland with Polish, Canadian, and British ground forces to enhance partner capacity and increase interoperability. The exercise incorporated ISAF lessons learned, through the participation of NATO Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC-NE) personnel and the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team.

- IMMEDIATE RESPONSE 11, a JCS-directed multilateral joint and combined exercise in the Balkans, with participation from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, which provided an important venue for continued Balkan interaction and prepared ISAF-contributing nations to serve in Afghanistan's complex counterinsurgency environment alongside coalition forces.


*Way Ahead.* U.S. Army Europe will provide forces for global combat operations, continue to conduct and facilitate world-class training with our allies and partners, and meet all theater missions to defend the homeland forward. Looking beyond ISAF, we have begun to establish new standards for multinational training to strengthen U.S. and partner nation participation in future coalition warfare. Recently, the 173rd ABCT Full Spectrum Training Event exercised critical Command capabilities to prepare full-spectrum forces ready for global employment, and to improve our allies' and partners' survivability and combat effectiveness during deployment. These engagements provide vital assurances to our allies and partners, reinforce U.S. leadership in NATO, enhance interoperability, and strengthen our key theater relationships.

*U.S. Marine Forces Europe  
Stuttgart, Germany*

*Introduction & Overview.* In 2011, Marine Forces Europe focused on strengthening and sustaining our allied and partner capabilities, as well as utilizing U.S. Marine expeditionary forces to reassure allies, deter potential adversaries, and remain ready to respond rapidly to crises across the region. The U.S. Marine Corps' expeditionary nature focuses Marine Forces Europe's primary orientation on security cooperation activities with our newest NATO allies and partners, particularly in the Caucasus, Black Sea, Balkan, and Baltic regions.

*Major Accomplishments.* In response to the Libya operation last year, Marine Forces Europe coordinated the provision of a battalion-sized augmentation to afloat expeditionary forces supporting U.S. Africa Command during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN, and facilitated the rapid deployment of electronic warfare assets to Italy in support of NATO Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. In response to Turkey's devastating October 2011 earthquake, Marine Forces Europe provided essential humanitarian assistance, rapidly deploying transportable shelters and heating equipment to ease human suffering and support this important NATO ally in its time of need. While maintaining only a small Service Component headquarters, Marine Forces Europe also effectively leveraged our capabilities to support key European Command objectives—focused on engagement in the Caucasus, Black Sea, and Balkans—in order to enable our partners to contribute to collective security in European and out-of-area operations. Marine Forces Europe continued to provide reassurance in the Baltics last year, while continuing to sharpen crisis response skills through training and operations.

*Georgia Deployment Program—International Security Assistance Force.* In support of nationally directed theater strategic end states, Marine Forces Europe leads European Command's joint mission to train the Georgian Armed Forces. Executing this mission since 2010, Marine Forces Europe has developed and implemented a program that has trained and deployed a total



*A Georgian soldier receives training through the Marine Forces Europe Georgia Deployment Program. The phase of training shown above was conducted at the Joint Multinational Training Center, Germany.*

of four Georgian battalions to conduct full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations in support of ISAF. This program, the first of its kind in scale and scope, increased the Georgian Armed Forces' capacity to train and prepare their own forces for coalition operations, gradually decreasing U.S. Marine Corps instructor requirements by 60%.

After working closely and building trust with the Marines through pre-deployment training and exercises—many conducted at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany—Georgia has extended its commitment to support U.S. Marine Corps operations in Regional Command-Southwest for another two years and, notably, expanded its ISAF contribution from one to two battalion rotations every six months, deploying a total of nine battalions during these two years for continued full-spectrum support to ISAF operations.

In light of this program's success and efficiency in moving toward partner self-sufficiency, the U.S. has accepted Georgia's offer. The Joint Staff has directed European Command to expand and extend the program to 2014. This spring, Marine Forces Europe is leading the simultaneous training of two Georgian battalions for deployment to ISAF.

*U.S. Marine Corps' Black Sea Rotational Force.* The U.S. Marine Corps' Black Sea Rotational Force is a multi-year program rotating Marine air and ground units, based in the U.S.,



*Marine Forces Europe instructors train Ukrainian soldiers on the firing range during their last cycle of counterinsurgency training before deployment to ISAF.*

on deployment to bases in the Black Sea region in order to strengthen military capabilities, provide regional stability, and develop lasting partnerships with nations in this important region. In 2011, the Black Sea Rotational Force trained Romanian, Bulgarian, and Macedonian units, as well as forces from eight

other contributing nations, for deployment to ISAF.

*Exercises.* Marine Forces Europe participated in 15 joint, bilateral, and multilateral exercises in 2011, reassuring theater allies and deterring potential adversaries by demonstrating rapid assembly, deployment, and maritime expeditionary capabilities. Of note, European Command's Exercise AUSTERE CHALLENGE 11 provided an outstanding opportunity to train the Marine Forces Europe staff in its Service component role during crisis response, revitalizing important amphibious and maritime pre-positioning objectives. Through participation in these exercises, Marine Forces Europe sustained critical warfighting skills, strengthened important theater relationships, and conducted vital interaction with European Command and NATO.


*Way Ahead.* Marine Forces Europe will continue to pursue renewed Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit presence in theater to meet the need for bilateral combined arms and amphibious training with key partners, including Israel, Turkey, France, and the United Kingdom, training that has been largely absent since 2003. Resuming this amphibious presence

supports important theater reassurance and deterrence objectives. Marine Forces Europe will also stay engaged with Service-led efforts to transform our current pre-positioning posture in Norway, able to provide augmentation for employment of up to a Marine Expeditionary Brigade-sized force while maintaining our commitment to the reinforcement of Norway. Additionally, coordination continues to develop a limited crisis response capability for Black Sea Rotational Force 12, addressing areas that include Non-combatant Evacuation Operations and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief missions.

*U.S. Naval Forces Europe / U.S. Naval Forces Africa / SIXTH Fleet  
Naples, Italy*

*Introduction & Overview.* U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Africa/Commander SIXTH Fleet (C6F), conducts the full range of maritime operations and Theater Security Cooperation in concert with NATO, coalition, joint, interagency, and other partners in Europe and Africa. Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F continues to perform Navy Component Commander functions supporting daily Fleet operations and Joint Maritime Commander/Joint Task Force Commander missions, thereby strengthening relationships with enduring allies and developing maritime capabilities with emerging partners, particularly in the theater's southern and eastern regions.

*Major Accomplishments Supporting European Command.* Naval Forces Europe/Africa/



*U.S. Navy Sailors conduct operations against the rising threat of international piracy which, by some estimates, costs the maritime shipping industry approximately \$9B a year.*

C6F met all mission requirements in 2011 and maintained its certification as Joint Force Maritime Component Commander. The command engaged in numerous Theater Security Cooperation activities, enhancing vital skills in Maritime Domain Awareness, security, and sea control. Always poised for crisis response, Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F contributed to numerous global security

efforts in 2011, including: Operation ENDURING FREEDOM; anti-piracy operations off the African coast; and coalition and NATO operations against pro-Gaddafi forces in Libya, consisting

of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN, Operation ODYSSEY GUARD, and NATO's Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR.

*Libya Operations.* Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F's posture and readiness were ideally suited to support Libya operations, wherein its forward naval bases—including Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy and Naval Support Activity Souda Bay, Greece—played a vital role in coalition asset placement and logistical support. Rapid crisis response and containment activities could not have occurred without Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F's bases and forward-stationed assets



MEDITERRANEAN SEA (March 29, 2011) The Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) launches a Tomahawk cruise missile in support of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN in Libya.

supporting and executing these operations.

Additionally, USS MOUNT WHITNEY, operating from international waters with the Joint Task Force Commander and Joint Force Maritime Component Commander embarked, provided vital command and control, planning, and strike coordination capabilities during the initial days of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN.

*Ballistic Missile Defense.* Last year, USS MONTEREY and USS THE SULLIVANS deployed to the European Command Theater to serve as the first Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships supporting the European Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense. Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F also increased support to the theater BMD mission by conducting 24-hour operations at its Maritime Operations Center in Naples, Italy.

*Forward Deployed Naval Forces, Spain.* The decision to station four Aegis destroyers at Naval Station Rota will place these ships in a position to maximize their operational flexibility for theater missions and crisis response in the Atlantic Ocean and across the Mediterranean Sea. These versatile, multi-mission platforms will perform a myriad of tasks, including BMD, maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, and bilateral and multilateral exercises. Spain's commitment reaffirms our nations' long-standing friendship and mutual security cooperation.


*Theater Submarine Operations.* U.S. submarine forces provide assurance, deterrence, and valuable contributions to the forward defense of the United States. U.S. submariners expand European Command's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capacity, and stand ready to conduct anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare operations, ensure undersea dominance, deliver close proximity strike, and provide high-value unit protection, thereby ensuring our nation retains unfettered access to the sea lines of communication. Naval Forces Europe executed a vigorous series of theater-wide exercises in 2011, bringing U.S. submarines and partner navies together to strengthen maritime warfighting proficiency and interoperability. These capabilities are increasingly important as the Russian Federation Navy increases the pace, scope, and sophistication of its submarine fleet. Four new classes of Russian submarines are in development or near delivery. This focus on submarine recapitalization, incorporating improved platform capabilities, indicates that Russia continues to place a high priority on undersea warfare.

*Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.* In addition to the surface and submarine fleet, Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F contributed to theater ISR capabilities and capacity by way of P-3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft and EP-3 Reconnaissance Aircraft operating from bases in Italy, Spain, Turkey, and Greece, as well as ship-based Unmanned Aerial Vehicle missions. Employing



these capabilities, Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F provided vital ISR support to both Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR, as well as ISR operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force.


*Theater Security Cooperation.* Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F led Eurasia Partnership Capstone, a flagship initiative designed to integrate various maritime efforts across the region into



a comprehensive partnership. Training with naval forces from Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine, Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F enhanced capabilities in Maritime Interdiction Operations; Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure; search and rescue; maritime law enforcement; and environmental protection. In the Partnership of Adriatic Mariners program, U.S. naval forces joined with countries along the Adriatic Sea to increase proficiency in Maritime Domain Awareness and counter-illicit trafficking operations. As part of this effort, sailors

from Croatia, Montenegro, and Albania embarked in USS MITSCHER and USS MONTEREY, spending two weeks gaining experience in these important skills.

*Exercises.* Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F participated in six JCS-directed exercises and 14 NATO and European Command exercises in 2011. BALTOPS 11, discussed earlier, involved 13 European nations—including Russia—23 ships, one submarine, and 31 aircraft conducting



*USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) Commanding Officer, CAPT Herbert Hadley, meets with Georgian senior military officials and civilian leaders. These engagements develop and sustain vital partner maritime capabilities.*

maritime operations and interoperability training. SEA BREEZE 11 involved 20 ships and over 2,000 personnel from 14 nations training in and around the Black Sea. NEPTUNE RESPONSE, conducted last November, exercised vital consequence management skills, preparing our forces and

installations for terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and major oil spills.

*Way Ahead.* Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F will remain focused on ensuring maritime safety, security cooperation, and crisis response in the defense of our nation and interests across the region. The command will support, develop, and expand ballistic missile defense capabilities, afloat and ashore, in synchronization with other European Command Service components. Naval Forces Europe/Africa/C6F will also focus on sustaining allied and partner maritime capabilities in a cost-effective manner.

*U.S. Air Forces in Europe  
Ramstein Air Base, Germany*

*Introduction & Overview.* U.S. Air Forces in Europe provides forward-based, full-spectrum airpower and support to global U.S., NATO, and coalition operations. Air Forces in Europe provides mobility, access, communications, logistical support, contingency bed-down, command and control, and capable, responsive forces prepared to defend the homeland forward and respond at any time to crises across the theater or the world. This posture supports partnerships that enhance the NATO alliance and existing coalitions, ultimately increasing the security of the United States and reducing the burden on U.S. forces.

*Major Accomplishments.* Air Forces in Europe flew over 26,000 combat hours to support



*U.S. Air Force tanker aircraft provided in-flight refueling for coalition aircraft flying combat sorties in support of NATO Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR.*

ongoing contingency operations in 2011, working daily with our NATO allies and partners to provide security across the European Theater and the globe. Of special note, forward-based air forces were essential to the United States' ability to rapidly respond to emerging operational requirements in Libya. Air Forces in Europe played a

major role, providing seasoned leadership, expert command and control across the full spectrum of air operations, and the initial strategic and tactical level personnel and forces that led to the overwhelming success of Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR.


Air Forces in Europe also made major contributions to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The command deployed a variety of aircraft to support combat operations, including fighter aircraft that provided multi-role and ground attack support as well as refueling aircraft, combat search and rescue, and operational support aircraft. In addition, personnel from across the command deployed



*U.S. Air Forces in Europe flew over 26,000 combat hours to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan with fighter and logistical aircraft, to include the resupply mission of this C-17 Globemaster III delivering supplies from Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, to Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan, in August 2011.*

in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and NEW DAWN. Additionally, as a major mobility hub, Air Forces in Europe supported the deployment and redeployment of forces and equipment into and out of the U.S. Central Command Theater.

An instrumental global communications hub, Air Forces in Europe provides vital data links



*U.S. Air Force loadmasters prepare palletized humanitarian aid supplies for delivery to Turkey in the wake of last October's 7.2-magnitude earthquake in the northeastern part of the country. Theater air forces were essential in providing rapid disaster response to this important NATO Ally in its hour of need.*

for worldwide communications, unmanned aerial system command and control, intelligence collection, and space operations. Poised to provide rapid humanitarian assistance, Air Forces in Europe delivered nine tons of aid last year to Tunisia less than forty-eight hours after notification, in direct support of U.S. Africa Command and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The command also

provided essential aid to Turkey in the wake of last October's earthquake, supporting this vital ally. Finally, Air Forces in Europe continues to ensure the availability of the basing and infrastructure that underpins the mobility en route system, directly supporting numerous combatant commands and critical air mobility missions.

*Operational Support.* As mentioned, Air Forces in Europe supports the operations of U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, and NATO, while conducting combat deployments at the same or higher rate than U.S. based air forces and supporting the throughput of over 60% of global air mobility missions. Air Forces in Europe maintains Combat Air Patrols supporting the NATO Icelandic and Baltic Air Policing missions, and conducts intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions across the greater Levant. Additionally, Air Forces in Europe coordinated the theater stationing and operation of permanent and expeditionary Air Force RQ-4B Global Hawk and MQ-1 Predator deployed in support of Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR.

*Ballistic Missile Defense.* Supporting the European Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense (BMD), Air Forces in Europe performs command and control for U.S. BMD forces, and is coordinating with the NATO Air Component Headquarters to develop capabilities and procedures to transition the European territorial missile defense command and control mission to NATO. In support of this effort, Air Forces in Europe is establishing a joint and combined European Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center in Einsiedlerhof, Germany, designed to educate, develop, and refine U.S., partner, and allied missile defense capabilities and expertise. Finally, we continue leading the effort to enable NATO to meet its goal of declaring an interim NATO Ballistic Missile Defense capability by May, 2012.

*Theater Security Cooperation.* When not supporting combat operations, Air Forces in Europe accomplished over 1,800 partnership events, including senior leader outreach, military-to-military engagement, and other training activities supporting three combatant commands. Robust senior leader engagement with 22 allied and partner nations sustained relationships across U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Central Command. Pursuing interoperability with newer NATO allies, Air Forces in Europe conducted thorough engagement strategy studies with Romania and Croatia to assess air capabilities and identify mutually beneficial engagement opportunities. Recently, the C-17 Heavy Airlift Wing passed the noteworthy 4,000 flight-hour mark while redeploying Hungarian allies from operations in Afghanistan. Air Forces in Europe also continues to conduct the Tactical Leadership Program with eight of our allies, developing the next generation of combat air leaders capable of worldwide operations to augment, or in some cases reduce, the need for U.S. airmen. Finally, Air Forces in Europe continues to develop a strong cadre of future non-commissioned officers through engagement with partner nation Senior Enlisted Leaders from across Europe and Africa.

*Exercises.* Air Forces in Europe participated in twelve JCS-directed exercises in FY11. ANATOLIAN EAGLE provided realistic, scenario-based training to test combined aerial combat skills with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and Turkey. In SCREAMING EAGLE, Ramstein Air Base personnel interacted with Polish forces to increase interoperability with this increasingly important theater partner. In MEDCEUR 2011, Air Forces in Europe developed expeditionary medical support capabilities and participated in a Macedonian interagency humanitarian assistance exercise to train personnel and agencies from the U.S. and five Balkan nations.

*Way Ahead.* Recognizing the need for sustained effectiveness and increased efficiency, Air Forces in Europe continues to implement Secretary of Defense-directed budget efficiencies. Accordingly, Air Forces in Europe will consolidate its subordinate numbered air forces and their associated Air and Space Operations Centers, creating an extremely lean, agile, and flexible headquarters with leadership and staff supporting U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command while maintaining essential service support to forces in theater. As we look to the near term, Air Forces in Europe will continue to aggressively implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense, and continue supporting global U.S. national and military objectives through our forward-based forces and infrastructure. Europe's strategic location and our strong relationships remain critical enablers for unilateral and joint mobility, and rapid response to contingencies across Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

*U.S. Special Operations Command Europe  
Stuttgart, Germany*

*Introduction and Overview.* Special Operations Command Europe operates from two main forward-deployed locations in Stuttgart, Germany, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) station at Mildenhall, England. The Command is comprised of three assigned components: 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne); Naval Special Warfare Unit-2; and the 352d Special Operations Group (Air Force Special Operations Command). Special Operations Command Europe continues to expand theater-wide special operations forces (SOF) capabilities, mainly by developing and enabling our allied and partner nation SOF to deploy to Afghanistan in support of ISAF. In developing our allied and partner SOF skills, we seek to enable niche capabilities which, taken together, can translate into unified SOF actions that support NATO, U.S. national security objectives, and our shared security interests.

*Operations.* While predominately focused on allied and partner development for ISAF employment, Special Operations Command Europe also supported combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through the deployments of U.S. Army Special Forces, U.S. Navy SEALs, and U.S. Air Force Special Operations MC-130 Combat Talon and Combat Shadow aircraft and air commandos. Additionally, Special Operations Command Europe conducted planning and provided forces to support U.S. Africa Command's Operation ODYSSEY DAWN and NATO's Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. Supporting this Alliance operation, Special Operations Command Europe's 352d Special Operations Group provided command and control for the first-ever AC-130 and EC-130J Compass Call combat operations over Libya, neutralizing 14 regime targets and conducting Military Information Support Operations, respectively, to help protect the Libyan people. Through these and other combat operations, Special Operations Command Europe



continues to validate its strategic posture and value by projecting U.S., allied, and partner SOF into two adjacent geographic combatant commands, while supporting steady-state transatlantic security and maintaining our ability to rapidly respond to unforeseen contingencies against emerging threats from state and non-state actors.


*Major Accomplishments.* Special Operations Command Europe focused its efforts and delivered results across four areas in 2011:

First, we maintained emphasis on engagement activities with allied and partner SOF, in order to prepare them for deployment to Afghanistan. Special Operations Command Europe conducted 21 Joint Combined Exchange Training events, 14 bilateral training activities, 51 Partnership Development Program events, 2 bilateral counter-narcoterrorism training events, an intelligence conference on Iranian activities in Europe, and numerous key leader engagements and staff visits to sustain partner SOF development. Additionally, Special Operations Command Europe conducted the Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed Exercise JACKAL STONE 11, bringing together over 1,400 international SOF participants from 9 countries for the invaluable opportunities to train together, build mutual respect, share SOF doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and ultimately increase our interoperability using NATO procedures.

Second, Special Operations Command Europe led European Command's efforts to support U.S. Central Command's efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Stuttgart, Special Operations Command Europe chaired the Stuttgart Effects Group, a multi-headquarters interagency forum to increase understanding of transnational threats and de-conflict associated efforts across the combatant commands and among our U.S. interagency partners. In Iraq, our deployed forces participated in numerous counterterrorism operations in direct support of U.S. Central Command, conducting more than 115 successful high-risk offensive missions that targeted 113 high-value

individuals. One such mission captured the leader of an Al Qaida-affiliated organization, dealing a huge blow to this Sunni extremist group. Additionally, 17 Special Tactics Airmen from the 352d Special Operations Group provided direct support to 120 combat operations in support of Operations NEW DAWN and ENDURING FREEDOM. Naval Special Warfare provided personnel to serve on Joint Planning and Advisory Teams (JPAT) for one Lithuanian and two Polish Special Operations Task Groups in support of ISAF. For the fifth year in a row, Special Operations Command Europe continued to provide direct support to ISAF through the deployment of Special Operations Task Force 10, providing essential military assistance to five Afghan Provincial Reaction Companies. These efforts made key contributions to the Government of Afghanistan and mentored Afghan National Security Forces, reinforcing their progress into a self-run, confident force capable of making significant contributions to security operations across sizable Afghan population centers.

Third, Special Operations Command Europe continued to prepare for contingency missions through an intense exercise schedule, while responding to actual contingency tasking. During our



*U.S. Special Forces from Special Operations Command Europe, alongside Romanian and Croatian SOF, conduct fast-rope insertion training from a Chinook helicopter onboard a ship at sea during Exercise JACKAL STONE 11.*

annual JACKAL STONE Part 1 certification exercise, the command validated critical command and control and crisis response functions, while also exercising important capabilities during European Command's annual AUSTERE CHALLENGE exercise and executing mission support to Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR.

Fourth, Special Operations Command Europe continued to refine and adapt strategic special operations forces requirements across European Command's area of focus, while also taking care of our people. We broke new ground, through the development of operational concepts like the Distributed Special Operations Forces Network (DSN), and by coordinating the work of U.S. Country Team SOF liaison elements with allied and partner SOF. After a decade of sustained combat operations, Special Operations Command Europe renewed efforts to focus on additional ways to take care of our warriors and their families. We have instituted greater command-sponsored family events, increased service member awareness regarding health and comprehensive well-being, and provided command-sponsored apartments near the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center to support wounded SOF Warriors and their families.

*Way Ahead.* Special Operations Command Europe will continue to focus our efforts on contributing to ISAF Special Operations Forces, moving from development of allied and partner tactical skills to the development of operational-level capabilities. Within the theater, Special Operations Command Europe will increasingly focus on supporting our interagency partners' counter-terrorist efforts and continue our engagement with allied and partner counterterrorism forces. Special Operations Command Europe will continue to support European Command, U.S., and NATO objectives, maintain our combat edge, further develop our allied and partner Special Operations Forces, and always be ready to respond quickly to crisis—a vanguard force for the forward defense of the United States.

*CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES*

"At U.S. European Command, all of the many diverse missions of our Armed Forces intersect, from combating transnational threats like terrorism and cyber attacks, to building partnership capacity, from supporting NATO's counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan to maintaining the strategic balance of forces with other European powers....U.S. European Command is doing it all."

Sen. John McCain, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 2011


Many challenges converge across a theater as large and complex as U.S. European Command. From the Arctic circle to the Caspian basin; from the strategic corridor of the North Atlantic to the strategic chokepoints of Gibraltar and the Bosphorus; in an area of focus encompassing 51 very different countries spanning Europe, Asia, and the Levant; and in environments that alternate from the ocean depths to the Eurasian steppes to the ever-expanding horizons of cyberspace, European Command is presented with important opportunities to initiate positive change across a wide array of 21st century security fronts. While maintaining vigilance for signs of regression or instability that may pose a threat to U.S. national interests, European Command approaches all of these challenges as opportunities for sustaining engagement, fostering cooperation, and establishing mutual security.

*Afghanistan.* At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the U.S. and its NATO allies announced the beginning of a process to transition leadership of security operations from ISAF to the Government of Afghanistan. Since then, the Afghan government has designated for transition part or all of 25 provinces and districts, comprising some 50% of the Afghan population. And the

Afghan population is responding. In a poll conducted by the Asian Foundation<sup>2</sup> last fall, 87% of respondents—from a diverse cross-section consisting of 6,500 Afghan men and women from rural and urban areas across Afghanistan's 34 provinces—stated that the Afghan National Army was improving the security situation across the country. The survey confirmed that many Afghans see affirmative progress in the quality of their lives, appreciate the services provided by the government, and support equal rights regardless of gender, ethnicity, or religion. Significantly, 85% of Afghans polled supported educational opportunities for women.

Maintaining this momentum depends on the continued development and expansion of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The key to sustaining this progress and achieving the 2014 transition is training the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police to a level that permits them to fully assume these responsibilities. In addition, we and our NATO allies are committed to an enduring partnership with Afghanistan, requiring sustained support to Afghan security institutions in order to solidify their capabilities against threats to the security, stability, and integrity of Afghanistan.

By providing army and police trainers, as well as other forces, our European allies and partners have played an essential role in supporting this transition and maintaining the enduring partnership that follows. Europeans currently contribute



*Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) align in formation at the Capital Division Headquarters. ANSF continues to make sustained progress in training, professionalism, and literacy, driving positive change and feedback across the Afghan population.*

<sup>2</sup> The Asia Foundation. "Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People," <http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2011-poll.php>.

approximately 25% of the mentoring teams required to train Afghan National Security Forces in the field, as well as gendarmerie and other instructor personnel serving at regional police training centers. Our European allies and partners understand the vital importance of this mission. They remain willing to send their sons and daughters into harm's way alongside the United States to bring peace, security, and prosperity to the people of Afghanistan. Their commitment also comes at a precious price, with nearly 1,000 forces killed in action and non battle-related deaths since 2001. In fact, many of these nations, making particularly large force contributions relative to their populations, are suffering proportionally higher casualties than the United States.

We need the continued efforts of our European allies and partners to complete the transition of responsibility to the Afghan government, and to consolidate security and stability in Afghanistan following the transition. For this reason, supporting European deployments to Afghanistan remains a European Command priority. This support includes assistance with pre-deployment training, equipment, personnel augmentation, and movement to and from Afghanistan. We also seek to sustain the expeditionary, counterinsurgency, and other important military capabilities that our allies and partners have built through years of deployment to Afghanistan, in many cases with equipment and training that the U.S. has provided. Our efforts to sustain these capabilities and maintain interoperability with U.S. forces will assist NATO in its commitment to an enduring partnership with Afghanistan, and will also help our allies and partners retain and refine the military capabilities called for in the NATO Strategic Concept, defining the path forward for the Alliance in the fast-moving and turbulent 21st century.

*Israel.* As Israel is inside European Command's area of focus, we continue to support the United States' commitment to this long-standing and important partner through numerous

bilateral military engagement events, increased interagency activities, robust exercises, and continuous senior military leader consultation. Israel's strategic location in the Levant, and our close working relationship with U.S. Central Command, enables European Command leaders and planners to remain regionally orientated and constantly updated on threats emanating from Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran, Syria, and other regional actors of concern. Additionally, the impact and pace of political change generated by the 'Arab Spring' dynamic continues to increase the need for a careful watch of rapidly unfolding events. This political-military environment remains volatile, and could erupt with little warning through instigation or miscalculation, posing serious security challenges to the region, the United States, and our allies and partners.

European Command's security cooperation activities remain focused on strengthening our relationship with Israel and enhancing regional stability and security. Our recently revised and released 2012 Theater Strategy emphasizes that stability in the Levant remains one of our most pressing Command concerns and highest Command priorities. As mentioned earlier, we chair four bilateral, semi-annual conferences to address planning, logistics, exercises, and interoperability with Israel. We also conduct multiple headquarters and Component-level security cooperation events annually, including eight major recurring exercises focused on cooperation, interoperability, and mutual understanding. This year, AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 will provide a multi-phased large-scale exercise opportunity to train key leaders and joint forces from U.S. European Command Headquarters, our U.S. Service components, the Israel Defense Forces General Staff, and Israel's Service components as we continue to build, maintain, and strengthen our unique partnership.

*Turkey.* A NATO ally since 1952, Turkey continues to be a critical geopolitical contributor to U.S. national security objectives, particularly in its support of U.S. and coalition antiterrorism

operations. Turkey is also an indispensable partner in addressing the increasingly complex challenges in the Levant and across the greater Middle East.

Last year, as an important step in implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense, the U.S. gained Turkey's approval to establish a Ballistic Missile Defense Early Warning Radar System (AN-TPY 2) in Kürecik, Turkey as part of a NATO missile defense system. In another key theater initiative, the U.S. continues to provide Turkey with critical support in their ongoing fight against terrorism.

Pursuing important interoperability goals with Turkey, European Command has acquired approval to provide secure communications for three Turkish AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters, enhancing Turkey's ability to contribute to mutual security interests, including counterterrorism, border security, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and NATO and UN operations. Lastly, European Command's Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center (JICTC), an organization chartered to synchronize theater military support to activities that combat illicit transnational trafficking and terrorism, supports the U.S. Interagency and U.S. Embassy's strong collaborative efforts with Turkey to disrupt illicit trafficking through Turkey's historic crossroads linking Europe and Asia.

*Bosnia and Herzegovina.* For over 16 years, the U.S. has made a substantial investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Recently, political difficulties and the country's delay in forming a central government until 15 months after the general elections illustrate that the long-term effect of our collective efforts and historic progress remain tenuous, requiring sustained vigilance and attention in order to keep regional stability on track. Unfortunately, 2011 did not see notable changes in either the political or defense reform processes, though these reforms are necessary for eventual



membership into the European Union (EU) and NATO. The road to EU and NATO accession may also meet with resistance when some elements of the political elite realize that further Euro-Atlantic integration will require enhancements in the rule of law and democratization. Continued U.S. and EU engagement is required to reinvigorate the reform process. Ultimately, this renewed focus, facilitating the Euro-Atlantic integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, will cost far less than responding to renewed conflict years from now should reforms be allowed to stagnate or fail.

In spite of these difficulties, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made contributions to the fight in Afghanistan, sending a troop rotation to support ISAF operations in Helmand Province and donating excess military equipment to support Afghan National Security Forces. Bosnia and Herzegovina will also host and participate in European Command's first iteration of Exercise SHARED RESILIENCE this June, an international civil-military event including NATO members and Southeastern European countries focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

*Kosovo.* In Kosovo, ethnic tensions flared last summer and fall along the northern border with Serbia, demonstrating that the hard-earned peace and security achieved in this region over the past decade still remains fragile. These events serve to remind us that our commitment to sustaining the dialogue between parties and our national contributions to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) remain important safeguards to Kosovo's security and stability. Currently, there are approximately 800 U.S. forces assigned to KFOR, only about 10% of the total NATO mission, a percentage that reveals the extensive commitment of our allies to this critical stability operation. European Command also maintains the U.S. National Intelligence Cell located in Pristina, Kosovo, providing mission-essential support to KFOR leadership.

U.S. engagement in Kosovo remains focused on the objectives outlined in the NATO-endorsed Ahtisaari Plan, calling for development of Kosovo Security Force (KSF) capacity in specialized skill sets including Explosive Ordnance Disposal, hazardous material response,



*KFOR Quick Reaction Force members conduct rapid response training. Kosovo remains a focus area to preserve and protect long-standing security gains.*

firefighting, search and rescue, and other supporting functions. The recent pairing of Iowa and Kosovo through the National Guard State Partnership Program will strengthen U.S. bilateral engagement with Kosovo Security Forces. U.S. military-to-military engagements also continue to focus

on strengthening and professionalizing the Kosovo Security Force with a special emphasis on the Non-Commissioned Officer corps. These initiatives are important transition and legacy objectives designed to develop a viable force able to provide security once the KFOR mission ultimately draws to a close.


*Russia.* European Command continues to evolve in our military-to-military partnership role with Russia, and we actively continue to seek out zones of cooperation. This remains a complex and challenging assignment. The U.S. maintains an open and honest dialogue about all aspects of our relationship, including our disagreements. Over the past year, we have increased our military-to-military dialogue and activities, both bilaterally and within the NATO-Russia architecture, while at the same time reassuring our allies and other partners that this intensification does not come at their expense.

With respect to military engagement, in September 2010, the Secretary of Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation to establish the Defense Relations

Working Group (DRWG) under the Bilateral Presidential Commission. Dialogue has started within specific issues of mutual concern, including missile defense, human resources, education and training, defense technical cooperation, and regional and global security. Within the Military Cooperation Working Group, discussion has intensified between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Russian General Staff on combating terrorism; Afghanistan/Pakistan; and other key regional and operational issues. In May 2011, the Chairman and Chief of the General Staff signed a Memorandum on Counter-terrorism Cooperation to outline mutual goals and activities for greater interaction in this area.

European Command plays a key role in operationalizing this strategic guidance to shape our military-to-military cooperation with Russia. We lead the development of the annual bilateral Military Cooperation Work Plan with U.S. stakeholders, including the Joint Staff, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Northern Command, the Services, select U.S. Defense Agencies, and their respective Russian counterparts. Despite continued disagreements at political levels over missile defense, the amount and scope of other cooperative activities continues to increase, in areas that include combating terrorism, counter-piracy, crisis response, and maritime operations. The number and quality of these bilateral events increased consistently in 2010 and 2011. We are coordinating for new and more substantive counterterrorism and peacekeeping exercises in 2012, and working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to develop mechanisms for reciprocal logistics support and information exchanges to ensure the bilateral relationship develops in an equal, pragmatic, transparent, and mutually beneficial manner.

Conducting counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, Russian ships continue to patrol alongside NATO vessels and ships from the European Union, Gulf States, China, and



*Counter-Piracy Operations:  
A Continuing U.S.-Russian Zone of Cooperation*

India. While piracy challenges persist—by some estimates costing the shipping industry more than \$9 billion a year<sup>3</sup>—Russian cooperation and coordination have been very helpful. We continue to work with Russia to improve these efforts. Cooperation between our navies is one of the most active areas in

the bilateral Work Plan and continues to enable the overall effort.

Outside the military-to-military framework, European Command seeks to support wider interagency initiatives to engage Russia in areas of mutual concern and potential benefit. We seek to build on previous experience, such as European Command's effort to assist Russia respond to its 2010 wildfires, ongoing U.S. Coast Guard cooperation with the Russian Border Service, and earlier engagement between the Iowa National Guard and Russia's Emergency Situation Ministry (within a bilateral Federal Emergency Management Agency-led framework), in order to pursue opportunities in areas such as disaster response and counternarcotics.

In 2009, European Command authored a framework document to resume military-to-military cooperation with Russia, as mentioned, in an equal, pragmatic, transparent, and mutually beneficial manner. The framework not only addresses crisis response and consequence management operations, but also seeks to promote interaction and ensure mutual support in areas that include counterterrorism and counter-piracy operations; peacekeeping; missile, space, and ballistic missile defense; and search and rescue operations.

<sup>3</sup> Nirmala George, "Piracy Costs World Shipping Industry \$9B a Year," *Insurance Journal*, October 4, 2011, <http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2011/10/04/218532.htm>.

This framework document, signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Russian Chief of Defense at the 2009 Presidential Summit in Moscow, has begun to rebuild a structure for our bilateral defense relationship that allows wide-ranging and candid engagement on all issues of concern. European Command continues to support this effort by leading the development of the annual military-to-military work plan, defining the events and activities that we aim to accomplish together over the next year. Again, while enhancing our bilateral military-to-military relationship with Russia, European Command will work with NATO and other partners to implement an integrated and inclusive security cooperation architecture beneficial to all participants that does not come at the expense of our allies and partners.

*Poland.* Poland is a staunch supporter of U.S. strategic interests, theater operational initiatives, and NATO coalition operations, and serves as a critical leader of the newly acceded NATO nations. We welcome their engagement and deeply appreciate their expanded contributions to ISAF's mission in Afghanistan. In another area of critical importance, Poland's commitment to host regional ballistic missile defense assets is not only valuable to the United States; it contributes to our security relationships with other NATO allies and regional partners, and identifies Poland as a leader within the alliance. We remain committed to furthering this highly beneficial relationship and assisting Poland develop the capabilities and interoperability needed to continue supporting NATO and coalition operations.

Building on this cooperation, European Command is proceeding with plans to establish a small aviation detachment in Poland to support rotational deployments of F-16 and C-130 units designed to strengthen interoperability between our air forces. In addition, U.S. support for the development of Poland's fourth generation (F-16) fighter capability and European Command's

pre-deployment training for Polish brigades slated to deploy to Afghanistan continue to underpin and strengthen our military relationship. Finally, in fulfillment of the Declaration of Strategic Cooperation between our two nations, European Command continues to support PAC-3 Patriot battery rotations to Poland on a quarterly basis to familiarize Polish Armed Forces with the Patriot Missile System and enhance U.S.-Poland Air and Missile Defense cooperation. There have been eight rotations in 2010 and 2011 for training and exercise purposes. The final four rotations are scheduled this year. I am greatly encouraged by the promising partnership we have with this pivotal European nation, and expect that Poland will continue to make strong contributions to our shared security interests in the years ahead.

*The Caucasus.* Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea present important strategic issues in our theater, including logistical access to Afghanistan, participation in coalition stability operations, hydrocarbon infrastructure security, and rising humanitarian concerns. The region also possesses a high degree of potential instability due to the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the Russia-Georgia clash over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. European Command's engagement with these nations seeks to promote security and stability in a sensitive region, promote maritime security cooperation in the Caspian, and improve partner nation interoperability with U.S. forces.

*Georgia.* Georgia remains a dedicated and capable partner, maintaining a thriving military engagement program with the U.S. and providing robust ISAF support. The Georgian government is committed to defense reform, seeks to inculcate a Western approach to civil-military relations, and is diligently working to achieve NATO standardization. Through this partnership, European Command buttresses U.S. policy supporting Georgian territorial integrity, and works to find peaceful resolutions to the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

*Armenia.* The U.S. continues to pursue a wide-ranging program of security engagement with the Republic of Armenia. Current emphasis is focused on defense reform, professional military education, international and NATO peacekeeping operations, expeditionary medical capabilities, and humanitarian de-mining as Armenia strives to become a security provider, rather than a security consumer, in the international community.

*Azerbaijan.* The U.S. relationship with the Republic of Azerbaijan remains strong. Azerbaijan continues to support ISAF through the Northern Distribution Network's logistical air and ground corridors, and with fuel supplies and a troop contribution. Additionally, U.S.-Azerbaijani efforts continue to improve critical energy infrastructure protection, enhance maritime security, increase NATO interoperability, develop strategic defense reform, and work toward the goal of regional stability and security.

*The Caspian.* The Caspian Sea is both an extension of the South Caucasus and a bridge to Central Asia. European Command continues its close cooperation with U.S. Central Command in order to coordinate security cooperation across the Caspian to develop regional capabilities and respond to maritime transnational threats. Maritime security cooperation helps our partners bolster their independence and contributes to regional stability.

*Terrorism in Europe.* The threat of terrorist attack and the presence of both Sunni and Shi'a terrorist support networks within our area of focus remain serious, with several hundred kinetic terror attacks in the European Command's region last year, including the death of two U.S. airman at the Frankfurt airport in Germany. Although these attacks from multiple Europe-based extremists were not conducted by al-Qaida, Europe continues to represent an area of high interest for al-Qaida and its affiliated terrorist groups, seeking potential targets and especially for their

use as a support base. Violent-minded extremists exploit the relatively permissive European legal environment to radicalize local populations and to seek material and financial support for jihadist efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

Radicalized fighters returning home to Europe from conflict zones pose a real threat given their experience, contacts, and ability to move across the continent. The threat these extremists pose, using Europe as a base or corridor for operations elsewhere in the world including the United States, cannot be discounted.

Though Al-Qaida and affiliated extremists possess significant ability to conduct mass casualty attacks against U.S. allied personnel and facilities in Europe, self-motivated terrorists with little or no guidance from any parent organization pose an additional unpredictable threat, as they remain largely unknown to European security services. The aforementioned attack last year, killing two U.S. airmen at the Frankfurt airport, highlights the unpredictable dangers that exist from extremist-inspired solitary terrorist assailants. And, as shown by the attacks in Norway last year—both in the devastating downtown bombing that killed eight and the horrific youth camp massacre that took the lives of 69 young people—uncoordinated acts of murderous terrorism across the continent may also proceed from other fanatical and inscrutable ideologies representative of the long history of terrorism in Europe, including nationalism, separatism, anarchism, and various kinds of political extremism.

We are also seeing increased Iranian activity in Europe from the Qods Force, the external operational arm of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps. Similarly, we are seeing an increase in the capabilities of Lebanese Hizballah. Both of these elements operate against U.S. and allied interests.



European countries continue to improve their counterterrorism capacity by strengthening counterterrorism legislation, expanding international counterterrorism cooperation, and successfully prosecuting and jailing terrorist actors. European Command's contribution to this evolving fight focuses on intelligence, information sharing, and support to our partners' capabilities. Current European Command information-sharing and coordination with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) has assisted investigations in more than 80 countries to date. European Command also works with our European partners, the Intelligence Community, and our counterparts at U.S. Central Command and U.S. Northern Command to identify and counter threats to the United States and U.S. forces originating from Europe, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. These efforts help close the seams exploited by terrorist networks, strengthening the broad global counterterrorism dragnet that reduces the homeland's vulnerability to terrorism emanating from Europe.

*Illicit Trafficking.* Located at the historic crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Asia, the European Command area of focus remains both a key global transit zone and destination for illicit trafficking in drugs, weapons, humans beings held against their will, and a host of other illicit commodities. The effects of globalization—expanded international trade, increased border porosity, and a widened potential for corruption among nascent governments—has created vulnerabilities which sophisticated criminal networks continue to exploit across the Black Sea, Caucasus, Balkans, and Eastern and Southern Europe. The proceeds from transnational illicit trafficking enable organized criminals, terrorists, and insurgents to evade law enforcement, conduct training and operations, penetrate legitimate economic structures, and challenge the authority of national governments. Drug trafficking through Europe has also had a significant impact on security in Afghanistan. A 2011 UN estimate indicated that the Taliban made more than \$150

million in 2009 through the sale of opium<sup>4</sup>. That same year, the UN estimated that 75-80 metric tons of Afghan heroin reached Central and Western Europe, while another 90 metric tons of Afghan heroin are estimated to have transited through Central Asia to Russia, compounding a growing heroin epidemic among the Russian people, particularly Russian youth.

While human and drug trafficking may not seem like purely military issues, their corrupting influence on governance and security structures, and their tragic human toll, elevate their relevance in the multi-faceted security arena of the 21st century. The U.S. Secretary of State has estimated that as many as 23 million people worldwide are victims of human trafficking, for despicable use in forced labor, prostitution, debt bondage as migrant laborers, involuntary domestic servitude, forced child labor, and as child soldiers. These tragic activities, along trafficking routes that run through Europe, make this dark side of globalization a signal security issue for European Command.

Accordingly, European Command has realigned existing resources to stand up the Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center (JICTC). JICTC is focused on counter-trafficking and counterterrorism, providing support to the U.S. Interagency and U.S. Country Teams in Europe, and establishing relationships with similar international organizations in Europe in order to disrupt and eliminate the intersecting networks that terrorists and organized criminals use to generate revenue, move illicit commodities, support operations, and destabilize partner nations and emerging governments across our theater.

*Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.* Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the hands of terrorists or a rogue state represent a grave threat to the United States and our allies. In the high-stakes fight to combat WMD, several factors intersect across the European Command area of focus: the bulk of the world's WMD reside here; European population centers and U.S.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). World Drug Report 2011. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/World\\_Drug\\_Report\\_2011\\_ebook.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/World_Drug_Report_2011_ebook.pdf).

military installations present numerous targets for terrorist organizations; and European ports and terminals are the last line of defense for much of the commercial traffic that enters the U.S. port system. Fortunately, we have several close allies and partners who share these WMD concerns.

Our goal is to leverage the capability of theater counter-proliferation stakeholders and facilitate collaborative efforts to reduce the potential for successful WMD trafficking. In order to do this, we must continue to increase our preparedness through military-to-military engagements, joint training events, and interagency interaction and partnering to strengthen our collective capabilities in this critical mission area.

*Cyberspace.* Today, economies, information, communications, transportation, essential services, critical infrastructure, and governance all hinge on cyberspace. Governments, corporations, and organizations of all kinds are increasingly reliant on network security, information assurance, and cyber defenses to keep modern society functioning. Meanwhile, hackers, spies, and terrorists can reach through cyberspace to conduct damaging, even devastating, attacks. And modern militaries continue to view cyberspace as an increasingly inviting and effective battleground for 21st century conflict. Indeed, a glimpse of this future was seen in our own theater, during cyber attacks occurring in Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008.

While the costs of cyber defense for governments, militaries, and other organizations are high, the risks and potential loss of critical national, military, and proprietary information are alarmingly higher. There is a clear and compelling need for greater cooperation among governments, militaries, and the private sector to protect critical networks and national infrastructures from cyber-related threats. Recognizing this challenge, European Command views cyberspace as a tremendous opportunity for theater outreach to engage, learn, and forge our cyber defenses stronger

together. Recently, the U.S. became a full member in the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, located in Tallinn, Estonia. Its focus on collaboratively building NATO Members' cyber defenses stronger together is a tremendously positive step in the right direction. European Command has also included cyber defense as a priority area for our military-to-military engagements. These engagements include focus areas that examine cyber defense capabilities, capacity required to build and sustain a cyber defense program, and the development of a capable cyber defense workforce. To date, 37 European Command country cooperation plans support these cyber-focused objectives.


*Arctic.* Climate change in the Arctic makes it one of the world's most rapidly changing environments. As the volume of Arctic sea ice decreases, access continues to increase permitting maritime traffic into areas previously impassable without specialized vessels. This new access is creating opportunities for transit, development, and natural resource extraction. While some see these changes as a potential breeding ground for conflict, we see the risk of armed conflict as low, and continue to approach the Arctic as an area of cooperation among Arctic nations.

Though significant cooperation exists among Arctic nations, continued cooperation should be based on a clear legal framework for determining the status of each nation's claims. To this end, I continue to support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. The Convention provides access to a procedure that maximizes legal certainty and international recognition of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles from shore. Establishing a clear, internationally recognized, continental shelf will enhance Arctic regional security and promote development.

European Command continues to work multilaterally with Arctic partners to build a comprehensive and sustainable approach that benefits all stakeholders, and pursues mutual interests

in safe navigation, scientific exploration, and environmental protection. In one example of our support to these efforts, European Command co-hosted with Norway the first Arctic Roundtable, a forum for Arctic nations' militaries to discuss cooperative solutions to shared challenges, enhancing the Arctic dialogue and increasing mutual trust and confidence. We are working with Norway to build upon this success with the 2012 Arctic Roundtable. We are also encouraged by the work done with the international search and rescue agreement and the international oil spill response initiative. As we look to the future, we must balance fiscal constraints with the need to provide safety and sustained access to this important region. As the Arctic continues to change, it is important that we plan and resource the necessary capabilities to meet our strategic interests there, ensuring our readiness to operate in the Arctic in the years ahead.

*Energy Security.* Reliable access to affordable energy remains a core issue for countries across the European Command Theater, whether they are energy exporters, importers, or transit states. Dependence on natural gas from Russia will continue for many of our European partners, especially in light of its continued substitution for coal in electricity generation and questions regarding the future of nuclear power in Europe raised by the Fukushima nuclear incident. We continue to monitor changes to the energy status quo in Europe, including the large-scale development of shale gas and the increased utilization of liquefied natural gas.



*European Energy Security: Overland pipelines will continue to be an economic and political driver across European Command's area of focus.*

In this area, European Command recognizes its role is a supporting one. We are working with our interagency partners, regional allies, and the private sector to explore whole-of-government solutions. Through our J9 Interagency Partnering Directorate, which includes experts from the Departments of Energy and State, we are assisting efforts to identify and protect critical energy infrastructure. Additionally, we have lent support to the nascent Energy Security Center in Lithuania, focused on operational energy security issues with potential NATO applicability. We are also working with our adjacent geographic combatant commands to address energy issues that transect theater seams, including North Africa and the Caspian Sea. Finally, in energy security areas with clear military utility, such as installations and deployed forces, we are exploring energy security as a topic for joint concept development focused on energy access and protection.

When it comes to energy, European Command supports conservation, fiscal stewardship, energy source diversification, as well as the potentially game-changing transition to renewable and sustainable energy options. By examining our own energy dependencies and working with partners to address the strategic energy environment, European Command can maximize our freedom of action and mitigate our dependence on access to energy resources in the years ahead.

*INITIATIVES*

Effective and efficient pursuit of U.S., allied, and partner interests, particularly in a fiscally constrained environment, ultimately depends on our ability to innovate, steward resources, and find new and better ways of achieving our objectives.

"I am convinced that we do not have to choose between fiscal security and national security."

- Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, October 5, 2011

*Efficiencies.* For well over two years now, European Command has been streamlining operations to build a leaner, more efficient, and more effective organization in support of the Secretary of Defense Efficiencies Initiative and the current fiscal environment. As we continue to adjust our organization, we are learning to function with more than 200 fewer billets in the management headquarters and nearly 150 fewer billets in our intelligence directorate. Seeking even greater efficiencies, European Command Headquarters has bundled together similar contracts to save on overhead costs, and has implemented Contract Management Boards to review all manpower contracts for possible in-sourcing or reduction. Additionally, we hold Manpower Governance Boards to validate authorized billets, and have willingly accepted greater risk in our Program Objective Memorandum in order to fund our most important missions and functions.

At European Command Headquarters, we have executed an internal staff rebalance that has incurred no new growth and achieved a 15% decrease in manning and budget, while increasing emphasis and focusing expertise on emerging 21st century mission sets, including ballistic missile defense, military partnering, counter-trafficking, and cyberspace. Finally, in an effort to measure

and evaluate our performance, a re-focused J7 directorate provides independent assessments and analyses of European Command activities and operations. We recognize the difficulties of the current fiscal environment, and are taking a number of steps to inculcate a culture of cost consciousness in everything we do. At the same time, it is important that we proceed with caution and a balanced approach in order to identify risks, assess alternatives, and meet our fundamental responsibilities to our mission and our people.


*NATO Operations & Engagement.* In addition to the outstanding support provided by our Service Component Commands, European Command has also participated in several key NATO initiatives. The Libyan operation demonstrated, once again, the vital importance of maintaining secure communications among NATO members. European Command's aggressive expansion of the U.S. Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES) network proved absolutely essential to the execution of effective targeting, intelligence sharing, and air tasking operations during Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. European Command also deployed Global Broadcast System (GBS) suites to provide full-motion video intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection and dissemination capabilities to NATO command elements.

Supporting NATO's continued transformation and evolving capabilities, European Command also contributed to U.S. accession as a fully participating member in three NATO Centers of Excellence: the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices Center of Excellence; the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Center of Excellence; and the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. Through the collaborative efforts of these vital centers and their initiatives, the U.S. shares important skills, lessons, and subject matter expertise with our NATO allies to meet the emerging and evolving threats of the 21st century, help prepare them for deployment and participation in NATO exercises, and develop common defense doctrine



and standards enhancing overall Alliance capabilities and interoperability. In turn, our nation gains access to these Centers, increasing our insight, synergy, and effectiveness through education, interaction, research, and concept development with our allies.

*European Ballistic Missile Defense.* Adversarial regimes continue to procure illicit ballistic missile technology, develop increasingly sophisticated missiles, and refine their abilities to employ these weapons against our forces, families, allies, and partners in Europe. Accordingly, European Command continues to plan and implement, in concert with our allies and partners, the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to Missile Defense. Together with the Department of State, Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, and others, European Command is actively implementing the President's direction to defend Europe and America against the threat of ballistic missile attack.



*An Aegis destroyer launches a Standard Missile (SM)-3 in a Missile Defense Agency (MDA) test conducted with the U.S. Navy.*

Last spring, USS MONTEREY became the first ballistic missile defense ship to deploy to theater as part of EPAA. Additionally, in September 2011, Turkey announced it will host an AN/TPY-2 missile defense land-based radar installation in Kürecik, Turkey, which is now operational. Taken together, these actions have achieved EPAA Phase One. Additionally, last October, to solidify EPAA Phase One capabilities, Spain agreed to base four U.S. Navy Aegis ballistic missile defense ships at Naval Station Rota. Also last fall, in support of EPAA Phase Two, the U.S. successfully concluded an agreement with Romania to host an Aegis Ashore facility, which will be operational by 2015. Currently, European Command is working closely with the Polish Ministry

of Defense to implement the U.S.-Poland Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement in support of important EPAA Phase Three capabilities.

At the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO declared its commitment to develop a missile defense capability for the protection of NATO's European populations, territory, and forces. Supporting that effort, European Command has already fielded workstations employing the NATO-compatible U.S. BICES network throughout our headquarters and our Service Components' headquarters in order to provide a communication system able



*NATO Allies' national contributions may include surface combatants 'riding shotgun' to provide at-sea protection of U.S. Aegis BMD platforms.*

to support NATO's ballistic missile defense mission. This spring, European Command will add U.S. ships to the U.S. BICES architecture, further integrating our theater sensors, shooters, and platforms. There has also been a remarkable increase in the willingness of NATO nations to support the NATO ballistic missile defense mission through national contributions, such as protection (i.e. "riding shotgun") for Aegis Missile Defense platforms. European governments, including Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, The Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, and France are examining ways to procure capabilities in order to complement EPAA and support this NATO mission.

*"Step by step, NATO's territorial missile defense is becoming a reality."*

*-NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, October 2011,  
interview preceding the NATO Defense Ministerials*

*Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center.*

As mentioned, European Command's response to the rising threat posed by global illicit trafficking is the Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center (JICTC). JICTC's mission is to support U.S. Interagency and Country Team efforts and collaborate with similar international organizations to effectively and efficiently counter transnational illicit trafficking and terrorism across our theater.

JICTC's focus areas include narcotics trafficking, terrorism, weapons trafficking (to include weapons of mass destruction), trafficking in persons, and illicit finance. JICTC's aim is to assist our partner nations develop and refine their counter-trafficking and counterterrorism skills, competencies, and capacity in order to keep these threats as far as possible from American shores. This year, JICTC outreach includes primary engagement with Turkey, as well as outreach to other nations in Southeastern Europe and the Black Sea region.


Embracing a whole-of-government design, JICTC is maturing steadily as a robust interagency team that includes representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Energy; Customs and Border Protection; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Immigrations and Customs Enforcement; and the Drug Enforcement Administration. JICTC's work—in conjunction with our interagency partners and the other combatant commands, including U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command—helps to close the seams that traffickers exploit, and to synchronize Department of Defense support to



*European Command's Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center (JICTC) is focused on combating transnational illicit trafficking networks and their support to organized crime and terrorism.*

U.S. interagency and regional actions supporting the National Strategy for Counterterrorism and the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. With the support of our interagency and international partners, JICTC is poised to bring all elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to bear in the fight against transnational organized crime and terrorism.

*Organizing in Cyberspace.* Recognizing the rising threats and vulnerabilities present in cyberspace, European Command has established a Joint Cyber Center (JCC) as the headquarters organization chartered to organize, coordinate, integrate, and direct cyberspace activities in, through, and across the European Command. Initially formed in January 2011 for experimentation during Exercise AUSTERE CHALLENGE



*European Command's 'Joint Cyber Center' will serve to organize, coordinate, and integrate cyberspace activities, synchronizing them with operations in the traditional warfighting domains.*

11, this compelling concept, sourced internally from existing headquarters personnel, continues to mature, providing important insights on how to conduct command and control in the cyber domain.

Organizationally, the JCC Director serves as the subject matter expert and principal advisor to the combatant commander to address the full spectrum of cyberspace operations, and integrate cyber effects with actions in the conventional warfighting domains. The JCC and staff are also actively engaged with our partner nations to strengthen our collective Information Assurance and Cyber Defense postures. To that end, European Command is the Executive Agent for five

Departmental Information Assurance and Cyber Defense Information Sharing Agreements critical to supporting the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. These agreements allow us to work closely with our allies and partners to share information and build the relationships necessary to provide for our collective cyber defense.

Additionally, European Command is involved in numerous NATO and U.S. cyber-based exercises with the Interagency, Services, and other combatant commands—to include the new and urgently needed U.S. Cyber Command—in order to coordinate, synchronize and integrate cyber activities with ongoing military activities. Working together, we are developing coordinated contingency plans, supporting execution orders, and building strong cooperative relationships across the defense enterprise to provide a solid foundation for operations and progress in cyberspace. We also continue to work with the Department of State to issue demarches that restrict adversarial use of cyberspace in Europe. In short, we are moving in the right direction. We need to keep moving in this direction and pick up speed in order to prevail in what is rapidly becoming a primary battlefield of the 21st century.

“Our nation sits at a crucial moment, where cyber attacks are common but have not yet significantly impacted or endangered the American way of life. We have the opportunity to improve prevention and response to cybersecurity threats, but we must take action now.”

—Congressman James R. Langevin (D-RI), House Armed Services Committee

*Interagency Coordination.* At European Command, we believe that 'no one of us is as smart as all of us, thinking and working together.' Nowhere is that maxim more applicable than in the realm of interagency coordination, particularly in an environment of constrained resources. The diversity and complexity of the modern security environment exceeds the capacity of any single government organization. It demands 'whole-of-government' solutions that draw strength and effectiveness from the collective judgment, training, and experience of the many dedicated public servants in government who, working together, can effectively synchronize the elements of national power. To that end, our Interagency Partnering Directorate continues to tap the strength of the U.S. interagency through in-house experts and outreach efforts that synchronize our efforts across the U.S. government, partner nation governments, international and non-governmental organizations, the private sector, think tanks, and academia.

We believe strongly in the value—and the efficiencies—that exist in these 'whole-of-government' and 'whole-of-society' solutions, if only we have the ability and patience to seek them out and put them into practice. To that end, European Command benefits tremendously from our Civilian Deputy to the Commander position, occupied by career Foreign Service Officer, Ambassador Larry Butler. His diplomatic credentials and savvy are indispensable to theater operations. Additionally, our Interagency Partnering Directorate adds the knowledge and capabilities of several interagency experts from the Departments of State, Justice, Energy, and Treasury; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Customs and Border Protection; the Drug Enforcement Administration; U.S. Agency for International Development; Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance; and the Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. These outstanding professionals each bring

a vital depth and breadth to our Command, its operations, and our outreach across the continent that is adding tremendous value to our mission, effectiveness, and ability to speak and act across a multitude of organizational cultures.

In addition, over the last two years, we have partnered with the U.S. Interagency and with international and non-governmental organizations—from the Department of State to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to volunteer technical communities—to explore continuing innovations in cloud computing and real-time information sharing. Through these efforts and partnerships, European Command seeks to leverage crowd-sourcing, crisis mapping, social media, and other unclassified information sharing venues to establish situational awareness and share critical information quickly during natural disasters, humanitarian assistance efforts, and other response activities. So far, this unparalleled outreach has achieved measurable success in crisis collaboration and communication. It is paving the way in an exciting and groundbreaking area that will significantly enhance our effectiveness and capacity in future operations.

*Public-Private Cooperation.* European Command continues to leverage expertise found in the private sector to find greater efficiencies, achieve important theater objectives, and support priority NATO efforts. One initiative is European Command's partnership with the Business Executives for National Security (BENS), a group of volunteer business executives with an interest in national security, who travel to theater at their own expense to understand and offer ideas about the complex challenges of the 21st century security environment. Last year, BENS provided concrete recommendations on strengthening cyber security in the Baltics, one of the best public-private exchanges I've seen in a decade. On another important front, BENS is examining how to work with European Command and the U.S. Embassies in Ukraine and Moldova to address the growing problem of illicit trafficking in and through those countries.

Supporting the partners who fight side-by-side with us in Afghanistan, European Command has teamed up with 'Project Hope,' sending some of the foremost experts in traumatic brain injury to the Baltics to work with our allies there and improve assistance programs for returning veterans injured in combat. European Command also continues to support the State Department's "New Silk Road" initiative, seeking to promote and broaden economic development opportunities across Afghanistan in support of vital NATO objectives and the U.S. transition strategy.

We are working with the U.S. Agency for International Development to develop and strengthen humanitarian programs designed to enhance and sustain U.S. engagement in the Balkans which are, as mentioned, increasingly important today. Finally, in an initiative European Command spearheaded with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the Defense Business Board plans to examine current departmental public-private collaboration with the goal of focusing these activities into a genuine 'whole-of-society' effort, continuing progress toward a more efficient, effective, and fiscally responsible Department of Defense.

*Innovation.* Increasingly, the key to unlocking greater productivity and efficiency lies in innovation. European Command continues to advance innovative ideas, concepts, and technologies to further our mission, support our partners, and improve our own capabilities and capacity. Innovation collaboration is a two-way street, requiring outreach and reciprocation with our international, interagency, and public-private partners. Since standing up an Innovation Cell two years ago, a culture of innovation and creativity has become engrained across the Command.

Our Science and Technology Office has initiated numerous Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations to speed the learning cycle in support of cyberspace, environment sensing, force protection, consequence management and counter trafficking initiatives. Our Intelligence directorate has launched efforts using complex modeling to better understand today's dynamic and



adaptive strategic and operational environments. Evaluating theater throughput, we are looking at innovative ways to build smarter logistics and improve the logistical capacity of our allies and partners. Our Public Affairs directorate has taken the lead in incorporating rapidly expanding social media technologies to help us understand, incorporate, and operate in the world of Facebook and Twitter. Numerous other innovations are being explored across the enterprise.

None of these ideas would be possible without our ability to engage, exchange, and cross-pollinate innovative ideas with our international, governmental and private partners. Ideas emerge and grow from connection and collaboration, and are improved and strengthened when they are combined in creative and surprising ways. We will continue to foster a robust and inclusive culture of innovation at European Command that relies on our ability to share and test ideas across the public and private spectrum. We know that future efficiencies and success will increasingly rely on new ideas and innovations. European Command stands ready to contribute to that national endeavor.

*POSTURE: FORCES, FOOTPRINT, AND RELATIONSHIPS*

European Command's posture is comprised of three interdependent elements—forces, footprint, and relationships—supporting the military operations, international military engagement, and interagency partnering that enhance transatlantic security and provide for the forward defense of the United States. Our posture facilitates U.S. global operations, assures allies and partners, deters aggression, maintains strategic access, enhances partnerships, and sustains our allies' and partners' capabilities and capacity to achieve shared security objectives.


*Forces.* Forward-stationed active duty service members, forward-deployed rotational units, and reserve forces in European Command remain our primary tool for maintaining U.S. influence across the theater and—when called upon—projecting power within and beyond it. These forces are a visible and incontestable manifestation of U.S. commitment to the region. They provide for frequent engagement at all levels, build habitual relationships and trust, ensure interoperability with our allies and partners, and help facilitate transformation within European militaries. They assure access when and where it is needed, fulfill our NATO alliance commitments, including our Article V commitment, and preserve U.S. leadership in NATO.

There are approximately 78,000 active duty military forces within the European Theater. Of these, approximately 68,000 personnel are assigned to European Command and its Service components. It is important to note that over 10,000 forces in Europe are assigned outside European Command, to other DoD organizations and U.S. government activities in theater, a testament to the important role European Command plays in supporting NATO, other U.S. combatant commands, and agencies across our theater.

*Footprint.* The nation relies on a network of Main Operating Bases, Forward Operating Sites, and Cooperative Security Locations located inside the European Command area of focus that provide superb training and power projection facilities supporting coalition operations and contingency missions in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. In addition to meeting our mission, this mature, well-established, and highly capable network supports and enables the activities of U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Southern Command, and NATO. This basing network, providing unparalleled proximity and access to three continents, stands ready to support U.S. and NATO contingency operations on very short notice. Indeed, we witnessed last year how rapidly the installations along the Mediterranean—Moron Air Base, Spain; Aviano Air Base, Italy; Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy; and Naval Support Activity Souda Bay, Greece—were able to provide critical basing and logistical support to support NATO operations over Libya.

Thanks to strong and continued Congressional support, previous annual military construction authorizations and appropriations have enabled European Command to address a balanced mix of our most pressing mission, mission support, quality of life, and housing requirements. The goal of our fiscal year 2013 military construction program is to support our posture initiatives, consolidation efforts, and infrastructure recapitalization projects, including the Medical Facility Consolidation and Recapitalization Project at the Rhine Ordnance Barracks, Germany.

The Rhine Ordnance Barracks Medical Center Replacement project is one of European Command's highest priority military constructions projects, providing for the consolidation of duplicative medical facilities in the Kaiserslautern Military Community (adjacent to Ramstein Air Base), and providing a vitally important replacement for the aged and failing infrastructure at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC). LRMC, a strategic national asset for nearly 60



years—which has saved the lives of thousands of U.S. warfighters, driven the U.S. combat fatality rate to historic lows over the past 10 years of conflict, and provided outstanding medical care to our overseas service members and their families—is reaching the end of its service life. LRMC’s accelerating structural failure and our enduring need to


preserve a critical surge-capable overseas medical platform, able to support current and future U.S. combat operations at this medically significant half-way point between the U.S. and conflict areas spanning half the globe, reinforce the need for this project. Importantly, the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act and FY12 appropriation provided essential authorization and funding to continue this vital project’s forward progress. Sustained Congressional support in FY13 and beyond is necessary to meet this pressing requirement.

At enduring theater locations, we will preserve past investments through the responsible use of both the Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization program and the military construction program, even as we continue our long-term and highly successful efforts to reduce overall facility inventory. It is important to note that, over the past 22 years, European Command has reduced inventory by approximately 75%. And, over the past eight years, we have closed or consolidated over 200 sites of various sizes across the theater. Our remaining footprint is primarily comprised of approximately 25 major bases with supporting smaller sites.

At other locations, we are optimizing the use of all available resources to ensure that these installations remain mission effective until they are removed from the inventory. Additional efforts to reduce inventory will be driven by future strategic force structure decisions. Though, in some cases, continued reductions and consolidations in the pursuit of increased efficiencies may require additional military construction in order to succeed.

As always, when it comes to military construction, we will continue to leverage NATO common funded investments and, where required, pre-finance our projects to reserve a future opportunity to recapture part of this investment through the NATO Security Investment Program.

When it comes to our overseas footprint, European Command will continue to review requirements across our mission, quality of life, and agency portfolios in order to work towards joint solutions and achieve infrastructure efficiencies, particularly as Departmental leadership, in accordance with the new strategic guidance, considers the appropriate size and composition of U.S. forces in Europe. As we continue these consolidation and recapitalization efforts, we will convey our requirements in our Theater Posture Plan and military construction requests.



*Relationships.* Our experience in operating as part of multinational coalitions has demonstrated the importance of developing and sustaining long-term relationships with our allies and partners. These relationships are critical to maintaining the theater access and freedom of movement we both need and rely upon in crises. These relationships also build

the trust essential for us to work and train together, develop needed capabilities and interoperability, and build the willingness among our partners to contribute to regional security and out-of-area operations.

We recognize that today's fiscal environment requires difficult decisions regarding overseas force structure. In order to achieve efficiencies and cost savings, European Command continuously evaluates opportunities for recapitalization, consolidation, or closure of facilities, balanced with the need to preserve the appropriate level of current and planned mission support for our command as well as the other U.S. combatant commanders, Services, agencies, and activities that we support. Uncoordinated or expedited posture reductions risk permanent loss of access with important host nations. Once relinquished, access is often fiscally and politically prohibitive to reestablish, or the terms are less advantageous to the United States. Our ongoing planning efforts seek to find the right balance between strategic access, operational effectiveness, fiscal efficiency, and diplomatic consistency.

*Initiatives.* Currently, European Command is implementing a number of critical posture initiatives to accomplish our mission, strengthen interoperability with our strategic partners, support our Service components and other U.S. combatant commands, and achieve basing efficiencies. Those initiatives include:

*Stationing four U.S. Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense destroyers in Rota, Spain.* This effort directly supports the President's European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to Missile Defense. EPAA outlines the phased implementation of U.S. contributions to an allied missile defense capability for Europe that protects U.S. forces stationed in Europe, our allies and partners, and the U.S. homeland. In terms of this mission, forward-based forces provide considerable efficiency

when compared to the force generation required to meet the same requirement with rotational U.S. forces. The Navy estimates that it would take 20 ships based in the United States to supply the presence provided by these four forward-deployed ships.

*Establishing a small aviation detachment in Poland.* As mentioned earlier, this detachment is designed to support a periodic rotational aircraft presence to strengthen interoperability between the U.S. and Polish air forces. The first detachment is scheduled to arrive in early 2013 for a two-week rotation.

*Continuing Army consolidation actions in theater.* First, the U.S. Army's V Corps relocated to Wiesbaden following the departure of 1st Armored Division Headquarters, which moved to Ft. Bliss, Texas. Second, U.S. Army Europe Headquarters will begin its move to Wiesbaden later this year. Third, scheduled in the near future, the Army will move the majority of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team to Vincenza, Italy.

*Multi-modal logistical support to U.S. Transportation Command.* Also as mentioned, European Command is supporting U.S. Transportation Command's requirement to develop and enhance its multi-modal distribution capabilities available at MK Airbase in Romania, an important capacity initiative for ongoing theater and global logistical missions.

*Strategic Presence.* U.S. posture in Europe provides a deterrent effect against would-be adversaries or aggressors reluctant to face forward-based U.S. forces or withstand a U.S.-supported coalition response. That deterrent effect, in proximity to some of the world's most dangerous places including the Levant, Africa, and the Middle East, is contingent on U.S. forces retaining our decisive edge in combat capabilities, agility and flexibility in providing rapid crisis response, and physical presence as a constant reminder of the costs of aggression and miscalculation. A

credible combination of forward-based and rotational forces, in proximity to these hot spots, is essential to maintaining deterrence against future aggressors, preserving stability, and reassuring our allies and partners. U.S. posture in Europe is also important because it provides irreplaceable basing and other support to global U.S. operations, helps to sustain critical partnerships and partner capabilities, demonstrates U.S. leadership in NATO, and reaffirms our nation's strong and enduring commitment to the NATO Alliance.




*OUR MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE*

None of these activities would be possible without the extraordinary people that make up U.S. European Command and NATO Allied Command Operations. We are committed to providing the best possible support to these brave and dedicated men and women, and their families. We are devoted to sustaining their readiness, health, and quality of life support.

*Deployment, Behavioral Health, and Compassionate Fatigue and Family Support.* While maintaining our focus on mission readiness, we must also seek avenues to respond to the significant stress placed on our forces and families due to protracted combat operations and cyclical deployments. Several organizations and studies within the Department of Defense have identified an urgent need for sustained behavioral health services to support our warriors and families, especially in an overseas environment with few private sector options. Within adaptive and flexible care systems, the members of our all volunteer force and their families must continue receiving quality care and responsive support in a stigma-free environment. A system-wide, recurring 360-degree review of these programs, focused on the connection between at-risk indicators and catalysts, is needed to eliminate gaps in support. The goal is alignment of focused caregiver teams with corresponding data to provide needed care in a timely and responsive manner. We will continue our work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a working definition for resilience, and determine initial measures for baseline assessments to address at-risk indicators and service member needs. Additionally, we have partnered with the First Family's Initiative to 'Join Forces,' and are implementing elements of that campaign within the European Command enterprise. We continue to support ongoing efforts

to improve complex care management and the medical portion of the disability evaluation process, which will result in improvement of wounded, ill, and injured warrior benefits.

*Investment in Our Schools.* We are pleased that the Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) continues to make needed investments in DoDEA's overseas school infrastructure. Many of our schools are converted 1950s-era barracks. These investments directly



*"We must preserve the quality of our All-Volunteer Force and not break faith with our men and women in uniform or their families."*

*-Secretary Panetta, January 5, 2012*

support the children of our servicemen and women, who will benefit tremendously from this investment. At the end of this seven-year program, all failed or failing infrastructure will be recapitalized, providing concrete proof of our promised commitment to take care of the military families who also serve, and have made many sacrifices in recent years. Additionally, we will continue to address and pursue improvements to our military family housing and barracks

in the 2013 military construction program to improve living conditions for our service members and their families.

*Sustaining Quality of Life.* Potential changes to overseas force structure require a renewed effort to ensure the appropriate balance between force levels and quality of life support. European Command is closely examining how to increase effectiveness and efficiency in applying regionally distributed service support, through a hub and spoke model, from our main operating bases to those locations experiencing change. Increasingly, our smaller force locations require a fresh look at scalable facilities and contracts, increased reliance on host nation support, and greater public-private cooperation. These geographically separated units require tailored support standards that

are palatable to service providers, within appropriate guidelines. We must ensure the availability of mainstay support functions—health care, education, child care, morale, post office, and internet access—prior to making assignments to these remote locations. We are also cognizant of the need to ensure safe, accompanied tour parity with our partner nations in locations that support and enhance our theater objectives.

*NATO & ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS*

“As an alliance of democratic nations, NATO ensures our collective defense and helps strengthen young democracies. . . . To ensure that this commitment has meaning, we must strengthen the full range of capabilities that are needed to protect our people today and prepare for the missions of tomorrow. Even as we modernize our conventional forces, we need to reform alliance command structures to make them more effective and efficient, invest in the technologies that allow allied forces to deploy and operate together effectively, and develop new defenses against threats such as cyber attacks.”

-President Obama

*NATO: An Active Alliance.* As an anchor of transatlantic security for more than 60 years, the NATO alliance remains essential to the security of the United States and its allies, ensuring peace and stability throughout Europe, and countering threats across the globe. Although much has changed since its founding in 1949, the Alliance remains an essential and unique source of stability in an unpredictable geopolitical environment. NATO members now confront a far broader spectrum of security challenges than in the past. Threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile technologies, cyber attacks, and terrorism know no borders. NATO has also found itself called upon to help protect civilian populations from government repression. NATO today leads seven major operations and missions—up from almost none in the early 1990s—including NATO’s largest mission ever in Afghanistan and last year’s highly successful Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. During that same period, NATO has cut personnel assigned to its operational headquarters by 67%, while expanding its partnerships. NATO’s 2010 New Strategic Concept entitled, “Active Engagement, Modern Defense,” provides a 10-year roadmap that reconfirms the allies’ commitment to defend one another against attack, as the bedrock foundation of Euro-Atlantic security, and lays out a vision for an evolving and


increasingly agile, capable, and effective Alliance ready to defend its members against the threats of the 21st century.

*Strategic Concept and Command Structure Reform.* The Strategic Concept announced at the 2010 Lisbon Summit reaffirms the fundamental purpose of NATO and defines three core Alliance tasks: collective defense; security through crisis management; and cooperative security through partnership. In June 2011, NATO Defense Ministers received a detailed review of capabilities, and approved a set of concrete reforms in support of the new Strategic Concept and the 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration. These reforms will make NATO leaner, more flexible, and more cost effective, sustain the current level of operational ambition, and enable command and control for two major joint operations and six smaller joint operations. The new military command structure will have fewer headquarters organized under two Strategic Commands, (Operations and Transformation), and will include two deployable Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQs). Additionally, the U.S.-led NATO organization, STRIKEFORNATO (led by a dual-hatted commander also responsible for the U.S. 6th Fleet and Naval Forces Europe/Africa), is in the process of relocating from Naples, Italy, to Lisbon, Portugal; one of the first major moves in the implementation of NATO's new command structure. Once fully implemented, this restructuring will lead to a 30% reduction in personnel (13,000 to 8,800), and will consolidate 11 major headquarters to only six.

*Major Operations.* Over the past year, NATO and Allied Command Operations have executed multiple major operations, demonstrating an impressive array of Alliance capabilities. Today, roughly 150,000 military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world, successfully managing complex ground, air, and naval operations in all types of environments. These forces are currently operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, the Mediterranean, in the seas

off the Horn of Africa, and, until recently, in support of operations over Libya. During the Libyan operation, NATO had a total of nearly 170,000 troops engaged in worldwide operations.

*Afghanistan.* NATO's operation in Afghanistan remains the Alliance's most significant operational commitment to date. Our allies and partners continue to share the risks, costs, and burdens of ISAF. They have contributed troops, funding, and equipment, and have made significant non-military contributions to ISAF. ISAF forces include over 130,000 troops from 49 contributing nations. Three of the six regional commands in Afghanistan are led by allied or partner nations, and 13 of the 29 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan are led by nations other than the United States.



*A Spanish soldier assigned to NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) conducts combat operations over northwestern Afghanistan. Spain has provided forces to ISAF for over a decade, since January, 2002.*


As mentioned earlier, the successful transition of security to Afghan authority will continue to rely upon increased Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) capabilities. Over the past year, ANSF has achieved their growth target of 305,000. In June 2011, the Security Standing Committee of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board agreed to an increase of the ANSF to over 350,000 by November 2012. The nascent Afghan Air Force (AAF) currently numbers nearly 4,700 personnel and 59 aircraft, and is on its way to becoming a professional, operationally capable, and sustainable force. There are now over 200,000 ANSF members either completed with or in literacy training, which may well have the most far-reaching and long-term impact, not only on the ANSF as a capable and professional force, but, importantly, on Afghan society as well.

These improvements in Afghan capabilities, along with improved security conditions, have allowed us to begin transitioning security responsibilities from coalition forces to Afghan authorities. Since the summer of 2011, NATO has started handing over primary security responsibility to the Afghan government and the ANSF. Thousands of police and military personnel have been trained as part of this enduring partnership and transition process. Following the November announcement by President Hamid Karzai that 18 more areas will soon transition to Afghan security control, over half the Afghan population will be protected by their national security forces.

The increased professionalism and capabilities of the ANSF support these transition objectives by enabling the Afghan capability to secure their own territory, facilitate civilian efforts to establish governance, and prevent future threats to stability. While there is tremendous progress occurring, key challenges and areas that still must be addressed by the international community include corruption, cross border sanctuaries, and strategic communications outreach.

The recent Bonn Conference set out how far we have come in 10 years since the first Bonn Conference in 2001, while reaffirming the mutual commitment between Afghanistan and the international community to deepen and broaden their historic partnership from Transition to the Transformation Decade of 2015-2024. This effort supports further transformation in the areas of governance, security, the peace process, economic and social development, and regional cooperation. The lasting commitment of the international community—including funding to sustain the ANSF; training and operational support for niche capabilities; Quick Reaction Forces; and assistance to Special Operations Forces—will be essential to ensure that gains made in stability become irreversible.

*Libya.* From March 24 to October 31, 2011, NATO Allies led an unprecedented coalition of contributors in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR supporting UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. The coalition enforced an arms embargo by air and sea across Libya's maritime flank, maintained a no-fly-zone, and undertook specific operations to protect civilians and civilian populated areas. NATO air assets conducted over 26,500 sorties, including



*A British Typhoon fighter jet takes off for a combat mission over Libya during NATO's Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. NATO air assets conducted over 26,500 sorties to protect the Libyan people.*

over 9,700 strike sorties to protect the people of Libya from attack or the threat of attack. A total of 49 ships from 12 nations, along with surveillance assets provided by submarines and maritime aircraft, supported the operation in the Mediterranean Sea. Ships conducted more than 3,000 intercepts for hailings, 311 boardings, and 11 denials. The NATO Alliance worked as it was designed to do, with our allies and partners sharing the burdens and responsibilities of these operational missions.

Shortly following initial coalition efforts by the U.S., United Kingdom, and France to reduce the threat of Libyan air defenses, NATO assumed the lead for Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. The U.S. continued to contribute as a combat enabler, focusing largely on aerial refueling and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. These crucial and irreplaceable U.S. contributions to the overall effort enabled our allies and partners to fully contribute to the operation. In all, 14 NATO members and 4 partner countries provided naval and air forces for NATO's



three missions. Together, these 18 countries bore the brunt of the Alliance effort. Additionally, the long-standing political-military relationships developed through Alliance operations, exercises, and partnerships permitted and facilitated the coordinated and rapid commencement of operations within an unprecedented timeline. Furthermore, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR proved the value of a comprehensive approach involving civilian advisors and coordination with non-governmental organizations. In sum, the Libya operation demonstrated the synergistic effects of Alliance capabilities, and manifested the continued success and evolution of the NATO Alliance in the 21st century.

"We have fully complied with the historic mandate of the United Nations to protect the people of Libya, to enforce the no-fly zone and the arms embargo... Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR is one of the most successful in NATO history. We are concluding it in a considered and controlled manner—because our military job is now done."

-NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, marking the end of the Libya operation,  
October 31, 2011

*Kosovo.* While Afghanistan remains NATO's primary operational theater, the Alliance has not faltered in its other commitments, particularly in the Balkans. Today, approximately 6,000 allied and partner nation troops operate in the Balkans as part of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) to help maintain a safe and secure environment, and enable freedom of movement for all citizens irrespective of their ethnic origin. The United States provides only around 10% of forces currently deployed. Despite great progress made towards peace and stability in Kosovo, continued tensions at the border crossings with Serbia have reinforced the need for vigilance and careful analysis before further adjusting the KFOR posture toward a minimal presence.

*Other Major NATO Operations.* The Alliance has been active in a number of operations and missions to counter terrorism and maritime piracy, and to enhance stability in troubled regions. Operation OCEAN SHIELD is focusing on at-sea counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, contributing to international efforts to combat piracy in this area. It is also offering, to regional states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities. NATO naval forces continue to lead Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, focused on detecting and deterring terrorist activity in the Mediterranean and safeguarding this strategic maritime region. The experience and partnerships developed through Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR considerably enhanced NATO's capabilities and contributed directly to the rapid integration of assets for Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR.

Additionally, the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) recently was successfully concluded. It delivered training, advice, and mentoring (with all NATO member countries contributing to the training effort either in or outside of Iraq) through financial contributions or donations of equipment. Over the 7 years of the mission, nearly 20,000 Iraqi security forces received training.

NATO members and partners also conduct an important joint and collective air-policing mission to preserve the integrity of NATO airspace through the NATO Integrated Air Defence System, a system comprised of sensors, command and control facilities, and weapons systems such as ground-based air defense and fighter jets.

*Major Exercises.* NATO exercises are key enablers for core missions and focus areas, and contribute to the value of U.S.-led training and exercises. As an example, in 2011, exercises and resources were synchronized with a large U.S. based Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) program,

UNIFIED ENDEAVOR, enabling two NATO pre-deployment exercises in order for the ISAF Joint Command Headquarters and Regional Command South to prepare forces and headquarters for the mission in Afghanistan. The exercises provided training for the U.S. First Corps, 82nd Airborne Division, NATO's HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), and individual augmentees from troop-contributing nations, increasing the level of coalition training not only for U.S. forces, but also for coalition members.

Additional exercises provide an opportunity for allies to work with other partner nations, building collective capabilities for mutual security interests. In 2011, NATO carried out a number of exercises with Russia supporting the Lisbon Summit pledge, seeking to enhance the strategic partnership with Russia and other new partners. Russia participated in allied Exercise BOLD MONARCH, demonstrating submarine rescue operations, as well as Exercise VIGILANT SKIES, the first live NATO-Russia counterterrorism exercise in the skies, where Polish, Russian and Turkish fighter jets intervened in response to the simulated terrorist hijacking of a passenger aircraft. We are doing some mission defense exercises with Russia this spring as we seek cooperative relations in this complex area.

*NATO Special Operations Forces.* The NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters (NSHQ) is a U.S.-led framework organization within the NATO structure that has achieved significant multinational Special Operations synergy over the past four years. This is perhaps best illustrated by the active presence of over 2,000 ISAF Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel on the ground, actively partnering with Afghan Security Forces. As NATO looks to broaden such engagements and partnering in an effort to apply comprehensive solutions to security challenges, NSHQ has already begun integrating Partnership-for-Peace SOF members from Sweden and

Austria into the NSHQ, where they interact habitually with Irish, New Zealand, Finnish, Swiss, and Australian SOF.

Fostering SOF capability and interoperability among 28 allies, and a wide range of other actors who leverage the Alliance, is an economy of force effort and force multiplier that epitomizes the concept of 'Smart Defence,' with an associated impact that extends beyond the Alliance and the transatlantic security relationship. Whether in areas of intelligence sharing, training and education, communications, or biometrics and exploitation, the NATO SOF community is driving significant change and innovation within NATO. As an effective agent of 21st century change, NSHQ continues to capitalize on knowledge, experience, and capabilities returning from Afghanistan, and apply them to future challenges in order to take NATO's SOF transformation to the next level.

*Chicago Summit.* Clearly, NATO is an active and leading contributor to peace and security on the international stage. This May, the 25th NATO Summit will take place in Chicago. Ministerial meetings since December 2011 continue to develop the summit agenda. In Chicago, NATO Heads of State and Government will further develop and approve strategic guidance for Alliance activities supporting the enduring partnership with Afghanistan beyond 2014, other partnership strategies, NATO's Missile Defense Capability, Multinational Capabilities, and a review of the Alliance's Deterrence and Defense Posture.

"The transatlantic partnership has been both a cornerstone of global security and a powerful force for global progress... We have fought and died for each other's liberty and freedom. These are ties that cannot and never should be broken."

"Europe is and remains America's partner of first resort."

-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton

*CONCLUSION*

The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians of U.S. European Command and NATO Allied Command Operations are making vital contributions to our national security and forward defense every day through their engagement, support, and brilliant execution of combined operations with our allies and partners across the theater. As we look to future success, I ask for your continued support of these extraordinary men and women, and their families, to ensure they receive the care and benefits they have earned and so rightly deserve.

Our work continues to make a difference. As the Secretary of Defense has stated, the U.S. depends on NATO “every day to provide capacity that we cannot find anywhere else.” Given the continuous change we face in the current security and fiscal environments, sustaining this vital, historic, and effective Alliance, and preserving our critical theater strategic partnerships, is even more essential to protecting the security interests we share as we continue moving forward in the 21st century.

European Command remains focused on sustaining these partnerships to meet the demands of ongoing operations. We continue to leverage the authorities and funding that Congress has provided to support the allies and partners who have made their own vital contributions to these operations. Congressional support for these programs has enabled us to assist these allies and partners as they have conducted operations in Afghanistan and taken a leadership role in last year’s Libya operation. These allied and partner contributions remain critical to meeting our goal to transition security responsibility in Afghanistan by 2014. Accordingly, we ask for your continued support of the funding and authorities so essential in preparing our allies and partners to make these contributions to our common defense.

Even as we focus on present needs, we must also consider the future of the transatlantic partnership. Through years of deployment to Afghanistan, and in recent operations over Libya, we have made great strides toward developing the military capabilities called for in the November 2010 NATO Strategic Concept. Looking ahead, we seek to consolidate and sustain these gains, keeping our skills sharp for future expeditionary and stabilization operations while retaining our ability to train foreign military forces to support future contingency operations. I agree with Secretary Panetta: it would be a tremendous loss if, for any reason, the Alliance did not retain, develop, and institutionalize the hard-earned capabilities that have allowed it to conduct these operations with such skill and success. Given the economic constraints facing Europe and the United States, this risk is real. However, we believe this outcome can be avoided as long as our allies and partners properly resource and transform their armed forces, and the United States continues to support these vital strategic partnerships, focusing in areas that allow us to train, deploy, and operate together safely and effectively. We respectfully request your continued assistance in this endeavor, one essential to the security of the United States.

And, as we look to the future of the historic transatlantic security partnership, one that proved so valuable and served us so well in the last century, we must continue to focus its evolution and capabilities on the common strategic interests and challenges that we face in the 21st century. Those challenges include the threat of ballistic missile attack, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, threats in cyberspace, and transnational illicit trafficking. The danger of underestimating the value of this partnership is also real, particularly as the generation that contributed and received so much from it passes from the scene. As former Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently said, "The policymakers who will follow us...will not have the same historical, personal and, indeed,

emotional ties to Europe, and may not consider the return on America's investment in Europe's defense worth the cost...and that will be a tragedy." Working together with our historic partners on these critical security challenges of the 21st century to wisely leverage the significant investments that America has made for over half a century will be more important than ever in light of the fiscal constraints that we all face. Your continued support will ensure that we are prepared, working in concert with these enduring allies and partners, to meet those challenges head-on and prevail.

So supported, European Command and Allied Command Operations will continue to serve as a vital part of the transatlantic bridge that provides our countries continued security in a new—and still unfolding—era. For, as Secretary Panetta said in Brussels last year, "Security in the 21st century will not be achieved by each nation marching to its own drummer. It can only be achieved by a willingness to fight together to defend our common security interests. That is the world we must shape today, to build a stronger world for tomorrow."

Every day, the men and women of European Command and Allied Command Operations are working through history's most successful alliance, alongside our allies and partners across a dynamic theater, to build and sustain that indispensable "willingness" in the pursuit of our common security interests and the forward defense of the United States. With every action, they are shaping the rapidly changing world we live in today in order to provide the enduring capabilities, security structures, and trust we need for a stronger world tomorrow. It is a world in which we are—and will continue to be—***STRONGER TOGETHER.***





## United States Navy Biography

### Admiral James G. Stavridis Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander, United States European Command

Admiral Stavridis assumed duties as commander of European Command and as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe in early summer 2009.

Stavridis is a 1976 distinguished graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a native of South Florida.

A Surface Warfare officer, he commanded the Destroyer USS *Barry* (DDG 52) from 1993-1995, completing UN/NATO deployments to Haiti and Bosnia, and a combat cruise to the Arabian Gulf. Barry won the Battenberg Cup as the top ship in the Atlantic Fleet under his command.

In 1998, he commanded Destroyer Squadron 21 and deployed to the Arabian Gulf, winning the Navy League's John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership.

From 2002-2004, he commanded *Enterprise* Carrier Strike Group, conducting combat operations in the Arabian Gulf in support of both Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and Operation *Enduring Freedom*.

From 2006-2009, he commanded U.S. Southern Command in Miami, focused on Latin America and the Caribbean.

Ashore, he has served as a strategic and long range planner on the staffs of the chief of Naval Operations and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has also served as the executive assistant to the secretary of the Navy and the senior military assistant to the secretary of Defense.

Stavridis earned a PhD and MALD from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in International Relations in 1984, where he won the Gullion Prize as outstanding student. He is also a distinguished graduate of both the National and Naval War Colleges.

He holds various decorations and awards, including two awards of the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal and five awards of the Legion of Merit. He is author or co-author of several books on naval ship handling and leadership, including *Command at Sea*, *Destroyer Captain*, and *Partnership for the Americas* about Latin America.



*Updated: 2 November 2010*

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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF  
GENERAL CARTER HAM  
U.S. ARMY  
COMMANDER



UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND  
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

29 February 2012

## Posture Statement of U.S. Africa Command

## U.S. Africa Command Mission Statement

Africa Command protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.

**Introduction**

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the accomplishments and future efforts of the men and women of U.S. Africa Command. During the past year, we worked closely with U.S. Government agencies and many international partners to address emerging and ongoing threats to security and stability in Africa. Our operations, exercises, and security cooperation programs continue to support U.S. policy objectives in Africa, strengthen partnerships and reduce threats to America, Americans, and American interests emanating from Africa.

This year, with the continued support of Congress, we will strive to build upon existing relationships and develop new partnerships in Africa in order to strengthen the defense capabilities of partner nations to better enable them to provide for their own security while increasingly contributing to regional security and stability. Guided by the Defense Strategic Guidance, we will continue to sharpen our focus, particularly in the realm of countering violent extremist organizations. We will seek new ways to work with and through the African Union and its regional organizations and to support their leadership in preventing and responding to African security challenges. We will continue to develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches consistent with the blueprint for the Joint Force of 2020.

Throughout Africa, small teams of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen, and DoD civilians and contractors, along with teammates from many other U.S. government

agencies, conduct a wide range of engagements in support of U.S. security interests. I believe that with a comparatively small resource investment, we can continue to achieve tangible results in Africa.

In order to realize success in our mission we must: **PREPARE**, in cooperation with our partners and allies, to respond to future crises and contingencies; **PREVENT** future conflicts by continuing to strengthen our partners' defense capabilities; and **PREVAIL** in current and future operations.


#### **Strategic Environment**

Despite numerous challenges, Africa is a continent where significant progress can be found and great potential exists. The United States is increasingly connected to African states and regional organizations through shared economic, political, and security interests, including commitments to consolidating democratic and economic progress achieved in recent years. U.S. Africa Command supports these efforts through our operations, exercises, and security cooperation activities. In the past year we have seen considerable progress in the capabilities and cooperation of regional partners in addressing threats to regional security, including the operational gains made by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces working alongside Somali, Kenyan, and Ethiopian troops against al-Shabaab, and the cooperative efforts of Algeria, Niger, Mali and Mauritania in combating AQIM.

With six of the world's fastest growing economies in the past decade, combined with democratic gains made in a number of African nations in 2011, Africa's strategic importance to the United States will continue to grow. This year will almost certainly be yet another dynamic year for Africa, with 20 national elections scheduled to occur across the continent, including five elections prompted by peace facilitation, post-conflict, and presidential successions. Some

elections may result in new political and security dynamics in Africa. Through all of these changes, U.S. Africa Command will remain flexible as we move forward with our engagements in order to accomplish our strategic objectives.

The Defense Strategic Guidance notes the need for adaptable and strategically targeted approaches to meet the increasing complexity of the 21<sup>st</sup> century global security environment. Africa’s sheer size, diverse population, and many fragile states are emblematic of this complexity. Africa accounts for 14 of the world’s 20 weakest states in *Foreign Policy’s* 2011 “Failed States Index.” Many of its fragile states lack the capacity or political will to effectively address demographic, political, social, and economic challenges, including population growth, rapid urbanization, persistent internal conflicts, widening income inequality, burgeoning political demands, widespread disease, and increasing demands for essential resources.



Key security challenges of concern to U.S. Africa Command and our partners include the activities of al-Qa’ida and its affiliates in East Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel. Across the continent, illicit trafficking and its nexus with violent extremist organizations (VEOs) pose

significant threats to regional stability and U.S. national interests. Illicit trafficking across the spectrum, from weapons proliferation to trafficking in narcotics and humans, contributes to instability by eroding governance and development. Many Man Portable Air Defense Systems, or MANPADS, disappeared from unsecured storage sites in Libya during the conflict last year and could potentially be trafficked to extremist groups. Also of concern are the Qadhafi regime's stock of chemical weapons and precursor chemicals, the destruction of which was interrupted by the conflict. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verified the presence of previously undisclosed chemical weapons in a visit to Libya in January 2012, and will continue to coordinate with the government of Libya on the destruction of all chemical weapons.

#### **U.S. Africa Command Strategy**

U.S. Africa Command's strategy is fully in line with key elements of U.S. foreign policy and the recent Defense Strategic Guidance. Applying resources in a thoughtful and effective manner to strengthen the defense capabilities of our partners in Africa also remains a critical element of the Department of Defense's new Strategic Guidance. For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to take an active approach to countering the threat posed by al-Qa'ida. Monitoring threats, working with African nations to establish control over undergoverned spaces, and taking an active approach to disrupting al-Qa'ida, are key elements of our efforts in Africa.




Chart: Africa Regions as according to the African Union

Due to the vast challenges and opportunities on the continent, as well as current fiscal realities, we have prioritized regions in Africa to better focus our exercises, operations and security cooperation activities. The Command's regional alignment corresponds with the African Union's regional approach. Our highest priority is the East Africa region which is the nexus for transnational threats to our nation's security. These threats include violent extremist organizations, illicit trafficking and piracy. In prioritizing engagement with individual partners, Africa Command considers our common interests, compelling U.S. national security interests, and each nation's role on the continent.

All of our efforts are guided by two principles; first that a safe, secure, and stable Africa is in our national interest, and second that Africans are best suited to address African security challenges. The United States can best address the security challenges and opportunities of the


African continent by employing all of the elements of national power in cooperation with our African partners. Our strategy synchronizes our activities with those of our U.S. Government, allied, and African partners. It also details our focus areas, prioritizes regions, and ensures our activities produce sustainable effects.

#### **U.S. Africa Command Priorities**

##### **Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)**


Our national defense strategy stresses countering terrorism by transnational VEOs as a critical mission. We conduct operations, exercises, and theater security cooperation programs to prevent attacks against the U.S. homeland or its personnel and facilities abroad and to reduce the threat to our partners and allies.

In Somalia, al-Shabaab represents both a terrorist threat to U.S. and regional interests and an insurgent problem to the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as well as Somali regional administrations. In a video released on 9 February 2012, al-Qa'ida and al-Shabaab jointly announced their formal merger.



Al-Shabaab continues its attempts to overthrow the TFG and gain control of Somali territory. The TFG remains dependent on international support and the presence of AMISOM peacekeepers for its survival. AMISOM successes in Mogadishu, as well as TFG, Kenyan, and Ethiopian operations in south-central Somalia, have the potential to consolidate gains against al-Shabaab and foreign fighters. Somalia faces a significant transition point in August 2012 when the TFG's mandate will expire. Current military operations provide the security necessary for progress in the political process.






Of concern in North and West Africa is the terrorist organization al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which uses the undergoverned spaces of the Maghreb and Sahel as a safe haven. Originally focused on overthrowing the government of Algeria, AQIM evolved and now has a stated intent to attack western targets. AQIM continues to increase its activities in North and West Africa, including collecting large sums of money through kidnapping for ransom. In August 2011, AQIM claimed responsibility for the bombing of an Algerian military school that killed 18 people. There are clear indications that AQIM is now involved in trafficking arms from Libya. In addition, the upheavals in Libya and Tunisia have created opportunities for AQIM to establish new safe havens.

Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation and the source of 8-11% of U.S. oil imports, has very recently experienced a significant decline in security, including a steep increase in the number of terrorist attacks by Boko Haram. Historically, Boko Haram focused on Nigerian government targets but in August of 2011, it bombed the United Nations mission in Abuja, killing 25 and

injuring more than 80 individuals. Violence has escalated in the last several months with 40 killed in Christmas 2011 attacks and over 180 killed in January 2012 in Kano in a series of coordinated attacks against government and police facilities.



In response to these attacks, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in some areas and sent additional military forces to northern Nigeria. We seek to work with our Nigerian partners to strengthen their capability in civil-military affairs to facilitate interaction between military forces and civilians in northern Nigeria and to improve their ability to counter improvised explosive devices. These tailored efforts will enhance Nigerian capabilities to effectively provide security to the Nigerian people and to address conditions conducive to the growth of Boko Haram. The insecurity in northern Nigeria will not be solved solely by military action. An enduring solution will require addressing the underlying conditions which lead individuals to support Boko Haram.

We actively counter these threats through a mix of security force assistance, assisting African states to establish control over undergoverned territories and, in some instances, direct military

activity. Our programs and activities support and complement the Department of State's Partnership for Regional East African Counter-Terrorism (PREACT) and the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Our engagements focus on border security, intelligence, and tactical training. We also assist in properly equipping partner nation forces as well as encourage regional cooperation and intelligence sharing as methods to increase effectiveness.

I believe our strategy for countering-VEOs and emphasis on regional cooperation are having positive effects. In June of 2011, the nations of Mauritania and Mali, whose forces have both trained in a variety of ways including in our annual FLINTLOCK exercise designed to help build counterterrorism capacity, collaborated to destroy an AQIM camp in northern Mali. The nations of Niger and Algeria are both aware of the threat of weapons trafficking from Libya, and are now cooperating to secure their borders. In January 2012, Algeria stopped a four vehicle convoy which was carrying over 100 assault rifles, two rocket propelled grenades (RPG), and ammunition suspected of being of Libyan origin. Furthermore, our sustained support for the troop contributing countries to the African Union Mission in Somalia has resulted in that organization being increasingly capable of countering al-Shabaab's influence.


The potential for support and strengthening of ties between these three groups (al-Shabaab, AQIM and Boko Haram) with al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qa'ida senior leaders in Pakistan, is of particular concern and requires continued monitoring.

#### **Countering Piracy and Illicit Trafficking**

Instability on land contributes to the growth of both VEOs and other criminal activity. The free flow of commerce through the global commons is essential to U.S. economic and security

interests. Piracy and other maritime crimes negatively impact the security and freedom of access for all nations to critical waterways and continue to threaten U.S. security in the waters off the East and West coast of Africa. The international community, including NATO and the European Union, is actively combating piracy in the waters off of the African continent. However, many African partners presently lack the maritime capability and capacity to effectively address piracy. Our goal is to help partner nations build their capacity to increase maritime domain awareness and security in Africa as part of the broader USG and international effort.

In the waters off the Horn of Africa and into the Indian Ocean, Somali-based piracy is a persistent threat. Pirates have demonstrated the ability to operate small watercraft at distances greater than 100 nautical miles from the coast. As the pirates move further east into the Indian Ocean and south into the Mozambique Channel, the challenges and cost associated with interdicting pirate vessels will grow due to a larger area to patrol, making vessels more vulnerable. According the Office of Naval Intelligence, the number of attempted pirate attacks decreased from 186 in 2010 to 166 in 2011; similarly, the number of successful attacks in 2010 dropped from 51 to 27 in 2011. This decline is attributed primarily to the presence of armed security teams on commercial vessels and increasing pressure from the international community in the form of naval patrols.



Somali pirates enjoy sanctuary and freedom of movement on land relatively unimpeded by regional forces. The emergence of armed security teams on commercial vessels, which is reducing the number of successful attacks, may be forcing Somali pirates to adopt new tactics to earn ransoms. A growing concern regarding Somali clan based criminal networks is land-based kidnapping for ransom.

Piracy and armed robbery at sea are also a persistent and growing threat in West Africa's Gulf of Guinea. The International Maritime Bureau statistics document an increase in reported attacks from 28 in 2010 to 39 in 2011. Unlike piracy in the waters off East Africa, attacks in the Gulf of Guinea tend to focus on theft of cargo and kidnapping of individuals crewmembers for ransom, and more frequently result in the injury or death of crewmembers.

Our objectives for maritime security include developing maritime domain awareness, increasing response capabilities, and fostering regional integration and cooperation. Our activities are carried out pursuant to a variety of DoD (title 10) and State (title 22) authorities. Some of these are military-to-military authorities like 10 U.S.C. 1051 and 2010. While others

are carried out in cooperation and coordination with Department of State pursuant to authorities such as International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Sales and Financing, and Peace Keeping Operations. Our flagship maritime security engagement program is Africa Partnership Station (APS). APS provides sustained engagement using mobile training teams, interagency, and international trainers, working from U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard and international partner nations' vessels. Beginning this year, APS will have a construct of "training African trainers" to enable African maritime forces to provide the same level of instruction without U.S. personnel. To date, APS engagements have involved 21 nations and trained more than 7,700 maritime security professionals.

U.S. Africa Command also works closely with African regional organizations to promote and facilitate enhanced regional dialogue and cooperation on maritime security issues. In July 2011, U.S. Africa Command along with the African Center for Strategic Studies sponsored the Maritime Safety and Security Seminar with subject matter experts from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The seminar provided a venue for the two groups to discuss the wide range of maritime security threats and to align their strategies to confront maritime threats. U.S. Africa Command was able to provide a neutral venue and foster the development of a draft agreement between the two organizations that delineates legal roles and promotes interregional cooperation.

Increasingly, African states are taking ownership of security challenges and are working together to combat shared threats. In response to the piracy threat in the Gulf of Guinea, Benin and Nigeria are conducting joint maritime patrols. The nations of Togo and Ghana are expected to join in these patrols as well. ECCAS is also conducting joint patrols in the Gulf of Guinea, with Cameroon, Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. In November 2011,

ECOWAS conducted a conference to discuss further regional cooperation to combat piracy in the region. Activities conducted to increase maritime security, also contribute to reducing the potential exploitation of undergoverned maritime space by violent extremists or criminal organizations.

Many of the same conditions conducive to VEOs and maritime crime are also exploited by criminal elements for illicit trafficking across the spectrum, from sales of weapons to potential trafficking in narcotics and humans. The emergence of complex networks of transnational criminals, narcotics traffickers, VEOs, and other actors necessitates a greater emphasis on countering illicit trafficking (CIT) on land and at sea. The primary objective of our CIT efforts is the development of legitimate, effective, and accountable security forces capable of combating narcotics, weapons trafficking, and other forms of illicit trafficking. We prioritize support to partner nations whose efforts prevent or disrupt the convergence of illicit trafficking and VEOs.

Last year we conducted 71 CIT training events with 24 African partner nations using both section 1033 of the FY 1998 NDAA (support to counter-drug activities of certain foreign governments) and section 1004 of the FY 1991 NDAA (support to counter-drug activities of other government agencies). We supported bases of operation in Ghana and Liberia used to enhance maritime security operations in the Gulf of Guinea. Additionally, we implemented five projects to facilitate information sharing with our partner nations. Through increased information sharing, Cape Verde successfully executed its largest drug seizure valued at \$100 million. These modest efforts relative to demand are paying dividends in increased cooperation and effectiveness against illicit trafficking capabilities.

**Partnering to Strengthen Defense Capabilities**

U.S. Africa Command assists African partners to develop the capabilities required to combat VEOs, piracy, illicit trafficking, and prevent conflict. Increasing the ability of Africans to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts leads to increases in stability and can create the conditions conducive to development. Building partner capacity is also important because it promotes the sharing of costs and responsibility for security on the African continent.

Our capacity building activities complement Department of State programs and are planned with the embassy country team and the partner nation. We focus on the development of professional militaries which are disciplined, capable, and responsible to civilian authorities and committed to the well being of their citizens and protecting human rights. Our efforts focus on increasing the capability and capacity of African partner nations to serve as trained, equipped agents of stability and security on the African continent.


The majority of our engagements are conducted by small teams led by our Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Special Operations Components at a low cost and with a small footprint. African militaries are very receptive to this approach which allows us to cultivate the personal relationships that are so important to our efforts to deepen institutional relationships and build capacity. Given the imperative to reduce costs, we have focused our exercise program on multilateral exercises to make judicious use of resources. An added benefit of multilateral exercises is they develop relationships between nations and contribute to regional cooperation.

One of our primary foci is support to African nations who are willing and able to provide forces to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other peacekeeping operations. In support of the Department of State's Global Peace Operations Initiatives (GPOI) and the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programs, we provide



military mentors to support pre-deployment training. We work extensively with the nations of Uganda and Burundi as they provide the majority of forces to AMISOM to date. Last year we assisted the forces of Djibouti in preparing for their deployment to support AMISOM. Despite some challenges, Djibouti deployed a 100-man advance element of its pledged infantry battalion of over 800 troops. This year we look forward to assisting Sierra Leone as it prepares peacekeeping forces for deployment to Somalia, and we would also look for ways to assist Kenyan forces, consistent with our prior trainings and as appropriate, given AMISOM plans to incorporate Kenyans into the mission.

In the Great Lakes Region of Africa, the United States is engaged in a number of efforts to help address violent armed groups and to promote security. For several years, the people and Governments of Uganda, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan have worked to eliminate the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), one of Africa's most violent and persistent armed groups, which has brutalized civilians in the region for a quarter-century.



Consistent with the bipartisan legislation on the LRA passed by Congress in 2010 and signed into law by the President, the United States continues to pursue a comprehensive, multi-year strategy to help our regional partners mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the LRA. As part of that strategy, President Obama reported to Congress in October that he had authorized a small number of U.S. forces to deploy to the LRA-affected region and to act as advisors to the militaries that are pursuing the LRA. About 100 U.S. personnel deployed to support the regional effort. These U.S. forces do not have an operational role and are focused on assisting and advising host nation forces. An important aspect of their mission is to enhance the capacity of our partners to coordinate and fuse intelligence with effective operational planning so they are better able to plan and conduct operations with the goal of removing from the battlefield Joseph Kony and other senior leadership of the LRA.

Our military advisors are sensitive to the challenges of civilian protection and are incorporating protection considerations into training and operational planning support. U.S. Africa Command is also implementing a rewards program intended to enhance information-gathering efforts throughout LRA-affected areas. Our support to addressing the LRA threat is embedded within a broader strategy and complemented by civilian efforts to include encouraging members of the LRA to defect and peacefully surrender, and we are working closely with the Department of State and USAID as a result. Ultimately, success in countering the LRA will depend upon the continued resolve and partnership of the affected countries as they work together to remove the LRA's top leaders from the battlefield and seek to encourage the defection and disarmament of others.

In East Africa, the Republic of South Sudan continues efforts to improve its capabilities addressing immediate security and humanitarian concerns. Tensions between Sudan and South

Sudan have been and remain a source of regional instability. Disagreements between the two nations remain over the contentious issues of border demarcation, wealth sharing primarily related to oil revenue, and debt forgiveness. Ongoing violence remains a challenge to both governments and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. As of February 2012, the two Sudans are engaged in difficult negotiations related to transit fees for oil. The two sides remain deeply divided over these issues but the future of both nations will depend on their ability to peacefully address this and other post-referendum issues.

Our activities in South Sudan will focus on assisting with the development of the Ministry of Defense and the transformation of their military. We will concentrate on developing the institutional processes of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) general headquarters and mission critical forces focused on command and control, discipline of the force, and mobility. Our efforts in security force assistance are expected to begin in 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter fiscal year 2012.

In our efforts to strengthen defense capabilities of African partners, the National Guard State Partnership Program is an incredibly important component. Currently, there are eight partnerships in Africa (Botswana and North Carolina, Ghana and North Dakota, Liberia and Michigan, Morocco and Utah, Nigeria and California, Senegal and Vermont, South Africa and New York, Tunisia and Wyoming). The Michigan National Guard is providing 24 personnel in support of Operation ONWARD LIBERTY to conduct training in defense sector reform. I have asked General McKinley, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to consider adding two State Partnerships this year and to continue to explore future growth.

Our Component Commands bring valuable assets and tailored experience necessary for successful capacity building efforts. One example of this is the United States Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) which established a rotational

presence in Sigonella, Italy, in October 2011 to support the command. Managed and tasked by U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa, the SPMAGTF is tailored to conduct theater security cooperation engagements. The SPMAGTF consists of just under 200 Marines, organized in five-14 man teams, with two KC-130 aircraft. These teams will deploy in support of PRACT and ACOTA missions. The SPMAGTF is an invaluable asset for the command and increases our ability to engage on the continent. In addition, the SPMAGTF provides the command a limited crisis response capability for natural disasters, evacuations, and other crises.

Beginning this year, we will begin Africa Partnership Flight or APF. Modeled after the Navy's successful Africa Partnership Station, APF features low footprint, short duration, high-impact, sustainable and predictable engagement with our African partners. APF will become the primary Air Force program for conducting building partnership capacity and will enable committed African states to enhance their aviation capabilities, foster greater regional cooperation, and increase air domain safety and security in Africa. The first event under APF is scheduled for March 2012, in Ghana.

Finally, the Department of the Army has selected United States Army Africa (USARAF) to conduct the pilot Regionally-Aligned Brigade (RAB) rotation in FY13. This brigade, a tailored Army General Purpose Force, is designed to help support U.S. Africa Command's validated requirements for security cooperation activities throughout Africa.

#### **Preparing and Responding to Crisis**

U.S. Africa Command is always prepared to conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations as directed. The dynamic security environment on the continent requires the command headquarters and our components to be trained and ready to plan and conduct

responses for a wide range of contingencies. Our operating locations on the continent support our operations and provide the ability to rapidly respond if required.

We demonstrated our ability to respond to a crisis in the spring of 2011 when the command directed coalition military operations in Libya, which prevented the Qadhafi regime from committing mass atrocities against the citizens of Benghazi. After the end of NATO Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR on 31 October 2011, we established a joint task force to command and control post conflict U.S. operations related to Libya. Joint Task Force ODYSSEY GUARD, commanded by U.S. Army Africa, was instrumental in providing support to the Department of State as it reopened the U.S. embassy in Tripoli. Joint Task Force ODYSSEY GUARD also provided explosive ordnance disposal assistance and monitored the security of the chemical weapons in the Waddan storage complex.

Critical Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets based in Sigonella, Italy, and Souda Bay, Greece, were used in Operation ODYSSEY DAWN and NATO Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR and continue to be used today to monitor illegal trafficking and violent extremist organizations.

ISR assets are a key enabler for many of our operations and engagements. The information provided by these assets is used to develop a full picture of the activities of VEOs and other activities of interest. Without operating locations on the continent, ISR capabilities would be curtailed, potentially endangering U.S. security. We currently operate ISR assets from various locations and continue to explore additional operating locations in order to improve access and on-station times for our ISR missions. Given the vast geographic space and diversity in threats, the command requires increased ISR assets to adequately address the security challenges on the continent.

On the African continent, we have strategic locations that provide a hub and spoke operational reach that covers the continent with C-130 aircraft operational capability. Our only enduring presence on the continent is Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, which provides an essential command and control and logistics hub for Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) to plan and support operations, exercises and security cooperation activities throughout East Africa. Camp Lemonnier is also an essential regional power projection base that enables the operations of multiple combatant commands; U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Africa Command. The requirements for Camp Lemonnier as a key location for national security and power projection are enduring.

New mission requirements at Camp Lemonnier necessitate new facilities and upgrades. We will take measured steps to move from expeditionary and temporary facilities which have been cobbled together over time to an enduring austere footprint. Additionally, we will prudently evolve to improve force protection, safety, and energy standards. We continue to work with the Department of the Navy to update the existing master plan. I very much appreciate the continued support the Congress has provided for military construction projects at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.

In addition to Camp Lemonnier, the command leverages support from U.S. European Command's and Defense Logistics Agency's military infrastructure to support operations in a time of crisis. U.S. bases in Europe provide geographic proximity, infrastructure, maintenance support and flexibility. European based forces were absolutely critical to operation ODYSSEY DAWN; simply stated, we could not have responded on the timelines required for operations in Libya had air and maritime forces not been forward-stationed in Europe.

The value of our operating locations on the continent and the readiness of the command's headquarters and its components were further demonstrated in January 2012 when the command, at the request of the Department of Justice, planned and conducted the successful hostage rescue of an American citizen and a Danish citizen who were held captive in Somalia.

Our headquarters location in Stuttgart, Germany, has been a topic of discussion since the command was established. The final decision on location was deferred until 2012 by then Secretary of Defense Gates. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is leading a comprehensive study of the factors involved in the headquarters basing, and we are providing complete data and information to support their analysis of the comparative costs, benefits, and risks of various basing options. Until a final decision is made, we will continue to accomplish our missions from Stuttgart, where our proximity to Africa, both geographically and in terms of time zones, facilitates our ability to build relationships with our African partners, and provides a location where our service members, civilians, and their families are well supported.

#### **Fiscal Responsibility**

U.S. Africa Command recognizes the national security imperative of deficit reduction and continues to seek innovative, low-cost concepts for activities and functions across the command. I have directed the staff to look beyond the assigned reductions with a goal of further efficiencies in the command's budget requirements. We conducted a study of the headquarters functions to seek further efficiencies and improve effectiveness. Through this study, we found areas where we believe we can combine functions and reduce manpower requirements with a minimum of risk.

To reduce fuel costs at Camp Lemonnier, the containerized living units (CLU) will be renovated through a \$1 million project funded by the DoD Operational Energy Plans and Programs Office. The CLUs will be redesigned incorporating energy efficient air conditioning units, increased insulation, and reflective exterior coatings. As part of the project, a highly energy efficient SuperCLU will be developed. The projected energy saving are 54% for CLUs and 82% for SuperCLUs thus reducing fuel costs for the camp.

We recognize our security cooperation engagements must be innovative, low-cost, and if sustained, yield more than immediate budgetary savings. The outcomes of our security cooperation programs are twofold, first as African partners become increasingly capable of addressing their own security and countering violent extremist organizations, the burden of addressing those threats is shared, reducing budgetary and personnel costs to the United States. Second, while it is difficult to prove that we have prevented a crisis by working with partners in peacetime, we know that the cost of intervention far exceeds that of prevention.

#### **How Congress Can Help**

The African continent has many challenges which require collaboration and support of all the agencies of government and the support of Congress. At this time, the command is properly resourced; however, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) continues to be a challenge to satisfy mission requirements. We are working with the Department of Defense to gain additional ISR to monitor the activities of al-Qa'ida affiliates in East Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel and the Lord's Resistance Army in Central Africa.

In order to conduct many of our programs we use a mix of Department of State and Department of Defense authorities. One example of this is the APS program where DoD Title



10 authorities pay for the movement of ships and personnel while State Department's PKO funding pays for the actual training activities of African personnel. An example of how Congressional support provided critical authority at an appropriate time is the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), approved in the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. This was a first step in streamlining State and DOD authorities for security assistance and the two departments are working closely to utilize the GSCF in the coming year.

The Department of State's ability, through security assistance funding, to work on the same problem set from a different angle is beneficial and would suffer if its funding were reduced, weakening overall U.S. government abilities to advance U.S. objectives on the continent. We will work with our interagency partners to ensure the resources you provide are appropriately tied to our highest defense and foreign policy priorities. I thank this committee and Congress for its continued support of our team and our mission.

Another example of how Congressional support provided critical authority at an appropriate time is the new authority of section 1207(n) in the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Pursuant to that authority, we are working with the Department of State to plan our support to build the capacity of the counter-terrorism forces of Ethiopia and those countries engaged in AMISOM. This is an opportune time to exercise this authority as al-Shabaab in Somalia is facing a fight on three fronts with forces from AMISOM and the Somali Transitional Federal Government, Kenya, and Ethiopia actively engaged. We appreciate the additional authority and believe it will enable AMISOM forces to continue their progress against al-Shabaab.

We also appreciate the new authority under section 1206 of the FY12 NDAA to provide logistics support, supplies, and services for countries participating in counter-LRA operations.

We feel this authority will enable continued steady progress by our regional partners toward our mutual goal of defeating the LRA and bringing Joseph Kony to justice.

Finally, we welcome visits by you and by your staffs. The Members and staff who have had the opportunity to travel in Africa gain a deeper appreciation for both the challenges and the many opportunities that are presented in this large and diverse continent.

**Conclusion**

U.S. Africa Command will continue its operations, exercises, and security cooperation in order to protect America, Americans, and American interests from threats emanating from the African continent and advance U.S. policy goals. We will prioritize and focus our engagements to counter the most significant threats to U.S. security. We look forward to being the security partner of choice for African nations by building lasting, beneficial partnerships. Our success is dependent upon close collaboration with our interagency partners, embassy country teams, African regional organizations, and African nations.

We believe that over the long run, it is Africans who should address African security challenges and that we most effectively advance U.S. security interests through focused and sustained engagement. In strengthening African defense capabilities and capacities, we enable African states to take ownership of their challenges and strengthen their leadership roles. We believe that for a relatively low resource cost, our programs are making a positive difference.

Our past successes would not have been possible without the dedication of the entire U.S. Africa Command team – Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen, civilians, contractors, and our interagency teammates – and their families.

During my travels throughout my first year with U.S. Africa Command, I have heard many great African proverbs, however, I have learned one which I think is particularly applicable to U.S. Africa Command:

“If you want to go quickly, go alone. If you want to go far, go together.”

We, at U.S. Africa Command, choose to go far. We choose to go together, with our Africa partners as well as together with our many interagency partners, to better meet their security interests and to advance the security interests of the United States.



**United States Africa Command**  
**General Carter F. Ham**  
 Commander, United States Africa Command

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General Carter F. Ham became commander of U.S. Africa Command headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany on March 9, 2011. U.S. Africa Command is one of six unified geographic commands within the Department of Defense unified command structure.

General Carter F. Ham served as an enlisted Infantryman in the 82nd Airborne Division before attending John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio. He was commissioned in the Infantry as a Distinguished Military Graduate in 1976.

His military service has included assignments in Kentucky, Ohio, California, Georgia, Italy and Germany to name a few. He has also served in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Macedonia, and Iraq.

He has held a variety of positions to include Recruiting Area Commander; Battalion Executive Officer at the National Training Center; Advisor to the Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade; Commander, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry; Chief of Staff, 1st Infantry Division; Commander, 29th Infantry Regiment; commander, Multi-National Brigade, Mosul, Iraq; Commander, 1st Infantry Division; Director for Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.

His previous assignment was Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army.

His military education includes the Armor Officers Advanced Course, Naval College of Command and Staff, graduating with distinction, and the U. S. Air Force's Air War College.

General Ham's awards and decorations include Army Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Joint Service Commendation Medal.



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**DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

FEBRUARY 29, 2012

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
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# Defence Expenditures

Figure 3: Volume indices of GDP and Defence Expenditures (2001 = 100)



IS/DPP Force Planning for the Alliance

**MICHAEL R. TURNER**

8th District, Ohio

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
CHAIRMAN  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
STRATEGIC FORCESCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND  
GOVERNMENT REFORM

ASSISTANT MAJORITY WHIP

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
Washington, DC 20515

February 28, 2012

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(937) 382-8831Admiral James Stavridis  
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
Office of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe  
Unit 21420, Box 7100 APO AE 09705

Dear Admiral Stavridis,

As members of the U.S. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, we ask for your assistance on a matter of interest to us, specifically one that relates to a steadfast U.S. ally and a NATO aspirant country, the Republic of Georgia.

During our recent delegation trip to the NATO PA's Joint Committee meeting, we were able to visit the NATO Special Operations Facility Headquarters where the 28 NATO nations, and seven non-NATO allied and friendly countries, conduct special operations training and coordination activities. We were proud to see the important work being done at this facility thanks to American leadership in direct support of our men and women fighting in Afghanistan.

As you know, the Republic of Georgia has one of the largest non-NATO forces in Afghanistan, larger than many NATO member contributions, and they operate without caveats. Yet, while there are seven non-NATO nations represented at this headquarters, Georgia is not.

We understand that all that is required for Georgian participation is a member nation sponsor - which we emphatically believe the United States should do - and an agreement on handling classified information correctly.

We respectfully request you review this matter and let us know if you agree that Georgia is a logical candidate for participation in NATO SOF, and, if so, how we can achieve that.

Sincerely,

Michael R. Turner  
Chairman, U.S. Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary  
Assembly  
U.S. House of Representatives







Jeff Miller  
Member, U.S. Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary  
Assembly  
U.S. House of Representatives



Jo Ann Emerson  
Member, U.S. Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary  
Assembly  
U.S. House of Representatives



Mike Ross  
Member, U.S. Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary  
Assembly  
U.S. House of Representatives



Carolyn McCarthy  
Member, U.S. Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary  
Assembly  
U.S. House of Representatives



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**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING  
THE HEARING**

FEBRUARY 29, 2012

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#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN**

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The details for this question come down to Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP). The key phrase in the question is “to operate” which means we have examined how we will ensure that critical Warfighting missions will continue to function if the Host Nation grid or other critical infrastructure is successfully attacked. This is a Command/Operations task—the Warfighting Commander will ultimately decide how resources (e.g. fuel, power generation, communications assets) will be allocated to support those Base missions determined to be most important. Providing more detailed information on each installation would require a USEUCOM tasking to each Component asking the Component to articulate how they would COOP critical capabilities.

Every installation/command has a COOP/disaster plan to deal with these situations. Additionally, all service components have reach back capabilities for technical expertise and limited equipment. [See page 26.]

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#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER**

Admiral STAVRIDIS.  
Smart Defense

The Smart Defense initiative aims to assure continued capability development commensurate with global security challenges and NATO’s Strategic Concept in a resources constrained situation. Smart Defense is based on the principles of affordability, availability, national and NATO priority alignment and complementarity.

A key element of Smart Defense is that all projects are “owned” and implemented by member nations, with NATO acting in a supporting and coordinating role.

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR), Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), and Air Policing have been selected as flagship initiatives for the NATO Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government (Chicago Summit) in May 2012. The Chicago Summit is meant to highlight a starting point for Smart Defense, to demonstrate the principle and to build confidence for additional projects.

Compatibility of Air Policing, Helicopter Maintenance, Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance with Smart Defense

Air Policing today uses already existing air forces in support of Iceland and the Baltic States, and Albania; states who lack air forces with that capability, thus enabling them to concentrate scarce resources on other security capabilities that are more in demand for the Alliance as a whole rather than the purchase of costly fighter aircraft.

The Helicopter Maintenance initiative will develop economies of scale by centralizing logistics support for commonly fielded helicopters. With multinational participation, this can reduce footprint and redundancy, increase the cost-efficiency and optimize the use of resources. For example, there is much potential in this area for NH90 operating nations (a similar conceptual approach is found within the Joint Strike Fighter project).

As existing Maritime Patrol Aircraft fleets age-out across many NATO member nations, rather than duplicate existing numbers with costly modern replacements, an agreement for multinational use of these specialized assets will to some extent achieve greater flexibility and efficiency by creating a multi-national framework to pool and share capabilities.

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, including the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) project, is Smart Defense in that a number of nations have agreed to procure critical assets that would otherwise be prohibitively expensive on an individual basis. Within the Alliance Ground Surveillance project, NATO will provide an organization and structure, Air Base facilities, training, etc, which will serve as an Alliance hub into which participating nations can collaboratively generate information for the benefit of NATO. [See page 22.]

**RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY**

Admiral STAVRIDIS.  
Iran's Nuclear Program

Since September 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been working to clarify the nature of Iran's nuclear program. In one of his most detailed reports to the Board of Governors on Iran's activities, Director General Mohamed ElBaradei indicated in November 2004 that Iran had failed to report, declare, and provide information on a number of critical issues.

Since November 2004, IAEA Directors General have issued numerous reports on Iran's implementation of its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929. The IAEA Board found Iran in noncompliance with its Safeguards Agreement in September 2005 and, after Iran restarted uranium enrichment activities at Natanz in January 2006, the Board reported Iran to the UN Security Council (UNSC) for its noncompliance.

In response to the IAEA Board of Governor's finding of noncompliance, the UNSC has adopted a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2006, March 2006) and six resolutions (UNSCRs) on Iran: UNSCR 1696 (July 2006), UNSCR 1737 (December 2006), UNSCR 1747 (March 2007), UNSCR 1803 (March 2008), UNSCR 1835 (September 2008), and UNSCR 1929 (2010). Four of the six resolutions (UNSCRs 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929) impose Chapter VII (legally binding) sanctions on Iran.

In June 2006, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United States, and United Kingdom—the P5+1, also known as the E3+3—offered Iran a substantial incentives package of economic cooperation and assistance in return for Tehran's full cooperation with the IAEA and suspension of its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The P5+1 presented Iran with a refreshed package of incentives in June 2008, but Iran has yet to respond clearly and positively to this offer, or comply with its UNSC and IAEA obligations. On April 8, 2009, the P5+1 invited Iran to meet with the group to resolve international concerns and rebuild the confidence of the international community. On October 1, 2009, the United States and the other P5+1 members met with representatives from Iran in Geneva, Switzerland.

In late 2009, Iran appealed to the IAEA for fuel assemblies for the Tehran research reactor (TRR), which has operated for decades and produces medical isotopes. The IAEA, with support from the United States, France, and Russia, offered a TRR re-fueling proposal that would utilize Iran's own available low-enriched uranium (LEU) at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant by sending 1,200 kilograms of the LEU to Russia for further enrichment, fabricating it into fuel, and returning it to Iran for use in this safeguarded reactor. The plan would have provided the TRR with much-needed fuel to continue to produce medical isotopes while also beginning to build international confidence in Iran's peaceful intent by removing the majority of its LEU stockpile from Iran's territory; however, parties did not reach an agreement on the swap deal.

On June 9, 2010, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1929, the fourth legally binding resolution calling on Iran to halt its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and comply with its NPT, UNSC, and IAEA safeguards obligations. The resolution calls for several actions to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.

International concerns regarding the nature of Iran's nuclear program were deepened and reaffirmed by a November 2011 IAEA Director General's report that concluded that Iran has carried out activities "relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device," and "that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured program, and that some activities may still be ongoing." On November 18, 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution expressing its deep concern about the unresolved issues regarding Iran's nuclear program and calling on Iran "to engage seriously and without preconditions in talks aimed at restoring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program." President Obama said on 7 March 2012, "To resolve this issue will require Iran to come to the table and discuss in a clear and forthright way how to prove to the international community that the intentions of their nuclear program are peaceful." And as he also noted, we don't expect a breakthrough in a first meeting. As President Obama noted, there are steps that Iran can take that are verifiable, that would allow them to be in compliance with international norms and international mandates and would provide the world an assurance that they're not pursuing a nuclear weapon. This is not a mystery; they know how to do it, and the question is going to be whether in these discussions they show themselves moving clearly in that direction. They understand that the world community means business.

“We have demonstrated consistently through the P5+1 that the international community is united in our concerns and condemnation of Iran’s actions that violate their international obligations. We are united in continuing to press the Iranian regime to come to the P5+1 diplomatic forum.” (Secretary Clinton)

“We continue to believe we have space for diplomacy. It is coupled with very strong pressure in the form of the toughest sanctions that the international community’s ever imposed.” (Secretary Clinton)

“Iran insists that their nuclear program is purely peaceful and if that’s the case, then openness and transparency, not only with the P5+1 but also with the IAEA and the Security Council and the international community, is essential.” (Secretary Clinton)

“We are hoping that the Iranians will come to the table prepared to have the kind of serious and sincere discussion we have been seeking for several years.” (Secretary Clinton) [See page 31.]





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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING**

FEBRUARY 29, 2012

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#### **QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY**

Mr. THORNBERRY. If you were to relocate the headquarters of US AFRICOM, what weighted factors would you deem important in determining the location for the command? What confluence of features and parameters create an ideal location for the headquarters of US AFRICOM? What kind of community would properly support the mission of the command?

General HAM. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently leading a comprehensive, congressionally mandated, Basing Alternatives Study which will assess the cost-benefit with moving the headquarters from its current location to the United States. We provided the requisite operational data to support their analysis of the comparative costs, benefits, and risks.

Strategically and operationally, our current location provides for effective command, control and coordination of operations. We demonstrated this during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN (OOD) in Libya. A key factor in OOD's successful execution was that the Headquarters lies in the same time zone (+/- 3 hours) of the entire African continent, including Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, the command's service components, U.S. European Command and our European allies and partners active in Africa.

Cost is also a consideration. Alternative options must account for the significant expense associated with a move from Stuttgart including the infrastructure costs related to any new headquarters facility. The cost associated with travel to the continent to meet face to face with our African partners, where strong personal relationships are valued and critical for working effectively together to address threats, is essential and will be a recurring obligation.

Until a final decision is made, we will continue to accomplish our mission from Stuttgart, where our proximity to Africa, both geographically and in terms of time zones, facilitates our ability to build relationships with our African partners, and where our service members, civilians and their families can serve from a safe and well-supported location. Once the study is complete, we will comply with the guidance and decision of the Secretary of Defense.

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#### **QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN**

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral Stavridis, in past years, several nations in the EUCOM AOR have been subject to sophisticated cyberattacks in conjunction with political and military conflicts. To what extent do we communicate with these countries on cyber threats?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. EUCOM is the executive agent for five Information Assurance/Cyber Defense Information Exchange Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), which are negotiated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Chief Information Office. These agreements facilitate sharing classified information with key regional partners, building robust relationships, and strengthening collective cyber security. Absent such MOUs, we can exchange only unclassified information.

CYBER ENDEAVOR is EUCOM's premier cyber security program for advancing collaboration, familiarization, and engagement with partner nations. It is designed to strengthen cyber defense capabilities through seminars, events, and exercises with NATO, partner nations, academia, and industry. Owing to the critical role that the cyber domain plays in military operations, CYBER ENDEAVOR is essential to maintaining and improving force readiness for deployment in support of multinational crisis response activities, combined exercises, and future missions.

Mr. LANGEVIN. How has your communication with other countries changed as a result of the inclusion of cyber in the 2010 NATO strategic concept, and are there limitations on your ability to communicate with these and other EUCOM AOR countries on cybersecurity-related matters that need to be addressed?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. LANGEVIN. To what extent is EUCOM involved with cyber threats that are associated with terrorism and organized crime?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Both terrorist organizations and organized crime syndicates are certainly well-versed in employing the cyber domain to assist them in their nefarious activities. Primarily, however, the cyber domain is employed by these two groups as a means of facilitation: recruiting, fundraising, propaganda messaging, or cyber crime schemes to defraud unwitting victims. While certainly problematic, these uses of the internet do not rise to the level of “cyber threats,” as the relative lack of “cyber sophistication” generally demonstrated by these groups does not threaten EUCOM networks in the way that more tech-savvy adversaries might be able to.

Mr. LANGEVIN. How has EUCOM’s cyber threat environment changed over the past year, and where do you see it going in the near term? Are we adequately prepared?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. EUCOM’s threat environment over the past year has seen an increase in hacker-activist (colloquially termed “hacktivist”) threat activity from non-state actors. The expectation is that the hacktivist threat will continue to increase in the near term. Preparing for an evolving and changing threat such as hacktivism is a challenge, but the agile and flexible work force at EUCOM is the best defense for such a dynamic adversary.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are EUCOM’s lines of communication and responsibility well defined with regards to operational cyber?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The recently adopted construct for command and control (C2) of cyberspace operations specifies command relationships, roles, and responsibilities of Combatant Commands, Services, and Agencies for operations in the cyber domain, consistent with existing authorities, requirements, and capabilities. This standardized framework will help EUCOM configure, operate, and maintain its Theater networks, allowing it to effectively operate in and through cyberspace in support of command requirements. The cyber C2 construct will continue to be refined as it is implemented over the coming year.

Mr. LANGEVIN. I have been very concerned over time about the capabilities of our bases here in the United States to withstand a cyberattack directed against outside supporting infrastructure, such as the electrical grid. Have you examined the ability of overseas bases in your areas of responsibility to operate in the event of such an attack?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do you see significant challenges or capability shortfalls where our research and development investments and capabilities could help you in achieving operational goals?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Research and development investments and capabilities play a key role in satisfying our capability shortfalls. We have a robust process of identifying and validating our capability shortfalls, in coordination with OSD and Joint Staff, which leverages ongoing research and development efforts. We proactively engage the research and development community to identify capabilities that would enhance our ongoing operations. Several areas in which we have seen benefits include ballistic missile defense, countering illicit activities, cyber security, and knowledge management.

The most significant challenge to addressing operational requirements with research and development (R&D) investment exists in the potential for Combatant Command (COCOM)- oriented R&D programs to be curtailed. Programs such as the Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) provide the COCOM with the ability to target R&D efforts to rapidly identify new solutions to meet joint urgent and emergent operational needs. Continued support of the JCTD program, combined with the efforts of the Service Laboratories, enables new technologies to be developed supporting a broad range of capabilities. Recent challenges to R&D funding have had a measurable effect on the pursuit of technological solutions to meet operational requirements.

EUCOM has identified a number of challenges and capability shortfalls where increased R&D will indeed help find solutions to operational goals, managed formally through the Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA) process (which identifies longer-term theater requirements appropriate for R&D). More immediate-term shortfalls are identified in the EUCOM Integrated Priority List. Despite the timing differences, there are a number of common topics identified in these two documents. Three areas where we believe there needs to be additional effort are in ballistic missile defense, energy security, and cyber defense.

Energy Security. There are dramatic changes occurring in the energy domain that portend real risks to forces in terms of sourcing and vulnerability. These changes require earnest effort into developing energy-independent platforms and facilities as

well as visibility and accountability of how we use energy and entirely different and significantly less vulnerable ways to power the force.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). BMD is taking on an increasingly important role due to current events, which requires more attention in the R&D community. We are accepting real risk in system capabilities such as data fusion and defense planning tools, as well as in operational and communications capabilities and enhancements.

Cyber Defense. Threats to our cyber domain are continually increasing. Despite significant Department-wide efforts, we are concerned that we are not allocating significant resources to mitigate these potentially crippling threats. We are a leading partner in development of cyber domain command and control, enumeration of adversary, insider, friendly, and environmental activities, and experimentation in cyber authority delegation, but more R&D work and investment is urgently needed in these areas.

Mr. LANGEVIN. I have been very concerned over time about the capabilities of our bases here in the United States to withstand a cyberattack directed against outside supporting infrastructure, such as the electrical grid. Have you examined the ability of overseas bases in your areas of responsibility to operate in the event of such an attack?

General HAM. We have examined whether our systems would be able to withstand a cyber attack directed against outside supporting infrastructure at Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti, our only enduring location in our area of responsibility, and at locations where we maintain a temporary military presence. We also regularly conduct assessments to determine the likely effects of an attack and measure redundancy to ensure we are able to continue operations. As needed, we refine our plans to ensure continuity of operations. While the loss of outside supporting infrastructure would have a detrimental effect, we would be able to sustain critical functions.

Mr. LANGEVIN. General Ham, to what extent has the transnational terrorism threat in Africa changed over the past year, and have you seen communication and coordination between different terrorist elements or criminal organizations?

General HAM. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do any developments demand a change in U.S. posture with regard to training, support, or counter-terrorism programs, both military and civilian?

General HAM. Events in Africa over the past year provide both opportunities and challenges. The Arab Spring gives us the opportunity to assist in the development of new governments and militaries while instability in East Africa and the Sahel region of North Africa requires greater vigilance to address threats posed by violent extremist organizations. Despite the dynamic nature of Africa, however, no major changes in U.S. posture, other than my previously stated requirement for additional collection assets, are required at this time.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do you see significant challenges or capability shortfalls where our research and development investments and capabilities could help you in achieving operational goals?

General HAM. There are several areas where the Research and Development (R&D) community can assist us in meeting our operational goals. Our top priority is for improved Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems that include near-real time processing, exploitation, dissemination, and communications capabilities to improve on-station time, persistence and timely delivery of information. Also, we would benefit from ISR systems with foliage penetration or counter-concealment capability. Additionally, investment in Identity Resolution capabilities such as biometrics, document exploitation, and forensics capabilities could provide critical indications and warnings. R&D investments in a Friendly Force Tracking capability integrated with a command and control system for Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) locator beacons would improve JPR operations. In the medical arena, timely and cost effective rapid diagnostic testing, surveillance, monitoring and reporting capabilities would help us keep our personnel healthy while they are conducting operations, engagements, and exercises on the continent in remote areas of known infectious diseases. Lastly, given the diverse environment and lack of a reliable infrastructure, further investment in portable, lightweight, long enduring, regenerating power technologies would enable continuous operations while reducing the amount of weight and demand for replenishment of power (e.g. batteries, fuel).

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER**

Mr. TURNER. As you know, the European Phased Adaptive Approach is being offered by the United States as a contribution to NATO. This means we're offering it free-of-charge. What discussions are taking place to make sure that our allies chip in a fair share of this system which, as you know, solely defends Europe until at least 2020? As a corollary, does EUCOM know how much this system will cost it through the four phases of the EPAA?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Many of our Allies already possess low-tier Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities, either in the form of U.S. Patriot systems or French SAM-T systems. Germany and Italy remain committed to development of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program which would provide increased lower tier capability. For upper-tier capability development, The Netherlands recently committed to upgrading their maritime forces to be able to support BMD operations (sensor only for now); Germany, Denmark, and Norway are examining the feasibility of similar upgrades for their maritime forces. Finally, it is important to note that the basing access which Spain, Turkey, Romania, and Poland are providing for our planned EPAA forces is yet another form of Allied contribution. As to the long term costs of EPAA, this question is best answered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) who can consolidate Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and Service-related costs.

Mr. TURNER. Second, this document (**See the chart on page 171**) is from a recent NATO PA Joint Committee meeting, specifically a presentation to the NATO PA from Mr. Frank Boland, Director of Planning for the Defence Policy and Planning Division on the NATO International Staff. What it shows is that even accounting for inflation, the United States foots the overwhelming majority, perhaps as much as 75%, of the defense spending in NATO. This was a clear lesson from the operation in Libya, when even some of our strongest allies ran out of basic munitions. Given your dual role as EUCOM Command and Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, please explain what this chart means to you?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. What this slide shows is that since 9/11 the United States has invested heavily in its armed forces, ensuring that they have the right resources for the mission and its operations across the globe. This slide, unfortunately, does not capture what part of the U.S. defense budget is committed to the Alliance, and what part is committed to other global defense and security priorities. With the exception of a very few (France, UK, to an extent Canada) Allied defense spending is 100% dedicated to NATO defense. Hence, comparing the U.S. defense spending to Allies' defense spending is difficult to do since many Allies focus on defense purely in support of NATO. We know that the financial crisis has hit many of our Allies hard, and it is indeed affecting U.S. defense spending in a similar manner, but we are all seeking ways to best address the challenges we face. What is important to remember is that the Alliance is working hard to ensure that it has the appropriate capabilities to meet the ambitions set out in the 2010 Strategic Concept. Much of the focus for the NATO Summit in Chicago this May will be on defense capabilities and ensuring the Allies, and hence the Alliance, remain capable to meet their Washington treaty obligations.

Mr. TURNER. We also spoke briefly about the fine work of our Georgian Allies in Afghanistan. As you know, three of their soldiers were killed last week in an IED attack and one of their officers is at the Walter Reed Army hospital right now, having suffered multiple amputations. a. Can you speak to the contributions of the Georgians in Afghanistan? b. As you know, there are at least seven Non-NATO states present at that facility undertaking NATO coordination activities for Special Operations. Yesterday, four members of the U.S. NATO PA delegation and I wrote to you (**See the letter on page 172**) asking you to review what needs to be done for Georgia to join the NATO SOF HQ. Do you support such a step?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. To date, the Georgian contribution to ISAF has been indispensable to the overall effort and has contributed considerably to United States capabilities and success in Regional Command Southwest. They have already sent four battalions on six-month deployments since 2010, and recently offered to double their commitment, and beginning in October will provide two battalions every six months. They have served valiantly to date suffering significant casualties while volunteering to conduct all the same missions as the U.S. Marines. The Georgians also secure a significant amount of territory (own battle space) in Helmand Province, an exception among other non-NATO partners.

To begin dialog on participation in the NATO Special Operations HQ (NSHQ), Georgia would need to gain a special security arrangement with NATO in accordance with the NSHQ governing legal framework, which first requires meeting certain NATO operational security benchmarks. Georgia would then need to establish

a formal sponsorship arrangement with one of the NSHQ participating NATO member nations. Such a sponsorship arrangement would likely require as a prerequisite a full assessment of Georgian SOF capabilities and follow-on training support.

Pending resolution of these issues, I support Georgian participation in the NATO Special Operations HQ.

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Sanchez and I are the heads of the Congressional Romania Caucus, which has 32 members. When we spoke last week we discussed the interest of Romania in purchasing F-16 fighters from the United States. Can you speak to where that proposal stands? Do you believe a part of “smart defense” should be making sure our allies are properly equipped?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the current EUCOM workforce construct reflect an appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes and policies.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, EUCOM Headquarters reorganized to embrace an inter-agency and “whole of society/government” approach to maintaining security and stability in Europe and Eurasia, while shaping existing structures to accommodate the security environment through 2020. Our assessment allowed us to reshape EUCOM Headquarters to ensure an organization that “effectively conducts the mission efficiently.” Directorates prioritized all permanent billets in order to identify those with the lowest priority. Directorates also developed a prioritized list of manpower requirements, drawn from the “gaps” that we identified in our assessment. Both the assessment and the prioritization of on hand resources looked at the enterprise across the board, and took into account all categories of available manpower (civilian, military, contractor, and Reserve Component). Permanent manpower requirements were accommodated from within the HQ USEUCOM staff, using lowest priority billets as offsets and other available human resources for mitigating or bridging any capability gaps.

The results allowed EUCOM Headquarters to execute an internal staff rebalance without incurring any growth. In accordance with our new mission-set the staff developed a re-prioritization of all permanent billets. This new prioritization presented leadership a picture of our bottom 10% zone in anticipation of additional reductions in manpower and fiscal resources that we took as directed by the SECDEF.

To achieve these ends, EUCOM Headquarters relies on the guidance and policy published in DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix and CJCSI 1001.01A, Joint Manpower And Personnel Program. EUCOM Headquarters supplements and provides further procedural guidance within the Command through its command instructions, ECI 1601.02, Manpower (currently under revision) and command guidance ECG 5101.01, EUCOM Organization and Functions (currently under revision). Additionally, the Command conducts regular directorate manpower reviews and detailed Strength Reports that highlight trends across all categories of manpower.

Ms. BORDALLO. In your prepared statement, you stated that EUCOM has implemented Contract Management Boards to review all manpower contracts for possible in-sourcing or reduction. How do you define manpower contracts and how does that reconcile with requirements of 10 USC 2330a?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Manpower Contracts are services contracts provided by industry to government to place subject matter experts and specialists or consultants in place to perform specific requirements in place of non-available military or civilian manpower. EUCOM's Contract Management Board considers the information set forth in 10 U.S.C 2330a(c)(2), relating to the reporting requirements for manpower contract issues.

Ms. BORDALLO. Your prepared statement indicated that EUCOM uses Manpower Governance Boards to validate authorized billets, and have willingly accepted greater risk in our Program Objective Memorandum in order to fund our most important missions and functions. To what extent do these Boards ensure compliance with statutory requirements and Personnel & Readiness issued policies related to workforce mix, cost, and risk?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The Manpower Governance Board (MGB) is the strategic governing body within USEUCOM to review and recommend changes to EUCOM's total force manpower. The purpose of the MGB is to ensure EUCOM's manpower resources, as well as its manpower policies and processes, are aligned to achieve the most important strategic and functional objectives of the Command within available funding. According to its charter, the MGB will:

a. Provide oversight and policy guidance to the manpower governance processes to include the Compensation Review Board (CRB), Joint Reserve Requirements Board (JRRB), and the Contract Management Board (CMB) actions that will result in contracted manpower. The MGB represents the decision-making authority for these governance processes and will serve to synchronize manpower decision-making.

b. Ensure that requests for increased manpower, permanent and temporary over-hires, are prioritized and consistent with EUCOM strategic objectives.

c. Ensure that internally-generated initiatives to realign manpower (e.g., across directorates; convert temporary positions to permanent) are consistent with EUCOM missions, avoid redundancy, and minimize risk to accomplishment of work. This includes contractor to civilian conversions (Concept Plan submissions), and military to civilian conversions (Defense Manpower Review Process and Reserve Component).

d. Ensure that EUCOM has sufficient manpower deployed to its most critical missions and functions.

e. Provide transparency in manpower resource decision-making and resource allocation within and across directorates.

The membership of the MGB includes: EUCOM Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) and Deputy ECJ1, who serve as co-chairs. The ACOS serves as the voting member for the Special Staff. The MGB also includes primary and alternate O-6 or GS-15 deputy-level representatives from each EUCOM numbered J-code directorate. The MGB submits recommendations to the EUCOM Chief of Staff for final approval.

The Manpower, Personnel, and Administration Directorate (ECJ1) staff will provide facilitation and analytic support to the MGB, and serves as the office of primary responsibility for the MGB. ECJ1 serves as manpower requirement and personnel policy subject matter expert to the J codes/Special Staff and the MGB, owns the operation of the manpower governance processes, analyzes business case analysis-based manpower increase requests (to assess the validity and priority of the request, as well as the best sourcing options for the requirement), and conducts analysis of current manpower alignment to ensure that internally-generated manpower realignment initiatives (e.g., across directorates; convert temporary positions to permanent) are consistent with EUCOM missions and minimize risk to the accomplishment of work.

Ms. BORDALLO. Did EUCOM seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-effectively performed by civilians?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, not during the last fiscal year. But, yes, over the last 5 years in order to accomplish insourcing. And EUCOM coordinated with the Joint Staff to ensure our manpower requirements were adequately reflected within the existing civilian personnel level.

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has EUCOM used insourcing to reduce reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate efficiencies?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. EUCOM Headquarters has been reducing reliance on contractors since 2006 and rebalancing our workforce. Several contracts have been cancelled due to mission accomplishment or when no longer needed. More than 60 contractor billets have been transitioned to civilian positions, creating efficiencies and cost avoidance of more than \$3 million.

Ms. BORDALLO. Are you comfortable that all contracted services currently supporting EUCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes. EUCOM continues to integrate updated DOD guidance to support a more efficient manpower solution. Through our contract management board process, we review alternatives to contracted services as well as conduct a "cost benefit analysis" to ensure that we are meeting the intent of 8108(c) and the Campaign to Cut Waste Guidance. We feel confident that we have taken the necessary measures to develop a process that achieves a cost effective source of labor, and our contract management board decisions continue to yield cost savings.

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within EUCOM to ensure the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. After the SECDEF Efficiency Initiatives reduction to the EUCOM Headquarters, EUCOM initiated EUCOM 2020 Phase III to review and as-



sess manpower against functions and rebalance the staff, if necessary, in order to correctly align appropriate manpower against the highest priority missions and functions, while taking additional risk in lower priority missions and functions.

The EUCOM staff prepared organizational functional risk assessments and identified areas of risk or functions that could either be deleted or transferred. The risk assessments and staff rebalance was approved by the EUCOM Deputy Commander on 8 June 2011, and the list of deleted functions was approved on 11 November 2011.

Subsequently, the EUCOM Organization and Functions Manual is being completely revised. Combined with the risk assessment tool developed during EUCOM 2020 Phase III and the Annual Manpower Process, through which organizations identify additional manpower requirements within EUCOM, the Command will conduct an analysis on an annual basis to ensure that manpower is correctly allocated, and that any reduction in either the military or civilian workforce reflects the elimination or reduction in the associated mission or function.

Ms. BORDALLO. In the EUCOM plan for the inventory of contracts for services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year's appropriations act, signed by your Director of Manpower, Personnel, and Administration on October 1, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, EUCOM planned to begin modifying statements of work beginning October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with the new requirements since October 1, 2011?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Contract actions initiated by EUCOM Headquarters are processed by several contracting organizations in Europe and the United States. Contracting Officer's Representatives have been coordinating with these contracting agencies and have commenced contract modifications as existing contracts come up for renewal. At least 12 out of 24 services contracts supporting EUCOM Headquarters have been executed with the new requirements. We expect to have all contracts modified by the beginning of fiscal year 2013.

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the "exceptions" to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates' mandated. Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions EUCOM has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Subsequent to the Secretary's August 2010 announcement of a civilian "freeze," EUCOM did request exceptions to the limit. None of those requests were granted.

Specifically, in September 2010, EUCOM requested exceptions for the following 28 positions:

Ballistic Missile Defense—13 positions Interagency engagement—1 positions Strategy for Active Security—2 positions Academic coordination—1 position Critical Infrastructure (counter-terrorism, information technology, cyber)—3 positions Defense Intelligence Agency conversion of 20 Air Force military positions—8 positions

There were no specific justifications for denial of these requests for exceptions.

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across EUCOM, is the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Beginning in August 2010, EUCOM participated in the Secretary of Defense Efficiency Initiatives that resulted in a loss of both manpower and funding to the headquarters. From December 2010 to June 2011, the management headquarters staff conducted EUCOM 2020 Phase III, a project that involved conducting a headquarters-wide functional risk assessment and resulted in reorganizing and rebalancing the staff. The functional risk assessments also resulted in recommendations for functional deletions, which was approved by the Deputy Commander on 9 November 2011.

The U.S. European Command Organization and Functions Manual (ECM 5100.01) has been completely revised from previous versions. The last version to be approved by the EUCOM Chief of Staff was dated 1 October 2009. On 22 June 2011, the Director, ECJ1 signed an interim guidance ECG 5100.01, which captured organizational changes to the Command but did not review or update the associated functions.

The starting point for this version of ECM 5100.01 is the functions developed during the EUCOM 2020 Phase III organizational risk assessments and approved by the EUCOM Deputy Commander on 8 June 2011. Reductions in manpower also forced directorates and special staff sections to reorganize in order to operate more efficiently. The current version reflects functions eliminated during EUCOM 2020 Phase III. Future versions will track further reductions.

It is expected that the EUCOM Organization and Functions Manual will provide a common foundation as the Command continues to periodically update the organization functional risk assessments and potentially absorb additional reductions in manpower or changes to missions and priorities.

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the current AFRICOM workforce construct reflect an appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes and policies.

General HAM. Our headquarters has an adequate, balanced and skilled workforce. We are currently authorized 804 military and 827 civilians. As the command formed, we bridged some personnel gaps with contractors until permanent manpower was assigned, but have since divested many of those contracts.

From Fiscal Year (FY)10 to the end of FY12 we will have reduced a total of 67 contractors for a savings of over \$17 million. Specifically, in FY10 we replaced 50 contractors with permanent military and civilian personnel for a savings of \$13.5 million; in FY11 when contractor to civilian conversions were no longer authorized, we reduced one contractor for a savings of \$275K; in FY12 we will divest another 16 contractors with an expected savings of over \$4 million.

In our Intelligence Directorate, the majority of positions are authorized and managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. In FY12, the Secretary of Defense directed geographic combatant commands to resize their Joint Intelligence Operations Centers. This will result in a FY12 reduction of \$2.8 million in funding for contracts equating to 10 Contract Manpower Equivalents and an additional \$5.2 million in FY13 equating to 19 Contract Manpower Equivalents. Additionally, in complying with the President's guidance, we have consistently vetted contract requirements through a corporate board for validation and funding. The board meets as often as biweekly in a continuous effort to reduce contract support.

Ms. BORDALLO. You indicated in your prepared statement, you indicated that throughout Africa, small teams of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and DOD civilians and contractors, along with teammates from many other U.S. Government agencies, conduct a wide range of engagements in support of U.S. security interests. How many contractors does AFRICOM currently have operating throughout Africa and what work are they performing? Given the mission and operating environment, is this the most appropriate and cost-effective form of labor to meet support U.S. security interests?

General HAM. As of 1 Feb 12, 370 contractors were accompanying U.S. forces in Africa. These contractors provide communication support, transportation, training, base support, general logistics and construction. Some of the considerations in deciding to hire contractors to perform a particular mission on the African continent are a review of factors such as the mission duration, the immediacy of the presence, and the availability of service members or civilians with the required skill set within the Department of Defense (DOD) or other federal agencies. Given limited DOD resources, contractors are often required to fill gaps in capability. A majority of the contracts on the continent are awarded based on full and open competition with a desire to maintain a small footprint. Any sole source requirement is accompanied with required justification. The labor mix (contractor/DOD civilian/military) has been evaluated and determined to be appropriate. The contract costs associated with labor are determined based on best contracting practices. These numbers do not reflect contractors that our components may use to provide basic support services to our deployed personnel at various locations on the African continent.

Ms. BORDALLO. Did AFRICOM seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-effectively performed by civilians?

General HAM. Yes; we requested relief to continue in-sourcing positions. There was a short window of opportunity to identify these positions. Our Operations Directorate had a standing plan to convert 33 positions over two years. We were successful in having these approved for Fiscal Year 12. Further guidance from the Department of Defense absolved the possibility of in-sourcing. Even without in-sourcing, we continue to reduce reliance on the use of contractors.

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has AFRICOM used insourcing to reduce reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate efficiencies?

General HAM. During the initial establishment of the Command, we relied heavily on contractors to fill gaps until permanent personnel arrived. In Fiscal Year (FY)10

we began an in-sourcing plan in our Operations Directorate which targeted contractors in key mission areas, such as our current operations, future operations, information operations, and anti-terrorism divisions. Based on the guidance at the time for in-sourcing, we identified approximately 50 contractor positions to in-source over a two year period. In FY10 we identified 22 positions, with the remainder to follow in FY11 and FY12. We continue to scrutinize contracts vetting each contract requirement through a corporate board for validation and funding. The board meets as frequently as biweekly in a continuous effort to reduce contract support. We have also generated efficiencies by internal realignments while managing acceptable risk to mission accomplishment.

Ms. BORDALLO. Are you comfortable that all contracted services currently supporting AFRICOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor?

General HAM. Yes; however we continue to evaluate ways to implement cost savings whenever possible. Part of any decision to hire contractors to perform a particular mission in Africa is a review of such factors as the duration of the mission; the immediacy of our participation; and the availability of service members or civilians with the required skills within the Department of Defense or other agencies. A large portion of our contract support lies in skills that are not readily available in the government workforce with the required skill currency.

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within AFRICOM to ensure the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?

General HAM. We have a number of internal processes to review labor activities. These processes include a Civilian Hiring Review Board, a Joint Manpower Working Group and a Business Management Working Group which conducts a holistic review of all contracts, contract renewals and workforce related activities.

Ms. BORDALLO. In the AFRICOM plan for the inventory of contracted services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year's appropriations act, signed by your Acting Director of Resources September 29, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, AFRICOM planned to begin modifying statements of work beginning October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with the new requirements since October 1, 2011?

General HAM. AFRICOM does not have contracting authority, therefore we are supported by various contracting offices. Of the 17 contracts anticipated to be reported in the inventory of contracted services, 11 contracts have been modified to include the support for the Contract Management Reporting Application. We anticipate the contracting offices will have the remaining six contracts modified prior to 1 October 2012.

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the "exceptions" to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions AFRICOM has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such.

General HAM. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Global Offices of Security Cooperation (OSC) Review identified a 5 year expansion plan for U.S. Africa Command to meet expanding DSCA and command programs. We requested 17 civilian exemptions for Fiscal Year (FY) 11 and in FY12 we requested an exception for 24 civilian positions in support of this expansion of programs in our OSCs on the continent.

Also, for FY12 we requested an exception for 33 positions identified in our Operations Directorate in-sourcing plan from FY10 to divest the headquarters of contractors in critical mission areas. Additionally for FY12, we were awarded an exception for 13 civilian positions for the Management Headquarters which are critical to the command's engagement missions. We were not provided justification for additions or deletions.

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across AFRICOM, is the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?

General HAM. As we execute efficiencies, the workload is either eliminated, decreased or modified. Specifically, contracted manpower is decreasing due to the temporary nature of assigned tasks. Reorganization resulted in further reductions in administration and overhead and enhanced the efficiency of the command in terms of planning and operations. Our Operations and Functions Manual is currently being rewritten to reflect functional changes and workload.

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY**

Mr. CONAWAY. There is a significant decrease in the number of troops in the EUCOM AOR with two Army BCTs being relocated to CONUS. Is this going to create excess intra-theater airlift capacity in the EUCOM AOR?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, the inactivation of the two Army Heavy Brigades will not create excess intra-theater airlift capacity in the EUCOM AOR. The United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) provides intra-theater airlift capabilities to both the United States European Command (EUCOM) and the United States African Command (AFRICOM). These capabilities support a broad spectrum of EUCOM missions that include routine airlift channel missions, airlift in support of regional contingencies, exercises and training, airlift for EUCOM and AFRICOM components, and activities supporting building partnerships/building partnership capacity (BP/BPC).

The 173rd Airborne Brigade's Joint Airborne/Air Transport Training requirements was considered as one of the many factors in determining the intra-theater airlift capacity requirements for EUCOM; the two heavy Brigades were not included in the study as both were scheduled to return to CONUS during the study period. The 173rd ABCT is one of the two remaining BCTs in Europe.

Mr. CONAWAY. What OPLAN does the C-130J unit at Ramstein support and how many non-training missions does the C-130J unit fly per day?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. CONAWAY. With the reduction in A-10s and F-16s and the Army troop reductions in Europe, in your professional opinion, do we have excess basing capacity in Europe that could be warm-based or closed yet still retain access if the need were to arise?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The recent posture decisions did not include any F-16 reductions. The Army reductions will allow the U.S. to return the communities of Bamberg and Schweinfurt, Germany, in addition to the ongoing actions to return the communities of Mannheim and Heidelberg. EUCOM is assisting the Office of the Secretary of Defense in its 2012 National Defense Authorization Act-directed study of basing capacity. In addition, all of the Services continue to evaluate their stationing capacity seeking efficiencies where possible. Any Departmental decisions to warm-base or close bases that assume the U.S. will enjoy the same degree of access must be informed by a thorough assessment of the relationship with the affected country.

Mr. CONAWAY. Does the Department plan to make a final decision on the permanent location for AFRICOM's headquarters this year and if so, what are the criteria that are going to be used to select the location?

General HAM. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently leading a comprehensive, congressionally mandated, Basing Alternatives Study, which will assess the cost-benefit of moving the headquarters from its current location to the United States. We provided the requisite operational data to support their analysis of the comparative costs, benefits, and risks. Once the Basing Alternatives Study is complete, we will comply with the guidance and decision of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. CONAWAY. Would you please give me an update on the final decision for permanent location of AFRICOM's headquarters?

General HAM. At this time, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is leading a comprehensive, congressionally mandated, Basing Alternatives Study which will assess the cost-benefit with moving the headquarters from its current location to the United States. We provided the requisite operational data to support their analysis of the comparative costs, benefits, and risks. Until a final decision is made, we will continue to accomplish our mission from Stuttgart, where our proximity to Africa, both geographically and in terms of time zones, facilitates our ability to build relationships with our African partners, and allows our service members, civilians and their families to serve from a safe and well-supported location. Once the study is complete, we will comply with the guidance and decision of the Secretary of Defense.

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN**

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral, with the recent announcement that the United States Navy will be home port shifting four *Arleigh Burke* Class DDGs to Naval Station Rota, Spain, in the coming years, how do you see these ships impacting your theater operations? Do you envision these ships strictly supporting missions in EUCOM and AFRICOM. As you are well aware, these are very versatile and capable platforms outside of their BMD mission set. What operational and strategic advantage do these ships provide you as a Combatant Commander?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The four destroyers planned to be forward deployed to Rota, Spain, will provide EUCOM with the ability to maintain a continuous BMD presence in the region, while minimizing the impact of our missions on the overall readiness of the fleet. While these ships will primarily be assigned BMD duties, the multi-mission capabilities of these ships provides EUCOM with the tactical assets capable of responding to any number of emergent threats in the region. I envision these assets will primarily be employed in two ways: first, in steady-state operations providing EUCOM with the ability to carry out its BMD mission as assigned by the Secretary of Defense; second, these ships may be employed in contingency operations supporting national objectives and military operations, such as last year's Operation ODYSSEY DAWN.

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral, EUCOM conducts many exercises with the Israel Defense Forces. The instability in the region coupled with the numerous threats to Israel has increased in the last year. What is EUCOM doing to ensure the defense of Israel and ensure the stability of the region?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. First, while Israel is certainly in a volatile region of the world, I would argue that the threats to Israel have not increased in the last year. If you take the broad view of the history of the modern state of Israel, it is certainly more secure now that it was in 1948, 1967, 1973, or even during the First or Second Intifadas. Israel currently has signed peace treaties with two of its four neighbors. A third neighbor, Syria, is currently undergoing a period of serious internal unrest and is in no position to threaten Israel militarily. The terrorist threat posed by Lebanese Hezbollah from within the fourth neighbor has been deterred from overt attacks since the war in 2006. Moreover, the Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas has renounced violence. Unrest in the West Bank has subsided significantly over the last few years. Similarly, since Operation Cast Lead in 2008, rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip have never been more than sporadic. The most recent attack, from March 9–12, saw nearly 250 rockets launched without causing a single Israeli casualty.

Second, since the Arab Spring, Israel faces a more uncertain neighborhood. This effect, particularly in Egypt, combined with the continued Iranian nuclear program gives the Israeli government reason for concern about the future.

EUCOM's robust bilateral and multilateral military exercise program offers the Israel Defense Forces strong reassurances of the United States' strong commitment to the security of Israel. The following list details the many EUCOM exercises and exercise planning conferences scheduled for 2012 in support of this commitment:

March Organization JCET Execution SOCEUR NOBLE DINA 12 Execution NAVEUR NOBLE MELINDA 12 Initial Planning Conference NAVEUR RELIANT MERMAID 12 Initial Planning Conference NAVEUR

April NOBLE SHIRLEY 12–1 Initial Planning Conference MARFOREUR Senior Leader Meeting EUCOM

May CBRNE Enhanced Response Force—Package National Guard NOBLE SHIRLEY 12–1 Main/Final Planning Conference MARFOREUR NOBLE MELINDA 12 Main/Final Planning Conference NAVEUR

June RELIANT MERMAID 12 Main/Final Planning Conference NAVEUR

July NOBLE SHIRLEY 12–1 Execution MARFOREUR

August NOBLE MELINDA 12 Execution NAVEUR RELIANT MERMAID 12 Execution NAVEUR NOBLE SHIRLEY 13–1 Initial Planning Conference MARFOREUR September None

October NOBLE SHIRLEY 13–1 Main Planning Conference MARFOREUR AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 Phase III FTX EUCOM AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 Phase III CPX EUCOM AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 Phase III WFX EUCOM

November AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 Phase IV CAX EUCOM AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 Phase V Tech Demo EUCOM AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 Phase V LFX EUCOM

Exercise Description:

NOBLE SHIRLEY: A biannual Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) combined arms exercise, designed to enhance selective small arms shooting and small unit

movement tactics, training, and procedures (TTP) for employment in a counter-terrorism environment.

**NOBLE DINA:** An annual Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) trilateral combined exercise scheduled with the maritime forces of the United States, Israel, and Greece and focused on Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) operations.

**NOBLE MELINDA:** An annual NAVEUR bilateral exercise scheduled with the maritime forces of the United States and Israel, focused on Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), mine warfare, and salvage skills. The exercise often includes both land-based EOD teams and divers.

**RELIANT MERMAID:** An annual NAVEUR trilateral combined exercise scheduled with the maritime forces of the United States, Israel, and Turkey and focused on maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations.

**JCET:** An annual SOCEUR Joint Combined Exchange Training encompassing Air, Ground and Maritime Special Operations Forces (SOF) engagement with IDF counterparts.

**CERF-P:** A bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive (CBRNE) exercise coordinated by the National Guard Bureau involving units from the Indiana National Guard.

**AUSTERE CHALLENGE:** A bilateral joint Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) exercise that encompasses exercises JUNIPER COBRA 12 and JUNIPER FALCON 13.

**Mr. WITTMAN.** General, East Africa remains a key operating and training area for Al Qaeda associates, and specifically, the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab. How concerned is the Department about al-Shabaab's ability to attract and train foreign fighters—including recruits from the United States—who may project violence outward from East Africa and what exactly is the Department doing to counter this threat? Do you have a sufficient amount of Department resources—including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and SOF assets—working to mitigate the spread of Al Qaeda's influence in the AFRICOM AOR?

**General HAM.** [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

**Mr. WITTMAN.** General Ham, the new strategy calls for us to build innovative partnerships in order to maintain our global force posture. In attempting to build these partnerships, how are AFRICOM and U.S. military efforts in Africa perceived by Africans and by other foreign countries, including China? Do you feel that we are winning or losing when compared to China in attempting to build relationships, trust and influence throughout Africa?

**General HAM.** We do not view China as a military adversary in Africa. I believe our African partners value a diverse set of relationships when it comes to meeting their security needs. Both the United States and China have the ability provide this support. I believe we should look for opportunities to partner with China in areas where our interests are similar.

The operations, exercises and security cooperation engagements of the U.S. military are, in large measure, warmly received across the continent. We have developed and continue to maintain strong relationships with many key African partners as we address shared threats. We also look to establish partnerships with the new governments and militaries in such countries as Libya, Tunisia, and South Sudan. I have discussed with the National Guard Bureau the expansion of the State Partnership Program by two additional state partners this year. The long term relationships developed through this program would be beneficial to the development of the militaries in these nations.

We also look to maintain strong relationship with non-African nations, non-governmental organizations and international organizations. We have strong relationships with the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Canada, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Union in order to partner to accomplish common goals in Africa. We are developing a relationship with the International Red Cross. In the future, I expect such combined efforts to increase.

**Mr. WITTMAN.** General Ham, according to the International Maritime Bureau, 56% of global piracy attacks conducted from January to October 2011 were orchestrated from the coasts of Somalia, and as of January 31, 2012, Somali pirates held 10 vessels and 159 hostages. Do you feel that this global piracy problem, resonating out of Somalia, which is continuing to cost the United States, its allies, and international commerce millions of dollars and numerous resources to combat; is improving, deteriorating, or remaining unchanged? Additionally, since this problem will not

be eliminated or even significantly reduced until the conditions in Somalia improve, is there any potential for positive changes inside Somalia in the near future?

General HAM. The international response to the Somali piracy problem is achieving some success. Over the last year, pirate success rates originating from Somalia dropped by nearly 50 percent. This drop was, in large part, achieved by the increased use of industry accepted best practices such as embarked armed security teams which have proven 100% effective in defending vessels against pirate attacks. Additionally, coalition and international forces may be contributing to the lower number of successful pirate attacks due to increased interdictions. Nevertheless, the total number of attempted attacks has remained essentially unchanged, suggesting that the pirates are continuing at the same operational tempo. Furthermore, due to the continuing trend of higher ransom payments, piracy generated revenue has remained steady. As long as the benefits outweigh the risks, Somali pirates will continue to conduct operations in this lucrative business. Ultimately, counter-piracy operations at sea must be complemented by the strengthening of law enforcement and judicial systems ashore.

I believe there is potential for positive change inside Somalia. The tactical and operational successes of the African Union Mission in Somalia, Kenyan, Ethiopian, and Somali forces against al-Shabaab over the last 12 months have greatly reduced the organization's control over south-central Somalia. Improvement of governance in Somalia, to include security sector reform, is key to establishing conditions that are not conducive to piracy. The recent London Conference on Somalia highlighted the international community's support for change in Somalia. During the conference Secretary Clinton announced the United States will work with Somali authorities and communities to create jobs, provide health and education services, build capacity, and support peace building and conflict resolution. The combination of a weakened al-Shabaab and international support for development within Somalia makes this the best opportunity we have seen for positive change in Somalia.

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#### QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON

Mr. JOHNSON. As you know, undercover journalists with Al Jazeera English recently documented high-level corruption in the office of Sierra Leone's Vice President, Samuel Sam-Sumana.

Footage presented in the Al Jazeera English documentary ("Africa Investigates—Sierra Leone: Timber!") appears to show that Vice President Sumana's aides solicited and accepted bribes on his behalf in exchange for illegal logging permits. The evidence was so damning that 19 Members of Congress have requested that the U.S. government push the Government of Sierra Leone to hold the perpetrators responsible.

General, you have agreed to convey to your partners in the Government of Sierra Leone and The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) how deeply concerned Members of the U.S. Congress remain concerning this matter. Will you please update us on your conversations to this effect?

General HAM. I have not yet had the opportunity to visit Sierra Leone to discuss the importance of good governance and fighting corruption, which is a conversation I believe, is best achieved in person. I will certainly provide an update after my visit. I believe it is worth noting that Sierra Leone has agreed to contribute troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia, the first nation to do so outside the East Africa region. I feel this is a positive step in the continued development of good governance.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING

Mr. SCHILLING. Admiral, you've emphasized that the U.S. relationship with Poland is crucial to long term stability in the region. Can you please explain further what you mean by that? Why do you think Poland is important?

How has our relationship changed with them and how will our future relationship be altered by the changes to the missile defenses plans in the region?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Poland and the United States are natural partners in promoting democracy and good governance. Poland takes seriously its commitment to NATO, spending more on defense (in relation to GDP) than any other country in its region, including Germany. And Poland has one of healthiest economies in the EU. Poland has consistently been a staunch supporter of US policy, contributing troops to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and currently ranking 5th out of 49 partner nations in total force contributions to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Poland has significantly invested in its Air Force through the pur-

chase of 48 F-16 aircraft and continues to improve its military police and special operations capabilities. Lastly, Poland's unique geopolitical position makes it, in both time and space, a key ally that can and does safeguard US and NATO Alliance interests in Europe.

The Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement with Poland was initially changed in 2010 when a US policy shift made the intended ground based interceptors untenable. Poland did not receive this change well but remains a steadfast, willing partner in our national and NATO Alliance pursuit of ballistic missile defense. Therefore, it is in our interest to follow through on the commitment we have made to deploying ballistic missile defense assets in Poland.

Mr. SCHILLING. Admiral, we focus a great deal on anti-terrorism efforts in the Middle East and in regards to the protection of the homeland. However, what challenges do you face with terrorist activities in the European theater and how are you dealing with them?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SCHILLING. Admiral, it is my understanding that when our soldiers are hurt in the conflicts in the Middle East they are first sent to EUCOM to be treated.

How will the change in force structure in the European theater affect how we can take care of our wounded from overseas conflicts?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The current projected change in force structure in the European theater is not expected to alter the staffing at the Medical Treatment Facilities in EUCOM and, therefore, will not affect EUCOM's ability to care for wounded service members during contingency operations.

Mr. SCHILLING. You have had to address the threats that are posed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Africa, but also new emerging terrorist groups. Will you be able to keep the same amount of vigilance under the new budget and force structure?

General HAM. I do not anticipate any reduced vigilance under the proposed budget and force structure. We will continue to work with the Department of Defense to obtain additional ISR assets.

Mr. SCHILLING. You have stated that a lack of ISR capabilities have been challenging for AFRICOM. Will the changes to the Air Force's U2 and Global Hawk programs make this issue more pronounced?

General HAM. The U-2 multiple collection capability as well as anticipated future upgrades could expand our collection effectiveness on the continent. Though the RG-4 Block 30's single collection capability make it a less valuable mission platform when requirements necessitate the need for multiple sensors during a single mission.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. The E-8C JSTARS is a high-demand, low-density platform. What are some of the missions they could perform if they were assigned to EUCOM on a regular basis?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. EUCOM would utilize E-8C JSTARS for monitoring and tracking vehicular traffic in several different operational areas across the EUCOM area of responsibility. First, we would establish a Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) baseline with which to compare future collection trends in support of indications and warning during Phase 0 and Phase 1 operations and continued collection upon Concept Plan (CONPLAN) execution. Specifically, GMTI can be employed to locate and track movements of military or non-state actors, either singly or in groups. In peacetime, this capability can be used to established patterns-of-life, as well as assist efforts to counter smuggling and illicit arms shipments to rouge states and terrorist organizations.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within your respective AORs in building partnerships?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) plays a very limited role within the USEUCOM area of responsibility as there were no operational Coast Guard ships or aircraft stationed in, or deployed to, Europe in 2011-2012. The tall ship USCGC EAGLE (WIX 327) visited her port of construction (Hamburg, Germany) and several other European ports in the summer of 2011 as part of her normal training and goodwill missions. The USCG has not deployed a cutter to participate in European naval exercises in four years due to other operational commitments.

Due to the capable and professional nature of many European navies and coast guards who work closely with their lesser developed neighbors, the USCG experiences limited demand signals for development and partnership building in Europe. What demand signal there is can only be met by the USCG under limited cir-



cumstances due to the agency's wide mission set and severely taxed resources. The USCG holds six priority countries within Europe: Greece, Malta, France, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation. The first two countries are priorities for their preeminence in maritime shipping; the next three countries are priorities due to their Caribbean territories and counter-narcotics cooperation; and Russia is a priority based upon the need to manage a shared maritime boundary in the Bering Sea. The USCG's partnerships with these countries are focused upon unique missions and do not necessarily meet the traditional definition of building partner capacity.

The one USCG unit permanently stationed in EUCOM's theater is Activities Europe, a 28-man marine safety and inspection organization located in Rotterdam, The Netherlands. This unit does not report to, or directly interact with EUCOM. This unit conducts inspections of U.S.-flagged vessels and some foreign-flagged ships headed to the United States. Since September 11, 2001, the majority of the mission involves administration of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. Under this reciprocal inspection regime, Activities Europe personnel provide guidance to foreign port and vessel owners to assist in the improvement of facility security, employee training, and incident response.

As part of its limited international engagement authority, the USCG hosts students from dozens of countries in its U.S. schoolhouses every year. These students are nominated, vetted, selected, and managed by U.S. Embassy Offices of Defense Cooperation. The students' attendance is funded either via International Military Education and Training (IMET) monies allocated to their nations by the U.S. Department of State, or in large number by the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program. Nations may also self-fund their students. Between 30 and 70 European students attend USCG resident training each year.

USCG Mobile Training Teams (MTT) travel the world to provide initial, refresher, and advanced training in a wide variety of subjects. They are common sights in Central/South America and Africa. They are rare in Europe, but have visited Azerbaijan, Georgia, Greece, and Malta in recent years. These teams are funded by IMET, EXBS, or national funds.

At a higher organizational level, the USCG participates in many international forums, including the Arctic Council, the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, the U.N.'s International Maritime Organization, and the E.U.'s border control agency FRONTEX. This cooperation extends mostly into the policy and strategy domains with very little operational action, with the exception of the transfer of unclassified information regarding illicit trafficking. The USCG was the lead negotiator for the landmark international search and rescue agreement signed by the Arctic Council nations in May 2011.

The USCG provides a maritime advisor in Georgia under the Department of State's EXBS program. This effort includes a very robust program of MTTs, U.S. resident training, two to three month subject matter expert deployments, and numerous infrastructure projects. Infrastructure projects include dry-dock overhaul of patrol boats, construction and outfitting of a maintenance facility, installation of an English language lab, and creation of a large maritime domain awareness coastal surveillance system. This multimillion dollar project includes integrating data from six radar stations via microwave/Ethernet data network; installation of NATO-standard, encryption capable, multi-bandwidth communications; and integration of HF/VHF radio automatic direction finders.

A USCG officer teaches at the World Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden. A USCG exchange helicopter pilot flies search and rescue with the United Kingdom's Royal Navy. The only USCG Attaché outside of the western hemisphere resides on the country team of the U.S. Embassy in Malta. Two USCG liaison officers are assigned to U.S. Naval Forces Europe where they manage maritime strategy and military-to-military engagements with many partner nations.

Finally, the USCG has two personnel permanently stationed on the EUCOM staff. One is the Deputy Director of the Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center where he guides the organization's interactions with the law enforcement agencies of partner nations. The other is the USCG liaison and maritime strategist within the Policy, Strategy, Partnering, and Capabilities (ECJ5/8) Directorate who plays a role in shaping EUCOM's Arctic strategy. Both personnel facilitate interaction with USCG organizations while simultaneously executing EUCOM missions and tasking.

Mr. SCOTT. What were the contributions of the U.S. Coast Guard to EUCOM in 2011?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The tall ship USCGC EAGLE (WIX 327) visited her port of construction (Hamburg, Germany) and several other European ports in the summer of 2011 as part of her normal training and goodwill missions. The USCG has not

deployed a cutter to participate in European naval exercises in four years due to other operational commitments.

The USCG holds six priority countries within Europe: Greece, Malta, France, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation. The USCG cooperates closely with the maritime shipping regulators of Greece and Malta due to their pre-eminence in maritime commerce as vessel flag states and cargo transshipment points. The USCG maintains very close operational relationships with France, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom due to their Caribbean territories and counter-narcotics cooperation in that region. The USCG holds a unique position within the U.S. government as a trusted partner with Russia based upon the need to manage a shared maritime boundary in the Bering Sea. The USCG's partnerships with these countries are focused upon unique missions/initiatives and are not managed by EUCOM.

The one USCG unit permanently stationed in EUCOM's theater is Activities Europe, a 28-man marine safety and inspection organization located in Rotterdam, The Netherlands. This unit does not report to, or directly interact with, EUCOM. The vessel and port facility inspection mission of this unit has indirect effects upon USEUCOM partner nations through reciprocal inspection regimes, goodwill, and professionalization.

As part of its limited international engagement authority, the USCG hosts students from dozens of countries in its U.S. schoolhouses every year. These students are nominated, vetted, selected, and managed by U.S. Embassy Offices of Defense Cooperation. The students' attendance is funded via International Military Education and Training (IMET) monies allocated to their nations by the U.S. Department of State or in large number by the Export Control and Related Border Security program. Nations may also self-fund their students. In 2011, the USCG hosted 52 resident students from 16 European countries. Courses included law enforcement boarding officer, search and rescue, pollution response, International Maritime Officer Course, and apprentice level engineering.

At a higher organizational level, the USCG participates in many international forums, including the Arctic Council, the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, the U.N.'s International Maritime Organization, and the E.U.'s border control agency FRONTEX. This cooperation extends mostly into the policy and strategy domains with very little operational action with the exception of the transfer of unclassified information regarding illicit trafficking. The USCG was the lead negotiator for the landmark international search and rescue agreement signed by the Arctic Council nations in May 2011.

The USCG provides a maritime advisor in Georgia under the Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security program. This advisor assists in the identification, acquisition, installation, training, and employment of maritime border surveillance and associated law enforcement tactics, procedures, and policies.

A USCG officer teaches at the World Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden. A USCG exchange helicopter pilot flies search and rescue with the United Kingdom's Royal Navy. The only USCG Attaché outside of the western hemisphere resides on the country team of the U.S. Embassy in Malta. Two USCG liaison officers are assigned to U.S. Naval Forces Europe where they manage maritime strategy and military-to-military engagements with many partner nations.

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Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of military bands within EUCOM and are they a cost-effective way of bringing people together and fostering greater understanding?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Three Service component command headquarters maintain bands within the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Theater: U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR); U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CNE); and U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). These bands are key elements in the command's outreach program, and their work is directly tied to two of EUCOM's expressed strategic priorities: 1) Building partnerships to enhance security, regional stability and support global initiatives; and 2) Countering transnational threats, which these bands do by endearing foreign publics to the United States.

Many of the bands' events are at no additional cost to the government. The CNE Band was invited to participate in the most prestigious military band event (called a "tattoo") in the world in August 2012—the Edinburgh Military Tattoo. The travel

and TDY expenses for this month-long engagement are covered by the event sponsor, and broadcast coverage is expected to reach 300 million people throughout the world, including China for the first time this year.

The engagements that do have costs attached to them typically have significant returns on investment. For example, the USAFE Band spent approximately \$140,000 to send a 42-person concert band to Russia last year. Through seven performances in six days in Ural and Western Siberia, the band played for a live audience of 5,800, and reached over 130 million people through positive media coverage. Based on post-event discussions and audience feedback, these Russians began to see Americans as “very sociable, warm people who engage easily with others—not at all like the Americans portrayed in movies.”

From an interagency perspective, the bands also help U.S. embassies reach out to people who would otherwise be inaccessible. In September 2011, the CNE Band played in an Azerbaijan internally displaced persons community where people do not have access to open information and lack understanding of the U.S. and its partnership with Azerbaijan. According to Chris Jones, cultural affairs officer for the U.S. Embassy Baku, “The Navy Band was one of the most effective tools I have seen for building relationships with both government elites and the population as a whole. They ‘made’ every event in Azerbaijan—providing that extra something that got us more media coverage, more public support, and more buy-in from high ranking officials.”

Military bands hold a rich tradition, but, more importantly, this “soft power” tool of the Department of Defense continually contributes to global and regional security and stability, enhances diplomacy and partnership, and builds vital goodwill.

Mr. SCOTT. The hospital ships *Comfort* and *Mercy* are high-demand, low-density platforms. If the United States had a larger fleet of hospital ships, what roles and missions could they perform within EUCOM’s AOR?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The current design and configuration of the COMFORT and MERCY makes it difficult to employ these vessels in the EUCOM Theater due to displacement and port access. Potential missions would include training and collaboration with partner nations in NATO and European Union that desire increased medical cooperation. The Hospital Ships would also support EUCOM Concept Plans (CONPLANS) within the Levant Region, as well as support to ongoing NATO humanitarian missions in Northern Africa.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the status of NATO’s ongoing engagement with Mongolia? What do they need to do in order to become formal NATO partner in “Partners Across the Globe.”

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The first Mongolia-NATO Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) received the approval of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 19 March 2012. I expect the announcement shortly acknowledging Mongolia as a formal partner to NATO in the Partners Across the Globe framework.

Mr. SCOTT. Are U.S. flag and general officers banned from visiting any countries within your respective AORs? If so, which countries?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. In accordance with the September 2011 U.S. Department of State Cable signed by Secretary Clinton, no engagements between U.S. flag and general officers are to be conducted with Belarus. Therefore, senior official travel is essentially banned there.

Mr. SCOTT. How would you rate the performance of E-8C JSTARS aircraft within AFRICOM?

General HAM. During OPERATION ODYSSEY DAWN (MAR 2011), we employed JSTARS with good effect, but AFRICOM has not used JSTARS since that time.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within your respective AORs in building partnerships?

General HAM. The Coast Guard plays a critical role in building maritime security capacity by providing ships in support of the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership Program. By partnering with African nations’ maritime forces during real-world operations, the Coast Guard assists our African partners enforce their maritime laws and also provides training in search and rescue, small boat operations and maintenance, and maritime law enforcement. The Coast Guard is also valuable in developing maritime bilateral agreements to enhance both U.S. and partner nation security by establishing the framework for operational maritime law enforcement cooperation.

The Coast Guard’s congressionally mandated International Port Security (IPS) Program complements our mission and expands the number of countries that conduct engagement with the command by maintaining bilateral relationships with 31 African nations to assess their implementation of effective maritime anti-terrorism measures.

Mr. SCOTT. What were the contributions of the U.S. Coast Guard to AFRICOM in 2011?

General HAM. In 2011, the Coast Guard deployed the Coast Guard Cutter FORWARD in support of the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership Program and conducted real-world operations and training with six African partner nations. Coast Guard training teams also completed 29 training missions with partner nations and hosted 20 African students in resident training at U.S. Coast Guard training centers. International Port Security Liaison Officers of the Coast Guard's International Port Security program conducted maritime security anti-terrorism visits to ports in 31 coastal African states.

In May 2011, the Coast Guard decommissioned and transferred a Cutter to Nigeria as an Excess Defense Article. The newly renamed NNS THUNDER is now being used in the Gulf of Guinea to counter threats such as piracy, illegal oil bunkering, and to ensure the security of offshore oil infrastructure.

Additionally, Coast Guard expertise in maritime law was key to the success of our initiative to foster regional cooperation among the nations and regional economic communities in West and Central Africa, an important aspect of effectively combating piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of military bands within AFRICOM and are they a cost-effective way of bringing people together and fostering greater understanding?

General HAM. There are no bands assigned to U.S. Africa Command. However, in the past year the U.S. Air Forces Europe band and the U.S. Naval Forces Europe band performed in eight African countries. Military bands provide a cost-effective and unique public diplomacy opportunity for our country teams in Africa. They bridge cultural gaps and reach elements of the general population vital to U.S. relationships abroad by providing the best image of our men and women in uniform and Americans at large. The good will demonstrated by military bands highlights the professional nature of our armed forces and builds civilian trust in the U.S. and partner nation forces.

Mr. SCOTT. The hospital ships *Comfort* and *Mercy* are high-demand, low-density platforms. If the United States had a larger fleet of hospital ships, what roles and missions could they perform within AFRICOM's AOR?

General HAM. Hospital ships have tremendous trauma care capability for combat operations and can contribute to humanitarian assistance missions. However, hospital ships are not designed for capacity building due to their configuration for acute care and surgery. Additionally, the draft of large hospital ships limits access to many African ports. Many African nations have medical delivery systems that struggle to meet the most basic needs of the populace. The use of a hospital ship under these circumstances has to be coordinated carefully so as not to overwhelm developing medical systems. For these reasons we find the use of multi-mission ships that have the capability to operate in these constrained ports to be of greater overall benefit.

Mr. SCOTT. Are U.S. flag and general officers banned from visiting any countries within your respective AORs? If so, which countries?

General HAM. There are no countries within our area of responsibility that U.S. flag and general officers are banned from visiting for official business. However, there are policy and force protection restrictions that limit Department of Defense personnel from traveling in certain areas on the African continent. For example, Somalia has current policy restrictions that limit all Department of Defense visits and require special approval for travel. Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Eritrea are under sanctions and require close coordination with Department of State before flag officer travel. But, none of these restrictions specifically ban U.S. flag and general officers from visiting these countries.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY

Mrs. ROBY. Admiral, how will the Administration's newly released defense strategy change the way you do business at EUCOM?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The Administration's recently released defense strategy, entitled "Sustaining Global Leadership—Priorities for 21st Century Defense" reads: "In keeping with [the] evolving strategic landscape, our posture in Europe must also evolve." As this occurs, the United States will maintain our Article 5 commitments to allied security and promote enhanced capacity and interoperability for coalition operations. You will see changes as we work with NATO allies to develop a "Smart Defense" approach that pools, shares, and specializes capabilities as needed. There is continuity in how we approach the challenges we face: we practice active security and forward defense focused on preserving our strategic partnerships in Europe;

building interoperability with the NATO Alliance; deterring would-be adversaries; sustaining progress and transition in Afghanistan; and, when directed, conducting decisive military and counterterrorism operations to fight and win. The change will come in an even greater emphasis on sustaining our partners' abilities to work with us to accomplish these missions. Additionally, we will be making changes to respond to new challenges emerging in missile defense and cyberspace.

Mrs. ROBY. Admiral, you've often discussed that the most effective approach to the national security challenges of the 21st century is through "Whole of Government" solutions. Can you describe for us what you've learned from this approach, and if you still believe this is the best path forward?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, I remain convinced that a "Whole of Government" approach is still the best path forward. Indeed my personal experience at EUCOM over the past three years continues to reinforce my belief that this approach is both effective and expands the solution sets that we use to address issues across our theater. In my testimony, I cited the numerous interagency partners that we are privileged to host within our Command's J9-Interagency Partnering Directorate. We host representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Agency for International Development, Department of Energy, Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration and Customs and Border Protection. These representatives help us tremendously, both in educating my staff and in influencing our planning and exercises at the regional/operational level. Their presence in Stuttgart complements the effective interagency "whole of government" effort down to the "tactical/country" level at U.S. Embassy Country Teams across the 51 countries included in the EUCOM Theater.

What is even more encouraging is that these interagency representatives are not at EUCOM simply to represent the interests of their parent agencies or departments; rather, they are valuable members of the EUCOM team, all working to achieve common objectives in the pursuit of our Command's mission and our nation's interests. The character and competency of our interagency partners earns them the credibility needed to function well in a predominantly military culture. Every day this team and their many contributions personify the motto at our Command: we are truly "Stronger Together!"

Beyond work with other federal partners, EUCOM is also reaching out to collaborate with academia and the private sector in order to tap non-traditional military solutions to the challenges we face. This is more than a "whole of government" approach; it is actually a "whole of society" collaborative effort. A good example of this approach was EUCOM's outreach to the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) in May 2011. With the concurrence of the U.S. Country Team in Riga and the government of Latvia, I asked BENS to assess cyber vulnerabilities in Latvia's government networks, financial systems, and technology networks. BENS organized a "cyber dream team," whose experts generated a list of proactive steps that could be taken to strengthen Latvia's cyber security. This trip to Latvia was among the very best examples of useful and practical, public-private collaboration that I have ever seen. It is another testimony to the value of a "whole of government/society" approach in addressing the security challenges of the 21st century.

Mrs. ROBY. From you position as EUCOM Commander with responsibility for the defense of Israel, what is your assessment of Israel concerns about Iranian nuclear weapons development and what are the capability gaps or areas of concern in defending Israel from missile or rocket attacks?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mrs. ROBY. What are the costs associated with AFRICOM and how are these costs affected by AFRICOM's chosen headquarters location?

General HAM. Our Fiscal Year (FY)13 headquarters operating budget request is \$285M. There has not been a decision on the permanent location of the command's headquarters. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently leading a comprehensive, congressionally mandated, Basing Alternatives Study which will assess the cost-benefit with moving the headquarters from its current location to the United States. We have provided the requisite operational data to support their analysis of the comparative costs, benefits, and risks. Until a final decision is made, we will continue to accomplish our mission from Stuttgart, where our proximity to Africa, both geographically and in terms of time zones, facilitates our ability to build relationships with our African partners, and provided a location where our service members, civilians and their families are safe and well-supported. Once the study is complete, we will comply with the guidance and decision of the Secretary of Defense.

Mrs. ROBY. If U.S. Africa Command was to move back to the United States, how would it be placed—one location or over a geographical region?

General HAM. The decision on where to place the command headquarters will be made by the Office of the Secretary of Defense which is currently leading a comprehensive, congressionally mandated, Basing Alternatives Study to assess the cost-benefit of moving the headquarters from its current location to the United States. We have provided the requisite operational data to support their analysis of the comparative costs, benefits, and risks.

