OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

2 May 2008

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Christopher S. Bond
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman and Vice Chairman Bond:

(U) The enclosures to this letter respond to questions from Members during the Committee's 5 February 2008 hearing on the Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States.

(U) If you have any questions on this matter, please contact me on (202) 201-1698.

Sincerely,

Kathleen Turner
Director of Legislative Affairs

Question 1: (U) a) To what extent has the government of President Preval been able to tackle ongoing problems with government corruption? Is the Haitian National Police (HNP) force taking adequate steps, with the support of U.N. forces, to address drug trafficking and armed criminal gangs? How is the training of the HNP progressing? b) In recent months, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) role has shifted toward helping Haitian authorities combat the trafficking of arms, drugs, and people. What steps are MINUSTAH and the Preval government taking to improve the security of Haiti's border with the Dominican Republic and to increase patrols of the country's maritime borders? What are the prospects of economic refugees from Haiti arriving on U.S. shores?

Question 2: (U) During President Bush's recent visit to Israel, the case of Jonathan Pollard—an American citizen who pleaded guilty in 1986 to conspiracy to deliver national defense information to Israel—was reportedly on the unofficial agenda. During the 1998 Wye River Summit, then Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet threatened to resign if Mr. Pollard's life sentence was commuted. Are you opposed to the release of Mr. Pollard? How would the release of Mr. Pollard affect the Intelligence Community and our national security interests?

Answer: (U) We are unequivocally opposed to leniency for Mr. Pollard. This is the unanimous view of the counterintelligence community. Our reasons are still best stated in the January 30, 1996 letter from then-FBI Director Louis Freeh to then-Attorney General Reno and the strong stance taken in 1998 by then-Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet. Additional classified information, previously submitted to the SSCI during the years of this matter, remains valid as to the grave national damage caused by this individual. Clemency for Pollard will undermine U.S. security practices and complicate U.S. counterintelligence programs.

Question 3: (U) a) The Administration has stated that the surge in Iraq is producing the desired results. Defense Secretary Gates recently stated that if progress continues in Iraq, he will authorize the redeployment of five military combat brigades. What is the current Intelligence Community (IC) assessment regarding neighboring countries' activities with respect to current conditions in Iraq? How does the IC assess potential actions that neighboring countries may taken should the U.S. initiate drawdown activities in the near future?

Question 3: (U) b) To what extent are you concerned that armed Sunni Arab Iraqis now associated with the Anbar Awakening movement and Concerned Local Citizens committees could pose a threat to the Iraqi government or U.S. forces? What role are Shiite militia groups such as the Jaysh Al Mandi likely to play in Iraq's security over the coming year?

Answer: (U) We continue to monitor the effectiveness and durability of tribal and former insurgent local citizens groups—commonly referred to as Sons of Iraq (SOIs)—and their interaction with the Iraqi government. We judge that over the next 6 months these security initiatives probably will remain a viable mechanism for countering extremist threats, providing economic opportunities, and allowing for constructive Sunni participation in a unified Iraq over the next 6 months and beyond as long as the Coalition or the Iraqi Government funds SOI contracts or provides job opportunities.

(U) We judge that if the Iraqi Government is unwilling or unable to meet Sunni expectations for economic opportunities and integration into government positions, the risk that SOIs will suspend support for local security initiatives and resume violence against Coalition forces and the Iraqi Government will increase.

(U) We judge Shia militia groups will continue to have a destabilizing affect on Iraq's security environment over the next year. The public rhetoric of Muqtada al-Sadr, the head of the Jaysh al-Mandi (JAM) militia, has become increasingly vocal about his long-held anti-Coalition and anti-Iraqi government stance over the last month and his militia has become increasingly active against Coalition forces in Baghdad and southern Iraq and is likely to remain so while being targeted by the— Iraqi government.

a.(U) Increasing competition between the Sadrists and other Shia organizations such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and its militia wing, Badr Organization, for political power and economic resources has the potential to further erode security in southern Iraq. Many Sadrists probably view the recent targeting of senior Sadrist officials in Najaf and Basrah as an attempt by ISCl/Badr to undermine the Sadrist movement in the run-up to provincial elections.

b.(U) Shia organizations such as Jund al-Sama, the Shia messianic cult responsible for violence in early 2006 and 2007, retains a capability to conduct high-profile violence in the Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala as well as in provin-

cial capitals in southern Iraq. Jund al-Sawa historically conducts their violence around major Shia religious holidays such as Ashura and Arbaeen.

Question 3: (U) c) Please describe the current state of Iranian intervention in Iraq in terms of the supply of weaponry, financing, or training to Iraqi groups. What level of threat do weapons and supplies of Iranian origin pose to U.S. and Coalition personnel?

Answer: (U) Iran, primarily through the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGCQF), continues to provide weapons, funding, training, and logistical support to certain Iraqi Shia militants. We have recovered weapons in Iraq that were clearly manufactured by Iran, and some with relatively recent factory markings. Tehran uses the provision of lethal aid to build ties to an array of influential actors, protect the Shia in the event of civil war, prepare for future contingencies such as, military action against Tehran, as well as ensure the US suffers setbacks in Iraq.

(U) We assess Iran continues to provide Iraqi Shia militants explosive devices or components, including explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), rockets, mortars, C–4, small arms and munitions. Attacks from EFPs—the vast majority of the components of which we assess come from Iran—are of particular concern because of the number of casualties they inflict on Coalition forces. We assess Iran also has supplied Shia militants with 107mm and 204mm rockets that have been used to attack Coalition Forces and Iraqi Government targets. We judge Iranian-supplied rockets were used by Jaysh al-Mandi militants to attack the International Zone and other Coalition facilities and bases during the recent fighting in Baghdad, Al Basrah, and several southern cities.

Question 3: (U) d) Do you agree with the recent comments by the Iraqi Defense Minister that it will take until 2018 to defend Iraq's borders? Do you believe the current level of violence in Iraq will hold, get better, or get worse? Are the factors behind the drop in violence sustainable?

Answer: (U) We are unable to confidently judge when Iraq will be fully capable of defending its borders. We judge the amount of time that is required before Iraq is able to defend its borders will depend on several factors, including how rapidly the ISF is able to address critical shortfalls in combat service support and combat enablers such as fire support and intelligence; the amount of time required for the ISF to acquire, integrate, and become proficient in modern combat equipment; the capacity of Iraq's security ministries to absorb and train additional forces; and the level and type of Coalition support provided to the ISF in the coming years.

(U) We assess with moderate confidence that overall security gains in Iraq will be maintained during the next 6 months because most of the factors underpinning security trends are likely to remain viable. Coalition and ISF population security operations will continue to inflict losses and constraints on AQI; the security contributions of the Sons of Iraq, assisted by the Coalition and grudgingly supported by the GOI, will continue to weaken the Sunni insurgency while bolstering the fight against AQI; and Iraqi Security Forces—supported by Coalition training, logistics and combat support elements—will continue to improve their operational capabilities.

(U) Nevertheless, AQI is still capable of conducting spectacular attacks despite disruptions of its networks. Stability remains fragile in southern Iraq as Shia groups continue to compete for political power and economic resources and the Iraqi Government forcibly confronts the JAM. Security in northern Iraq also remains tenuous as Sunni resistance elements and AQI increasingly focus their activities in the area.

Question 3: (U) e) Does the Intelligence Community assess al-Sadr and his militias will continue their cease-fire indefinitely? Do they retain the capacity to return to violence? Will the recently approved de-Bathification law promote reconciliation or discord between Shiite and Sunni factions? How big a role will Ahmed Chalabi play in the law's implementation?

Answer: (U) Prime Minister Maliki's recent endorsement of operations against the Jaysh al-Mandi (JAM) militia and public warning that the Sadrists cannot participate in the political process unless the militia disbands could diminish the Sadrists' stake in the provincial elections and decrease Muqtada al-Sadr's incentives to use political, rather than violent, means to gain influence.

(U) Sadr on 7 April 2008 publicly announced he would disband the JAM only if top Shia clerics in An Najaf or Qom, Iran, ordered him to do so. Sadr also has warned that he would lift the freeze on attacks by his group if government military actions against the group become too far-reaching.

(U) The JAM also may resume attacks to relieve supporters' frustration about Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) operations and to press the Iraqi Government to address Sadrist demands, including an end to indiscriminate raids and a release of JAM prisoners. Although the efforts of the Iraqi government to limit the scope of their operations have so far prevented major JAM violence, recent ISF and Coalition operations in Sadr City and ongoing clashes in Al Basrah could trigger widespread fighting.

(U) Muqtada al-Sadr on 3 April 2008 called for an end to ISF operations against JAM members and the Sadrist movement is reacting to stepped-up government pressure by keeping its JAM militia at high readiness to resume violence quickly if directed.

(U) Recent passage of de-Bathification reform by the Council of Representatives (COR), along with several other laws, marks a step toward Iraqi political reconciliation. The impact of de-Bathification reform will depend on how effectively it is implemented, who is appointed to the new de-Ba'thification Commission, and what procedures and regulations govern its work.

(U) Ahmad Chalabi is unlikely to have significant influence over the implementation of the Law on Accountability and Justice unless he can secure an appointment to the new Higher National Commission of Accountability and Justice (HNCAJ), which will replace Chalibi's Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission.

Question 3: (U) f) How likely are we to secure Iraq's borders with Iran and Syria without these countries' cooperation?

Answer: (U) We judge increased efforts by the Iraqi government to garner legitimate cooperation from Tehran—in addition to implementing measures to filter out corrupt members of the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), increasing funding for additional border security personnel and new equipment, and engaging border area tribal leaders—will be necessary to improve security along the Iraq-Iran border. Iraqi police and DBE are constrained by corruption, militant infiltration, insufficient manpower, and outdated equipment and are at present incapable of stopping the flow of Iranian-made explosives, weapons, drugs, oil, and people across Iraq's 900-mile border with Iran.

(U) We judge the Iraqi government will have difficulty securing Iraq's borders with Syria without additional measures taken by Damascus to secure the Syrian side of the border and prevent Sunni extremists from crossing into Iraq. Over the past year, Damascus has taken more aggressive action against some Sunni extremists in Syria and has continued to take steps to increase security along its border with Iraq, such as installing new border guard posts; improving earthen berms at the border; and engaging Iraq and other states in the region to increase border security. Despite these efforts, we estimate the majority of foreign terrorists continue to travel to Iraq via the Syria-Iraq border.

Question 4: (U) a) Does Iran have the ability to mate a nuclear warhead to a long- or medium-range ballistic missile? Can International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards provide confidence in the ability of the United States and/or the IAEA to detect a revived Iranian nuclear weapons program?

Question 4: (U) b) The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released this past December states that "the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely." The NIE adds that "Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough LIEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010–2015 timeframe." It also notes that "INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems." This estimate also states that "[all agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015." However, the NIE also states that "Iran probably would use covert facilities — rather than its declared nuclear sites — for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon." Do the NIE's timelines assume that Iran would use covert enrichment facilities, rather than its known enrichment facilities? Would Iran's use of a covert facility alter the timelines significantly?

Question 4: (U) c) To what extent, if at all, does the recently published National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear program alter the perception of threat from Iran? How would you characterize the potential Iranian overall threat to broader U.S. interests in the Middle East?

Question 5: (U) (a) Please provide an assessment of the strength, capabilities, and intentions of remaining al-Qa'ida operatives in Saudi Arabia. What steps have Saudi authorities taken to secure critical energy infrastructures such as the Abqaiq oil facility that was attacked in 2006? (b) To what extent are Saudi nationals and organi-

zations based in Saudi Arabia providing material or financial support to international terrorist organizations? To what extent are Saudi nationals and organizations supporting armed Sunni groups in Iraq? How do you assess current Saudi efforts to curtail the flow of fighters and money from the kingdom to combatants in Iraq and terrorist groups elsewhere?

Question 6: (U) a) To what extent are you concerned that the Turkish military will launch another invasion of northern Iraq to combat the terrorist organization Kongra Gel (KGK), formerly known as the Kurdistan Workers Party — or PKK? How has U.S. assistance to the Government of Turkey mitigated this concern? How much of a threat does KGK pose directly to the U.S. and U.S. interests? b) In 2007, the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) secured a second term in office despite objections from the military command and secularist groups. Are you concerned about the possible loss of Turkey's secular identity and, if so, why? Please assess the changes in Turkey's relations with Arab and Muslim countries since the AKP came to power and any concerns you might have about these relations. In particular, how do Turkey's relations with Iran and Syria and dependence on Russian gas affect, conflict or undermine U.S. policies?

Question 7: (U) The threat posed by Islamist militancy in western Pakistan appears to be growing. a) What new steps might the Pakistan Government take to more effectively combat al-Qa'ida and affiliated groups in the tribal regions of Pakistan? b) How does the Intelligence Community assess Islamabad's ability to curb support emanating from the FATA to the Afghan Taliban, whose insurgency is a threat to the government of President Karzai?

Answer: (U) If the Pakistan Government took the following steps, it would more effectively combat al-Qa'ida and affiliated groups in the tribal regions of Pakistan:

a. (U) Exert sustained effective military pressure on militants and their al-Qa'ida allies, reducing their de facto control of portions of the FATA.

b. (U) Integrate sustained effective military pressure with administrative, economic, educational, legal and social reforms that reduce the leverage of militants and their al-Qa'ida allies.

c. (U) Improve police and paramilitary forces' ability to provide justice and border security.

d. (U) Provide effective political leadership that effectively explains the reasons for military action and orchestrates the administrative, economic, educational, legal, and social reforms to reduce the leverage of militants and their al-Qa'ida allies.

(U) Islamabad can curb support emanating from the FATA to the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan has substantial military and intelligence resources that it has not used in the FATA, and its leadership has not made reducing militancy there a top priority.

(U) Three factors account for Pakistan's lack of action. First, civilian and military leaders for the most part do not appreciate the threat that FATA-based militants pose to Pakistan. Second, military leaders have been more concerned about the threat from India. Third, Islamabad is not prepared to bear the very substantial costs of a larger military effort, such as counterattacks by tribal militants and their al-Qa'ida allies through the length and breadth of Pakistan, as occurred in the latter half of 2007 and early 2008, with heavy military casualties, and strong public criticism of the government.

(U) The newly elected civilian leaders in Islamabad and at the provincial level in Peshawar are slowly beginning to come to terms with the threat of militancy in the tribal areas. They are beginning to examine the administrative and economic steps that would be necessary to counter militancy over the long term. Their public statements suggest they see some role for military action as well, but we expect that new civilian leaders will reduce the pace of military efforts against FATA militants in the near term.

(U) Taliban based in Baluchistan also provide important support for the insurgency in Afghanistan.

Question 8: (U) Two independent assessments on the situation in Afghanistan were recently released — one prepared by the Atlantic Council of the United States and the other by the Afghanistan Study Group. The reports state that (1) NATO forces in Afghanistan are in a "strategic stalemate" and that "NATO is not winning"; (2) Afghanistan remains a failing state, and could become a failed state," and (3) progress in Afghanistan "is under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional challenges, and a growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the future of their country." The

administration has recently announced that 3,200 Marines would be sent to Afghanistan to stem shortfalls in troop levels there.

    a. (U) Do you agree with these assessments? Why is violence up 27 percent last year? Is NATO winning or losing in Afghanistan? How large is the Taliban insurgency? How does this compare with recent years?

    b. (U) What is the role of al-Qa'ida in the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan? Does al-Qa'ida control any insurgent forces in Afghanistan?

    c. (U) Will the Government of Afghanistan ever be able to defend itself and provide security and services with outside assistance? How long will this take?

    d. (U) What is the role of Iran in Afghanistan? How has it changed in the last year?

    e. (U) What would be the consequences for NATO of a withdrawal from Afghanistan? Is NATO able to sustain its deployments to Afghanistan?

Answer: (U) After almost thirty years of continuous warfare, Afghanistan and the international community face enormous challenges in building a self-reliant, sustainable government. Notable gains have been made but there is a long way to go. Increased violence last year was a result of a combination of operations by international forces and insurgent initiated activity. The insurgents cannot capture ground held by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops but Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are not yet able to hold ground cleared by ISAF. The Taliban-led insurgency includes hardcore militants and part-time fighters and overall numbers are hard to assess. We judge that despite losses among leaders and the rank and file last year that the Taliban can find replacements and will remain a formidable challenge in 2008.

(U) We judge that al-Qa'ida fighters comprise a comparatively small percentage of the overall insurgent force, frequently working with Taliban commanders. Al-Qa'ida does, however, provide fmancial and personnel support as well as assistance in training and propaganda.

(U) Improvements made in governance at the national level have not yet, for the most part, fully extended to the provincial and district level. The creation of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance in the Presidential palace is an attempt to close that gap. The Afghan National Army (ANA) continues to grow and improve. Some units are capable of limited independent activity but it will be at least several years before the ANA is ready to take a leading role against the insurgency. Development of the Afghan National Police lags behind the Army.

(U) Iran is a major aid donor providing funding for development and reconstruction in Afghanistan—particularly in the western region of that country, and is engaged in counter-narcotics efforts along the Afghan border. Iran's active pursuit of its own interests, however, undermines Afghan objectives to achieve peace and stability. Iran does not limit its support to a single political, religious, or ethnic group in Afghanistan. Tehran provides financial support to government-aligned tribes and former Northern Alliance contacts politically opposed to President Karzai, while also funding and arming the Taliban in Afghanistan. Since 2006, Iran's IRGC Qods Force has provided weapons to the Taliban for use against Afghan government and international forces. The frequent weapons shipments Iran has arranged have included small arms and associated ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, plastic explosives, explosively formed projectiles (EFPs), and probably man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to the Taliban.

We believe Iranian lethal support is aimed more at attempting to raise the costs for the United States and our ISAF partners of our presence in Afghanistan — inflicting casualties on international forces in an attempt to negatively affect public opinion in ISAF troop-contributing nations — than at restoring a Taliban government.

Question 9: (U) Is al-Qa'ida as strong today as it was on 11 September 2001? How serious is the Government of Pakistan about the threat from al-Qa'ida? How effectively have the Pakistanis dealt with the al-Qa'ida presence in the FATA?

Question 10: (U) How aggressive is China in collecting against sensitive and protected U.S. systems, facilities, and development projects? Is the counterintelligence threat to the U.S. from China at the same level as it was during the cold war? What are the challenges of prosecuting suspected espionage cases involving China? What has been the evolution of threats of cyber-attacks and computer spying from China?

Answer: (U) The Counterintelligence Community considers the People's Republic of China (PRC) to be one of the most aggressive countries targeting U.S. military, political, and economic secrets as well as sensitive U.S. trade secrets and technologies. A broad spectrum of entities is involved in the collection effort. For exam-

ple, the PRC Intelligence Services (PRCIS) such as the Ministry of State Security, People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff 2nd Department and 3rd Department, Liaison Office of the PLA General Political Department, and the PRC Ministry of Public Security—are major collectors. The PRCIS has the intent, the patience, and the capability to spot, target, assess, and recruit U.S. officials with high-level access to sensitive U.S. Government information.

(U) Nonprofessional intelligence collectors—including government and commercial researchers, students, academics, scientists, business people, delegations, and visitors—also provide China with a significant amount of sensitive U.S. technologies and trade secrets. Some members of this group knowingly or unknowingly collect on behalf of PRCIS or Chinese defense industries, presenting a significant intelligence threat. But in many cases, the collection efforts of these private-sector players are driven entirely by the opportunity for commercial or professional gain and have no affiliation with PRCIS. Although, in such cases, the Chinese government is not involved in the collection effort, it has been a major beneficiary of the acquired technology.

(U) For a number of reasons, we believe China poses a significantly greater foreign intelligence threat today than it did during most of the cold war era.

a. (U) China's economic boom has enabled the government to invest in a broad spectrum of advanced technical intelligence collection capabilities. That increase in basic capability poses a rising challenge to U.S. military, intelligence, and security operations.

b. (U) The sizable increase in immigrants and visitors from China to the United States has created a large pool of potential targets for PRCIS. For example, in 1989 about 32,000 immigrants entered the United States from China. By comparison, in 2006 and 2007 the figures were about 87,000 and 77,000. The overwhelming majority of these visitors are in the United States to pursue legitimate objectives, but Chinese intelligence services and other PRC Government institutions exploit the access these individuals afford.

(U) We respectfully recommend you refer your question regarding the challenges of prosecuting suspected espionage cases involving China to the Department of Justice.

(U) China has identified the U.S. critical infrastructure as a lucrative target for cyber as well as kinetic attacks; however, we have little direct information on specific plans to attack these systems. We assess that Beijing currently has the technical capabilities to target and disrupt elements of the U.S. information infrastructure and aggressively targets U.S. Government, military, and private sector information systems for intelligence collection. Over the past two years, a number of U.S. Government departments and agencies—including the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense—have been victims of computer network intrusions that appear to have originated in China. Determining the exact origins of these attacks, however, is a challenging technical problem.

Question 11: (U) Between 2004 and 2005, Egypt experienced a series of bombings against tourist sites in the Sinai Peninsula. Since then, the situation has become relatively stable. In your opinion, were these bombings a result of local grievances, or were they influenced or carried out by international organizations such as al-Qa'ida? How secure is the Suez Canal, and are U.S. warships passing through the Canal a target for terrorist groups?

Answer:(U) TWJ appears to be motivated by Cairo's harsh treatment of the Bedouin community and difficult economic conditions in the Sinai Peninsula. Animosity between the Bedouin and the Egyptian government runs deep, although the Taba bombings marked the first Bedouin involvement in violence against the Egyptian state.

a. (U) The Bedouin tribes have historically considered themselves a distinct ethnic group from other Egyptians, and some Egyptians consider them second-class citizens.

b. (U) The Egyptian government has largely failed to deliver on promises to improve economic opportunities and infrastructure in the Sinai, and the aggressive tactics of the Egyptian security services in the northern Sinai following the attacks likely fueled further resentment of the central government.

Question 12: (U) a) Do you believe that it is important for the Intelligence Community to examine issues such as water shortages, disease, and the environment as threats to U.S. national security? What unique resources, expertise, or information does the Intelligence Community have to add to this issue? To what extent have

Intelligence Community analysts examined the impact of climate change? Does the Intelligence Community have sufficient resources to adequately address the environmental change issue? What judgments, if any, have they made with regard to the potential impact of climate change on National Security? How much analytic disagreement, if any, has there been with regard to the potential impact of climate change on National Security, and how would you characterize the range of any such disagreement? b) To what degree do the intelligence services of the other countries view climate change as a national security issue? c) Which world's regions have analysts assessed to be at greater risk of instability as a result of climate change? Of those regions, will any significantly affect U.S. national security, and over what period of time could such a threat expect to emerge? d) What is the assessment of the eventual likelihood of territorial conflict due to climate change? What conclusion, if any, have intelligence analysts reached with regard to climate change, its impact on regional and global instability, and the effect such instability may have on religious and political extremism and, ultimate, any increase in terrorism?

Answer: (U) This question calls for a partial classified response. The Intelligence Community (IC) examines state stability as a critical part of determining potential threats to U.S. interests. In this analysis, water shortages, disease, and the environment are considered along with other factors. The IC also considers the effects that climate change negotiations and mitigation efforts will have on the U.S. economy, its trade goals, and its diplomatic relationships with the international community. Based upon a recent National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) review and Congressional interest, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) is preparing a National Intelligence Assessment (NIA) on the national security impacts of global climate change to 2030. The assessment will provide judgments of the IC on the broad potential impacts of climate change on National Security. This assessment has not yet been completed so we have no information on any analytical disagreement among the members of the IC. If there is disagreement, this will be documented in the NIA, using the same footnote procedure the NIC uses for National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). For determining the physical impacts of environmental and climate changes, the IC relies heavily upon research work from other organizations (non-government and government). However, the general scientific literature and research is more concentrated at the global level, and often not targeted at areas that may be of interest to the IC. In addition, many climate-related impacts on state and regional stability are likely to be felt first in areas of the world where IC agencies—particularly collection agencies—have limited resources and expertise. Hence, there is a need for better research/information on state/regional level on physical, agricultural, economic, social, and political impacts from climate change. This research does not necessarily require classified sources or methods and may be performed in an open/unclassified environment. However, once the impacts are understood, the IC is equipped to make the determination if the impacts cross a national security threshold. A section of the NIA will be devoted to challenges to the IC in performing these kinds of assessments. The IC is evaluating its own ability to make contributions to the scientific study of environmental and climate change issues through a special study with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Results from this effort—which may also identify specific IC needs—are not expected until next year. As a result of previous research we had put in place a long-term collection program to observe critical sites using national classified systems, and these data are being routinely collected through the US Geological Survey (USGS) and the Civil Applications Committee (CAC). Working with NAS, we will add additional sites, globally, as appropriate. These data will be a valuable resource to evaluate future trends in climate and environmentally sensitive sites. In addition, the Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence is expanding its climate change analytical capabilities, as well as prototyping an unclassified strategic intelligence network focused on these issues.

(U) The regional impacts and likely significance to national security from climate change will be discussed in the forthcoming NIA.

(U) The potential for climate change to cause territorial conflict, or regional instability will be discussed in the forthcoming NIA.

Question 13: (U) Many health analysts are concerned about the threat of emerging (e.g. the H5N1 strain of avian influenza) or re-emerging (e.g. severe acute respiratory syndrome) infectious diseases. Is there a role for the Intelligence Community in the effort to protect the U.S. from diseases that might originate overseas but threaten U.S. territories? Does the Intelligence Community collect intelligence on the international efforts to improve state openness, global reporting, monitoring, and containment of infectious diseases, and to prepare for pandemics, coordinating

national and global responses to infectious disease outbreaks, and including resource and distribution challenges?

Answer: (U) The Intelligence Community (IC) plays a crucial role in the protection of U.S. persons and national interests from emerging or re-emerging disease outbreaks. The IC provides earliest possible warning, and forecasts potential primary, secondary, and tertiary impacts from these events, using both clandestine collection and open source collection of foreign print and electronic media.

(U) Not all countries are capable of detecting—or are forthcoming in reporting—disease outbreaks. In the absence of such data, there may be important gaps in the international disease surveillance conducted by national and international health agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The IC helps to close these gaps through the use of clandestine reporting and foreign language open source material that provide insights into foreign governments' transparency, capabilities, intentions, and effectiveness in responding to disease outbreaks. Further, the IC is developing partnerships with non-IC agencies such as the CDC to enable data sharing and strengthen US government warning capabilities for emerging and re-emerging diseases. IC examination of foreign news websites through use of an Open Source Center capability called ARGUS provided the CDC with the first indications of an Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo last year.

(U) While national and international health agencies assess information on the spread of emerging diseases and their impact on the health of populations, the IC is unique in providing policymakers with all-source analysis of potential primary, secondary, and tertiary impacts from these events (including the international political, economic, and security ripple effects). Further, the IC provides dynamic threat assessments and develops scenarios that clarify how a foreign government may respond should an outbreak occur. The 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)—which, in spite of a very low mortality rate resulted in an estimated $40 billion of economic losses in affected countries—demonstrated that the strategic impact of a disease can outweigh the public health one. Throughout the SARS period, IC analysts tracked not only the course of the disease, but the havoc it was wreaking on the global economy.

Question 14: (U) What intelligence does the Intelligence Community have about how the U.S. position on the use of enhanced interrogation techniques impacts U.S. national security interests? What does that intelligence indicate?

Answer: (U) The Central Intelligence Agency will respond to this question under separate correspondence.

Question 15: (U) a) Please describe the recently announced Cyber Initiative (cyber security) program. Is the program focused only on cyber security related issues relevant to the Intelligence Community?

Answer: (U) This question can be answered only at the classified level. The program is focused on the critical cyber infrastructure of the U.S., beginning with that of the entire Federal Government. The role of the Intelligence Community (IC) is only one small part of a holistic inter-agency effort to improve cyber security across the government. The U.S. information infrastructure, which is critical to our national security and prosperity, is under constant threat by a growing array of state- and non-state adversaries. An integrated and holistic national approach is needed to implement effective solutions, and will include an emphasis on defensive and offensive capabilities such as intelligence, law enforcement, counterintelligence, and information assurance capabilities.

Question 15: (U) b) There has been much criticism over the years that the IC increasingly has focused on current or tactical intelligence rather than on strategic intelligence. The result, according to some observers, is that the government's capacity to think broadly and strategically has been reduced. Do you agree with that general assessment? If so, what steps have you taken to address the problem and what evidence can you submit that would indicate progress? If not, why not?

Answer: (U) In March 2005 the Commission tasked to investigate the IC's approach to Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) issued their report. The report addressed the IC's need to foster long-term research and strategic thinking, and recommended a dedicated research and analysis unit within the National Intelligence Council (NIC).

(U) In 2006, the Office of the DNI took seriously the Commission's diagnosis and recommendation, and established a new dedicated organization, the Long-Range Analysis Unit, within the NIC. The Unit is staffed by a combination of research di-

rectors and rotational analysts from across the IC and has been active in developing strategic intelligence for the National Security Council and the policy planning staffs of the Departments of State and Defense.

(U) The Unit's staff works closely with analysts from across IC agencies and a wide range of outside academics, researchers and practitioners on issues deemed important for strategic intelligence. The Unit has produced strategic intelligence on the implications of WMD proliferation, the prospects for global democratization, the implications of the rise of China, and the social and political consequences of climate change, among many other issues. Since mid-2006, the Unit has produced 14 strategic level studies.

(U) The Unit is currently taking the IC lead on development of a large study on global trends looking out fifteen to twenty years. The study effort is undertaken every 4 years, and the results are widely used by policymakers, academics, and the media both in the US and abroad. A key purpose of the study is to orient top US policymakers toward the trends and likely contexts in which future policy will be developed and implemented.

(U) Besides the LRAU's work, the NIC continues to provide policymakers with IC-coordinated strategic analysis. As with LRAU papers, NIC products oftentimes serves to orient and prompt strategic-level analysis from the individual analytic agencies. In the past few years, individual agencies—such as the CIA/DI—also have developed extensive annual research programs, which emphasize strategic and long-range analysis.

Question 15: (U) c) The 9/11 Commission and other groups have argued that in the past, intelligence agencies tended to rely on information from sensitive sources, neglecting important information available in newspapers, the Internet and other "open sources." Are you satisfied that open source information is currently being thoroughly and effectively used by intelligence agencies? What steps have been taken to ensure the integration of Open Source information into all source analysis?

Answer: (U) The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Collection will respond to this question under separate correspondence.

Question 16: (U) The CSIS Commission on Smart Power's recent report noted that the United States influence abroad has waned dramatically, with majorities of the world's population not trusting the U.S. to act responsibly, and viewing our role in the world negatively. These numbers have become even worse in the last years — especially in the Middle East. How significant is the United States standing in the world to the Intelligence Community? How do negative views of the U.S. impact our national security?

Answer: (U) Department of State polling confirms the general observation that foreign publics, especially in the Middle East, have a much more negative view of the United States than they did a decade ago. That, however, is not the only facet of public opinion that has salience for foreign policy formulation. Polling also indicates, for example, that in a number of countries, including some in the Middle East, polled individuals value relations with the United States and frequently describe relations as generally good, even if their view of the United States is less than rosy. These findings point to a pragmatic sense among publics about bilateral relations that leaders draw upon as part of their policymaking calculus in deciding whether to cooperate with the United States on various issues.

Question 17: (U) a) Do public threats against the government of Iran weaken or strengthen the opposition to the regime of the Ayatollahs? How strong is Ahmadi-Nejad's position? b) The American ambassador to the U.N. said on February 1, 2008, that the U.S. led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq "helped Iran's relative position in the region." Do you agree with his assessment? c) What is your assessment of the likelihood that Iran and Syria would be willing to engage in multilateral efforts to stabilize Iraq? d) Are sanctions against Iran having an effect on the country? Have they had an effect in changing decisions by Iran's leaders? e) Was the January 2008 Strait of Hormuz incident a deliberate attempt to force a confrontation between Iran and the United States? Is there a danger that a similar incident in the future could lead to an unintended conflict between the U.S. and Iran?

Answer: (U) Public threats against the government of Iran—which presumably would target Iran's objectionable foreign policies or nuclear program—probably do little to strengthen opposition to the regime, but may provoke policy debates among regime elites.

    a. (U) Internal opposition to the regime is fragmented and primarily is based on parochial domestic issues—such as ethnic, religious, and localized economic

or political grievances—that have little linkage to regime activities that might prompt foreign threats.

b. (U) Iran's leaders frequently attempt to use foreign threats to rally support for the regime. For example, Iranian elites in March 2008 tried to use the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1803, which placed additional international sanctions on Iran, to encourage greater voter participation in Iran's Majles (parliament) elections as a sign of popular support for the government and opposition to international pressure.

c. (U) Nonetheless, we judge that foreign threats play a role in internal policy debates and political infighting between regime insiders. Iranian leaders who favor a more pragmatic approach to international affairs sometimes blame their hard-line rivals for engaging in provocative actions that may endanger or disadvantage Iran.

(U) President Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad's internal political standing and prospects for re-election are unclear. Ahmadi-Nejad's policies and abrasive style appear to have alienated many regime elites, but he retains the public support of Supreme Leader Khamenei and, so far, seems to have escaped popular blame for his controversial actions and inflationary economic policies.

a. (U) We judge that many senior regime figures have serious concerns about Ahmadi-Nejad's policies—especially his populist economic programs and provocative approach to international affairs—or dislike his management practices and political style. In addition, we judge that Ahmadi-Nejad's economic policies are fueling inflation and other economic problems, which are the biggest source of popular dissatisfaction with the regime.

b. (U) Nonetheless, Ahmadi-Nejad retains the public backing of Supreme Leader Khamenei and we see little open indication that he is being broadly blamed by the Iranian public for Iran's economic woes and increased international isolation.

c. (U) The Majles (parliament) elections on 15 March should have provided the latest opportunity to judge Iranian public attitudes toward national political issues, but candidate vetting, restrictions on campaign techniques, the re-election of relatively few incumbents, and the murky nature of Iranian domestic political affiliations make it difficult to determine how Ahmadi-Nejad's allies fared.

d. (U) We note that Ahmadi-Nejad's institutional authority—despite his elevated public profile—pales in comparison to Supreme Leader Khamenei, who remains the ultimate decisionmaker on Iranian domestic and foreign policy.

(U) Iranian leaders probably perceive that regional developments—including the removal of Saddam and the Taliban, challenges facing the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the influence of HAMAS and Hizballah—have given Tehran more opportunities and freedom to pursue its objective of becoming a regional power. Despite Tehran's ambitions, we judge regional geo-strategic rivalries, religious and ethnic animosities, and concerns of neighboring states regarding Iran's foreign policy and military programs will limit the success of Iran's efforts to expand its influence.

(U) We assess that Iran likely would be willing to participate in multilateral efforts to stabilize Iraq, but we note that any participation would primarily be intended to further Iran's own interests in Iraq. Tehran would see participation in such efforts as an opportunity to legitimize its presence in Iraq, learn more about the activities of other foreign actors engaged in Iraqi stabilization efforts, and perhaps direct additional international resources to its allies.

a. (U) Tehran's ability to help stabilize Iraq may be limited. Although Iranian lethal aid to Shia militias in Iraq currently enables violence, we judge that Tehran has only a limited ability to encourage reconciliation.

b. (U) Nonetheless, Iranian participation in such efforts might be useful in terms of aligning Iranian assistance with broader international efforts, reducing some of Iran's concerns that Coalition activity in Iraq is targeting their interests, and giving the U.S. additional insight into the scope of Iranian involvement in Iraq.

c. (U) Syria also most likely would be willing to participate in multilateral efforts to stabilize Iraq to gain influence in any Iraqi government and to look cooperative to the international community. Damascus's contribution to stability probably would be limited to increasing patrols of its border with Iraq and taking more consistent steps to stop the flow of foreign fighters transiting Syria. Syria, however, probably would continue reaching out to Iraqi Sunni and Shia

groups to increase its influence regardless of the implications for multilateral efforts.

(U) We judge that U.S. and U.N. actions against Iran since the fall of 2006 have disrupted Iran's international financial and commercial activity, raised its cost of business, and contributed to Tehran's continuing engagement in discussions about its nuclear policy. Tehran, however, is seeking to minimize the effect of sanctions by developing options and we see little indication that sanctions yet have changed decisions by Iran's leaders who, for example, remain publicly resolute about not suspending uranium enrichment.

(U) We assess the January 2008 Strait of Hormuz incident likely was initiated unilaterally by local Iranian Navy commanders and that it was not an attempt by Tehran to provoke a confrontation between Iran and the United States. We see no indication, however, that Tehran has instructed naval units to alter their operational approach or to less aggressively defend Iran's maritime boundaries. The assertive attitude of Iranian naval units and ongoing bilateral tensions between Iran and the United States make similar future incidents likely. There is a danger of escalation should a future incident turn violent.

Question 18: Is Hizballah stronger or weaker than at the end of the conflict with Israel in the summer of 2006? Given that many believe that Hizballah is a more capable organization than al-Qa'ida, do you believe we are allocating enough intelligence resources against it?

Question 19: (U) a) Which foreign intelligence service currently poses the most significant counterintelligence threat to the United States? What intelligence or sensitive information is that service generally targeting for collection? b) The Department of Energy oversees a complex of scientific laboratories that engage in some of this government's most sensitive nuclear research. How significant a target do the laboratories remain for foreign intelligence services? Which foreign service do you view as the most aggressive at targeting the national laboratories, and what information and intelligence is being targeted for collection? c) As director of the government agency with principal responsibility for counterintelligence, what is your assessment of the quality of DOE's counterintelligence program? d) How serious is the cyber threat confronting the DOE complex, including its weapons laboratories and what steps are being taken to address the problem? What evidence can you point to that indicated progress is being made in confronting this problem?

Question 20: (U) In your testimony before the Committee, you stated that "we do not use coercive techniques of any sort in the course of our interrogations." Have you been briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques? If so, do you consider the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to be coercive? Please elaborate. Has the FBI's Office of General Counsel examined the Army Field Manual? Has the FBI determined whether its interrogation and/or interview techniques would be affected if the FBI were limited to only those techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual?

Answer: (U) Although I am aware generally (largely from press reports) of some of the enhanced interrogation techniques the CIA has used, I have not been briefed on their "enhanced interrogation techniques" and I can, therefore, not comment on whether they are coercive. In my opinion, though, waterboarding, which General Hayden has acknowledged was used on certain high value detainees, is coercive.

(U) As for the FBI's interrogation policy, the FBI has continued its time-tested interrogation technique of "rapport-based interviewing" in its criminal and intelligence interviews, both domestically and abroad. This technique comports with the U.S. Federal Court due process standard for voluntariness. Furthermore, "[i]t is the policy of the FBI that no attempt be made to obtain a statement by force, threats, or promises." This interrogation policy was reaffirmed in a 5/19/04 Electronic Communication (EC), subject: "Treatment of Prisoners and Detainees," from the FBI General Counsel to all FBI divisions. This EC stated: "It is the policy of the FBI that no interrogation of detainees, regardless of status, shall be conducted using methods which could be interpreted as inherently coercive, such as physical abuse or the threat of such abuse to the person being interrogated or to any third party, or imposing severe physical conditions.

(U) The FBI's Office of the General Counsel is familiar with the relevant portions of the applicable Army Field Manual, including its list of eighteen permitted interrogation approaches. We are not aware of any FBI technique that would be prohibited by the Field Manual. Likewise, we are not aware of any Field Manual technique the FBI would prohibit. Nevertheless, we do not believe that a manual designed for use by soldiers, who may have limited law enforcement experience and education, on a battlefield would be appropriately applied to the FBI, which has both a domes-

tic law enforcement mission and a national security mission. The FBI has a long history of conducting interviews using techniques that have been accepted by Article III Courts for use in interviewing criminal defendants. These standards could be different from those acceptable for use in a battlefield setting. It would be counterproductive if the FBI were forced to return to the courts to demonstrate that its currently court-approved techniques remain legitimate under the Field Manual's standards.

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