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**STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD**

**by**

**DR. STEPHEN CAMBONE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE**

**BEFORE THE**

**U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON  
ARMED SERVICES**

**APRIL 28, 2005**

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**REMODELING DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE (RDI)  
&  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE FUNDING PRIORITIES**

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**(U) INTRODUCTION**

(U) Good morning Chairman Warner, Senator Levin and Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me here today. I appreciate the interest the Committee has taken in the Department's effort to remodel its intelligence capabilities to meet changing demands. I also welcome this opportunity to share with the Committee our thoughts on funding priorities for intelligence within the Department.

(U) Today we are facing a world populated by a number of highly adaptive adversaries. It is a world where terrorist networks are in place, where largely ungoverned areas can serve as sanctuary for those networks, and where it is not beyond imagining a terrorist attack employing weapons of mass destruction.

(U) At the same time, traditional national security concerns remain.

(U) It is difficult to predict with certainty what threats the United States will face in the future. In this dynamic strategic environment, the nation relies heavily on intelligence to anticipate and support the timely response of the United States Government to events.

**Remodeling Defense Intelligence**

(U) It is now just over two years since the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence was established. At the time of my confirmation hearing, I set out three objectives:

- (U) Focus on Service intelligence activities;
- (U) Meet the intelligence needs of the Combatant Commands; and
- (U) Reform Defense HUMINT.

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(U) During the last year, these objectives have been combined under the heading of "Remodeling Defense Intelligence (RDI)." This initiative aims less at significantly changing reporting chains than in reorienting existing capabilities and entities to meet current and expected demands.

(U) Some have asked whether RDI is a finished product. The answer is that RDI is an ongoing, adaptive effort, and it is in the earliest stages of implementation. I would think it will take another year or more before the initiatives associated with RDI begin to take on their final form.

(U) Moreover, in addition to the complexity of the effort itself, the Department wants to be certain that any internal remodeling efforts are helpful to the DNI in meeting his objectives.

(U) There is no meaningful result to remodeling intelligence within the Department if it is not complementary to and in support of the larger intelligence enterprise that the DNI leads. Furthermore, to the extent that RDI initiatives touch on either programs or activities for which the DNI is responsible, having his affirmative support is essential.

(U) I would like to touch briefly on the leading elements of the proposals for remodeling defense intelligence.

### *Warfighter Support*

(U) The Silberman-Robb Commission, the 9/11 Commission and other panels and reviews before them have pointed to the desirability of bringing analysts, collectors and those who can act on intelligence into closer coordination with one another.

(U) The RDI proposes to implement such recommendations through the creation of what we are calling Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs).

(U) These centers would be located at each of the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) except NORTHCOM and TRANSCOM. They would combine existing assets with improved information systems and communications connectivity. Because that intelligence is the inherent responsibility and duty of the Commander at every level, the purpose is to give the COCOM an organization to which he can assign the mission of preparing actionable intelligence and which,

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within limits, has the assets and/or authority to undertake actions necessary to support collection or generate analysis.

(U) Those actions could range from tasking an asset organic to the command—e.g., a U-2 aircraft—to working with the national agencies to tailor their activity to support command needs.

(U) Clearly, these JIOCs will need to cooperate closely with the CIA, NSA, NGA and DIA to ensure coordination and deconfliction of their respective intelligence activities and needs. The JIOCs must also ensure that intelligence and analysis relevant to DNI priority tasking or guidance is appropriately disseminated in accordance with that guidance. This leads me to a discussion of the Intelligence Campaign Plans.

### *Intelligence Campaign Plans*

(U) It is not enough for Defense to do better at its assigned missions and work more efficiently to deconflict and coordinate its activities with the DNI or various intelligence agencies. It must improve substantially its performance as both a customer of the DNI and his partner in satisfying the DNI's national intelligence mission. We believe that another feature of RDI, called Intelligence Campaign Plans (ICPs) will help improve DoD's performance.

(U) The concept behind the ICP is twofold:

- (U) First, the ICP requires the COCOMs to demonstrate how they would employ always scarce intelligence resources in meeting their assigned missions. This should result in a set of capability requirements to be specified for both the JMIP and TIARA accounts as well as the National Intelligence Program.
- (U) Second, DoD should be able to derive from the ICP a set of collection and analysis requirements against which the DNI can plan his management of the IC's resources and develop future capabilities within the NIP. DoD has never done this before. The DCI was expected to make *ad hoc* adjustments as DoD needs were fed to him piecemeal over time. There will always be a need for adjustments in plans, but through the ICP we intend to provide the DNI a baseline against which he can plan with some confidence.

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(U) We recently briefed the ICP to the National Intelligence Collection Board (NIC B), and received a strong endorsement for developing and exercising the ICP process. The NIC B would like to institutionalize this planning process. It advocated the establishment of a national intelligence planning team to support DoD's strategic and operational planning requirements.

### *HUMINT Reform*

(U) Over the last two years Members and staff of this and other Committees have stressed the need to pay closer attention to DoD's human intelligence capabilities. We are taking initial steps to improve those capabilities.

(U) After the better part of a year's consideration, the Defense HUMINT Management Office (DHMO) was established in DIA in December 2004. The DHMO is jointly staffed by the Services and DIA personnel and is responsible for ensuring that all DoD collection priorities are known to Defense HUMINT executors and for deconflicting and enabling DOD human intelligence activities.

(U) Equally important, because the DIR/DIA is the GDIP program manager for the DNI, we now have for the first time in one office within DoD the means for linking DNI-directed HUMINT and COCOM-requested or authorized activities in a seamless and mutually supporting manner.

### *Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Integration*

(U) Likewise, we have taken steps to assign the DIR/DIA responsibility as a "functional component commander" for STRATCOM. In this role, he brings together STRATCOM's planning for the deployment and employment of DoD ISR assets with his role as DoD's collection manager within the National Intelligence Program.

(U) The objective is to make as near-to-seamless as possible the assignment of DoD and DNI missions to the assets best able to satisfy the need whether they are DoD- or DNI-tasked assets. As significant, it also means that the data collected by DoD will be quickly inserted into the DNI's information management systems.

(U) To help oversee this new organizational construct, we are using the ISR Integration Council, which was established by this Committee. It includes Service intelligence representatives, Joint Staff and COCOM (as desired) representatives,

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representatives of NSA, NGA, DIA and NRO and frequently their respective directors, as well as senior representatives of the DCI's—now DNI's—staff.

### *All-Source Analysis and Information Sharing*

(U) The Department has undertaken major initiatives to build the information system architecture and revise policies to support the rapid access to and distribution of all-source Defense intelligence. The objective is to get the right information, in the right context, to the right place, at the right time. We continue to work through the Community Interoperability and Information Sharing Office (CIISO) to accelerate the development, vetting, and implementation of new information sharing policies.

(U) Of particular note are the initiatives taken by Admiral Jacoby, General Hayden when he was the Director of NSA, and Jim Clapper at NGA, to increase the availability of data to analysts. I'll leave Admiral Jacoby—who is here today—to elaborate on his efforts to improve all-source analysis within DIA.

### **Resourcing Our Priorities**

(U) The FY06 budget for JMIP and TIARA reflects the thrust of the RDI effort. For example:

- (U) JIOC: The request will support initial efforts to align resources at the commands to start developing the JIOC concept.
- (U) Sensors: Funds are requested to continue upgrading the capability to collect signals of interest across the airborne fleet.
- (U) Communications: DCGS is being continued and will serve as part of the network connecting DoD and IC information systems.
- (U) Predator: The USAF is requesting funds to move to the larger and more capable "B" model and to increase the number in the inventory.
- (U) Space Radar: As part of the effort to increase the persistent, all weather, day-to-night coverage of fixed and moving targets, we have requested funds for the space radar. The DCI and the Secretary of Defense agreed on a way forward for this program in a joint memorandum of 13 January 2005.

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- (U) Manpower Increase: The Army, in particular, is requesting funds to substantially increase the number of personnel in its Corps and below structure who are dedicated to intelligence tasks.
- (U) Language: The FY06 request seeks the first increment of over \$300 million increase over the FYDP for improvements in the numbers of instructors, throughput of students and the diversity of languages taught.

### Conclusion

(U) I would like to thank the Congress for its support of our efforts to remodel our enterprise and its support in funding the Defense Intelligence programs that are critical to our warfighters. I look forward to discussing our initiatives further with you in a closed session.

(U) The DoD is ready and eager to help the DNI in any way that it can.

(U) My guidance from the Secretary of Defense is unchanged from two years ago, substituting the DNI for the DCI. In the memo standing up the OUSDI, the Secretary wrote that he is the principal interface within DoD for the DNI and that the role of the OUSDI within DoD does not alter relationships between the defense components of the NIP and the DNI.

(U) I personally look forward to working with Ambassador Negroponte and General Hayden to achieve the goals of the Intelligence Reform Act.