

[REDACTED]

VIII. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AGAINST IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence focused its work in reviewing U.S. intelligence on the quality and quantity of intelligence analysis, the objectivity and reasonableness of the Intelligence Community's (IC) judgments, and whether any influence was brought to bear to shape that analysis to support policy objectives. The Committee also examined the role of intelligence collectors in providing the fundamental information upon which the intelligence analysts based their assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. To understand how intelligence collectors worked to obtain information on Iraq's WMD capabilities, what the IC's collection efforts entailed, and whether those efforts produced tangible results, Committee staff interviewed the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection (ADCI/C) and various members of the National Intelligence Collection Board (NICB)³². Committee staff also interviewed Iraqi collection officers in the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Directorate for Operations and National Security Agency (NSA) Iraqi signals intelligence analysts to gain further insight into the IC's post-Gulf War human and signals intelligence collection strategies for Iraq. Committee staff also reviewed the National Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection Directives on Iraq, which are intended to prioritize and guide collection, to determine where IC collectors were requested to focus their collection efforts.

(U) The NICB told Committee staff that prior to the Gulf War there had been a robust, U.S., all-source intelligence collection program against Iraq and its WMD programs. After the Gulf War, however, most of the IC's knowledge of Iraqi WMD programs was obtained from, in conjunction with, and in support of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections. NICB members and IC analysts told Committee staff that information from UNSCOM provided a significant portion of the information the IC had on Iraq's WMD programs and capabilities. One NICB representative told Committee staff, "it's very difficult to overstate the degree to which we were focused on and using the output from the U.N. inspectors."

([REDACTED]) While inspectors were in Iraq from 1991 through 1998, the IC was not aggressively pursuing collection against the WMD target and most of the assets tasked for Iraqi

³²The NICB comprises the most senior collection managers from each intelligence discipline (human intelligence [HUMINT], signals intelligence [SIGINT], imagery intelligence [IMINT], and measurement and signature intelligence [MASINT]).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

collection were focused on satisfying support-to-military operations requirements, support to UNSCOM inspections, and to indications and warning. Due to competing collection priorities globally: [REDACTED] and regionally: Operations Northern and Southern Watch, and the emphasis on current, rather than strategic or national, intelligence, there was no focused, collaborative collection effort on the Iraqi WMD target.

([REDACTED]) When United Nations (UN) inspectors left Iraq in December 1998, the IC was left with a limited unilateral collection capability against Iraq's WMD. A report from intelligence collectors in 2001³³ noted, "with the end of UNSCOM activity inside Iraq, . . . the IC's collection capability on Iraqi WMD programs diminished significantly. . . . [REDACTED]"

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) In 1998, a new ADCI/C led a major effort to examine worldwide end-to-end collection.³⁴ To undertake this effort, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) established the Collection Management Task Force. Led by the ADCI for Collection, the Collection Management Task Force identified both the successes and challenges of the IC's collection activities and made several recommendations to improve collection, including bringing "the collection disciplines together in a more synergistic way," looking for "innovative ways that improve collaboration and innovation across the Community," and establishing a center to examine the IC's most intractable intelligence problems and develop new ways to improve collection. In 2000, the Collection Concepts Development Center (CCDC) was created to achieve these goals and took on Iraq's WMD capabilities for its first study.

([REDACTED]) In the CCDC study, collectors and analysts within the IC worked together to identify collection gaps and develop new, unilateral collection strategies designed specifically to target Iraq's WMD programs. The study looked at all four aspects of WMD (nuclear, biological, chemical and delivery) and recommended ways to address the collection gaps. The CCDC released its report, titled, *Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: Recommendations for*

³³*Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: Recommendations for Improvements in Collection*. The Collection Concepts Development Center, June 2000.

³⁴End-to-end collection refers to the collection cycle which entails the development of collection requirements, allocating tasks to specific collection assets, collecting, processing, exploiting, and then disseminating the information that is collected.

[REDACTED]

Improvements in Collection, in June 2000. Immediately after the report was released, the IC began to implement the CCDC's recommendations to improve intelligence collection in all disciplines (human intelligence [HUMINT], signals intelligence [SIGINT], imagery intelligence [IMINT], open source intelligence [OSINT] and measurement and signature intelligence [MASINT]) against Iraq's [REDACTED]. The NICB briefed Committee staff on the how these recommendations were implemented and how intelligence collection improved as a result of these efforts.

A. Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

([REDACTED]) In order to more fully understand why the CCDC recommended certain changes to the Intelligence Community's (IC) HUMINT collection activities, Committee staff interviewed HUMINT collection officers in the CIA's Directorate of Operations, including collection officers in the Near East (NE) Division and the Counterproliferation Division (CPD). These officers briefed Committee staff on the IC's HUMINT collection posture against Iraq from the end of the Gulf War until the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). CIA officers told staff that the IC's HUMINT collection efforts throughout this period were dedicated to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the IC obtained human intelligence on a variety of issues. Most of this information obtained through CIA's sources was related to political and military issues, not WMD, however. The CIA had no dedicated WMD sources on the ground in Iraq until the late nineties. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. The CIA [REDACTED] did not have any WMD sources in Iraq after 1998. When asked about the lack of sources with access to WMD, the Deputy Chief of CPD told Committee staff that "despite an intense, vigorous recruitment campaign against Iraq WMD targets . . . we were never able to gain direct access to Iraq's WMD programs."

([REDACTED]) A CIA officer from NE told staff that when he came to his position in 2001, the CIA had four Iraqi sources reporting on non-WMD topics. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) The recommendations in the CCDC study responded to these deficiencies in HUMINT WMD collection. The CCDC study found that HUMINT operations against Iraq WMD were extremely limited. HUMINT was heavily dependent on liaison sources and although, by 2001, there were [REDACTED] sources inside the country and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] outside the country, HUMINT collection against the Iraq WMD target was still negligible. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] When Committee staff asked why there had not been an aggressive HUMINT strategy developed to target Iraq's WMD prior to the CCDC study, the NICB said that budgetary constraints prevented them [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) The NICB told Committee staff that getting people on the ground was difficult and said that Iraq was a "tough [REDACTED] problem." the CCDC recommended instead that the IC focus its HUMINT strategy [REDACTED]. The CCDC study team recommended the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]:

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) The NICB told Committee staff that even before the CCDC study was finalized, the IC began implementing many of these recommendations and aggressively pursued HUMINT collection. The NICB said both the CIA and the DIA developed well organized efforts [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These operations failed to provide any usable intelligence. The NICB told Committee staff that the negative results were reported in intelligence reports.

([REDACTED]) In September, 2001, the DCI established a Joint Task Force within CIA's Counterproliferation Division (CPD) of the Directorate of Operations (DO). According to the Deputy Director of CPD, "there was a full complement of UNSCOM inspectors inside Iraq from '91 until December '98, so the focus wasn't as intense as it was after that in recruiting sources on WMD." The DCI's Iraqi WMD issue manager for the clandestine service told staff that "before the Task Force was set up, there were fewer than half a dozen at some times, individuals working on Iraq. [REDACTED] There were very few assets [REDACTED] at all reporting on Iraq's WMD efforts." After the Task Force was established, the CIA recruited [REDACTED] sources, [REDACTED] whose information resulted in the production and dissemination of over 400 intelligence reports. This was an increase from only 90 reports in 2000.

([REDACTED]) Some other examples of how the IC tried to improve HUMINT collection against Iraq's WMD programs included:

- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) After this push to improve HUMINT collection, the CIA made contact, through other sources, [REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) From late summer 2002 until the start of OIF in March 2003, the CIA “dramatically picked up the pace” of HUMINT collection according to a CIA collector. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CIA officials told Committee staff this resulted in [REDACTED] or more sources reporting [REDACTED] by March 2003. Just prior to the start of OIF, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] None of these sources provided information on Iraq’s biological, chemical or nuclear weapons programs.

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Committee staff asked why the CIA had not considered placing a CIA officer in the years before Operation Iraqi Freedom to investigate Iraq’s WMD programs. A CIA officer said, “because it’s very hard to sustain . . . it takes a rare officer who can go in and [REDACTED] survive scrutiny [REDACTED] for a long time.”

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

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([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]
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C. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)

([REDACTED]) As with the other intelligence disciplines, there was a coordinated effort within the IC to improve imagery collection against the WMD target. The CCDC study found that [REDACTED] that imagery assets were in high demand for the Iraq WMD target and for support to military operations. This required imagery assets to be tasked more efficiently and effectively.

([REDACTED]) The CCDC study made several recommendations aimed at overcoming the challenges of competing priorities [REDACTED]. The recommendations included:

- [REDACTED] airborne missions [REDACTED] over the entire Northern and Southern no-fly zones;
- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The NICB told Committee staff that from June 2000 to January 2003 these collection efforts resulted in over 200 chemical-related reports, over 60 biological reports, and over 800 nuclear-related reports, which, the NICB said contained both positive and negative information on activity related to WMD. When asked by Committee staff which of these reports contained positive hits, the vice deputy director for MASINT and Technical Collection at DIA said that were [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A NICB representative said that all of the reports were available to analysts via INTELINK.

E. Impact of Increased Collection on Analysis

([REDACTED]) Representatives from each collection discipline reported to Committee staff that collection increased significantly in their areas after the recommendations of the CCDC were implemented. Committee staff asked the collectors how they work with the all-source analysts to make sure that when they see a large increase in collection, that they understand that the increase is a result of an increase in collection, not necessarily an increase in activity by the Iraqis. An analyst who worked on the Iraq WMD CCDC study told Committee staff that WMD analysts regularly participated in NICB meetings on all WMD collection issues. This analyst noted that “there was a constant feedback mechanism available throughout this period from certainly 2001 through the present that enabled [analysts] to get a gauge of whether this was a collection bias or if it was new collection or if it was a scale-up in activities.” This same analyst also noted that “in some places, [the IC] was collecting [REDACTED] . . . in other cases [the IC] was collecting for the [REDACTED] that had been under way for quite some time . . . and frequently the reporting would show that.”

([REDACTED]) Comments from analysts to Committee staff, however, suggest that some Iraq WMD analysts did not believe that collection had increased significantly as a result of the improved effort against Iraq’s WMD. A CIA BW analyst told Committee staff, “we increased our collection efforts, but that did not necessarily equate to increased collection. We tried very hard to focus them to collect on areas we thought were most important, but it did not necessarily translate into us getting more collection.” Two analysts from CIA’s office of Near East and South Asia Analysis (NESA), [REDACTED], [REDACTED], told Committee staff that they did not notice an increase in collection as a result of the CCDC.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) While some analysts did not believe that collection had increased, several analysts pointed to intelligence reporting obtained by the IC after late 2000 (and after the IC began implementing the CCDC study recommendations) as having played a significant role in their assessments that Iraq had increased its WMD activities. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Imagery reports from 2002 on [REDACTED] were key to chemical analysts assessments that Iraq had and was producing chemical weapons (CW). In addition, intelligence assessments on all of Iraq's suspect WMD programs – nuclear, chemical, biological, and delivery programs, pointed to increased procurement activity after 2000 as part of the judgment that Iraq had increased WMD activity.

F. Collection Directives

([REDACTED]) Committee staff reviewed the IC's national HUMINT collection directives (NHCDs) covering Iraq's WMD programs published in the years preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom. The NHCD's are the IC's primary guidance to its HUMINT collectors around the world on how to prioritize and guide HUMINT collection efforts. The NHCDs provide lists of questions and information requirements, categorized by subject, to be explored with sources that have the appropriate knowledge and access to information. The NHCD's are reviewed by appropriate analysts in the IC to ensure that their analytic questions and requirements are being met. All of the questions and requirements in the NHCDs on Iraq's WMD programs were written with the clear presumption that Iraq had active WMD programs, and focused on collecting information about issues such as the extent of Iraq's WMD activities, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] None of the NHCDs reviewed by Committee staff contained any questions or requirements that suggested that collection be focused on determining *whether* Iraq had weapons of mass destruction or active WMD programs.

G. CIA HUMINT Compartmentation

(U) IC officials provided Committee staff with reporting from a number of sensitive CIA HUMINT sources who reported on Iraq's WMD programs before Operation Iraqi Freedom. The reporting from these sources was restricted to a limited list of recipients within the IC, or was handled in special access programs (SAP). SAPs limit distribution to a small group of IC personnel who have been formally granted access to the intelligence based on their need to know the information being reported. When the IC provided these reports to the Committee, they told

[REDACTED]

Committee staff that they could not be sure that they were providing all of the limited distribution and special access reporting on Iraq's weapons programs, because of the difficulty of searching for reports across the different special access compartments.

H. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Collection Conclusions

(U) Conclusion 77. The Intelligence Community relied too heavily on United Nations (UN) [REDACTED] information about Iraq's programs and did not develop a sufficient unilateral collection effort targeting Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and related activities to supplement UN-collected information and to take its place upon the departure of the UN inspectors.

(U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Conclusion 78. The Intelligence Community depended too heavily on defectors and foreign government services to obtain human intelligence (HUMINT) information on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activities. Because the Intelligence Community did not have direct access to many of these sources, it was exceedingly difficult to determine source credibility.

(U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Conclusion 79. The Intelligence Community waited too long after inspectors departed Iraq to increase collection against Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs.

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Conclusion 80. Even after the departure of United Nations (UN) inspectors, placement of human intelligence (HUMINT) agents and development of unilateral sources inside Iraq were not top priorities for the Intelligence Community.

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]

(U) Conclusion 81. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) continues to excessively compartment sensitive human intelligence (HUMINT) reporting and fails to share important information about HUMINT reporting and sources with Intelligence Community analysts who have a need to know.

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) Conclusion 82. [REDACTED]. The lack of in-country human intelligence (HUMINT) collection assets contributed to this collection gap.

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]