

[REDACTED]

V. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) PROGRAM

A. Background

(U) The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on *Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction* (WMD) provided the most comprehensive Intelligence Community (IC) assessment of Iraq's chemical weapons (CW) programs since United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspectors departed Iraq in 1998. Prior to the departure of inspectors, IC assessments focused largely on UNSCOM's findings in Iraq, outstanding compliance issues, and the IC's assessment of the difficulties UNSCOM would face as it attempted to gain full Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions requiring its disarmament.

(U) For example, The National Intelligence Council (NIC) produced a NIC memorandum, *Iraq: Outstanding WMD and Missile Issues* in September 1998 and produced a follow-on memorandum of the same title in November 1998 which comprehensively addressed UNSCOM's assessments of Iraq's outstanding compliance issues. The papers noted that the Intelligence Community generally agrees with the assessments made by UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about Iraq's remaining WMD efforts and capabilities. Regarding CW, the IC assessed that:

- Gaps and inconsistencies in Iraqi declarations to UNSCOM strongly suggest that Iraq retains stockpiles of chemical munitions and agents.
- Iraq also had the residual technical expertise, facilities, and production equipment to quickly restart production at declared sites if UNSCOM is again barred from conducting inspections and on-site monitoring.

(U) In February 1999, soon after UNSCOM inspectors departed Iraq, several intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA),²⁵ the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the U.S. Central Command produced a joint intelligence report, *Iraq: WMD and Delivery Capabilities After Operation Desert Fox*. This assessment focused on the effectiveness of air strikes during Operation Desert

²⁵ NIMA has recently been renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

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Fox in destroying Iraq's WMD facilities and programs, but was not a comprehensive assessment of Iraq's WMD capabilities. The report noted:

- During Operation Desert Fox, few of Iraq's chemical warfare facilities were targeted or damaged and the operation probably had very little impact on Iraq's ability to reconstitute its chemical warfare programs.
- We believe that Iraq possesses chemical agent stockpiles that can be, or already are, weaponized and ready for use. The size, location, nature and condition of those stockpiles is unknown.
- We assess Iraq's production of chemical weapons to be largely dormant; however, Baghdad has the infrastructure necessary to support offensive programs. Without an effective monitoring presence, Iraq could probably resume its CW program immediately, if it has not already done so.

■ In December 2000, the IC published an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), *Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities* (ICA 2000-007HCX). The ICA was prepared at the request of the National Security Council (NSC) for a broad update on Iraqi efforts to rebuild WMD and delivery system programs, as well as a review of what remained of the WMD arsenal and of outstanding disarmament issues that were the focus of UNSCOM. This assessment was the first comprehensive IC product on all aspects of Iraq's WMD capabilities since United Nations (UN) inspectors departed Iraq. Regarding Iraq's CW programs the assessment stated:

- We judge that Iraq's expansion of its chemical industry is intended to support CW production.
- We have seen no indication since the Gulf War that Iraq has engaged in large-scale production of CW agents, but we cannot rule out that small-scale production has occurred.
- Iraq has increased procurement of sensitive equipment and chemicals, some of which we believe will be used to reconstitute a CW production capability.
- We believe that Iraq has chemical agent and stable intermediaries in bulk storage, production equipment, and filled munitions that are still militarily useful.

[REDACTED]

- We assess the size of the CW agent stockpile to be 100 tons or less. We are uncertain about the extent and condition of Iraq's stockpile, although we believe mustard agent – and to a lesser degree G-agents Sarin and VX – and related munitions probably are key components.
- [REDACTED] a range of intelligence reports, suggests that a small portion of Iraq's prewar stockpile of filled munitions remains. Iraq also retains the capability to produce many types of weapons that could be filled with chemical agents.
- The issue of shelf life is critical to assessments of the current stockpile of Iraqi chemical agents. Mustard is the only agent that would have survived for a significant period after the Gulf War.
- Our main judgments about what remains of Iraq's original WMD programs, agents stockpiles, and delivery systems have changed little: Iraq retains stockpiles of chemical agents and munitions.

(U) In December 2001, the IC produced an NIE on *Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015*. A section of the estimate on Iraq's missile payload options noted that Iraq had, "tested chemical warheads for Scud-variant missiles before the Gulf war," and assessed that "Iraq is rebuilding a CW production capability, probably focusing on mustard, sarin, GF, and VX." The NIE added, "We estimate Iraq holds up to 100 metric tons of chemical agent, although the nature and condition of the agent is unknown. Reporting suggests Iraq might retain at least six Scud-variant missiles equipped with chemical warheads." These assessments were generally consistent with previous IC assessments of Iraq's chemical weapon capabilities.

(U) The IC next addressed the issue of Iraq's WMD in the October 2002 NIE, *Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction*. The judgments in the estimate pertaining to Iraq's CW program were consistent with the 2000 ICA in assessing that:

- Iraq's expansion of its civilian chemical infrastructure was intended to support CW production.
- Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited CW production hidden within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- Iraq had experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles.
- Iraq probably had a chemical weapons stockpile and CW bulk fills.



(U) In the 2002 NIE, however, the IC made new statements about Iraq's CW program, shifting some judgments in significant respects and eliminating some of the uncertainties regarding Iraq's chemical programs that had been expressed in previous assessments. The 2002 NIE said that, "Baghdad has chemical . . . weapons" and "we assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX." As in previous assessments, the IC continued to note that there was little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, but it increased its assessment of its size, noting that, "Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of CW agents – much of it added in the last year."

(U) Because the 2002 NIE encompassed all of the intelligence in the previous assessments and because of the notable shifts in assessment between that estimate and all previous assessments of Iraq's CW programs, the Committee focused its review on the intelligence supporting the NIE and the assessments that led the IC to conclude that Iraq had chemical weapons. The Committee examined all of the intelligence provided by the IC underlying each of the assessments made in the NIE and focused particular attention on those assessments which changed between the 2000 ICA and 2002 NIE. Committee staff interviewed analysts from each all-source analysis agency involved in the chemical section of the NIE including CIA, DIA, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to hear each agency's views of Iraq's chemical program and to understand how and why each analyst's assessments of the intelligence evolved over time.

(U) All intelligence agencies agreed with the assessments in the CW section of the NIE and there were no dissents or footnotes in this section. The discussion below outlines the intelligence supporting the assessments in the CW section of the NIE. Those assessments included:

- Baghdad has chemical weapons.
- We judge that Iraq is expanding its chemical industry primarily to support chemical weapons production.

[REDACTED]

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- We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX.
 - Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical warfare agents – much of it added in the last year.
 - The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing chemical bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles.
 - Baghdad probably is hiding small-scale agent production within legitimate research laboratories.
 - Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited CW production hidden within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry.

B. Baghdad Has Chemical Weapons

(U) The statement that, “Baghdad has chemical . . . weapons,” was made only in the key judgments of the NIE and not in the main text of the document. The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Conventional Military Issues who was responsible for the chemical weapons section of the NIE, told Committee staff that the statement was intended to be a summation of assessments in the main text. The statement is broader than previous IC assessments provided to the Committee which used less definitive language in describing Iraq's CW capabilities. For example, the 2000 ICA said, “We believe that Iraq has chemical agent and stable intermediaries in bulk storage, production equipment, and filled munitions that are still militarily useful.” The elimination of “we believe” from the 2002 NIE key judgments removed the indication that this was an assessment rather than a fact. Analysts from several intelligence agencies told Committee staff that in retrospect they believe that the statement, “We judge that Baghdad has chemical weapons,” would have been a more accurate reflection of their views in the 2002 NIE.

(U) Because the judgment that Iraq had CW was not specifically described in the body of the NIE, no intelligence reporting was provided by the IC directly in support of that assessment. IC analysts told Committee staff, however, that the assessment was based in part on Iraq's inability to fully account for the destruction of pre-Gulf War CW and precursors, suggesting that Iraq may have retained some of those chemicals. Information from UNSCOM reports provided

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED] of a second facility from [REDACTED] 2002 also showed that possible transshipment activity had occurred at the [REDACTED] Ammunition Depot. This activity was also assessed to be possible CW transshipment because a tanker truck, which could have served as a decontamination vehicle, was present at the facility while a [REDACTED] truck was engaged in probable transshipment activities.

([REDACTED]) Additional [REDACTED] showed that Iraq had conducted munitions transshipment activity at [REDACTED] ammunition depots and storage sites around Iraq in the spring and summer of 2002. Most of this activity was assessed to be related to conventional munitions.

([REDACTED]) While the presence of the [REDACTED] decontamination vehicle was assessed to be an indicator of the presence of CW, a July [REDACTED], 2002 NIMA assessment noted that because of the similarities of the [REDACTED] decontamination vehicles to a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The report concluded that the [REDACTED] vehicle could not be discounted "as a tipoff when assessing possible CW activity," suggesting that it may be present during non-CW activity as well.

([REDACTED]) Intelligence analysts also told Committee staff that the tanker trucks and [REDACTED] vehicles were an indication of possible CW transshipment activity, but could also have been associated with other activities. An analyst from the DIA told Committee staff that, "Today, we don't know whether this vehicle is still associated with the CW program, but it is a specific vehicle that the chemical program used in its former program before 1991." An analyst from INR said, "The [REDACTED] decon vehicle is used for multiple purposes, and [REDACTED] [REDACTED], it can also be used as for fire safety as a water truck."

[REDACTED] Some of the same hazards exist with conventional munitions as they do for CW munitions, so you need a fire safety truck."

([REDACTED]) The Committee was not provided with any corroborating intelligence reporting prior to publication of the NIE that indicated the transshipment activity at any of the facilities mentioned in [REDACTED] reports was related to movement of CW.

[REDACTED]

C. We Judge That Iraq Is Expanding its Chemical Industry Primarily to Support Chemical Weapons (CW) Production

(U) The judgment in the NIE that Iraq was expanding its chemical industry primarily to support CW production was based on intelligence reports which showed construction and other activity at suspect Iraqi CW facilities, particularly the Fallujah II chlorine and phenol plants. Iraq's Fallujah II chlorine and phenol plants were designed and built as dedicated CW precursor production plants in the 1980s, but were heavily damaged during the first Gulf War. Iraq told inspectors in the 1990s that it was rebuilding the plants for civilian chlorine and phenol production. Both chlorine and phenol have CW applications, but also have legitimate civilian uses such as water treatment or pesticide and resin production. The IC judged that Iraq's civilian needs for chlorine were already adequately met through UN-authorized imports and three other chlorine plants in the country. The IC also noted in the NIE that Iraq modified the phenol plant after the departure of UN inspectors in 1998, which they assessed suggested that it was modified for illicit use.

(I) At least [REDACTED] imagery reports provided to the Committee did show that the Fallujah II chlorine and phenol plants had been operational since March 2000 and that both plants had been modified after the departure of UN inspectors. [REDACTED] showed [REDACTED] support elements at both facilities.

(I) To show how the IC determined that Iraq's chlorine needs were adequately met without the Fallujah II chlorine plant, the IC provided the Committee with a [REDACTED] chlorine stockpiles at Iraq's water treatment plants. [REDACTED]. The IC also said that Iraq had three other chlorine production plants in the country that were continuing to produce chlorine. At the end of 2000, just one of the plants was producing 25 tons of chlorine per day. According to the CIA analysts, this was [REDACTED] more than the [REDACTED] Iraq needed for water treatment each day.

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) The NIE also noted that personnel at the facility had engaged in [REDACTED] burial of equipment, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In a written response to a question from Committee staff, the CIA said that [REDACTED] burial indicates that Iraq was, "hiding equipment so that it could be dug up easily later," and said that even if the equipment was damaged, other reporting showed that Iraq had repaired such equipment in the past for use at this facility. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) The NIE also said that Iraq was using its procurement network to try to acquire precursors for chemical agents it had made in the past. The IC provided at least thirty [REDACTED] intelligence [REDACTED] reports to the Committee which indicated that Iraq was trying to procure chemicals and equipment with both CW and legitimate civilian applications. Some of the reports noted specifically that the chemicals were probably for legitimate purposes.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] None of the remaining reports showed that Iraq had ultimately obtained any of these chemicals or that the chemicals were intended for a weapons program. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) Finally, the NIE noted that the management of the facility included individuals identified as personnel from Iraq's pre-Gulf War CW program. [REDACTED] reports provided to the Committee indicated that in 2000 and 2001 several individuals who worked in Iraq's CW program were working at the Fallujah II facility. One of the reports noted, however, that there

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

was no indication that these individuals were conducting chemical warfare research at the facility.

(U) None of the intelligence reporting provided to the Committee showed that Iraq was expanding its chemical infrastructure “primarily” to support CW production. Although the word “primarily” was in the draft NIE which all analysts had the opportunity to review and coordinate, IC analysts told Committee staff during interviews that they do not believe the assessment that the expansion was “primarily” intended to support a CW program accurately represented their views. When asked whether in retrospect there was anything analysts regretted including in the NIE, a CIA analyst told Committee staff “There’s a line in there about how Iraq’s chemical industry was rebuilt primarily to support the CW program, and we don’t think it was ‘primarily.’ We think that the program was benefitting from it, but we don’t think that’s why they were rebuilding the industry.” In a written response to a question from Committee staff, the DIA said that it had proposed deleting the word “primarily” from the NIE text at the NIE coordination meeting because “It was difficult to distinguish how much of the chemical industry was supporting CW programs versus various non-chemical warfare programs.” Non-chemical warfare programs include both civilian chemical programs and conventional weapons programs. The DIA told the Committee that the disagreement on whether to exclude the word “primarily” was not of sufficient importance to warrant a footnote to the NIE. An INR analyst told Committee staff that he had “no specific recollection” from the NIE coordination meeting about this specific passage, but noted that “In general, INR judged that Iraq could use elements of its dual-use infrastructure to support a CW capability, but that we had little specific intelligence to judge that Iraq was producing chemical warfare agents in 2002.”

D. We Assess That Baghdad Has Begun Renewed Production of Mustard, Sarin, GF (Cyclosarin), and VX

(U) The IC provided the Committee with seven intelligence reports which said Iraq had renewed production of chemical agents. [REDACTED] according to an IC response to a question from Committee staff “Analysts in 2002 evaluating these reports did not consider them highly reliable.” There were no [REDACTED] reports to corroborate the [REDACTED] reporting that CW production had begun. Intelligence analysts told Committee staff that their assessment that Iraq, “had begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF and VX,” was not based on this reporting, but was an analytical judgment based largely on [REDACTED] reports of transshipment activity at al Musayyib [REDACTED], discussed previously in this report. A CIA analyst told Committee staff that prior to [REDACTED] reports, the IC assessed that Iraq was capable of producing CW, but could

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

not determine whether Iraq had produced such weapons. The analyst said that the IC assessed that if Iraq had been moving chemical munitions, it must have produced the agents with which to fill those munitions. The specific references to the chemical agents mustard, sarin, GF and VX were based on information about which agents Iraq had produced in the past and an analytical judgment about which agents Iraq was still capable of producing.

E. Although We Have Little Specific Information on Iraq's CW Stockpile, Saddam Probably Has Stocked at Least 100 Metric Tons and Possibly as Much as 500 Metric Tons of CW Agents – Much of it Added in the Last Year

(U) The NIE assessment of Iraq's stocks of CW was outlined in a footnote in the report. It said,

Conservative estimates of Iraqi CW precursor stocks and production capacity, combined with Iraqi motivations and military requirements, suggest the stockpile is composed of at least 100 tons. We believe the Iraqis are capable of producing significantly larger quantities of CW agent in some scenarios; the 500-ton upper-end estimate takes into account practical bounds, such as Iraq's limited delivery options, and approximates Iraq's stocks at the time of Operation Desert Storm.

([REDACTED]) The IC did not provide the Committee with any intelligence documentation which showed that Iraq had stockpiled between 100 and 500 metric tons of chemical agents, other than [REDACTED] reports which showed that Iraq did not adequately account for its pre-Gulf War stocks of chemical precursors and stocks. Previous intelligence assessments said that Iraq had a probable stockpile of 100 metric tons or less, based on estimates of CW and precursors for which Iraq had not been able to adequately account.

([REDACTED]) An intelligence analyst from the CIA told Committee staff that CIA analysts had estimated 500 metric tons as the upper end of the range for the CW stockpile [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The IC increased the stockpile estimate and assessed that much of that 500 metric ton stockpile had been "added in the last year" largely because of the discovery of the suspected CW transshipment activity at al Musayyib [REDACTED] in the spring of 2002 discussed previously in this report. The IC assessed that if Iraq had been moving chemical weapons in the spring of 2002, it must have recently produced those weapons, causing the

[REDACTED]

Community to raise the stockpile estimate. There was no direct intelligence reporting of an increase in weapons stocks that caused the IC to raise the stockpile estimate.

(U) An INR CW analyst told Committee staff that he believed the 500 metric tons upper assessment was calculated "very poorly." He said he was dubious of the stockpile estimates, but said he did not footnote the NIE because the 100 metric tons lower estimate was a reasonable and longstanding IC assessment based on Iraq's accounting discrepancies and because the 500 metric tons upper limit was discussed in the NIE as "up to" 500 tons which he believed was plausible. The DIA concurred with the language in the NIE regarding the size of Iraq's CW stockpile because it believed the language, "was sufficiently caveated to indicate DIA's uncertainty in the size of the stockpile."

(U) The fact that the IC lacked specific information about Iraq's CW stockpile was noted in the body of the NIE, and the IC explained in a footnote how it arrived at the assessment that Iraq had stocked "possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agent." The key judgments of the NIE did not alert the reader to these explanatory notes.

F. Iraq Had Experience in Manufacturing CW Bombs, Artillery Rockets, and Projectiles

([REDACTED]) The IC provided the Committee with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] which noted that Iraq had produced CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles prior to the Gulf War. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The report noted that Iraq had produced over [REDACTED] 500-gauge aerial bombs, [REDACTED] 250-gauge aerial bombs, [REDACTED] 130-mm artillery shells, almost [REDACTED] DB2 aerial bombs, [REDACTED] al-Hussein (Scud-variant) warheads, [REDACTED] R-400 aerial bombs and [REDACTED] warheads for 122-mm artillery rockets. In addition, Iraq declared that it expended thousands of these munitions in the 1980s.

G. Baghdad Probably Is Hiding Small-Scale Agent Production Within Legitimate Research Laboratories

([REDACTED]) The IC noted in the NIE that its knowledge of Iraq's small-scale agent production hidden within legitimate research laboratories rested on "limited intelligence reporting on suspicious activity at only a few research centers." The NIE said one of the facilities, the al-Basel Research Center which Iraq had declared as part of its pre-Gulf War CW program, "may be collaborating on CW-related tasks" with a suspected chemical facility, Habbaniyah II (another name for Fallujah II).

[REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) Intelligence reporting provided to the Committee did show that these facilities “may” have been collaborating on a sensitive project to produce nerve agent. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A separate [REDACTED] report showed that the deputy director of the Tareq State Establishment, which operates Habbaniyah II, was planning to purchase [REDACTED] equipment through the UN’s Oil For Food Program in May 2002, but there was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

H. Baghdad Has Procured Covertly the Types and Quantities of Chemicals and Equipment Sufficient to Allow Limited CW Production Hidden Within Iraq’s Legitimate Chemical Industry

([REDACTED]) The IC assessed in the NIE that Iraq’s procurement of CW precursors, technology, and specialized equipment cannot be definitely linked to Iraq’s CW program, but “Iraq’s procurements have contributed to the rebuilding of dual-use facilities that probably are adding to Iraq’s overall CW agent capability.” The IC provided at least seven [REDACTED] [REDACTED] reports to the Committee which showed that Iraq had attempted to procure various chemicals that had potential applications in CW production. These chemicals, however, all had legitimate civilian uses. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED] one of the reports, a HUMINT report [REDACTED] indicated that Iraq had actually “procured” a chemical substance as noted in the NIE. The other reports showed only that Iraq had attempted to procure the chemicals. Although the original draft language of the NIE which all analysts had the opportunity to review and coordinate said “procured,” analysts from several intelligence agencies told Committee staff that, in retrospect, “Iraq sought various chemicals . . .” or “Iraq tried to obtain various chemicals . . .” would have been more accurate statements.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I. Chemical Weapons Defensive Posture and Procurements

([REDACTED]) The NIE also included a discussion of Iraq's attempts to procure nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defensive equipment, including NBC reconnaissance vehicles, chemical detection tubes, a decontamination shower, Geiger counters, and atropine auto-injectors – a nerve agent antidote. The NIE noted that, "Iraqi troops could use NBC equipment defensively against a WMD attack or as a preventative measure during an offensive attack. If Iraq used a nonpersistent agent such as sarin, its troops would need protection in case the agent blew back on them . . ." The reports provided to the Committee did not reference whether the equipment was intended to be used defensively for an anticipated WMD attack on Iraq or during an offensive Iraqi attack using WMD. One of the reports did indicate that Iraq had obtained some of the defensive gear [REDACTED]

J. Explaining Uncertainties

(U) The NIE provided a "text box" that listed the IC's "confidence levels for selected key judgements in this estimate." The NIE's key judgements were broken down into three categories of high, moderate and low confidence. Assessments related to Iraq's CW capabilities listed under the "High Confidence" heading were:

- "Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions."
- "We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs."
- "Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles."

(U) There were no assessments of Iraq's CW capabilities listed under the "Moderate Confidence" or "Low Confidence" headings.

K. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Iraq's Chemical Weapons (CW) Prior to Publication of the NIE

(U) Analysis from individual intelligence agencies on Iraq's CW program was consistent among agencies and largely consistent with the NIE and other IC products discussed earlier in this report. The following are examples of assessments from the DIA, CIA and INR.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) In October 1997, the DIA published a defense intelligence assessment, *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs: Progress, Problems, and Potential Vulnerabilities* which stated that, "UNSCOM has had limited success in locating proscribed items and Iraq is assessed to have retained a broad range of CW-related items, including a residual agent and precursor stockpile estimated at 10 to 100 tons." The DIA assessed that Iraq could restart limited agent production quickly, probably within a few weeks of a decision to do so and said "mustard, sarin, and VX are likely to be the focus of the renewed production efforts, although sarin and especially VX will require longer to start up significant production quantities."

(U) On December 14, 2001, the DIA published another document, *Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook*, which stated that, "Iraq is assessed to hold 100 metric tons of chemical agents or less in bulk storage and filled munitions. The nature and condition of this remaining stockpile are unknown. Mustard agent is the most likely component of the stockpile. We believe that Iraq also holds production equipment and chemical precursors." The assessment noted that the DIA, "cannot confirm whether Iraq is currently producing chemical agents, or whether Baghdad has decided to re-establish a large-scale CW production capability," but noted that, "We cannot dismiss the possibility that small-scale production has taken place. The agents mustard, sarin, cyclosarin (GF) and VX will most likely be the focus of Iraq's reconstitution efforts."

(U) In September 2002, the DIA published a defense contingency product, *Iraq - Key WMD Facilities An Operational Support Study* which said, "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has - or will - establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities. Unusual munitions transfer activity in mid-2002 suggests that Iraq is distributing CW munitions in preparation for an anticipated US attack." The assessment said that "Iraq likely has resumed some chemical and biological agent production, but we lack conclusive proof due to Iraq's effective national-level denial and deception (D&D) effort." The assessment added, "Although we lack any direct information, Iraq probably possesses CW agent in chemical munitions, possibly including artillery rockets, artillery shells, aerial bombs, and ballistic missile warheads. Baghdad also probably possesses bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily containing precursors, but that also could consist of some mustard agent or stabilized VX."

(U) As early as August 1996, the CIA published a report which noted that Iraq retained chemical agents and munitions. The CIA intelligence report, *Iraq's Remaining WMD Capabilities*, said that "Iraq is continuing to conceal a small stockpile of chemical agents, munitions, precursors, production material and equipment."

[REDACTED]

(U) In August 1998, the CIA published an intelligence report, *Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program: Status and Prospects* (NPC 98-10005C), which noted that "Baghdad retains a clandestine stockpile of chemical munitions and agents. Although UNSCOM initiatives have significantly reduced Iraq's CW stockpiles and infrastructure, Iraq will be poised to restart limited CW production after the departure of UNSCOM." The CIA assessed that, "Iraq could begin limited CW agent production within weeks after UN sanctions are lifted and intrusive inspections cease: Baghdad retains key elements of its CW program including personnel, production data, and hidden stocks of production equipment and precursor chemicals."

(U) On January 3, 2002, the CIA produced a Publish When Ready (PWR010302-06) which said, "Baghdad retains the ability to strike opponents in the region with chemical and biological agents, including delivery by missiles."

([REDACTED]) On April 18, 2002, the CIA published an assessment, *Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Profiting From Equipment and Chemical Transfers*, which stated, "Over the past three years, Iraq may have obtained chemicals that would allow it to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents – most likely the blister agent sulfur mustard, and the nerve agents sarin and cyclosarin – quickly on a small scale, according to our analysis of [REDACTED] intelligence [REDACTED]. Iraq is seeking the equipment and chemicals needed to produce covertly CW precursors and agents within its chemical industry, despite the sanctions and control regimes that are aimed at preventing such transfers. [REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) INR published an intelligence brief on November 5, 2001, which said that Iraq appeared to have resumed operations at a production building suspected by the IC of supporting CW precursor production. INR also said in an [REDACTED] 2002, assessment that Iraq may have conducted CW-filling activity at the al Musayyib site, a suspect CW storage site. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

INR

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

said, nonetheless, it believed that the activity may have involved suspect CBW-related munitions transshipment.

(U) None of the pre-NIE assessments provided to the Committee by any of the intelligence agencies said that Iraq “has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX.” Most of the assessments were published prior to the IC obtaining the intelligence on the spring and summer 2002 transshipment activity that the IC assessed was related to chemical weapons and was a major factor in their judgment that Iraq had chemical weapons.

L. Chemical Conclusions

(U) Conclusion 58. The statement in the key judgments of the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that “Baghdad has . . . chemical weapons” overstated both what was known about Iraq’s chemical weapons holdings and what intelligence analysts judged about Iraq’s chemical weapons holdings.

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]
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(U) Conclusion 59. The judgment in the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq was expanding its chemical industry primarily to support chemical weapons production overstated both what was known about expansion of Iraq’s chemical industry and what intelligence analysts judged about expansion of Iraq’s chemical industry.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) Conclusion 60. It was not clearly explained in the National Intelligence Estimate that the basis for several of the Intelligence Community’s assessments about Iraq’s chemical weapons capabilities and activities were not based directly on intelligence reporting of those capabilities and activities, but were based on layers of analysis regarding [REDACTED] intelligence reporting.

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Conclusion 61. The Intelligence Community's assessment that "Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical weapons agents -- much of it added in the last year," was an analytical judgment and not based on intelligence reporting that indicated the existence of an Iraqi chemical weapons stockpile of this size.

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Conclusion 62. The Intelligence Community's assessment that Iraq had experience in manufacturing chemical weapons bombs, artillery rockets and projectiles was reasonable based on intelligence derived from Iraqi declarations.

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) Conclusion 63. The National Intelligence Estimate assessment that "Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited chemical weapons production hidden within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry" was not substantiated by the intelligence provided to the Committee.

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) Conclusion 64. The National Intelligence Estimate accurately represented information known about Iraq's procurement of defensive equipment.

(U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]