

[REDACTED]

## IV. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

### A. Background

(U) Prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on *Iraq's Continuing Programs of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, the Intelligence Community (IC) prepared several coordinated papers that contained assessments of Iraq's biological weapons (BW) program. Prior to the departure of inspectors in 1998, IC assessments focused largely on the United Nations Special Commission's (UNSCOM) findings in Iraq, outstanding compliance issues, and the IC's assessment of the difficulties UNSCOM would face as it attempted to gain full Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions requiring its disarmament.

(U) In February 1999, the Intelligence Community reported in *Iraq: WMD and Delivery Capabilities After Operation Desert Fox*, that Iraq probably retained the personnel, documentation, and much of the critical equipment necessary to continue and advance its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery programs. Iraq possessed biological agent<sup>20</sup> stockpiles that could be, or already were, weaponized and ready for use, but the paper did not state definitively that Iraq had biological weapons. The size of those agent stockpiles was said to be uncertain and subject to debate, and the location, nature, and condition of the stockpiles was also unknown. Iraq's production of biological weapons was assessed to be largely dormant, but the IC observed that Iraq could begin BW agent production within days of a decision to do so.

( [REDACTED] ) A July 1999 National Intelligence Council (NIC) Memorandum titled *Iraq: Post-Desert Fox Activities and Estimated Status of WMD Programs* noted that in the wake of Operation Desert Fox, the "loss of United Nations (UN) inspectors on the ground and of airborne imagery from the UNSCOM U-2 flights make it difficult to determine whether activity detected at known dual-use<sup>21</sup> sites is related to WMD production." It went on to note that Iraq may have already resumed some BW production but the IC had no reliable intelligence to indicate this, and assessed that in the absence of UN inspectors Iraq would expand its BW activities. A month

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<sup>20</sup>BW agent is a dangerous biological pathogen. The agent must still be disseminated or distributed effectively in a weapon or some other type of delivery mechanism to effect the intended target.

<sup>21</sup>The term dual-use, in a BW context, refers to technology that is useful both for biological warfare and legitimate biotechnical, agricultural and public health needs. An example would be a fermenter that is useful for both making vaccines and biological warfare agents.

[REDACTED]

later, the IC expanded this judgment in the August 1999 NIE, *Worldwide BW program: Trends and Prospects* (NIE 2000-12HCX), which stated that Iraq's "BW program has continued since the Gulf War, and we judge it is being revitalized now that the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) monitoring and inspection activities are suspended." This NIE was updated in December 2000 (*Worldwide BW Programs: Trends and Prospects Update* (NIE 99-05CX/D)), when the IC adjusted upward its assessment of the BW threat posed by Iraq, citing new intelligence acquired in 2000. The IC's concern about Iraq's BW program began to grow in early 2000 when the Defense Human Intelligence Service (DHS) began reporting the [REDACTED] debriefings of an Iraqi engineer, the human intelligence (HUMINT) source code named CURVE BALL, who claimed to have worked on a project in Iraq to construct seven mobile biological production units. The December 2000 Worldwide BW NIE stated in its key judgements that:

(U) Despite a decade-long international effort to disarm Iraq, new information suggests that Baghdad has continued and expanded its offensive BW program by establishing a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability. We judge that Iraq maintains the capability to produce previously declared agents and probably is pursuing development of additional bacterial and toxin agents. Moreover, we judge that Iraq has BW delivery systems available that could be used to threaten US and Allied forces in the Persian Gulf region.

( [REDACTED] ) In December 2000, at the request of the National Security Council, the IC also produced an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on Iraq's WMD programs that included an assessment of the state of Iraq's BW program. The paper assessed that Iraq had largely rebuilt declared facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and expanded WMD-capable infrastructure. Specific to BW, the paper assessed:

- We cannot confirm whether Iraq has produced . . . biological agents, although in the case of biological weapons, credible reporting from a single source suggests it has done so on a large scale and had developed a clandestine production capability.
- Our main judgment about what remains of Iraq's original WMD programs, agents stockpiles, and delivery systems have changed little: Iraq retains stockpiles of chemical and biological agents and munitions.
- IC analysts are increasingly concerned that Saddam has acquired a clandestine BW production capability which has the potential to turn out several hundred tons of unconcentrated BW agent per year.

[REDACTED]

- According to [REDACTED] reporting from a single source, Iraq has constructed seven transportable – via trucks and rail cars – plants, some of which have produced BW agents. Although the information is unconfirmed, it tracks with UNSCOM evidence acquired in the mid-1990's that Iraq was considering such a program.
- Recent [REDACTED] analysis suggests that Iraq has built and is operating a new castor oil plant. Castor oil has various civilian applications, but leftover bean pulp could easily be used to make the BW agent ricin.
- New construction at a few dual-use facilities formerly associated with the BW program has raised our concern about Iraqi intentions. Nevertheless, we are unable to determine – because of the lack of intelligence information or observable signatures – whether Iraq is diverting these or other of its many pharmaceutical, vaccine, or pesticide plants to produce BW agents.
- According to multiple [REDACTED] sources, Iraq is bolstering its BW research and development, [REDACTED] that in 1999 that such research & development (R&D) was being carried out while UNSCOM was active in Iraq. Iraq could easily have intensified and expanded this work over the last two years.
- A limited body of reporting suggests that Iraq is seeking through its extensive procurement network dual-use equipment and other materials for BW research.

(U) The 2000 ICA also discussed at length the significant uncertainties associated with Iraq's failure to satisfy UN inspectors that it had destroyed all of its biological weapons, agent and growth media.

(U) The IC published, *The BW Threat to the Global and US Agricultural Sectors* (ICB 2001-09) in March 2001, and *Smallpox: How Extensive a Threat?* (ICB 2001-34HC) in December 2001, which stated for the first time that “we think chances are even that smallpox is part of Baghdad's offensive BW program, although credible evidence is limited.” A chart included in the December 2001 assessment indicated the likelihood that smallpox is part of Iraq's “current offensive BW program” was medium, which was defined on the chart as “40-60%.” The chart also indicated that the “quality of information” to support this assessment was “poor.”

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) While the Intelligence Community had adjusted upward its assessments of the BW threat posed by Iraq beginning with the 2000 Worldwide BW National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), the October 2002 NIE represented a shift in the IC's judgments about Iraq's biological weapons program. Many of the uncertainties that were expressed in all previous IC assessments about what was known about the BW program were not contained in the NIE's text. The starkest shift was the judgment that "Baghdad has . . . biological weapons." All previous assessments had stated that Iraq *could* have biological weapons. The other significant change was the assessment that all key aspects -- R&D, production, and weaponization<sup>22</sup> -- of Iraq's offensive BW program were active and that most elements were now larger and more advanced than they had been before the Gulf War. Given this shift in the IC's assessments, Committee staff focused their work on the analysis of Iraq's biological warfare program in the 2002 NIE.

(U) The Committee examined each of the IC's assessments outlined in the NIE and the available intelligence that supported those assessments. Committee staff also interviewed analysts and officials from the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and every intelligence agency involved in the biological section of the NIE including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency<sup>23</sup> (NIMA), and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). The Committee also interviewed IC personnel responsible for intelligence collection regarding Iraq's BW capabilities and former UN inspectors.

(U) The Deputy National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Science and Technology assembled the biological warfare section of the NIE from a compilation of previous IC publications concerning Iraq's BW program. The material in the BW section was drawn from the Iraqi BW section of a draft update to the December 2000 Worldwide BW NIE that was titled, *Worldwide BW Programs: Trends and Prospects Update*, a September 12, 2002 CIA paper that was provided in support of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Iraqi BW section from the draft NIE, *Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland Through 2007*, and the September 17, 2002 testimony and background material produced for the DCI for use with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee.

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<sup>22</sup>Weaponization refers to taking biological warfare agent and placing it in an effective delivery system, such as a spray tank system or artillery shell.

<sup>23</sup>NIMA has recently been renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) The DIA analyst, who was a key player in producing the Iraqi section of the draft update to the December 2000 Worldwide Biological Weapons NIE, told Committee staff that the draft was revised in three successive rounds of electronic mail (e-mail) coordination with his IC counterparts. The DIA analyst told Committee staff that the comments he received from his IC counterparts in this e-mail coordination process did not significantly change any of the overall assessments, and only offered more detail and “refined our assessments.” The DCI refused to provide the Committee with copies of draft revisions of the BW section of the October 2002 NIE. NIC officials and IC analysts told Committee staff that there was no significant dissent from any IC agencies concerning the October 2002 NIE’s BW assessments.

( [REDACTED] ) As the title of the October 2002 NIE’s BW section, “Biological Warfare Program – Larger Than Before,” indicates, the primary assessment of the BW section of the NIE was that, not only had Iraq continued its BW program since 1991 in defiance of international efforts to disarm Iraq, but the program had advanced beyond what it had achieved prior to the 1991 Gulf War. This overall assessment is stated clearly in both the key judgments and the first sentence of the body of the BW section: “we assess that all key aspects – R&D, production, and weaponization – of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War.” An important component of this overall assessment is a statement found in the second sentence of the NIE’s key judgments section, “Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons . . . .” This statement was not repeated in the body of the NIE’s BW section. The [REDACTED] CIA BW analyst [REDACTED] [REDACTED] noted during an interview with Committee staff that in retrospect, [REDACTED] believes that the sentence should have carried the caveat that *we assess* that Baghdad has biological weapons, to better reflect the uncertainties associated with this judgment.

(U) To support the assessment that Iraq’s offensive BW program was larger and more advanced than it was before the Gulf War, and that Iraq had biological weapons, the NIE makes the following assessments:

- Baghdad has transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents.
- Baghdad has been able to renovate and expand its fixed dual-use BW agent production facilities.
- We assess that Iraq has some BW agents and maintains the capability to produce a variety of BW agents.

[REDACTED]

- In the absence of UN inspectors, Iraq probably has intensified and expanded research and development in support of Iraq's BW program. Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered BW agents.
- We assess that Baghdad also has increased the effectiveness of its BW arsenal by mastering the ability to produce dried agent.
- Iraq's capability to manufacture equipment and materials . . . and to procure other necessary, dual-use materials . . . makes large-scale BW agent production easily attainable.
- The nature and amounts of Iraq's stored BW material remain unresolved by UNSCOM accounting.
- We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception efforts.

(U) The following sections outline the Committee's examination of the intelligence supporting the arguments behind the NIE's assessment that Iraq's offensive BW program was larger and more advanced than before the 1991 Gulf war.

***B. Baghdad Has Transportable Facilities for Producing Bacterial and Toxin BW Agents***

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE stated that "Baghdad has transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents and may have other mobile units for researching and filling agent into munitions or containers, according to multiple [REDACTED] sources. Iraq has pursued mobile BW production options, largely to protect its BW capability from detection, according to a credible source."

( [REDACTED] ) A large part of the NIE's discussion of the alleged mobile BW production units was based on information provided by a source described in the NIE as "a credible source" and "an Iraqi defector deemed credible by the IC." The source was an Iraqi defector who had been the subject of debriefings [REDACTED] since 2000. He was believed by the IC to have been a project engineer involved in the design and production of [REDACTED] biological production facilities in Iraq. [REDACTED]. The source is hereafter [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
referred to by the codename he was given [REDACTED],  
"CURVE BALL".

( [REDACTED] ) The Committee was provided with 112 reports from the [REDACTED] debriefings of CURVE BALL. CIA, DIA and INR BW analysts all told Committee staff that CURVE BALL provided the majority of the specific detail in the IC's assessments concerning the mobile BW production units. An INR BW analyst told Committee staff that if the reporting from CURVE BALL was removed from consideration it would have reduced his confidence in the assessment that Iraq had mobile BW production units. The INR BW analyst noted that without CURVE BALL ". . . you probably could only honestly say that Iraq would be motivated to have a mobile BW program and that it was attempting to procure components that would support that."

( [REDACTED] ) Additional reporting from CURVE BALL, and additional human intelligence (HUMINT) sources that analysts believed corroborated his reporting, was instrumental in the IC shifting its characterization of Iraq's mobile BW production program from an assessment in December 2000 that stated, "according to credible US military reporting [REDACTED], Baghdad now can produce biological agents in transportable plants" to the 2002 NIE's assessment that "Baghdad *has* transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents and may have other mobile units for researching and filling agent into munitions or containers, according to multiple [REDACTED] sources" (emphasis added). A CIA BW analyst told Committee staff that, "The big factor changing assessments that we had since the Gulf War was this body of reporting we got on the mobile BW program."

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE stated that CURVE BALL reported that, ". . . seven mobile BW production units were constructed and that one began production as early as 1997." The NIE also said that, according to CURVE BALL, the seven units were produced [REDACTED]. Reports from CURVE BALL provided to the Committee described the production of seven mobile BW production units. One report [REDACTED] [REDACTED], suggesting that production was underway in 1997. One of the reports also described the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] "construction of each of the new mobile biological weapons (BW) agent production units."

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE stated that "the reported locations of these plants have been identified in imagery, but Iraq has most likely dispersed these units since the source defected." Several reports from CURVE BALL described the locations of the seven mobile production units.

[REDACTED]

Imagery analysts used this information to identify what they assessed to be the locations in Iraq described by CURVE BALL. In interviews with Committee staff, IC analysts indicated that they viewed the identification of the sites on imagery, and the fact that buildings were [REDACTED] to accommodate the mobile production plants as described by CURVE BALL, as corroboration of CURVE BALL's reporting. A CIA BW analyst told Committee staff that "we were able to identify the sites he had named to be agricultural sites housing these mobile plants. Stuff like that looked like more corroboration to us at the time." The CIA BW analyst also noted that while the IC was confident that it had identified the seven sites that CURVE BALL was discussing, "when we reviewed the imagery we couldn't find any evidence of the [mobile BW production] plants being there. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE's discussion of the mobile biological production units concluded with the estimate that if all seven units were operational, Iraq would take "... approximately 14 to 26 weeks to produce the amount UNSCOM assessed was actually produced prior [to] the Gulf War." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

### 1. Other Sources

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE stated that the information concerning Iraq's efforts to build mobile BW production facilities "... tracks with [REDACTED] evidence that Iraq in the mid-1990s was considering a mobile fermentation capability, [REDACTED]" The [REDACTED] evidence is described in a December 1996 HUMINT report that provided a translation of two Iraqi handwritten notes [REDACTED]. The report described how the undated notes were written on Iraqi Military Industrial Corporation letterhead found in late 1995 and provided a summary of their contents:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE also noted that another source provided information to the IC on mobile biological research laboratories. The NIE said, "in mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile laboratories for BW agent research to evade UNSCOM inspections, according to [REDACTED], an Iraqi defector associated with the Iraqi National Congress (INC)." [REDACTED] is hereafter referred to as the INC source. The information provided by the INC source is detailed in a March 2002 Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) intelligence report. The report discussed a project involving several Iraqi ministries, including the Iraqi Intelligence Service, to procure labs that would allow Iraq to conceal "biological research operations" from UNSCOM inspectors. The report noted that the source was "unaware of the exact nature of the research conducted in the labs." This report, which does not discuss mobile BW production, was the only report concerning mobile BW units from this source. In addition to the INC source, the IC provided the Committee seven other reports concerning Iraqi mobile biological laboratories. None of these reports discussed mobile BW production units. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) Although he was not specifically referenced in the text of the NIE, the IC also provided the Committee with an intelligence report from the debriefing of another Iraqi Asylum seeker [REDACTED]. A report from June 2001, which was the only report from this source provided to the Committee, said that Iraq had transportable facilities for the production of biological weapons mounted on trailers at a special armaments factory in Iraq, and that there were other Iraqi sites where biological weapons were produced. The report noted that protective gear had to be worn in these transportable facilities, which were housed in partially underground buildings that were surrounded by a fence. The report also stated that "anyone with open sores was strictly forbidden access to these facilities," and that "warheads with biological agents were stockpiled at this site."

( [REDACTED] ) Committee staff found several areas of concern regarding the HUMINT sources upon which the IC relied to build its assessments concerning Iraq's mobile BW production program. Those sources were CURVE BALL, [REDACTED], the INC source, and [REDACTED].

## 2. CURVE BALL

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]. A CIA BW analyst told Committee staff that the translation process used to debrief CURVE BALL led to some misunderstandings. CURVE BALL spoke in English and Arabic, which was translated into a Western European language. [REDACTED]

DHS officers [REDACTED] translated the reports back into English before transmitting them to the [REDACTED] Intelligence Community. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) The IC provided the Committee with a copy of an evaluation of the intelligence reporting from CURVE BALL that was submitted by [REDACTED] DIA BW analysts. The evaluation stated that “overall, the fact that the source may be valuable and the reporting appears to be of major significance are presently compromised by reporting inconsistencies as noted in the guidance below.” [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The DHS intelligence officer responsible for collecting and reporting the intelligence from CURVE BALL was unable to tell Committee staff whether these concerns had been raised [REDACTED]. The DHS intelligence officer did not recall the particular evaluation provided by the DIA BW analysts, or if [REDACTED] provided any information in response.

( [REDACTED] ) A CIA BW analyst told Committee staff that a Department of Defense (DOD) detailee who provided technical advice on CURVE BALL “. . . thought that the guy might be an alcoholic and that bothered him a lot.” The detailee who provided technical advice to the CIA Directorate of Operations (DO) on BW matters, met CURVE BALL in May 2000 in order to administer [REDACTED]. The detailee is the only American intelligence official to have met CURVE BALL before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) The DOD detailee raised several concerns about CURVE BALL's reliability in an electronic mail (e-mail) he wrote to the Deputy Chief of the CIA's [REDACTED] Iraqi WMD Task Force after reading a draft of Secretary Powell's speech to the U.N. The detailee noted that "I believe I am still the only [United States Government] USG person to have had direct access to him. There are a few issues associated with that contact that warrant further explanation, in my opinion, before using him as the backbone for the Iraqi mobile program." The detailee explained,

I do have a concern with the validity of the information based on "CURVE BALL" having a terrible hangover the morning [REDACTED]. I agree, it was only a one time interaction, however, he knew he was to have a [REDACTED] on that particular morning but tied one on anyway. What underlying issues could this be a problem with and how in depth has he been [REDACTED]?

The DOD detailee also expressed concern in his e-mail that,

During the [REDACTED] meeting a couple of months ago when I was allowed to request [REDACTED] that "we/USG" wanted direct access to CURVE BALL, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] replied that in fact that was not possible, [REDACTED] were having major handling issues with him and were attempting to determine, if in fact, CURVE BALL was who he said he was. These issues, in my opinion, warrant further inquiry, before we use the information as the backbone of one of our major findings of the existence of a continuing Iraqi BW program!

( [REDACTED] ) The detailee's e-mail was sent to the Deputy Chief of the [REDACTED] Iraqi WMD Task Force on February 4, one day before Secretary Powell delivered his speech. The detailee told Committee staff that prior to receiving a draft copy of Secretary Powell's speech he had "had many discussions with the analysts about my concerns with CURVE BALL as this whole thing was building up and taking on a life of its own. I was becoming frustrated, and when asked to go over Colin Powell's speech . . . and I went through the speech, and I thought, my gosh, we have got - I have got to go on record and make my concerns known. . . ."

( [REDACTED] ) The detailee also told Committee staff that during his [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of CURVE BALL, he had several opportunities to speak with the [REDACTED] who had [REDACTED] responsibility for debriefing CURVE BALL. The detailee observed that ". . . this is an opinion of mine and I really have nothing else to base it

[REDACTED]

on, but it was obvious to me that his case officer, for lack of better words, had fallen in love with his asset and the asset could do no wrong. I mean, the story was 100 percent correct as far as [REDACTED] was concerned.”

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The INR BW analyst also told Committee staff that he was not aware that the detailee had concerns that CURVE BALL might have a drinking problem.

( [REDACTED] ) Because of Committee staff’s concerns about the IC’s reliance on a single source and questions about CURVE BALL’s reporting, the Committee requested an IC assessment of CURVE BALL and his reliability. The DHS provided the Committee with an information paper on December 17, 2003 that stated “. . . the Iraqi design engineer [CURVE BALL] is not a biological weapons expert nor is he a life science expert. Source simply designed [REDACTED] production facilities. He never claimed that the project he was involved in was used to produce biological agents.” The DHS assessment also noted that “the source’s reporting demonstrates a knowledge of and access to personalities, organizations, procurement, and technology related to Iraq’s BW program.” Concerned that the assessment had said the primary source behind the IC’s assessments of the Iraqi mobile BW production program had “never claimed that the project he was involved in was used to produce biological agents,” Committee staff asked DHS to clarify what appeared to be a serious discrepancy. The DHS was unable to respond to the request for several weeks, noting to Committee staff that the matter was being handled by the DCI’s staff. The DHS then issued a correction to the Committee on January 15, 2003 that stated the information in the December 17, 2003 paper contained several errors and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] . . .” The DHS correction also stated that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

“by virtue of his position, and as reflected in the published Intelligence Information Reports, the source demonstrated extensive knowledge of Iraq’s BW program. As the project manager, he had intimate details of the mobile BW program.” The author of the December 2003 DHS paper which stated that CURVE BALL “never claimed that the project he was involved in was used to produce biological agents” was the DHS intelligence officer who had primary responsibility [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for collecting and reporting the intelligence from CURVE BALL’s debriefings. In an interview with Committee staff, the DHS officer stated that in his haste to provide an assessment of the source to the Committee, he had misread some of the intelligence reports from the source.

(b) 3. [REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]  
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( [REDACTED] ) Committee staff asked a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) polygraph expert with 29 years of experience with polygraph examinations about the possibility of a “false negative” resulting from a polygraph examination. A false negative is when a subject who is telling the truth is judged to be deceptive on a polygraph. The DoD polygraph expert told Committee staff that in regard to polygraph examinations, “anything could always be a false positive or a false negative. The polygraph is not 100 percent accurate and will never be 100

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

percent accurate, because we're dealing with the psychology and the physiology of the individual." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**4. INC Source**

( [REDACTED] ) As previously discussed, a March 2002 report from the INC source, [REDACTED] stated that in mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile laboratories for BW agent research to evade UNSCOM inspections. The NIE described the source by name and noted that he was an "Iraqi defector associated with the Iraqi National Congress." He had defected from Iraq in late 2001, and was brought to the attention of the DIA by Washington-based representatives of the INC in February 2002. After several meetings with the INC source, a DIA debriefer assessed that some of the information he provided ". . . seemed accurate, but much of it appeared embellished." The DIA debriefer believed that ". . . the source had been coached on what information to provide." The DIA's report from the INC source, however, described him as a "first time reporter who is considered reliable" and does not note the debriefer's concerns that he had been coached or that he had embellished information. The report also stated that the "source passed a DHS-administered polygraph regarding information included in this report."

( [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) In April 2002, the CIA published an assessment of the INC source that stated that DHS had terminated contact with him after four meetings because of suspicions he was a fabricator. In May 2002, DIA issued a "fabrication notice" which said that the information the INC source provided was "assessed as unreliable and, in some instances, pure fabrication." A DIA investigation of this source that resulted in the fabrication notice, questioned the source's truthfulness and noted that the ". . . information is now considered suspect." Although the source passed "an issue-specific DIA administered polygraph examination, DIA's discussions with the examiner indicate that some areas were not fully explored, which could account for the potential fabrication." In July 2002, the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia provided the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs with an assessment of Iraqi defectors who had been brought to the attention of the IC by the INC and noted the concerns the DIA and the [REDACTED] had about the source's reliability. Despite the April 2002 CIA assessment, the May 2002 fabrication notice and the July 2002 assessment suggesting the source may have fabricated information, the source was highlighted in the October 2002 NIE, and he was one of the four HUMINT sources specifically referred to in the part of Secretary Powell's February 2003 speech before the UN Security Council that discussed the mobile BW production units.

(b) 5. [REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) Although he was not specifically referenced in the text of the NIE, the IC also provided the Committee with an intelligence report from the debriefing of another Iraqi asylum seeker [REDACTED]. The June 2001 report, which is the only report from this source that discussed mobile BW units, stated that there were transportable facilities for the production of biological weapons mounted on trailers at a special armaments factory in Iraq, and that there were other Iraqi sites where biological weapons were produced. The detailee also expressed concern about this source in his e-mail concerning Secretary Powell's UN speech. He noted that the source was "[REDACTED]", but one whose reliability nor reporting has been evaluated," and said the reporting had inconsistencies that needed further checking. The detailee added, "we sure didn't give much credence to this report when it came out. Why now?" The detailee's e-mail was written four months after the NIE was published.

## 6. Intelligence Community Mind Set Concerning Mobile BW Programs

( [REDACTED] ) An INR BW analyst told Committee staff that ". . . as a community the U.S. BW analysts generally think that BW programs historically have shifted from large-scale fixed

[REDACTED]

facilities producing large quantities of BW agents being stockpiled to smaller dual-use facilities that can be mobilized. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] So it's very appealing to the analysts to learn about a mobile BW program. It fits with what we think the state of the BW program worldwide are heading toward. It's kind of like a built-in bias."

( [REDACTED] ) A CIA Directorate of Operations (CIA/DO) officer told the Committee that when he began serving as the Deputy Chief of the CIA Iraq WMD Task Force in the summer of 2002, the Iraqi BW program was not the focus of the Iraq WMD Task Force's efforts because, while many questions existed about other issues such as Iraq's nuclear weapons program, analysts felt fairly certain that they knew what the BW program looked like and believed the issue was largely "wrapped up." He noted that although there was always a lot of ambiguity with these sources, the CIA's lead analyst on Iraq's BW program was adamant about the existence of the Iraqi mobile BW platforms. He noted that [REDACTED] was "a bull dog with these sources." The CIA/DO officer told Committee staff that the CIA BW analyst and the Department of Defense detailee who was assigned to CIA/DO had "locked horns" over the reliability of the mobile BW HUMINT sources. The CIA/DO officer noted that he had several conversations with the CIA BW analyst about the detailee's concerns over the reliability of the mobile BW HUMINT sources. In one of these conversations, the CIA BW analyst discounted the detailee's concerns by stating that the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) had multiple sources reporting on the program, and that the detailee was not aware of all of this reporting.

***C. Baghdad Has Been Able to Renovate and Expand its Fixed Dual-Use BW Agent Production Facilities***

( [REDACTED] ) The introduction of the BW section of the NIE said that, "Baghdad has been able to renovate and expand its fixed dual-use BW agent production facilities . . ." Later in the NIE, however, the reference to renovation of fixed facilities said, "we are increasingly concerned that Baghdad's renovation and expansion of its fixed, dual-use facilities that served as Iraq's BW agent production capability prior to the Gulf War are part of an effort to increase significantly Iraq's BW agent holdings." The second version of this assessment makes it more clear that the dual-use facilities were not known to be BW agent facilities, but that the IC had concerns about their potential use as BW facilities because they had been used for BW agent production prior to the Gulf War. To support this assessment, the NIE discussed renovation and

[REDACTED]

expansion activity at three fixed, dual-use facilities: the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, the Habbaniyah I Castor Oil Plant, and the Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Plant.

**1. Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute**

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE noted that increased activity and construction at Iraq's Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute has been observed [REDACTED] since at least 2000 "suggesting more than pharmaceutical production or distribution is taking place." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) The IC provided the Committee a National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)<sup>24</sup> report that described [REDACTED] of Amiriyah from April 1999 to November 2001, which stated that the facility remained active during this period and may have increased its level of operations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The report said that these changes may represent changes in the facility's operations.

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE's discussion of Amiriyah also states that "Iraqi scientists reportedly conducted quality testing at this site on BW agents produced in the mobile production units, [REDACTED] A HUMINT report from [REDACTED] CURVE BALL, who provided the majority of the intelligence reporting concerning the mobile BW program, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) In discussions with Committee staff, both CIA and DIA BW analysts said they assessed that the changes [REDACTED] at the facility suggested Amiriyah was active, but said the

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<sup>24</sup>NIMA has recently been renamed the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (NGA).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

activity could have been consistent with legitimate public health related activity. A CIA Iraq analyst [REDACTED] also told Committee staff that in the late 1990's and in the 2000 to 2002 period Iraq did have "some huge vaccination campaigns," particularly against polio and foot and mouth disease (FMD). A CIA BW analyst also told Committee staff that she was not aware of any effort in the IC to analyze the impact of those mass vaccination campaigns on dual-use facilities like the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute.

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

## 2. Habbaniyah I Castor Oil Plant

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE noted that the Habbaniyah I Castor Oil Plant, which was damaged during Operation Desert Fox in 1998 because it was assessed to be involved in the production of the biotoxin ricin, was rebuilt by early 2000. The NIE said, "The facility continues to extract oil from the castor beans, allegedly for use in brake fluid production. [REDACTED]"

[REDACTED] The NIE stated that while the extraction of castor oil is a legitimate activity, the bean mash that is left over contains the BW agent ricin. The IC assessed that ricin was probably not being extracted at the castor oil plant but said concurrent activity at the nearby main production building, "suggests that toxin extraction may be taking place in the main production building."

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) [REDACTED]

**3. Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Plant**

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE also pointed to [REDACTED] of the Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Plant in support of the assessment that Iraq may be rebuilding dual-use fixed facilities for BW production. Iraq used Dawrah to produce BW agent before UNSCOM rendered the facility useless for BW work in 1996 by filling ductwork with a cement and foam mixture and destroying equipment used for BW agent production. Other research and production equipment at Dawrah deemed by UNSCOM to be legitimate was left in place. The NIE noted that Iraq probably renovated the facility after UNSCOM's work, but said "We are unable to determine whether BW agent research or production has resumed." Iraq claimed in 1999 that the facility was going to be renovated to produce foot and mouth disease vaccine.

( [REDACTED] ) In a September 2001 report, [REDACTED] assessed that the facility had been renovated beginning in 1999 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As noted in the NIE, the [REDACTED] report said it was unclear whether the possible restart of the plant was related to Iraq's BW program or was for legitimate vaccine production.

( [REDACTED] ) A CIA Iraq analyst [REDACTED] [REDACTED] told Committee staff that Iraq may have had a legitimate need for foot and mouth disease (FMD) vaccine because for years the U.S. had vetoed Iraqi requests under the UN Oil for Food program for FMD vaccines based on suspicion that these materials were intended for BW purposes. The U.S. Government (USG) and IC later learned that Iraq had in fact had an FMD outbreak, prompting the USG to start approving Iraqi imports of FMD vaccinations in 1999. The USG, as a member of the UN Iraq Sanctions Committee, rejected a proposal from the Iraqis and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization to rehabilitate Dawrah because the USG believed that was able to import as many FMD vaccines as it needed.

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The information that Iraq may have had legitimate public health reasons to restart the Darwah plant was not included in the NIE.

***D. We Assess That Iraq Has Some BW Agent and Maintains the Capability to Produce a Variety of BW Agents***

(U) The NIE stated that "we assess that Iraq has some BW agent and maintains the capability to produce B. anthracis, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene) and ricin toxin." The NIE also noted that Iraq "may be able to produce a number of other incapacitating and lethal agents that it has researched over the years" and assessed that "Chances are even that smallpox is part of Baghdad's offensive BW program."

**1. Smallpox**

( [REDACTED] ) The 2002 NIE stated in the key judgments that "Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive BW program." The body of the 2002 NIE expanded on this assessment:

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

“Various intelligence reports and [REDACTED] indicate that Iraq probably has retained unauthorized stocks of Variola major virus, the causative agent of smallpox. Baghdad reportedly kept smallpox virus samples from its 1971-1972 outbreak, [REDACTED]. We assess that the chances are even that smallpox is part of Baghdad’s offensive BW program, although credible evidence is limited.”

(U) The NIO and Deputy NIO for Science and Technology (S&T) told Committee staff that the statement “although credible evidence is limited” was not included in the key judgments because the issue was adequately addressed in the body of the NIE, and because of space limitations in the key judgments, they decided not to reiterate the point. The Deputy NIO added that she expected the readers of the NIE to read both the key judgments as well as the body of the document. When asked by Committee staff if a policymaker who read only the NIE’s smallpox key judgment, and not the body of the NIE’s BW section, would have been misled about the uncertainties behind that assessment, an INR BW analyst responded, “Absolutely, particularly on such a sensitive topic as smallpox. And it’s important to remember that people who were reading this at the time when we were having a national debate on whether people should be immunized and what the threat was from al-Qa’ida on smallpox, it was a much more charged atmosphere than the one we are in right now.”

( [REDACTED] ) The assessment “Chances are even that smallpox is part of Baghdad’s offensive BW program” was based primarily on intelligence [REDACTED] that Iraq probably had retained unauthorized stocks of Variola major virus, the causative agent of smallpox. The assessment was also based on reporting that kept smallpox virus samples from a 1971-1972 outbreak, as well as reporting that suggested Iraq had the capability to work with the virus and fragmentary reports that were looking into such work. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], who said Iraq had saved samples from a smallpox outbreak in the 1970s. [REDACTED] also said that Iraq had “the capability of producing several biological agents – among them . . . smallpox.” The report indicated that at the time of the conversation in May 2002, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. The report does not indicate that any of Iraq’s work on smallpox was applied to an offensive biological program.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] )

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] )

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] )

[REDACTED]

. The former UN BW inspector noted that he believed

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

that the quantity of dry agent the machine could produce was too small to be very useful in a biological weapons program and stated that "I don't think that machine was designed to dry smallpox to make weapons material. That would be a hard way of doing it." CIA BW analysts told Committee staff that they believed any quantity of dry agent would be useful in a biological weapons program.

( [REDACTED] ) Another HUMINT report from February 2000 discussed reported research conducted at a facility run by the Iraqi Intelligence Service in Abu Ghurayb, near Baghdad, involving a number of agents including smallpox. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] No mention is made in the report about whether the reported efforts at Abu Ghurayb were successful in creating a delivery method for smallpox.

( [REDACTED] ) The IC provided the Committee with [REDACTED] additional HUMINT reports. One of the reports said an Iraqi scientist had "published on pox viruses [REDACTED] [REDACTED] described Iraqi work on "a poxvirus such as monkey pox." A third report said Iraq worked on camel pox virus. None of the reports referenced smallpox.

( [REDACTED] ) One report provided to the Committee suggested that, at least as of 1991, smallpox was not a part of Iraq's offensive BW program. [REDACTED] report from 1995 detailed

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. CIA BW analysts also told Committee staff that they believed that work on camelpox would give Iraq the capability to work on smallpox if they had it.

(U) In a written response to a question from Committee staff, the CIA said "We have no evidence that Iraq ever weaponized smallpox." The NIE's assessment that, "Chances are even

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive BW program," was based on the intelligence indicating that it was likely within Iraq's ability to produce smallpox agent.

## 2. Other Agents

(U) The NIE also noted that "Iraq has some BW agent and maintains the capability to produce B. anthracis, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene) and ricin toxin" and that Iraq "may be able to produce a number of other incapacitating and lethal agents that it has researched over the years." To show which agents Iraq has researched, the NIE included a table titled "BW Agents that Iraq has Researched." The table listed twenty one biological agents that Iraq had researched. While some of the agents listed on the chart are highly lethal agents that Iraq had confirmed it weaponized prior to 1991, others do not appear to have been researched for weapons purposes, while others have little or no utility in a BW program.

### (U) BW Agents that Iraq has Researched

<i>Bacillus anthracis</i> (anthrax)	Enterovirus 70 (acute hemorrhagic conjunctivitis)
Botulinum toxin (botulism)	Camelpox virus
Ricin	Rotavirus
<i>Clostridium perfringens</i> (gas gangrene)	Vibrio cholerae (cholera)
<i>Yersinia pestis</i> (plague)	<i>Clostridium tetani</i> (tetanus)
<i>Brucella melitensis</i> (brucellosis)	Hemorrhagic fever viruses
Variola major virus (smallpox)	Staphylococcal enterotoxins
<i>Burkholderia mallei</i> (glanders)	<i>Rickettsia prowazekii</i> (typhus)
Aflatoxin	<i>Francisella tularensis</i> (tularemia)
Mycotoxins	<i>Shigella dysenteriae</i> (dysentery)
Tilletia species (wheat covered smut)	

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Of the 21 agents listed on the chart, only one is an effective and lethal battlefield BW agent that Iraq had declared to the UN that was researched, produced and weaponized prior to 1991: anthrax.

( [REDACTED] ) Three of the agents on the chart are agents that Iraq declared to the UN that it had weaponized prior to 1991, but have differing and debatable utility as a battlefield BW weapon: aflatoxin, ricin and botulinum toxin (botulism). Aflatoxin, a type of mycotoxin, may cause cancer and liver damage, but only years after exposure. IC analysts told Committee staff that there are indications in the scientific literature that aflatoxin can suppress the immune system, which may increase the effectiveness of other BW agents, but there are no indications that Iraq had weaponized aflatoxin for this purpose. A HUMINT report relating information [REDACTED] [REDACTED] noted that Iraqi scientists admitted to some level of research on other mycotoxins for BW purposes sometime prior to 1991. Although aflatoxin is a mycotoxin, the category "mycotoxins" is listed separately on the NIE's chart. A former senior UN BW inspector told Committee staff that the Iraqis had admitted to producing about ten grams of a mycotoxin that could serve as an effective BW agent prior to 1991 ". . .for special purposes for the intelligence service."

(U) Another agent on the chart, Tilletia species (wheat cover smut), also known as wheat bunt and wheat rust, is a fungus that can significantly reduce crop yields. Iraq declared to the UN that it weaponized tilletia species as an antiagricultural BW agent prior to 1991.

( [REDACTED] ) Four of the agents, enterovirus 70, camelpox virus, clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene) and rotavirus, are incapacitating agents on which Iraq admitted to have conducted BW-related research and development work prior to 1991. These are agents that would result in symptoms such as muscle pain, blurred vision, vomiting, and diarrhea, that could have incapacitating effects. One report provided to the Committee indicated that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] also considered the possibility that Iraq's camelpox work was intended to cause economic damage to Saudi Arabia by attacking their camel herds.

( [REDACTED] ) The IC also provided the Committee with intelligence reports that suggested Iraq had conducted BW research on seven of the agents listed on the NIE's chart: brucella, tularemia, plague, tetanus, hemorrhagic fever viruses, cholera, and smallpox. A HUMINT report describing [REDACTED] the former Iraqi BW facility at Salman Pak revealed that Iraq had samples of four of these eight BW agents: brucella, tularemia, clostridium perfringens (gas

[REDACTED]

gangrene), and tetanus. [REDACTED]

A 1999 HUMINT report describes an order given by Hussein Kamal [REDACTED] in 1994 to conduct research on, among other topics, tetanus. When [REDACTED] asked why the military was interested in “public and animal health issues” Kamal told them that the work was for “Iraq’s biological warfare program.”

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

(U) As noted in the preceding discussion concerning smallpox, the last of the eight BW agents, the only report provided to the Committee which provided a Iraqi BW link to this agent was a February 2000 HUMINT report which discussed reported research conducted at Abu Ghurayb, near Baghdad, involving a number of agents including smallpox. The report that said experiments had reached an advanced stage and were moving into the “production phase” and noted that in 1995 one of the researchers commented that tests at the facility focused on how to introduce materials into soft drinks and “other mediums.” One of the specific projects undertaken was to produce lethal pills. No mention is made in the report about whether the reported efforts at Abu Ghurayb were successful in creating a delivery method for smallpox.

( [REDACTED] ) Two reports provided to the Committee discussed glanders, an agent listed on the NIE’s chart. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A former senior UNSCOM BW inspector told Committee staff that glanders is an effective BW agent that had been weaponized by the Soviet Union. He noted, however, that he was not aware of any evidence that Iraq had worked with glanders in a BW program. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control's internet web page notes that glanders is "... still commonly seen among domestic animals in . . .the Middle East. . . ."

( [REDACTED] ) A 1999 HUMINT report was provided to the Committee that discussed Iraqi research on *shigella dysenteriae*, the causative agent for dysentery. The report states that staff [REDACTED] researched "shigella", among other pathogens, but notes that the report's source did not recall what strains of shigella were held at the facility. The report also notes that the facility had been inspected by UNSCOM more than once, and prior to each inspection the head of the department forbade his staff from discussing their work with inspectors. The head of the department also instructed his staff to keep the pathogens at home until after the UNSCOM inspections had finished.

( [REDACTED] ) None of the intelligence provided to the Committee showed a BW link to two of the agents listed on the NIE's chart. One of those agents, Staphylococcal enterotoxins, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] No other intelligence was provided to the Committee that would indicate a BW connection to Iraqi research conducted on this agent. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) A chart in a CIA paper published one month after the NIE that was titled, *Iraq: Biological Warfare Agents Pose Growing Threat to US Interests*, presented another depiction of Iraq's biological agent research. The chart titled, "Status of Possible Iraqi BW Agents" showed three levels of research activity – research and development (R&D), production, and weaponization – and provided three different levels of confidence of the IC's knowledge of Iraq's work – confirmed, probable and suspected. This chart presented a more accurate depiction of the certainty and uncertainty behind the assessments of Iraq's biological agent research and made clear which agents were researched for weapons purposes. The title of the chart in the NIE, "BW Agents that Iraq has Researched" suggested that all of the agents were researched for weapons purposes, while the CIA publication more clearly indicated that the agents were "possible" BW agents.

**(U) Status of Possible Iraqi BW Agents**

*Note: Agents are not listed in any particular order. Assessments reflect past Iraqi declarations to the UN plus intelligence assessments of Iraq's current biological weapons capabilities.*

C=Confirmed
P=Probable
S=Suspected

BW Agent (Disease)	R&D	Production	Weaponization
<i>Bacillus anthracis</i> (anthrax) <sup>a</sup>	C	C	C
Aflatoxins <sup>a</sup>	C	C	C
Botulinum toxins <sup>a</sup>	C	C	C
Ricin toxin <sup>a</sup>	C	C	C
<i>Clostridium perfringens</i> (gas gangrene) <sup>a</sup>	C	C	
<i>Tilletia</i> species (wheat cover smut) <sup>a</sup>	C	C	
<i>Yersinia pestis</i> (plague)	P	P	
Variola major virus (smallpox)	P		
<i>Burkholderia mallei</i> (glanders)	P		
<i>Rickettsia prowazekii</i> (typhus)	S		



[REDACTED]

BW Agent (Disease)	R&D	Production	Weaponization
Enterovirus 70 (acute hemorrhagic conjunctivitis) <sup>a</sup>	C		
Rotavirus <sup>a</sup>	C		
Staphylococcal enterotoxins	P		
Trichothecene mycotoxins <sup>a</sup>	C		
<i>Brucella melitensis</i> (brucellosis)	P		
<i>Clostridium tetani</i> (tetanus)	P		
Camelpox virus <sup>a</sup>	C		
<i>Vibrio cholerae</i> (cholera)	P		
Hemorrhagic fever viruses	S		
<i>Shigella dysenteriae</i> (dysentery)	S		
<i>Francisella tularensis</i> (tularemia)	S		

<sup>a</sup> Iraq declared to UNSCOM that it worked with this BW agent.

***E. In the Absence of UN Inspectors, Iraq Probably Has Intensified and Expanded Research and Development in Support of Iraq's BW Program. Baghdad Probably Has Developed Genetically Engineered BW Agents***

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE assessed that in the absence UN inspectors, Iraq probably had intensified and expanded research and development efforts in support of Iraq's BW program. The NIE noted that "Military reporting and [REDACTED] intelligence indicates that Iraq's BW research and development efforts have benefitted from professional contacts between its scientists and engineers and their foreign counterparts, exploiting conferences and scientific exchanges to acquire technical knowledge and supplies." The NIE's key judgments stated that "Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered BW agents." The NIE's discussion of this research and development focuses on research activity [REDACTED], and reported BW testing near Iraq's Qadisiyah Reservoir.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**(b) 1. Research Activity [REDACTED]**

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE stated that “[REDACTED] in 1999 that R&D in support of Iraq’s offensive BW program was continuing [REDACTED]. In the absence of UN inspectors, Iraq probably has intensified and expanded these efforts.” The NIE stated in the key judgments that “Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered BW agents.” The text of the NIE, however, said only that foreign government service reporting indicated that “biological research facilities are actively engaged in genetic engineering and biotechnology research and development,” and noted that some of the facilities were suspected of involvement in Iraq’s BW research and development program.

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] However, UNSCOM’s final report, which was submitted to the UN Security Council in 1999, stated that “Iraq has a broad based research community in Universities, Medical and Agricultural Institutes, covering microbiology, biological processing, materials science, genetic engineering, pathology, biological production, munitions and weapons.” [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) The IC also provided the Committee with eight intelligence reports to support the assessment that Iraq was engaged in genetic engineering and biotechnology research. The first was a 2002 HUMINT report that discussed information [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] The report provided no additional information. The NIE noted that IPA is the parent organization for a center that was engaged in BW related work prior to the Gulf War. A second HUMINT report stated that two scientists were conducting “secret research” in the microbiology laboratory at the Saddam College of Medicine. The report said the scientists were working to genetically alter anthrax and plague to increase the bacteria’s resistance to “antibiotics and environmental factors.” While the work was described as “secret,” the report did not draw any link to BW work. The CIA told Committee staff that, while the report did not connect this research to BW work, the CIA believes that there is no legitimate application to this work outside of a BW program. A DIA BW analyst told Committee staff that there were legitimate non-BW reasons for conducting such research. He noted, however, that such research was suspicious in a country like Iraq. CIA BW analysts told Committee staff that this research was particularly suspicious because it was “secret.”

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) A 1996 HUMINT report from a former officer of the Iraqi Directorate of General Security said that 1,600 death row prisoners from Baghdad prisons were delivered to "unit 2100", near al-Haditha, which conducted chemical and biological warfare experiments on human subjects. [REDACTED] into Iraqi prison records revealed that prisoner transfer files at a prison believed to be involved in the alleged incident during the time in question were missing. [REDACTED] that prisoner transfer files "were in order and well maintained before and after this time frame."

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE assessed that the reported testing location described in the HUMINT report as an "unknown location near al-Haditha" was probably a facility near the Qadisiyah reservoir. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) A DIA BW analyst noted to Committee staff that there was "really very little" to suggest a BW role [REDACTED] at Qadisiyah, and noted that "Perhaps we were stretching that just a little bit." A [REDACTED] analyst responsible for the [REDACTED] analysis of this facility told Committee staff "You have to remember that this was only considered a suspect facility. That's as far as we went with it. The information linking this to BW was so incredibly sketchy that this is sort of our best guess [REDACTED]"

***F. We Assess That Baghdad Also Has Increased the Effectiveness of its BW Arsenal by Mastering the Ability to Produce Dried Agent***

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE assessed that Iraq had increased the effectiveness of its BW arsenal by "mastering the ability to produce dried agent." The IC assessed that Iraq had both liquid and dry BW agents. As the NIE pointed out, the ability to produce dry BW agents is significant because it allows the agent to be disseminated over a much wider area than wet agent. IC analysts also told Committee staff that dry agent is much easier to handle than liquid agent and has a longer shelf life. The NIE stated that "Iraq had the capability to dry organisms in a respirable particle size prior to the Gulf War but declared that all weapons systems deployed

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

during the Gulf war were filled with liquid agent.” The NIE went on to note that, “. . . reporting on the procurement of dual-use drying and milling equipment suggest (sic) continued interest by Iraq in the capability to dry and size at least some of the agents in its arsenal.”

( [REDACTED] ) The IC provided the Committee with 14 HUMINT and [REDACTED] reports to support the assessment that Iraq had the capability to dry BW agent. Six of the reports described existing Iraqi dual-use drying and milling equipment, while the other eight reports described Iraqi attempts to acquire such equipment. Nothing provided to the Committee indicated whether or not the Iraqis were successful in obtaining the equipment in any of these eight cases. Only one of the 14 reports described drying and milling equipment that is clearly linked to a BW effort. The report came from the HUMINT source codenamed CURVE BALL who reported on Iraq’s alleged mobile BW program. The report stated that the alleged mobile BW trailers contained spray drying equipment. The other 13 reports described dual-use drying and milling equipment that would be useful in a BW program, but none of these reports showed any links to a BW program.

( [REDACTED] ) Iraq declared to UNSCOM that prior to 1991 it produced only liquid biological weapons agents and dried only a small amount of anthrax for use in aerosol tests on animals. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Intelligence Community analysts told Committee staff that technology and expertise to dry *Bacillus thuringiensis* is directly applicable to drying and milling anthrax.

***G. Iraq’s Capability to Manufacture Equipment and Materials . . . and to Procure Other Necessary, Dual-use Materials . . . Makes Large-scale BW Agent Production Easily Attainable***

**1. Foreign Procurement**

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE stated that “Iraq continues to circumvent and undermine UN sanctions to enhance its biotechnical self-sufficiency, while advancing its BW program when possible.” The NIE listed several examples of Iraqi attempts to procure dual-use biotechnology equipment abroad. The IC provided the Committee with 19 [REDACTED] reports showing Iraqi attempts to procure dual-use biotechnology equipment abroad. While all of this equipment would be useful in a BW program, only one of these reports showed a BW-related end user in Iraq, and only one report indicated that Iraq had received the dual-use equipment as a result of its efforts.

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE also described Iraqi efforts to obtain a “jet mill” capable of grinding hundreds of kilograms of biological material per hour to one to ten microns “the ideal particle size range for BW agents.” Although it is not discussed in the NIE, IC BW analysts told Committee staff that the one to ten micron particle range is also the ideal particle size for some legitimate pharmaceutical applications such as inhalers.

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE described the travel in 1999 of three Iraqi intelligence officers [REDACTED] to obtain materials “. . . for use in the manufacture of biological weapons. . . .” A 2000 HUMINT report stated that three Iraqi Intelligence Service officers traveled [REDACTED] [REDACTED] “. . . coordinate the acquisition of quantities of materials for use in developing Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons capability. Their plan was to obtain materials in [REDACTED] for use in the manufacture of biological weapons.”

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE also described, “a robust network of intermediary firms [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and elsewhere that assist with the procurement of dual-use and support equipment for Iraq’s offensive BW program.” The NIE stated that “Since the embargo was imposed in 1990, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]” A CIA Iraq analyst [REDACTED] [REDACTED] told Committee staff that after 1991 Iraq used front companies to import a wide range of goods, including consumer goods. None of the intelligence provided to the Committee showed that Iraq used front companies as a denial and deception technique to procure equipment for a BW program.

( [REDACTED] ) The last example of BW-related procurement cited by the NIE is an Iraqi order for the antibiotic [REDACTED]. The NIE stated that the order was placed by “the same Iraqi company that recently procured CW nerve agent antidotes.” The Iraqi company, [REDACTED] which purchased the CW nerve agent antidotes is also responsible for acquiring a wide variety of goods associated with Iraq’s legitimate public health needs. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] This suggests that the [REDACTED], which is widely used to treat a variety of infections, was intended for legitimate public health needs in Iraq.

( [REDACTED] ) The CIA noted in a written response to a question from Committee staff that “A majority of the dual-use equipment sought probably was for legitimate research because of the dual-use nature of the equipment and the much larger needs of Iraq’s industrial infrastructure over its [BW] program. [REDACTED]”

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]” CIA and DIA BW analysts interviewed by Committee staff all agreed that in every case cited by the NIE of Iraqi attempts to obtain dual-use biotechnical equipment abroad, the Iraqis could have been seeking equipment for their legitimate needs. As a CIA BW analyst noted “There was nothing that was uniquely BW. . . .” A CIA BW analyst stated that none of the equipment and materials required for a BW program were exclusively BW in nature, and said that the IC did not have a specific case where it could provide intelligence that showed that a piece of dual-use biological equipment or material sought by Iraq was clearly intended to go to an Iraqi BW-related end user. The Deputy Director for Analysis at the DCI’s Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control told Committee staff that “. . . if you look at every individual dual-use procurement, if your question is, are there any of these procurements that we saw that can’t be explained by a potential legitimate application . . . I think the answer to that probably is no.”

## **2. Indigenous Iraqi Efforts**

( [REDACTED] ) The final part of the NIE’s section concerning Iraq’s ability to obtain dual-use biological equipment and production capabilities stated that “We assess that Iraq also maintains the capability to manufacture some BW-related equipment and materials indigenously.” The IC provided the Committee with several [REDACTED] reports and an abstract of a paper published in a European science journal that showed dual-use biotechnical capabilities inherent in Iraqi industry that could potentially be converted for use in an offensive BW program.

(U) While all of the examples in the NIE have potential application to the Iraqi BW program, and while some of the organizations involved were connected to the pre-1991 Iraqi BW program, only one of the reports has a clear link to a post-1991 BW program. The report came from the HUMINT source codenamed CURVE BALL who reported on Iraq’s alleged mobile BW program. According to this report, CURVE BALL stated that fermenters and tanks in the mobile production units had been made in Iraq.

(U) When asked by Committee staff whether the 2002 NIE did a good job of explaining the possibility that some, most or all of the examples cited in the NIE of dual use biological research and procurement could have been intended for legitimate, non-BW uses, a senior INR analyst stated, “I think, to answer your question, someone who is not an expert in weapons of mass destruction, if I were coming to the issue and they said here, read this Estimate on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program, even if you have a discussion of dual-use applicability I think that I would come to the conclusion that, well, it must be really for WMD stuff because it’s

[REDACTED]

in this Estimate that talks about Iraq's WMD. So even if it has a legitimate application in civilian industry, the presumption that I would come to the document with as a lay reader in what was then the environment, I assume, of policymakers or Hill policymakers, my assumption would be that I would think it was for [chemical-biological weapons] use."

***H. The Nature and Amounts of Iraq's Stored BW Material Remain Unresolved by UNSCOM Accounting***

(U) The NIE stated that "The nature and amounts of Iraq's stored BW material remain unresolved by UNSCOM accounting." The NIE went on to state that "From the end of the Gulf war to mid-1995, Iraq denied that it had an offensive BW program, claiming that it had conducted only 'defensive research.' Only after UNSCOM confronted Baghdad with irrefutable evidence of excessive growth media procurement did Iraq admit that it had an offensive BW program and had made 30,000 liters of concentrated biological weapons agents. Even then, UNSCOM estimates that Iraq's production of anthrax spores and botulinum toxin could have been two to four times higher than claimed by Baghdad."

(U) UNSCOM's final report noted that Iraq "categorically denied" it had a BW program from 1991 to 1995 and took "active steps to conceal the program" from UNSCOM. "In 1995, when Iraq was confronted with evidence collected by the Commission of imports of bacterial growth media in quantities that had no civilian utility with Iraq's limited biotechnology industry, it eventually, on 1 July 1995, acknowledged that it used this growth media to produce two BW agents in bulk, botulinum toxin and Bacillus anthracis. . . ."

(U) The NIE described Iraq's inability to substantiate claims that a large amount of growth media was lost in failed production runs or stolen from the high security BW facility at Al-Hakam and other sites. UNSCOM's final report listed the growth media as an unresolved accounting issue, and IC analysts told Committee staff that they did not believe that it is possible that growth media could have been stolen from a facility like Al-Hakam. A former UN inspector told Committee staff, however, that he found it believable in light of the chaos and looting that followed immediately after the defeat of the Iraqi army in 1991. He noted that Iraqi guards abandoned their posts at many Iraqi government facilities. When asked why an Iraqi would want to steal growth media, he noted that there was not necessarily any logic to looting.

(U) The NIE also described Iraq's failure to provide adequate proof that it destroyed 157 aerial bombs it had filled with BW agent. The UNSCOM final report stated that inspectors were unable to verify both how many aerial bombs existed and how many were actually destroyed.



[REDACTED]

The NIE noted that “Iraq claimed that it produced four aerosol spray tanks by modifying a Mirage F-1 fuel drop tank. We have no evidence that the Iraqis destroyed these tanks, [REDACTED]” While the UNSCOM report noted that inspectors were not satisfied that the prototype drop-tank was destroyed, “The remains of the other three drop-tanks were inspected by the Commission.” The UNSCOM final report also noted that “There is no evidence to corroborate that only four were produced. Interviews indicate that 12 tanks were to be modified.”

(U) The NIE stated that UNSCOM’s final report indicated that “. . . about 20 mobile double-jacketed storage tanks, which we judge may contain previously produced agent, remain unaccounted for.” UNSCOM’s final report states that “20+ tanks remain unaccounted for.” The report noted that these tanks “were used to transfer agent between production and filling or deployment site and for storage of agent. Owing to their properties, they can be used for long-term storage of agent under controlled conditions. . . .”

***I. We Judge That We Are Seeing Only a Portion of Iraq’s WMD Efforts, Owing to Baghdad’s Vigorous Denial and Deception Efforts***

(U) One of the NIE’s key judgments stated, “We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq’s WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad’s vigorous denial and deception efforts.” The NIE’s BW section contained a text box titled “Iraq’s Denial and Deception (D&D) Program for Biological Weapons.” The first sentence of the box stated that “Iraq has a national-level BW D&D program.”

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the intelligence provided to the Committee does not provide a clear link after 1991 between offensive BW related work and the dual-use research [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) The NIE also states that “Iraq uses codewords to compartmentalize BW program elements, conceal acquisition of BW-related equipment, and impair Western attempts to monitor Iraqi technology acquisition.” The NIE cited the use of the codeword “project 600” for BW activity at Iraq’s Abu Ghurayb facility, which was in use before the 1991 Gulf War. The Committee was provided with six HUMINT reports concerning the use of codes:

[REDACTED]

- A 1993 HUMINT report describing the use of the code word “project 600” for BW activity at Iraq’s Abu Ghurayb facility before the 1991 Gulf War.
- A 1997 HUMINT report described the use of the codename “313” with the Djerf al Nadaf facility. While Djerf al Nadaf may have a BW connection, the use of a code for this facility is not necessarily specific to BW.
- A report from the HUMINT source code named CURVE BALL who provided most of the IC’s understanding of the mobile production capability states that letters were used to describe agents produced in mobile plants.
- [REDACTED]
- A 2000 HUMINT report described the use of letter-number codes to refer to BW agents. UNSCOM’s final report notes that Iraq referred to BW agents with letter code designation in its declarations to the U.N.
- A 2000 HUMINT report that discussed research allegedly underway as of 1997 at a facility run by the Iraqi Intelligence Service in Abu Ghurayb, near Baghdad, focused on how to introduce a number of BW agents into soft drinks and “other mediums.” The report stated that the facility’s reports referred to BW agents by letter-number codes.

(U) The intelligence provided to the Committee describes the use of codewords to “compartmentalize BW program elements” but no intelligence reports were provided that described the use of codewords to “conceal acquisition of BW-related equipment, and impair Western attempts to monitor Iraqi technology acquisition.” While code words are a denial and deception measure, no intelligence was provided to the Committee that showed an Iraqi “national-level BW D&D program” existed in 2002, as stated in the NIE.

***J. Explaining Uncertainties***

(U) The NIE provided a “tone box” that listed the IC’s “confidence levels for selected key judgments in this estimate.” The NIE’s key judgments are broken down into three categories of high, moderate and low confidence. Assessments related to Iraq’s BW capabilities listed under the “High Confidence” heading are:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- “Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions.”
- “We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs.”
- “Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles.”

(U) There were no assessments of Iraq’s BW capabilities listed under the “Moderate Confidence” or “Low Confidence” headings. Nowhere in this section, or anywhere else in the NIE, is the possibility explicitly raised that the majority or all of the dual-use biotechnology issues discussed in the NIE’s BW section could represent legitimate public health activity.

***K. Intelligence Agencies’ Analysis of Iraq’s Biological Weapons Program Prior to Publication of the NIE***

(U) Analysis from individual intelligence agencies on Iraq’s biological weapons program was consistent between agencies and largely consistent with the NIE and other IC products discussed earlier in this report. The following are examples of assessments from the DIA and the CIA. INR told the Committee that it did not publish any specific intelligence papers on Iraq’s BW program.

(U) In October 1997, the DIA published a Defense Intelligence Assessment, *Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs: Progress, Problems, and Potential Vulnerabilities* which stated that “Iraq may have successfully concealed some biological agents. It retains much of its biotechnical infrastructure and is positioned to weaponize biological warfare (BW) agents at pre-Gulf War levels in 2 years or less after sanctions are lifted.” The paper noted that Iraq’s “. . . dual-use-type facilities give Iraq the capability to produce biological agents and plausible deniability of a biological weapons program,” but “no active BW facilities are currently identified. . . .”

(U) In January 2002, the DIA published a Defense Intelligence Assessment, *Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs: Post-11 September*, which stated “Some aspects of Iraq’s biological warfare (BW) program are active, and most elements are probably larger and more advanced than they were in the pre-Gulf War program. Iraq is capable of producing and weaponizing a moderate spectrum of BW agents for a moderate range of delivery systems. UN sanctions imposed after the Gulf War did little to prevent Saddam from equipping and operating the program.” The paper also notes “Iraq has gone to great lengths

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

to conceal its BW production, reportedly using mobile trailers” and that “several BW-associated facilities have recently undergone renovation and construction. These facilities may have provided additional capabilities and support to the BW infrastructure.”

( [REDACTED] ) DIA published a Defense Contingency Product, *Iraq - Key WMD Facilities An Operational Support Study* in September 2002 which said, referring to bulk biological agent-filled munitions that Iraq claimed to have destroyed in 1991, “. . . Iraq never provided credible evidence to support this claim. The location, nature, and condition of this [BW] stockpile, and the seed stocks and growth media for biological agent production are unknown.” The paper stated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The paper also noted that “Iraq is assessed to possess biological agent stockpiles that may be weaponized and ready for use. The size of those stockpiles is uncertain and is subject to debate. The nature, size and condition of those stockpiles are also unknown.”

(U) A September 2002 DIA Information Paper with the subject line, *Iraqi Interest in Smallpox as a Biological Warfare (BW) Agent*, states that the “DIA assesses it is possible that Iraq possesses samples of the smallpox virus. However, whether Iraq is actually producing smallpox agent in quantities or where it could be produced is unknown.”

(U) The CIA published a paper in August 1996 titled *Iraq's Remaining WMD Capabilities*, stated “Baghdad has provided no compelling evidence to buttress its claim that all its BW agents and munitions were destroyed in the spring of 1991. Even if Iraq's claims were true, its BW expertise could enable it to rapidly resurrect a small-scale BW program.”

(U) In October 2002, CIA published a paper titled *Saddam's Timelines for Using WMD*, which stated that “Based on Iraqi declarations and a variety of intelligence reporting, we judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating biological agents and is currently using fixed facilities to quickly produce and weaponize a variety of such agents, including *Bacillus anthracis* (anthrax), botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, *Clostridium perfringens* (gas gangrene), and ricin toxin. Iraq could also use its mobile facilities to produce some bacterial agents.”

[REDACTED]

*L. Biological Conclusions*

(U) **Conclusion 48.** The assessment in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that, “[W]e judge that all key aspects – research & development, production, and weaponization – of Iraq’s offensive biological weapons program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War” is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**(U) Conclusion 49. The statement in the key judgments of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that "Baghdad has biological weapons" overstated what was known about Iraq's biological weapons holdings. The NIE did not explain the uncertainties underlying this statement.**

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**(U) Conclusion 50. The statement in the National Intelligence Estimate that "Baghdad has mobile transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin biological weapons agents," overstated what the intelligence reporting suggested about an Iraqi mobile biological weapons effort and did not accurately convey to readers the uncertainties behind the source reporting.**

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

**(b) Conclusion 51. The Central Intelligence Agency withheld important information concerning both CURVE BALL's reliability and [REDACTED] reporting from many Intelligence Community analysts with a need to know the information.**

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**(1) Conclusion 52. The Defense Human Intelligence Service, which had primary responsibility for handling the Intelligence Community's interaction with CURVE BALL's [REDACTED] debriefers, demonstrated serious lapses in handling such an important source.**

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**(U) Conclusion 53.** The statement in the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate that “Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq’s offensive biological weapons program” is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

**(U) Conclusion 54.** The assessments in the National Intelligence Estimate concerning Iraq’s capability to produce and weaponize biological weapons agents are, for the most part, supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee, but the NIE did not explain that the research discussed could have been very limited in nature, been abandoned years ago, or represented legitimate activity.

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**(U) Conclusion 55. The National Intelligence Estimate misrepresented the United Nations Special Commission's (UNSCOM) 1999 assessment concerning Iraq's biological research capability.**

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**(U) Conclusion 56.** The statement in the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate that “Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered biological weapons agents,” overstated both the intelligence reporting and analysts’ assessments of Iraq’s development of genetically engineered biological agents.

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**(U) Conclusion 57.** The assessment in the National Intelligence Estimate that “Iraq has . . . dry biological weapons (BW) agents in its arsenal” is not supported by the intelligence information provided to the Committee.

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]