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STATEMENT OF
DR. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
APRIL 7, 2004

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, & RECONNAISSANCE

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INTRODUCTION

(U) Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee for inviting me here today. I appreciate the interest the subcommittee has in the stand up of the USD(I), which occurred a little over a year ago. I will briefly review the roles and missions of my office as well as the Department's goals in guiding the Defense intelligence community. I would also like to provide you an overview of the tactical and operational intelligence capabilities and requirements of the DoD, as well as how the military intelligence capabilities of the Department can best be transformed to support combatant commanders and subordinate war fighting commands. I would also like to briefly review some steps we are taking to help determine future Defense intelligence requirements as well as what we are doing to acquire these capabilities – which will be critical to success against current and future threats. I will also provide some comments on the role of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Integration Council as well as my assessment of the performance of the Defense intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system, including the supporting communications architecture during recent military operations, the degree of integration that has been achieved, the ability of this system to support the peacetime and contingency requirements of all combatant commanders, lessons learned at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of intelligence support, and any significant changes or reforms to Defense intelligence that I am implementing or considering. Finally, I will discuss my Horizontal Integration efforts and how we are working with the Director of Central Intelligence to move forward in an area that will play an important role in enhancing how analysts can more effectively manage information and find the critical knowledge decision makers need.

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CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

(U) We are facing a turbulent and volatile world. It is populated by a number of highly adaptive adversaries including terrorist networks that operate both within the confines of civil society and in ungoverned areas. It is a world in which international political-military affairs continue to evolve. As a result of these and other ongoing developments, it is impossible to predict with confidence what nation or entity could pose threats in 5, 10, or 20 years to the United States or to our friends and allies. This places a heavy burden on intelligence. Deterring, and if necessary confronting and defeating future adversaries, some of whom may emerge only in the fullness of time, will require detailed understanding of their goals, motivations, history, networks, and relationships that is developed over a long period of time and to a level of detail that is far deeper than we can reach today.

DOD's SIX CRITICAL GOALS

(U) If the Department's intelligence components are to successfully fulfill their roles in the coming decades both as part of the Intelligence Community and in their roles in support of the operations of the joint force, we must modernize and transform that capability.

(U) The Secretary of Defense identified six critical operational goals in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that provide the focus for the Department's overarching transformation efforts. They are

- 1) Protection of critical bases and defeating chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons;
- 2) Projecting and sustaining forces in anti-access environments;
- 3) Denying enemy sanctuary;
- 4) Leveraging information technology;
- 5) Assuring information systems and conducting information operations;
- 6) Enhancing space capabilities.

(U) Intelligence has a major contribution to make in meeting these goals. Our intelligence capability is essential to military success. It is a key enabler of how and when our power is applied. Intelligence capabilities allow military commanders to prepare appropriately, and when ordered by the President, to close rapidly with the adversary, to swiftly defeat the enemy, and to support follow-on security and stability operations.

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(U) In support of the Department's goals and to guide us in the transformation effort we have established the following goals:

(U) Defense Intelligence Goals To Achieve Intelligence Transformation

(U) (1) **Know something of intelligence value about everything of interest to us, all the time:** Current collection capabilities predominantly reflect a Cold War-era reconnaissance paradigm – one of periodic looks and sampling. Persistent surveillance (the ability to monitor, track, characterize, report and update at short intervals on specific activities at a fixed location, moving objects such as trains, convoys or military movements, as well as changes occurring to the surface of the earth) is essential for planners, operators, and policy makers. We need to evaluate existing and proposed intelligence programs e.g., technical collection, HUMINT, etc. in light of the goal of persistent surveillance. We need to seek out and develop long-dwell sensors and pursue other emerging technology breakthroughs in sensor or platform capability. We must also develop technology to permit rapid data exploitation by users who need it most urgently. The combination of these improvements will enable us to achieve the goal of persistent surveillance.

(U) (2) **Develop reliable strategic warning:** Competence in strategic warning across the full spectrum of potential threats is critical to support the full range of political, economic, and military tools that we have. For DoD in particular, strategic warning is essential to provide the time needed to re-fashion our forces and adjust their posture in a timely, efficient, and effective way to dissuade adversaries, deter foes and, when necessary, defeat enemies. The effort is complicated by the reality that the warning we seek in the future is likely to be against threats that we may not be able to imagine today. Averting crises is nearly always preferable to managing them.

(U) (3) **Pursue agile and adaptable intelligence collection and analysis capability:** Our intelligence capability needs to be less dependent on Kepler's Laws, Bernoulli effects (that is, satellites and aircraft in fixed orbits), and linear processes (like Tasking, Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination) (TPED)), and more prepared to respond to surprise. We need to expect the unexpected. The tremendous amount of information available to collectors and analysts requires a horizontally-integrated, network-centric environment less constrained by bandwidth limitations. Today's transforming military and intelligence environment demands rapid conversion of data to information and information into actionable knowledge. Interoperability at the data level, through the use of common standards

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and content tagging, will further the horizontal integration of information from all sources – not just intelligence – at all levels of classification. The net result will be a more efficient use of our collection assets and a more effective synergistic use of our intelligence analysts.

(U) (4) **Provide an intelligence capability that supports a national strategy of forward deterrence and agility:** Deterring future adversaries will require a detailed understanding of their goals, motivations, history, networks, relationships, and all the dimensions of human political behavior, on a scale that is broader and deeper than today's. This requires a regeneration of our Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and close access capabilities and an overhaul of our analytic processes and culture. An "intelligence reachback" capability is needed to permit deployment of platforms/sensors/shooters to forward operational areas without the need to deploy analytic cells and infrastructure into theater. Reachback communications from our intelligence platforms can make this collected intelligence data readily available to our military forces and to the intelligence community through shared communications and archives. It is now Department policy that the national intelligence agencies and service intelligence centers have broad access to collected theater intelligence data along with the authority to store and distribute. This will facilitate the horizontal integration of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) information making the analytical power available to assist where needed without extended lead times and delays.

(U) (5) **Ensure military forces receive intelligence in a fashion and in a format that enables them to swiftly defeat an adversary:** We need intelligence that enables us to act quickly, secretly, and effectively—intelligence that enables us to anticipate our adversary's actions and anticipate the needs of our commanders and warfighters We then need to provide predictive intelligence that stays ahead of the battle. This implies continuous preparation of the battle space, whether it is on the surface, under the seas, in the air, in space, or in cyber-space. This includes having policies and procedures to deliver nearly instantaneously critical data from sensitive sources directly to the warfighter so that prompt action can be taken based on that data. Intelligence support must extend to the post-conflict, security and stabilization phase of a campaign as well.

(U) (6) **Ensure knowledgeable adversaries do not compromise our secrets:** This will require obtaining robust capabilities to acquire an adversary's secrets in ways that cannot be comprehended, even as we ensure that our own capabilities are not vulnerable. Traditionally, this goal has been met through defensive

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measures. In the world of today and tomorrow that will not be enough. An active offensive counterintelligence effort is needed to complement defensive measures. To protect our plans, critical infrastructure, and research technology while at the same time countering espionage, we will need to learn of an adversary's intent and capability in advance and take measures to deny and disrupt those efforts. An offensive posture will require investment in intelligence capabilities that allow us to gather exquisite knowledge of the adversary, but without his knowledge, that is integrated with and validated by sensitive HUMINT sources, and explained by trained analysts.

(U) In order to support the needs of both the policymakers and the warfighters, the Office of USD(I) continues to evaluate Defense intelligence plans and programs and to make resource decisions relative to the six primary Defense Intelligence goals as well as lessons learned from recent operations. OUSD(I) coordinates with the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) Community Management Staff (CMS) to ensure continuity and consistency across the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) programs.

(U) ISR Organizational Transformation

(U) ISR organization and doctrine—whether in support of political or military leaders—has not been systematically revised for two generations. ISR activities are burdened by legacy policies and stove-piped activities that are de-conflicted, but not integrated either within DoD or between DoD and the Intelligence Community. We are taking measures to create a modern ISR capability.

(U) Unified Command Plan Change- Global ISR

(U) The organizational transformation of our ISR forces is already underway. The means by which ISR information was produced and used in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) is just the beginning of what will eventually become a transformational intelligence capability. Cooperation among defense and non-defense agencies was outstanding during these conflicts and resulted in a number of innovative applications of intelligence. Fused analysis of data provided by differing disciplines produced new kinds of information. Close integration of intelligence and operations was the norm, to the point where the two were sometimes indistinguishable. Speed with which critical information was supplied to both analysts and war fighters made the

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difference in a number of critical situations. New tactics, techniques, and procedures for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence made contributions to the successful completion of those campaigns. We must codify these lessons by updating how our ISR forces' are organized and fight.

(U) US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), in addition to its Global Strike responsibilities, has been assigned responsibility for Global ISR. This is in keeping with our continuing effort to make intelligence and operations integral to each other and capable of performing within the timelines of the commander's decision-making cycle. We know that if intelligence lags behind operational and command decision-making windows it is not actionable. Just as a maneuver formation on the ground, at sea or in the air is a warfighting system, so is intelligence. By making ISR the responsibility of a functional Combatant Commander we gain synergy and perspective among warfighting systems.

(U) In addition to the assignment of the Global ISR the mission to USSTRATCOM, I have issued guidance for all theater-collected airborne, shipboard and ground intelligence data to be posted for discovery and access across the Global Information Grid in a timely manner. The Chairman's Staff is converting this guidance to an Instruction. I believe this is the first time such direction has been given. Not only does it permit access to the data at all levels within a command and between commands, it also opens the way for sharing this data with the larger Intelligence Community, which I believe is a first as well.

(U) We are also working closely with USSTRATCOM, the DCI's Community Management Staff (CMS), the Combat Support Agencies and the Joint Staff on proposals to operationalize our coordination between and among organizations to maximize the return on DoD and IC collection.

(U) ISR Integration Council

(U) The ISR Integration Council, under my direction, will be the vehicle the Department uses to connect Defense ISR programs and the Global ISR applications and capabilities being administered by USSTRATCOM. The objective of the ISR Integration Council will be to oversee DoD's fundamental goals in achieving an integrated ISR capability. It will provide leadership for ISR capability transformation, overseeing development of an investment strategy for achieving integration of DoD's ISR capabilities that ensures effective sustainment of needed tactical and operational efforts and efficient acquisition of transformational ISR capabilities. The ISR Council's strategy will allow

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rationalization of ISR investments focusing on identification of critical ISR integration issues, materiel and non-materiel. It will enable synchronization of Service and Agency programs, resulting in better integration of investment across the full spectrum of ISR systems – operated by the Services and the Combat Support Agencies.

(U) To guide the Council in its deliberations and to institutionalize its products, we are developing an ISR Integration Roadmap. This roadmap will be a broad document that provides guidelines for future capabilities, articulates the Department's fundamental ISR goals, establishes the boundaries of the trade spaces within which the Department's ISR investment strategy will be built, and identifies the options for funding. It will span the entire range of Defense ISR, including space, air, maritime and ground systems, as well as HUMINT and emerging disciplines. The Roadmap will also address key external issues / systems that impact Defense intelligence, such as the Transformational Communications Architecture, to enable an understanding of how issues in those foundational capabilities will affect the ability of Defense ISR to transform.

(U) ISR Investment Transformation

(U) The Department of Defense is strengthening our intelligence capabilities by transforming our Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) processes, procedures, and systems. We must transform if we are to succeed in protecting our homeland and in achieving and ensuring peace abroad. The Department is currently engaged in transformational ISR investments to bolster integrated ISR capabilities. Investments made in collection systems a generation ago are being re-evaluated. Known adversaries, arrayed in large formations, operating in known locations, have given way to a new combination of potential threats who focus their efforts on denying us use of those capabilities we rely upon most.

(U) ISR Communications Network Investment

(U) ISR collection must be coupled to a process that allows the data collected to be accessed by the user—the analyst or the military operator. Toward this end, beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 substantial investment has been made in laser satellite communications, the expansion of the Global Information Grid, the creation of a Distributed Common Ground System, and joint command and control systems. These, in turn, are being fashioned into a networked operating environment both the defense and intelligence community share. As this capability

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comes on line, the need for “direct downlinks” (and the bandwidth that it consumes in theater) will decline as “reachback”, both on and through the intelligence network, takes hold.

(U) ISR Interoperability Investment

(U) The Department continues to increase real-time networking of ISR systems, improve access to ISR information by weapons platforms, and increase interoperability among ISR systems, allowing seamless integration of collected sensor data into the Joint and National environment. The Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS) is the Department’s overarching family of interconnected systems for posting, processing, exploiting, and updating ISR information. Many ISR assets are already an element of, or have a major interface with, the DCGS. DCGS is also the Department’s “hub” to effectively implement the information sharing relationships between the warfighters, the Service intelligence analysts, and the various intelligence agencies.

(U) A key feature of DCGS is that it’s constructed in such a way that the data is separated from the Service applications used to employ the data. Each Service – or by extension agency or command – can at its discretion or by direction of higher authority employ the same applications. This is especially important in a joint operating environment. But, for other Service, agency or command-specific activity, the users are free to assemble and present the data in a manner most appropriate to its need. In other words, we have avoided “one size fits all” in favor of the ability to create a user defined operating picture on demand.

(U) Another important feature of DCGS is the potential to support integrated mission management by allowing all available data to be accessed by any interested user. This could reduce the overall demand for ISR collection assets by eliminating unnecessary duplication of effort and maximizing the processing of the total collected data.

(U) ISR Platform and Sensor Investment

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(U) The Department's ISR ground, naval, and airborne platforms have been heavily employed since the start of the Global War on Terrorism. These systems provided a significant portion of the theater and tactical intelligence information during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and continuing operations in Afghanistan, enabling rapid precision strikes and an unprecedented speed of advance by our ground forces. These ISR platforms remain the primary "eyes and ears" of our deployed forces. This administration has strongly supported programmed budgets and supplemental requests that have funded numerous improvements to ISR systems to enhance our existing capabilities.

(U) Among the investments made in newer platforms or sensors, DoD is fielding high endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (e.g., Air Force's PREDATOR and GLOBAL HAWK) and smaller tactical UAVs (to include Army's SHADOW 200), providing flexibility and adaptability to meet the immediate needs of battlefield commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department continues to invest in other UAV programs like the Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) and Vertical Take-off and Landing (VTOL) Tactical UAV (VTUAV). The Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (JUCAS), conceived as a combat aircraft, may prove to have ISR potential as well.

(U) The Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) is a project now wholly within the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program for FY 2005, realigned from TIARA and the JMIP's DCP and consolidated within DARP. ACS is an Army-led, joint airborne ISR system that will meet both Army and Navy requirements. ACS will provide commanders with tailored, multi-sensor intelligence using four to six onboard operators. The robust ACS Multi-sensor capabilities include communication intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT) and measurements and signatures intelligence (MASINT) sensors, incorporating electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR), synthetic aperture radar (SAR), Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI), and multi- and hyper-spectral imagery sensors. For the Army, ACS replaces the ageing RC-12 Guardrail Common Sensor and the RC-7 Airborne Reconnaissance Low fleets beginning in FY 2009, while the Navy will replace their EP-3E Aries II aircraft with ACS beginning in FY 2012.

(U) Prominent among new investments to realize the intelligence goal of persistent surveillance is the Space Based Radar (SBR). The FY 2004 SBR appropriation was \$198 million and the FY 2005 request is \$438 million, spread across three TIARA and JMIP budget lines. The FY 2005 request is critical for the concept

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development activities we are pursuing under the SBR acquisition strategy. The surveillance provided by a space-based radar, in combination with other complementary space and airborne systems, could bring us much closer to realizing persistent surveillance. SBR plays to an established area of U.S. technological advantage with its all weather, day/night, and worldwide multi-theater access. SBR capabilities will include:

- Surface moving target indication
- High Resolution SAR imagery
- High Resolution Terrain information

(U) Among the products envisioned from using these SBR capabilities are:

- Maneuver Doctrine
- Relocatable Entity Tracking
- Treaty Monitoring/Verification
- Coherent change detection (CCD)
- Dynamic Imaging

(U) HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION (HI)

(U) These new ISR capabilities will be enabled by an overarching Horizontal Integration strategy that compels an integrated approach to acquiring and applying collection assets – a planned “system-of-systems” that integrates surveillance capabilities across the various human and technical intelligence disciplines and national, theater, tactical, and commercial programs. This provides the mechanism to share information across the enterprise – increasing the likelihood that events can be correlated and fused to increase the accuracy, timeliness and value of intelligence.

(U) OUSD(I) is working closely with the Intelligence Community to achieve the horizontal integration of currently fielded and future DoD and IC intelligence systems. The aim of HI is to take full advantage of future intelligence systems that provide agile and persistent collectors, enable ease of information sharing, and support predictive analysis to deal with a strategic environment characterized by adaptable adversaries, accelerated technology diffusion, and the increasing potential for disruptive and destructive attacks.

(U) Pursuit of HI was a key recommendation of the Kerr Panel report on remote sensing in 2001 and it was the primary recommendation from the July 2003 Transformational Space and Airborne Project (TSAP) report sponsored by DoD

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and the Intelligence Community (IC). The TSAP study found that near term improvements in intelligence capabilities could best be realized by focusing on HI and recommended immediate implementation of initial policy, management, and organizational improvements.

(U) In August 2003, a Senior Steering Group for HI was formed to guide the implementation of these key capabilities across DoD, the IC, and law enforcement. This steering group is co-chaired by the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence and myself.

(U) Among the principles guiding our approach to HI:

- It places emphasis on the tailored mission needs of consumers
- It shifts the focus from data ownership to data usability
- Accordingly, it urges that all data must meet net-centric standards at its earliest point of consumability and be broadly available.

(U) Quite honestly, we have not yet worked out between DoD and the IC the many thorny issues that need to be resolved to realize the promise of HI. However, I do believe that the vision of a seamless and transparent capability to translate analysts' needs into the collection of information, and the availability of that information in a timely fashion to be structured in useful formats to those who need it, will come in its own time. The advance of the Internet, with the adoption of its features both within Defense and the IC, suggest to me that this time is not far off.

(U) Intelligence Campaign Plans

(U) As we develop integrated approaches to acquiring and applying collection assets, we must also develop integrated approaches for planning and conducting intelligence operations. We have begun exploring the concept of Intelligence Campaign Planning, which is designed to synchronize and integrate intelligence into the commander's adaptive planning process and, when fully developed, will bring together DoD and IC capabilities in a more synergistic effort. Intelligence Campaign Plans are designed to focus the intelligence community's capabilities on the commander's critical decision requirements. Under the old paradigm, intelligence developed stove-piped plans that were poorly coordinated. Recent lessons learned and new operational concepts require intelligence plans that are, fully integrated, multi-discipline, holistic and support all phases of operations.

(U) To that end we have asked the Commander, Joint Forces Command, to begin the concept development process, focusing initially on three elements of

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Intelligence Campaign Planning: defining and developing the concept, creating a comprehensive methodology for use by the DoD intelligence community, and designing an exercise venue for validating the concept and methodology.

(U) To fully realize the promise of robust Intelligence Campaign Planning, we have begun an intensive, long-term strategy for remodeling defense intelligence in order to address several of our major objectives. This remodeling effort focuses on “operationalizing intelligence,” transforming the functions and capabilities of Defense intelligence into more than simply a supporting arm of the Department, but rather into a true joint operational capability. We are examining organizational approaches that could provide senior DoD leaders and military commanders a wide array of intelligence options against mobile and adaptive adversaries. Those organizational approaches are being evaluated for their contributions.

(U) Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Revitalization

(U) Human Intelligence is one of our top priorities in the defense intelligence remodeling effort. HUMINT in the DoD context is much more than clandestine recruitment of assets. It includes clandestine logistics, overt debriefers, and interrogators, as well as the hundreds of Tactical HUMINT Teams we have deployed in the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). We have taken steps to provide better management and oversight of HUMINT resources by establishing a new JMIP Program, the Defense Human Intelligence Program to give us better management and oversight of HUMINT resources.

(U) Finally, we are studying a number of inputs gathered from Combatant Commands and the Services, including lessons learned from both Afghanistan and Iraq, regarding their clandestine and overt HUMINT needs.

REMODLING DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

(U) Proposed plans and initiatives for Defense intelligence transformation are the culmination of almost 10 months of work. We began with a multi-service, inter-agency study titled ‘Taking Stock of Defense Intelligence,’ which we have offered to your staff. Our efforts to remodel defense intelligence are a work in progress, but we are moving toward implementation, while consulting across the defense

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intelligence community, the national intelligence community, and supported warfighters as we move forward. In the coming months, I look forward to sharing with you the progress we are making and refinements in our plans as we pursue this goal.

(U) Conclusion

(U) Our Nation possesses a preeminent advantage: A global intelligence capability composed of the very best people and the finest technology anywhere. Military capability, guided and enabled by intelligence, is a powerful instrument. The DoD – along with its IC colleagues – are reshaping and revitalizing intelligence capabilities to meet the more rigorous demands of today and tomorrow. I look forward to the opportunity to work with you to improve the Nation's intelligence capabilities in this time of war. Again, thank you for your support. I look forward to your questions.