联合查询人员声明

埃莉诺·希尔（Eleanor Hill），参谋长

October 17, 2002

介绍

Goss主席，Graham董事长，该联合调查的成员，早上好。在过去的几个月中，这些委员会考虑了大量信息，这些信息既是通过证人证词和纪录片审查获得的。情报界高级领导人今天早上的证词将结束这一系列公开听证会。至少在情报委员会方面，也许是前所未有的，是通过公开公开的公开听证会完成本审查的大部分程度的程度。这项努力是由9月11日的幅度和您对美国公众对当天事件更好地了解其政府（尤其是情报界的表现）的认可所驱动的。

除了9月11日的事件,然而,我们believe these open hearings have also served to educate the public on the ongoing policy debate about the future path of the Intelligence Community. The considerable factual record that is now before these Committees touches on a wide range of issues that are critical to that debate. Ultimately, many of those issues will be considered and addressed in even greater depth as these Committees deliberate on what will become the final report of this Joint Inquiry. At this point, however, the Staff has been asked to briefly review the most important elements of the factual record as well as key questions that we believe have been raised through the course of these public hearings.

Review of Key Facts

从首次公开听证会开始，该记录详细描述了美国情报界在2001年9月11日之前就乌萨马·本·拉丁（Usama bin Ladin）构成的恐怖威胁而面临的情况。关键事实包括：

• Usama Bin Ladin's public法特瓦1998年，授权全世界对美国平民和军事人员发动恐怖袭击；

• 情报界在三年的时间内收到的信息广泛地表明，乌萨马·本·拉丁（Usama bin Ladin）的网络打算在美国境内发动攻击；

• The Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) statement in December 1998 that "we are at war" with Usama Bin Ladin and that no resources should be spared by the Intelligence Community in that regard;

• Information accumulated by the Intelligence Community over the course of a seven-year period indicating that international terrorists had considered using airplanes as weapons; and

• 众多的一个主要指标即将到来的恐怖分子attack detected by the Intelligence Community in the spring and summer of 2001. Although those indicators lacked the specifics of precisely where, when, or how the attack would occur, the Intelligence Community had information indicating that the attack was likely to have dramatic consequences for governments and cause mass casualties.

尽管9月11日攻击的细节尚不预先知道，但相关信息在2001年夏季提供。但是，该信息的集体意义尚未得到认可。也许结果，在情报界和其他联邦机构中，这些信息都没有及时有效地共享。示例包括：

• 2000年1月,美国中央情报局(CIA) succeeded indetermining that Bin Laden operatives Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi were in Malaysia and in obtaining important information about them. While some information regarding the two was provided to the FBI at an early point, the weight of the evidence suggests that the CIA apparently did not transmit information regarding al-Mihdhar's possession of a U.S. multiple-entry visa and the likelihood of travel by al-Mihdhar, and later by al-Hazmi, to the United States, despite various opportunities to do so in January 2000, March 2000, and June 2001;

• It was not until late August 2001 that the CIA watch-listed al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi and advised the FBI of their likely presence in the United States. FBI efforts to locate them through the New York and Los Angeles FBI offices proved unsuccessful. Other potentially useful federal agencies were apparently not fully enlisted in that effort: representatives of the State Department, the FAA, and the INS all testified that, prior to September 11th, their agencies were not asked to utilize their own information databases as part of the effort to find al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. An FAA representative, for example, testified that he believes that, had the FAA been given the names of the two individuals, they would have "picked them up in the reservations system";

• The FBI did not grasp the significance of a July 2001 electronic communication from the Phoenix field office identifying a pattern of Middle Eastern males with possible terrorist connections attending flight schools in the United States. Apparently no one at FBI headquarters connected that idea to previous FBI concerns about the topic or to the increasing threat of a terrorist attack in the summer of 2001. The communication generated no broader analytic effort on the issue nor any special alert within the Intelligence Community. Despite ts relevance to civil aviation, the FAA did not receive the communication until it was brought to the agency's attention in 2002 by the Joint Inquiry Staff;

• 同样在2001年夏天，在扎卡里亚斯·穆萨伊（Zacarias Moussaoui）的联邦调查局野外办事处的特工可能是潜在的恐怖威胁，担心更大的土地可能针对航空公司，并与联邦调查局总部和DCI的反恐中心分享了这些担忧。联邦调查局总部和CTC显然都没有将信息与CTC发出的有关即将发生的恐怖袭击或可能在美国的两名Al-qa'ida操作员的存在联系起来。联邦调查局总部的同一单位处理了凤凰城EC，但仍听起来没有任何警钟。

No one will ever know whether more extensive analytic efforts, fuller and more timely information sharing, or a greater focus on the connection between these events would have led to the unraveling of the September 11 plot. But, it is at least a possibility that increased analysis, sharing and focus would have drawn greater attention to the growing potential for a major terrorist attack in the United States involving the aviation industry. This could have generated a heightened state of alert regarding such attacks and prompted more aggressive investigation, intelligence gathering and general awareness based on the information our Government did possess prior to September 11, 2001.

除了与9月11日袭击有关的相当大的事实记录外，这些委员会的听证会还确定了影响的系统问题，这些问题已经影响，如果尚未解决，将继续影响情报界的表现。例如，证人在9月11日之前抱怨缺乏资源，以应对太多广泛的情报要求，其中反恐只有一个。虽然需求增长，但通常没有更新优先级。正如我们上周报道的那样，对于许多情报界来说，一切都是当务之急 - 美国希望一直了解一切。

在这些听证会的过程中，缺乏反恐资源一直是一个重复的主题，尤其是在情报界证人的证词中。关于联邦调查局和中央情报局的确切分析师的数量也有一些争论由DCI反恐中心（CTC）中的全职UBL分析师的工作人员报告。最初，在与CTC代表的访谈中给予了这些数字。最近，我们从中央情报局（CIA）收到了有关这一点的其他数字，表明截至2001年8月，总共有48.8英尺或相当于49位分析师，集中在整个CIA中。

Regarding their resource issues, the FBI has emphasized that FBI headquarters had a number of operations analysts in addition to the one strategic analyst which we had been told of originally by FBI officials and which was noted in our previous staff statement. Our statement, which also noted that some of the FBI's strategic analytic capability on al-Q'aida had been transfered to "operational units", does not dispute that point. Our focus had been on the FBI's ability to perform strategic, as opposed to operational, analysis of al-Q'aida.

但是，除了这些具体观点之外，我认为，工作人员，中央情报局和联邦调查局都同意，在9月11日之前，资源全职专门用于AL-Q'AIDA分析，与在此之后专门为这项工作的水平进行比较而苍白。攻击。在9月20日联合调查听证会上作证的中央情报局官员作证，在9月11日之前的工作量“简单地”了CIA和FBI工作人员。

Resource issues were not, however, the only systemic problems facing the Intelligence Community. Even aside from the case of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, a number of witnesses described their own experiences with various legal, institutional, and cultural barriers that apparently impeded the Intelligence Community's ability to enhance the value of intelligence through effective and timely information sharing. This is critically important at several levels: within the Intelligence Community itself, between intelligence agencies and other components of the federal government; and between all those agencies and appropriate state and local authorities. Finally, the loss in potential intelligence from a lack of information sharing cuts both ways: we heard from representatives of state and local authorities that, when confronting the threat of terrorist activity within the United States, intelligence obtained at the local level can be critically important.

在这些听证会的过程中，我们还了解了超越情报界并涉及政策问题的问题。乐动冠军在冷战之后，美国的反恐努力面临着一种新的恐怖分子的出现，这些恐怖分子从事一种新的恐怖主义形式，与1960年代，1970年代和1980年代的国家赞助，有限的伤亡恐怖主义不同。美国反恐努力面临着许多新的挑战，包括本·拉丁（Bin Ladin）和Qa'ida的崛起以及在阿富汗的存在，使Al-Qa'ida能够组织，培训，训练，招募，招募，筹集资金和成长，并筹集资金，筹集资金和成长进入全球威胁。随着本·拉丁（Bin Ladin）和他的“军队”在这个庇护所中蓬勃发展，美国继续依靠主要是执法恐怖主义的方法。结果，尽管起诉成功地将个别恐怖分子带离了街头，但过去和将来的袭击的策划者通常仍然超出了正义的范围。

最后，记录表明，在9月11日之前，美国情报和执法社区在反对恐怖主义的战争中大为奋斗，而没有某些人在这种努力中称其最有力的武器的好处：警报并承诺美国公众。您不需要比93号航班上的乘客的英勇或识别鞋炸弹式轰炸机理查德·里德（Richard Reid）的乘客的英勇行为。尽管情报界的高级层次以及高级决策者都意识到了本·拉丁（Bin Ladin）构成的危险，但几乎没有迹象表明，任何持续的国家努力都在动员公众对9月11日之前威胁的严重性和即时性。在没有这样的努力的情况下，显然不足以公开关注本·拉丁（Bin Ladin），他对美国的法特瓦（Fatwah）以及他已经针对美国国外利益的攻击的信息。正如克里斯汀·布雷特威尔（Kristen Breitweiser）在第一次公开听证会上的证词中提出的那样，如果公众对公众更加意识到，那么在任何程度上都会减少9月11日的破坏，从而更加戒备，从而对我们在夏季所面临的威胁感到更加警惕。2001年？

Key Questions for the Committees to Consider

In sum, the record now before these Conunittees raises significant questions for consideration by policymakers in both Congress and the Executive branch, as they chart the future path of the Intelligence Community in the war against terrorism. For purposes of this public hearing, these include:

• 中央情报总监（DCI）是否具有元帅资源，灌输优先事项并在整个情报界对这些优先事项的一致回应的必要权力和权威？当DCI在1998年确定了针对本·拉丁的“战争”时，是什么阻止了整个情报界的战争基础上的完全动员？需要什么（如果有任何结构性变化），以确保对既定优先级的更大响应能力，并改善社区各地的反恐努力的合作？

• What can be done to significantly improve the quality and timeliness of analytical products throughout the Intelligence Community? Do we have the resources, the training, the skills, the creativity, and the incentives in place to produce excellence in analysis, at both the strategic and tactical levels? Are analysts now focused not only on individual events, but also on the collective significance of the bigger picture? Do we need to create a kind of all-source "fusion center" to maximize our ability to "connect the dots" in the future?;

• 可以做些什么来确保情报界能够充分利用可用来破坏，抢先和预防恐怖行动的技术范围？例如，我们是否可以改善和增加对人类情报的使用，信号情报，与外国情报和执法服务的联系，联络人的关系，在美国法院起诉的恐怖分子的恐怖分子以及秘密行动？我们的情报人员是否需要有效地使用这些技术的培训，资源，工具和激励措施？

• Is the Intelligence Community adequately equipped to address the full range of the terrorist threat, both at home and abroad? Has the Community made the adjustments needed to succeed against global terrorist organizations that now include the domestic United States within their range of targets? Have we established clear channels to facilitate enhanced communication and collaboration between our foreign and domestic intelligence capabilities?;

• 联邦调查局能否有效承担解决美国境内威胁的责任，包括情报的分析，收集和共享？传统的执法部门是否关注个人起诉，兼容更广泛，更积极地关注智力和预防？如果是这样，我们该怎么做才能增强联邦调查局应对挑战的能力？如果没有，应在哪里应对国内威胁谎言？

• Can the Intelligence Community requirements process be revamped to reflect more accurately legitimate priorities, to simplify the tasks facing collectors and analysts, and to establish a clearer and more credible basis for the allocation of resources? How can we insure that both Intelligence Community requirements and resources keep pace with future changes in the terrorist threat?;

• 我们的反恐努力是否可以完全访问最佳的可用信息？我们如何才能在机构之间以及现场运营，管理和其他机构的其他组件之间最大化信息共享？在9月11日之后，我们的反恐努力能否依靠所有相关的外国和国内情报？我们最终是否克服了我们执法机构和情报机构之间建立的法律，机构和文化因素的“墙”？

• How do we bridge the informational gap that often exists between the Intelligence Community and other federal, state, and local agencies? What can be done to improve the timely dissemination of relevant intelligence to customer agencies? How do we insure that analytic and collection efforts fully benefit not only from information held within the Community, but also from the great wealth of information that exists in other government agencies, as well as the private sector?;

• 我们能否更好地利用技术的好处来加强美国的情报和反恐努力？FBI何时准备实施将终止其长期数据库问题的技术解决方案？可以做什么（如果有的话）来加快该过程？情报界是否正在充分利用数据挖掘和其他技术来大大提高其收集和分析能力？我们如何确保社区充分利用技术的发展？

• Should the Intelligence Community play a greater role in focusing policymakers not only on intelligence but also on those areas where the intelligence suggests defensive or other action may be called for? How can we better insure that future efforts to "harden the homeland" in areas such as tightening border controls and strengthening civil aviation security will be identified and implemented before, and not merely after, attacks of the magnitude of September 11th?; and, finally,

• How can we insure that the American public understands and appreciates the full significance and severity of whatever threats may confront this country in the years ahead? How do we balance legitimate national security concerns about the release of intelligence information with the need for the American public to remain alert and committed in efforts as critical as the war against terrorism? How do we maintain, over the long run, a threat warning system that remains both responsible and credible in the eyes of the American public? How can our government, and the Intelligence Community, best explain to the American people not only what happened on September 11th but also what they can expect to face in the future?

结论

Those are, in our view, legitimate and relevant questions, based on the factual record of this Inquiry. The extent to which effective responses are developed and ultimately implemented could significantly impact the future course of counterterrorist efforts, both within and beyond the boundaries of the Intelligence Community. With that in mind and with a view towards the future, we have asked the witnesses today to address the following:

• If the Intelligence Community could replay the years and months prior to September 11, 2001, would the Community do anything differently the second time around?

• What lessons has the Intelligence Community drawn from the September 11 experience?

• 情报界将以特定的方式做什么来改善未来的绩效？

主席先生，这是我今天的说法。