感谢您邀请我今天出现。我想谈谈与美国政府在收集和处理有关恐怖主义和恐怖分子的情报信息方面相关的三个不同但相关的主题。第一批涉及中央情报局和联邦调查局之间在追求恐怖主义威胁时的任务的重叠越来越大。第二个指出了几种明显的方式，即必须改变情报机构在该领域运作的宪章的法定权威，以反映新现实。最后，我想对大学讲师发表评论，即对当前一代毕业生的上诉或缺乏政府服务，以及我们可能对此做些什么。我们都同意，恐怖主义将以与过去的国家安全威胁的根本不同的方式挑战美国，我们希望我们最好，最聪明的人被吸引到这一努力中。 弗雷德里克·P·希茨（Frederick P. Hitz）的声明
Lecturer of Public and International Affairs,
Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University,在联合情报委员会之前
美国参议院和美国众议院
调查导致2001年9月11日袭击的事件First, some scene-setting. In this short review, I am indebted to my colleague, Greg Treverton of RAND, who made remarks on this subject recently at the annual conference of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies in Ottawa. Mr. Treverton pointed out that in the struggle against terrorism, old-fashioned distinctions between the roles of intelligence agencies such as CIA, and law enforcement such as the FBI, simply do not work. The notions that intelligence work in this area means secret, overseas and designed for the edification of policymakers exclusively no longer obtains. On the contrary, in counter terrorism operations, the CIA may be held to the evidentiary standards of the court room in terms of the quality of its reporting. The FBI is increasingly being tasked to obtain intelligence information before the perpetration of a terrorist act, rather than merely piece together what happened and who did it after the fact. Finally, law enforcement is being challenged to meet the intelligence needs of policymakers, as well as prosecutors and the courts, and do it over the broad range of challenges that a war on terrorism entails rather than on a case-oriented basis which has been their method of operation heretofore.
对于中央情报局和联邦调查局来说，这是一项艰巨的变化，在许多方面都代表了一生的习惯，这些习惯不会在一夜之间发生。难怪有太多关于“连接点”的讨论。考虑到中央情报局和联邦调查局的传统核心任务，迄今为止，在两个机构中，迄今为止都有很大的理由从未将它们之间的点联系起来。大陪审团保密和检察官菲亚特限制了联邦调查局特工对其他案件的看法；和“需要知道”和原则隔室inhibited the intelligence agencies. In addition, the National Security Act of 1947 specifically prohibited CIA from exercising "domestic law enforcement powers". Finally, the FBI and CIA have a fifty-five year history of intense rivalry and suspicion to overcome. J. Edgar Hoover sought to strangle the fledgling CIA in its crib in 1947, seeking initially to retain his overseas deployments in Latin America, and to tightly constrain CIA collection and counterintelligence activities in the U.S. even when there was a foreign nexus. As a junior clandestine services officer at CIA in the 1960s, I remember having to go through a single focal point at the FBI to obtain information: S.J. Papich. I'll never forget the name and will always wonder if there ever was such a creature. In those early days there was little chance of developing personal professional relationships and many opportunities for misunderstanding.
所以我赞同中情局局长乔治·特内特的步骤nd FBI Director Robert Mueller have taken to further break down cultural barriers between the two agencies by exchanging personnel between them to work on counterterrorism. It only remains for this committee to suggest ways to streamline and rationalize the current overlap of responsibilities between the intelligence and law enforcement communities on counter terrorist matters to minimize needless rivalry and duplication of effort. I note the Attorney General has just issued guidelines governing the way grand jury testimony is to be shared with the intelligence agencies in terrorist cases under the USA PATRIOT Act. Rules of the road will have to be established in other areas affected by the Act as well. Perhaps something along those lines will be forthcoming in the surveillance area, emanating from the current appeal of the FISA Court decision to constrain the permitted use of FISA permissions in terrorist cases. Do we currently have a clear notion of how the newly expanded network of legal attaché offices abroad works with CIA Stations in the field on counter terrorist cases? These and other areas of overlapping responsibility need to be rationalized, while CIA case officers continue to learn the heightened requirements of supplying intelligence to evidentiary standards while still following unsubstantiated hunches when their gut-knowledge of the culture dictates it. Likewise, FBI agents must appreciate the value of target analysis for pre-emption purposes as well as the need to build a probative case for apprehension of the bad guys and eventual trial.
我坚信并在去年春季《哈佛法律与公共政策杂志25周年纪念》上的一篇文章中提倡并提倡，必须在围绕情报界参与国内执法活动的法律和实践中寻求某些变化和澄清，以此作为担忧反恐。根据我的判断，最重要的问题是，现在似乎有一些动作来澄清《美国爱国者法案》有关分享大陪审团证词和FISA许可的某些规定，就是要修改或删除禁止中央情报局涉及国内法律的禁令1947年《国家安全法》建立了中央情报局的执法活动。对我来说，很明显，随着《美国爱国者法》的通过，如果没有明显，在反恐行动中，中央情报局坐在国内执法部门的肘部，并提供与外国出处有关的情报信息，援助和专业知识恐怖计划和实施should如果我们要成功防止未来的9/11攻击，请做。问题在于，如果打算在美国法院建立最终审判的案例，目前不得根据《 1947年法》允许，这是国内执法活动。
最后,我想说几句感人current responsibilities. Each of you should be proud of the response to the events of 9/11 on the university campuses at which I teach, Princeton and the University of Virginia. I have students visiting me every day seeking help in getting their resumes to the intelligence community, law enforcement and the armed services for summer jobs, internships and permanent employment. I am supervising five undergraduate theses this year on subjects relating to the war on terrorism, historical or prospective, and have had to turn down others. Several of my students have begun the study of Arabic over the summer and are continuing it during this academic year. What concerns me is that the U.S. Government in the past has been notoriously poor in capitalizing on this outburst of patriotic enthusiasm. I read the statistics of government being overwhelmed by the growth in interest and applications for employment post 9/11 in the national security area. I can understand and sympathize with the difficulty of dealing with the numbers. To me, however, it is so important that we capitalize on this renewed interest in public service among American students. Every person on this committee is aware of the frightening statistics reflecting the eligibility for retirement of large numbers of current federal civil servants over the next five years, with no identifiable replacement cadre in the wings. I believe Washington should respond to this quiet crisis in three dramatic ways to take advantage of the 9/11-induced interest in federal service that I see among my students:
1.从根本上增加了情报/执法领域中合格学生可用的暑期实习数量。尽管他们对公共服务有兴趣，但学生对官僚主义的沉重手保持着责任。实习允许政府在没有最终承诺的情况下查看潜在的新兵，更重要的是，学生可以在相同条件下看到政府如何工作并迷上业务。
Thank you for allowing me to express my views.2.增加联邦工资。尽管在大多数情况下，薪酬不会成为削弱学生在美联储工作的大多数情况，但政府的薪水却低于最佳学生的私营部门薪水。此外，我们许多最有才华的毕业生都有大量的学生贷款，他们需要还清，这显然是他们决策的一个因素，如果还有其他报价，政府的机会并不明显地压倒性。
3.停止政府服务的贬损。对于现在将近一代人来说，这对于华盛顿特区和联邦公务员制度已成为敌人的土地上最高职位的共和党和民主党候选人普遍存在。这种观点使我的学生怀疑。每年都在统计数据中证明这是反映普林斯顿公共行政毕业生大师的工作选择，他们在大量上选择与非政府组织，非政府组织或国际组织（例如Worldbank）一起工作，而不是美国政府！他们想在公共部门工作，但害怕他们认为华盛顿官僚机构已经成为什么。必须纠正这种误解，并在9/11之后创造的爱国气候是尝试它的最佳时机。