Unclassified Version of
中央情报局局长George J. Tenet的证词
联合调查恐怖袭击对美国的袭击
2002年6月18日
笔记:
1.�The Joint Inquiry members asked that the highly classified testimony DCI Tenet presented to them June 18 be modified to make it unclassified so that it could be released publicly.� To that end, intelligence sources and methods and all other classified text have been replaced with unclassified text.� The thrust of the Director's statement remains intact.
2.�文本中的以下名称 - e.g。,“(#14)” - 被键入随附图形中的照片,这在两者中都提供JPG和PDF格式。
在您和穆勒(Mueller)主任专注于9/11情节之前,正如您要我们担任主席先生时,我想在发生攻击的情况下发表一些评论。
- 首先,我们跟随了本·拉登(Bin Laden)多年,毫无疑问他打算进行重大攻击。
- 其次,在9/11之前的十八个月是CIA/FBI的一段时间,以抑制UBL的运营活动。
We first locked onto Bin Laden in the period from 1991 to 1996 when he was in Sudan.
- During those years, he was principally a financier of terrorist attacks and our efforts against him competed with other deadly threats, such as those posed by Hizbollah – which at that point was responsible for the deaths of more Americans than any other terrorist organization.
- 本·拉登(Bin Laden)于1996年搬到阿富汗,并努力建立庇护所,后来又引发了他最壮观的攻击。由中央情报局,联邦调查局,国防部和NSA官员作者。
- Bin Laden showed his hand clearly that year when he said that the June bombing of Khobar towers marked the beginning of the war between Muslims and the United States.
- Two years later, he issued a fatwa stating that all Muslims have a religious duty "to kill Americans and their allies, both civilian and military worldwide".
- 然后,他在1998年袭击了我们东非大使馆,并说袭击在the US was his highest priority.
- 我们将其视为他明确的战争宣言,而我们又向他宣战,开设了一段密集的反恐活动时期,填补了9/11的几个月。
在9/11之前的斗争中,有三个广泛的阶段,我想通过告诉您有关它们的情况为9/11剧情奠定基础:
- 首先,1999年底的千年前时期。�UBL operatives planned a series of attacks against US and allied targets designed to exploit the millennium celebrations planned around the world.� CIA and FBI worked closely and successfully to defeat these terrorist plans.�� We acquired information that enabled us to break up a large terrorist cell in Jordan that had been planning to blow up the Radisson Hotel, holy sites, and Israeli tour buses, and that had plans to use chemical weapons.� The arrest of Ahmad Ressam coming across the Canadian border into the US was the single most compelling piece of evidence we had that UBL was intending to strike at us in the United States.� During this period, we identified numerous terrorist suspects around the world and carried out disruption activities against more than half of these individuals including arrests, renditions, detentions, and interrogations.�
- 第二,斋月时期。In November and December 2000, we had an increase in Ramadan-related threat reporting. Working with a number of foreign governments, we were able to successfully preempt attacks including a planned attack against US interests.� Overall, these operations disrupted several al-Qa'ida plans and captured hundreds of pounds of explosives, as well as weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles.� You will recall that the attack on the科尔号had just occurred in October 2000, a serious defeat.
- And finally, the Pre-9/11 Period.�从春季开始,一直持续到2001年夏天,我们看到了威胁报告水平的显着提高。。
因此,甚至在2001年9月之前,我们就知道我们面对了一个敌人,具有韧性,具有弹性并具有操作深度。
- 很少有战争是一系列不间断的胜利或失败。
- 但是我们已经在行动。
We had, in fact, considered ourselves at war with al-Qa'ida since 1998.� By 1998, key elements of CIA's strategy were emphatically offensive rather than defensive.� And in the spring of 1999, we put in place a new strategic operational plan whose central focus was to获得通过其组织的渗透对本·拉丁的情报。
- This strategy—which we called simply "the Plan"—as it evolved in conjunction with increased covert action authorities, was a multifaceted campaign against Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida.�
- The campaign involved a multifaceted program to capture and render Bin Ladin and his principal lieutenants.� The range of operational initiatives employed included a strong and focused FI collection program using all means at our disposal to monitor Bin Ladin and his network around the world, and to disrupt al-Qa'ida operations.
- 我现在不打算在这项活动上进行详细介绍 - 这次听证会大约是9/11。
- 但是我的信息是,对9/11事件的充分理解需要对这场战争的全部理解,我希望随后的听证会能够发展该故事的细节。
现在,以此为背景,让我首先要在广义上描述9/11的情节。
- First, the plot was专业构思和执行- 它表现出耐心,体贴和专业知识。
- 第二,是tightly compartmented- 我们将不得不穿透一个很小的狂热者圈子,以便提前学会了该情节的精确细节。
- 第三,情节是有弹性的- 几个吹向操作的炸弹发生在没有脱轨的情况下。
- 我会放大每个观点。
从我们今天知道的剧情的专业精神。�The 11 September operation was conducted carefully, patiently, and with evident understanding of how to operate in the United States.�
- 劫机者(包括飞行员和其他人)以交错的间隔,来自不同国家以及通过不同的美国城市进入美国。
- We now know that al-Qa'ida leaders deliberately chose young men who had not carried out previous terrorist attacks and therefore would not have attracted the attention of intelligence services.�Seventeen of the nineteen hijackers were in fact "clean," and the two hijackers who had an extensive record of al-Qa'ida involvement—Nawaf al-Hazmi (#14) and Khalid al-Mihdhar (#12)—may have been added to the plot after it was launched.� I'll return to this possibility later in my remarks.
- They also selected men from countries whose citizens traditionally have little trouble obtaining US entry visas and instructed them to travel under true name using genuine passports.�� ��
- 情节中最重要的人 - 飞行员 - 在西方生活了几年,使他们更容易在美国运营。
- Once in the US, the hijackers were careful, with the exception of minor traffic violations, to avoid drawing law enforcement attention and even general notice that might identify them as extremists.� They dressed in Western clothes, most shaved their beards before entering the US, and they largely avoided mosques.�
- 他们收到了通过普通的电线传输资金为飞行培训和生活开支提供资金所需的资金,通常每天在美国发生的数百万美元的金融交易中,他们并没有引起人们的关注。
我提到情节紧密隔间。For intelligence work, breaking into the compartment is key to gaining the precise details of a plot.� We never achieved this success for the 9/11 plot.� We now have several indications of this compartmentation.
- Bin Ladin himself—in a candid videotape found in Afghanistan after the attacks—said even some members of his inner circle were unaware of the plot.
- He also indicated that some of the hijackers themselves never knew the targets.
- 根据我们今天所知,对9/11袭击的调查显示,阴谋家的运营安全没有重大失误。
我对情节的第三个特征是称之为有弹性的。
- 77航班劫机者纳瓦夫·哈兹米(Nawaf al-Hazmi)(#14)和哈立德·米·米哈尔(Khalid al-Mihdhar)(#12)试图在2000年5月学习飞行,由于他们的技术和英语技巧差,很快就不得不放弃他们的努力。2000年底,汉尼·汉朱(Hani Hanjur)(#11)的替换飞行员在美国。
- 在情节的韧性的最显着例子中,穆罕默德·阿塔(Mohammad Atta)(#1)汉堡牢房(Ramzi bin al-Shibh和Zakaria Essabar)的两名成员表现出打算加入劫持的垃圾,但被多次拒绝签证。-Shibh最终从国外的逻辑上支持劫持。
- 穆罕默德·阿塔(Muhammad Atta)本人是第一架袭击世界贸易中心的飞机的飞行员,于2001年1月从西班牙重新进入美国,因为他对他申请更改签证状态的疑问,并发布了法院在四月份没有驾驶执照的驾驶召唤,但对这两种事件均不感到惊慌。
- 最重要的是,即使在2001年8月16日逮捕了Zacarias Moussaoui(目前,由于串谋犯下恐怖主义和飞机盗版等起诉书,尚未被起诉)。Moussaoui被捕后一周。
请记住这些特征作为导演穆勒(Mueller),我会带您了解情节的细节。。
让我从9-11攻击之前我们知道的:
- 我们知道并警告说,Usama bin Ladin和他的Qa'ida组织是对美国的“最直接,最严重的”恐怖威胁。”我们说,包括在2001年2月对SSCI的声明中,包括几种方式。
- 在9月11日之前的几个月中,我们向决策者提醒了Qa'ida开始进行的行动可能会造成大规模的生命丧失,并且本质上是壮观的。
- Beginning in June 2001, we received a barrage of intelligence indicating that al-Qa'ida associates in Afghanistan and abroad expected imminent attacks against unspecified US interests.
- 在2001年夏天,很明显,正在进行多次攻击,尤其是在国外。其中一些被禁止进行,例如计划对欧洲和中东地区的目标攻击 - 对美国情报的成功。
- Finally, we knew—and warned—of Bin Ladin's desire to strike inside the US.
马来西亚
围绕9/11调查的一个主要问题是,美国政府如何能够将两个劫机者确定为al-qa'ida,但没有发现他们所属于的情节。Hazmi(#14)和Khalid al-Mihdhar(#12)开发了,我会带您浏览案件。
- 我们在1999年末得知,两名嫌疑人本·拉丁特工“纳瓦夫”和“哈立德”正计划前往马来西亚。由于它们之间的联系与已知与Qa'ida和埃及伊斯兰圣战操作员有关的设施。
- Based solely on this tenuous link, CIA initiated an operation to place "Khaled" under surveillance.� Recall that we did not know either Khaled's or Nawaf's true identities at this time.� The subsequent operation to learn more involved eight stations and bases and a half-dozen liaison services.�
- Our interest in monitoring the meeting was based on our suspicion that Khaled's travel to Malaysia was associated with supporting regional terrorist plans or operations.� We believed that the meeting was likely for discussion of regrouping from extensive disruptions around the world that the CIA had engaged in.�
- 在2000年初,就在他到达马来西亚之前,我们获得了“哈立德”护照的副本,该副本显示了1999年4月在吉达(Jeddah)签发的美国多次入场签证,并于2000年4月6日到期。�
- 在这一点上,我们了解到,“哈立德" name was Khalid bin Muhammad bin `Abdallah al-Mihdhar (#12). This was the first point at which CIA had complete biographic information on al-Mihdhar.
- 2000年1月5日,美国情报界广泛传播在formation report advising that "Khaled", identified as an individual with ties to members of the Bin Ladin organization, had arrived in Malaysia.�
- 直到2000年3月5日,我们才从我们的一个海外电台获得信息,使我们能够将“纳瓦夫”识别为纳瓦夫·哈兹米(Nawaf al-Hazmi)(#14)。哈兹米(#14)。
马来西亚会议在2000年12月对2000年10月的Cole Bombing的调查将Kahlid Al-Mihdhar的一些马来西亚联系与Cole Bombing嫌疑人联系起来时提高了重要意义。一个人认为是Cole攻击的主要计划者之一,通过联合FBI-CIA HUMINT资产。操作员。
In August 2001, because CIA had become increasingly concerned about a major attack in the United States, we reviewed all of our relevant holdings.� During that review, it was determined that al-Mihdhar (#12) and al-Hazmi (#14) had entered the US on 15 January 2000, that al-Mihdhar had left the US on 10 June 2000 and returned on 4 July 2001, and that there was no record of al-Hazmi leaving the country.� On 23 August 2001, CIA sent a Central Intelligence Report to the Department of State, FBI, INS, and other US Government agencies requesting that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar be entered into VISA/VIPER, TIPOFF, and TECS [Treasury Enforcement Communication System].� The message said that CIA recommends that the two men be watchlisted immediately and denied entry into the US.
我们以前不推荐Al-Hazmi(#14)和Al-Mihdhar(#12)的事实watchlisting is not attributable to a single point of failure.� There were opportunities, both in the field and at Headquarters, to act on developing information.� The fact that this did not happen—aside from questions of CTC workload, particularly around the period of the disrupted Millennium plots—pointed需要一个全新的系统,而不是在系统中的一个点上进行修复。
我们现在对情节的了解
``我们已经组装了一系列细节,这些细节给出了图片的清晰图片。''Several things allowed us to assemble large amounts of information after the attacks that were not available before the attack.�
- 首先,调查迅速建立了劫机者的身份。预订时,票,有些人使用相同的电话号码或地址。
- 其次,一些劫机者都落后于识别和有罪的证据。在宾夕法尼亚州的93航班撞车事故的现场以及在杜勒斯机场的77劫机驾驶汽车中。
- 第三,攻击的巨大幅度促使情报服务和全球新闻组织都在调查中付出了重大而直接的努力。我们要建立有关人员的照片。
行动陷入了three general stages:概念化,,,,preparation, 和执行。
概念化
我们现在认为,在1993年2月对世界贸易中心的第一次攻击与9月11日袭击之间的共同点。9月11日行动的计划者。
- Mukhtar��is the uncle of Ramzi Yousef, who masterminded the 1993 bombing plot against the World Trade Center.�
- 在1993年的袭击之后,尤塞夫(Yousef)和穆克塔尔(Mukhtar)于1995年绘制,以炸毁飞机飞行东亚航线的飞机,因为穆克塔尔(Mukhtar)于1996年被起诉。�
- 据他的一位同谋[穆拉德]说,尤塞夫还考虑将飞机飞往中央情报局总部,他在1995年受到菲律宾当局的讯问。
Mukhtar并不是唯一考虑如何在恐怖袭击中使用商业客机的Bin Ladin合伙人。
- 9月11日之后,我们得知,1996年,本·拉丁(Bin Ladin)的第二任命中赛穆罕默德·阿蒂夫(Muhammad Atif)提出了一项研究,研究了劫持我们飞机并在飞行中销毁飞机的可行性,可能受到Yousef和Mukhtar未实现的计划的影响。�
Bin Ladin's determination to strike America at home increased with the issuance of the February 1998 fatwa targeting all Americans, both military and civilian.� The ideas about destroying commercial airliners that had been circulating in al-Qa'ida leadership circles for several years appear to have been revived after that fatwa.
- 尽管我们缺乏确切制定计划并获得本·拉丁的批准的细节,但我们知道袭击的计划始于9月11日之前的三年。
- 我们了解到,当Bin Ladin的一位同事提议将世界贸易中心的目标是装满炸药的小型飞机时,据报道,Bin Ladin建议使用甚至更大的飞机。
- We also believe that outside events also shaped al-Qa'ida leaders' thinking about an airliner attack.� The October 1999 crash of Egypt Air Flight 990, attributed in the media to a suicidal pilot, may have encouraged al-Qa'ida's growing impression that air travel was a vulnerability for the US.�� ��
In December 1999, the plot moved from conceptualization to preparation, with the arrival in Afghanistan of three young Arab men from Hamburg, Germany who would become pilot-hijackers on 11 September.
Preparation
The men selected to carry out the 11 September attacks largely fall into three overall categories:
- 我刚才提到的汉堡的三名飞行员。
- al-qa'ida退伍军人;
- 和年轻的沙特
汉堡细胞
The men from Hamburg were Muhammad Atta (#1), Marwan al-Shehhi (#6), and Ziad Jarrah (#16), on whom the US held no derogatory information prior to 11 September 2001.
- 他们是part of a group of young Muslim men in Hamburg, Germany who came from different countries and backgrounds, but attended the same mosques, shared common acquaintances, and were drawn together by their increasingly extreme Islamist views and disenchantment with the West.�
- 他们是聪明,讲英语且熟悉西方社会,这对于9月11日的情节至关重要。
- 他们是well suited—educated, including in technical subjects, and proficient in several languages—to mastering the skills they would need to pilot three of the four planes on September 11.�
穆罕默德·阿塔(#1),,,,an educated middle-class Egyptian, arrived in Hamburg in 1992.
- 阿塔(Atta)在离开德国之前没有表现出任何极端主义的迹象。。
- 阿塔(Atta)在德国期间变得越来越虔诚,朋友们还报告说,阿塔(Atta)对他在埃及的宗教和政治信仰的就业前景和表达的前景变得越来越悲观。德国朋友,几乎与其他穆斯林建立了联系。
- 阿塔(Atta)可能是1998年初第一次去阿富汗,当时他告诉室友他在朝圣中走了两个月。尚未到期,表明他可能一直在试图掩盖前往阿富汗的旅行证据。
Future hijacker-pilotMarwan al-Shehhi(#6),,,,came to Germany from the United Arab Emirates in April 1996 on a UAE military scholarship.
- 我们相信他住在Bonn到1999年初,他通过了德国能力考试,但显然是汉堡before 1999.��
- Al-Shehhi于1998年7月授予授权书,送给了居住在汉堡的摩洛哥Mounir Motassadeq,他于1996年成为Atta遗嘱的两个证人之一,目前正在德国当局拘留。
- Marwan Al-Shehhi moved to Hamburg in 1999 and enrolled at the Hamburg-Harburg Technical University where Atta studied.�� ��
Ziad Jarrah(#16)像阿塔(Atta)一样来自中产阶级家庭。
- Having dreamed of becoming a pilot since childhood,�Jarrah traveled from his home in Lebanon to Germany to study in 1996.�
- 在他从1996年至1997年在格里夫斯瓦尔德(Greifswald)度过的某个时候,贾拉(Jarrah)似乎与阿卜杜拉·拉赫曼·玛哈迪(Abdulrahman al-Makhadi)接触,这是格雷夫斯瓦尔德清真寺(Greifswald Mosque)的伊玛目(Imam),涉嫌与恐怖分子建立联系。
- 贾拉moved to Hamburg in August 1997 where he began studies in aircraft construction at Hamburg's School of Applied Sciences.�� ��
- 同学们告诉新闻界,当他虔诚地祈祷五次时,他从不以极端主义者的身份击中他们。
A common acquaintance of members of Atta's circle was German-Syrian Muhammad Heydar Zammar, a known al-Qa'ida associate in Hamburg who was detained after 11 September.�
- 扎马(Zammar)自1980年代以来一直活跃于伊斯兰极端主义圈子,并于1991年在阿富汗进行了训练和战斗。
- Zammar Met Atta(#1),Al-Shehhi(#6)和Jarrah(#16)(#16)(与汉堡牢房的其他人一起)在1990年代后期在汉堡al-qods清真寺,并说服他们前往阿富汗前往阿富汗加入圣战。
阿塔(Atta)与他的室友也门拉姆齐·本·希伯(Yemeni Ramzi bin al-Shibh)的关系,可能对将汉堡圈子的伊斯兰主义信仰集中在al-qa'ida上也可能至关重要。自9月11日起,我们收到了各种报告ReportsReports将Bin al-Shibh识别为重要的Al-Qa'ida操作员,我们怀疑,与三位汉堡飞行员不同,他甚至在1995年移居德国之前也可能与al-Qa'ida有联系。
The al-Qa'ida Veterans
我们现在知道,有两个劫机者在2001年9月11日之前与Qa'ida曾参与过几年。
- 他们是沙特s Nawaf al-Hazmi (#14) and Khalid al-Mihdhar (#12), who on 11 September would help to hijack American Airlines Flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon.� We have learned a great deal about these men since 11 September
- 这两个人在麦加长大。
- In the mid-90s, al-Hazmi (#14) and al-Mihdhar (#12) traveled to Bosnia.��������������
- 之后,他们加强了与Qa'ida的参与。
- ``hazmi(#14)``Al-Mihdhar(#12)于1999年初返回沙特阿拉伯。
年轻的沙特人
The young Saudi men who made up the bulk of the support hijackers became involved with al-Qa'ida in the late 1990s, we have learned since 11 September.
- Many, like veterans al-Hazmi (#14) and al-Mihdhar (#12), knew each other before they traveled to Afghanistan and became involved in the 11 September operation.
- Investigative efforts have uncovered two sets of brothers—the al-Hazmis (#14 and #15) and al-Shehris (#4 and #5)—as well as small networks of friends and acquaintances among the young Saudi hijackers, many of whom came from southwest Saudi Arabia.�
- 他们来自各种背景 - 他们的家庭来自社会经济范围的不同部分,一些人接受了高等教育,而其他人则几乎没有受过高等教育。目的。
- 据报道,这些年轻人中的一些从未表现出太多的宗教热情,在明显地接触过极端主义思想(通过家庭成员,朋友或牧师)的突然激进化和与家人的分离之前。
作为对激进伊斯兰教的承诺的一部分,这些年轻的沙特人前往阿富汗在他们流亡的乡下人Usama bin Ladin的营地中训练。
- 自9月11日以来获得的旅行数据的分析表明,大多数人在1999年或2000年首次前往阿富汗,在进入阿富汗以掩盖其目的地之前,经过一个或多个国家旅行。
- 仅对于阿拉伯联合酋长国的Fayiz Banihammad(#8),没有任何信息建议前往阿富汗旅行,尽管可以合理地假设他在进入美国之前在某个时候就在那里。
- Although their early travel to Afghanistan added these young men to the ranks of operatives that al-Qa'ida could call upon to carry out future missions, we do not believe that they became involved in the 11 September plot until late 2000 [we don't believe the al-Qa'ida leadership would have wanted them knowing about a plot in the US any sooner than necessary given the conspiracy's compartmentation].� Even then, they probably were told little more than that they were headed for a suicide mission inside the United States.�
沙特Hani Hanjur(#11)第四飞行员在某些方面与其他年轻的沙特劫机者相似,但由于:
- 他在9月11日之前在美国延长了频繁的存在。
- 在参与阴谋之前,他缺乏与其他沙特劫机者的联系。
- His probable role as a pilot on 11 September, given that he had far greater flying experience than Flight 77 co-hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar.�
Hani Hanjur (#11) expressed an early wish to participate in a jihad conflict, but�did not appear to experience a sudden increase in his religious fervor until 1992.� That year, he returned to Saudi Arabia after four-and-a-half months in the US "a different man," according to one of his brothers who spoke to the Western media. Hanjur reportedly now wore a full beard, cut his past social ties, and spent most of his time reading books on religion and airplanes.� In April 1996, Hanjur returned to the US.�� ��
汉堡飞行员于1999年末前往阿富汗,当时他们很可能在9月11日的情节中被选中并进行了简报。
- 1999年末,阿塔(1)从汉堡飞往伊斯坦布尔,然后飞往巴基斯坦的卡拉奇。之后,他显然前往阿富汗。
- 根据9月11日袭击事件发生后获得的信息,1999年底,阿塔(1)和al-shehhi(#6)都出席了阿富汗的本·拉丁设施。阿塔的存在得到了一个单独的来源。
- Al-Shehhi (#6) likely left Hamburg at roughly the same time as Atta (#1) since he granted power of attorney over his German bank account to another member of the Hamburg cell beginning November 1999.�� �����
- 贾拉(Jarrah)(#16)此时旅行反映了阿塔(Atta)的,从汉堡飞往伊斯坦布尔,然后于1999年底前往卡拉奇。
Since 11 September we have also obtained information on哪些AL-QA'IDA领导人参与了在计划在1999年末在阿富汗的关键时期的袭击时。
- 我们知道,本·拉丁(Bin Ladin)副手穆罕默德·阿蒂夫(Muhammad Atif)故意从没有以前没有恐怖活动的年轻阿拉伯男子那里选择了劫机者。
- 还根据国籍选择了劫机者,因此他们不会难以获得美国签证。然后,另一位高级本·拉丁中尉安排他们接受飞行员培训。
- A key planner of the 2000 attack on the科尔号目前也在阿富汗。
- 我们现在也相信本·拉丁的安全负责人,Sayf al-Adl,,,,played a key role in the 11 September plot, and阿布·祖贝达支持并意识到行动及其阶段。
当他们在1999年底和2000年初离开阿富汗时,汉堡劫机者立即开始为他们的任务做准备。
- 他们首先获得了新护照,这些护照在申请美国签证时不会显示前往阿富汗的迹象。
- Al-Shehhi (#6) obtained a new passport and a US visa in the UAE in January 2000.�� ��
- 贾拉(#16) returned to Hamburg in January�and on 9 February 2000, reported that his passport had been lost.� He received a visa from the US Embassy in Berlin in May 2000.�� ��
- 阿塔(#1)returned to Hamburg in February 2000.�In March, he sent e-mails to flight schools in Florida and Oklahoma asking about pilot training.�Atta received a new Egyptian passport from the Egyptian consulate in Hamburg on 8 May 2000.�On the 18th, he was issued a visa by the US Embassy in Berlin.�� ��
Al-Shehhi(#6),Atta(#1)和Jarrah(#16)于2000年5月和2000年6月从三个不同的欧洲城市进入美国,可能会误导当局对其共同目的的误导。
- Al-Shehhi (#6) flew from Brussels to Newark on 29 May 2000.�� ��
- 阿塔(#1)traveled by bus to Prague, entering the city on 2 June 2000, and flew to Newark the next day.�� ��
- Jarrah(#16)从杜塞尔多夫(Dusseldorf)飞往纽瓦克(Newark),然后于2000年6月27日飞往佛罗里达州的威尼斯。
汉堡飞行员在1999年末和2000年初返回德国的汉堡飞行员在世界各地返回德国,而Qa'ida退伍军人,Nawaf al-Hazmi(#14)和Khalid al-Mihdhar(#12))准备进入美国。
- 在1999年4月获得美国签证后,两人都去了阿富汗,并参加了1999年下半年的特殊培训。
- 在2000年1月的马来西亚会议之前概述的是1月15日进入美国。
您可能已经注意到的那样,在情节中加入了Al-Hazmi(#14)和Al-Mihdhar(#12),似乎违反了阴谋最成功的策略之一:使用未经验证的特工。,Al-Hazmi(#14)和Al-Mihdhar(#12)与al-Qa'ida有多年的参与,以至于他们已经在9月11日之前引起了我们的注意。Hazmi(#14)和Al-Mihdhar(#12)在该地块中,我们不会有一个劫机者在袭击发生前9月11日在我们的目光中死亡的劫机者。两名男子最初进入美国进行了不同的恐怖行动,然后才能折叠成9/11的情节。导致我们考虑这种可能性。
- Al-Hazmi(#14)和Al-Mihdhar(#12)obtained US visas far earlierthan the other hijackers—in April 1999, while the Hamburg pilots didn't begin getting US visas until early 2000.
- As noted above, al-Hazmi (#14) and al-Mihdhar (#12) received阿富汗的特殊培训在1999年下半年,以及科尔号自杀炸弹袭击者Al-Nibras和油菜袭击。
- Al-Hazmi(#14)和Al-Mihdhar(#12)与当地的阿拉伯人口互动远大当他们定居在美国时,其他劫机者。
- 飞行员Atta(#1),Al-Shehhi(#6),Jarrah(#16)和后来的Hanjur(#11)在到达美国后很快就开始了飞行训练,而Al-Hazmi(#14)和AL-Mihdhar(#12)直到2000年4月才从事飞行训练活动- 来到这个国家三个月后。
如前所述,看来汉堡牢房的至少另一名成员(可能有两个)旨在参加9月11日的飞行员袭击。
- 也门Ramzi Bin al-Shibh是德国Atta(#1)的亲密同事和室友,在2000年多次失败,以获得美国签证,甚至向Jarrah(#16)正在培训的飞行学校寄了存款。������农
- 在Bin al-Shibh的努力失败后,另一名蜂窝成员摩洛哥Zakaria Essabar在2001年1月尝试并未能获得签证。他还试图去佛罗里达。
- 这两个人都表现出与其他劫机者相同的特征:面对障碍的持久性,这是明显的决定,是合法地和以真实名称进入国家的决定,以及他们在情节中的角色的灵活性。例如,bin al-shibh,例如2000年仍在试图获得美国签证时,将钱转给了Marwan al-Shehhi(#6)。
未来飞行员进入美国的进入也认真地启动了该地块的融资。近两年的过程。财政支持行动的关键特征包括:
- 长期计划。�o相关重大资金的转移peration began nearly two years before the attacks and appear to have been calculated to cover specific training and travel needs.
- Division of labor。”每个劫机者似乎都负责维持自己的帐户和个人交易,而三名劫机者(#1),al-shehhi(#6)和Banihammad(#8)(#8)(#8)(#8) - 通常承担与财务交流的责任主持人,接收和退还资金,并向其他劫机者分配资金。
- Pervasive use of cash。
- Trickle-down through intermediaries。
- Exploitation of open economies。The operation's principal financial hubs were the UAE, Germany, and the US, partly because of the relative ease and anonymity with which financial transactions can be conducted in these countries.
- External funding实际上,所有对袭击的财政支持都来自国外。
随着2000年下半年的飞行员训练在美国进行,Al-Qa'ida领导人将注意力转移到了将支持飞行员的年轻人带到情节中。
- 大多数年轻的沙特人在2000年秋季获得了美国签证。美国签证在签证到期后。一个例行公事 - 大多数都没有接受采访。
- 报道表明,所有这些人 - 可能包括汉尼·汉朱尔(Hani Hanjur)(第11名),然后在2000年末或2001年初前往阿富汗。
On 3 January 2001,阿塔(#1)从佛罗里达州的坦帕飞往西班牙马德里。飞行员的培训进度并接收有关将于春季开始到达美国的支持劫机者的信息。
在他获得并磨练自己的飞行技巧的时期,Atta(#1)并不是唯一在美国以外旅行的飞行员。
- 贾拉(#16)left the US six times, apparently spending most of his time outside the US visiting either family in Lebanon or his girlfriend in Germany.�
- Al-Shehhi(#6)还三场不同的旅行前往美国以外旅行,飞往阿联酋,德国,摩洛哥和埃及。收集阿塔(Atta)的国际驾驶执照,在美国郊外旅行时alshehhi的活动一无所知。
正如您可能在媒体上阅读的那样阿塔(#1)allegedly traveled outside the US in early April 2001 to meet with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague, we are still working to confirm or deny this allegation.
- Atta(#1)可能以一个未知的别名旅行,因为我们无法确定Atta离开美国或以他的真实名字或任何已知别名离开美国或进入欧洲。
Khalid al-Mihdhar(#12)在该国近一年之外,2001年7月4日返回美国。
- Al-Mihdhar(#12)于6月回到沙特阿拉伯,并于6月13日在吉达获得了美国签证
2001年7月,阿塔(#1)回到西班牙。On 7 July, he flew from Miami to Zurich, then on to Madrid.�� ��
- 在9日从马德里酒店退房后,阿塔(Atta)的动作(#1)几天都不知道。
- His next known location is in Tarragona on Spain's east coast on 13 July, when he checked into a local hotel.�
- 搬到另外两家酒店后,阿塔(#1)于7月19日返回马德里,飞回佛罗里达。
- 尽管在西班牙时在西班牙的Atta(#1)活动中尚无具体,但汉堡的同谋Ramzi bin al-Shibh于2001年7月9日从德国飞往塔拉贡纳。7月10日至16日没有责备,大约在同一时期,在同一时期,阿塔(Atta)的运动未知,这表明两人参加了有关情节进步的秘密会议。
- 我们正在继续调查西班牙时的Atta(#1)和Bin al-Shibh的活动以及可能的联系。
结论
到2001年8月5日,所有劫机者都在美国留下。
9月11日的教训不仅被学到了,而且还继续前进。
- 在这场斗争中,我们必须扮演进攻和防守。”进入阿富汗庇护所是必不可少的。我们破坏了恐怖分子的计划,否认了他们的基础和训练设施的舒适性,以及他们可以安装和安装和安装的信心重新攻击而不必担心严重报应。
- 进入庇护所的行动导致了本·拉丁(Bin Ladin)开发大规模杀伤性武器的计划的发现,并至少部分地挫败了大规模杀伤性武器。基础架构,并为我们提供了其他细胞和网络。
- 我已经说过我们一直与联邦调查局紧密合作,自9/11以来,我们的合作变得越来越近。我们还在努力扩展我们在车站首领和海外法律附件之间建立的良好合作,到美国中央情报局和联邦调查局现场办事处之间的合作制度。
- 我们已经显着增加了分析恐怖主义模式和趋势的中央情报局官员的数量。我们的能力。
- 我们对监视清单的支持正在改建。``标准化指导已分发给CTC官员,以手表列表程序分发,提醒他们在向国务院发送姓名时在报告的一边犯错。被插入情报报告中,国务院纳入Viper System的标志信ReportsReports息要审查。已经创建了一个数据库,以便坐在CTC中的状态,FBI,DOD,FAA,INS,海关和财政部代表可以轻松访问它;CTC正在中心内创建一个单元,该单元将致力于查看名称和与ID相关的数据片段以进行注意列表。
- 与从9/11情节中了解和学习的重要性一样,我们需要在随后的会议中开会,以便您可以客观地评估1990年代初期至今的反恐努力的全部范围。
正在进行的安全性增强和新的潜在客户,调查和人类消息来源的发展使同一攻击变得更加困难。如果他们使用9月11日劫机者使用的大部分弹性贸易克罗夫特,他们可能会成功。
- Al-Qa'ida的Tradecraft与每年进入美国进入美国的大量旅行者相结合,将无法保证没有恐怖分子不会进入该国。
- The type of financial transactions and communications used by the hijackers would still be lost among the millions of others taking place in the US every day without preexisting information to draw attention to the initiators.
- 根据我们对9月11日情节了解的知识,可以肯定的是对美国土壤进行另一次攻击。
- 即使自9月11日以来对恐怖主义的政府和公众警惕提高,危险仍然很大。