DEFENSE INTELLLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, DC 20340

U-02,0109/DM-CA

21 March 2002

Honorable Bob Graham
Chairman, Select Committee On Intelligence
美国参议院
Washington, DC 20510

亲爱的主席先生：

On 6 February, Vice Admiral Wilson provided testimony before the Select Committee on Intelligence on the current and projected national security threats to the United States.

On 21 February, the committee forwarded several Questions for the Record the responses to which were to become part of the official transcript of the hearing.

Admiral Wilson has reviewed the responses to those questions and is herewith providing them for inclusion into the official record of the proceedings.

威廉·R·格伦德曼（William R. Grundmann）
Chief, Office of Congressional Affairs

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing

2002年2月6日

问题区域：（u）恐怖主义

QUESTION 1: The Intelligence Community is America's early warning system against threats to American lives and property both here and overseas.
a）（u）情报界在监测恐怖主义方面的最大优势和缺陷是什么？
b）（u）您从2001年9月11日开始学到了哪些课程来解决任何缺点？
c）（u）您相信自己有足够的资源来打击恐怖主义战争吗？

ANSWER: A. (U) US intelligence collection against terrorists generally provides a good strategic picture of the terrorist threat, to include terrorist groups' capabilities, intentions, structure and areas of operation. Collection, however, rarely provides tactical warning of a future attack. For instance, the intelligence community can tell you that planning for a terrorist attack is nearing completion. However, we often lack the insight to provide specifics on exactly where or how that attack will be carried out.

(U) The Intelligence Community has needed, and continues to need, an experienced body of highly qualified and motivated personnel performing rigorous analysis against the terrorist target. Congruent with that is the need for more detailed data, improved information sharing among agencies, and improvements in automation. The lack of information sharing among and between members of the intelligence and law enforcement communities continues to be an issue that directly affects the quality of analysis. DIA's current initiatives to strengthen Defense terrorism analysis is based on the principles of giving analysts access to the full range of all-source reporting and applying the proper resources to more precisely direct National-level Defense intelligence analytical support for warning and Force Protection.

答案：B。（u）9月11日的事件加强了许多假设，迫使我们挑战其他长期以来的假设，并教会了我们几个新课程。Usama bin Ladin和他的基地组织网络与其他恐怖组织的限制不同样。在9月11日之前，很明显，美国的利益是基地组织的主要目标，但所有报道中的绝大多数涉及基地组织的利益和威胁。基地组织具有创造力和机会主义。仅使用盒子切割者进行攻击，并导致2,000多人死亡的概念化和启动，这清楚地表明了这种创造力。

(U) An important lesson for the Intelligence Community involves open information sharing. We are fighting a flexible enemy--certainly more flexible than the Intelligence Community structure--with a worldwide presence. To battle this enemy most effectively, the intelligence analysts must be able to have access to all "all source" information to provide a true all-source picture of the terrorist threat.

（u）最后一点还可以追溯到上述提出的点：信息技术。随着政府提供越来越多的资源来打击恐怖主义，为更多的分析师和收藏家提供资金，我们预计与恐怖主义有关的信息的数量将继续增加。淹没分析师的信息水平已经是我们面临的最大挑战之一。为了帮助分析师通过大量的数据进行分类，情报界必须帮助开发并引入改进的工具来对这些信息进行分类和筛选。

答案C: (U)我们将提供一个响应这个问uestion in the classified responses to SSCI's classified questions for the record.

QUESTION AREA: (U) The continuing threat posed by al-Qaida:

问题2：a）（u）自9月11日以来，有多少塔利班和基地组织成员被杀害，受伤或俘虏？
b）（u）基地组织和塔利班在多大程度上被以对美国利益的威胁有效地消除？

ANSWER: A. (U) The exact numbers of al-Qaida killed or wounded are not known. Several hundred al-Qaida personnel have been captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with thousands of others apprehended worldwide. We believe the most senior al-Qaida personality killed to date was Usama Bin Ladin's senior deputy Muhammad Atef. The most senior al-Qaida personality captured to date is Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, perhaps the most experienced al-Qaida trainer.

答案：B。（U）基地组织是并且将仍然对美国国内外利益的严重威胁，并在反对恐怖主义运动中对美国盟友和伙伴构成持续威胁。这种威胁的说明是自9月11日以来一直在挫败的袭击。例子包括“鞋炸弹”理查德·里德（Richard Reid），对东南亚海军资产的袭击中断，以及在意大利逮捕北非人，他们可能一直计划攻击我们的使馆。针对基地组织网络的压力导致了数十起逮捕，恐怖袭击中断，最终导致该网络越来越分散。随着网络变得更加分散，它以协调的方式行动并筹集和分配资金和其他材料将变得更加困难。尽管如此，不管基地组织高级领导人的最终处置如何，都有经验丰富的，一般的基地组织特工具有将恐怖行动融合在一起的能力。

问题区域：（u）美国在阿富汗目标的地位

QUESTION 3: (U) President Bush has indicated that among U.S. objectives in Afghanistan are the following: deliver to the U.S. all the leaders of al-Qa'ida who hide in Afghanistan; release all foreign nationals, including U.S. citizens, who have been unjustly imprisoned; closing every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and handing over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities; and give the U.S. full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.
A) (U) Please provide an overview of the status of compliance with these demands.
B) (U) What level of commitment will need to be made to Afghanistan to prevent it from once again becoming a breeding place for international terrorism?

答案：A。（U）阿富汗当局正在与我们和其他联盟合作伙伴合作。众所周知，恐怖分子不再在阿富汗接受训练。除了前基地组织战斗机外，迪亚还不知道任何美国或外国国民在阿富汗持有的意愿。尽管政府临时努力和持续的联盟活动，但基地组织仍在阿富汗保留。使我们和临时政府努力变得复杂的是地形，天气，人力问题以及该国的种族/政治竞争。乐动冠军完全破坏或冲洗了基地组织在阿富汗的存在是一项长期努力。

ANSWER: B. (U) A sustained and protracted campaign against terrorists worldwide will prevent al-Qaida from establishing its roots anywhere in the world. Afghanistan's unique role as a base of operations was a key factor in the expansion of the al-Qaida network from 1996-2001; the benefits al-Qaida enjoyed in Afghanistan, such as access to training, safe-haven, jihad opportunities, a common meeting place and a place where friendships are built and personal links forged, can not be allowed to be duplicated elsewhere. Constant pressure puts terrorists in the defensive mode, inhibits their ability to mount an effective terrorist operation and prevents them from establishing themselves in any one geographic location.

问题区域:(U)支持恐怖主义的国家

问题4：（u）在去年9月20日举行的国会联席会议的讲话中，布什总统说：“ [f] ROM这一天，任何继续居住或支持恐怖主义的国家都将被美国视为一个敌对政权。”国务卿保留了“反复为国际恐怖主义行为提供支持”的国家。目前，此恐怖主义清单上的七个国家是：古巴，伊朗，伊拉克，利比亚，朝鲜，苏丹和叙利亚。
A) (U) How good is our intelligence on the terrorist related activities of these countries?
B) (U) Has the Intelligence Community noted any increase or diminution of these countries' support to terrorism since last September 11, 2001?

答案：A。（u）将这些国家与恐怖活动联系起来的情报是巨大的，非常可信。每个活动中仍涉及的程度差异很大。伊朗仍然是恐怖主义的主要国家赞助商。伊朗和伊拉克都从事对我们的人员和设施构成潜在，直接恐怖主义威胁的活动。其他国家支持团体或从事对更广泛的美国利益构成间接威胁的行为。

ANSWER: B. (U) There has been no notable change in these countries support to terrorism since 11 September. However, certain states are playing a constructive role via the provision of intelligence and/or other means in the war against terrorism.

QUESTION AREA: (U) Embassy and Overseas Facilities Security

问题5：a）（u）自2001年9月11日以来，恐怖主义威胁对美国外交和军事设施的恐怖威胁的性质和程度是什么？
B) (U)你相信国防部门nse and State have taken appropriate security measures to address the terrorist threat to all of their overseas facilities?

ANSWER: A. (U) DoD and DOS assets worldwide will remain an attractive target for terrorist groups. Terrorists have and will continue to target DoD facilities. Increased worldwide cognizance of the terrorist threat and increased cooperation may allay the threat to some extent.

答案：B。（U）我们认为，国防部对采取必要的安全预防措施一直保持警惕，以帮助减轻恐怖主义威胁。虽然总是可以添加更多的安全性，但这些要求必须与我们继续进行海外任务的能力保持平衡。

问题区域：（u）恐怖主义Issues QUESTION 6: (U) On November 13, President Bush signed a Military Order pertaining to the detention, treatment and trial of certain non-citizens in the current war on terrorism. Please describe how the IC is involved in this process, including the interrogation of prisoners?

ANSWER: (U) DIA participates in the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities' programs for the interrogation of detainees. In Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, the Army is the lead department for the interrogation of detained personnel, with DIA and other Intelligence Community personnel attached to the joint interrogation operations. Guantanamo Bay DIA/DHS personnel are under direct control of the SOUTHCOM JTF 170 commander. DIA/DHS personnel concentrate on collecting intelligence of a strategic military nature, rather than the tactical intelligence which is the Army's focus. DIA also is deeply involved in the analysis of information derived from these prisoners and providing follow up questions based on reporting fmm their interrogations. As of 3 March 2002, all 300 detainees have been interviewed and/or screened by DHS personnel at Guantanamo Bay.

QUESTION AREA: (U) Possible Terrorist Use of "Conflict Diamonds" QUESTION 7: (U) The mining and sales of diamonds by parties to armed conflicts -- particularly Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo -- are regarded as a significant factor fueling such hostilities. These diamonds, known as "conflict diamonds," comprise an estimated 3.7% to 15% of the value of the global diamond trade. Do you have any information that "conflict diamonds" are being used to subsidize the activities of terrorist groups, including al-Qaida?

答:(U)几个基地组织细胞在两个成员Kenya and Tanzania were nominally active in both legitimate and illegitimate gem trading. Most significant was their involvement with the Tanzanite King Company based in Nairobi. However, since the August 1998 East Africa bombings, there have been no further credible indications of al-Qaida involvement in gem trading. Recent press reporting suggests that the group may still benefit from gem smuggling operations; however, the available intelligence does not support the existence of a direct business relationship between al-Qaida, the Revolutionary United Front rebels of Sierra Leone and the dictator of Liberia, Charles Taylor. Although plausible, there are few, if any, indications of direct relationships between terrorist organizations and the diamond trade.

QUESTION AREA. (U) Vietnam

QUESTION 8: A) (U) What is your assessment of the level of assistance provided by the government of Vietnam to the US on POW/MIA issues?
B) (U) Do you believe that there is any room for improvement in this area?

ANSWER: (U) These policy questions could best be answered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (OSD/DPMO). I would merely note that, while there is always room for improvement, DIA does certify Vietnamese efforts in a report the President sends to Congress annually.

问题区域：（u）俄罗斯核库存的安全

问题9：
A) (U) What is your assessment of the safety and security of the Russian nuclear stockpile (including weapons grade material)?
B) (U)如何俄罗斯nuclea的安全r stockpile compare to the security of the U.S. nuclear stockpile?

ANSWER A: (U) Russia employs physical, procedural and technical measures to secure its weapons against an external threat, but many of these measures date from the Soviet era and are not designed to counter the preeminent threat faced today - an insider who attempts unauthorized actions. Moscow has maintained adequate security and control of its nuclear weapons, but a decline in military funding has stressed the nuclear security system.

(U) Security varies widely among the different types of Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) facilities and other Russian institutes. Russian facilities housing weapons-usable nuclear material - uranium mulched to 20 percent or greater in uranium-235 or uranium-233 isotopes and any plutonium containing less than 8 percent of the isotope plutonium-238 - typically receive low funding, lack trained security personnel, and do not have sufficient equipment for securely storing such material. Weapons-grade and weapons-usable nuclear materials have been stolen from some Russian institutes. We assess that undetected smuggling has occurred, although we do not know the extent or magnitude of such thefts. Nevertheless, we are concerned about the total amount of material that could have been diverted over the last 10 years.

（u）在过去的六年中，莫斯科认识到需要改进的条件，并在美国和其他国家的协助下采取了措施，以减少盗窃的风险。通过减少合作威胁计划和美国能源部的材料保护，控制和会计计划，美国继续协助俄罗斯改善核设施的安全性。在过去的几年中，俄罗斯的核安全逐渐改善，但风险仍然存在

ANSWER B: (U) DIA cannot perform a comparison with U.S. practices.

问题区域：（u）俄罗斯在古巴和越南关闭情报设施

问题10：（u）2001年10月17日，俄罗斯宣布将关闭其在古巴卢尔德的大型电子情报基地，以及其在越南卡姆·兰赫湾的海军基地。
A) (U) What is the status of the closure of these facilities?
b）（u）这些设施关闭对俄罗斯与古巴和越南关系的影响会产生什么影响？

回答一:(U)俄罗斯外交部和最小istry of Defense have made several statements to the press that the Russian listening post in Cuba has closed. According to the statements, only a small group of technicians remain to facilitate the transfer of equipment back to Russia. DIA has no reason to doubt the validity of these statements. The status of intelligence operations at Cam Ranh Bay Vietnam is not certain.

ANSWER B: (U) Relations between Havana and Moscow will remain lukewarm but stable. A major factor influencing Moscow's decision to close Lourdes was Cuban disregard of Russian attempts to collect its substantial Soviet-era debt.

(U) The Russian government continues to express its desire to maintain cordial relations with Cuba and expand economic ties, but has pursued debt repayment. In mid-September, it reportedly approved a draft plan that would require Cuba to repay its debt in goods and services during 2002. Relations could improve if Havana meets these new financial obligations to Moscow.

（u）宣布关闭在卡姆·拉赫湾的俄罗斯海军基地的关闭对俄罗斯 - 越南关系的影响很小，俄罗斯 - 越南关系仍然友好和合作。两国都预计，近年来几乎没有使用该基地的关闭。一月份，俄罗斯副总理克里斯滕科（Khristenko）在一月份访问了河内。Khristenko的旅行为俄罗斯总理Kasyanov的后来访问做好了准备。双边贸易有限，2001年增长到仅5.5亿美元；但是，俄罗斯仍然是越南石油和发电行业的重要参与者。确保将越南债务偿还俄罗斯的债务仍然是莫斯科的重要目标。尽管俄罗斯和越南仍然友好，但他们的关系对两个州的重要性远不如中苏联的关系。

问题区域：（U）俄罗斯军事能力

QUESTION 11:
A) (U) If present trends continue, what will be the Russian military's capability to conduct operations 5 years from now?
B) (U) Do these trends indicate the possibility that Russia may soon have insufficient military force to retain order within Russia?

答案A：（U）至少在接下来的10年中，俄罗斯将无法将重要的军事力量投射到前苏联国家以外的传统部队。俄罗斯军方越来越多地依靠其缩小的战略和非战略核武库来阻止，或者，如果威慑未能通过，则反对对俄罗斯领土的大规模常规攻击。尽管它将保持比前苏联国家的常规优势，但俄罗斯的军事力量相对于该地区和邻近地区的其他国家将下降。

ANSWER B: (U) No, Russian military and internal security forces will remain capable of maintaining order, countering insurgency within its borders, and quelling all but the most extreme internal instabilty.

QUESTION AREA: (U) Transfer of Technology from Russia

QUESTION 12:
A) (U) What general trends has the Intelligence Community noticed of scientists, technology and conventional and unconventional military sales from Russia to other nations?
B) (U) What trends have you detected that Russian nuclear materials, BW, CW or ballistic missile-related materials or technology have found their way to the international black market?
C)(U) What are the implications of these trends for U.S. security?

ANSWER A: (U) In general terms, the Intelligence Community has noticed an increase in the number of Russian scientists working in or with the defense industries of other nations, although exact numbers and locations cannot be confirmed. This increase is consistent with the worldwide trend to collaborate on the development of new, technologically complex, and costly weapon systems. Russia, in particular, is dependent upon the funding of other nations to share the financial burden associated with the development of new and costly weapon systems. Transfers of technology are commonly associated with the joint development of weapon systems. This trend is apparent in Russia and elsewhere in the world, where development of advanced conventional weapon systems is too costly for one nation to undertake alone.

(U) With regard to unconventional weapons, Russia transfers technologies and commodities having legitimate civilian and military applications, i.e.dual-use, to a variety of nations with interests inimical to the U.S. Many of these nations target such dual-use exports, since they can be applicable to their WMD program. Due to the inherently dual-use nature of the exports, Russian exporters can more easily disguise the ultimate end-user or end-use.

答案B: (U) activit显著上升y in the mid-1990s, there has been a decrease in the credible instances of trafficking in Russian-origin nuclear materials. Since 1991, there have been 195 such reports (Figure 1), 32 of which included enriched uranium or plutonium. The peak period of trafficking occurred between 1992 and 1994, which accounts for 45% of the total number of incidents. The number of cases peaked in 1994 at 40 cases, then declined during the mid and late 1990s. Since 1999, the number of cases reported annually has remained in the low teens. In 80% of these reported cases, there is no independent corroboration of the incident, so what details we have must be used cautiously.

(U) Our information largely is limited to intercepted materials and may not necessarily present a true picture of the black market. Many smuggling attempts end with the capture of the smuggler, but yield no information on the buyer, if any, and we have no way of knowing how many or what kind of transactions go undetected.

(U) Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, them was reason to suspect that Russian entities with connections to organized-crime or black-markets would be interested in brokering biological weapon technologies and expertise. We have no evidence, however, of any transfer unique to biological weapons. During the mid 1930's, Russia eliminated its standing arsenal of biological weapons in favor of mobilization-production in time of war. Consequently, no agent stockpiles are believed extant to serve as a basis for proliferation. The dual-use nature of the technologies required for biological warfare has enabled those seeking such technologies from Russia to do so under an umbrella of legitimacy, largely eliminating a role for criminal elements in biotechnology transfers.

(U)自苏联解体以来,俄文sian press has alleged that some chemical materials were sold to organized criminal groups. We can not substantiate these claims. It is entirely possible, however, that criminal elements have acquired toxic industrial chemicals, poisons, riot-control agents and even actual chemical warfare agents from various sources. We cannot rule out that thefts or illicit transfers of materials have occurred from military units, commercial facilities, and even from CW-related research, production and storage facilities -- either active sites or those that were abandoned after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The mafia could readily market such chemical materials to insurgents or to countries of concern seeking to enhance their chemical warfare capabilities, as well as to terrorist groups. Other press reports claimed that al-Qaida operatives were seeking chemical and biological materials and expertise in the Central Asian states. There is no information to substantiate whether or not al-Qaida obtained any chemical or biological warfare related material or expertise from former Soviet or Russian entities.

答案C：（U）即使黑市可能没有发挥重要作用，但随着时间的推移，对美国安全的生物武器威胁可能会增加。希望寻求增强BW技术的国家和实体有望更擅长利用双重用途技术及其用于生物武器相关的目的的应用。DIA还认为，生物技术的进步将进一步使控制或防止其虐待的能力更加复杂。

QUESTION AREA: (U) The Situation in North Korea.

QUESTION 13: A) (U) What is the likelihood that North and South Korea will unify within the next 5 years and what is the likelihood that unification between North and South Korea will be a peaceful process?
B) (U) Under what circumstances would a war be likely?
c）（u）金正恩对权力的掌握有多强？
D) (U) Who will likely succeed him?

ANSWER: A. (U) The likelihood that North and South Korea will reunify in the next 5 years is very low. North Korea shows few signs of meaningful economic reform or engagement with Western economics, choosing instead to emphasize its socialist ideology and military capabilities. Over the past year, Pyongyang has backed away from its willingness to engage the South and, for its part, Seoul now is less willing to provide economic assistance without reciprocal political concessions on the part of the North. It also appears unlikely that the next administration in Seoul, which will take office in February 2003, will pursue openings to the North with the determination that has been the hallmark of the now lame-duck Kim Dae Jung administration. Together with North Korea's growing anxiety (and retrenchment) over U.S. intentions associated with the global war on terrorism, these developments make it extremely wilikely that significant progress toward peaceful reunification will occur over the next five years.

ANSWER: B. (U) North Korea probably will not attack South Korea, unless the strategic environment on the peninsula changes significantly. An attempted North Korean unification by force is unlikely unless U.S. resolve and ability to defend the peninsula change and South Korea's political will to resist weakens. The greatest risk of conflict would occur if Pyongyang miscalculates the strategic equation, perhaps as a result of an internal crisis, a regional conflict, or a belief that military action by the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command was imminent.

ANSWER: C. (U) Kim Chong-il exercises firm control over Norih Korea and its military establishment. Kim has been careful to place staunch loyalists in positions of authority, has cultivated favor with military leaders, and has not allowed other officials to build large followings of their own. Any sudden incapacitation of Kim Chong-il, therefore, most likely would occur as the result of illness, accident, or an individual attack on his person. The institutions of government, including the armed forces, are unlikely to be threatened and, like Kim himself, other senior officials risk loss of privilege and power should they attempt substantial change to the system. Thus, party and government officials probably would support a successor who would command, while ensuring internal stability and a continuation of the status quo.

ANSWER: D.(U) Kim Chong-nam, 30, Kim Chong-il's oldest son, is rumored to be the eventual heir, assuming North Korea adheres to a hereditary succession formula, but he has not yet assumed any high-profile government or Party positions. If Kim Chong-il is incapacitated in the near term, before Kim can groom a successor, it is more likely that power will be assumed by one of the high-ranking members of the National Defense Commission, someone possessing both strong Party affiliations and the loyalty of the military. Possible candidates include Vice Marshals Cho Myong-nok, 79, and Kim Young-chun, 69, although age and health problems may limit Cho's role. It is also possible that someone like Chang Song-taek, Kim's influential brother-in-law, could assume power, provided the military remained loyal.

QUESTION AREA: (U) Trends in Conventional Arms Transfer Activities

QUESTION 14:
A) (U) What are the most recent major trends you have identified in conventional arms transfer activities with respect to sales to: the Middle East from foreign suppliers, to China by Russia, and all suppliers to Iran?
b）（u）从俄罗斯转移到：伊朗和中国的哪些特定主要常规武器系统？

ANSWER A: (U)The Middle East.The Middle East generally has been the largest arms market in the developing world. In 1993-1996, it accounted for 55 percent of the total value of all developing nations' arms transfer agreements ($46 billion in current dollars). During 1997-2000, the region accounted for 47 percent of all such agreements ($38.4 billion in current dollars).

(U) The U.S. dominated arms transfer agreements with the Middle East during 1993-200O, with 55 percent of their total value ($46.5 billion in current dollars). France was second during these years, with 23 percent ($19.2 billion in current dollars). From 1997-2000, the United States accounted for 61 percent of arms agreements with this region ($23.4 billion in current dollars), while France accounted for 16 percent of the region's agreements ($6.2 billion in current dollars), representing most of the arms transfer agreements by the major West European suppliers with the Middle East.

(U) Future arms sales in the region will involve advanced fighter aircraft, tactical air launched missile systems, tactical air defense systems. Europe, Russia and the United States will be looked to as sources of these weapon systems.

(U)China.China's current and future arms acquisitions include fighter airrraft, major surface combatants, and advanced air defense systems. China relies heavily on Russian military technology, which can be found in all major categories of Chinese advanced conventional weapon systems. Russian technology transfer will make the lethality of China's currently deployed conventional weapons at least one generation more advanced.

（u）以下是中国积极的武器协议清单。

Aircraft

Su-30MK FLANKER (second batch)
su-27ubk侧翼串联座位训练师
A-50E支流式空降早期飞机
Mi-17 HIP helicopters
AA-12 ADDER air to air missiles

Naval

SOVREMENNYY Class guided missile destroyers
Repair for KILO Class submarines

Ground

SA-10/20 GRUMBLE SAM systems
SA-15 GAUNTLET SAM systems
Licensed production of the RPO-A SHMEL flamethrower system

(U)Iran.在过去的六年中，伊朗与40多个国家的军事设备签署了武器协议，价值约22亿美元。主要供应商是俄罗斯，中国和朝鲜，造成了近90％的协议和80％的交货。俄罗斯是伊朗领先的供应商，合同价值约10亿美元，主要用于地面攻击飞机和海军服务。中国是第二大供应商，合同价值为8亿美元，主要出售和共同生产海军设备。其他重要协议包括来自俄罗斯，朝鲜和中国的弹道导弹设备和技术。

(U) At the end of 2000, Russia announced it intended to withdraw from a 1995 ageement with the U.S., intending to enter into new weapons sales contracts with Iran effecyive 1 December, Russia's agreement with the U.S. had prohibited new Russian sales of tanks and other conventional weapons to Iran, but permitted Moscow to fulfill contracts for hundreds of tanks and armored personnel carriers. The deal also allowed Russia to deliver a diesel-powered submarine and a number of sophisticated torpedoes. The agreement exempted Russia from U.S. sanctions for selling weapons to Iran, in exchange for Moscow's pledge that it would end all deliveries of sophisticated conventional arms to Tehran by 31 December, 1999.

(U) Iran's primary arms negotiations are with Russia, and Moscow's ailing defense industrial sector needs new orders. Press reports claim that Russia's implementation of the bilateral agreement with the U.S. may have cost Moscow as much as $2 billion in lost sales. Potential contracts that have been under negotiation include modern air defense systems, aircraft helicopters, naval systems and ground force weapons potentially worth an additional S2 billion over the next 5 years.

(U) Since 1988, when Iran exhausted its supply of SCUD-B SRBMs during the Iran-Iraq War and was unable to procure additional missiles with which to retaliate against Iraq, Tehran has worked tirelessly to develop indigenous ballistic and cruise missile production capabilities, so that its military readiness would never again be compromised by dependence on outside suppliers. Three countries which have made the largest contribution to these long-term efforts are China, North Korea, and Russia.

（U）中国已经出售了伊朗各种短程巡航导弹，并完成了CSS-8 SRBMS。中国还向伊朗转移到了各种与导弹相关的关键设备，材料和启用技术，但似乎不愿转移将损害中国关系的完整导弹系统。它提供了有限的支持。中国认为其与伊朗的关系是长期的战略关系，并且很可能在可预见的未来向伊朗提供先进的技术。

(U) North Korea, not a party to the MTCR, is less constrained by appearances and has sold Iran SCUD B and C SRBMs and associated production technology. Teheran was able successfully to assimilate this SCUD technology and has now moved on to develop the larger Shabab 3 MRBM (based on the North Korean No Dong MRBM). In addition to SRBM and MRBM development Iran is likely to develop space launch vehicles to put satellites into orbit and to establish the technical base from which it could develop IRBMs/ICBMs capable of delivering payloads to Western Europe and the United States. These systems will likely include significant inputs of technology and support from North Korea, Russia and China.

ANSWER B: (U) Equipment exports from Russia to Iran, 1997-2001:

MI-171髋关节直升机
KILO Class (877) submarine
BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicles
Assembly Kits for BMP-2 IFV
T-72S Medium Tanks
atgms

(U) Equipment exports from Russia to China, 1997-2001:
SU-27和Su-30Mk侧翼战斗机飞机
SU-27侧翼战斗机的装配套件
KA-28 Helix，MI-17和MI-171髋关节直升机
KILO Class (636) submarines
KIEV Class aircraft carrier
SOVREMENNYY Class Guided Missile Destroyers
SS-N-22 SUNBURN Antiship Cruise Missiles

问题区域：（u）美国退出《 ABM条约》的影响

QUESTION 15: (U) On December 13, 2001, President Bush notified Russia that the U.S. intends to withdraw from the ABM Treaty - the withdrawal to be completed in June of this year.
a）（u）俄罗斯将对美国退出《 ABM条约》的军事反应如何？
B) (U) What will China's likely military reaction be?
C)(U) What is the likelihood that the deployment of a U.S. ballistic missile defense will lead to the escalation of ballistic missile and tactical missile defense systems by other countries, as well as a commensurate increase in the number of ballistic and tactical missiles to overwhelm these defensive systems?

答案：A。（U）到目前为止，俄罗斯对美国宣布退出ABM条约的意图的反应已被静音和低调。这一官方反应与莫斯科过去的众多步骤的宣言相反，这是响应美国从ABM条约撤离而采取的。这些措施包括增加俄罗斯最现代的洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）SS-27的部署；在单战头SS-27上部署多个可独立的重新进入车辆（MIRV）；在改进的SS-N-23海底弹道导弹（SLBM）的改进版本上部署10条弹头；将较旧的洲际弹道人保留在部队中；用渗透辅助物部署洲际弹道导弹和SLBM；优先考虑下一代巡航导弹开发；并开发和部署新的中型弹道导弹。包括普京总统在内的俄罗斯官员现在强调，不存在导弹防御系统，并且不确定它是否存在。

（u）尽管俄罗斯保留了这些选择和其他选择，但其最终反应将取决于与美国的整体关系状态，以及美国战略导弹防御系统的确切建筑和美国战略力量的规模。任何军事反应俄罗斯都应决定还需要它克服过去几年阻碍俄罗斯军队的资金短缺。

答案：B。（U）华盛顿宣布退出《 ABM条约》的宣布加强了北京的担忧，即美国最终将部署导弹防御系统，这将威胁中国小型核武库及其对台湾的弹道导弹威胁。除了试图在国际社会中支持反对美国导弹辩护的支持外，中国可能正在考虑采取多种军事措施来应对它们。这些措施可能包括越来越多的导弹数量或为新系统或现有系统开发多个导弹弹头，采用诱饵或改善其导弹的技术特征以欺骗导弹防御。中国已经部署了短距离弹道导弹（SRBMS），并正在继续增加台湾与台湾相对的人数。它还可以尝试用中距离弹道导弹（MRBM）和洲际弹道导弹（ICBMS）来淹没导弹防御。

(U) China seeks to increase its ability to penetrate BMD systems while avoiding a Soviet-style arms race that would disrupt continued economic development.

ANSWER: C. (U) Regardless of US missile defense deployment, China has plans to increase production of ballistic missile and tactical missile defenses but would be further motivated to ensure survival of its nuclear deterrent if the US were to deploy a missile defense system. "Overwhelming" a BMD system is one of several measures that China is trying to take to counter a missile defense system that has not yet been developed and for which China is uncertain of the scope and range, both at the theater and at the strategic level.

(U) China's ballistic missile modernization began before it assessed that the U.S. would deploy a missile defense, but China likely will take measures to improve its ability to defeat the defense system to preserve its strategic deterrent. The measures likely will include improved penetration packages for its ICBMS, an increase in the number of deployed ICBMs, and perhaps development of a multiple warhead system for an ICBM, most likely for the CSS-4 that is large enough to deliver multiple warheads.

(U) DIA expects new production of Russian ballistic missile systems during the next five years to consist of SS-26 SRBMs, SS-27 ICBMs, SS-N-23 Sineva and Bulava-30 SLBMs. Anticipated production levels of these programs are not expected to increase beyond that which is currently projected.

（U）DIA预计中国将拥有战略导弹力量能够在未来10至15年内交付约100枚弹头。

（u）其他国家以响应美国导弹国防的“导弹防御系统”升级的可能性很低。外国导弹防御要求将由自己的威胁看法驱动。目前的开源表明，除了莫斯科附近的现有导弹防御系统外，以色列和印度对导弹防御的兴趣。这些不是对美国部署导弹防御的回应。它们是对现有导弹威胁的回应。

（u）无论我们的导弹防御如何，全世界的弹道和战术导弹的数量都会增加。由于导弹防御，朝鲜，伊朗和伊拉克不太可能消除其远程导弹计划，但很可能会发展对策。战术很可能会强调Salvo的发射和时间对付时间，以试图压倒导弹防御。

QUESTION AREA: (U) North Korea's Taepo Dong-2

QUESTION 16: (U) Last December's NIE on the ballistic missile threat states that "North Korea's multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2, which is capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized (several hundred kilogram) payload, may be ready for flight-testing."
A) (U) What will be the impact of the continuation of the North's flight test moratorium on the development of this missile?
2) (U) Under what circumstances would North Korea be likely to use its missile capability against the U.S.?
C)(U) What is the current estimate of the size of North Korea's nuclear weapon arsenal?
D) (U) How confident are we that North Korea is complying with the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework regarding plutonium production activities in Yongbyan?

ANSWER A: (U) We believe that the flight test moratorium is having minimal impact on North Korea's ability to continue its development of the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) ICBM/SLV, short of conducting a flight test. By precluding flight testing, the moratorium probably would delay deployment of TD-2 missiles as long as it remains in place. While it is unlikely that Pyongyang would deploy the TD-2 without a flight test, such a move is possible. Although the TD-2 may be ready for flight testing, it also is possible the North Koreans could continue development of improved components during the moratorium. These activities probably are not precluded by the moratorium.

ANSWER B: (U) North Korea likely perceives its TD-2 ballistic missile capability primarily as a tool for deterrence and political coercion. During a conflict, the North also could attempt to strike U.S. and US interests with ballistic missiles, if North Korea's leadership were attacked directly or was facing imminent destruction.

ANSWER C: (U) We judge that North Korea has produced one, possibly two nuclear weapons.

答案D：（u）DIA对朝鲜已达到了“冻结” Yongbyon中的Praphite主持反应堆的承诺，并停止建造两个较大的石墨辅助反应堆，从而停止在Yongbyon的plut子生产。然而，朝鲜尚未遵守其IAEA保障协议（在商定的框架中涵盖），允许IAEA采样和测量以验证用过的燃油杆中宣布的plut含量。

QUESTION AREA: (U) Nonmissile Means for Delivering Weapons of Mass Destruction

QUESTION 17: (U) Last December's NIE on the ballistic missile threat states that "[s]everal countriescould开发一种机制来发射SRBMS（短距离弹道导弹），MRBMS [中型弹道导弹]或来自前向船或其他平台的陆地攻击巡航导弹；一些是likelyto do so -- more likely for cruise missiles -- before 2015."
a）（u）哪些国家有能力用船只或其他平台的导弹威胁美国领土。
B) (U) Which nations are the likeliest to do so?
C)(U) What is the Intelligence Community's ability to monitor this threat and provide early warning against an attack?

ANSWER A: (U) Although we have identified the potential threat to the U.S. from short or mediwn range missiles on surface ships (especially disguised freighters), or on large aircraft, the only country known to be developing a surface ship launched capability is India, which is using navy patrol ships to launch its Dhanush ballistic missile. Also, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom possess submarine launched ballistic missiles and deployed strategic missile submarines. The Ukraine, in concert with the US, Russia and Norway, has demonstrated the ability to launch a space launch vehicle from a converted floating drilling rig. Iran may have the capability to build a floating platform.

(U) More than 60 countries have sea or air launched antiship cruise missiles. Some of thew missiles might be converted to attack targets on land. The launch platforms are operationally difficult to employ at long distances from bases, but in the future, some countries could develop such a capability to threaten the U.S.

ANSWER B: (U) The "some of these are likely" construct in the NIE was debated and adopted because of a desire not to rule-out a technically possible capability, rather than an intention to identify specific countries. This statement probably would best apply to the countries that we usually identify as potentially hostile to the U.S.

ANSWER C. (U) We are unable to provide an unclassified response.

QUESTION AREA: (U) The Impact of HIV/AIDS and Other Infectious Diseases

问题18：
a）（u）从现在起十年后，艾滋病毒/艾滋病对非洲和其他国家的影响会产生什么影响？
b）（u）最大的艾滋病毒/艾滋病对军事和经济影响最大？
C) (U)似乎朝着这些趋势the long term?
D) (U) What other infectious diseases - such as tuberculosis, malaria and hepatitis - will have the most impact over the next 10 years?

ANSWER A; (U) The proportion of persons living with HIV/AIDS, characterized in Table I as the adult prevalence rate in 2001, will continue to rise worldwide during the next 10 years.

(U) The impact will be greatest in Africa, where HIV/AIDS is reversing development gains achieved in the past several decades and could create new transnational security threats. The majority of the HIV/AIDS deaths worldwide will continue to occur in Africa.

(U) Inevitably, because of their huge populations, China and India dominate any assessment of HIV/AIDS epidemics in Asia. China recently acknowledged that HIV/AIDS is well-established and will have serious implications, unless it is addressed by an aggressive campaign to prevent transmission. Beijing does not know how widespread the epidemic is, although many experts feel that China's HIV/AIDS prevalence will rise rapidly among intravenous drug users and commercial sex workers over the next 10 years. HIV/AIDS will no doubt have an impact on the military, but to what extent is unclear.

(U) India currently has low overall HIV infection rates, but even slight increases in prevalence translate into significant increases in gross numbers. An increase in India's adult HIV prevalence of just 0.1 percent, for example, would add more than half a million infected individuals. HIV in India will continue to spread through unsafe sex, administration of contaminated blood, and intravenous drug use. The impactof HIV/AIDS on the military likely will be limited by current screening policies.

(U) In Russia and Eastern Europe, more that 1 million people are infected with HIV. At the same time, Russia and Ukraine are experiencing negative population growth. Although major causes of death continue to include trauma and lifestyle diseases, such as alcoholism and coronary heart disease, soaring HIV infection rates in high-risk groups -- young intravenous-drug users and commercial sex workers --will speed population decline. Russia and Ukraine will face problems supplying enough healthy conscripts for current and future missions. Future declines in the conscript pool will contribute to the trend toward use of less-manpower-intensive military strategies. Decreases in the entry-level labor pool will not affect Soviet-era heavy industry, but may impede development of high technology and defense sectors of the economy.

ANSWER B: (U) HIV/AIDS will have the most impact on the militaries and economies of Afiican countries. The HIV prevalence within sub-Saharan militaries currently is between 20 and 60 percent. The impact on military capabilities varies across the region because of military HIV/AIDS policies, the military technology level, country-specific mores and beliefs, and the capabilities of various medical systems to provide interventions. Militaries in Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tome, South Africa, and Tanzania will be moderately degraded. Militaries in Nigeria, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe will be most severely affected by HIV/AIDS.

(U) The macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS in Afiica remains difficult to gauge. Many factors apart from HIV/AIDS affect economic performance, such as drought, internal or external conflict, corruption, and economic mismanagement. Despite these factors, evidence is growing that as HIV prevalence rates rise, both total and growth-rate in national income -- gross domestic product (GDP) -- fall significantly. African countries, in which less that 5 percent of the adult population is infected, will experience a modest impact on GDP growth rate. As the HIV prevalence rate rises to 20 percent or more, as it has in a number of southern African countries, GDP growth may decline up to 2 percent a year.

(U) Botswana and South Africa are likely to experience the largest economic decline. With adult prevalence rates around 36 and 20 percent, respectively, today's 15-year-old has a greater than 50 percent chance of dying of HIV-related causes, if current infection rates are not cut drastically.

(U) Medical systems throughout Africa are unable to provide adequate preventive health care to the populations. Prevention and education remain the key to combating HIV/AIDS. Preventing HIV infection costs an estimated U.S. $2 per person. Treating HIV/AIDS illnesses is estimated to cost U.S. $300 per year per person, just for medications alone. Clearly, no country in the region can afford to maintain that level of investment in health care until an affordable HIV vaccine is developed, which is unlikely for at least 10 to 15 years.

ANSWER C: (U) Although HIV infection and death rates have slowed considerably in developed countries, owing to the growing use of preventive measures and costly new multi-drug treatment regimes, the pandemic continues to spread in much of the developing world, where 95 percent of global infections and deaths have occurred.

(U) HIV/AIDS will cause more deaths than any other single infectious disease worldwide by 2020 and may account for up to one-half or more of infectious disease deaths in the developing world alone. Africa will remain the region most severely affected; however, Eastern Europe and Central Asia are experiencing the fastest growing epidemics.

(U) Since a large proportion of the people projected to become sick and die of HIV/AIDS during the next 10 to 15 years are infected already, the economic and health care impact will intensify over the next 10 years. Few countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, have expanded their HIV prevention programs to the extent needed to decrease infection rates. International and regional organizations are providing programs for HIV education and prevention, voluntary testing and counseling, and limited medical intervention in developing countries; however, the impact of these programs is gradual creating a 3- to 7-year lag between implementation and any sustainable decrease in HIV infections. If prevention and education efforts are funded and executed effectively now, there will be a decrease in new cases in the years from 2009 to 2012.

(U) As examples, Uganda and Thailand implemented effective national programs in the 1990s that have led to declines in their HIV infection rates, because of vigorous involvement of their top leaders.

ANSWER D: (U) Lower respiratory infections, acute diarrheal diseases, malaria, hepatitis, dengue fever, and tuberculosis also will contribute to declining health, particularly in developing countries. Factors that will increase the impact of these diseases during the next 10 years include organisms that are resistant to current drug therapies, newly emerging infectious diseases, and spread of infectious agents to new geographic regions. Negative demographic and social conditions in developing countries -- such as continued urbanization, persistent poverty, and poor health care capacity -- facilitate spread of these infectious diseases.

QUESTION AREA: Criminal Organizations and Networks

QUESTION 19:
A) (U) What is the likelihood that criminal organizations and networks will expand the scale and scope of their activities over the next 10 years?
B) (U) What is the likelihood that such groups will traffic in nuclear, biological or chemical weapons?

ANSWER A. (U) DIA will defer to our Law Enforcement Agencies to answer this question.

ANSWER B: (U) As is the case with Question A, DIA is not in a position to answer this question.