Index

整个2015年全球威胁和挑战

副海军上将托马斯·R·威尔逊
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

声明备案
参议院情报选拔委员会
2001年2月7日

The Emerging Global Security Environment

"What's past is prologue" Shakespeare wrote. Those words have relevance today with respect to the recent and future global security environment. The 1990s were a time of transition and turmoil as familiar Cold War issues, precepts, structures, and strategies gave way to new security paradigms and problems. That transition continues, with the end nowhere in sight. In fact, I expect the next 10 to 15 years to be at least as turbulent, if not more so. The basic forces bringing stress and change to the international order -- some of them outlined below -- will remain largely at work, and no power, circumstance, or condition is likely to emerge capable of overcoming these and creating a more stable global environment. Within this environment, the 'Big C' issues -- especially counter drug, counter intelligence, counter proliferation, counter terrorism -- that have been a focal point of this Committee's efforts will remain key challenges for the United States. I will discuss each of these in some detail.

全球化-- defined here as the increasing (and increasingly less restricted) flow of money, people, information, technology, ideas, etc. throughout the world -- remains an important, and perhaps even the dominant, influence. Globalization is generally a positive force that will leave most of the world's people better off. But in some ways, globalization will exacerbate local and regional tensions, increase the prospects and capabilities for conflict, and empower those who would do us harm. For instance, the globalization of technology and information -- especially regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons -- will increasingly accord smaller states, groups, and individuals destructive capabilities previously limited to major world powers. Encouraging and consolidating the positive aspects of globalization, while managing and containing its 'downsides,' will be a continuing challenge.

全球化is independent of any national policy and can weaken the power of governments to control events within and beyond their borders. Nevertheless, many individuals, groups, and states equate globalization to 'Americanization' ... that is, the expansion, consolidation, and perceived dominance of US power, values, ideals, culture, and institutions. This dynamic -- in which the US is seen as both a principal proponent for and key benefactor of globalization -- and the global reaction to it, will underpin many of the security challenges we face during the first two decades of the 21st century.

并非每个人都分享我们对未来的特殊观点，disaffected states, groups, and individualswill remain an important factor and a key challenge for US policy.

Global demographic trendsremain a factor. World population will increase by more than a billion by 2015, with 95 percent of that growth occurring in the developing world. Meanwhile developing-world urbanization will continue, with some 20-30 million of the world's poorest people migrating to urban areas each year. These trends will have profound implications that will vary by country and region. Poorer states, or those with weak governance, will experience additional strains on their resources, infrastructures, and leadership. Many will struggle to cope, some will undoubtedly fail. At the same time, some advanced and emerging market states -- including key European and Asian allies -- will be forced to reexamine longstanding political, social, and cultural precepts as they attempt to overcome the challenges of rapidly aging populations and declining workforce cohorts. In these and other cases, demographic pressures will remain a potential source of stress and instability.

Rapid technology development and proliferation——特别是关于信息,过程ssing, and communications technologies, biotechnology, advanced materials and manufacturing, and weapons (especially weapons of mass destruction) -- will continue to have a profound impact on the way people live, think, work, organize, and fight. The globalization of technology, the integration and fusion of various technological advancements, and unanticipated applications of emerging technologies, make it difficult to predict the technological future. Regarding military technology, two other trends -- constrained global defense spending, and the changing global armaments industry -- will affect the nature of future conflict.

这些因素与其他“二阶和三阶”趋势和后果的复杂整合 - 包括种族冲突的频率，强度和残酷，当地资源短缺，自然灾害，流行病，大规模迁移以及有限的全球响应能力 - 预示着一种非常动态的，复杂的，复杂的，复杂的，不确定的全球未来。例如，考虑到我们今天对俄罗斯，中国，欧洲，中东和朝鲜半岛的可能方向所面临的重大疑问。这些关键州和地区中每个地区的发展将大有帮助定义21世纪的安全环境，但是结果实在太难了。这种复杂性使我们中的那些人负责对未来做出判断，并使未来威胁的特定“点项目”不那么有意义。确定一些更令人不安的潜在环境并广泛定义了我们最有可能遇到的各种挑战，也许更有用。

关键的近期关注

While specific threats are impossible to predict, and new threats and challenges can arise almost without warning in today's environment, over the next 12-24 months, I am most concerned about the following potential situations.

长期威胁和挑战

除了这些直接的有限公司ncerns, I have a long list of more enduring potential threats and challenges. Some of these are in the category of 'the cost of doing business' in that they are generally a consequence of our unique power and position and will exist so long as we remain globally engaged. Others are more a reflection of the complex mix of political, social, economic, technological, and military conditions that characterize today's world. Still others reflect more direct anti-American sentiments held by various nations, groups, and individuals. While none of these individual challenges is as directly threatening to the US as the Soviet Union was during the Cold War, collectively they form a significant barrier to our goals for the future.

参与挑战

只要全球安全环境仍然动荡，美国保留（并且仍然愿意行使）独特的领导能力和反应能力，我们可能会经历对军事，外交和情报参与的高需求。这种动荡可能会产生各种潜在的冲突，从大规模的战斗意外事件，到遏制部署，和平行动和人道主义救济行动。由于我们从来没有没有提供的最佳情报，因此我们的情报服务有巨大的“成本”。

首先，“参与意外事件”通常会发生在冲突范围的下端，在较不发达的国家中。因此，他们经常要求我们的部队在具有挑战性的“不对称环境”（城市中心，偏远，严峻或以其他方式欠发达地区，基础设施有限，健康和卫生设施，高水平的工业或其他有毒污染等等）中运作。这些环境将提出独特的部署，操作，智能和后勤问题，这些问题可能会限制我们许多“信息年龄”力量的优势。同样，这种意外情况通常会使我们抗击我们可能采用各种不对称方法来抵消我们一般军事优势的对手。（我将在下一节中讨论其中的一些）。

高级和平时期参与度的另一个结果是，我们的军事和情报部门的操作（和人员）节奏（Optempo）增加。高光po设备，资源和人员应变，减少了“正常”活动的时间，例如培训，教育和维护，干扰人员和单位旋转周期，并压力人员。这些影响是累积性的，随着时间的流逝而恶化。从情报的角度来看，我在最近的科索沃运动中非常担心，如果有人出现，我们将很难支持另一个重大危机。此外，作为情报资源的经理，我仍然担心我们的情报能力正在伸展“一英里宽，一英寸深”。优先考虑我们对最重要的威胁的努力……保持专注于那些……进行研究，数据基础维护以及维持我们的分析深度所需的长期分析项目……通常是主动的，而不是反应性……在高节奏安全环境中都难以做到。

Finally, high levels of peacetime engagement can limit our flexibility and extend our response times because committed forces, personnel, and resources are not easily extracted and readily available for new contingencies. In fact, it may be that on a daily basis, our simultaneous involvement in 'many lesser crises' equates to a 'major theater war' contingency ... in terms of our available resources and capabilities.

不对称挑战

我们未来的对手 - 从各州到毒or--可能是聪明和适应性的。认识到我们一般的军事优势，他们将避免“按照我们的条款”参与，而是选择旨在使我们的军事力量优柔寡断或与他们的行动和目标无关的战略。他们将努力（情报工作）来了解我们如何思考，组织，指挥和操作……将尝试确定我们的优势，劣势和潜在的脆弱性……并将追求各种普遍的低成本运营和技术倡议，他们希望这些倡议能够实现不成比例的（尤其是心理学上）的结果。他们寻求我们不愿意或无法反击的能力，从而否认我们的领导“军事选择”，或者在被击败之前迫使我们“脱离”。在最糟糕的情况下，不对称方法可能会破坏我们2020年联合愿景概念中设想的“全光谱主导”。

尽管特定的对手，目标，目标和攻击手段因情况而异，但我认为大多数不对称方法通常将属于五个广泛的重叠类别：

除了这些更广泛的概括之外，我还强调了我们在接下来的10 - 15年中最有可能遇到的几种类型的不对称方法。

恐怖主义。Terrorism remains the most significant asymmetric threat to our interests at home and abroad. This threat will grow as disgruntled groups and individuals focus on America as the source of their troubles. Most anti-US terrorism will be regional and based on perceived racial, ethnic or religious grievances. Terrorism will tend to occur in urban centers, often capitals. Our overseas military presence and our military's status as a symbol of US power, interests, and influence can make it a target. However, in many cases, increased security at US military and diplomatic facilities will drive terrorists to attack 'softer' targets such as private citizens or commercial interests. The characteristics of the most effective terrorist organizations - highly compartmented operations planning, good cover and security, extreme suspicion of outsiders, and ruthlessness -- make them very difficult intelligence targets. Middle East-based terrorist groups will remain the most important threat, but our citizens, facilities, and interests will be targeted worldwide. State sponsors (primarily Iran) and individuals with the financial means (such as Usama bin Ladin) will continue to provide much of the economic and technological support needed by terrorists. A move toward 'higher-casualty attacks' is predictable as globalization provides terrorists access to more destructive conventional weapons technologies and WMD.

Information Operations.Information operations can involve many components including electronic warfare, psychological operations, physical attack, denial and deception, computer network attack, and the use of more exotic technologies such as directed energy weapons or electromagnetic pulse weapons. Adversaries recognize our civilian and military reliance on advanced information technologies and systems, and understand that information superiority provides the US unique capability advantages. Many also assess that the real center of gravity for US military actions is US public opinion. Accordingly, numerous potential foes are pursuing information operations capabilities as relatively low cost means to undermine domestic and international support for US actions, to attack key parts of the US national infrastructure, or to preclude (or make more difficult) our attainment of information superiority. The threat from information operations is limited today, but will grow significantly during the next decade or so.

WMD and Missile Proliferation.Many potential adversaries believe they can preclude US force options and offset US conventional military superiority by developing WMD and missiles. Others are motivated more by regional threat perceptions. In either case, the pressure to acquire WMD and missiles is high, and, unfortunately, globalization creates an environment more amenable to proliferation activities. Some 25 countries now possess -- or are in the process of acquiring and developing -- WMD or missiles. Meanwhile, a variety of non-state actors are showing increasing interest. New alliances have formed, providing pooled resources for developing these capabilities, while technological advances and global economic conditions have made it easier to transfer materiel and expertise. The basic sciences necessary to produce these weapons are widely understood. Most of the technology is readily available, and the raw materials are common. All told, the global WMD/missile threat to US and allied territory, interests, forces, and facilities will increase significantly.

外国情报威胁。Adversaries hoping to employ asymmetric approaches against the United States need detailed intelligence on US decision-making, operational concepts, capabilities, shortcomings, and vulnerabilities. Consequently, we continue to face extensive intelligence threats from a large number of foreign nations and sub-national entities including terrorists, international criminal organizations, foreign commercial enterprises, and other disgruntled groups and individuals. These intelligence efforts are generally targeted against our national security policy-making apparatus, national infrastructure, military plans, personnel, and capabilities, and our critical technologies. While foreign states -- particularly Russia and China -- present the biggest intelligence threat, all our adversaries are likely to exploit technological advances to expand their collection activities. Moreover, the open nature of our society, and increasing ease with which money, technology, information, and people move around the globe in the modem era, make effective counterintelligence and security that much more complex and difficult to achieve.

封面，隐藏，伪装，否认和欺骗（C3D2）。Many potential adversaries -- nations, groups, and individuals -- are undertaking more and increasingly sophisticated C3D2 operations against the United States. These efforts are generally designed to hide key activities, facilities, and capabilities (e.g. mobilization or attack preparations, WMD programs, advanced weapons systems developments, treaty noncompliance, etc.) from US intelligence, to manipulate US perceptions and assessments of those programs, and to protect key capabilities from US precision strike platforms. Foreign knowledge of US intelligence and military operations capabilities is essential to effective C3D2. Advances in satellite warning capabilities, the growing availability of camouflage, concealment, deception, and obscurant materials, advanced technology for and experience with building underground facilities, and the growing use of fiber optics and encryption, will increase the C3D2 challenge.

Counter-Space Capabilities.我们潜在的对手众所周知，美国对使用太空平台的使用（和优势）的依赖。许多人试图通过开发威胁美国太空资产的能力来降低这一优势，尤其是通过否认和欺骗，信号干扰和地面片段攻击。许多国家都对可以用来开发相反空间功能的各种技术感兴趣或实验。这些努力可能会改善用于太空对象跟踪，电子战或干扰以及指示能量武器的系统。中国和俄罗斯正在进行全体董事会计划，其他较小的州和非国家实体正在采用更有限的方法（尽管可能有效）。到2015年，未来的对手将能够采用各种各样的手段来破坏，退化或击败美国太空支持系统的部分。

Threats to Critical Infrastructure.许多对手认为，避免，阻止或抵消美国军事优势的最佳方法是发展威胁美国家园的能力。除了更传统的战略核威胁（下面讨论）外，我们的国家基础设施很容易受到其他形式的物理和计算机攻击的干扰。基础设施的相互依存性创造了更多的脆弱性。外国具有最大的攻击潜力（就资源和能力而言），但是当今最直接，最严重的威胁来自内部人士，恐怖分子，罪犯，其他小团体或个人，对选定的关键节点进行了良好的协调罢工。

Criminal Challenges

International criminal activity of all kinds will continue to plague US interests. I am very concerned about the growing sophistication of criminal groups and individuals and their increasing potential to exploit certain aspects of globalization for their own gain. The potential for such groups to usurp power, or undermine social and economic stability is likely to increase.

战略挑战

超出了非对称t和基础设施的威胁o our homeland outlined above, we will continue to face an array of more traditional, albeit evolving, strategic threats. Under virtually any circumstance short of state failure, Russia will maintain a viable strategic nuclear force. Moscow has begun deployment of the new SS-27 ICBM and has upgrades to this missile and several other systems under development. While strategic forces retain their priority, they have not been immune to the problems affecting the rest of the Russian military. System aging, chronic underfunding, and arms control agreements ensure that Russian strategic warhead totals will continue to decline -- from some 5,000 today to a future force perhaps under 1,500 warheads (depending on arms control treaties, decisions we make about missile defense, the state of the Russian economy, Russian perceptions of other strategic threats, etc).

At the same time, for at least the next decade or so, Moscow will rely increasingly on nuclear weapons to compensate for its diminished conventional capability. This policy -- published in the October 1999 Russian Military Doctrine statement and reiterated in January and April 2000 -- lowers the theoretical threshold for Russian use of nuclear weapons. One additional concern, which will remain with us so long as Russia remains in some turmoil, is the potential for a Russian nuclear weapon (or more likely, nuclear material) to be stolen by or otherwise diverted to a state of concern, a terrorist group, or other criminal organization.

北京的最高军事重点之一是加强和现代化其小小的，过时的战略核威慑力量。尽管难以预测中国战略现代化的最终范围，但能够击中美国的中国战略导弹的数量，可靠性，生存能力和准确性将在未来20年内增加。我们对中国对核武器使用的概念一无所知，尤其是关于北京对战略武器在涉及中国重要利益的国际危机中的作用和实用性的看法（例如，台湾或朝鲜半岛）。

Beyond China and Russia, several states -- especially North Korea and, later on, Iran and possibly Iraq -- could field small numbers of long-range, WMD-equipped missiles capable of striking the United States. Again, we know very little about how these states think about strategic weapons, deterrence, and escalation.

As these trends unfold, the strategic threat picture will become more complex, diverse, and complicated, leaving our homeland potentially more vulnerable to a wider array of strategic challenges.

Regional Military Challenges

2020年联合视觉是美国部队发展的概念模板。它设想了21世纪的“信息时代”军队，该军事利用高质量，训练有素的人员，先进的技术，并开发了几种关键的运营概念，包括主要的操纵，精确参与，完整的维度保护和专注的物流 - 以在军事行动范围内实现优势。美国正在稳步发展这一愿景中体现的能力。

相比之下，其他大型军队通常会取得较慢的进步，并且将继续野外“工业时代”力量（主要是质量和火力为导向，主要是配备后期冷战（VICE 21世纪）技术，并保留集中的，等级的，等级的命令和控制结构。尽管这些大型区域力量不如美国军方前进，但按地区标准仍然有效，并且在许多情况下，完全有能力实现重大的区域目标。此外，在接下来的15年中，许多区域国家将寻求通过选定的高端功能来增强这些“传统”力量，包括：WMD和导弹，高级C41系统，卫星侦察，精密罢工系统，全球定位，先进的防空系统，先进的防空系统以及先进的抗面板功能。在某种程度上，这些“利基”功能将旨在应对美国的关键概念（精确罢工，全球访问，信息优越性等），以试图阻止美国参与区域意外情况，或提高美国参与的成本。

For the most part, however, even large regional forces will be hard pressed to match our dominant maneuver, power projection, and precision engagement capabilities. But in a specific combat situation, the precise threat these forces pose will depend on a number of factors, including: the degree to which they have absorbed and can apply key '21st Century' technologies, have overcome deficiencies in training, leadership, doctrine, and logistics, and on the specific operational-tactical environment. Under the right conditions, their large numbers, combined with other 'situational advantages' -- such as initiative, limited objectives, short lines of communication, familiar terrain, time to deploy and prepare combat positions, and the skillful use of 'asymmetric' approaches -- could present significant challenges to US mission success. China and perhaps Russia at the high end, followed by North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, are all examples of militaries that could field large forces with a mix of current and advanced capabilities.

中国。Beijing recognizes that its long term prospects to achieve great power status depend on its success at modernizing China's economy, infrastructure, and human capital, and it will continue to emphasize those priorities ahead of military modernization. In addition to the limitations posed by these other priorities, China's military is moving from 1960s to 1990s technology, and can probably not efficiently absorb technology upgrades at a much faster rate. Accordingly, I expect China to continue to allow total military spending to grow at about the same rate as the economy, by maintaining a defense burden of roughly 5% of GDP (or about $40-50 billion in defense spending last year). Part of this steady defense spending increase will be absorbed by rapidly rising personnel costs, a consequence of the overall transformation toward a market economy.

As I mentioned earlier, a top Chinese military priority is to upgrade its small, aging strategic deterrent force (although we have no indications that China intends to develop a 'first strike' strategic capability). In terms of conventional forces, Beijing is pursing the capability to defend its eastern seaboard -- the economic heartland -- from attacks by a 'high-technology' opponent employing long-range precision strike capabilities. This means China is expanding its air, anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-surface ship, reconnaissance, and battle management capabilities, to enable the PLA to project 'defensive' power out to the first island chain. China is also rapidly expanding its conventionally-armed theater missile force (particularly the road-mobile, solid-propellant, 300 km CSS-7), in large measure to give it leverage against Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, other US Asian allies.

由于这些和其他发展，中国在地区军事行动的能力将大大提高。到2010年左右，中国最好的部队将在机动战争中取得相当高的水平（尽管直到2020年接近2020年，他们可能不会完全掌握大型，复杂的联合服务运营。此外，到2015年，中国部队的装备将变得更好，拥有一千多个剧院范围的导弹，数百个第四代（大约是F-16同等的）飞机，成千上万的冷战等效坦克和炮兵，少数几个先进的柴油和第三代核潜艇，以及一些新的表面战斗机。中国还可能将综合防空系统和调制解调器的指挥和控制系统验证在战略和运营水平上。从俄罗斯的高级系统的选择性收购 - 例如Sovremennyy驱逐舰和su-30/侧翼飞机 - 在此期间，将仍然是PLA现代化工作的重要辅助。

The Taiwan issue will remain a major potential flashpoint, particularly over the near term. It is doubtful, however, unless Taipei moved more directly toward independence, that China would attempt a larger scale military operation to attack Taiwan outright. Beijing recognizes the risk inherent in such a move and, at least for the near term, probably has questions about its military ability to succeed. Nevertheless, by 2015, China's conventional force modernization will provide an increasingly credible military threat against Taiwan (though probably not the large amphibious capability necessary for invasion).

Russia.I remain relatively pessimistic about Russia's prospects, primarily because there are no easy, simple, or near term solutions to the tremendous political, economic, social, and military problems confronting Moscow. Consequently, I expect that many of the issues that concern us today -- Russia's role as a proliferator of advanced military and WMD technologies and brainpower, the uncertain security of Russia's nuclear materials and weapons, the expanding local, regional, and global impact of Russian criminal syndicates, and Moscow's questionable reliability as a global security partner -- will be with us for some time to come.

In the meantime, Russia's Armed Forces continue in crisis, with even priority strategic force elements receiving only a portion of their authorized funding. Compensation, housing, and other shortfalls continue to undermine morale. Under these conditions -- chronic underfunding and neglect -- there is little chance that Moscow's conventional forces will improve significantly during the next decade.

Beyond the near term, the size, characteristics, and capabilities of Russia's conventional forces could vary widely, depending on the outcome of numerous unsettled issues. Among the most important of these are the level of Russian defense spending, Russian threat perceptions, the achievement of national consensus on a blueprint for military reform, and Moscow's success at restoring the 'intangible' components of military effectiveness (leadership, readiness, morale, sustainment, etc.).

我仍然看到2010年以后的俄罗斯军队的两个主要替代方案。第一种（更有可能的情况）是俄罗斯将长期弱化（可能对美国构成的军事威胁少于今天）。这一未来将是由于政治领导人继续忽视俄罗斯军队的未来，其特征是持续资金不足，缺乏优先级和军事改革的成功最低。另一方面，如果经济复苏和领导力支持更快而不是较晚，那么俄罗斯可以在这十年末开始重建有效的军队，并在2015年的时间范围内实现较小但更有能力的力量。通过区域标准，这种改善的力将是很大的，并且具有数千种晚期冷战系统以及2005年后建造的数百个更先进的系统。

Iran.The election of President Khatemi in August 1997 marked a turning point in Iran's domestic situation. Khatemi received the bulk of his support from minorities, youths, and women (all growing segments of Iran's population), and I am hopeful that Tehran will change for the better over time. For now, however, the religious conservatives who have held power since 1979 remain in control of the security, foreign policy, intelligence, and defense institutions, and generally continue to view the US with hostility. For these reasons, I remain concerned with Tehran's deliberate (though uneven) military buildup. That effort is designed to ensure the security of the cleric-led regime, increase Iran's influence in the Middle East and Central Asia, deter Iraq or any other regional aggressor, and limit US regional influence. While Iran's forces retain significant limitations with regard to mobility, logistics infrastructure, and modem weapons systems, Tehran is attempting to compensate for these by developing (or pursuing) numerous asymmetric capabilities, to include subversion and terrorism, the deployment of air, air defense, missile, mine warfare, and naval capabilities to interdict maritime access in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and the acquisition of WMD and longer range missiles to deter the US and to intimidate Iran's neighbors.

Although Iran's force modernization efforts will proceed gradually, during the next 15 years it will likely acquire a full range of WMD capabilities, field substantial numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles - including, perhaps, an ICBM -- increase its inventory of modern aircraft, expand its armored forces, and continue to improve its anti-surface ship capability. Iran's effectiveness in generating and employing this increased military potential against an advanced adversary will depend in large part on 'intangibles' -- command and control, training, maintenance, reconnaissance and intelligence, leadership, and situational conditions and circumstances.

伊拉克。只要萨达姆或他的同类的瑞玛某人ins in power, Iraq will remain challenging and contentious. Saddam's goals remain to reassert sovereignty over all of Iraq, end Baghdad's international isolation, and, eventually, have Iraq reemerge as the dominant regional power. For the time being, however, his options are constrained. Years of UN sanctions, embargoes, and inspections, combined with US and Coalition military actions, have significantly degraded Iraq's military capabilities. Manpower and materiel resource shortages, a problematic logistics system, and a relative inability to execute combined arms operations, remain major shortcomings. These are aggravated by intensive regime security requirements.

然而,伊拉克的地面部队继续one of the most formidable within the region. They are able to protect the regime effectively, deploy rapidly, and threaten Iraq's neighbors absent any external constraints. Iraq's air and air defense forces retain only a marginal capability to protect Iraqi air space and project air power outside Iraq's borders. Although the threat to Coalition Forces is limited, continued Iraqi confrontational actions underscore the regime's determination to stay the course. Iraq has probably been able to retain a residual level of WMD and missile capabilities. The lack of intrusive inspection and disarmament mechanisms permits Baghdad to enhance these capabilities.

Absent decisive regime change, Iraq will continue to pose complex political and military challenges to Coalition interests well into the future. Saddam has been increasingly effective during the past year at circumventing sanctions and exploiting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to garner sympathy for Iraq's plight by linking the Iraqi and Palestinian causes. Should sanctions be formally removed, or become de facto ineffective, Iraq will move quickly to expand its WMD and missile capabilities, develop a more capable strategic air defense system, and improve other conventional force capabilities. Under this scenario, Baghdad could, by 2015, acquire a large inventory of WMD -- including hundreds of theater ballistic and cruise missiles -- expand its inventory of modern aircraft, and double its fleet of armored vehicles. While this force would be large and potent by regional standards, its prospects for success against a western opponent would depend ultimately on how successful Baghdad was in overcoming chronic weaknesses in military leadership, reconnaissance and intelligence, morale, readiness, logistics, and training.

北朝鲜。t尽管意想不到放松的紧张局势he peninsula during the past year, and the real potential for further improvements, North Korea retains a large, forward deployed military force, capable of inflicting significant damage on the South. War on the peninsula would still be very violent and destructive, and could occur with little warning. Moreover, even if the North-South rapprochement continues, Pyongyang is unlikely to significantly reduce its military posture and capability in the near term, because the North needs its military forces to ensure regime security, retain its regional position, and provide bargaining leverage. In the meantime, the Korean People's Army continues to demonstrate resiliency, managing during the past several years to stop the general capability decline experienced during most of the 1990s and, in some ways, marginally improve its readiness and capability for war.

在不久的将来，我预计朝鲜将继续扩散WMD，尤其是导弹技术，这是北朝鲜在国际市场上提供硬币的少数地区之一。对于那些寻求扩大导弹舰队范围的州，平壤对无东导弹技术的扩散尤其重要。我还希望朝鲜将继续发展和扩展其自己的“不对称”能力 - WMD，导弹，特种作战部队，小型潜艇插入平台等 - 部分以抵消其常规部队的缺点。而且，正如我之前所说，我认为朝鲜必须在未来几年内某个时候进行洲际弹道导弹。简而言之，只要朝鲜以目前的形式留在其周围，它将代表对我们地区和全球利益的主要威胁之一。

The Bottom Lines

The global turmoil we've encountered since the end of the Cold War will likely continue ... because the basic conditions fostering that turmoil remain in place. As a result, we are likely to continue to face a high demand for US military engagement on a global scale, a trend that has wide ranging consequences for our military and intelligence services. We have the potential to be increasingly involved in a variety of environments against adversaries employing a wide range of asymmetric approaches.

At the 'high end' of the conflict spectrum, the United States will continue to face an array of strategic threats ... but their character will be different from the Cold War. Russia will maintain a viable, though much smaller strategic force, but will rely increasingly on nuclear weapons to compensate for diminished conventional capability. China is expanding and modernizing its strategic capability. Other states of concern, especially North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, could field ICBMs with WMD, presenting a new strategic threat that we've not faced before. At the same time, 'non-traditional' threats to our homeland and critical infrastructure will likely increase. Collectively this mix of more traditional and emerging challenges will compound the strategic threat picture.

一些区域国家将维持大型的，主要是“工业时代”的军事力量，并由WMD和长期导弹增强，并选择了“ 21世纪”技术和能力。在适当的条件下，尽管我们持久了整体军事优势，但这些地区军队仍可能构成重大挑战。

美国将在接下来的15年中面临的安全挑战将有很大差异……取决于个人对手的优点和劣势...他们的手段和目标……以及特定操作环境的独特情况，环境和其他特征。因此，“全光谱优势”的2020年联合愿景目标……也就是说，能够在各种可以想象的战斗行动中统治我们的对手...仍然是基本的力量要求。