Testimony of Jeffrey H. Smith Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before you this afternoon to discuss these issues of great national importance.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
2001年9月24日You have asked me to discuss my views on how the United States should respond to this attack, particularly from an intelligence and law enforcement perspective. You have also asked for my views on the legislation pending before the Senate, particularly on those issues for which this Committee has jurisdiction.
It is a special privilege for me to appear before this Committee, because I was honored to be a member of its staff for nearly five years. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, I commend you for your leadership over the years, particularly in this extraordinarily difficult and demand time. I am sure this Committee and the Congress will play a great role in leading this nation to victory.
Let me also add, Mr. Chairman, a note of commendation to the truly extraordinary efforts being made by the men and women of the U.S. Intelligence Community. They are working around the clock in an unprecedented effort of dedication and determinination to find out who attacked us, prevent future attacks, and support the U.S. diplomatic, military, law enforcement and intelligence response that is forthcoming. In particular, I know that George Tenet has put his heart and soul in this effort, and he deserves the nation's thanks.
概述
不久前，有很多谈论我们正朝着一个无边界的世界前进。许多人认为，信息技术革命等因素将使边界变得毫无意义。有些人甚至质疑国家主权的未来，尽管其他人断言国家将在国际政治中生存并成为主要演员。
跨境的资本，商品，人，技术和思想的流动增加为许多世界社区带来了很多。但是，正如总统所说的那样，那些从这种趋势中失去这种趋势的人对世界其他地区享有的自由，进步和繁荣遭到了非理性的恐惧。这些恐惧的力量已经在许多志趣相投的个人，组织和政府编织了一个网络，以对我们和我们的盟友宣战。
这个国际网络的本质为我们带来了独特的挑战，我们必须为此找到新的和创新的回应。这种威胁是从许多方向和许多伪装中引起的，我们必须准备在同样广泛的方面做出回应。
The terrorists have created their own borderless world, and it is therefore ironic -- and most appropriate -- that President Bush has called upon all states to enforce the most basic rules of international law: namely, that states must exercise governmental authority within their defined borders. President Bush has rightly demanded that every state abide by the rule of law by rooting out terrorists on its territory or cooperating with us in doing so. Indeed, all states have a common interest in defeating these forces of terror and fear because these forces can turn on other states as surely as they have turned on us.
那么，美国应该如何回应呢？我认为，五个原则应控制我们的回应。
首先，因为这是一种无缝的，无边界的攻击，我们的回答中不能有人造接缝或边界。过去，我们通过询问特定行为是执法，情报还是国家安全事务来与恐怖分子的行为联系。这个问题不再是第一个问题。我们必须能够收集和分析信息;整理后无论是“证据”或“intelligence."
我们必须将其视为一个综合威胁，我们必须对此有一个单一的集成响应。我们的回答中不应有人造的“炉子管道”。我的意思是，我们必须像武装部队一样有“联合”回应。多年来，国防部一直在努力创建将共同战斗的联合组织。这不仅在我们的军队内部，而且在整个政府内都必须是正确的。
This is easier said than done, but the President took a major step in this direction by appointing Governor Ridge as the cabinet-level coordinator for homeland security. The contours of his responsibility are not entirely clear at this point, but consideration should be given to a "civilian CINC" who would be responsible for coordinating the U.S. war on terrorists. Much as the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 gave increased authority to our CINCs overseas, a civilian CINC for counter-terrorism could pull together all of the various elements to respond to the war. Perhaps, like a military CINC, the various agencies should assign "forces" to him for the fight. President Bush may have intended that Governor Ridge function in this manner. In any event, I believe we need to continue to work very hard to resolve the organizational issues.
其次，必须对我们的法律和法规进行审查，以确保它们不会促进过去造成许多问题的stovepipes。例如，我们知道政府机构不会尽快或应尽快共享信息。在某些情况下，当前法律阻止了此类信息共享。这些法律应审查并适当地更改，以促进有效的信息共享。我很高兴看到国会之前的许多具体建议做出了这些更改。
In addition to legal requirements, attitudes and traditional rivalries continue to impair information-sharing. Nevertheless, it has been my experience that when U.S. officials are given a particular mission, they roll up their sleeves, share the information and get the job done. I am sure that is what has happened after this attack. It is now up to Congress to eliminate unnecessary impediments in the law that clog the machinery of government. The Executive Branch, too, must reduce or eliminate unnecessary constraints on the sharing of information.
同时，我们必须认识到，颁布了许多这些规则，例如大陪审团，以保护我们的公民权利。我们必须找到一种方法来满足情报界的需求，而不会损害美国公民的权利。
第三，我们必须像宪法所允许的那样积极进取。例如，我们应该检查是否应更改美国境内的非U.Sitizens进行电子监视的标准，以获取外国情报。昨天Washington PostReportsReports报告（p。A18），联邦调查局希望对乌萨马·本·拉登（Osama Bin Laden）的某些非美国的某些人进行电子监视，袭击发生前美国的某人同事，但司法部不相信FISA下没有足够的权力来获得窃听。如果这是真的，我们应该改变法律。
FISA基本的基本概念是，要求批准在美国收集外国情报的电子监视 - 但标准的标准比犯罪目的较低。FISA还区分了美国人和非美国人的人，从理论上讲，它比美国人更容易获得对非美国人的认股权证。
I have not had time to review the recent case law on surveillance of non-U.S.persons. But I am generally aware that courts have, over time, extended more Fourth Amendment protections to non-U.S. persons. I suspect, however, that most if not all of those cases are criminal cases. I believe, therefore, that Congress should take a hard look at the standards in FISA for conducting surveillance of non-U.S. persons and consider easing the standards for obtaining warrants for electronic surveillance against non-U.S. persons for foreign intelligence purposes.
正如亚瑟·戈德堡大法官所说，宪法不是自杀协议。
还应考虑更改有关在FISA下的电子监视过程中获得的有关美国公民的信息“最小化”规则的规则。我的印象是，情报分析师认为，由于对最小化规则的过分谨慎的解释，有价值的情报经常丢失。
第四，我们将赢得这场战争 - 但我们如何赢得比赛很重要。我们绝不能在国内滥用法治，以寻求在海外执行它。我们必须确定，并在必要时准备使用致命力。但这并不意味着我们应该正如某人所说的那样，我们应该“扔掉所有规则”。世界已经发展了一个法律机构，战争法，管理武装冲突的行为。这些规则不仅旨在减少战争的恐怖和保护非战斗者的恐怖，而且是出于认识到战争的方式不应通过播种仇恨种子而引起未来冲突的方式。
在这方面，我们需要研究有关法治的每个提议的行动，以及他人将如何看待它。例如，我们不应取消暗杀禁令。美国人不是刺客。废除该禁令的路线是大多数美国人不舒服的过境点。无论如何，我们已经能够开展军事和情报活动，包括一些使用致命力量，以实现我们的目标。此外，这不是对恐怖的有效威慑。它经常在恐怖分子中造成烈士和英雄，并使我们自己的领导人面临着增加暗杀的威胁。最后，当这场战争结束时，我不相信我们希望我们的行动确立对外国领导人暗杀的世界，成为一种可接受的国际行为规范。
第五，美国的反应应动员美国所有资源。特别是，总统应呼吁美国工业界的天才来满足和击败这一威胁。总统应支持创新的，公共/私人合作的努力，以确保行业，学术界和私营部门的其他要素的最佳思想与这种国家威胁有关。
但是，关于目前正在考虑的具体立法，我认为国会应该明确指出，对于提高电子监视，政府将不采取技术任务，要求信息技术行业以促进拦截的方式构建其系统，以增强安全性或控制加密的传播。取而代之的是，政府应与行业和利用市场力量联系，以取得必要的结果。
A national objective must be to assure that U.S. industry remains the world leader in these fields. Our security is much better enhanced by having American industry continue to lead rather than to face information technology and encryption produced overseas, which would happen if the United States exerts an overly heavy hand and interferes in the marketplace in the development of technology.
主席先生，我也相信，该委员会应从是否考虑到情报界提出的所有担忧的角度仔细审查政府的法案。我感谢该账单很快被汇总在一起，我珍视对速度的需求。但是，我们不仅必须在公民自由方面，而且在山羊方面都要谨慎。例如，我知道是否有担心执法机构向情报界有足够的信息共享。可能还需要对FISA进行少量调整，以解决最新或预期的技术发展。
由于所有这些原因，我似乎谨慎地制定了广泛支持的规定，并在其他规定上更加故意进行。
拟议的立法
现在，让我转到立法的规定。
您已要求我考虑代表该委员会管辖范围内的政府提出的法案的规定。您还要求我对该委员会主席提出的法案发表评论。我没有很多时间来研究任何一项法案，但是我很乐意提供提出的初步评论。
ADMINISTRATION'S BILL
Turning first tothe bill as introduced on behalf of the Administration，我注意到第103条修改了18 U.S.C.2510（7）允许与联邦政府行政部门的任何官员或雇员共享标题III窃听。
法规的拟议更改不包括可以给出谁的限制。限制可能在行政部门内传播此类信息的目的，例如将其限制在国家安全事务中，这似乎是谨慎的。
分析还说，它将与FISA的标题III标准进行协调。但是，情报官员抱怨说，司法部频繁地拒绝共享根据FISA收集的信息，或者提供的信息非常慢。我相信这是一个更根本的问题，应该按照我上面建议的方式解决。我看不出为什么司法部根据FISA窃听收集的信息没有立即提供给情报界的相关机构。在我看来，总检察长可以要求所有情报机构遵循普通的最小化标准。
第104条的特征是“储蓄规定”，该解释说，它提供了外国情报的收集由外国情报当局约束，而不是由刑事诉讼法规管辖。正如我上面讨论的那样，这是一个值得注意的目标。但是，我尚不清楚这项提议的更改将取得什么成就。我相信需要对拟议的更改及其后果进行更详细的解释。
Section 105 appears to codify the so-called "silver platter" doctrine; namely that when a foreign government provides information to the U.S. Government for which the U.S. Government has not asked nor had any role in collecting, the U.S. Government may use that information. However, I am troubled by the proposed language of the new Section 2514(l)(b). It would require that when a U.S. official participated in the electronic surveillance, the information collected may only be used when it "would have been lawful if executed within the United States." That may be entirely appropriate in the case of a criminal prosecution, but I do not believe such limitation should apply in acase of collection of foreign intelligence. There may also be reason to distinguish between information collected on a U.S. person - for which a higher standard might be appropriate - and a non-U.S. person.
第151条延长了FISA法院可以授权在美国授权搜查和监视外国大国和国际恐怖组织的外国成员的搜查和监视的时间。这与格雷厄姆参议员法案第202条的规定相同，似乎是一项明智的规定。
Section 152 expands the obligations of third parties to furnish assistance to the government under FISA, particularly when the target moves frequently to avoid detection. This is substantially the same as Section 203 of Senator Graham's bill and enhances the ability to monitor individuals who move rapidly to change the mode of their communication to avoid detection. It also seems sensible and should be adopted.
第153条将更改FISA的语言，以便在外国情报是调查的“目的”目的的情况下可以使用它，而不是现行法律将其限制在调查的唯一或主要目的的情况下。与上述概述的观点一致，我认为这是一个适当的变化。我相信，这种情况应该具有决定是否发起FISA收藏的灵活性，尤其是当涉及外国国民时，而不是被迫进入具有更高标准的标题III收藏。但是，委员会应询问政府在政府认为这是适当的情况下，现行法律是否限制了其执行FISA的能力。委员会应谨慎认可这一变更，因为它具有政府寻求FISA监视令的潜力 - 当它没有足够的信息以获取标题III命令时 - 但是在其中获得的外国情报信息是遥控或高度投机。
第154条外国我呼吁更大的分享ntelligence information held in the hands of the Department of Justice, whether in a grand jury proceeding or obtained under Title III. I believe this is an extremely important provision but note that it does not appear to be codified. I believe it should be. I also note that it is similar to Section 354 of the Administration's bill and Section 301 of Senator Graham's bill. My first impression is that this provision in the Administration's bill is the most clear. In particular, the Administration's proposal mentions Rule 6E of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which has been a significant bar to providing relevant information from Grand Jury investigations to the intelligence community.
第155条将消除政府确定已使用通信设备与“外国权力的代理人”联系，以获取笔寄存器/陷阱和跟踪订单的FISA订单。我相信这是有道理的，应该被采用。
第156条将授予总检察长以“行政传票”来寻求信息，以获取与他在毒品调查中拥有的授权相似的文件和记录。这似乎是一项明智的规定。
Section 157 expands the authority of the FBI to issue National Security Letters to request certain information. Current law requires both a showing of relevance and a showing of links to "an agent of a foreign power." The elimination of this latter requirement would permit the FBI to seek information in the same fashion as with criminal subpoenas. It seems to me sensible and should be adopted.
Section 354 makes specific changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in combination with Section 154 seems a sensible approach.
尽管该委员会对政府法案第110条没有管辖权，但我有一个评论，我相信委员会应该考虑并推荐给司法委员会。该节修改标题18，以便包括ISP在内的电信和服务提供商可以向政府实体（包括通讯的内容）提供信息，如果公司合理地认为，涉及即时死亡或严重身体伤害的紧急情况任何人都证明了信息的披露。”在这种情况下，应该鼓励公司向政府提供此类信息。但是，我注意到，对这样的披露的公司没有免疫力。第158节中有这样的法定豁免权，规定了教育记录的披露。该节提供“任何人根据本小节提供记录或信息的人不得对任何其他人提供此类信息负责”。我建议考虑类似的规定来保护那些根据第110条规定的自愿向政府提供有关个人信息的公司。
董事长格雷厄姆的提议
Turning to主席建议的法案, I have the following comments.
第101条将为DCI的责任增加一项新的规定，以“建立和管理根据FISA收集的所有外国情报的分析和传播”的要求和优先事项。我的倾向是，这是一个好主意，因为它将授权DCI在使用FISA收集和分析外国情报方面发挥更大的作用。但是，我认为应该寻求和仔细考虑DCI的观点。重要的是，DCI的权威足以确保以有效的方式进行FISA收集以支持外国情报的收集，但没有赋予DCI过多的权力来指导美国使用电子监视。
Section 102 revises the National Security Act to make it clear that the DCI has particular responsibilities for international terrorism. Again, I believe this is a good change, as there has been considerable debate within the Executive Branch as to primacy for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information on international terrorism. This is a welcome change.
第103条将为《国家安全法》添加一项规定，指出情报界的官员“可以与任何人建立并维持情报关系，以获取各种恐怖分子目标”。这显然是为了确保该领域的案件官员将被鼓励承担与恐怖组织中招募人类源有关的必要风险，即使该个人可能犯有谋杀案或从事其他严重的侵犯人权或犯罪活动。
当前的准则在1995年被CIA通过，因为在新闻界和国会中广泛表达了该机构与此类人打交道的担忧。该准则采用了一个简单的测试：个人可以向美国提供与与此人打交道有关的情报的价值？准则有两个目的。首先，要确保总部做出明智的决定，以授权招募此类人。观点是，平衡测试应在总部，而不是在现场进行。第二目的是保护参与人员。一旦从总部授予批准后，该官员就有“狩猎许可证”，并且可以自由进行，因为他或她拥有总部的全部支持。后一点尤其重要，因为在90年代中期，国会委员会，PFIAB，中央情报局/IG以及在某些情况下，正在调查几名官员。众所周知，许多官员认为有必要自行购买个人责任保险，以支付雇用外部律师来捍卫自己免受各种调查的费用。然后，我想，现在想，现在没有CIA案件官员不得不从他自己的口袋里购买此类保险。
我知道该领域的许多官员都认为，这些准则是招募恐怖组织中的来源的障碍。我还了解到，中央情报局总部坚持认为，该准则不会阻碍招募可以在这些组织中提供宝贵智能的资源。因此，很难知道真相在哪里。但是，很明显，该指南在该领域中有一种看法会抑制招募。中央情报局案官员必须知道，鼓励他们冒险，当他们这样做时，他们将得到中央情报局总部，国家安全机构和国会的支持。
因此，这些准则应由DCI及其顶级领导团队仔细审查，如果他们实际上抑制了该领域的招聘，则应将其更改。
I do have reservations about Section 103 of this bill. First, it provides that an officer may maintain a relationship only "for purposes of acquiring information." Thus, if an officer had a relationship with a source inside a terrorist organization, this language would limit our ability to direct that officer to use that relationship to disrupt a terrorist organization, for example by feeding misinformation to his source or by using his source to support a covert operation that would be designed to disrupt or destroy the terrorist organization. Second, it raises questions about CIA case officers dealing with persons inother groups, such as international organized crime or international narcotics organizations, that enjoy no similar provision.
经过反思，我认为国会可以有效地命令中央情报局局长，也许与PFIAB或其他外部组织结合，以仔细审查这些准则，如果他们实际上会阻碍该领域的招聘工作，它们应该相应地更改。
Section 104 defers submittal to Congress of certain reports and will surely be most welcome.
Section 201 amends FISA to exclude from the definition of interception an instruction or signal that is given to operate an electronic device. That seems a sensible provision and should be adopted.
Sections 202 and 203 are analogous to Sections 151 and 152 in the Administration's bill and, as noted above, should be adopted.
Section 204 seeks to clarify the relationship between Title III and FISA wiretaps. The consequences of this provision are not immediately clear but it does not seem sensible to me to have a situation in which two collections efforts are being mounted in parallel.
如上所述，第301条旨在确保情报界可以访问司法部持有的信息。这是一个值得称赞的目标，但我的倾向是赞成政府法案中的规定，因为它们似乎更加清楚。
Sections 302, 303 and 304 also make reasonable and thoughtful changes to existing law and should be adopted.
主席先生，总而言之，让我重复我为解决这些问题感到荣幸，我期待回答委员会的问题。乐动冠军