1997 Congressional Hearings情报和安全
1997 Congressional Hearings
The Cali Group and Traffickers from Mexico
Amado Carrillo-Fuentes
Miguel Caro-Quintero
The Arellano-Felix Brothers
耶稣·阿米兹库亚
华金·古兹曼·洛拉（Joaquin Guzman-Loera）
Effect of Mexican Organized Crime on United States
U.S. Law Enforcement Strategy vs Organized Crime in Mexico
Corruption and Intimidation: Tools of the Trade
主席先生，委员会成员：我很高兴有机会今天就墨西哥和西南边境倡议出现在小组委员会上。我今天的评论将仅限于对涉及有组织犯罪和毒品贩运问题的执法问题的客观评估，并特别关注墨西哥，与美国执法部门的合作以及西南边境的合作。乐动冠军这次听证会非常及时，在我的证词期间，我将为小组委员会提供有关墨西哥的有组织犯罪团体如何运作并影响当今美国生活中许多方面的完整情况。当我说来自墨西哥的这些复杂的毒品集团已将来自哥伦比亚的有组织犯罪团体黯然失色时，我并不夸张，这是当今美国面临的主要执法威胁。
Many phrases have been used to describe the complex and sophisticated international drug trafficking groups operating out of Colombia and Mexico, and frankly, the somewhat respectable titles of "cartel"or "federation" mask the true identity of these vicious, destructive entities. The Cali organization, and the four largest drug trafficking organizations in Mexico --- operating out of Juarez, Tijuana, Sonora and the Gulf region --- are simply organized crime groups whose leaders are not in Brooklyn or Queens, but are safely ensconced on foreign soil. They are not legitimate businessmen as the word "cartel" implies, nor are they "federated" into a legitimate conglomerate. These syndicate leaders --- the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers in Colombia to Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, Juan Garcia -Abrego, Miguel Caro-Quintero, and the Arellano-Felix Brothers --- are simply the 1990's versions of the mob leaders U.S. law enforcement has fought since shortly after the turn of this century.
But these organized crime leaders are far more dangerous, far more influential and have a great deal more impact on our day to day lives than their domestic predecessors. While organized crime in the United States during the 1950's through the 1970's affected certain aspects of American life, their influence pales in comparison to the violence, corruption and power that today's drug syndicates wield. These individuals, from their headquarters locations, absolutely influence the choices that too many Americans make about where to live, when to venture out of their homes, or where they send their children to school. The drugs ---and the attendant violence which accompanies the drug trade ---have reached into every American community and have robbed many Americans of the dreams they once cherished.
随着时间的流逝，在美国有组织犯罪得到了解决，但只有在美国人意识到有组织犯罪对我们的生活方式构成的危险之后。但这并非一夜之间发生。美国有组织的犯罪有系统地暴露于日间，剥夺了暴民领导人是匿名商人的假装。1957年的阿巴拉契亚突袭迫使执法人员承认这些有组织的联合组织确实确实存在，并采取了强有力的措施来追随顶级领导，这是我们在国家反对暴民的全国运动中有效使用的这一战略。在1960年代，总检察长鲍比·肯尼迪（Bobby Kennedy）在结束美国有组织犯罪统治的方法中明确毫无疑问，并制定了一贯的执法政策，从而带来了真正的收益。如今，我们在美国所知道的传统有组织的犯罪已经被淘汰了，这是曾经的碎片。
在权力的巅峰时期，这个国家的有组织犯罪是在少数主要参与者居住在这个国家的主要家庭的手中的，并在我们的刑事司法系统中触及。有组织犯罪做出的所有决定均在美国境内做出。在美国土壤上进行了订单。虽然对暴民领导人建立案件并不容易，但执法部门知道，一旦对老板提出了一个好案件，他可能会位于美国境内，被捕并被送进监狱。
That is not the case with today's organized criminal groups. They are strong, sophisticated and destructive organizations operating on a global scale. Their decisions are made in sanctuaries in Cali, Colombia, and Guadalajara, Mexico, even day-to-day operational decisions such as where to ship cocaine, which cars their workers in the United States should rent, which apartments should be leased, which markings should be on each cocaine package, which contract murders should be ordered, which official should be bribed, and how much. They are shadowy figures whose armies of workers in Colombia, Mexico and the United States answer to them via daily faxes, cellular phone, or pagers. Their armies carry out killings within the United States---one day an outspoken journalist, one day a courier who had lost a load, the next, an innocent bystander caught in the line of fire---on orders of the top leadership. They operate from the safety of protected locations, and are free to come and go as they please within their home countries. These syndicate bosses have at their disposal airplanes, boats, vehicles, radar, communications equipment, and weapons in quantities which rival the capabilities of some legitimate governments. Whereas previous organized crime leaders were millionaires, the Cali drug traffickers and their counterparts from Mexico are billionaires.
It is difficult---sometimes nearly impossible---for U.S. law enforcement to locate and arrest these leaders without the assistance of law enforcement in other countries. Their communications are coded, they are protected by corrupt law enforcement officials, despite pledges from the Government of Mexico to apprehend the syndicate leaders, law enforcement authorities have been unable to locate them and even if they are located, the government is not obligated to extradite them to the U.S. to stand trial.
在墨西哥，就像有组织犯罪繁荣的情况一样，腐败和恐吓使领导人保持控制。除非执法人员受贿，否则这些老练的犯罪团体不能蓬勃发展，目击者对他们的生命感到恐惧。在证词的后面，我将更详细地讨论其中一些问题。
我们所有人在执法部门中都令人沮丧的是，这些犯罪组织的领导人虽然众所周知和被起诉，但并未被逮捕，逮捕或起诉。
我们今天无法在墨西哥讨论墨西哥的局势，而没有查看哥伦比亚的团体的演变 - 他们是如何开始的，今天的地位以及墨西哥的团体如何从他们那里学到重要的教训，成为他们的主要贩运组织自己的权利。
在1980年底的卡利集团认为greater and greater power as their predecessors from the Medellin cartel self-destructed. Where the Medellin cartel was brash and publicly violent in their activities, the criminals, who ran their organization from Cali, labored behind the pretense of legitimacy, posing as businessmen, just carrying out their professional obligations. The Cali leaders --- the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, Santa Cruz Londono, Pacho Herrera --- amassed fortunes and ran their multi-billion dollar cocaine businesses from high-rises and ranches in Colombia. Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his associates composed what was until then, the most powerful international organized crime group in history, employed 727 aircraft to ferry drugs to Mexico, from where they were smuggled into the United States, and then return to Colombia with the money from U.S. drug sales. Using landing areas in Mexico, they were able to evade U.S. law enforcement officials and make important alliances with transportation and distribution experts in Mexico.
由于强烈的执法压力着重于1995年和1996年哥伦比亚国家警察中勇敢的男人和女性的卡利领导，卡利联合组织的所有顶级领导人都在监狱中或死亡。塞拉诺将军仅在两周前就出现在您的小组委员会面前的精美工作，其他CNP官员证明了面对巨大的个人危险，哥伦比亚执法人员的承诺和奉献精神证明与毒品腐败。
自从卡利领导人被监禁以来，判处荒谬和不足的判决以来，墨西哥的贩运者更加突出。哥伦比亚贩运者与墨西哥组织之间的联盟对双方都有好处。传统上，来自墨西哥的贩运者长期以来一直参与将大麻，海洛因，可卡因送入美国，并在全国范围内建立了扎实的分配路线。由于卡利集团（Cali Syndicate）担心其负载的安全性，因此他们与墨西哥的贩运者达成了商业交易，从而减少了潜在的损失。
本协议引起的哥伦比亚人移动的可口ine from the Andean region to the Mexican organizations, who then assumed the responsibility of delivering the cocaine into the United States. In 1989, U.S. law enforcement officials seized 21 metric tons of cocaine in Sylmar, California; this record seizure demonstrated the extent and magnitude of the Mexican groups' capabilities to transport Colombian-produced cocaine into the United States. This huge shipment was driven across the Mexican/U.S. border in small shipments and stored in the warehouse until all transportation fees had been paid by the Cali and Medellin cartels, to the transporters from Mexico. Now, trafficking groups from Mexico are routinely paid in multi-ton quantities of cocaine, making them formidable cocaine traffickers in their own right.
The majority of cocaine entering the United States continues to come from Colombia through Mexico and across U.S. border points of entry. Most of the cocaine enters the United States in privately owned vehicles and commercial trucks. There is new evidence that indicates traffickers in Mexico have gone directly to sources of cocaine in Bolivia and Peru in order to circumvent Colombian middlemen. In addition to the inexhaustible supply of cocaine entering the U.S., trafficking organizations from Mexico are responsible for producing and trafficking thousands of pounds of methamphetamine, and have been major distributors of heroin and marijuana in the U.S. since the 1970's.
A number of major trafficking organizations represent the highest echelons of organized crime in Mexico. The leaders of these organizations are under indictment in the United States on numerous charges. The Department of Justice has submitted Provisional Warrants for many of their arrests to the Government of Mexico, and only one, Juan Garcia Abrego, because he was a U.S. citizen has been sent to the U.S. to face justice. The other leaders are living freely in Mexico, and have so far escaped apprehension by Mexican law enforcement, and have suffered little, if any inconvenience resulting from their notorious status. I believe that in order to fully expose these syndicate leaders, it is more beneficial to refer to them by their personal names than by the names of their organizations.
目前，墨西哥最强大的贩毒者是Amado Carrillo-Fuentes，他最近报道，据称，他与INCD前专员Gutierrez-Rebollo有联系。他的有组织犯罪小组总部位于华雷斯（Juarez），与罗德里格斯·俄罗斯组织（Rodriguez-Orejuela）组织和来自麦德林（Medellin）的Ochoa兄弟有关。该组织还参与了海洛因和大麻贩运，该组织处理了哥伦比亚的大型可卡因货物。他们在瓜达拉哈拉（Guadalajara），赫莫西洛（Hermosillo）和托雷恩（Torreon）的区域基地是存储地点，稍后，这些毒品被移至边境，最终运送到美国。
The scope of the Carrillo-Fuentes'network is staggering; he reportedly forwards $20-30 million to Colombia for each major operation, and his illegal activities generate ten's of millions per week. He was a pioneer in the use of large aircraft to transport cocaine from Colombia to Mexico and became known as "Lord of the Skies." Carillo-Fuentes reportedly owns a fleet of aircraft and has major real estate holdings.
Like his Colombian counterparts, Carillo-Fuentes is sophisticated in the use of technology and counter surveillance methods. His network employs state of the art communications devices to conduct business. Presently, Carrillo-Fuentes is attempting to consolidate control over drug trafficking along the entire Mexican northern border, and he plans to continue to bribe border officials to ensure that his attempts are successful. We have recently documented attempts by Carrillo-Fuentes to expand his operations in to the lucrative east coast market, that has traditionally been dominated by traffickers from Colombia.
Carrillo-Fuentes, who is the subject of numerous separate U.S. law enforcement investigations has been indicted in Florida and Texas and remains a fugitive on heroin and cocaine charges. Oscar Malherbe, a key lieutenant for ACF, and responsible for air smuggling operations that brought 2000 kilograms of cocaine per week from Colombia to Mexico, was arrested in Mexico City on February 27, 1997 on drug trafficking and weapons charges. The Department of Justice has forwarded a provisional arrest warrant for Malherbe to the Government of Mexico. The provisional arrest warrant is based an indictment in Houston, Texas that charged Malherbe, once a trusted lieutenant and assassin for Juan Garcia Abrego, with cocaine trafficking.
Miguel Caro-Quintero的组织总部位于墨西哥的Sonora，并将注意力集中在贩运可卡因和大麻上。他的兄弟拉斐尔（Rafael）因在1985年杀死DEA特工Kiki Camarena中的角色而在墨西哥入狱。
米格尔（Miguel）以及他的其他两个兄弟 - 乔治（Jorge）和吉纳罗（Genaro） - 该组织。米格尔本人于1992年被捕，USG和GOM在双边起诉中合作。不幸的是，当米格尔能够利用威胁和贿赂的结合以被赫莫西洛（Hermosillo）的一名联邦法官驳回他的指控时，这项努力受到了挫败。从那时起，他就自由运营了。
Caro-Quintero组织主要专门研究大麻的种植，生产和分配，这是来自墨西哥药物群体的主要现金创作。据信，该组织在北边界州索诺拉（Sonora）拥有许多牧场，那里存储了毒品，并从中上演了毒品运营。尽管它专门从事大麻种植和分配，就像墨西哥的其他主要药物组织一样，该群体本质上是多药的，也可以运输和分发可卡因和甲基苯丙胺。
Miguel Caro-Quintero是美国几项起诉书的主题，目前是美国政府签发的临时逮捕令的主题，但在令人惊讶的傲慢行为中，他于去年5月在墨西哥的Hermosillo称为一个广播电台我对我发表的言论感到困扰，因为他是一个无辜的牧场主，而DEA对他提出的指控是不真实的。然后，他敢于发表他的地址，并邀请墨西哥和美国的执法人员拜访他 - 但他仍然是整个。
Arellano-Felix组织（AFO）通常被称为蒂华纳卡特尔（Tijuana Cartel），是从墨西哥运营的最强大，最具侵略性的毒品贩运组织之一。不可否认，这是最暴力的。它比墨西哥的任何其他大型贩运组织都多，它直接从墨西哥执法和司法系统的高chelon人物扩展到了美国的街道级个人。AFO负责从墨西哥进入美国的多吨可卡因，大麻以及大量海洛因和甲基苯丙胺的运输，进口和分配。AFO主要在墨西哥锡那罗亚州（其出生地），哈利斯科州，米歇尔卡坎，奇亚帕斯和巴哈加利福尼亚州南部和北部运作。从巴哈（Baja），这些药物进入加利福尼亚州，这是登上美国分销网络的主要点。
The AFO does not operate without the complicity of Mexican law enforcement officials and their subordinates. According to extradition documents submitted by the Government of Mexico in San Diego, California, key family members reportedly dispense an estimated one million dollars weekly in bribes to Mexican federal, state and local officials, who assure that the movement of drugs continues to flow unimpeded to the gateway cities along the southwestern border of the United States.
由七个兄弟和四个姐妹组成的Arellano家族，从Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo继承了该组织，他于1989年在墨西哥的监禁中因谋杀DEA特工Enrique Camarena而在墨西哥的监禁中。Alberto Benjamin Arellano-Felix担任家庭结构犯罪企业的领导，并提供了商人对贩毒行动管理的方法。
拉蒙·爱德华多·阿雷拉诺·弗里克斯（Ramon Eduardo Arellano-Felix）被认为是最暴力的兄弟，他们组织和协调了他拥有绝对控制的保护细节。AFO维持武装良好且训练有素的安全部队，墨西哥执法人员在本质上将其描述为准军事，其中包括国际雇佣军作为顾问，培训师和成员。拉蒙·阿雷拉诺（Ramon Arellano）的责任包括谋杀竞争对手的毒品领导人和那些不在薪资上的墨西哥执法人员的谋杀案。那些AFO成员也是对AFO领导层不满，或者只是涉嫌与执法人员合作的那些AFO成员。执法人员通常是从墨西哥和美国城镇的暴力街头帮派中雇用的，因为这些帮派成员是可以消耗的。他们被派往暗杀目标个人，并向那些试图利用Mexicali/Tijuana走廊的人发送明确的信息，而无需支付AFO贩运领域要求的区域运输税。
AFO还维持墨西哥几个主要城市的复杂通信中心，以针对执法实体采取电子间谍活动和反绩效措施。该组织采用无线电扫描仪和能够拦截硬线和蜂窝电话的设备，以确保AFO操作的安全性。除技术设备外，AFO还维护着从各种国际来源获得的复杂自动武器的缓存。
A Joint Task Force composed of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been established in San Diego, California, to target the AFO; the Task Force is investigating AFO operations in Southern California and related regional investigations which track drug transportation, distribution and money laundering activities of the AFO throughout the United States.
在墨西哥瓜达拉哈拉（Guadalajara）开展业务的Amezcua-Contreras兄弟领导了一个具有全球尺寸的甲基苯丙胺生产和贩运组织。由耶稣·阿米兹库亚（Jesus Amezcua）执导，并由他的兄弟阿丹（Adan）和路易斯（Luis）的支持，如今，阿米兹卡（Amezcua）贩毒组织可能是世界上最大的麻黄碱走私者和甲基苯丙胺的秘密生产国。随着美国甲基苯丙胺滥用问题的日益增长，该组织的活动影响了美国的许多主要人口中心，Amezcua组织获得了大量的前体麻黄碱，利用泰国和印度的联系，他们提供给甲基苯丙胺实验室在墨西哥和美国。该组织已将信任的同事在美国搬到美国在美国经营的墨西哥甲基苯丙胺贩运者Jose Osorio-Cabrera，这是洛杉矶调查的逃犯，直到他在曼谷被捕为止，他是Amezcua组织的主要硬同志购买者。
华金·古兹曼·洛拉（Joaquin Guzman-Loera）
华金·古兹曼·洛拉（Joaquin Guzman-Loera）began to make a name for himself as a trafficker and air logistics expert for the powerful Miguel Felix-Gallardo organization. Guzman-Loera broke away from Felix-Gallardo and rose to patron level among the major Mexican trafficking organizations. Presently, he is incarcerated in Mexico; however, Mexican and United States authorities still consider him to be a major international drug trafficker. The organization has not been dismantled or seriously affected by Guzman-Loera's imprisonment because his brother, Arturo Guzman-Loera, has assumed the leadership role. The Guzman-Loera organization transports cocaine from Colombia through Mexico to the United States for the Medellin and Cali organizations and is also involved in the movement, storage, and distribution of marijuana, and Mexican and Southeast Asian heroin. This organization controlled the drug smuggling tunnel between Agua Prieta, Sonora, Mexico and Douglas, Arizona through which tons of cocaine were smuggled.
古兹曼·洛埃拉（Guzman-Loera）在美国的几项起诉书中被命名，他于1993年6月9日在墨西哥塔利斯曼（Talisman）被捕，原因是毒品，凶杀案和可卡因贩运，目前在墨西哥托卢卡（Toluca）的Almoloya de Juarez Maxiver监狱被监禁。
Unfortunately, the violence that is attendant to the drug trade in Mexico is spilling over the border into U.S. towns, like San Diego, California and Eagle Pass, Texas. Last summer, ranchers along the Texas/Mexico Border reported they were besieged by drug organizations smuggling cocaine and marijuana across their property--fences were torn down, livestock butchered and shots were fired at the ranchers' homes at night. Ranchers reported seeing armed patrols in Mexico with night vision equipment, hand-held radios and assault rifles that protected a steady stream of smugglers back packing marijuana and cocaine into the United States. The problem became so acute that the State of Texas and the Federal government sent support in the form of additional U.S. Border Patrol Agents, DEA Special Agents, Officers from the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Texas National Guard. Life has returned somewhat to normal in that area, as the drug gangs reacted to law enforcement pressure and have moved their operations elsewhere.
DEA information supports widely reported press accounts that the Arellano-Felix organization relies on a San Diego, California gang known as "Logan Heights Calle 30" to carry out executions and conduct security for their distribution operations. Six members of "Calle 30" were arrested by DEA's violent crime task force and the San Diego Police Department for the murder of a man and his son in San Diego. Since that time 49 members of "Calle 30" have been arrested by the Narcotics Task Force in San Diego on a variety of charges from trafficking to violent crimes.
1996年12月11日，费尔南多·耶稣 - 古铁雷斯（Fernando Jesus-Gutierrez）在当时的独家社区（当时的独家社区）在加利福尼亚州科罗纳多（Coronado）的Silver Strand的高峰时段被枪击了五次，此前他的Arellano-Felix组织命令他去世。1993年，来自墨西哥的竞争对手毒品团伙之间在甲基苯丙胺市场上进行的草皮战斗导致在圣地亚哥地区的一个夏天被谋杀26人。
The Southwest Border Initiative (SWBI) is Federal law enforcement's joint response to the substantial threat posed by Mexican groups operating along the Southwest Border. The SWBI, now in its third year of operation, is an integrated, coordinated strategy that focuses the resources of DEA, FBI, the United States Attorney's Office, the Criminal Division, the U.S. Border Patrol, the U. S. Customs Service and state and local authorities on the sophisticated Mexican drug trafficking organizations operating on both sides of the U.S./Mexican border.
通过这个项目我们已经确定了sophisticated Mexican drug trafficking organizations operating along the entire U.S. border. These groups are transporting multi-ton shipments of cocaine for the Colombian groups, as well as heroin, methamphetamine and marijuana. Imitating the Colombian groups, the Mexican organizations are highly compartmentalized, using numerous workers to accomplish very specific tasks, such as driving load cars, renting houses for storage sites, distributing cocaine, and collecting profits. Through the compartmentalization process each worker performs a distinct task and has no knowledge of the other members of the organization.
We are attacking the organizations by targeting the communication systems of their command and control centers. Working in concert, DEA, FBI, U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Attorneys offices around the country conduct wiretaps that ultimately identify their U.S. based organization from top to bottom. This strategy allows us to track the seamless continuum of cocaine traffic as it flows from Colombia through Mexico, to its eventual street distribution in the United States. However, even though this strategy is extremely effective in dismantling the U.S. based portions of the organizations, we are frustrated by not being able to use this same information to reach the organization's bosses in Mexico and their current counterparts in Colombia. Criminals, such as Carillo-Fuentes and Arellano-Felix, personally direct their organizations from safe havens in Mexico and until we garner the complete cooperation of law enforcement officials in Mexico, we will never be truly effective in stopping the flow of drugs from their country.
The Southwest Border Strategy is anchored in our belief that the only way of successfully attacking any organized crime syndicate is to build strong cases on the leadership and their command and control functions. The long-term incarceration of key members of these organization's command and control will cause a steady degradation of their ability conduct business in the United States and with the assistance of foreign governments, the long-term incarceration of the leadership will leave the entire organizations in disarray. The Cali syndicate once controlled cocaine traffic in the world from a highly organized corporate structure, with the incarceration of the Cali leaders we see the cocaine trade in Colombia has become far less monolithic and several independent unrelated organizations are controlling the exportation of cocaine to the U.S. and Mexico. This change is a direct result of the incarceration of the Cali leaders and their inability to fully control their organizations from prison.
去年操作佐罗二世,是下进行的the auspices of the SWBI, during which both a Colombian distribution organization and a Mexican smuggling organization were dismantled and the infrastructure of both organizations were destroyed. Ninety court authorized wire taps resulted in the arrest of l56 people and the seizure of $17 million dollars and 5,600 kilograms of cocaine. Most importantly, neither the Colombian or Mexican organizations have been able to reconstitute these distribution organizations. Zorro II confirmed our belief that cocaine distribution in the United States is controlled by the foreign syndicates located in Colombia and Mexico.
Since Zorro II, we have continued to focus on the command and control function of other transportation and distribution cells operating along the Southwest Border and throughout the U.S. These investigations are time and resource intensive, but yield significant results. Additional investigations, of similar significance and importance as Zorro II, have been developed since that time, however due to the sensitive nature of the investigations, I am precluded from discussing them at this time.
传统上，有组织的犯罪取决于官员的腐败，潜在或实际证人的恐吓，以及对任何以商业方式站立的人的暴力行为。麦德林和卡利贩子是腐败，恐吓和暴力的硕士，并有效地使用了这些工具来沉默和胁迫。
在墨西哥有组织的犯罪数据经常使用these tools as well. The recent arrest of the Commissioner of the INCD in Mexico is the latest illustration of how deeply rooted corruption is in Mexican anti-narcotics organizations. A good illustration of the extent of corruption in Mexico was revealed when officials, seeking the extradition of two of Arellano-Felix's contract killers, who are currently incarcerated in the United States, submitted papers indicating that the State Attorney General and almost 90% of the law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges in Tijuana and the State of Baja California have been compromised and are on the payroll of the Arellano-Felix brothers. In addition, several high ranking police officers regularly provide the names of witnesses who give statements against the Arellano-Felixes and have even provided information that assisted in locating targets for assassination. Just recently, the Federal Police in Baja California Norte were replaced with military troops, a tacit admission of the level of corruption in that area. Yet, as we observed with the arrest of Gutierrez-Rebollo, the military is not immune from corruption either.
Historically, corruption has been a central problem in DEA's relationship with Mexican counterparts. In short, there is not one single law enforcement institution in Mexico with whom DEA has an entirely trusting relationship. Such a relationship is absolutely essential to the conduct of business in that, or any other nation where organized crime syndicates traffic in narcotics.
In the brief time we have allotted to us today, I would like to provide you with some recent examples of the corruption which we encounter all too frequently in Mexico:
而大量的腐败困扰law enforcement agencies in Mexico, the Mexican military and other institutions are also vulnerable to the corrupting influences of the narcotics trade. The Mexican Government has replaced police with military officials, who are not fully trained in all of the aspects of narcotics investigations. This situation is far from ideal. Political officials are also not immune to narcotics corruption; DEA has documented instances where public officials have allowed drug traffickers to freely operate in areas under their control. Corruption is the most serious, most pervasive obstacle to progress in addressing the drug trade in Mexico.
除了严重的腐败问题在墨西哥困扰着反毒品执法工作的严重问题外，谋杀和暴力是沉默的证人或竞争对手的常见方法。自1993年以来，墨西哥发生了二十三个与毒品有关的暗杀。几乎所有这些谋杀案尚未解决。其中许多发生在蒂华纳（Tijuana）或涉及蒂华纳（Tijuana）的受害者。去年，蒂华纳（Tijuana）有12名执法人员或前官员被枪杀，据信该城市的200起谋杀案中的绝大多数被认为与毒品有关。
A number of these incidents involving law enforcement officials are a serious indication of the depth and breadth of the power of the traffickers in Mexico:
很难想象，在我们自己的国家，我们会代表这样的杀戮和政府在解决谋杀案中的无所作为。墨西哥的暗杀类似于三名美国助理律师，圣地亚哥DEA办公室的特别代理人，负责休斯顿联邦调查局办公室的特别代理人和圣地亚哥的警察局长被毒品无聊谋杀经销商。美国人不会接受这些谋杀案未解决，也不会逮捕。为了使任何国家的执法机构成为国际执法领域的可行伙伴，他们必须逮捕和监禁那些以这种不受惩罚的谋杀罪的罪犯。
与墨西哥政府合作执法工作的主要计划是一系列双边工作队（BTF）。美国和墨西哥在1996年签署了一份谅解备忘录，概述了美国政府和墨西哥政府对有针对性药物组织进行联合调查的框架。这些双边工作组（BTF）是在华雷斯，蒂华纳和蒙特雷建立的。蒂华纳和华雷斯的工作队在收集智力和抓住毒品的能力上受到限制，他们没有达到逮捕主要联合国领导人并拆除组织的最重要目标。
在双边全体会议期间，墨西哥官员保证，他们将从美国与墨西哥分享的股票资产中分配240万美元，以筹集BTF的融资；但是，INCD的前负责人弗朗西斯科·莫利纳·鲁伊斯（Francisco Molina Ruiz）告知DEA，他无法获得使这些工作队运作所需的经济支持。BTF在大多数情况下都有热情的年轻官员，但是，他们既没有接受培训，也没有在建立案件并逮捕这些精致而富有的毒品贩运者所必需的设备。
The most significant shortcoming of the B.T.F.'s, however, lies in its leadership. On at least two occasions, after having been advised of pending enforcement actions by their subordinates, corrupt command officers in Mexico City compromised the investigations. One involved the attempted seizure of sixteen tons of cocaine belonging to the Arellano-Felix family. To be successful in Mexico, we must be able to share intelligence with the B.T.F.'s with the confidence that it will be promptly acted on and not be compromised by corrupt officials that is not the condition that we are currently faced with in our relationship with the bi-lateral groups .
Unfortunately, I was recently forced to limit DEA participation in these B.T.F.'s, because of a decision by the Government of Mexico that would no longer allow us to guarantee the safety of our Special Agents while they were working in Mexico. The atmosphere in Mexico is volatile and threats against DEA Special Agents, along the border, have increased substantially; therefore I have rescinded travel authority for all DEA Special Agents to Mexico, to participate in counter-drug investigations, until they are provided appropriate protection, that is commensurate with the risks inherent in these dangerous assignments.
Since coming to office, President Zedillo has promised that he would take action against organized criminal groups in Mexico. Yesterday, it was announced that that President Zedillo had named Mariano Herran Salvatti to replace General Guiterrez-Rebollo as Director of the INCD. Mr. Salvatti, a long time lawyer and magistrate, reportedly passed a background investigation and a polygraph prior to being named to the post. This is the first step utilized by most law enforcement agencies to professionalize their ranks and if sustained over a long period could be the beginning of the creation of a credible agency.
Zedillo总统还通过赞助有组织的犯罪法案来提供成功攻击犯罪集团所需的工具，并组建有组织犯罪工作组和双边工作队，从而对执法过程进行了重大改变。但是，即使过程得到改进，该机制本身的基础设施也被腐败所破坏，以至于短期结果令人怀疑。
The real test is in the mid- and long-term . Unless some meaningful reforms are made in the law enforcement systems--and Mr. Herran Salvatti's appointment may well be the step-- such as targeting and apprehending major organized crime figures in Mexico, that nation, and unfortunately our own, will continue to fight an uphill battle as drugs will continue to flow into cities and towns across the United States. To date, our inability to successfully attack the major organized crime groups in Mexico, as we have in the United States and Colombia, is a direct result of our inability to arrest the leadership of these groups.
President Zedillo has acted against corrupt officials, and has stated that he is committed to professionalizing Mexican law enforcement. Yet the bottom line remains: until the major organized crime figures operating in Mexico are aggressively targeted, investigated, arrested, sentenced appropriately and jailed, both Mexico and the United States are in grave danger.
What law enforcement steps are necessary for long-lasting progress against organized crime leaders in Mexico? We faced the same questions in our mutual struggle against the Colombian organized criminal groups during the past decade. What it took was an all-out effort by the Colombian National Police to target and incarcerate the top leaders in Cali . Until the Government of Colombia was put on notice that their lack of commitment to this goal was unacceptable, the CNP did not have the moral backing it needed to move out aggressively. In Mexico's case, it appears that the political will to rid the country of the its narco-trafficking reputation is there; however, what is lacking are clean, committed law enforcement agencies willing to take on the most powerful and influential organized crime figures operating on a global scale.
我们希望为这一目标做出的努力将带来成果。1996年11月，墨西哥政府通过了一项有组织的犯罪法，该法为执法人员提供了许多成功攻击其国家成熟毒品集团所需的许多工具。作为法律的一部分包括：
进行电子监视的授权；证人保护计划；辩诉交易；阴谋法；卧底行动；警察使用线人。
For these new law enforcement tools to be utilized effectively, the new law mandated the Government of Mexico to form Organized Crime Units to conduct the investigations and further stipulated that the laws could not be enforced until the unit was formed and properly trained. The Organized Crime Units are now in place and consist of 60 officers to investigate crimes specified under the law. The Government of Mexico has agreed to insure the integrity of the Organized Crime Unit through the use of polygraphs and regular background investigations. However, like the Bilateral Task Forces, these units will not be successful and DEA might not be able to share sensitive information with them as long as their supervisors or managers are corrupt.
重要的是要记住，在美国的执法部门没有窃听的权威和广泛的有组织犯罪法律，例如RICO和持续的犯罪企业，直到1960年代后期。墨西哥政府实际上落后于我们35年，以建立法律，这对于我们成功拆除有组织的犯罪集团至关重要。如果它们正常工作，则双边工作队和西南边境倡议可以与鲍比·肯尼迪（Bobby Kennedy）在1960年代建立的罢工部队相比。这款1990年代的打击力量是国际范围，并与墨西哥的几个联邦和州机构的资源，专业知识和法律汇集了资源，专业知识和法律。
有组织的犯罪单位和双边工作队作为其宪章的一部分绝对至关重要。除非这些单位值得信赖，否则合作的线人将不安全，秘密调查将受到损害，情报共享过程将根本无法正常工作。正如我们最近看到的那样，这些犯罪集团都严重妥协了军事和执法，这使墨西哥任何计划保持自由腐败的能力质疑。但是，上周我们看到古铁雷斯 - 雷波洛将军在逮捕中，确实存在一些值得信赖的单位，并且可以不妥协工作。
The problems of establishing a corruption-free law enforcement infrastructure are not insurmountable. However, to become credible in the law enforcement arena the Government of Mexico must ensure the integrity of the units that have the responsibility of tracking down and arresting the syndicate leaders, insuring these individuals are either prosecuted in Mexico and receive meaningful sentence commensurate with their crimes or agree to extradite them to the United States where they will receive punishment similar to that of Juan Garcia-Abrego.