1997 Congressional HearingsIntelligence and Security
1997 Congressional HearingsMr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address this committee today on threats to US national security.
In the months following the Second World War, the hallmarks of America's new role as a global leader were set:--we needed to ensure that our diplomacy would be engaged, our military power ready, and our intelligence alert. Over the next fifty years, America's leaders summoned the best of the nation to respond to the political, military, and ideological challenges that threatened to undermine our hard fought victory and undercut our dreams of a more hopeful world.
Mr. Chairman, as we survey today's world, core threats which dominated our national security for fifty years have ended or receded. In their place, however, is a far more complex situation that holds at least five critical challenges as we bring this century to a close and usher in the next. As was the case fifty years ago, these challenges will require the best from the Intelligence Community in helping defend American interests and support American leadership. Let me briefly list these challenges and then describe them in greater detail.
在经济方面，俄罗斯在拆除世界上最大的州指挥经济并建立真正的市场驱动经济方面取得了重大进展。它释放了价格，达到了一定的金融稳定性，加入了世界银行和国际货币基金组织，将俄罗斯推向融入世界金融体系，私有化中小型行业，并结束了该国国防行业的主要作用。
These major gains notwithstanding, Russia still faces major challenges in advancing the reform process.
The Russian military, meanwhile, is suffering from serious social and economic difficulties. The process of downsizing, organizing, and adjusting to new missions will be long and hard, given reduced defense resources. Russian military planners also are examining very closely various ongoing arms control regimes and treaties -- particularly CFE, START II, CWC, and ABM -- to assure that they adequately protect what they perceive to be key Russian security needs during this period of great change and uncertainty. Economic hardship, flagging morale,
腐败也引起了其他军事问题：核武器和裂变材料的安全和控制。
Despite these difficult times for the military, Russia retains a major nuclear arsenal -- nearly 6,000 deployed strategic warheads -- and a range of development programs for conventional and strategic forces. In terms of overall military planning, the Russian government is emphasizing research and development over production in its parceling of a tight defense budget.
在国际舞台上,莫斯科一直寻求我nsure its great power status by bolstering its ties to Germany, France, China and Japan and demanding an equal voice in the resolution of international issues, particularly with regard to the shape of future European security architecture and NATO's role in it. While wary of what it sees as US efforts to dominate a "unipolar" world, Russia still continues to seek close cooperation with the United States on matters of mutual concern, provided that such cooperation is perceived domestically as serving Russia's national interests.
莫斯科更靠近家，将其在新独立国家保留其影响力并最大程度地减少外部大国的影响力方面将其优先考虑。总统耶尔斯汀（Yel'tsin）和其他领导人通过多边机制（独立国家的英联邦）和双侧进行了与其中一些州的整合。例如，俄罗斯和白俄罗斯都在谈论团聚，尽管许多实用的障碍。莫斯科还试图在高加索和中亚中发挥有影响力的作用，在那里，丰富的能源资源吸引了大量的外部关注。
中国正在世界舞台上成为主要的经济，政治和军事力量，其行动和公开声明表明，它决心将自己视为最高的东亚大国。在总统兼党负责人江泽明（Jiang Zemin）的带领下，高级领导支持继续进行经济改革的必要性，并在地区和全球范围内将中国视为认真的参与者。
With one-fifth of the world's population and the largest standing army, China stands poised to compete as a dominant regional military power, and it can aspire to be the first new great power since World War II. Early in the next century, China will have a much improved force projection capability.
中国的军事现代化努力将火腿pered by its difficulty in raising revenues from relatively autonomous provinces, competition for available resources with an increasingly urbanized population, and ongoing difficulties in successfully designing, developing and fielding complex weapons systems. One of China's options in pursuing its programs is to use part of its vast foreign exchange reserve -- second only in size to that of Japan -- to fund purchases from foreign suppliers.
China's new assertiveness has led, at times, to frictions with Washington over issues of significant US national security interest. Among these are troubling proliferation activities by China, particularly with Pakistan and Iran, and continuing concerns about the human rights situation.
Beijing's leaders view the 1 July 1997 reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese rule as a particularly important symbol of China's reemergence as a world player. Chinese leaders unquestionably understand the economic value of Hong Kong and will work to preserve its economic vibrancy. What remains unclear is the degree to which they will tolerate political activism and dissent in Hong Kong after the reversion, given their intolerance of political dissent within China.
Let me turn to those states that can undermine our security interests and the security of our friends and allies in their respective regions. I'll begin with North Korea, then discuss Iran and Iraq.
The continued deterioration of the North Korean economy is weakening the stability of the regime. North Korea's grain harvest last fall was less than half of its projected need for this year, and industrial operations in December fell to less than half the pace of 1992. The declines are the result of poor weather, a lack of fertilizer, raw materials shortages, aging factories and infrastructure, the inefficiencies stemming from central planning, and the large share of non-food output that goes to the military.
The decline in living conditions is eroding popular faith in the regime. Shortages of food and fuel in the military are becoming common and causing morale and discipline problems. Potential dangers to the regime could include: food shortages becoming widespread among front-line military units, the security services becoming reluctant to crack down on dissent, or elites concluding that their fortunes were no longer inextricably linked to Kim Chong-il. While we have no evidence that any of these conditions are present at this time, we remain concerned about how the regime's evolution will play out.
北方的经济困难使它更加依赖外部援助 - 其中大多数来自中国，日本，韩国和美国。例如，粮食援助最后
year totaled nearly 700,000 tons. Without additional imports or aid, the North probably will face worse food shortfalls this spring.
What makes us especially concerned about the future evolution of North Korea is its military strength. Its 1.1 million-strong military retains the ability to inflict enormous destruction on Allied forces, including the 37,000 US troops deployed in South Korea. North Korea's long-range artillery and surface-to-surface missiles near the DMZ can hit forward defenses, US military installations, and Seoul. We are increasingly concerned about North Korea's exports of major weapons systems.
On a more positive note, regarding the October 1994 Agreed Framework, the IAEA has maintained a continual presence at Yongbyon since the May 1994 defueling of the reactor. North Korea has not refueled its reactor or operated its reprocessing plant at Yongbyon and has halted construction of additional, larger reactors.
Turning to Iran, conservatives secured a plurality in last March's Majles, or Parliamentary, elections and are positioning themselves to capture the presidency in June. This political feat will not blot out the reality of Iran today: economic stagnation, rising numbers of disaffected youth, and questions about the clerics' day-to-day role in governance.
Despite growing discontent among many Iranians, opposition to clerical rule lacks a charismatic leader or an institutional power base. Moreover, the clerics are adept at burying their differences in the interests of retaining their control.
伊朗的领导人知道，他们面临双重挑战，即在沙漠风暴中所见证的那样，在国内对革命的公众支持和国外的美国军事力量。但是他们没有，意图放弃其反西方立场或在该地区的目标。相反，他们将寻求其他方法来破坏美国的立场 - 例如，通过提高其军事能力相对于邻居的能力，并使用我们所谓的不对称手段 - 从越来越多的恐怖主义使用到开发大规模杀伤性武器 -- 为了颠覆或恐吓我们的盟友，破坏了我们的朋友和盟友在军事存在中的信心，并最终将我们驱逐出该地区。此外，伊朗人试图通过与土耳其人和喀萨克人接触，并巩固与日本和德国的石油供应商关系来改善外国关系。
Iran is improving its ability to potentially interdict the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. For example, it has acquired Kilo- class submarines from Russia and is upgrading its antiship missile capabilities. It is building its capabilities to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction -- chemical, biological, and nuclear -- and in less than 10 years probably will have longer range missiles that will enable it to target most of Saudi Arabia and Israel.
伊朗将恐怖主义视为有用的工具。除了进行自己的行为外，伊朗还继续赞助该地区的培训，并向各种激进的伊斯兰团体（例如真主党和巴勒斯坦团体反对和平进程）提供数百万美元。
Iraq under Saddam continues to present a serious threat to US forces, interests, and allies. In 1996 Iraqi forces again fired at coalition forces as Saddam tried to test his limits - as he has every year since Desert Storm. His long-term goals have not changed. He is unrepentant for having triggered the Gulf war. He remains hostile to Israel and the peace process, and he is determined to possess weapons of mass destruction and to dominate the Gulf region. His military remains the largest in the Gulf region -- an abiding threat to Iraq's southern neighbors, and to Kurdish and Shia Iraqis.
UN sanctions remain intact and, given Baghdad's continued evasive stance toward UN weapons inspectors, are unlikely to be lifted anytime soon. These sanctions severely constrain Saddam, and he has managed to survive the pressures sanctions have created almost entirely due to the strength of his elaborate security services, which have priority access to Iraq's constricted resources. These forces have been very successful in penetrating and destroying organized political opposition inside Iraq. Nevertheless, Iraq's economy is in shambles, and the intense resentment that the regime has engendered in Iraq still poses a constant threat to Saddam and his family, as suggested by the assassination attempt against Saddam's son Uday in December.
萨达姆（Saddam）的宣传机器已将联合国决议986吹捧为制裁结束的开始，也是迈向恢复正常的第一步。但是，如果得到适当的执行，决议986将适度受益于平均伊拉克人，而不会显着改善该政权的崩溃基础设施。的确，该政权对萨达姆（Saddam）对986的接受过度销售可能会随着制裁的持续而适得其反，而伊拉克人986岁以下的伊拉克人民的收益的适度性质变得明确。即使在萨达姆（Saddam）的机构内的中心，也很悲观，也可能会重新浮出水面
Iraqis realize that sanctions remain intact, the economy remains crippled, and institutions like the Iraqi military continue to decline. We cannot rule out that Saddam's frustration with this situation will prompt him to threaten another military confrontation with the United States and its Coalition partners.
让我解决第三个挑战 - 那些跨越边界的问题，可能会影响我们的地区性，在许多情况下，我们的乐动冠军全球利益。
尽管1996年记录的恐怖主义事件比1971年以来的任何时候都少，但在1992 - 1996年期间，恐怖袭击的总死亡和伤害有所增加。确实，即使我们的反恐努力正在改善，国际团体正在扩大他们的网络，提高他们的技能和成就感，并努力进行更壮观的攻击。
International terrorist groups have developed large transnational infrastructures, which in some cases literally circle the globe. These networks may involve more than one like-minded group, with each group assisting the others. The terrorists use these infrastructures for a variety of purposes, including finance, recruitment, the shipment of arms and materiel, and the movement of operatives. With regard to finance, we have seen increasingly complicated channels for soliciting and moving funds, including the use of seemingly legitimate charitable or other nongovernmental organizations as conduits for the money.
恐怖分子也可以使用这些地球圈基础设施来攻击自己选择的地方和地点 - 正如黎巴嫩真主党在1992年和1994年在布宜诺斯艾利斯对以色列或犹太目标的两次轰炸所证明的那样。
Modern international terrorists also exhibit a high degree of sophistication and expertise. We see this whenever a successful counterterrorist operation provides a glimpse into their operations, including how they communicate, conduct surveillance, and maintain operational security. We see the same level of sophistication in actual or attempted terrorist attacks.
State sponsorship of terrorism continues. I noted Iran's significant involvement earlier. Sudan also is continuing to support terrorism by providing a safehaven for a variety of Islamic extremist and opposition forces. We cannot rule out that Iraq, or surrogate groups, will aim for US or UN targets.
Now let me turn to the issue of proliferation. Not too many years ago, the primary threat facing the United States was from a single country with its thousands of nuclear weapons on alert. Today we face a spectrum of threats from more than two dozen countries developing or acquiring the same kinds of devastating weapons we feared during the Cold War. Our concern is increasing as the ability of these countries to develop indigenous capabilities, including production technologies, continues to grow.
多年来，我们最大的关心一直是无法控制这种武器中的核武器或材料。过去，有两个障碍
proliferators: the technical know-how for building a bomb and the acquisition of the fissile material. Fissile material is the highly enriched uranium or plutonium whose atoms split apart in a chain reaction and create the energy of an atomic bomb.
Today, the major impediment to a nation committed to acquiring a nuclear capability is the acquisition of fissile material. It is by no means easy to make a nuclear weapon, but knowledge of weapons design is sufficiently widespread that trying to maintain a shroud of secrecy around this technical knowledge no longer concerns about nuclear weapons and materials security in the countries of the Former Soviet Union.
一些美国项目,比如Nunn-Lugar在总结m on Cooperative Threat Reduction, are designed to improve this security. But, Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union are increasingly not the only potential sources of nuclear weapons and materials. Weapons stockpiles are increasing in other countries, and materials reprocessed from power reactors are becoming more widespread.
Nuclear weapons are certainly not our only worry. Materials and technologies for other weapons of mass destruction are more accessible now than at any other time in history. About 20 countries, among them Iran, Libya, and Syria, have or are actively developing chemical and biological weapons.
Let's look at two examples. Despite the most intrusive inspection regime ever imposed against weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraq still has not properly accounted for all its program
根据联合国特别委员会的说法。在生物武器区域，伊拉克宣布，它总共生产了11,000升浓缩的肉毒杆菌毒素和8,500升炭疽病。至少其中一些是用122毫米火箭，炸弹和弹头的形式化的。尽管伊拉克人表示在海湾战争后都被摧毁，但他们尚未提供可验证的证据证明其破坏。此外，伊拉克有能力在取消制裁并减少联合国的存在后尽快重新启动这些计划。
伊朗有一个越来越活跃的化学武器计划。在过去的一年中，它不仅寻求生产化学剂本身，而且还生产前体化学物质，从而使其不易受到外国供应商的出口控制。
In the last few years, the state-sponsored weapons of mass destruction programs are yielding some of our concern to the possibility of terrorist use. Terrorist interest in chemical and biological weapons is not surprising, given the relative ease with which some of these weapons can be produced in simple laboratories, the large number of casualties they can cause, and the residual disruption of infrastructure. We are increasingly seeing terrorist groups looking into the feasibility and effectiveness of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. And as the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist incident in the Tokyo subway showed, no country is invulnerable to the possibility of massive, civilian casualties from terrorist use.
Narcotics production is expanding, traffickers are developing new transshipment routes and methods, and trafficking networks
are increasingly sophisticated in their operations. Narcotics production continues to meet rising worldwide demand for both cocaine and heroin: potential cocaine production in 1996 exceeded 700 metric tons, and potential production of illicit opium--the raw material for heroin--reached a record high for the second successive year, exceeding 4,200 metric tons.
Counternarcotics operations have dealt significant blows to some of the world's most notorious drug trafficking organizations, but the international narcotics trade remains a formidable threat. While top leaders of the Colombian Call cartel are in prison, other Colombian traffickers -- as well as traffickers in Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico -- seek to increase their role. Mexican drug trafficking organizations, which also smuggle heroin and marijuana into the United States, are now becoming a major source of methamphetamine for the US market. The dismantling of the Burma-based Mong Tai Army in the last year has not significantly affected heroin flows from Southeast Asia.
Powerful drug traffickers manipulate the political and legal systems in many of the major narcotics-producing countries. Just as in many other countries, narcotics corruption and violence are of increasing concern to Mexican Government officials. In late 1996 the Mexican Congress passed a legal reform package to facilitate government efforts to combat crime and corruption.
While narcotics production and trafficking are expanding, so are money laundering, financial crime, alien smuggling, and criminal involvement in the gray arms trade, challenging governments and law enforcement authorities worldwide. Russian, Nigerian, Italian, and ethnic Chinese criminal networks, in particular, have become worldwide in scope and more sophisticated and multifaceted in their operations.
The multi-billion dollar scope of worldwide money laundering poses a significant threat to countries on both a micro- and macro-economic level. The tremendous wealth being legitimized by laundering allows criminal organizations to gain a large amount of economic power fairly quickly. Front companies -- legitimate businesses through which illicit profits are funneled -- are the predominant means of laundering funds used by almost all criminal groups. As drug trafficking and other criminal organizations invest more in these businesses, their toehold in the legitimate economy of a country grows, as does the economic, social, and political influence of the criminal kingpins.
The tremendous growth in communications technology is shrinking distances and weakening barriers to the flow of information. This technology also presents us with an important transnational challenge -- protecting our information systems. Recognizing this problem, we are assessing which countries have such potential, including which appear to have instituted formal information warfare programs. To date the number is not large. This is small comfort, however. We believe that this problem will grow, given the potential lucrative market for criminal groups, and the potential for mischief on the part of foreign intelligence services or rogue groups such as terrorist organizations.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to briefly highlight four regional areas of concern: the Middle East, South Asia, Bosnia, and the Aegean.
The 15 January signing of the Hebron Protocol brings the parties back from the brink of violence and embeds Prime Minister Netanyahu's Likud government more deeply than ever before into the process begun by the previous Labor-led government. But we are still far from the final chapter in the peace process. Many of the most difficult, contentious, and time consuming issues lie ahead, including the status of Jerusalem and settlements. And Israel and Syria continue to haggle over terms to restart talks on the Golan Heights -- which also promises to be a long, difficult, and uncertain process.
希伯伦协议在新的以色列政府与阿拉伯世界的和平与关系方面暂时恢复了阿拉伯国家之间的信心。不过，随着以色列的预期退出更多的西岸领土，新的平静将再次进行测试，因为双方的极端分子威胁要破坏这一进程。去年9月在西岸爆发了暴力事件时，许多阿拉伯国家制定了与以色列建立或加深联系的计划。在希伯伦协议之后，有些人可能会重新考虑，但大多数似乎都在等待进一步的进步。
在南亚，印度和巴基斯坦之间的关系仍然贫穷，我们几乎没有迹象表明严重解冻。尽管双方都想要战争，但两个竞争对手可能会偶然发现这场战争，这很可能是由于彼此意图或军事姿势的误解而导致的。威慑工作多年了；但是，这可能会在危机中崩溃，国家领导人和外部力量削弱紧张局势的时间将受到限制。
Leaders in both Pakistan and India face daunting domestic and political challenges at the same time that they have to contend with foreign policy issues that require political strength. These include: nuclear testing, missile proliferation, negotiating global nonproliferation regimes, and working out differences over Kashmir.
Let me turn to the situation in Bosnia, and provide the committee both with a status report, and a look ahead over the next 18 months.
在代顿实施的第一年，已经有许多积极的趋势：
At the same time, however, relatively little progress has been made in implementing other provisions of Dayton which relate to freedom of movement and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.
Looking out over the next 18 months, opportunities have improved for creating the conditions that would permit the withdrawal of SFOR without a resumption of conflict. In particular, the split between Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leadership has removed -- for the time being -- the option of Republika Srpska's unification with Serbia. As a result, Bosnian Serb leaders will have an incentive to cooperate to a limited extent with Bosnian central authorities. If this cooperation can be sustained, the next 18 months provides an opportunity to build momentum on economic reconstruction and economic ties between the Srpska and Croatia and the Federation.
在未来几个月中，可能会遇到一些挑战，可能会破坏和解进程，包括对BRCKO仲裁决定的反应 - 预计本月晚些时候 - 并强迫难民重新安置。这种紧张局势可能使OSCE目前在7月中旬进行市政选举的计划复杂化。同时，在过去的几个月中，现场有两个新的通配符。-在塞尔维亚的不稳定以及克罗地亚领导力变化的可能性。
塞尔维亚的政治动荡对波斯尼亚的影响很小。科索沃不能说同样的情况仍然存在
tense. Some fear that Milosevic might even provoke a crisis in Kosovo to distract attention from domestic problems.
我们担心之间不断升级的紧张局势Greece and Turkey. Long-standing animosity, exacerbated by festering disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean, are fueling growing nationalist sentiments in both countries. Both states have been more aggressive since January 1996 in challenging Aegean sea and air boundaries and disputing the sovereignty of selected islands. On Cyprus, Greek Cypriots have concluded deals to take delivery of more military equipment, including SA-10 surface-to-air missiles. Several events have the potential for provoking violence in the coming months, including delivery of these missiles and national military exercises by both sides on Cyprus that are scheduled for the fall.
在当前两国的政治环境中，机动室是有限的，妥协的前景是陷入困境的。在希腊，总理Simitis必须平衡雅典应应对这些紧张局势的竞争观点。至于土耳其，它被许多国内外挑战所困扰。在家里，其注意力集中在库尔德分离主义，结构性经济问题以及关于伊斯兰在现代土耳其的作用的日益辩论。在南部和东部，土耳其看到了竞争，不稳定和冲突。在北部，土耳其看到西欧的冷漠（如果不是敌对）。
During the past five years we have witnessed a growing phenomenon -- conflict within states has far outstripped conflict between them. The number of people requiring foreign humanitarian assistance remains three times the number in need during the early 1980s. Currently, more than 34 million people have been unable to return to their homes; more than 20 million are internally displaced and 14.5 million are refugees. As a result, our attention is increasingly focused on, and our resources committed to such crises and their consequences: disruptions in the supply of food and clean water which threaten deaths from starvation and disease, refugee flows impacting on neighboring states, murderous ethnic and civil conflict, and even state disintegration. Because of our military capabilities, nations will turn to us to join, if not play a leading role, in transporting supplies and equipment, distributing needed material, protecting those displaced, and helping to re-establish a semblance of stability and order. Our intelligence capabilities will be needed to warn of impending conflicts, and to help our military forces cope with these crises as they unfold.
Sub-Saharan Africa is a special area of concern. The situation created by civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa remains critical. In West Africa, 700,000 Liberians have taken refuge in neighboring countries (principally Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire) with 1.5 million internally displaced. Sierra Leone has generated 330,000 refugees, with 1.2 million internally displaced. While internal conditions in Sierra Leone have begun to improve, the possible revival of full-scale factional warfare in Liberia risks extending a human tragedy.
在大湖区，胡图族叛乱分子和布隆迪境内的政府之间的战斗继续
under sanctions by its neighbors. Although Rwanda has done a remarkable job of absorbing 700,000 returning refugees, communal tensions persist and may be aggravated by the genocide prosecutions now underway.
Stability of these smaller countries depends in good measure on the stabilization of the Eastern Zaire border areas -- now under Zairian rebel control -- and on their relations with Kinshasa and the rest of Zaire, where President Mobutu's uncertain health creates the specter of a destabilizing succession struggle.
主席先生，当我们试图抵制这一不断扩展的挑战清单时，我们将努力解决最高优先智能目标的关键差距。成功将意味着对美军的安全性和更好的工具为美国努力摆脱区域不稳定并管理与重大权力的关系。
同时，我们确信向前看，突然出现且不适合传统模具的危机不会感到宽慰。我们还将提供全球覆盖范围 - 包括在危机期间激增的能力 - 并投资长期计划，这些计划将在21世纪充分发挥良好的智能
As the century draws to a close, we must be mindful of our duty to preserve and enhance the intelligence capabilities on which our Nation has come to rely.