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Mr.DeConcini。总统先生，在上周，有一系列报纸文章，其中包含有关海地和中央情报局总统阿里斯蒂德总统活动的指控。作为参议院情报委员会主席，我不仅被指控的实质所困扰，而且对某些成员和工作人员使用行政部门提供的机密信息的方式感到非常困扰。
10月31日，《洛杉矶时报》（Los Angeles Times）发表了一篇题为“ CIA援助计划将在1987年至88年削弱Aristide”的文章。这篇文章首先说：
中央情报局曾经试图通过一项秘密行动计划来干预海地的选举，该计划将削弱其现任总统让·贝特兰德·阿里斯蒂德（Jean-Bertrand Aristide）的实力，这是根据国会消息来源对事件的第一手知识的。
According to a source identified as a former senior staff member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, `There were those in the CIA who were not pleased with him [Aristide] in the past and don't want him to be successful now.'
第二天，《纽约时报》发表了一篇题为“海地主要领导人”的文章，据说是中央情报局的薪水。”本文的主要段落指出，
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中央情报机构为控制海地的军事政权的主要成员让其当选总统让·贝特兰德·阿里斯蒂德（Jean-Bertrand Aristide）的归还，由中央情报机构从1980年中期开始，至少直到1991年的政变迫使阿里斯蒂总统退出权力。给美国官员。
该文章引用了阿里斯蒂德总统的发言人，
Given what the CIA has done in the past two weeks, namely the attempted character assassination of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, it wouldn't be surprising to learn that the CIA had been working with his political enemies in Haiti for many years.
文章表明，众议院情报委员会成员证实了在海地当前处于敏感地位的人的付款。
Following these articles, USA Today ran an op-ed entitled, `History Repeats in CIA Smear of Haiti's Aristide.' The op-ed states that,
阿里斯蒂德,如马丁·路德国王被认为s a threat to those who desire the status quo. King's death was preceded by character assassination from U.S. spy agencies. Could history repeat itself?'
总统先生，这些是非常严重的指控，并且根据情报委员会迄今为止被告知的事情，我认为中央情报局可能会遇到不好的说唱。当我们继续调查有关指控时，我们没有证据表明中央情报局试图阻止阿里斯蒂德先生上台。同样，我们没有任何信息暗示中央情报局以削弱或抹黑阿里斯蒂总统的任何一致努力，因为他当选为海地总统。我们已经检查并正在继续研究，支持中央情报局对海地和阿里斯蒂德先生的局势分析的信息。尽管该分析中得出的一些结论是有争议的，但没有证据表明信息已被制造或故意扭曲。我认为，我们委员会的大多数成员，甚至可能质疑一些人
中央情报局的判断，将同意分析师真诚地行事。坦率地说，更难捍卫的是国会议员和员工的行为一直有选择地泄露机密信息。
Leaking classified information provided to this body violates the law and the standing rules of the Senate.
Selective leaks also create a highly distorted picture and do a disservice to the public. The reporting in this instance is a clear case in point. The facts are, in reality, quite complex, and those individuals who have chosen to leak information bearing on only one side of the story have created a distorted impression of the CIA's reports and activities.
那些以这种方式泄漏信息的人也可能会使敏感的来源和方法处于危险之中。海地的当前情况是一个完美的例子。毫无疑问，如果人们过去曾与中央情报局合作，人们的生活将受到危害。无论我们可以使用哪个政府分支，我们都有一种道德义务来保护此类个人的生活。
Continued leaks of classified information also inevitably undermine the executive branch's confidence in our ability to protect confidential information. This could ultimately make it harder to obtain classified information from the executive branch.
Finally, we need to consider the impact of selected leaks on the intelligence community. I recall that during the Gates nomination many Members, myself included, expressed concerns regarding the politicization of intelligence. Republicans and Democrats alike said that we wanted the CIA to give us their most candid views, regardless of how politically inconvenient such information might be. We agreed that we don't see any value in intelligence analysis if it is just going to be a lot of mush, or worse yet, reporting that is merely contrived to support the policies of the President and his administration.
吉姆·伍尔西（Jim Woolsey）领导下的情报界
deserves credit for not ducking the tough calls. The intelligence reporting on Haiti, and other regions as well, has not always been convenient for this administration. Whether the analysts are right on this one may be debatable, but it is clear to me that they have been candid, as they should be, and the DCI is doing the right thing in encouraging them to call it like they see it. If members and staff continue to selectively leak classified information, however, I think that the candor we claim to want will dry up and disappear. If an analyst provides a briefing, and parts of it are then used by the media and Members of the Senate to publicly castigate the administration or the intelligence community, the lesson will be clear: Don't tell the Senator anything they don't want to hear; don't say anything that could be used to oppose current policies; just feed the Senators a spoonful of mush when they ask a tough question.
总统先生，我希望情报界能够自由地与我们交谈。我不希望来到国会山的情报分析师在回答问题之前问自己，`让自己在政府中遇到麻烦吗？
Mr. President, we all know that if a referee in a football game fails to throw a flag when flagrant penalties are occurring, the game can quickly get out of control. That's what I'm doing, Mr. President, throwing out a flag before this situation gets out of control. It is time for us to bring some discipline to the way we handle intelligence. In particular, we need to examine the procedures governing classified briefings outside the framework of the intelligence committees and how information provided in those briefings is subsequently controlled. If we do not clarify the rules on such matters, we are apt to have a repetition of the events that have transpired in the last couple of weeks which are not in the interests of the Senate, the executive branch, or the public. I will be asking the staff of the Intelligence Committee to review these issues and will work with the leadership of the Senate to address them. I also would welcome any ideas in this regard that my colleagues have to offer.
Mr. President, I ask that a series of articles pertinent to this issue be included in theRecordat this point.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in theRecord， 如下：
华盛顿- 根据国会对事件的第一手了解，中央情报局曾经试图通过一项秘密行动计划干预海地的选举计划，该计划将削弱其现任总统让·贝特兰德·阿里斯特迪（Jean-Bertrand Aristide）的政治实力。
But the CIA's effort was stymied when the Senate Intelligence Committee ordered the CIA to halt the program, under which the agency tried to channel money for the use of some of the candidates in the 1987-88 Haitian elections.
当时，阿里斯蒂（Aristide）不是候选人，而是攻击了军事控制的过程，呼吁进行彻底的变革，显然担心一些美国官员。
两名现任和前美国情报官员承认，中央情报局制定了一项秘密行动计划，以干预海地的选举，并在国会中被阻止。但是，他们坚持认为该计划的目的不是反对阿里斯蒂，而是提供免费开放的选举，并帮助一些没有足够钱的候选人。
`We were engaged in covert action on behalf of the National Security Council,' said one former high-level U.S. intelligence official who was directly involved in the covert-action plan and the dispute with Congress. `We were involved in a range of support for a range of candidates.'
中情局的加热器参与海地的故事tions provides some of the backdrop for the episode earlier this month in which a senior U.S. intelligence official, Brian Lattell, characterized Aristide as mentally unbalanced. The comments were made in a closed-door briefing to member of Congress.
The CIA has made similar allegations in the past about Aristide, based on what officials say is a psychological profile of the Haitian leader. Aristide was elected Haiti's president by a landslide in December, 1990, but was ousted in a military coup after serving less than a year.
上周被问及中央情报局对海地的参与以及与国会有关秘密行动的纠纷肯特·哈灵顿（Kent Harrington）回答说：“我们的评论不会对此发表评论。”
The CIA's negative assessment of Aristide's psychological stability complicated the Clinton Administration's Haiti policy by giving Republicans a rationale for trying to limit the extent of U.S. support for Aristide.
一位消息人士说：“需要知道的是，中央情报局和阿里斯蒂之间有一些历史”，他在参议院情报委员会高级职位的消息人士说，中央情报局和国会正在为海地的秘密行动作斗争时。
“过去，有些人过去对他（Aristide）不满意，现在不希望他成功。”
阿里斯蒂（Aristide）首先在海地（Haiti）成为解放神学的支持者，该学家旨在将基督的教导与穷人对既定秩序的政治革命学说相结合。解放神学不仅在海地，而且在许多其他拉丁美洲国家的教区贫困的牧师中占据了占主导地位。
Asked why the CIA might have sought to oppose Aristide, the congressional source said: `Liberation theology proponents are not too popular at the agency. Maybe second only to the Vatican for not liking liberation theology are the people at [CIA headquarters in] Langley.'
阿里斯蒂（Aristide）不是海地1987 - 88年选举中的候选人。当时，他是一位超凡魅力的牧师，在海地最贫穷的贫民窟中有着强烈的追随。他谴责了以军事为主的选举，并呼吁海地人对整个进程进行一次“真正的革命”。
Aristide's activities figured prominently in the elections and the American response to them, in which U.S. officials showed a strong antipathy to Aristide.
In a letter to Time magazine during the elections, then-Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams, the Ronald Reagan Administration's primary spokesman for Latin American policy, devoted most of his energies to attacking Aristide.
`The stark contrast between the Pope and the firebrand Aristide underscores the difference between responsible constructive effort and strident negativism.' Abrams wrote.
艾布拉姆斯上周没有将两个电话回到哈德逊研究所的办公室。一位秘书说他不在城里。在两周前在《华盛顿时报》上的一篇文章中，艾布拉姆斯批评白宫支持阿里斯蒂德，称克林顿政府正在“重复布什政府犯下的每一个错误”。
反对的阿里斯蒂将与里根政府在拉丁美洲的整体政策保持一致。在当时的CIA主任威廉·凯西（William J. Casey）的积极支持下，政府积极寻求与尼加拉瓜和埃尔·萨尔瓦多（El Salvador）等国家 /地区的左翼政权，政党和领导人作斗争。乔治·布什政府采取了较少的对抗方法。
情报和国会官员在1987 - 88年的选举期间就中情局就秘密诉讼提出了以下关于中央情报局的纠纷：
At the beginning of the 1987 elections, the CIA may have already been operating in Haiti under an existing, previously approved covert-action program, according to a present and a former intelligence officer. Any CIA covert operation must be approved both by the President and the congressional intelligence committees.
As the campaign began, the CIA was supporting or preparing to support particular candidates.
`This sort of thing doesn't go on every day,' a former high-ranking U.S. intelligence official said. `But there's nothing unusual about it. The idea was to enable some candidates to spend money on publicity and that sort of thing.
`中央情报局没有选择候选人来支持。这些候选人是由国务院选出的。* * *有多个候选人。我们没有任何候选人。
在选举的早期阶段，参议院情报委员会的一些工作人员参观了海地。返回后，委员会要求确切知道中央情报局在做什么以及支持哪些候选人。
Then-CIA Director William H. Webster refused to give the committee the names of the CIA-supported candidates. Finally, a compromise was arranged in which the CIA director would give the names only to Sens. David L. Boren (D-Okla.) and William S. Cohen (R-Me.), then the chairman and ranking minority member of the Intelligence Committee.
但这笔交易告吹。他们杀死了总结m,' a former U.S. intelligence official said. `It was one of the few times they ever closed us down. It was a bruising battle.'
一位在情报委员会工作的高级消息来源说，中央情报局的秘密行动计划被杀的原因是：“我们中有些人相信选举的中立性。”
海地选举原定于1987年11月29日举行，但当34人死于选举时，他们陷入了暴力崩溃 - 当时他们站在一对一投票时。1988年1月上旬，举行了一次新的选票，并受到海地军政府的青睐，但当年晚些时候，他在军事政变中被罢免。
Aristide had urged a boycott of the elections, saying, `The army is our first enemy.' By helping to finance some of the candidates, the CIA apparently hoped to strengthen those candidates' position and to diminish Aristide's attempt to have a low turnout, which would have reduced the election's validity.
But in 1990, Aristide ran for president himself and won with about two-thirds of the popular vote.
Supporters of Aristide and some congressional sources have alleged that the CIA opposed the Haitian president and supported his principal opponent, Marc Bazin, in the 1990 elections.
But that allegation was denied by a present and a former U.S. intelligence official, each of whom knew of the covert-action plans in the 1987-88 elections.
此外，在阿里斯蒂德（Aristide）当选时处理海地政策的国务院官员，当时是参议院情报委员会的排名工作人员
说他们不知道1990年CIA击败Aristide的任何努力。两者都说，如果那年对Aristide进行了中央情报局的行动，他们会知道这一点。
1990年12月19日，在阿里斯蒂德（Aristide）当选后三天，布什政府拉丁美洲助理国务卿伯纳德·阿隆森（Bernard Aronson）祝贺阿里斯蒂（Aristide）取得了胜利，并宣布增加了美国对海地的援助。
在担任海地总统不到八个月的时间后，阿里斯蒂德（Aristide）于1991年9月在一次军事政变中被罢免。从那时起，他一直在美国住在美国，同时等待返回海地。
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During a recent lunch I attended with Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the deposed Haitian president didn't climb onto the table and stomp through my mashed potatoes.
Yet if CIA reports are to be believed, Aristide's luncheon guests would have been smart to hide under the table in terror. The reports label the charismatic priest a violent fruitcake who has been treated in a mental hospital and has used drugs to calm his manic depression.
Aristide denies those CIA profiles circulating on Capitol Hill, saying the only time he was hospitalized was as a boy with hepatitis.
令人震惊的是，中央情报局还描述了海地残酷的军事独裁者劳尔·塞德拉斯中将是“自1986年杜瓦利尔独裁统治以来最有前途的海地领导人之一。自从1991年的政变被罢免以来，当军队被指责为数千起谋杀案时，如何称赞雪松？什么给了这里？
为什么中央情报局抹黑一个被认为是海地马丁·路德·金（Martin Luther King Jr.这是一位牧师，他是海地穷人的民间英雄，他为无家可归的街头孩子们建立了一个孤儿院，面对了谋杀的麦克图特，并暴露了美国为仇恨的杜瓦利人提供的美国政策。
Here is a man who speaks six languages, has a doctorate in philosophy, has written six books, composed more than 100 songs sung in Haiti and plays six musical instruments.
然而，美国间谍机构将他描述为疯狂，他们从未说过罗纳德·里根（Ronald Reagan）的话，罗纳德·里根（Ronald Reagan）的总统任期在占星家的指导下。
Something is screwy here.
像国王一样，阿里斯蒂（Aristide）被认为是那些想要现状的人的威胁。国王的死之前是美国间谍机构的性格暗杀。历史可以重演吗？
The smearing of Aristide is geared to discredit him in the public mind, which is stupid for a nation that should be begging him to continue the fight against drug trafficking, which has gained momentum since the coup.
海地在流放的海地毒品沙皇帕特里克·埃利（Patrick Elie）说：“只要塞德拉斯及其腐败的精英支持者掌权，就无法赢得毒品战争。”海地是仅次于哥伦比亚的第二大毒品转运港，政变领导人每年带来超过2亿美元的非法毒品，这些毒品被运往美国。中央情报局为什么会抹黑第一位海地领导人致力于打击毒品？
我认为阿里斯蒂一点都不疯了。但是那些试图抹黑他的人可能是。
华盛顿，October 31. Key members of the military regime controlling Haiti and blocking the return of its elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, were paid by the Central Intelligence Agency for information from the mid-1980's at least until the 1991 coup that forced Mr. Aristide from power, according to American officials.
As part of its normal intelligence-gathering operations, the C.I.A. cultivated, recruited and paid generals and politicians for information about everything from cocaine smuggling to political ferment in Haiti, they said.
Without naming names, a Government official familiar with the payments said that `several of the principal players in the present situation were compensated by the U.S. Government.' It was not clear when the payments ended or how much money they involved, although they were described as modest.
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Supporters of Mr. Aristide said the payments proved that the C.I.A.'s primary sources of information in Haiti were Mr. Aristide's political enemies, and they criticized the agency's reporting on Haiti as one-sided.
Michael D. Barnes, a former member of Congress who is a spokesman for Mr. Aristide, said, `Given what the C.I.A. has done in the past two weeks, namely the attempted character assassination of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, it wouldn't be surprising to learn that the C.I.A. had been working with his political enemies in Haiti for many years.
But Representative Robert G. Torricelli, a New Jersey Democrat who serves on the House Intelligence and Foreign Affairs Committees and who confirmed the payments, defended the intelligence relationships as crucial to United States policy-makers in trying to gain an understanding of Haitian politics.
`The U.S. Government develops relationships with ambitious and bright young men at the beginning of their careers and often follows them through their public service,' he said. `It includes people in sensitive positions in the current situation in Haiti.'
A member of Congress familiar with the recruiting of sources of information within the Haitian Government said the information received was a mixed bag. `There are things we should have been getting for the money which we didn't get--for example, on the narcotics side,' he said. Members of the current regime are suspected of receiving lucrative payments from drug traffickers to protect shipments of cocaine passing through Haitian airfields en route to the United States.
官员们说，C.I.A在海地的活动还包括由Ronald Reagan总统和国家安全委员会授权的秘密行动，该行动涉及中止企图影响1988年1月举行的选举。
海地当时在军事统治者列伊特的控制下。亨利·恩本（Henri Namphy）将军，他向里根政府保证，选举将是自由公平的。但是，投票被军方被广泛认为是谋杀的，这项运动以平民的杀戮为标志。
Mr. Aristide, who was not a candidate, had urged a boycott of the election. The operation undertaken by the C.I.A. aimed at seeing the election go forward, the officials said, but it also involved plans to slip campaign money to candidates. In a rare action, the payments were blocked by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the officials said. The attempt was first reported today by the Los Angeles Times.
In the 1980's, the United States undertook covert operations and military actions throughout the Caribbean and Latin America to support pro-United States and anti-Communist governments. Several prominent figures in the region were on the United States intelligence payroll during the decade.
The officials who described the payments to Haitian generals and politicians said they were not intended to install any one leader as the President of Haiti.
In 1990, in the first free election in 20th-century Haiti, Mr. Aristide won 67.5 percent of the vote in a field of 10 candidates. He was overthrown in a September 1991 coup. The military regime controlling Haiti has blocked his return--which was to have taken place Saturday under an accord negotiated by the Clinton Administration and signed by the military leaders last summer--with a widespread campaign of intimidation, violence and murder.
Supporters of Mr. Aristide say the C.I.A., which does not make policy but which can influence policy-makers through its reporting, has undermined the chances for his return. In recent briefings to Congress, Brian Latell, the C.I.A.'s chief analyst for Latin American affairs, has described Mr. Aristide as unstable and as having a history of mental problems.
In a 1992 report widely circulated in Washington, Mr. Latell described a meeting with Lieut. Gen. Raoul Cedras, Haiti's current military dictator, and praised him as one of `the most promising group of Haitian leaders to emerge since the Duvalier family dictatorship was overthrown in 1986.'
反过来，克林顿政府对C.I.A.的分析进行了质疑，并称赞阿里斯蒂神父是一个理性和合理的人。
The officials who described the payments to generals and politicians in the current regime in exchange for information said they were a normal and necessary part of gathering intelligence in a foreign country.
Torricelli代表说：“这些关系至关重要，因此我们可以预期挥发性社会的变化。”他说，信息的质量和数量是C.I.A.在海地提供的通常是值得称赞的。
But Robert Pastor, the chief National Security Officer for Latin American affairs from 1977 to 1981, said, `It appears that the portrait of Aristide is seriously flawed. Whether that is in part due to intelligence contacts that began as a result of these operations is a legitimate and important question that needs an answer.'
结尾