1991 Congressional Hearings情报and Security
1991 Congressional Hearings约翰·c·塔克在SECRE声明TARY OF ENERGY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY before the COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DOE's NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ROLE April 24, 1991 Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee today to discuss the role of the Department of Energy (DOE) in performing its nuclear nonproliferation responsibilities, including the interaction between DOE and other U.S. Government agencies and international organizations. As you requested in your letter of April 10, 1991, I will direct my remarks primarily to the Department's role in performing its nuclear nonproliferation responsibilities. As President Bush stated in his first State of the Union message, "The spread of nuclear weapons must be stopped .... Our diplomacy must work every day against the proliferation of nuclear weapons." This has been the policy of every President since the advent of nuclear weapons on August 6, 1945. The implementation of this policy has never been so evident as with the actions taken with regard to Iraq in the past few months. The conditions which the U.S. Government insisted that Iraq accept for a permanent ceasefire include several specifically designed to halt and reverse Iraq's efforts to develop and produce nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. Iraq's Scud missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel were a reminder that these could have been launched with warheads other than high explosives. If Iraq's nuclear and chemical/biological and missile programs were allowed to proceed unchallenged, other countries could be the target of such an aggressive regime within the next decade. The Department, under the direction of Secretary Watkins, is firmly committed to President Bush's goal of stopping nuclear proliferation and we take our responsibilities in this area very seriously. Because we recognize that this goal is one of our most difficult challenges, DOE has, in cooperation with other interested agencies, undertaken major efforts to achieve it. First let me cover recent organizational changes initiated by Admiral Watkins before I discuss DOE's nonproliferation role. RECENT REORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES: At the time of his appointment as Secretary of Energy in March 1989, it was immediately apparent to Admiral Watkins that the general organizational and management responsibilities of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs were too far-reaching and complex for one individual to oversee. The Admiral recognized that in order to establish better downsize the overall role and responsibilities of the ASDP to include management and accountability of this office, it would be necessary to only the national security related functions of Nuclear Weapons Research, Development and Production, Nuclear Materials Production, and Arms Control and Verification. Admiral Watkins also became concerned with a number of issues related to DOE's智力program as well as the status of safeguards and security throughout the complex. This caused him to take two separate actions to address these matters. First, he asked retired Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, formerly Chief of Naval情报, who had completed a comprehensive study of DOE's智力programs in April 1988, to once again evaluate the program and provide his recommendations for setting a new direction. Second, he commissioned a study conducted by retired Army Major General James E. Freeze to review the broad area of safeguards and security. Based on the findings and recommendations resulting from those studies the Secretary directed organizational realignments to clarify and strengthen accountability and responsibility for智力and safeguards and security related activities while concurrently reducing the span of control for the overburdened Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs. On April 6, 1990, Secretary. Watkins transferred DOE's智力programs from the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs into a newly created Office of情报由小罗伯特·W·丹尼尔（Robert W.委托给部门。这些功能现在将直接向我的办公室报告。在更广泛的方面，沃特金斯海军上将担心该部门缺乏一个可以担任科学和技术顾问的高级高级个人。他认为没有充分解决的横切问乐动冠军题包括：o美国能源部国家实验室系统的整体健康，尤其是在联邦政府其他机构中为DOE赞助商和赞助商提供实验室努力的有效性；o能力研究计划之间的优先设定和集成；o部门技术转移计划的整体活力和方向。为了在这三个领域获得公正的建议，沃特金斯海军上将很快将与该部门的R＆D R＆D大部分计划的副科学和技术顾问正式建立一名范围内的科学和技术顾问 - 用于国防和民用应用程序。这种重组的一个关键特征将是在DOE技术转移政策和科学技术顾问协调下对技术利用总监的实施。该职位将促进总体部门计划的一致性，以支持技术转移。 To improve the nuclear nonproliferation posture of the Department, on April 1, 1991, Secretary Watkins, transferred the Technology Policy Division's export control and nonproliferation responsibilities to the Office of Arms Control in Defense Programs. This, I believe, is the first step in an evolving process to combine the various nonproliferation activities and responsibilities within one office reaction to any one event but that the Secretary has had this issue within the Department. It should also be noted that this is not a under consideration since the Fall of 1989. The export control and associated nuclear nonproliferation functions now complement those responsibilities of the Arms Control Office relating to the control of missile, chemical, and biological weapons and verification technology. DOE's ROLE IN NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES INTERAGENCY NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES: U.S. nonproliferation policy and initiatives are developed by an interagency group composed primarily of representatives from the Department of Energy, the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency the Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce. These agencies are represented on the Nonproliferation Policy Coordinating Committee which is chaired by the Department of State. EXPORT CONTROLS: Most of the Department's export control activities are based on two statutory provisions: Section 57b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act of 1978. Section 57b of the Atomic Energy Act requires that U.S. firms or individuals intending to engage, directly or indirectly, in the production of special nuclear material outside the United States obtain the authorization of the Secretary of Energy. The Federal regulations that implement this statutory requirement appear as 10 CFR Part 810. Because of the significance of this responsibility, the Atomic Energy Act does not permit the Secretary of Energy to delegate the authorizing function. At the present time, U.S. persons intending to engage in activities falling within the scope of 10 CFR Part 810 must submit an application to the Department of Energy's Office of Defense Programs. A DOE staff analysis and a proposed recommendation to the Secretary are circulated to the Department of State for concurrence and to the Departments of Defense and Commerce, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for their views. Only after the other agencies have been consulted does the Secretary determine whether or not to authorize the activity. I might mention that we have had only one Part 810 case for Iraq in recent years. This was in 1990 and involved a U.S. company that had been asked to present a training course at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center. On July 13, 1990, DOE staff informed the applicant that because the proposed activity was contrary to existing policy, they were unable to recommend approval to the Secretary. Section 309 (c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act requires the Department of Commerce to control dual-use exports of potential nuclear concern. On June 9, 1978, the Departments of State, Energy, and Commerce jointly published "Procedures Established Pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978," to jointly establish and maintain a list of such export items, known as the Nuclear Referral List. Whenever Commerce receives an application to export an item on refers the application to DOE for a review and recommendation. In the Nuclear Referral List to a country of proliferation concern, it keeping the list up to date and in making reviews, the Department of Commerce relies extensively on the technical experts within the Department as well as its contractor facilities to assess the significance of the technology involved, its value to a would-be nuclear proliferant, and the ease and likelihood of its diversion to a clandestine nuclear program. Whenever DOE's review of dual -use cases raises a potential proliferation concern, DOE refers the case to the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination (SNEC), an interagency forum mandated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. The Department of State chairs the Subgroup and DOE serves as the Secretariat. Other members of the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination are the Departments of Defense and Commerce, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Central情报代理机构，国家安全局和辩方情报机构观察员地位。国际NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES: In order to control proliferation of nuclear weapons, a viable and effective international nonproliferation regime must be in place. The two major components of such a regime are the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To monitor compliance with NPT provisions, the Treaty provides for the application of international safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency. safeguards system and technical assistance activities, to keep IAEA a The Department provides and coordinates support for the IAEA, its strong viable organization and to maintain and monitor effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The Department also participates in varied bilateral and multilateral activities with other countries to promote and strengthen international nonproliferation activities including control of exports by supplier countries. In this regard, DOE has been an active participant in various international export control mechanisms -- including the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. COCOM is comprised of our NATO allies, minus Iceland, plus Japan and Australia. COCOM members agree to control exports of strategic significance to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and their allies. DOE, along with the other agencies, provides the technical and policy support to the Department of State in formulating COCOM's Industrial List (IL) of dual-use commodities; DOE provides the principal support in formulating COCOM's International Atomic Energy List (AEL) which describes nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies considered to be of strategic significance. The Zangger Committee, based in Vienna, Austria, implements Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits the export of specially designed equipment or material used in the production of special nuclear material unless under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The Committee has developed a so-called "trigger list" of items that trigger the mandatory implementation of IAEA safeguards to ensure peaceful use. DOE, in conjunction with the Department of State and other agencies, has initiated the upgrade of the "trigger list" for the control of gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion enrichment and reprocessing components. DOE has also developed and published a guide on gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge equipment to assist officials in this and other countries in enforcing export control laws based on the Zangger "trigger list." The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) -- of which France is a member -- was formed at the initiative of the United States and in response to the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974. The aim was to address the need for more comprehensive guidelines for control of exports of nuclear technology. The Zangger list controls only equipment and material especially designed for the production of special nuclear material. It does not address technology, nor does it address dual-use components that can contribute to a nuclear explosive. Last year, the U.S. Government began a series of bilateral discussions with other countries to lay the groundwork for establishing an International Dual-Use List of items that all supplier countries should control from a nuclear proliferation standpoint. These bilateral discussions led to a meeting of 26 nuclear supplier countries in March in The Hague at which there was a clear consensus that such an International Dual-Use List should be adopted. Allow me to note that the International Dual-Use List effort traces back to an initiative launched in March 1990 by the Department of Energy. And, drawing on the expertise of the DOE nuclear weapons laboratories, DOE developed a draft list that the U.S. Government is circulating to the other supplier countries. DOE also is participating DOE-drafted U.S. Government list to form the basis of these in the bilateral and multilateral meetings and we expect the discussions.INTELLIGENCE支持：情报支持是我们nonproliferat成功的关键ion actions. The Department of Energy's national laboratory complex provides much of the technical undergirding for the U.S.情报Community's extensive research and analysis on nuclear proliferation. For over fifteen years DOE情报它的国家实验室资源一直是建立和发展扩散的领导者智力program, in constant agencies. Resources have been arrayed in direct support of numerous and close coordination with all U.S.情报Community member U.S. nonproliferation policy determinations and enforcement activities. DOE's智力核扩散领域的能力和绩效是首屈一指的，并且高度支持该部门的高级管理层，因为它承担了其关键的核不扩散责任。正如我在介绍中提到的那样，Doe的智力一年前将计划从国防计划中删除，以恢复智力support for defense and for non-defense programs. Additionally, we brought in a new management team, under the direction of Mr. Daniel, to augment the program's responsiveness to Secretary Watkins' priorities, guidance and requirements. Additional resources have also been committed to this important function. This transition was effected without disruption to our proliferation智力我希望强调的计划一直使我们的高级管理层告知外国核计划扩散问题。例如，伊拉克核计划已经在很长一段时间内受到了严格的审查，在我两年的任期中，智力计划一直是美国政府的正确表征伊拉克核能力，并与伊拉克核计划相关联，并将这些数据提供给了意图。作为另一个例子，我们确定并确定了对支持沙漠风暴行动的国防部的目标。DOE在联合国军事无核化计划中的作用：该部门最近采取的国际非扩散行动之一是针对伊拉克的。在海湾战争之后，DOE的不扩散社区在制定美国政府取消伊拉克未来党内合作能力的计划方面发挥了至关重要的作用，该部门组织了一个工作队开发核武器。在一个杰出的例子中，在两天半的激烈努力中，准备了对人员，时间和金钱所需的详细评估，以确保伊拉克在未来的军事无核方面的良好状态。沃特金斯海军上将最近写信给国务卿贝克，1991年4月12日，他“ ...智力技术资源准备支持联合国授权的伊拉克核计划的非军事化。在美国政府和国际努力中扮演着非常重要的角色，以防止进一步的核武器扩散。我们非常认真地对待我们的职责，并不断审查我们的绩效，以寻求改善的方法。主席先生，这是我的结论。声明。我很高兴回答您或小组委员会其他成员可能遇到的任何问题。