1979年的伯特 - 基德通讯

由霍华德·莫兰德（Howard Morland）介绍

汉斯·贝特（Hans Bethe）是20世纪物理学的名人之一，是与1979年第一修正案相关的最著名人物，美国与进步等等. At issue was the civil lawsuit initiated by the Department of Energy which, for six months, blocked the publication of an article I wrote titled, "The H-Bomb Secret, to Know How is to Ask Why." In issuing his restraining order in March, the judge cited Dr. Bethe's affidavit in favor of censorship, and noted his prominence in the scientific world.

加利福尼亚州利弗莫尔实验室的核武器设计师雷·基德（Ray Kidder）博士很快成为辩方的明星证人（即，有利于未经审查的出版物），他认为贝西博士已经被说服签署了他的誓章而没有被签署所有相关信息。基德建议他们通过私人信件来辩论这个问题。基德（Kidder）认为，在他们的书信中的第十个也是最后一封信中，贝特（Bethe）的一个神秘的手写笔记承认了他的观点。

The existence of this correspondence was unknown to the outside world until Kidder revealed it to me in the spring of 1999. (Some of the letters had been shared with defense lawyers in进步case, but they were never submitted to the court and therefore do not appear in the case record.) At my request, Kidder had the classified items declassified, a task which was completed on May 1, 2001. It was then discovered that the unclassified letters, stored separately, had been mis-filed and apparently lost, until they were eventually located in September of 2002. For the benefit of scholars interested in the case, the complete set of letters, numbered one through ten, is posted here for the first time.

基德（Kidder）的第一封信和它的八个围栏之一或展品之一是秘密的，伯特（Bethe）和基德（Kidder）随后的一封信之一也被分类。其他七个信件未分类，并通过基德的利弗莫尔办公室和纽约伊什卡康奈尔大学的伯特办公室之间的普通邮件交换。由于康奈尔（Cornell）没有处理机密邮件的设施，因此在贝特（Bethe）访问全国各地政府设施时，必须交换机密信件。以前的分类字母被认为。

Letter #1, with Exhibit #4
[注意：机密秘密，2001年5月1日解密]

劳伦斯·利弗莫尔实验室
COT-79-11
April 3, 1979

Professor Hans A. Bethe
C/o Duane C. Sewell先生
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs
能源部
华盛顿特区，20545年

Dear Professor Bethe:

根据我们4月2日的电话对话，我封闭了几个文档的副本，我认为这些副本包含的信息直接且重要地涉及有关Morland文章的案件，该案件涉及该杂志正在寻求发表的信息。我很高兴您同意收到这些文件以获取您的信息。

Four of these documents derive from the 1976 disclosures of Soviet physicist L.I. Rudakov. The disclosure itself is described in the September 1976 issue of the magazine LASER FOCUS [ref #1] under the heading "Soviet fusion pellet is said to convert e-beam energy to thermal x radiation." It goes on to say:

This news article discloses the method of the radiation implosion and suggests that this approach may have been known to U.S. scientists but was not discussed in public, i.e., it was classified. The enclosed copy of an article in the 1977 Annual Progress Report of the Institute of Laser Engineering of Osaka, Japan, entitled "Deflagration Waves Supported by Thermal Radiation" [ref #2] references Rudakov's paper, and shows that the Japanese fully and quantitatively understood the principle of the radiation implosion he had disclosed.

The October 8, 1976, article in the magazine SCIENCE entitled "Thermonuclear Fusion: U.S. Puts Wraps on Latest Soviet Work" [ref #3] states in part:

The SCIENCE article establishes that the Rudakov disclosure was classified in the U.S., that it was widely discussed by an international group of scientists (at a Gordon Research Conference), and states explicitly that this esoteric science is related to the H-bomb. (This point could be very effectively impressed upon the court if the article's author William D. Metz, and Dr. Alfred Wong of UCLA, were called as defense witnesses.)

1976年鲁达科夫披露的第四个文件（可能）是1977年11月2日的信，是从亚瑟·托马斯（Arthur D.格里芬）。[参考＃4]这封信揭示了一个事实，即德国的科学家熟悉辐射内爆原则，日本以及加拿大和意大利的科学家也是如此。这也表明，分类人本身开始严重怀疑继续对辐射内爆概念进行分类的智慧，该概念正在国际科学界公开讨论。

这四个文件毫无疑问地证明了辐射内爆的原则并不是“秘密”一词的任何合理定义，自1976年中以来。他们还证明，（并且）众所周知，辐射内爆的原理由DOE分类，并且与H炸弹有关。

It is also well known that fission bombs are imploded by high explosive (HE), and therefore that the radiation implosion must be used to implode something other than the fission primary, i.e., the fusion secondary. (See Teller's Encyclopedia Americana Article.) [ref #5]

例如，也众所周知，印度的原子能建立与惯性限制融合的发展保持同步。（请参阅Bhabha Atomic Research Center的重印请求的副本[Ref＃6]，这是我从印度收到的众多文章中的许多有关ICF内爆物理的文章。）假设印度核物理学家的工作人员合理，人们对热核内爆物理感兴趣，在激光焦点和科学中不会遵循这些文章，并理解所陈述的结论吗？我想不是。

我关注的另一个问题是杰克·罗森格伦（Jack W.罗森格伦（Rosengren）宣誓书对人们表示，莫兰德（Morland）的文章在确定“美国热核武器中使用的特定设计方面有很长的路要走”，这使人们感到恐慌。当然，这不是。美国战略核武器采用了辐射内爆的原则，但相似之处结束了。由于多种重要原因，在Morland文章中示意性地说明了二次插图，而不是启发可能成为H-BOMB设计师的融合。（上述“恐慌”的一个例子是，阿尔贡国家实验室的西奥多·A·Postol博士在一个周末午夜让约翰·格里芬（John Griffin）躺在床上，表达了他对罗森格伦宣誓书的影响表示关切的事实。）

我认为，惯性限制融合（ICF）的研究的推力不可避免地会出现“秘密”。Sam Goudsmit的社论“再次保密”在1973年1月1日的物理评论信中提供了ICF将提出的分类问题的早期迹象。[参考＃8]即使没有ICF，最终也会出现，但是ICF加速了该过程。DOE未能欣赏这一演变，Arid现在发现自己处于无法对世界各地众多科学家进行常识的概念进行分类的站不住脚的立场。

从积极的一面来看，有两个优势，可以解释辐射内爆原理以及该原理在H炸弹中使用的事实。首先是保密的幻觉提供了一种错误的安全感。如果知道仅有的真正的限制核武器的扩散s the availability of fissile materials, more emphasis would be placed on international control of these materials and nonproliferation would be helped rather than hurt. The second advantage is that progress in the field of ICF would be accelerated. While it is true that it is yet to be learned whether ICF will ever be a practical source of energy, it should not be unnecessarily impeded. It might work.

事实坚定地支持了这样的结论，即几乎没有秘密剩下的东西。当然，还不足以通过披露损害国家，当然还不足以证明我们历史上第一次对“先前约束”的严厉措施是合理的。我还注意到，这些证据都不支持“无秘密”结论，取决于Morland的文章，或者他如何获得信息。因此，Morland是否完全依靠未分类的来源并不是关键问题。

After considering this material, I hope you will convey to Jeremy Stone your views. I fear that the F.A.S. may be engaged in an ill-informed attempt to salvage what I believe is a lost cause.

Reference List [注意：这些项目后来称为展览]

1.《重点新闻》，《激光焦点》，1976年9月，第1页。12。

2.日本大阪大学激光工程学院激光融合计划的年度进度报告，日本，第110-112页。

3.科学1914年，1976年10月8日，第1页。166。

*4。COK-77-160。1977年11月2日，亚瑟·托马斯（Arthur D. Thomas）致约翰·格里芬（John A. Griffin）的信（SRD）。

5. Article entitled Hydrogen Bomb by Edward Teller in the Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. 14, 1976, pp. 654�656.

6. Reprint request card from H. C. Pant, Laser Section, Bhabha Atomic Research Center, Bombay, India.

7.杰克·罗森格伦（Jack W. Rosengren）的宣誓书，1979年3月13日。

8. Editorial: Secrecy Again by S. A. Goudsmit, Physical Review Letters 30, January 1, 1973.

*Document COK-77-160 is not enclosed with this letter. It is to be made available to Professor Bethe by Mr. Sewell at DoE Headquarters in Washington.

[Note: COK-77-160, exhibit #4, was declassified on May 1, 2001 and is printed here, below. Several attempts were made to deliver it to Dr. Bethe during the course of this correspondence, but it is unclear from Bethe's letters when he actually first got to read it.]

-------------------

劳伦斯·利弗莫尔实验室
COK-77-160
November 2, 1977

J.A.格里芬
U.S. DOE
分类部
华盛顿特区20545

亲爱的杰克，

在过去的几年中，我们听说过各种轶事，这表明ICF目标的辐射内爆的优势并不熟悉美国和外国的许多未知的科学家。最近，我们提供了一个非常明确的例子。

LLL的Ray Kidder博士在慕尼黑附近的Garching的Max Planck Institut Institut Institut Institut Institut Institut Institut Institut Institut Institut Institut咨询委员会任职了两年。他最近与该研究所的Richard Sigel博士和S. Witkowski博士进行了讨论。（Witkowski博士是激光融合计划的负责人，Sigel博士是他的代表。）Sigel博士说，将光转换为软X射线并使用这些X射线驱动内爆的两步过程在很大程度上消除了处理复杂的光质相互作用的问题的优势。激光将通过孔聚焦到一个空腔，将其捕获并转换为X射线。然后，这些X射线将均匀地照亮目标胶囊，并有效地驱动内爆（由于波长适当的波长）。

Dr. Sigel said he knew this approach was classified. Nevertheless he asked the question raised by these considerations: Should their program for laser fusion concentrate its attention on x-ray implosion, avoid x-ray studies, or what?

Dr. Witkowskl said he felt it was appropriate to study all processes of energy transport that are physically important, neither to stress nor avoid x-ray studies. Dr. Kidder stated that he could not comment on Dr. Sigel s speculations concerning use of x-rays. He did state his belief that the program should study the light-plasma interaction for low, medium, and high-Z elements without prejudice, agreeing with Dr. Witkowski s viewpoint.

该事件主要是因为其明确的性质。几天前，我们从另一个来源听到了Max Planck Institut的科学家意识到辐射驱动的融合靶标的概念。基于日本和加拿大激光融合研究人员对X射线运输研究的越来越重视，基德博士认为他们也知道这一概念。（我们同意他的评估。）意大利人也可能准备好调查辐射内爆目标。

我们将这些信息传达给您，以协助您计划ICF的短期和长期分类策略。鉴于当前不断提高的意识，我们看不到明显的最佳动作。但是，等待直到其他人开始谈话并尝试一个概念之前，我们知道这可能不是最可取的姿势。

The German scientists (for example) apparently have been willing to follow a tacit "gentlemen's agreement" and keep speculations about radiation implosion and its utility in-house for awhile; but when they have results to report, they will make them public. There is the question of what role we should play with regard to influencing the directions taken by uncleared scientists (In the U.S. and elsewhere). Should the policy be to discourage radiation implosion target work and its publication; to continue to classify information we believe is Important to the development of ICF because the concepts are used in weapons; or to consider the best way to declassify the pertinent ICF concepts in an ICF context? Whatever the decision, it is likely to be widely recognized and discussed publicly-ly in a few years.

This leads to a host of related questions. Is there a real advantage in not talking about radiation-driven ICF? What is the benefit and how important is it? Would release of the radiation implosion concept change the decision of current non-nuclear nations?

We are interested in your views and would welcome further discussion of this subject.

焦油：TT

信＃2

April 17, 1979

亲爱的基德博士：

非常感谢您向我发送了ACDA的Spurgeon Keeny的材料。我通过Sewell博士的办公室将其分类的部分退还，并保留了未分类的围栏。

围栏没有告诉我任何本质上新的东西，尽管我没有明确看过所有这些论文。在阅读了此材料之后，我的看法完全没有改变，因为《莫兰》的文章所包含的远远超过了公开文献中以前发表的内容。在另一封信中（下周将发送给您），我将详细讨论。因此，我坚持先前在渐进案中给出的誓章。

拥有此信息对我非常有帮助，我感谢您将其发送给我。

HAB:vhr
CC：D。C. Sewell博士
Dr. Jeremy Stone, FAS

信＃3
[注意：机密秘密，2001年5月1日解密]

康奈尔大学
核研究实验室
ITHACA, N.Y. 14653

Dr. Ray Kidder
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory
University of California
P.O.Box 808
Livermore，CA 94550

亲爱的基德博士：

在下面，我会给您对4月3日信的八个围栏的详细反应。更相关。

图1，Laser Focus，在我看来，唯一一个真正重要的人。它说，鲁达科夫将电子的动能转化为软X射线的能量，然后用来爆内激光融合颗粒。大概在国际上，许多人读了这份报告。但是，本文与H炸弹没有任何联系。

图3，来自科学, makes such a connection, in a rather vague manner. It however does not talk about the x-ray implosion. If some foreigner puts these two articles together, he might possibly get the idea that x�ray implosion is used in an H-bomb--but he has to be very astute to do so. One of the saving graces may be that the most creative scientists do not usually read very much, and especially do not read semi-scientific journals likeLaser Focus和科学. So I would consider it is not clear whether weapons scientists in countries dangerous for proliferation have put these two papers together.

据我所知，图5是《百科全书》中柜员的文章，这是完全干净的。“构造”段仅提及高温，而不是高压或密度。同样，该插图也提到了主要的压缩，但不是次级的压缩。我看不出柜员的文章如何给出一个有用的提示，即扩散因子必须压缩次级，并且可以使用主发射的X辐射来完成。实际上，在泰勒的文章中从未提及过这种辐射。

Exhibit 7, I do not see what "factual errors" you discern in the Rosengren affidavit. Perhaps you want to write me about this once more. I can be reached again by classified mail on May 8-10 when I shall be in the Boston area... I shall also be at MIT, and could receive a classified letter through any suitable person at MIT.

日语论文图2是关于辐射支持的辐射的学术讨论。第二次世界大战期间，我们在洛斯阿拉莫斯（Los Alamos）知道了这种冲击的可能性，但它并没有给我们任何人，包括爱德华·泰勒（Edward Teller），这是使用这种冲击来制造H炸弹的想法。因此，关系仍然很遥远。

如前所述，图4缺失。

图6是Bhabha原子中心激光部分的印度科学家的要求，仅表明印第安人对激光融合感兴趣。他们可能对H炸弹感兴趣也可能不感兴趣 - 总理Desai表示，他对原子弹不感兴趣，但这当然可以修改。当然，我不会从这个要求中得出结论，即印第安人已经理解了如何制造H炸弹。

Exhibit 8, Goudsmit's editorial, is just a genera1ized appeal against secrecy. From the standpoint of an editor of a physics journal this is understandable, but this is hardly a criterion which can be used for declassification.

You mention in your letter that declassification of the presently "Classified Targets" in laser fusion might help the development of laser fusion. I believe that the groups working on laser fusion at Livermore and Los Alamos are very strong and surely can accomplish the goal if this is technically feasible. I do not believe they need help from people outside the classified community. It has bothered me for a long time that the classified targets use similar principles as the H�bomb, and I therefore have never liked the idea of using a laser fusion power plant in a public utility. This clearly is a point which is far down the road, but I don t think declassification of more of laser fusion is necessary or justified at this point.

一个说服我的论点是，我们应该继续保留H-Bomb Secret的原则是法国人花了很长时间才能进入H炸弹。他们在1958年爆炸了第一枚原子弹，但要进行热核测试已经十年了。尽管他们强烈希望发展H炸弹，并且尽管法国核科学家具有明显的能力，但这还是确实如此。

Clearly some very sophisticated countries, like West Germany and Japan, working on laser fusion, may well get the H-bomb principle. But these two countries have clearly decided not to develop A-bombs, let alone H-bombs. What I am afraid of is the second tier of industrial countries which have not signed the non-proliferation treaty, especially South Africa and Argentina, somewhat less India and Brazil. These countries have competent scientists and some industrial base. But their scientists may not be quite good enough to get the main idea on their own. Serving them this idea on a platter, as the Morland article does, seems to me a very damaging act. It is true that these countries (except India) do not yet have A-bombs, but it is clearly in their capacity to get them. Seeing an easy road to H-bombs can only stimulate them more on to the road to A- and then H-bombs. H-bombs, by their smaller weight for a given yield, will be easier to deliver than A-bombs.

在阅读了莫兰（Morland）的文章和他向法院的宣誓书中，我无法将他的动机解释为除了对美国出版物的恶意之外，我无法看到我能看到的有用目的。他声称，来自其他国家 /地区的间谍可以发现与他发现的那样，我会不同意：遵循我们非常奇怪的开放定律，莫兰德可以使用许多敏感的装置。这种访问显然不会给予南非或阿根廷的公民。

HAB:vhr
CC：D。C. Sewell博士

信＃4

May 1, 1979

Dear Professor Bethe:

感谢您的4月17日的来信（未分类），以及您对4月23日（分类）提出的观点的周到且详细的批评，并在4月3日给您的信中包含了展览。有机会阅读参考文献4（COK-7 7-160。我保证，塞维尔先生在DOE总部将提供此文件的副本（如我4月3日的信中所述），但不幸的是不是。

显然，我们不同意许多要点，但我相信这种分歧的来源很容易确定。

关于发表文章的内容（图1,2,3,5,8）没有分歧，当我的信中伴随着我的信时，伴随着我的信。这些文件不言而喻。

出现了分歧，即将这些文件集中在一个地方的可能性中。至于如果要整体考虑他们可能会从他们那里推论的内容。当然，这取决于进行收集和推断的人的本质。只有在我们同意我将称之为H-Bomb研究小组X（HSX）的可能性之后，我们才能就这些文件的重要性达成共识。

I believe we must assume that a foreign government seriously interested in informing itself about H-bombs would establish a competent HSX for this purpose that would include physicists experienced in hydrodynamics, nuclear physics, and astrophysics. The services of capable scientists with these skills are both available*和便宜。这样的HSX肯定会对惯性限制融合（ICF）文献进行彻底，系统的，可能是计算机化的搜索。并不是要忽略与核武器有着密切关系的信息来源，并且与HSX的假定能力不一致。

发布的文章whi的概率ch I have drawn your attention would escape such a systematic literature search is nil, in my opinion. Not only would these articles be discovered but they would excite exceptional interest, since they disclose material stated to be classified.

在我看来，当并排放置时仔细分析这些物品的内容时，HSX正确构成上面概述的构成的可能性也不会推断出H-Bomb秘密。这两个无效概率陈述是我“无秘密”论文的基础。

On the other hand, remarks contained in your detailed critique of April 23 suggest that you envisage an HSX as consisting either of creative scientists who will fail to read the relevant material in the ICF literature, or of (presumably) uncreative weapons scientists who would not be sufficiently astute to see the significance of this material even if they did read it. This is where we disagree.

如果我们假设H-Bomb的秘密至关重要，那么Brown，Schlesinger和Vance的宣誓誓章中所述，我们不能同时假设在Hanphazard中将解决至关重要的问题。以及像您似乎建议的那样的X国家的业余风度。要使用当前的成语，“一个人不能双向拥有”。

可能会说，即使H-Bomb的秘密确实可以由有能力的HSX推论，我认为这是Morland文章的出版，也会鼓励各国对H炸弹产生兴趣这样做。这个论点可能有一些优点，没有政府如此迅速地通过未分类的宣誓书（例如罗森格伦）来验证莫兰的文章内容。实际上，世界已被广泛通知世界，只有一个拥有经济学本科学位的人发现了H-Bomb Secret。这似乎为任何尚未知道建立HSX并自己找到秘密的国家提供了充分的鼓励。

有关特定展览的其他评论：

我被告知，Doe的Rosengren博士和William Grayson博士已提交了一份宣誓书，试图反驳我对原始Rosengren宣誓书的批评，我将等到我有机会阅读他们的反驳之前，然后再提供更详细的评论来提供更详细的评论您在这方面。在那个tine上，我将回答您的信中提出的其他点，这些积分无法在这样的信中讨论。

REK：NLW

信＃5

May 14, 1979

亲爱的基德博士：

感谢您的5月1日来信，我从长时间的缺席中返回后才收到。

我认为您已经正确地确定了我们分歧的根源，即是独立考虑或集中在一起的发表文章。

It is likely that some foreign governments interested in informing themselves of H-bombs would establish a competent HSX. I also agree with your footnote that we only consider those nations X that have the scientific expertise and technology to successfully design and construct a fission bomb.

However, not every nation competent to do so would be seriously interested in informing itself about H-bombs. As you yourself say, on page 2 of your letter, "It might be argued .... that the publication of the Morland article will encourage nations to take an interest in H-bombs that might not otherwise do so." I would go even farther and say that if these governments conclude that H-bombs are feasible for them they might even change their attitude toward nuclear weapons altogether: If they had previously decided not to build nuclear weapons at all, the possibility of going all the way to the H-bomb with its easier deliverability might induce them to go on the path toward nuclear weapons.

您是正确的，即使文章从未发表过，也吸引了Morland文章本身的关注，这是一个激励任何国家来查看H炸弹的可能性的动机。但是我们的政府应该做什么？它是否应该只是允许出版任何主要军事秘密，因为担心引起对这些文章的关注会加剧局势？这确实会造成一个无法忍受的情况，并要求法律的一些改变，以使像Morland这样的人更加困难地“发现”秘密信息。

关于参考文献4，我相信亚瑟·托马斯（Arthur D. Thomas）给约翰·格里芬（John A. Griffin）的信与其他文件一起发送给了我。但是，我没有办法说这是参考。但是在我看来，这是泄漏缓慢而不是爆发的本质，就像《莫兰》的文章所构成的那样。

Concerning a classified letter to me, I have no plans at present to go to Washington or to Los Alamos. However, I am planning to go to Seattle, Washington. Probably there is no classified mailing address there either, but I shall also go to Hanford, and I am sure there must be a classified address there.

您的信件已经大大阐明了您的观点。如果不是法律程序，我们甚至可能最终就中间立即达成协议。但是关于诉讼，我应该很高兴，如果您可以将我的信的副本发送给4月23日的详细批评给锡尼金，安德森和芒森的芒森先生，因为他在5月9日的信中要求我。

HAB:vhr
外壳

信＃6

June 8, 1979

Dear Professor Bethe:

Thank you for your letter of May 14. I apologize for not being able to answer it more promptly.

您在信中提出了两个要点，我想发表评论。首先是“如果这些政府得出结论，H炸弹对他们来说是可行的，他们甚至可能会完全改变对核武器的态度：... ...”我同意您的结论是从您的前提中遵循的，但对我来说尚不清楚政府对H炸弹可行性的看法将因其对Morland文章的了解而发生重大改变。

为了获得可靠的H炸弹能力，政府必须面对进行不可预测的核试验的必要性，其中包括至少一个高收率。这一要求与获得裂变炸弹能力的获取重要不同，因为单一的低收益测试（甚至没有）可能就足够了。这样的扩展的多拍测试系列可能会对有关的政府造成灾难性的后果，从世界意见，政治和经济制裁，甚至是军事行动方面。

沉思这些可能的后果将有力地表明，炸弹比炸弹（或没有炸弹）的优势可能不值得必须采取的风险才能获得它们。在我看来，这些政治考虑对于任何H炸弹决定都比Morland文章中包含的信息更为重要，尤其是因为不能认为这些信息是可靠的。

您的第二点是问题：“（我们的政府）应该只允许出版任何主要的军事秘密，因为担心提请注意这些文章会加剧局势吗？”当然不是，如果它们可以被证明是“主要”和“秘密”。但是，在渐进式的情况下，鉴于现有的已发表文献，所讨论的秘密似乎可能无法达到构成秘密的普遍标准。如果政府因此失去案件，那么显然最好允许出版而无需发表评论。

我推迟了发送给您的关于您4月23日的信的分类评论，因为我担心我错过了在汉福德拦截您的机会。这些评论是简短的，对于我们的观点交换而言并不重要。但是，如果您可以再次向我提供合适的地址，以及您打算在那里的日期，我将尝试将它们发送给您。

REK：NLW

信＃7

1979年6月14日

亲爱的基德博士：

感谢您在6月8日的信中。您的论点非常掌握了实现H炸弹能力需要的很多事情。但是，我相信深入防御，并希望保留第一道防线，即该原则的保密，只要这是可行的。

My visit to the Hanford area is still in the future; it will be between July 10 and August 15. I shall be in Seattle for approximately this time, and I shall probably visit the Hanford area at least twice during this period.

我仍然对您的分类言论感兴趣。如果您将它们发送到汉福德，请指出在汉福德的哪里，我可以看它们。对我来说最方便的是巴特尔·西雅图研究中心，但这可能没有足够的清除存储库。就我个人而言，我将与我想没有资格的埃克森核能合作。

HAB:vhr

信＃8

1979年7月20日

Professor Hans A. Bethe
Battelle Seattle Research Center
4000 NE 41街
Seattle, Washington 98105

Dear Professor Bethe:

This note is to inform you that my classified comments concerning your letter of April 23 will be available for you to read at the office of

The documents will be available on August 20, the expected date of your visit to Richland, but will also be available during the previous week of August 13-17 in case you decide to move your visit forward, a possibility you mentioned in our telephone conversation of July 20.

根据您的要求，我的评论将包含参考4。

REK：NLW
CC：Kenneth E. Sebrell

信＃9
[注意：机密秘密，2001年5月1日解密]

劳伦斯·利弗莫尔实验室
COT-79-26
July 25, 1979

Professor Hans A. Bethe
c/o Mr. Kenneth Jackson
保障和安全总监
美国能源部
Richland Operations Office
P.O.方框550
Richland, Washington 99352

Dear Professor Bethe:

在您的4月23日的分类信中，我无法在5月1日和6月8日的未分类信中发表评论。我现在将纠正该遗漏。

With reference to Exhibit 5, the Encyclopedia Americana article on the H-bomb, you state that it "is entirely clean as far as I can tell". I agree that the text is entirely clean but the figures are not. They are properly classified (SRD) according to paragraph 413 of Joint AEC/DoD Nuclear Weapons Classification Guide CG-W-4 which states that

关于图表3，《科学》文章，您正确地指出，本文“不谈论X射线内爆。但是，它确实在8月20日的《苏维埃物理学期刊》中准确地引用了Rudakov论文。描述了X射线内爆（Jetp Letters 24，182，1976，附加了副本），因此将读者引导到此明确的来源。

最后,您指的是“很长一段时间took the French to get to an H-Bomb". This fact by itself does not prove that the long delay was due to ignorance of the radiation implosion concept. Many other diverse factors, technological, scientific, and possibly political, may have contributed to the delay. In any event, the French did not have the benefit of the Rudakov disclosure and the publicity that accompanied it, so that their experience is of limited applicability to the present situation.

Reference List:

1.从壳压缩的等离子体的热核中无体屈服，

2. COK-77-L60。1977年11月2日，亚瑟·托马斯（Arthur D. Thomas）致约翰·格里芬（John A.Note: This is the same as Exhibit #4, attached to Letter #1]

信＃10

(注意：在1979年7月25日之后不久，它的文件背面上的一张未注明日期的手写笔记。它指的是基德（Kidder）信函中提到的三个项目：即法国H-Bomb计划和展览3和5信函＃1。基德认为，贝特在这里说的是图3，关于惯性限制融合研究的辐射内爆的讨论，以及图5，《美国百科全书》中的H炸弹图实际上确实将H-Bomb Secret放置在公共场所在进行进步案件之前的几年。)

亲爱的基德博士：

Thanks a lot for the interesting documents. I still disagree with your assessment of the French. On exhibits 3 and 5, you are right.