More From FAS: Highlights and Achievements Throughout Recent Months

FLAWED PENTAGON NUCLEAR CRUISE MISSILE ADVOCACY – JUNE 10, 2016

In its quest to secure Congressional approval for a new nuclear cruise missile, the Pentagon is putting words in the mouth of President Barack Obama and spinning and overstating requirements and virtues of the weapon. Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project, discusses these false claims and the potential ramifications they could have for the LRSO program. The full post can be viewed here:/blogs/security/2016/05/hiroshima-stockpile/.

US NUCLEAR STOCKPILE NUMBERS PUBLISHED ENROUTE TO HIROSHIMA – MAY 26, 2016

In the wake of President Barack Obama’s historic visit to Hiroshima, the first of two Japanese cities destroyed by U.S. nuclear bombs in 1945, the Pentagon has declassified and published updated numbers for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and warhead dismantlements. Kristensen analyzes this data and discusses what it could mean for the Obama administration’s nuclear legacy and the arms control community as a whole, here:
/blogs/security/2016/05/hiroshima-stockpile/.

USING SOCIAL MEDIA IN BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS – MAY 13, 2016

一个国家Int总监签署的指令elligence formally authorizes the use of social media by official investigators who are conducting background investigations for security clearances. The directive was crafted to avoid undue infringements on privacy. Investigators will be limited to considering only publicly available postings. The subjects of a background investigation “shall not be requested or required” to provide passwords for access to non-publicly available materials or to make such materials available; agencies will not be allowed to “friend” an individual for the purposes of gaining access to materials that are not otherwise available; and the consideration of social media must be relevant to the official guidelines for granting access to classified information – that is, they must pertain to substance abuse, criminal conduct, foreign allegiance, or other such criteria. Read Aftergood’s analysis in full here:/blogs/secrecy/2016/05/social-media/.

THE DEBATE ON COMMERCIAL DELIVERY DRONES – MAY 10, 2016

The growing prospect of the use of drones for commercial delivery purposes is considered in a new memorandum from the Congressional Research Service. “Can you prevent a drone from flying over your house to deliver a package to your neighbor? Until now, that question has been of purely theoretical interest. However, the Senate recently passed a bill that could significantly change the operational landscape for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS or drones) and make these kinds of hypothetical delivery drones a reality,” the CRS memo begins. Read Aftergood’s take on the debate here:/blogs/secrecy/2016/05/delivery-drones-crs/.

BOOK SYNOPSIS AND AUTHOR SPOTLIGHT: DAVID HAFEMEISTER – MAY 25, 2016

FAS Visiting Scientist, Dr. David Hafemeister, has just released his new book,Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism in the Post-9/11 World(施普林格2016),一个独特的教科书为联合国dergraduate courses on nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapon issues and policy. Read a synopsis of the book, plus an exclusive interview with the author here://www.tuuruguay.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/booksynopsisinterviewdh_final.pdf.

PUNISHING LEAKS THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE CHANNELS – MAY 3, 2016

The Obama Administration has famously prosecuted more individuals for unauthorized disclosures of classified information to the media than all of its predecessors combined. But behind the scenes, it appears to have sought administrative penalties for leaks — rather than criminal ones — with equal or greater vigor. “This Administration has been historically active in pursuing prosecution of leakers, and the Intelligence Community fully supports this effort,” said ODNI General Counsel Robert S. Litt in testimony from a closed hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee in 2012 that was released last week in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. But, he said, “prosecution of unauthorized disclosure cases is often beset with complications, including difficult problems of identifying the leaker, the potential for confirming or revealing even more classified information in a public trial, and graymail by the defense.” Read Aftergood’s analysis in full here:/blogs/secrecy/2016/05/administrative-penalties/.

OP-ED: “CHERNOBYL AFTER 30: THE VESUVIUS OF OUR TIME” – APRIL 26, 2016

In light of the 30th Anniversary of the cataclysmic accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, Edward Friedman, Professor Emeritus of Technology Management at Stevens Institute of Technology, takes the opportunity to explore the meaningful lessons learned from that pivotal day in history. Read the full article here:/oped/chernobyl-after-30/.

EVENT: “30 YEARS AFTER THE ACCIDENT: THE MEANING OF CHERNOBYL TODAY?” – APRIL 26, 2016

Leading experts came together to discuss Chernobyl on the eve of its 30th anniversary, the lessons learned, and possible implications that this fateful event has for the nuclear industry today. This special event was convened by the Federation of American Scientists. Speaker presentations and a full recording of the event are available here:/event/chernobyl-30-year-anniversary-event/.

OP-ED: “WHAT HAPPENED AT CHERNOBYL 30 YEARS AGO?” – APRIL 20, 2016

In this op-ed, Tara Drozdenko, Managing Director for Nuclear Policy and Nonproliferation at the Outrider Foundation, examines the science behind the catastrophic accident that occurred on April 26, 1986 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Pripyat, Ukraine, and discusses the lessons learned from that fateful day. Read the full piece here:/oped/what-happened-at-chernobyl-30-years-ago/.

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES, 2016 – APRIL 18, 2016

In the latest FAS Nuclear Notebook published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Norris and Kristensen take the pulse on Russia’s nuclear arsenal, reviewing its strategic modernization programs and the status of its non-strategic nuclear forces. Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces are currently the subject of much interest in NATO due to concerns that Russian military strategy has been lowering the threshold for when nuclear weapons could potentially be used. Russia has also been increasing operations and exercises with nuclear-capable forces, a trend that can also be seen in NATO and U.S. military posturing. The complete report can be viewed here:/blogs/security/2016/04/russian-nuclear-forces-2016/.